(9) {epimeleia}. Cf. "Cyrop." V. iii. 47.
(10) Lit. "or else the whole of Attica will be one encampment." As at
the date of the fortification of Decelea (413 B.C.), which
permanently commanded the whole country. See Thuc. vii. 27. Al.
Courier, "autrement vous n'avez plus de camp, ou pour mieux dire,
tout le pays devient votre camp."
Again, it frequently happens on the march, that an army will get into roads where numbers are no advantage. Again, in the passage of rivers, defiles, and the like, it is possible for a general with a head on his shoulders to hang on the heels of an enemy in security, and to determine with precision (11) the exact number of the enemy he will care to deal with. Occasionally the fine chance occurs to attack the foe while encamping or breakfasting or supping, or as the men turn out of bed: seasons at which the soldier is apt to be unharnessed—the hoplite for a shorter, the cavalry trooper for a longer period. (12)
(11) See "Anab." II. v. 18; "Cyrop." III. iii. 47; IV. i. 18.
{tamieusasthai}, "with the precision of a controller."
(12) Cf. "Hell." II. iv. 6; VII. i. 16.
As to vedettes and advanced outposts, you should never cease planning and plotting against them. For these in their turn, as a rule, are apt to consist of small numbers, and are sometimes posted at a great distance from their own main body. But if after all it turns out that the enemy are well on their guard against all such attempts, then, God helping, it would be a feat of arms to steal into the enemy's country, first making it your business to ascertain (13) his defences, the number of men at this, that, and the other point, and how they are distributed throughout the country. For there is no booty so splendid as an outpost so overmastered; and these frontier outposts are especially prone to be deceived, with their propensity to give chase to any small body they set eyes on, regarding that as their peculiar function. You will have to see, however, in retiring that your line of retreat is not right into the jaws of the enemy's reliefs hastening to the scene of action.
(13) Or, "having first studied." Cf. "Mem." III. vi. 10.
VIII
It stands to reason, however, that in order to be able to inflict real damage upon a greatly superior force, the weaker combatant must possess such a moral superiority over the other as shall enable him to appear in the position of an expert, trained in all the feats of cavalry performance in the field, and leave his enemy to play the part of raw recruits or amateurs. (1)
(1) Cf. "Cyrop." I. v. 11; "Mem." III. vii. 7.
And this end may be secured primarily on this wise: those who are to form your guerilla bands (2) must be so hardened and inured to the saddle that they are capable of undergoing all the toils of a campaign. (3) That a squadron (and I speak of horse and man alike) should enter these lists in careless, disorderly fashion suggests the idea of a troop of women stepping into the arena to cope with male antagonists.
(2) Or, add, "for buccaneers and free-lances you must be."
(3) Lit. "every toil a soldier can encounter."