As has been seen, the Ottoman Empire began to decay from the top. The Sultan finally became the mere figurehead of palace intrigues, and the effect of the rottenness in the supreme head of a centralized military despotism was widespread. Taxation became extravagantly burdensome; the royal domains were alienated, the coinage was debased, offices were sold to the highest bidder, and this general venality caused the disappearance of the military fiefs from which the armies of the empire had been recruited.

The Janitschars lost their characteristic qualities as warriors when the custom of recruiting them from the Christian population was abandoned. They finally degenerated into a mere rabble of turbulent blackguards, composed of the worst elements of all nationalities, Christian and Moslem, who disappeared from the ranks during a war, or fled from the battlefield and lived normally by blackmail or by illicit trading. The abandonment of this living tithe was due probably to the jealousy of the Moslem families, who objected to the monopolizing by men of Christian birth of the lucrative privileges attached to an élite corps. The last time the tithe was collected was in 1676, when 3000 youths were brought in as recruits. With the abolition of the Janitschars dates the rise of the bands of brigands among both the Slavic and Hellenic populations. The able-bodied members of the conquered races found in this sphere of activity a chance for developing their capacities in guerrilla warfare; with the training and traditions so acquired they were able in later years to act as the leaders in the national movements which, during the course of the nineteenth century, ended in the dismemberment of the Ottoman provinces in Europe.

SPANISH CONQUERORS

I
THE SPANIARD AND THE NEW WORLD

In the century which followed the discovery of America, not only was the lead in initiative taken by Spain never lost, but she practically had no competitors in the conquest and colonization of the New World. If the lines of medieval enterprise had been followed in the opening up of new territories for economic development, it should have fallen either to Venice or to Genoa to undertake the work of exploration and exploitation of these unknown regions. But times had changed, and the Italian republics had changed with them. Under the stress of the Turkish conquests, which had led to the organization of a great military and naval power in the East, Venice could follow nothing but a policy of self-protection that admitted neither of expansion nor of adventure. Internal changes in the Italian peninsula, indicated by the overlordship of Milan, had reduced the power of Genoa, which had already been weakened by her long contest with Venice for the naval mastery of the Mediterranean.

The rise of Spain was phenomenal; nothing exactly resembling it had been seen before, except in the case of those great tribal or national invasions that so often altered the face of Europe. For centuries, like Italy before the advent of Italian unity, Spain was only a geographical expression. Only fourteen years before Columbus’ first voyage, the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile had consolidated the royal power on the Iberian peninsula and made these two Spanish monarchs lords of the whole land south of the Pyrenees, except in the kingdoms of Granada in the south, of Portugal in the west, and of Navarre in the north. A steady policy of aggression and conquest soon brought about the disappearance of the small kingdom of Granada. Between 1486 and 1489 Loja, Malaga, and Baza had been taken; Granada alone held out a few years more. Ferdinand, a most astute monarch of the type of Louis XI of France and Henry VII of England, had already crushed the Portuguese faction in Castile, who had favored the alliance of their queen with the King of Portugal. His ideals were for an absolute monarchy, which, by the elimination of feudal traditions and by the accumulation of wealth, might become the predominant power in western Europe.

There was no reason for Spain to become a colonizing power in the modern sense, since the peninsula was a sparsely populated country, large tracts of land having been opened up for occupation by the Christian conquests of Moorish territory. In preceding centuries, when the Christian princes began to win back, piece by piece, the lands belonging to the Moslems, a conciliatory policy had been adopted towards the conquered race; the Moors had kept their personal liberties and had been encouraged to group themselves in autonomous communities in the suburbs of Christian cities. Even when Granada was taken, favorable terms were given to its inhabitants, although in the end the promises were broken. They were conceded liberty of person, trade, education, and worship, the protection of Mohammedan law, administered by Mohammedan judges, and the benefit of mixed tribunals. But here and elsewhere Ferdinand’s methods were a consistent application of the principles of an autocrat, and, when the New World fell as a prize to the Spanish conquerors, the usages of expansion by conquest at home in the Iberian peninsula were mercilessly applied. When Malaga was taken, the captive inhabitants were sold as slaves; one-third of the proceeds of the sale was taken for the redemption of Christian captives in Africa; another was given to those who had served in the army of occupation either as mercenaries or as officials, and the remaining portion was paid into the royal treasury. As to the land, it was laid out for a colony. The large tracts opened to colonization were offered on easy conditions to the Christian inhabitants of Spain.

It was not land hunger, therefore, which prompted the Spanish monarchs to accept Columbus’ scheme of a westward route to the rich empires of the Orient. Profit-bringing trade by which stores of specie could be accumulated attracted the founders of Spanish absolutism. The project itself was not viewed with skepticism; its scientific basis was cogent; there were besides widely circulated stories of land existing in the West. But the one practical difficulty in the way of fitting out the proposed expedition was the war with the Moors of Granada, by which the Spanish treasury had been exhausted. After the city fell in January, 1492, several months were spent in haggling over terms. Columbus had made up his mind that if the voyage were sucessful he should be adequately rewarded for his trouble. Apart from conditions as to offices and the administration of the newly acquired possessions, it was agreed that he was to receive one clear tenth of all merchandise, whether gold, silver, pearls, spices, or whatsoever else was gained or gotten for the crown in his new jurisdiction. Moreover, there was a further clause inserted that in case Columbus should choose to contribute to the equipment of vessels employed in the new trade to the extent of one-eighth, he was to be at liberty to do so, thereby entitling himself to one-eighth part of the profits.

The prospects of a great trading adventure seemed altogether alluring. It must be remembered that the discoverer carried with him a letter from the Catholic monarchs to the Grand Khan of Tartary; and that it was this opening up of a direct trade route, with enormous possibilities for commercial profit, that inspired the Spanish conquest of America. Even after the configuration of the new continent had been made out by later voyagers, the fascination of establishing a connection with the Orient remained a strong inducement. Then as it faded away as an immediate possibility, the opportunity of securing large hoards of the precious metals stimulated discovery and exploration. The lust of territorial conquest remained associated with the lust of gold. The Spanish adventurer had no ideal aims; he was not attracted by the American continent because it offered a new home or because it presented a chance for trying political experiments. There was the same single-mindedness in the conquistador ideal as is seen to-day in the trust magnate who is searching for oil wells. The sordid aims called forth by the success of Columbus’ expedition were not developed by the contest with the natives occupying the lands whose possession was coveted.

When the Spanish conquerors arrived in those unknown islands of the western sea the American continent was held by a number of the Turanian races which had one time peopled most of the Old World. Only a few relics of their predominance are seen in the Europe of to-day in the Basques, the Finns, and the Esthonians. Long before historical times the process of uniting Asia and Europe with America had begun. Probably thousands of years before the rise of Caucasian civilization along the Nile and the Euphrates, Turanian hordes found their way across the Behring Straits. Little capacity for attaining the arts of civilized life was shown by the American Turanians; there were, it is true, differences in social organization, but the general level of civilization was not far above the savage type, even in the Valley of Mexico or in Quito and Cuzco in South America.