It is said that town will hold out for five or six days, but it seems most unlikely that when the Court and Government are gone resistance will be so much prolonged.
Decision taken very suddenly this afternoon is result of increasingly critical situation. I have seen both Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who maintain that no other course was possible, in view of danger that the King’s Government and field army will be caught here.
I saw that my colleagues had received this news, which they had already been discussing for half an hour, with consternation. The rapidity with which the situation had degenerated was utterly unexpected. That the great fortress and city of Antwerp with its triple line of forts and inundations, defended by the whole Belgian Field Army (a force certainly equal in numbers to all the German troops in that neighbourhood), should collapse in perhaps forty-eight hours seemed to all of us not only terrible but incomprehensible. That this should happen while preparations were in progress both in France and England for the relief or succour of the city, while considerable forces of fresh and good troops undoubtedly stood available on both sides of the Channel, and before General Joffre had even been able to reply to Lord Kitchener’s telegram, was too hard to bear. We looked at each other in bewilderment and distress. What could have happened in the last few hours to make the Belgians despair? Our last telegram from Colonel Dallas, received that afternoon, had said: ‘Situation unchanged during night and Germans have not made further progress. Great slaughter of Germans reported and corresponding encouragement to Belgians, who are about to undertake counter-attack in neighbourhood of Fort Ste. Catherine.’ And now a message at 10 p.m. announced immediate evacuation and impending fall!
Those who in years to come look back upon the first convulsions of this frightful epoch will find it easy with after knowledge and garnered experience to pass sagacious judgments on all that was done or left undone. There is always a strong case for doing nothing, especially for doing nothing yourself. But to the small group of Ministers who met that midnight in Lord Kitchener’s house, the duty of making sure that Antwerp was not cast away without good cause while the means of saving it might well be at hand was clear. I urged strongly that we should not give in without a struggle: and we decided unitedly upon the following telegram to Sir F. Villiers:—
October 3, 1914, 12.45 a.m.
The importance of Antwerp being held justifies a further effort till the course of the main battle in France is determined. We are trying to send you help from the main army, and, if this were possible, would add reinforcements from here. Meanwhile a brigade of Marines will reach you to-morrow to sustain the defence. We urge you to make one further struggle to hold out. Even a few days may make the difference. We hope Government will find it possible to remain and field army to continue operations.
On the other hand, the danger of urging the Belgian Government to hold out against their considered judgment without a full knowledge of the local situation was present in every mind, and even if the forces for the relieving army were to come into view, there was much to be arranged and decided before precise dates and definite assurances could be given. We were confronted with the hard choice of having either to take decisions of far-reaching importance in the utmost haste and with imperfect information, or on the other hand tamely to let Antwerp fall.
In these circumstances, it was a natural decision that some one in authority who knew the general situation should travel swiftly into the city and there ascertain what could be done on either side. As I was already due at Dunkirk the next morning, the task was confided to me: Lord Kitchener expressed a decided wish that I should go; the First Sea Lord consented to accept sole responsibility in my absence. It was then about half-past one in the morning. I went at once to Victoria Station, got into my train which was waiting, and started again for Dover. A few minutes before I left, Lord Kitchener received the answer to his telegram of the 2nd from the British Ambassador in Bordeaux. Sir Francis Bertie said that before he could carry out the instructions sent him about Antwerp, he had received a letter from the French Foreign Minister stating that with the shortest delay possible two Territorial Divisions, complete with artillery and cavalry, would be sent to Ostend for the relief of the fortress. This was to be without prejudice to what the French Government expected to do very soon in respect of ‘a contemplated combined movement, French, British and Belgian, on the extreme left of General Joffre’s armies which indirectly would have the effect of causing German troops in the neighbourhood of Antwerp to retreat, and so effect its relief.’ The French Government, he said, could not go back on their decision to employ Territorials. The French Foreign Minister declared that the Territorials were good troops, better in some respects than some of the Regulars, and that they were sending two divisions complete, with artillery and cavalry, instead of one. Sir Francis Bertie added that the French Government had received reports from its Attaché in Antwerp stating that ‘though the military situation there was not good, it could not be regarded as really bad. The Germans had suffered severe losses in the attacks which they had made on some of the outer works. Those attacks had not been simultaneous, which fact indicated that the Germans were not in great force, had only a limited siege train and not more than two army corps before Antwerp.’
Meanwhile a telegram was also sent (1.15 a.m. October 3) by Sir Edward Grey to the Belgian Government saying that I would arrive on the morning of the 3rd.
‘It is hoped that the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is fully acquainted with our views, may have the honour of an audience with the King before a final decision as to the departure of the Government is taken.’