‘Situation at Antwerp is very grave, and French Government will fully realise the serious effect on the campaign that would be entailed by its loss.
‘Unless the main situation in France can be decided favourably in a short time, which would enable us to relieve Antwerp by detaching a proper force, it is most desirable that General Joffre should make an effort and send regular troops to region of Dunkirk, from which post they could operate in conjunction with our reinforcements to relieve Antwerp.
‘We can send some first-line troops, but not sufficient by themselves to raise the siege of Antwerp, and we cannot send them to co-operate with any but French regulars.
‘If General Joffre can bring about a decisively favourable action in France in two or three days the relief of Antwerp may be made the outcome of that, but if not, unless he now sends some regular troops the loss of Antwerp must be contemplated.’
All he was able to send to Antwerp was the following:—
‘Be very careful not to raise hopes of British and French forces arriving quickly to relieve Antwerp. The matter has not been decided, as the Territorial division offered by France in ten days’ time would, in my opinion, be quite incapable of doing anything towards changing the situation at Antwerp. I have represented this. Unless a change is made, I consider it would be useless to put in our little force against the very superior German forces in the field round Antwerp.’
He then entered in some detail upon the few guns he was sending, giving particular directions about the use of the two 9·2’s.
Up to this point I had not been brought into the affair in any way. I read, of course, all the telegrams almost as soon as they were received or dispatched by Lord Kitchener, and followed the situation constantly. I warmly approved the efforts which Lord Kitchener was making to provide or obtain succour for Antwerp, and I shared to the full his anxieties. I saw him every day. But I had no personal responsibility, nor was I directly concerned. My impression at this time was that the situation at Antwerp was serious but not immediately critical; that the place would certainly hold out for a fortnight more; and that meanwhile Lord Kitchener’s exertions or the influence of the main battle in France would bring relief. So much was this the case that I proposed to be absent from the Admiralty for about eighteen hours on the 2nd–3rd October.
I had planned to visit Dunkirk on October 3 on business connected with the Marine Brigade and other details sent there at General Joffre’s request. At 11 o’clock on the night of the 2nd I was some twenty miles out of London on my way to Dover when the special train in which I was travelling suddenly stopped, and without explanation returned to Victoria Station. I was told on arrival I was to go immediately to Lord Kitchener’s house in Carlton Gardens. Here I found shortly before midnight besides Lord Kitchener, Sir Edward Grey, the First Sea Lord, and Sir William Tyrrell of the Foreign Office. They showed me the following telegram from our Minister, Sir Frederick Villiers, sent from Antwerp at 8.20 p.m. and received in London at 10 p.m. on October 2:—
The Government have decided to leave to-morrow for Ostend, acting on advice unanimously given by Superior Council of War in presence of the King. The King with field army will withdraw, commencing with advanced guard to-morrow in the direction of Ghent to protect coast-line, and eventually it is hoped to co-operate with the Allied armies. The Queen will also leave.