History of Mexico, Volume 1, 1516-1521

by Hubert Howe Bancroft

FOOTNOTES

[845] ‘Esto despues lo declararon los mismos Indios.’ Vetancvrt, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 143. Nor do they omit the ever recurring story of the virgin image casting dust into the eyes of the pursuers.

[846] The Tlascaltec and Cempoalan bodies were thrown among the reeds, and the Spanish into deeper water. Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 126-7.

[847] Duran and Ixtlilxochitl make the murders take place in the Spanish quarters, as we have seen. Sahagun permits two of Montezuma’s sons to fall between the last channel and Popotla, while guiding the fugitives. Hist. Conq., 33 (ed. 1840), 122. Gomara assumes also that the pursuers may have been content with the injury inflicted, or cared not to renew the fight on more open ground. Hist. Mex., 161. Solis attributes the respite wholly to the discovery of the bodies. Hist. Mex., ii. 185-6.

[848] ‘Llegado á la dicha ciudad de Tacuba, hallé toda la gente remolinada en una plaza, que no sabían dónde ir.’ Cortés, Cartas, 136. ‘Hasta cerca de Tlacupan hasta un lugar que se llama Tilihucan.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq., 33. ‘Tacuba ... is at the present day chiefly noted for the large and noble church which was erected there by Cortez.’ Latrobe’s Rambler, 128.

[849] Gomara assumes that the Tlacopan people were not aware of the broken condition of the troops. Now they joined the 40,000 Mexicans who had set forth prepared for pursuit. Hist. Mex., 161. ‘Yà auian venido de Mexico.... dar mandado a Tacuba, y a Escapuçalco, y a Tenayuca, para que nos saliessen al encuentro.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 106. The Mexicans were disgusted with those of Tlacopan for their neglect. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xii.

[850] ‘Un Angel de Guarda, ó San Pedro, como otros quieren, ó Santiago Apostol,’ observes the enthusiastic Lorenzana. Cortés, Hist. N. España, 145.

[851] ‘Totolpec.’ Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 302; Toltotepec is Vetancurt’s misspelling. ‘Cerro llamado de Muteczuma.’ Lorenzana, ubi sup.

[852] ‘Una torre y aposento fuerte.’ Cortés, Cartas, 136. ‘Vnas caserias q̄ en vn cerro estauan, y alli jũto a vn Cu, e adoratorio, y como fortaleza.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 107. ‘A este templo llamaron de la Vitoria, y despues nuestra Señora de los remedios.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xii. Sahagun calls the rise Acueco, and places upon it the Otomí village of Otoncapulco. Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 122. Vetancurt follows, Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 143, while Camargo calls it Tzacuyocan. The variations in Sahagun’s editions lead Torquemada to say that the Spaniards moved the same day from Otoncalpulco pueblo to Acueco, an Otomí village, i. 504-5. This, Brasseur de Bourbourg follows. The Spaniards may have passed through it on departing, but would hardly move from a stronghold to a probably open village while surrounded by enemies. If food was the object, the able-bodied soldiers would have made a sally for it. It appears that the army camped for the night on the hill now occupied by the Remedios shrine, and in the fortress-like temple, to which a small village was attached. Alzate, however, who took pains to inquire into the subject, found that the natives applied the name Otoncapulco, not to the Remedios hill, but to the mountain, three fourths of a league off. On this mountain he found the ruins of a strong building, and none on the hill, whence he assumes that the camp was not made on the site of the shrine, but on the mountain. Gacetas de Lit., ii. 457-9. Bustamante accepts this view, but Archbishop Lorenzana, whose testimony in the matter must be reliable, says: ‘Se conservan aun algunos vestigios de la antigua Fortaleza, y esta se ha convertido dichosamente en el célebre Santuario de N. Sra. de los Remedios.’ Cortés, Hist. N. España, p. xiii. He also intimates that the Otoncapulco name is misapplied. Hence it may be assumed that the common application of Otoncapulco to this hill is due to a misinterpretation of Sahagun’s versions, which have been greatly tampered with, for that matter, and that the ruins mentioned by Lorenzana had disappeared by the time Alzate examined the place.

[853] Cartas, 136; Cabrera, Escudo Armas, 110. ‘Aqui se señalò mucho Gonçalo Dominguez, hombre diestro y valiente.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xii. Prescott makes several blunders and omissions in connection with this day.

[854] A few stragglers managed to reach the camp, and among them one Sopuerta, who had escaped death by feigning it. Herrera, ubi sup. Sahagun states that Otomís from Teucalhuican, and from the immediate neighborhood, no doubt, brought food, and invited the Spaniards to the former town, a few leagues from there. Hist. Conq., 33. Torquemada follows him, but the story is probably an exaggeration.

[855] It has been shown previously, by testimony not accessible till later years, that the image placed in the great temple was a picture on a tablet, while that of Remedios is a doll. But, of course, the image that could move through the air could also transform its shape. Bernal Diaz assumes, as we have seen, that Montezuma had ordered the image to be cared for; yet many believe that Rodriguez secured it before or after the massacre, while the more pious prefer to suppose that he could not find it, for want of time, perhaps, and that it moved miraculously to the camp. Acosta, Hist. Ind., 524; Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 302. After the departure of the troops the image hid itself on the spot, or Rodriguez, tired of the burden which had saved his life, ungratefully left it there. It is also supposed to have been carried to Tlascala ere it reappeared on its later site. Cabrera, Escudo Armas, 106 et seq.; Alaman, Disert., i. 122. Lorenzana accepts it as the image from Mexico’s temple. Cortés, Hist. N. España, 138.

[856] It has frequently been brought to Mexico, and is still brought to avert epidemics and other ills, to bring rain or other blessings. When detained it would travel back of its own accord to the shrine, a proof of which was afforded by the travel stains on the dress. One rainy night it arrived covered with mud. Latrobe’s Rambler, 133. Thompson describes it as ‘a little alabaster doll, with the nose broken, and the eye out ... about eight inches high.’ Her wardrobe and jewels are valued at over $1,000,000. Recollections, 103-9. He gives an account of the veneration for the image and its miraculous power. The history of its origin and worship is to be found in a multitude of books, among which may be mentioned, Medina, Chrón. S. Diego Mex., 30 et seq.; Cabrera, Escudo Armas, 106 et seq.; Bustamante, Mem. Piedad Mex., 1-52.

[857] Cortés prudently limits, and we must add untruthfully, the loss to 150 soldiers and some 2000 allies. It is with a view to this estimate that he reduced the force brought into Mexico to 570 men, to which must be added the 140 composing the garrison. Deducting the 150 lost, 560 remain, and since he would hardly overestimate the number, for obvious reasons, this figure is probably near the truth. Bernal Diaz musters 1300 at Tlascala, and has 80 at Mexico. Deducting from this 800 men stated to have been lost before entering Tlascala, not counting those who fell in other provinces, leaves about 580; yet he acknowledges only 440 alive. Hist. Verdad., 108 et seq. Herrera is also contradictory, admitting in one place 500, and in another ‘less than’ 400 soldiers and 600 allies. Oviedo reduces the soldiers to 340. iii. 513. Vetancurt adopts Bernal Diaz’ 440 soldiers and Herrera’s 600 allies. Prescott hastily declares Gomara as nearest to the truth, yet he departs from him in the result. With regard to the allies, he reckons the full number of all who were brought to Mexico, while it is pretty obvious, from figures and facts, that a portion must have been allowed to return home during the inaction of the emperor’s captivity. The list of losses, as given by different authorities, stands as follows: 150 soldiers, over 2000 allies, Cortés; over 200 soldiers, over 2000 allies, Lejalde, Probanza; nearly 200 soldiers, over 1000 allies, Solis; 300 soldiers, over 2000 allies, at one bridge, Sahagun, 122; 450 soldiers, 4000 allies, Gomara, followed by Ixtlilxochitl, Clavigero, Camargo, and others; over 500 soldiers in all New Spain, Carta del Ejército; over 600 soldiers, Robertson; over 600 soldiers, B. V. de Tapia, in Ramirez, Proceso contra Alvarado, 38; 800 soldiers in all New Spain, Cortés, Residencia, i. 42; 870 soldiers in all New Spain, Bernal Diaz; 1170 soldiers, 8000 allies, Cano, in Oviedo, iii. 551.

[858] The loss in horses varies from 45, in Cortés, to 56, in Lejalde, Probanza, both acknowledging 24 left.

[859] ‘Perdidose todo el oro y joyas y ropa,’ etc. Cortés, Cartas, 135. It had been confided to Tlascaltecs, and was nearly all lost, says their chief. Camargo, Hist. Tlax., 169-70. The officers testified afterward before public notary: ‘Se perdió todo el dicho oro é joyas de SS. AA., é mataron la yegua que lo traia.’ Lejalde, Probanza, in Icazbalceta, Col. Doc., i. 425. Two witnesses during the residencia of Cortés stated that the general had two mares, one given to carry the royal treasures and the other laden with his own. The latter being lost, he claimed the other to be his, and in this manner appropriated 45,000 pesos or more which belonged to the king. Cortés, Residencia, i. 69, 101-2. Not long after the retreat he called on all to declare, under penalty, what gold they had saved of that taken from the unappropriated piles. From those who did so the treasures were taken, although it was understood that they had been given to them. All this Cortés kept. Id., 101-2, 241-2; ii. 402. Many refused to surrender, and since the leaders had also secured shares from the common pile, the order to reveal possession thereof was not enforced, says Bernal Diaz. He adds that one third was to be retained by the possessor as a reward. Cortés kept as a forced loan what had been surrendered. Hist. Verdad., 117-18. The loss of treasure, that thrown away by carriers and pressed soldiers, or sunken with their bodies, has been estimated at from several hundred thousand pesos to over two millions, in the values of that time; to which Wilson sarcastically objects, that ‘nothing was really lost but the imaginary treasure, now grown inconveniently large, and which had to be accounted for to the emperor. The Conquistador was too good a soldier to hazard his gold; it was therefore in the advance, and came safely off.’ Conq. Mex., 412-13.

[860] ‘Si esta cosa fuera de dia, por ventura no murieran tantos,’ adds Gomara, Hist. Mex., 161. While grieving he recognized ‘el manifiesto milagro que la reyna de los angeles su abogada, el apostol San Pedro, y el de los egércitos Españoles Santiago, habian hecho en haberse escapado él.’ Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 302. Vetancurt moralizes on the flight as a chastisement by God, who saved the remnant to spread the faith. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 145-6.

[861] On a later page Bernal Diaz says he fell at Otumba. Hist. Verdad., 107, 246.

[862] Herrera attempts to save somewhat the reputation of the astrologer by the statement that he prophesied death for himself or his brother.

[863] Every one, say Cortés and Herrera; but Ixtlilxochitl states that one sister of King Cacama was saved, and he intimates that one or two of his brothers also escaped. He is contradictory, however. Hist. Chich., 302, 390. The one who escaped must have been Cuicuitzcatl, the newly made king of Tezcuco. Brasseur de Bourbourg adds two of his brothers, probably from misinterpreting Ixtlilxochitl. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 339.

[864] Ixtlilxochitl names some of the chiefs to whom these offers were made. Hist. Chich., 302.

[865] Ávila, a veritable martinet, maimed a soldier with a blow for stepping from the ranks to pluck some fruit. Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xii. The same story has been told of Ávila in Cempoala.

[866] Cortés allows the five scouts to defeat the enemy, who are frightened by the supposition that a larger force is upon them. Cartas, 137. Herrera is more explicit with regard to the ambuscade, and makes Ordaz lead up the reinforcements. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xii.

[867] ‘Mas no cenar.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 162. Sahagun states, however, that this was the town to which the Otomís had on the preceding day invited them, chiefly because they were related to the Otomís of the Tlascaltec division under Cortés. Hist. Conq., 34-5. A risky proceeding, if true, for an isolated community, on whom might fall the vengeance of the hostile Mexicans. In the account of the route followed to Tlascala Cortés is still the best guide, for he not only kept a record, but wrote his report while the occurrences were yet fresh. He is wanting in details, however, and fails to give names to localities. These omissions are remedied by Sahagun, who now seems more reliable. Other authors are vague or misleading for the route, but the occasional incidents told by them are noteworthy. Bernal Diaz indicates only one stopping place, Quauhtitlan evidently, before Otumba is reached. Camargo skips to a place adjoining Otumba, and Ixtlilxochitl takes the army to Quauhximalpan, a place which modern maps locate south of Remedios. He resumes the northern route, but names some towns that cannot be identified. Gomara adheres pretty well to Cortés, but his commentator, Chimalpain, supplies names for places, which differ from Sahagun and indicate a deviation from the extreme northern course, as will be seen. Torquemada follows chiefly Sahagun, whom he recommends. Orozco y Berra has closely studied the journey, and throws much light on it, more so than any other writer; yet his conclusions are not always satisfactory. Itinerario del Ejercito Español, in Mex. Not. Ciudad., 246 et seq. I have already spoken at length, in Native Races, iii. 231-6, on the life and writings of Father Sahagun, and will here refer only to the twelfth book of his Historia General, inserted by Bustamante, at the beginning of the set, under the title of Historia de la Conquista de Mexico. This copy is from one found by Muñoz in the Franciscan convent of Tolosa, in Navarre. Another copy of the twelfth book, in possession of Conde de Cortina, claimed as the true original, was published separately by the same editor, at Mexico, 1840, with lengthy notes from Clavigero and other writers to complete the chain of events, and to comment on the suppression in the former issue of statements concerning Spanish misdeeds. It has also an additional chapter. Neither copy, however, corresponds quite to that used by Torquemada, who in more than one instance quotes passages that are startling compared with the modified expressions in the others. The severity of the friar toward Spanish conquerors was no doubt a strong reason for the suppression of his work. The twelfth book begins with Grijalva’s arrival and the omens preceding it, and carries the narrative of the conquest down to the fall of Mexico. According to his own statement, on page 132, it is founded to a great extent on the relations given him by eye-witnesses, soldiers who had assumed the Franciscan robe and associated daily with the friar; but much is adopted, with little or no critique, from superstitious natives, the whole forming a rather confusing medley, so that it is difficult to extract the many valuable points which it contains. This difficulty is, of course, not encountered by such followers as Bustamante and Brasseur de Bourbourg, and similar supporters of native records or anti-Spanish versions.

In the Native Races I give the traits which characterize the French abbé and his famous works on Central American culture and antiquities, and it remains only to refer briefly to his version of the conquest, comprised in the fourth volume of the Histoire des Nations Civilisées. His pleasing style lends attraction to every page, but his faults become more conspicuous from the comparison presented by a vast array of authorities, revealing the indiscreet and enthusiastic readiness to accept native tales, or anything that favors the hypotheses by which he is ruled, and in the disposition to build magnificent structures on airy foundation. His version, indeed, strives rather to narrate the conquest from a native standpoint, and to use Spanish chronicles only as supplementary authority. To this end he relies chiefly on the now well known writings of Sahagun, Ixtlilxochitl, Camargo, and Torquemada, and it is but rarely that he is able to quote the often startling original manuscripts possessed only by himself.

[868] ‘Mordiendo la tierra, arrancando yeruas, y alçãdo los ojos al cielo, dezian, dioses no nos desampareys en este peligro, pues teneys poder sobre todos los hombres, hazed que con vuestra ayuda salgamos del.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xii.

[869] Herrera conforms to Cortés and Gomara in admitting a stay of two nights at one place, but makes this Tecopatlan, called ‘duck town,’ from its many fowl. This is evidently Tepotzotlan. But it was not near the lake like Citlaltepec, and ‘duck town’ applies rather to a lake town, in this region, at least. Cortés also writes, in Cartas, 137, ‘fuimos aquel dia por cerca de unas lagunas hasta que llegamos á una poblacion,’ and this does not apply well to Tepotzotlan, which lies a goodly distance from the lakes, requiring certainly no march along ‘some’ lakes to reach it. Hence the Citlaltepec of Sahagun must be meant. This author, however, supposes the Spaniards to stay one night at each place. Hist. Conq., 36 (ed. 1840), 129. Ixtlilxochitl calls the place after Tepotzotlan, Aychqualco. Hist. Chich., 302. At Tepotzotlan, says Vetancurt, some of the people remained to receive the Spaniards—this is in accordance with one of Sahagun’s versions—and here remained to hide the son of Montezuma, whom he supposes to have escaped with the troops. Teatro Mex., pt. iii. 144. According to Chimalpain’s interpretation the Spaniards stay the two nights at Quauhtitlan, and thence proceed by way of Ecatepec, now San Cristóbal, skirting the northern shore of Tezcuco Lake, and on to Otumba. Hist. Conq., i. 304-5. This route certainly appears the most direct, but there is no authority for it. The sentence from Cortés might no doubt be adopted equally well for this road; but Sahagun, Ixtlilxochitl, and Herrera name towns which lie east and north of the Zumpango Lake, and during the rainy season now prevailing the passages between the lakes were rather swampy. Tezcuco was beside too close for the fleeing army. Alaman accepts the route south of Zumpango, Disert., i. 122, against which nearly all the above reasons apply.

[870] ‘Nos convenia ir muchas veces fuera de camino.’ Cortés, Cartas, 138. Owing to the guide’s inefficiency, adds Gomara, Hist. Mex., 162.

[871] Sahagun also calls the mountain, or the slope, Tona. His confusing versions sometimes reverse all the names. Cortés places it two leagues from the last camp.

[872] ‘Detrás dél [hill] estaba una gran ciudad de mucha gente.’ Cortés, Cartas, 138. Zacamolco is also called a large town. There could hardly be two large towns so close together in a district like this, so that the other must have been Teotihuacan, ‘city of the gods,’ with its ancient and lofty pyramids, sacred to all Anáhuac, and one of the chief centres of pilgrimage. For description of ruins, see Native Races, iv. 529-44.

[873] ‘Con un golpe de piedra en la cabeza tan violento, que abollando las armas, le rompió la primera tunica del cerebro.’ So Solis defines the wound, which afterward grew dangerous. Hist. Mex., ii. 203. He supposes that it was received at Otumba.

[874] ‘Le comieron sin dexar [como dizen] pelo ni huesso.’ Gomara, Hist. Mex., 162. ‘La cabeza cupo a siete o ocho.’ The horse was Gamboa’s, on which Alvarado was saved after his leap. Herrera, ii. x. xii.; Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 107. Ixtlilxochitl says that Zinacatzin, of Teotihuacan, killed it—he whom we shall find leading the enemy on the morrow.

[875] ‘Y pareció que el Espíritu Santo me alumbró con este aviso,’ exclaims Cortés, Cartas, 139. Many a soldier carried a comrade on his back. Gomara, Hist. Mex., 163.

[876] According to Cortés, whose dates I have already shown to be reliable. He makes it a Saturday. Prescott makes it the 8th, a mistake which has been copied by several writers, including Brasseur de Bourbourg and Carbajal Espinosa.

[877] ‘Llanos de la provincia de Otupam.’ The battle taking place near Metepec. Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 302-3. Plain of Otumpan, also called Atztaquemecan. Camargo, Hist. Tlax., 170. ‘Los Llanos de Apan.’ ‘El Valle de Otumba.’ Lorenzana, in Cortés, Hist. N. España, xiv. 148. Clavigero calls it the plain of Tonan, derived from Sahagun, who applies the name to the slope of the range bordering it.

[878] Following the intimation given by Sahagun, Torquemada states that the enemy came pouring in from rear and sides to surround the troops, i. 508.

[879] While they were halting, writes Ojeda, a big Indian with club and shield advanced to challenge any Spaniard to single combat. Ojeda responded, but in advancing against the man his negro slave followed him, and either the sight of two frightened the native or he sought to decoy them, for he retreated into a copse. Herrera, ii. x. xiii.

[880] Camargo, Hist. Tlax., 171-2; Torquemada, i. 509. Ixtlilxochitl spells the name Zihuatcatlzin, and Oviedo calls it Xiaquetenga, based probably on that of the Tlascaltec chief. Duran, Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 480. ‘La flor de Mexico, y de Tezcuco, y Saltocan.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 108.

[881] Solis clears the way with volleys, but only seven muskets remained and no ammunition.

[882] Camargo states that he lived to an age exceeding 130 years. Heroes in all ages have enjoyed the privilege of not being tied down to laws governing ordinary mortals.

[883] An ill-natured brute, which attacked the enemy with teeth and hoofs. He did good service all through the following campaign, till he fell in one of the last battles of the great siege. Camargo, Hist. Tlax., 172.

[884] ‘Duró este terrible conflicto por mas de cuatro horas.... Llegado el medio dia, con el intolerable trabajo de la pelea, los españoles comenzaron á desmayar.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 132.

[885] ‘En vnas Andas, vn Caballero mandando, con vna Rodela Dorada, y que la Vandera, y Señal Real, que le salia por las Espaldas, era vna Red de Oro, que los Indios llamaban Tlahuizmatlaxopilli, que le subia diez palmos.’ Torquemada, i. 509. ‘Su vandera tendida, con ricas armas de oro, y grandes penachos de argenteria.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 108. Ixtlilxochitl calls the gold net matlaxopili. Hist. Chich., 303. Camargo more correctly agrees with Torquemada.

[886] The accounts of this incident vary greatly. According to Bernal Diaz ‘Cortes dió vn encuẽtro cõ el cauallo al Capitã Mexicano, hizo abatir su vãdera ... quiẽ siguiò al Capitan q̄ traia la vandera que aun no auia caido del encuentro que Cortes le diò, fue vn Juan de Salamanca, natural de Ontiueros, con vna buena yegua ouera, que le acabò de matar.’ Hist. Verdad., 108. The banner could not have fallen without the general. Gomara intimates that Cortés charged alone against the ‘capitan general, y diole dos lançadas, de que cayo y murio.’ Hist. Mex., 163. This is also substantially the view of Duran and Camargo. Herrera leaves the impression that Salamanca alone follows Cortés in the charge, and cuts off the head and banner of the commander after his chief had wounded and overthrown him. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xiii. Torquemada, Clavigero, Prescott, and others, also assume that Cortés lances the generalissimo, but they let the cavalry follow. Sahagun, who obtained his information from participants that afterward became friars, merely states that Cortés and one other led the charge, which resulted in the overthrow of the general and his banner. Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 132. Cortés is still more reticent in saying: ‘quiso Dios que murió una persona dellos, que debia ser tan principal, que con su muerte cesó toda aquella guerra.’ Cartas, 139. The assumption that Cortés overthrew the commander with his lance rests chiefly on the fact that Cortés as leader of the charge receives credit for everything that happens. Writers also forget that the commander was carried aloft in a litter the better to observe the movements of the army. His burdened carriers would with greater likelihood have been overthrown by the horses or in the disorder created by their advance. This supposition is confirmed by Cortés’ reference to the affair, wherein he gives credit to none for the act, his usual custom when some one else performed a noteworthy deed. He was seldom chary in giving credit to himself for achievements, as may be gathered alone from his account of the stay in Mexico City, which announces that he it was who tore down the idols, who captured the temple after another had failed to do so, who single-handed covered the retreat of his comrades on the Tlacopan causeway on the morning preceding the flight, and who with less than a score that ‘dared stay with him’ protected the retreat of the last remnant from the city. The supposition receives further support from the permission given by the emperor to Salamanca to add to his escutcheon the trophy taken from the commander. This implies that although the victory was due to Cortés he could not have inflicted the mortal wound. Salamanca became alcalde mayor of Goazacoalco. Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 108, 111.

[887] ‘Los principales, lleuarõ cõ grã llanto, el cuerpo de su general,’ says Herrera; but this is doubtful, to judge also from his subsequent observations.

[888] ‘Murieron ... casi todos los amigos de los españoles, y algunos de ellos mismos.’ Sahagun, Hist. Conq. (ed. 1840), 132. Solis acknowledges only wounded, of whom two or three died afterward. Hist. Mex., ii. 203. Cortés did not escape additional wounds, from which he was soon to suffer intensely.

[889] The natives were particularly ready to testify to this supernatural aid, as Camargo relates, Hist. Tlax., 172, perhaps for their own credit, as good converts and brave warriors.

[890] ‘Never,’ writes Gomara, ‘did a man show such prowess as he, and never were men so well led. He by his own personal efforts saved them.’ Hist. Mex., 163. ‘Se tuuo la vitoria despues de Dios, por el valor de Cortés.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xiii. While quite prepared to uphold the general as a hero, Bernal Diaz takes exception to this praise as unjust to his many followers, who not only did wonders in sustaining him, but in saving his life. Hist. Verdad., 111.

[891] Ixtlilxochitl assumes that another army was encountered and routed with great slaughter, a few leagues ahead, at Teyocan. Hist. Chich., 303.

[892] Ixtlilxochitl. Chimalpain calls it Apam, which appears to have been situated farther north. Lorenzana refers to all this extent as the plains of Apan, the name which it now bears. Camargo names the plains of Apantema, Tacacatitlan, and Atlmoloyan as traversed by the army to reach Tlascala. Hist. Tlax., 172.

[893] Cartas, 140. ‘Pues quizà sabiamos cierto, que nos auian de ser leales, ò que voluntad ternian.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 108.

[894] Brasseur de Bourbourg gives to a village here the name of Xaltelolco. Hist. Nat. Civ., iv. 352. Ixtlilxochitl refers to it as Huexoyotlipan, and states that Citlalquiauhtzin came up with food and presents from the lords.

[895] Cortés calls the town Gualipan; Bernal Diaz, Gualiopar; Gomara, Huazilipan; Herrera gives it 2000 houses.

[896] ‘Yo queria,’ said Maxixcatzin, ‘yr en vuestra busca con treynta mil guerreros.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 109. This is confirmed by the Aztec version of Duran, which says that the rumor of Tlascaltec preparations helped to intimidate the proposed Mexican reinforcements for Otumba. Hist. Ind., MS., ii. 483. According to Oviedo, 50,000 warriors, followed by 20,000 carriers, met the Spaniards at the frontier, iii. 514. Camargo extends the number to 200,000, ‘who came too late, but served nevertheless to check pursuit from the enemy.’ Hist. Tlax., 173. Gomara stamps Oviedo’s statement as hearsay, but adds that the Tlascaltecs declared themselves prepared to return with the Spaniards at once against Mexico. This Cortés declined to do for the present, but allowed a few soldiers to join a band in pursuit of marauding stragglers. Hist. Mex., 164. The delay in collecting the proposed reinforcements may have been due to the small faction hostile to the Spaniards, headed by the captain-general, Xicotencatl the younger, who seems never to have forgiven the disgrace of defeat which they had been the first to inflict upon him. He had accompanied the lords to Hueyotlipan, perhaps to gloat over the misfortune of his victors. According to Herrera, Captain Juan Paez—Torquemada writes Perez—was one of the invalids at Tlascala, and to him 100,000 warriors had been offered to go to the aid of his general; but he declined, on the ground that his strict orders were to remain with his 80 men at Tlascala. For this he was naturally upbraided by Cortés as a coward, fit for hanging. The story is not very probable. dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xiv,; Torquemada, i. 512.

[897] ‘Que estimó él mucho, y puso por una de sus armas.’ Ixtlilxochitl, Hist. Chich., 303.

[898] Cortés, Cartas, 140. Bernal Diaz intimates one day.

[899] ‘Cõ mas de duzientos mil hombres en orden: yuan las mugeres, y niños, en la delantera.’ Herrera, dec. ii. lib. x. cap. xiii. This order may have been intended to signify peace and welcome.

[900] Camargo differs from Bernal Diaz, in intimating that all were lodged in Maxixcatzin’s palace, while Ixtlilxochitl assumes that Cortés was the guest of Xicotencatl. ‘Magiscacin me trajo una cama de madera encajada, con alguna ropa ... y á todos hizo reparar de lo que él tuvo.’ Cortés, Cartas, 141.

CHAPTER XXVIII.
INVALUABLE FRIENDSHIP.
July-September, 1520.

Divers Disasters to the Spaniards—Mexico Makes Overtures to Tlascala—A Council Held—Tlascala Remains True to the Spaniards—Disaffection in the Spanish Army—Cortés again Wins the Soldiers to his Views—Renewal of Active Operations against the Aztecs—Success of the Spanish Arms—Large Reinforcements of Native Allies—One Aztec Stronghold after another Succumbs.

At Tlascala were certain invalid Spaniards, who praised the natives for their kind treatment, and for the almost universal sympathy exhibited with regard to the misfortunes at Mexico. The army now learned that disaster had also befallen the Spaniards in other parts of the country. The news of the flight had spread with marvellous rapidity, and Cuitlahuatzin’s envoys had not failed to magnify the successes of his arms while urging throughout the country the extermination of the invaders. This advice had found ready acceptance in the provinces west and south of Tlascala, which had additional reasons for hostility in the assumption of the little republic since she became the ally of the strangers.

Shortly after the departure of the army from the coast a party of fifty men with five horses had followed with baggage and valuables. At Tlascala a portion of them, with two horses, under Juan de Alcántara senior, received the portion of treasure set aside during the late repartition for the coast garrison, estimated at sixty thousand pesos. With this they set out on their return to Villa Rica, accompanied by a few invalids. On the way they were surprised and slaughtered, the treasures and effects being distributed as spoils.[901]

The larger division of the party, under the hidalgo Juan Yuste,[902] which were to join Cortés, also picked up some convalescents, together with additional treasure and baggage, and proceeded to Mexico by the way of Calpulalpan. They numbered five horsemen, forty-five foot-soldiers, and three hundred Tlascaltecs, the latter under command of one of Maxixcatzin’s sons. Advised of their approach the natives of Zultepec, among others, were induced, more by cupidity than patriotic zeal, to form an ambuscade along the steep declivity of a narrow pass which had to be followed. Here they fell upon the party on all sides as they descended in single file, encumbered beside by their burdens. Resistance was ineffective, and those not slain were carried to Tezcuco to be offered up to the idols, while their effects were distributed, some of the trophies being dedicated to temples of the Acolhuan capital, there to tell the mournful tale to the returning conquerors.[903]

About this time a vessel arrived at Villa Rica with three or four score of adventurers, under Captain Coronado, and being told of the fabulously rich Mexico they resolved to lose no time in following the army, in order to secure a share of treasures. It was just after the flight from Mexico, and the provinces were in arms, elated at the triumphs at the lake. On approaching the Tepeaca district the party was surprised, and partly slaughtered, partly captured, the prisoners being distributed among the towns of the province for sacrifice.[904]

These reports created no small alarm for the safety of Villa Rica, and several Tlascaltec messengers were sent with letters, by different routes, to bring news. Orders were also given to the comandante to forward powder, fire-arms, bows, and other necessaries that he could spare, together with some men, sailors, if no others were available. The reply was reassuring, for although the natives had fuller particulars of the disaster at Mexico than Cortés had chosen to impart to the garrison, yet everything remained quiet. The remittance of war material was small, and the men who convoyed it numbered less than a dozen, men stricken by disease, and led by Lencero, who became the butt of the drôles de corps.[905]

Every attention and comfort was tendered at Tlascala to the Spaniards while caring for their wounds and awaiting the development of projects. Hardly a man had arrived scathless, and quite a number had received injuries which maimed them for life or resulted in death.[906] Cortés’ wounds were most serious. The indomitable spirit which sustained him so far now yielded with the failing body. Severe scalp cuts brought on fever,[907] which caused his life to hang in the balance for some time. Finally his strong constitution and the excellent empiric methods of the native herb doctors prevailed, to the joy, not alone of Spaniards, but of Tlascaltecs, who had shown the utmost anxiety during the crisis.

During this period of Spanish inaction the Mexicans were energetically striving to follow up their blow against the invaders. The first act after ridding the capital of their presence was one of purgation, in which the victorious party fell on those whose lukewarmness, or whose friendly disposition toward Montezuma and his guests, had hindered the siege operations and aided the enemy. A tumult was soon raised, wherein perished four royal princes, brothers and sons of Montezuma,[908] whose death may be attributed to Cuitlahuatzin’s desire to remove any dangerous rival to the throne. Not that this was a necessary precaution, since his standing, as a younger brother of Montezuma, and his successful operations against the Spaniards, were sufficient to raise him above every other candidate.[909] Furthermore, as commander-in-chief of the army and as leader of the successful party, he held the key to the position, and accordingly was unanimously chosen. About the same time Cohuanacoch was elected king at Tezcuco, in lieu of the younger brother forced on the people by Cortés, and Quauhtemotzin, nephew of Montezuma, rose to the office of high-priest to Huitzilopochtli. The coronation was the next prominent event,[910] for which the indispensable captives had already been secured from the fleeing army. What more precious victims, indeed, could have been desired for the inaugural than the powerful Spaniards and the hated warriors of brave Tlascala? And what grander site for the ceremony than the great temple, recovered from the detested intruders and purified from foreign emblems? In connection with this came a series of festivals.[911]

The utmost activity was displayed in repairing the damage caused by the Spaniards, and in fortifying the city and its approaches against a possible future invasion. The construction and discipline of the army were improved in some degree after the examples given by the Europeans; its tactics were revised, and its arms perfected with the aid of captured weapons, the Chinantec pike being also introduced and tipped with Toledo blades or other metal points. Envoys were despatched to near and distant provinces, bidding for their support by remission of taxes and tributes, by restoration of conquered territories, by patriotic appeals, and by roseate views and promises.[912] The Spaniards were painted as selfish, perfidious, and cruel, intent on conquering the whole country, on enslaving the people, on extorting their substance, and on overthrowing social and religious institutions. Spoils and heads of Spanish men and horses were sent round to disabuse the people of their supposed invulnerability; and as a further encouragement the dreaded Cortés was declared to have fallen.

The most important missions were those to Michoacan and Tlascala, the former an independent kingdom of considerable extent, stretching westward beyond the lake region to the Pacific, over an undulating, well watered territory, which abounded in all the resources of a rich soil and a tropic climate. The inhabitants, the Tarascos, were distinct from the Aztecs in language, but fully their equals in culture, which was of the Nahua type, and as a rule successful in resisting the armed encroachments of the lake allies. The present ruler was Zwanga, who held court at Tzintzuntzan, on Lake Patzcuaro. He received the embassadors of Cuitlahuatzin with due attention, but hesitated about the answer to be given. The Aztecs had from time immemorial been the enemies of his people, and to aid them would surely bring upon him the wrath of the Spaniards, who must still be powerful, since the Mexicans came to plead for his alliance. In this dilemma it was resolved, with the advice of the council, to send plenipotentiaries to Mexico, in order to learn more fully the condition of affairs, and there determine what should be done.[913]

More decisive in its results was the mission to Tlascala. Regarded as the most important of all, it was intrusted to six prominent men, of acknowledged talent for negotiation. They came fortified with choice presents of robes, feathers, salt, and similar desirable commodities, and were received with customary courtesy by the assembled lords and council. The eldest was the first to speak. He recalled the intimate relationship between Mexico and Tlascala in blood and language, deplored the feud which had so long existed, and urged the establishment of permanent peace, for mutual benefit, whereby the Tlascaltecs would gain all the advantages of a long prohibited trade. One obstacle alone interposed to prevent a happy harmony, which was the presence of the Spaniards, to whom was due the unfortunate condition of the whole country. Their only aim was to make themselves masters, to overthrow the gods of the natives, to enslave the inhabitants, and impoverish them by exactions.

The Tlascaltecs would after rendering service be treated with the same base ingratitude and perfidy as the over generous Montezuma, and reap not only universal detestation, but the anger of the gods. Better, therefore, to seize the present favorable opportunity to deliver themselves from dreadful calamities, to establish prosperity and independence on a firm basis, and by a joint alliance recover the alienated provinces and share the revenues therefrom.[914] The first step to this desirable end was the destruction of the Spaniards, now at their mercy, whereby they would gain also the gratitude of neighboring peoples, the fame of patriots, and the blessing of the gods.

The speech delivered, together with the presents, the envoys withdrew to let the council deliberate. Bitter as was the enmity between the two peoples, intensified by the recent defeat, there were not wanting persons to whom the argument and offers seemed all that the most brilliant fortune could bring. What, indeed, had they in common with a strange race by whom they had been conquered, and whose presence portended many changes in their social and religious institutions, transmitted by their forefathers, and upheld with the blood of generations? Their independence would be endangered. Besides, the invaders had been shamefully defeated, and might never again hold up their heads. The whole country was mustering to drive them out, and, if successful, woe to Tlascala, as their ally. In any case a struggle was in prospect, wherein their sons and brethren would be sacrificed by the thousands. And for what? For the benefit of strangers, always ready with their yoke of slavery. On the other hand, they were offered the peace so long desired, with its accompanying blessings; deliverance from the trade blockade and seclusion which had so long afflicted them, together with the attractive adjunct of assured independence, and the triumphant and profitable position of conquering allies of the Mexicans.[915]

The strongest advocate of these views was Xicotencatl junior, who had never forgotten the several Spanish victories that checked his triumphal career as soldier and general, and humiliated him in the eyes of the whole people. Yet this feeling was tinged with love for the independence and welfare of the country, threatened, in his eyes, by the invaders. With the news of disaster at Mexico his party had assumed respectable proportions. Some of its members were impelled by motives similar to his own; some were bribed by Mexican gifts, and promises of wealth and preferment; some were tempted by the arms, baggage, and treasure of the fugitives, whom it seemed easy now to overcome. Not a few considered the burden of maintaining a horde of strangers, with the prospect of afterward yielding them service and blood for their aggrandizement. When the collectors of provisions for the Spaniards made their rounds they could not but observe the bitter feeling which prevailed in some quarters.[916] The elder Xicotencatl appears to have remonstrated with his son for breeding trouble; but this availed little, as may be supposed. During the deliberation of the council on the Mexican proposal the young chieftain stepped beyond the timid suggestions of those who inclined toward an Aztec alliance, and boldly advocated it as the only salvation for Tlascala.

Next spoke the wise Maxixcatzin, the leading representative of the republic. In his chivalrous nature devotion to the Spaniards exercised an influence, while as ruler of the richest district, in agriculture and trade, he had also an eye to the benefits which would accrue from an alliance with them. He recalled the many instances of treachery and want of good faith on the part of the Mexicans to show how little their promises could be relied on. It was merely the presence of the Spaniards that prompted their offer of alliance, which was to restore Mexico to its former terrorizing strength. This accomplished, the ancient enemy would not fail to remember that Tlascala, in addition to the old-standing enmity, had been one of the chief instruments in their late suffering and humiliation, and had figured as conqueror and master over them. They would lose no time in avenging themselves, and by the destruction of the republic remove forever so dangerous an enemy. Far better, then, to maintain the friendship of the Spaniards, whose good faith had been tried, and whose prowess was not broken by one defeat. Previous to their arrival they had been suffering from the want even of necessaries, and had been exposed to incessant ravages and warfare, which threatened their very existence. With the Spaniards’ aid they had been freed from this want and danger; they had enriched themselves with trade and spoils, and had raised the republic to the most prominent position it had ever occupied, all far beyond what the Mexicans would ever permit. What did the gods say? Oracles and omens had foretold the doom of the empire. It was in vain to struggle with fate, which had decreed the control to the new-comers. The interests of the state demanded the friendship of these destined victors, who offered them wealth and glory, while good faith and honor demanded loyalty to the invited guests, from whom so many benefits had already sprung.

Observing the effect of the appeal on the wavering members, young Xicotencatl hastened to defend his cherished plans, but with such imprudence as to rouse Maxixcatzin to strike him. He was thereupon jostled out of the council-chamber, badly bruised and with torn clothes.[917] Against this expulsion none of his supporters ventured to remonstrate, and the vote being unanimously in favor of Maxixcatzin’s views, the Aztec envoys were notified accordingly.[918] How momentous this discussion! And did the council of Tlascala realize the full import of their acts? For thereby they determined the present and permanent fate of many powerful nations besides themselves. Undoubtedly the country would at some time have fallen before the dominant power; but, had it been possible for the nations of the great plateau to combine and act in unison, very different might have been their ultimate condition. Cortés and his company owed their safety to a decision which kept alive discord between the native tribes, while the Tlascaltecs were saved from what probably would have been a treacherous alliance, perhaps from annihilation, only to sink into peaceful obscurity and merge into the mass of conquered people.[919] They endeavored to keep the disagreement in the council-chamber a secret from Cortés, but he heard of it, and failed not to confirm Maxixcatzin in his devotion by holding forth the most brilliant prospects as the result of this alliance. The words by which the council decided for Cortés were to him as drops of perspiration on the lately fevered brow, which tell that the crisis is passed.

There was another cloud about this time appearing on the horizon of the fortunes of Cortés. During his stay at Tlascala the men of Narvaez began again to moot the subject of return. The golden vision of Mexico’s treasures had been rudely dissipated, leaving only the remembrance of hardships and disgrace. The flowery Antilles appeared more alluring than ever to these gold-seekers, only too many of whom were more accustomed to the farm than to the camp. They could think of nothing but the ease and security of the fertile plantations, where nature unloaded its wealth, and where docile natives ministered to every want. In furtherance of this idea it was urged on Cortés, by Duero and other leaders, to retire, to Villa Rica before the Mexicans had succeeded in their efforts to cut off his retreat. There they would intrench themselves while awaiting aid from the islands and arranging a fresh campaign, having the vessels to fall back on, if necessary. But to these intimations Cortés would not for a moment listen. And there were many reasons for this—his ambition to be all or nothing in this enterprise, his crimes against Velazquez, his irregularities regarding the king’s interests, which only brilliant success could redeem. As well might they talk to the unyielding hills; he would join his dead comrades in the canals of Mexico, or voluntarily ascend to the sacrificial stone, but he would not turn back from this adventure.

When the general revealed his firm intention to renew the campaign as soon as possible, the outcry became loud. The Noche Triste and the narrow escape at Otumba had left impressions too horrible to be easily forgotten. They shuddered at the thought of renewing such risk, and cursed the gold which had allured them to former discomfitures. If the general wished to throw away his life he might do so, but they were not such madmen. Moreover, it was highly imprudent to place so much faith in the Tlascaltecs, who might at the first encounter with the enemy abandon or betray allies differing so greatly in language, religion, and customs. A formal demand was therefore addressed to him, through the notary, to return to Villa Rica, on the ground of their small number and dismembered condition, devoid as they were of clothing, arms, ammunition, and horses, and with so many maimed and wounded. They were wholly unfit to undertake any campaign, much less against an enemy who had just defeated them when they were far stronger in number and armament than now. Declared, as it was, in the name of the army, though in truth by the men of Narvaez only,[920] and headed by such persons as Duero, with invocation of the imperial name, the proposal placed Cortés in a dilemma. Yet it roused in him only a firmer determination. He was more master now than ever he could be under the new proposal; and Cortés loved to be master. The same reasons which had moved him before to advance into Mexico in quest of independent fame and wealth, and to evade the prospective disgrace and poverty, imprisonment and death, were reasons stronger now than ever.

Here was another of those delicate points on which the destiny of the Estremaduran seemed ever turning. Rousing himself to meet the issue, though still weak with disease, he summoned an audience. “What is this I hear?” he asked of the assembled soldiers. “Is it true that you would retire from the fertile fields of New Spain, you, Spaniards, Castilians, Christians! leave the ship-loads of gold which in the Aztec capital we saw and handled; leave still standing the abominable idols with their bloody ministers, and tamely summon others to enjoy the riches and glories which you are too craven to achieve? Alack! for your patriotism, for duty to your emperor, to God, for the honor of Spanish arms! Know you not that one step further in retreat than necessary is equivalent to the abandonment of all? Or perhaps the fault is my own. I have been too careful of mine ease, too cowardly to expose my person to the dangers into which I directed you; I have fled before the foe—help me to remember, friends—I have left my comrades to die unaided on the battle-field while I sought safety, I have fed while you starved, I have slept while you labored, or my too sluggish brain has refused the duty due by your commander.” The speaker paused, but only for a moment. At this, the very beginning of his plea, a hundred eyes were affectionately regarding him through their moisture, a hundred tongues were denying all insinuations of baseness as applied to him, their great and brave commander. Already their hearts were aflame with avarice and ambition; aflame, like St Augustine’s, with Christian zeal and fervency of devotion, soldier fanatics as they were, stern, forehead-wrinkled men—for fighting men, no less than fighting dogs, display a gravity in their every-day demeanor unknown to tamer spirits. “Are not my interests yours, and yours mine?” continued Cortés. “Therefore, I pray you, ascribe not my views to disregard of your wishes, but to a desire to promote the good of all. What people going to war that does not sometimes suffer defeat; but what brave men ever abandoned a glorious campaign because of one repulse? And do you not see that it is more dangerous to go than to remain—that to retreat further would only invite further attack? I will not allude before soldiers of mine,” concluded the speaker, “to the everlasting infamy of abandoning these brave Tlascaltecs to the enmity of the combined forces of the plateau for having stood the Spaniards’ friend in time of danger. Go, all of you who will! abandon your sacred trusts, and with them the riches in mines, and tributes here awaiting you, and fair encomiendas, with countless servants to attend before your new nobility; for myself, if left alone, then alone will I here remain and general Indians, since Spaniards have all turned cowards!”

Hearts of steel could not withstand such words so spoken; and loud came the shouts of approval from Cortés’ old comrades, who swore that not a man should be allowed to endanger the common safety by leaving. This manifestation was in itself sufficient to shame the disaffected into resignation, although not into silence, for mutterings were frequent against the quality of persuasion employed by the general and his beggarly followers, who had nothing to lose except their lives. In order somewhat to allay their discontent Cortés promised that at the conclusion of the next campaign their wishes should be consulted, and the first favorable opportunity for departure be tendered them—a cool proposal, affecting only those who would be left of them, yet made with sober visage by the artless Cortés.[921]

The determination of Cortés was now what it always had been, namely, to conquer and become master of all New Spain; and the greater the difficulty the greater the glory. Fearing that further evil might result from continued inactivity, and from remaining a burden on the allies, Cortés resolved to lose no time in taking the field.[922] In the fertile plains to the south of Tlascala lay the rich province of Tepeyacac,[923] euphonized into Tepeaca, long hostile to the republic. Intimidated by the subjugation of Tlascala and Cholula, the three brothers who ruled it[924] had tendered their submission to the conquerors, only to return to their old masters, the Aztecs, the moment fortune seemed to favor them. The latter had indeed, in connection with their other preparations, made particular efforts to stir the provinces round Tlascala and toward the coast, sending large garrisons to form centres for the native armies, the object being partly to cut off communication with the coast, so as to prevent reinforcements from reaching the Spaniards, and partly to effect a rear movement when it might be decided to attack the republic. Reinforcements had already been surprised in this region and slaughtered, as we have seen, and raids had been made on the allied frontier.

Here was all the cause the Spaniards required for attack, and as the country was for the most part open, the horsemen would have great advantage over native troops. Its subjugation, therefore, promised to be easy, and would secure the rear. The Tlascaltecs approved of beginning the campaign with the outlying provinces,[925] where the concentration of forces was smaller, and where the memory of Aztec misrule and oppression might readily induce the inhabitants to transfer their allegiance, so as to strengthen the conquerors and allure fresh allies. They were eager to begin the campaign, and offered a large force of warriors. Xicotencatl junior also evinced a promptness to coöperate, as if to remove any ill feeling that might have arisen from his machinations.[926] In order to thoroughly enlist their sympathies Cortés made an arrangement with the lords whereby a number of privileges were assured to their people, together with a fixed proportion of the spoils[927] to be obtained during the war.

The troops were mustered at Tzompantzinco, near Tlascala, amidst a large concourse of people. There were about four hundred and fifty Spanish soldiers, with nearly twenty horses, a few firelocks and field-pieces, and a number of cross-bows, but the arms were chiefly swords and pikes. The reinforcements consisted of six thousand Tlascaltecs, including a few Cholultecs and Huexotzincas, a larger force being prepared under Xicotencatl to follow later.[928] A demand had meanwhile been sent to Tepeaca to confirm the oath of allegiance once tendered the Spanish sovereign and dismiss the Aztec garrisons, whereupon all past offences would be forgiven. The reply was a contemptuous refusal, with the threat that any attempt at coercion would bring upon the invaders worse punishment than they had received at Mexico, for they all would be dished up at the festive board. Every proposal being rejected, a formal notice was sent condemning the province to be chastised with sword, and fire, and slavery, for rebellion and murder of Spaniards.[929]

The army now advanced on Zacatepec, the first town on the Tepeaca border, where an ambuscade had been prepared in some maize fields. This was discovered in time to prevent a surprise, but a fierce encounter took place, wherein the horsemen did good execution, and victory was soon obtained, with slaughter of the flying. Ojeda, who had led the Tlascaltecs into the thickest of the fight, came during the pursuit to the residence of the cacique and planted there the republican flag, in token of capture. These warriors had suffered severely, owing in part to the use of large lances by the enemy, but the Spaniards had only a dozen wounded, beside two horses, one of which died.[930] During the three days’ stay at this town the neighborhood was reduced, with pillage and enslavement.

The next camp was formed at Acatzingo, which had been abandoned by the enemy after a short fight. These successes so discouraged the Mexican garrisons that they abandoned the province, and the allies, on marching straight for Tepeaca, five days later, entered it without opposition. This now became the headquarters for the different expeditions sent out to reduce the surrounding districts;[931] and rare work they made of it, plundering, and tearing down idols, and making captives. Salt, cotton, feather ware, and other commodities were abundant, and with their share therein the Tlascaltecs were highly delighted, but the Spaniards obtained little gold. The rulers of the country had fled; one of them to Mexico, to remonstrate against the retreat of the garrisons, and to demand additional aid. Finding themselves abandoned, the inhabitants sent to beg mercy of the conquerors, and being assured that no further harm should be done them, they returned to the city and again tendered allegiance. Several other towns were taken, some, like Tecalco, south of Tepeaca, being evacuated, others tendering submission in advance, while still others required hard fighting to subdue.

The reduction of the Tepeaca province, which was virtually accomplished in about a month,[932] produced an immediate and marked effect, not only on the natives, but on the late refractory Spanish soldiers. The latter were reconciled to the prosecution of the conquest on finding the opening campaign so speedy and comparatively bloodless, and fresh confidence was infused into the Tlascaltecs, and new allies came forward, while the prestige of Spanish arms began again to spread terror among the enemy and open a way into other provinces. This was promoted by messengers, who carried promises of release from Aztec tyranny, and pointed out the fate of rebellious and stubborn Tepeacan towns. The Mexicans, who during the inactivity of the allies had grown somewhat lax in their efforts to conciliate subject provinces, now became more earnest, more free with presents and offers to remit tribute. These endeavors were greatly counteracted by their troops, however, whose insolence and greed drove the inhabitants to tacitly or openly favor the Spaniards.

The withdrawal of the Aztec garrisons from Tepeaca served to strengthen those on its frontier, particularly at Quauhquechollan,[933] ten or eleven leagues south-west of the new Spanish head-quarters, which protected the approach to the southern pass into the valley of Mexico.[934] Its province bordered on Huexotzinco and Cholula, and skirting the snow-crowned Popocatepetl it extended for some distance south and south-east of it. The lord,[935] who had tendered allegiance to Spain simultaneously with Montezuma, had recently sent in the assurance of his loyalty, with the explanation that fear of the Mexicans had prevented him from doing so before. A few days later came his messengers to ask protection against the Aztec garrisons, reinforced to the extent of some thirty thousand men,[936] who, from their camp within a league of the city, were plundering and committing outrages. This appeal being quite in accord with the plans of Cortés, he at once complied by sending Olid and Ordaz, with two hundred soldiers, thirteen horses, most of the fire-arms and cross-bows, and thirty thousand allies.[937] It was arranged with the Quauhquechollans that they should begin the attack as soon as the Spaniards came near, and cut off communication between the city garrison and the adjoining camp.

Olid marched by way of Cholula, and received en route large accessions of volunteers, chiefly from the province to be aided and from Huexotzinco, all eager for a safe blow at the Aztecs, and for a share of the spoils. So large, indeed, was the enrolment that some of the ever timid men of Narvaez conjured up from this a plot for their betrayal into the hands of the Mexicans, with whom rumor filled every house at Quauhquechollan, making in all a larger number than at Otumba. The loyalty of the new province being wholly untried, and that of Huexotzinco but little proven, the alarm appeared not unfounded, and even the leaders became so infected as to march back to Cholula, whence the chiefs of the suspected allies were sent under guard to Cortés, with a report of the occurrence.[938] The latter examined the prisoners, and readily surmised the cause of the trouble; but, as it would not answer to dampen native ardor for the war by leaving them in that suspicion, he apologized for what had happened as a misunderstanding, smoothed their ruffled feelings with presents, and encouraged their zeal. With an additional force of one hundred soldiers and some horses he set out for Cholula to assume command in person, shaming the men out of their fears,[939] and accepting the large reinforcements which were offered on the way.

As soon as he came in sight, at the end of the valley, the Quauhquechollans, who had made their preparations in advance, fell on the garrison, securing at the same time the scouts and stragglers. The Aztecs resisted valiantly, encompassed though they were by assailants who filled the roofs and heights round the temple which formed the citadel. An entry was effected by the Spaniards, and the natives rushed upon the warriors with such fury that scarcely one was left to tell the tale. A number of the besieged, outside the citadel, had already fled toward the Aztec camp, whose battalions were now descending, brilliant in feathered mail and ornaments. Entering the further side of the city they began to fire it. Cortés was summoned to the rescue, and hurrying onward with the cavalry he soon routed their disorganized masses, leaving pursuit chiefly to the allies. At a certain pass the enemy rallied, to be dislodged within a few moments and cut off from their camp. Exhausted by battle and flight, under a broiling sun, they turned in disorderly scramble up the steep mountain slope, only to find themselves checked on the summit by fleeter bands of Quauhquechollans and other allies, and obliged to make a stand. By this time they could hardly raise their hands in self-defence, and the battle became little more than a butchery, during which scattered remnants alone managed to escape, leaving the rich garments and jewels of the dead to stay the pursuers, who now, according to Cortés, numbered over one hundred thousand. Several Spaniards were wounded, and one horse killed.[940] The field being reaped, the victors entered the camp,[941] which was divided into three parts, each large enough, it is said, to form a respectable town, well appointed, with hosts of servants, supplies, and paraphernalia. Laden with spoils they returned to the city to receive a well merited ovation. The citizens were afterward rewarded with several privileges for their loyal aid;[942] deservedly rewarded, for without their coöperation the place could not have been captured without difficulty, since it lay between two rivers[943] coursing through deep ravines, and was shielded on one side by a steep mountain range. Beside its natural strength the city was protected by a breastwork of masonry, which extended toward the mountain and down into the ravines, forming here a smooth facing of some twenty feet, and rising in other places into a distinct wall of great height and width,[944] with a parapet. There were four entrances,[945] wide enough for one horseman only, with staircase approaches, and with maze-like lappings of the walls, which rendered it difficult to force an entrance. Along the walls lay piles of stones and rocks ready for the foe. The population was estimated at five or six thousand families, supported in part by a number of gardens within the city, and subject to it were three towns in the valley, containing an equal number of people.

Four leagues south of Quauhquechollan lay Itzocan,[946] a well built city, with a hundred temples, says Cortés, and a population of three or four thousand families, situated in a fertile, irrigated valley, which from the climatic protection afforded by the sheltering mountains included cotton as one of its staples, and had also some attractive gold mines. The place lay at the foot of a hill, surmounted by a strong turreted fort, and offered a striking resemblance to Málaga, it was said. The level sides were protected by the banks of a deep river, which here formed a semicircle, and all round the city ran a wall five feet high, well provided with towers and stone ammunition. The cacique was an alien, appointed by Montezuma, whose niece he had married, and possessed strong sympathies for the lake government, which maintained a fine garrison. To reduce the place, so as to root out a stronghold for the dissemination of Aztec influence, was of the first importance.

Thither, therefore, Cortés proceeded with his forces, including allies, who were by this time so numerous as to cover the plains and mountains, wherever the eye could reach, representing at least one hundred and twenty-five thousand men. On arriving before the city it was found occupied only by warriors, estimated at from five to eight thousand, the women and children having all withdrawn. Guided by natives the army passed to a point affording a comparatively easy entrance. The surprised garrison now thought less of resistance than of securing their retreat across the river. It was spanned by a bridge, but this the Spaniards destroyed as they fell upon them, and many of the unfortunate Aztecs took to the water in their confusion, only to add to the list of victims. The cavalry, swimming across with ease, overtook and arrested a large portion of the flying till the allies came up to aid in the slaughter.[947] Two captives were sent to offer pardon to the inhabitants, on the condition of their returning and remaining loyal. Soon after the chiefs came to make arrangements, and within a few days the city had resumed its wonted appearance.

Cortés thought it the best policy, in this frontier town of his conquest, to make a favorable impression by extending mercy, and with the rapid flight of his fame as an irresistible conqueror spread also his reputation as a dispenser of justice, lenient or severe, as the case might be. A number of caciques hastened accordingly to propitiate him, during his stay in this quarter,[948] by tendering submission and praying to be confirmed in authority. Among them came a deputation from the inhabitants of Ocopetlahuacan,[949] at the foot of Popocatepetl, who cast the blame for delay on their cacique. He had fled with the retreating Mexicans, and they disowned him, praying that the dignity might be conferred on his brother, who had remained, and who shared the popular desire for Spanish supremacy. After a judicious hesitation the request was granted, with the intimation that future disobedience would be severely chastised.[950]

Still more flattering overtures came from the caciques of eight towns in Cohuaixtlahuacan,[951] some forty leagues to the south, who had already tendered allegiance on the occasion when Pilot Umbría first passed through that province in search of Zacatula’s gold mines.[952]

Before leaving Itzucan, Cortés was called upon to appoint a successor to the fugitive cacique. The candidates were a bastard son of the late native cacique, whose death was due to Montezuma, and the son of the deceased ruler’s legitimate daughter, married to the lord of Quauhquechollan. The general, being only too eager to please so loyal an ally, decided in favor of his son, on the ground of legitimacy; but since he was not yet ten years old, the regency was intrusted to the bastard uncle, aided by some chiefs.[953] The boy followed the army to imbibe Spanish ideas and instruction, and received baptism not long after, with the name of Alonso,[954] the first Christian prince in New Spain.

Another important yet troublesome expedition was to secure the road to Villa Rica, on which so many Spaniards had fallen, and which was still dangerous. It was intrusted to two hundred men, with ten horses, and a large force of allies.[955] The first reduction in this quarter had been Quecholac, where pillage and enslavement formed the retaliation for murders committed,[956] and Tecamachalco, which gave greater trouble before it fell, and yielded over two thousand slaves, besides much spoil.[957] The chastisement of these districts had taught the easterly parts a lesson, so that more hardship than fighting was now encountered, for the march lay to a great extent through uninhabited tracts. It was in the region of Las Lagunas that some captive Spaniards had been denuded and fattened, and then goaded to death, like bulls in a ring, for the amusement of the natives. The bodies had then been devoured, a part of the flesh being jerked and distributed over the district as choice morsels, and pronounced savory. Forty of the most guilty tormentors were secured in a yard for execution. Informed of their fate they began to dance and sing, commending themselves quite cheerfully to the gods as they bent their heads to the sword.[958] How blessed the righteous when they die!