(1) The reference is doubtless to the Thebans. Unfortunately we do not
know, on good authority, how many troops of either arm they had in
the field at Leuctra or at Mantinea.
(2) Lit. "without the rest of the city," i.e. the hoplites, etc.
Now, to deal with this vast hostile array, if only the city will determine to sally out en masse to protect her rural districts, the prospect is fair. Under God, our troopers, if properly cared for, are the finer men; our infantry of the line are no less numerous, and as regards physique, if it comes to that, not one whit inferior, while in reference to moral qualities, they are more susceptible to the spur of a noble ambition, if only under God's will they be correctly trained. Or again, as touching pride of ancestry, what have Athenians to fear as against Boeotians on that score? (3)
(3) See "Mem." III. v. 3, where it is contended that in pride of
ancestry Athenians can hold their own against Boeotians.
But suppose the city of Athens determine to betake herself to her navy, as in the old days when the Lacedaemonians, leagued with the rest of Hellas, brought invasion; (4) and is content once more simply to protect her walls through thick and thin. As to protecting what lies outside the city wall she looks to her cavalry for that; and single-handed her troopers must do desperate encounter against the united forces of the enemy. I say, under these circumstances, we shall need in the first place the strong support of Heaven; and in the second place, well will it be for us if our cavalry commander prove himself a consummate officer. (5) Indeed, he will have need of large wisdom to deal with a force so vastly superior in numbers, and of enterprise to strike when the critical moment comes.
(4) See Thuc. ii. 13, 14, 22, etc., and in particular iv. 95,
Hippocrates' speech before the battle of Delium, 424 B.C.
(5) A "parfait marechal."
He must also, as it appears to me, be capable of great physical endurance; (6) since clearly, if he has to run full tilt against an armament present, as we picture, in such force that not even our whole state cares to cope with it, it is plain he must accept whatever fate is due, where might is right, himself unable to retaliate.
(6) So Jason, "Hell." VI. i. 4.
If, on the contrary, he elect to guard the territory outside the walls (7) with a number just sufficient to keep a look-out on the enemy, and to withdraw into safe quarters from a distance whatever needs protection—a small number, be it observed, is just as capable of vedette duty, as well able, say, to scan the distant horizon, as a large; and by the same token men with no great confidence in themselves or in their horses are not ill-qualified to guard, or withdraw within shelter (8) the property of friends; since fear, as the proverb has it, makes a shrewd watchman. The proposal, therefore, to select from these a corps of observation will most likely prove true strategy. But what then of the residue not needed for outpost duty? If any one imagines he has got an armament, he will find it miserably small, and lacking in every qualification necessary to risk an open encounter.
(7) Or, "His better plan would be to."
(8) Reading {anakhorizein}. Cf. "Cyrop." II. ii. 8; "Anab." V. ii. 10;
or if {anakhorein eis}, transl. "or retire into safe quarters."
See "Hell." IV. vi. 44.
But let him make up his mind to employ it in guerilla war, and he will find the force quite competent for that, I warrant. His business, so at least it seems to me, will be to keep his men perpetually in readiness to strike a blow, and without exposing himself, to play sentinel, waiting for any false move on the part of the hostile armament. And it is a way with soldiers, bear in mind, the more numerous they are, the more blunders they commit. They must needs scatter of set purpose (9) in search of provisions; or through the disorder incidental to a march, some will advance and others lag behind, beyond a proper limit. Blunders like these, then, our hipparch must not let pass unpunished (unless he wishes the whole of Attica to become a gigantic camp); (10) keeping his single point steadily in view, that when he strikes a blow he must be expeditious and retire before the main body has time to rally to the rescue.