Lord Salisbury himself was far-sighted, but not sanguine. He was doubtful of a Whig coalition:—
It was said of the Peelites of 1850 [he wrote on March 16] that they were always putting themselves up to auction and always buying themselves in. That seems to me the Whig idea at present. I do not think it is necessary to make any more advances to them. The next steps must come from them.
I have great doubts about your being the impediment. I observe that Hartington, whenever he has the chance, dwells with so much conviction upon my ‘rashness, &c.,’ that I suspect I am more the difficulty than you. I believe the G.O.M., if he were driven to so frightful a dilemma, would rather work with me than with you; but that with Hartington it is the reverse.
And a fortnight later:—
It does not seem to me possible that we should attempt to govern by a majority of which Hartington, Trevelyan and Chamberlain will be important parts. On the other hand, a dissolution by us, as a ‘Government of Caretakers,’ would be hazardous. It would give both the Chamberlain and Hartington sections an opportunity of wooing back their old supporters by abusing us on some point or other that is sure to arise and so escaping from the necessity of fighting the election campaign mainly on Home Rule. It would be much better for us that the dissolution should take place with Gladstone in power, and upon the Home Rule question. It will then be impossible for the three sections of Liberals to coalesce against us, and the moderate men will be compelled to give us (at the election) some friendly guarantees. But Gladstone may, if he is beaten, decline either to dissolve or to go on. I see no hope of good Parliamentary government in England unless the right wing of the Liberals can be fused with the Tories on some basis which shall represent the average opinion of the whole mass. But I see little hope of it. The tendency to grouping, caused mainly by the exigencies of various cliques of supporters, is becoming irresistible.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I doubt any popular stirring on this question. The instinctive feeling of an Englishman is to wish to get rid of an Irishman. We may gain as many votes as Parnell takes from us; I doubt more. Where we shall gain is in splitting up our opponents.
But in the last week of March the situation cleared and hardened. Descriptions more or less accurate and detailed of the Home Rule Bill and its companion measure had leaked out. The division in the Cabinet became open. Mr. Chamberlain and Mr. Trevelyan had, it now appears, already wished to resign on the 16th. Mr. Gladstone persuaded them to remain, at any rate until the Irish proposals could be presented to his colleagues in a concrete form. On the 26th the Prime Minister faced his powerful lieutenant for the last time across the Cabinet table. The differences of opinion and mood were not to be reconciled or covered by verbal concessions, however ingenious. Even with goodwill on both sides they could not honestly have come to an agreement. And by this time personal goodwill had ceased to be the determining factor in the decisions of either. The resignations were announced forthwith. Persons were found, as is usual in such circumstances, to occupy rather than to fill their places. Together, in the ensuing five years, Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Chamberlain could have carried almost any measure of Liberal or Radical reform upon which they were resolved. The champion of Tory Democracy, the cautious leader of the Whigs, the astute Conservative general, would have resisted them in vain. But the separation proved as lasting as it was complete and the war declared upon March 26, 1886, did not cease until after Mr. Gladstone had finally retired from the political arena.
Ever since their reconciliation after the Aston Riots, Lord Randolph Churchill and Mr. Chamberlain had been good friends. The Radical leader had been the first to offer his congratulations upon the defeat of ‘the old gang’ in June 1885. He had discountenanced the opposition to Lord Randolph’s re-election on taking office, and had been displeased that a contrary action should have been attributed to him. The bickerings and wranglings of the General Election in Birmingham had left their personal relations quite unaffected. They had fought with fairness, and even with courtesy in public speech, and without rancour of any kind. The friendship that existed between them was now to have an important bearing upon the course of events.
In various ways Lord Randolph Churchill was the only prominent man in the Conservative ranks with whom Mr. Chamberlain could easily deal. Lord Salisbury represented opposite ideas, and his antagonism had been so recent and marked that direct association was impossible, even in this great crisis. But Lord Randolph had been so roundly charged, both by his Conservative comrades and his regular opponents, with being ‘a Radical in disguise,’ and was, in fact, so far advanced on many questions, that Mr. Chamberlain could consort with him without embarrassment or flagrant incongruity. Lord Randolph therefore became a natural and indispensable link. The force of political circumstances was strengthened by personal predilection. Both men liked each other’s company. Their moods and ways of looking at things—to some extent their methods—were not altogether dissimilar. Both were popular leaders drawing their strength from democracy. Both were bold, determined, outspoken and impulsive by nature. Both had been joined to their orthodox party colleagues by slender and uncertain bonds. So long as Chamberlain was a Minister, their communications were necessarily restricted; but as soon as he had resigned, he was free, and the two came together in close and cordial co-operation.