The World Crisis, Volume 1 (of 6)

by Winston Churchill

October 8, 1914.

I am in full agreement with your letter. No change in principle is required in the naval policy to which we have steadily adhered since 1911. The main point is to secure the safety of the British Fleet during the long and indefinite period of waiting for a general action. The phase in which raids up to 10,000 or 20,000 men were dangerous or would have had an object has passed. A very considerable, though no doubt incomplete, watch over the Heligoland debouches is being maintained by our oversea submarines. It is not necessary, as manœuvre experience had suggested, to traverse the waters of the North Sea with the Battle Fleet with any degree of frequency. Such movements should only be undertaken for some definite, grave and primary purpose. Occasional sweeps by cruisers in different directions, and avoiding anything like routine patrolling, are all that is necessary in present circumstances. In order to secure the greatest amount of rest and security for the Fleet, and the maintenance of the highest efficiency both of the steaming and fighting of its ships, you are justified in using occasional anchorages even more remote than Scapa and Loch Ewe; but on this you should make proposals officially. You need not fear that by these withdrawals you will miss a chance of bringing the German Battle Fleet to action. If that ever comes out it will be with some definite tactical object—for instance, to cover the landing of an invading force, to break the line of blockade to the northward in order to let loose battle-cruisers on to the trade routes, or simply for the purpose of obtaining a naval decision by fighting a battle. In the first two of these cases you would have the time to come round and meet or intercept them before their operation was completed; in the third instance, their wishes would be the same as yours.

The Committee of Imperial Defence have again considered the question of invasion in the light of the experience of the first two months of the war. The War Office have pointed out that although no troops can be spared by Germany in the present active state of the land war on all frontiers, it is possible that in the winter a deadlock may arise in both the Eastern and Western theatres, when the Germans might find it possible or useful to create a diversion by attempting to throw a regular invading army across the North Sea. In the Admiralty opinion the difficulties of such a task have been in no wise diminished by anything we have learnt since the war began. We think it is useless to discuss such matters in general terms, and we are sure that a detailed study of a concrete plan of landing, say, 150,000 men will prove fatal to such ideas. In this connection it must be remembered that the war has shown the absolute reliance of the Germans upon their artillery, without which they would cease to be formidable. The landing of great quantities of artillery and the maintenance of an ammunition supply, are operations which, even if every other part of the enemy’s plan had succeeded, could not be maintained without giving ample time for the intervention of your Fleet in decisive force. Further, if the Germans could spare 150,000 of their best troops for the invasion of England during a deadlock, a similar number would be released from our side, and it is obvious that even pushing this argument to its most extreme conclusion, we could transport our men back across the Channel with the command of the sea much more swiftly and surely than the Germans could bring theirs across the much wider distances of the North Sea in the face of a greatly superior naval force. All that would have resulted from the success of this most perilous operation on the part of Germany, would be to transfer the fighting of a certain number of Army Corps from the Continent to the British islands, under circumstances unfavourable in the extreme to the Germans, and favourable in every way to our troops; with the certainty that the Germans could not be reinforced, while we could be reinforced to almost any extent, and that unless the Germans were immediately successful before their ammunition was expended, the whole force to the last man must be killed or made prisoners of war. I therefore see no reason why this contingency, any more than that of raids, should force the Battle Fleet to keep a station of danger during the winter months. The power of the superior Fleet is exerted with equal effect over the longer distances, and in fact pervades all the waters of the world.

With regard to anchorages you have only to make your proposals and we will do our best to equip with anti-submarine nets, lights, and guns the places which you may wish to use. It is of importance that these should be varied, absolute safety lying much more in the uncertainty attending the movements of the Grand Fleet than in any passive or fixed defence of any particular place. We must not be led into frittering away resources by keeping half a dozen anchorages in a state of semi-defence, and so far as possible we must organise a movable defence of guardships, trawlers, patrolling yachts, minesweepers, destroyers with towing charges, and seaplanes, which can move while the Fleet is at sea and prepare the new resting-place for its reception.

The employment of a portion or occasionally of the whole of the Battle Fleet, to supplement the Northern Blockade from time to time is a matter on which you must be the judge. A large part of your time must necessarily be spent cruising at sea, and this being so the cruising should be made as useful as possible. Here, again, anything in the nature of routine or regular stations would be dangerous, and would, after a while, draw upon you, even in remote northern waters, the danger of submarine attack.

The enemy in my judgment pursues a wise policy in declining battle. By remaining in harbour he secures for Germany the command of the Baltic, with all that that implies, both in threatening the Russian flank and protecting the German Coast, and in drawing supplies from Sweden and Norway. This is an immense advantage to the Germans, and is the best use to which in present circumstances they can turn their Fleet. It is to secure the eventual command of the Baltic that British naval operations must tend. I have already pointed out, in the papers which I showed you, the three alternative conditions[^[76]] [the defeat of the German Fleet: the breaking of the Kiel Canal: or the effective blocking in of the Heligoland Bight] under which this would be possible, and I hope that proceeding on the assumption that one of these conditions exist you will make a study of the actual method by which the entrance to the Baltic could be effected when the time arrives.

These general conclusions governed our policy during the next few months. But as October wore on our anxieties were steadily aggravated. The tension grew. Telegrams and letters tell their own tale.

October 15.

First Lord to Sir John Jellicoe.

Personal. You are invited to give your opinion secretly on every aspect of the Naval situation at home and abroad and we welcome warmly any scheme you may put forward.