Afternoon Session
THE PRESIDENT: Now, Sir David, you were going to show these applications.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord.
I wonder if I might leave, for the moment, Number 1, which my friend General Rudenko will deal with, because he will deal with another one; and if I might deal with the ones which I have?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The second one is on behalf of Defendant Kaltenbrunner and is an application to cross-examine three witnesses whose affidavits were used by the Prosecution. The first is Tiefenbacher, and he dealt with conditions at Mauthausen; the second, Kandruth, who dealt with the same subject; the third, Stroop, dealt with the reception of orders from the Defendant Kaltenbrunner by Stroop as SS and Polizeiführer in Warsaw. The Prosecution submits that in these cases cross-examination by way of interrogatories would be sufficient. Next, I do not know if...
THE PRESIDENT: Interrogatories are all they asked for, certainly in the case of—in all three.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will have no objection to cross-interrogatories as long as they are not brought here as witnesses.
My Lord, the next application is on behalf of the Defendant Von Neurath to use M. François-Poncet as witness. The Prosecution will be grateful if the Tribunal would allow that to stand over for a day or two, as my French colleagues are awaiting instructions from Paris at the moment and they have not got a reply yet. I do not think it will prejudice the Defendant Von Neurath’s case. It will be time for a reply before there is any difficulty as to time.
Then, My Lord, the next is an application on behalf of the Defendant Von Schirach. I think that all that is now wanted is to use an affidavit from Dr. Otto Wilhelm von Vacano. The affidavit is 12 pages long and is a highly academic statement on the educational philosophy underlying the Adolf Hitler Schools. The Prosecution feel that the matter has been thoroughly covered by the Defendant Von Schirach himself and also by his witnesses Hoepken and Lauterbacher, and they feel that the affidavit would be cumulative and repetitive. But, of course, it is an affidavit; it is not a question of an oral witness, and if the Tribunal feel that they ought to have it, the Prosecution do not wish to press their objection unreasonably.
THE PRESIDENT: Has the affidavit been translated yet?
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I have certainly got an English—I have read the English translation of it, My Lord, so I assume that it has been translated into the other languages.
The next, applications from the Defendants Hess and Frank to put an interrogatory to General Donovan. If I may put the objection quite shortly, that raises the same point as the application on 2 May 1946 for Mr. Patterson of the United States War Department. The objection of the Prosecution is the same as I made on that occasion, that when you are cross-examining a witness as to credibility you are bound by his answer, and should not, in the opinion of the Prosecution, be allowed to call evidence to contradict him. So it is on exactly the same point, the relationship between the witness Gisevius and the United States Office of Strategic Services.
The next application is on behalf of the Defendant Speer for the approval of certain documents which are in his possession. The Prosecution have no objection to the application. They reserve the right to make any individual objection when the documents are produced at the Trial.
My Lord, the next is a purely formal application on behalf of the Defendant Jodl, whose case is now before the Tribunal, to use an affidavit of Dr. Lehmann. There is no objection to that.
Next is the application on behalf of the Defendant Hess...
THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, that application we have already heard. We have heard the arguments for that in full and the Tribunal will consider that.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.
Then I think that only leaves an application of the Defendant Keitel for the use of a decree of Hitler of 20 July 1944, and the Prosecution has no objection to that.
My Lord, I think I have dealt with every one except the first one, which my friend General Rudenko will deal with—the application of the Defendant Göring.
GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): Members of the Tribunal, the Soviet Prosecution have several times expressed their view respecting the application of Defense Counsel to call witnesses with regard to the mass shooting of Polish officers by the Fascist criminals in Katyn Forest. Our position is that this episode of criminal activity on the part of the Hitlerites has been fully established by the evidence presented by the Soviet Prosecution, which was a communication of the special Extraordinary State Commission investigating the circumstances of the mass shooting of Polish officer prisoners of war by the German Fascist aggressors in Katyn Forest. This document was presented by the Soviet Prosecution under the Document Number USSR-54 on 14 February 1946, and was admitted by the Tribunal; and, as provided by Article 21 of the Charter, it is not subject to argument.
Now the Defense once again are putting in an application for the calling of three supplementary witnesses—a psychiatrist, Stockert; a former adjutant of the Engineer Corps, Böhmert; and a special expert of the staff of the Army Group Center, Eichborn.
We object to the calling of these three witnesses for the following reasons:
The calling of the psychiatrist Stockert as a witness must be considered completely pointless as the Tribunal cannot be interested in the question of how the commission drew its conclusion—a conclusion which was published in a Hitlerite White Book. No matter how this conclusion was drawn, the fact of the mass shooting of Poles by Germans in Katyn Forest has been unequivocally established by the Soviet Extraordinary State Commission.
Stockert himself is not a doctor of forensic medicine but a psychiatrist—at that time a member of the Hitlerite commission, not on the basis of his competence in the field of forensic medicine, but as a representative of the German Fascist military command.
The former adjutant, Captain Böhmert, is himself a participant in the crimes of Katyn Forest, having been a member of the Engineer Corps which carried out the executions. As he is an interested party, he cannot give any useful testimony for clarifying the circumstances of this matter.
Third, the expert of the staff of the Army Group Center also cannot be admitted as a witness because he, in general, knew nothing at all about the camp of the Polish prisoners of war, and could not have known all that pertained to the matter. The same reasons apply to his potential testimony to the fact that the Germans never perpetrated any mass shooting of Poles in the district of Katyn. Moreover, Eichborn cannot be considered an unprejudiced witness.
Regardless of these objections which express the opinion of all the prosecutors, the Soviet Prosecution especially emphasize the fact that these bestial crimes of the Germans in Katyn were investigated by the special authoritative State Investigating Committee, which went with great precision into all the details. The result of this investigation has established the fact that the crimes in Katyn were perpetrated by Germans, and are but a link in the chain of many bestial crimes perpetrated by the Hitlerites, a great many proofs of which have previously been submitted to the Tribunal.
For these reasons the Soviet Prosecution categorically insists on the rejection of the application of the Defense Counsel.
I have finished my statement.
THE PRESIDENT: Counsel for Kaltenbrunner, Sir David was right, was he not, in saying that you were only asking for cross-interrogatories, which the Prosecution do not object to?
DR. KURT KAUFFMANN (Counsel for Defendant Kaltenbrunner): Mr. President, I have no objection to questionnaires, but I would then ask that these witnesses be heard in my presence outside this courtroom; and then, on the basis of this interrogation, questionnaires can later be submitted to the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: But are the witnesses here?
DR. KAUFFMANN: Mr. President, I do not know.
THE PRESIDENT: We granted interrogatories, and you now ask for cross-interrogatories; that is all you ask for, and that does not involve bringing the witnesses here at all. The cross-interrogatories will be sent to them; they will answer them. If, for any reason, on the cross-interrogatories being answered, you want to make further application, you can always do so.
DR. KAUFFMANN: The rule of the Court so far was, as I understood it, that I have the right to cross-examine in this courtroom if the Prosecution submits affidavits of these witnesses here. That has, so far, been the ruling of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it depends on what the substance of the affidavit is. If it is a matter of importance, no doubt we—we have never made any general rule, but we have generally allowed the witness to be brought here for cross-examination if the matter is of importance; but if the matter is of less importance, then we have very frequently directed that there should be cross-interrogatories.
DR. KAUFFMANN: May I add to this last sentence? I consider this testimony extremely important. The Court will probably know the contents.
THE PRESIDENT: Again in your application you say that three interrogatories were used by the Prosecution on the understanding that the deponents would be subject to cross-interrogation. That means, I suppose, cross-interrogatories. It does not say cross-examination; it says cross-interrogation. Do you want to have them brought here for cross-examination?
DR. KAUFFMANN: That is what I had intended, unless my first suggestion is accepted. My first suggestion is simpler, in my opinion, and it would save time. It proposes that I be allowed to be present at the questioning of the witnesses outside this courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, we understand your point of view, Dr. Kauffmann, and we will consider it.
DR. KAUFFMANN: Thank you.
DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): May I make a brief statement with reference to General Rudenko’s motion?
General Rudenko wishes to reject my application for evidence, referring to Article 21, I believe, of the Charter. I do not believe that this regulation opposes my application. It is true of course, that government reports are evidence...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I think the Tribunal has already ruled that that article does not prevent the calling of witnesses; but General Rudenko, in addition to an argument based upon Article 21, also gave particular reasons why he said that these particular witnesses were not witnesses who ought to be called. He said that one of them was a psychiatrist, and the other one could not give any evidence of any value. We should like to hear you upon that.
DR. STAHMER: In the report submitted by the Soviet Union, the charge is made that members of the engineer staff which was stationed near Katyn carried out the execution of these Polish officers. They are mentioned by name, and I am bringing counterevidence—namely members of the same staff—to prove that during the whole time that this staff was stationed there no killings of Polish officers occurred. I consider this is a pertinent assertion and a presentation of relevant evidence. One cannot eliminate a witness by saying that he was involved in the act. With reference to these people, that is not yet settled, and it is not mentioned at all in the record. Neither are these people, whom I have now named, listed in the Russian record as having taken part in the deed. Apart from that, I consider it out of the question to eliminate a witness by saying that he committed the deed. That is what has to be proved by hearing him.
THE PRESIDENT: About the psychiatrist, was he a member of the German commission?
DR. STAHMER: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: He was a member of it?
DR. STAHMER: Yes. He was present at the unloading, and he ascertained from the condition of the corpses that the executions must have been carried out at some time before the occupation by the German Army.
THE PRESIDENT: But he does not actually say in the application that he was a member. He said he was present during the visit of the military commission; he knows how the resolution of the commission was produced.
DR. STAHMER: I do not think he was an appointed member, but he took part in this inspection and in the duties connected with it. As far as I know, he was a regimental doctor in some regiment near—he was a regimental doctor of a regimental staff in the vicinity.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, we will consider your argument.
Then, is the counsel for Von Neurath agreeable that that matter should stand over? Is counsel for Von Neurath here? He is not here? Very well then, we will consider that.
Then, Counsel for the Defendant Schirach, do you wish to say anything in answer to what Sir David said?
DR. NELTE: My colleague Dr. Sauter asked me, if necessary, to represent the interests of the Defendant Von Schirach.
As to the statement of Sir David, I have only to say that, according to the opinion of the Defendant Von Schirach, the witness Von Vacano, who made and signed this affidavit, makes statements on a number of points on which Herr Von Schirach did not speak when he was examined as a witness. I therefore ask the Court to examine this affidavit to determine whether it does not contain individual points which would be important in connection with the charges against Von Schirach, and then to decide whether to admit it.
THE PRESIDENT: Then does counsel for the Defendants Hess and Frank want to say anything about the application for an interrogatory to General Donovan? Dr. Seidl, we have already heard the argument about it.
DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Hess and Frank): I have nothing to add to the arguments which I have already offered on the application to obtain official information from the War Department. I have also withdrawn my request for a decision on my first application, which was to obtain information from the War Department. It has not yet been decided, however, whether a questionnaire is to be submitted to Secretary of War Patterson.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well, the matter will be considered. There was no objection to the other three applications, so it is unnecessary to hear argument. Then the Tribunal will consider all these matters.
Now, Dr. Exner. Dr. Exner, if it is convenient to you personally, the Tribunal thinks that you might go a little bit faster in your speech through the earphones.
DR. EXNER: Before the recess, we heard what you told your officers when Adolf Hitler entered the government. Now I should like to hear what you felt about the appointment of Hitler as head of the State in 1934.
JODL: The union of the two offices in one person gave me much concern. When we lost Hindenburg, we lost the Field Marshal loved by the Wehrmacht and by the whole German people. What we should get with Hitler, we did not know. It is true, the result of the plebiscite was so overwhelming that one could say that a higher law than this popular will could not possibly exist. Thus we soldiers were quite justified in taking the oath to Adolf Hitler.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution speak of your close relationship with Hitler. When did you learn to know Adolf Hitler personally?
JODL: I was presented to the Führer by Field Marshal Keitel in the command train on 3 September 1939 when we were going to the Polish Eastern Front. At any rate that was the day I first exchanged words with him.
DR. EXNER: Two days after the outbreak of war?
JODL: Two days after the beginning of the war.
DR. EXNER: Did the Führer have confidence in you?
JODL: That came about very gradually. The Führer had a certain distrust of all General Staff officers, especially of the Army, as at that time he was still very skeptical toward the Wehrmacht as a whole.
I may, perhaps, quote a statement of his which was often heard: “I have a reactionary Army, a Christian”—sometimes he said too—“an imperial Navy, and a National Socialist Air Force.”
The relations between us varied a great deal. At first, until about the end of the campaign in the West, there was considerable reserve. Then his confidence in me increased more and more until August 1942. Then the great crisis arose, and his attitude to me was severely caustic and unfriendly. That lasted until 30 January 1943. Then relations improved and were particularly good, sincere, after the Italian betrayal in 1943 had been warded off. The last year was characterized by numerous sharp altercations.
DR. EXNER: To what extent did the Führer confide in you regarding his political intentions?
JODL: Only as far as we needed to know them for our military work. Of course, for the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff political plans are somewhat more necessary than for a battalion commander, for politics is part of strategy.
DR. EXNER: Did he permit discussions of political questions between himself and you?
JODL: Discussion of political questions was generally not admissible for us soldiers. One example is especially characteristic. When I reported to the Führer in September 1943 that Fascism was dead in Italy, for party emblems were scattered all over, this is what he said: “Such nonsense could only be reported by an officer. Once again it is obvious that generals do not understand politics.”
It can be easily understood that after such remarks the desire for any political discussions was slight.
DR. EXNER: Were political and military questions therefore kept strictly separate?
JODL: Yes, they were strictly separated.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible for you to consult him on military matters or not?
JODL: Consultation on military questions depended entirely on the circumstances of the moment. At a time when he himself was filled with doubts, he often discussed military problems for weeks or months, but if things were clear in his own mind, or if he had formed a spontaneous decision, all discussion came to an end.
DR. EXNER: The system of maintaining secrecy has often been discussed here. Were you also subject to this secrecy?
JODL: Yes, and to an extent which I really first realized during this Trial. The Führer informed us of events and occurrences at the beginning of the war—that is, the efforts of other countries to prevent this war, and even to put an end to it after it had already begun—only to the extent that these events were published in the press. He spoke to the politicians and to the Party quite otherwise than to the Wehrmacht; and to the SS differently again.
The secrecy concerning the annihilation of the Jews, and the events in the concentration camps, was a masterpiece of secrecy. It was also a masterpiece of deception by Himmler, who showed us soldiers faked photographs about these things in particular, and told us stories about the gardens and plantations in Dachau, about the ghettos in Warsaw and Theresienstadt, which gave us the impression that they were highly humane establishments.
DR. EXNER: Did not news reach the Führer’s headquarters from the outside?
JODL: The Führer’s headquarters was a cross between a cloister and a concentration camp. There were numerous wire fences and much barbed wire surrounding it. There were outposts on the roads leading to it to safeguard it. In the middle was the so-called Security Ring Number 1.
Permanent passes to enter this security ring were not given even to my staff, only to General Warlimont. Every guard had to check on each officer whom he did not know. Apart from reports on the situation, only very little news from the outer world penetrated into this holy of holies.
DR. EXNER: But what about foreign papers and radio reports?
JODL: Among foreign papers we studied very carefully the illustrated American and English papers, for they gave us very good information on new weapons. The foreign news itself was received and censored by the headquarters civilian press section. I was given only what was of military interest. Reports concerning internal politics, police, or the present situation were forbidden.
DR. EXNER: How did your collaboration with the Führer take place?
JODL: It took place as follows: Every day I made at least two reports on the situation. Some time ago it was asserted, rather indignantly, that I took part in 119 conferences. I took part in far more than 5,000 conferences. This discussion of the situation and reporting on the military position was at the same time an issuing of orders. On the basis of the reports on events, the Führer decided immediately what orders were to be given for the next few days.
I worked in this way: When my report was finished, I went into an adjoining room. There I immediately drew up the teletype messages and orders for the next few days, and while the reports on the situation were still going on, I read these drafts to the Führer for his approval. Warlimont then took them along to my staff where they were sent off.
DR. EXNER: Were you also present at political talks?
JODL: May I add—to complete the picture it should be said that I did not hear many things which were discussed during these reports on the situation. The same is true of Field Marshal Keitel, who worked in a similar manner.
DR. EXNER: Were political matters also brought up at the discussions of the situation, and to what extent were you present at discussions of a political nature?
JODL: As I have already said at the beginning, political problems were discussed only to the extent that was necessary for our military measures. Also on occasions when political and military leaders came together, when the Reich Foreign Minister was present, problems were discussed which lay on the borderline between politics and the conduct of the war. I did not take part in the exclusively political talks with foreign politicians, neutral or allied, or with the Reich Foreign Minister. I did not even take part in the discussions on the organization, armament, and administration of the occupied territories, for the purely military discussions of the situation in which I had to take part often lasted or required as much as 6 or 8 hours a day. I really needed the time I then had left for my own work.
DR. EXNER: It has often been stated here that it was impossible to contradict the Führer. Did you have any success with remonstrances?
JODL: One cannot say it was really impossible to contradict the Führer. Very many times I contradicted him most emphatically, but there were moments when one actually could not answer a word. Also by my objections I induced the Führer to desist from many things.
DR. EXNER: Can you give an example?
JODL: There were a great number of operational questions which do not interest the Court; but in the sphere of interest to the Court, there was, for example, Hitler’s intention to renounce the Geneva Convention. I prevented that because I objected.
DR. EXNER: Were there other possibilities of influencing Hitler?
JODL: If it was not possible by open contradiction to prevent something which according to my innermost convictions I should prevent, there was still the means I often employed of using delaying tactics, a kind of passive resistance. I delayed work on the matter and waited for a psychologically favorable moment to bring the question up again.
This procedure, too, was occasionally successful, for example, in the case of the intention to turn certain low-level fliers over to lynch justice. It had no success in the case of the Commando Order.
DR. EXNER: We will speak about that later. The Führer therefore ordered that himself.
The witness Gisevius in answer to questions by the Prosecution, said that “Jodl had a key position with Hitler.”
Did you know this witness by sight, or by hearing about him, or in any other way?
JODL: I did not have that honor. I heard the name of this witness for the first time here, and I saw him for the first time here in Court.
DR. EXNER: What, if anything, could you influence Hitler not to do?
JODL: Obviously, I could give the Führer only an extract of events. In view of his inclination to make emotional decisions I naturally was particularly cautious in presenting unverified reports made by agents. If the witness meant this by his general term of “key position,” he was not wrong. But if he intended it to mean that I kept from the Führer atrocities committed by our own Wehrmacht, or atrocities committed by the SS, then that is absolutely untrue. Besides, how was that witness to know about it?
On the contrary, I immediately reported any news of that kind to the Führer, and no one could have stopped me from doing so. I will give examples: An affidavit by Rittmeister Scheidt was read here. He testified that Obergruppenführer Fegelein told the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Guderian, and Generaloberst Jodl of atrocities committed by the SS Brigade Keminski in Warsaw. That is absolutely true. Ten minutes later I reported this fact to the Führer and he immediately ordered the dissolution of this brigade. When I heard through the American radio, through my press chief, of the shooting of 120 American prisoners near Malmédy, I immediately, on my own initiative, had an investigation started through the Commander, West so as to report the result to the Führer. When unimaginable horrors committed by an Ustashi company in Croatia came to my knowledge, I reported this to the Führer immediately.
DR. EXNER: I should like to interrupt you a moment. In your diary Document Number 1807-PS, you write, on 12 June 1942—Page 119, second document book:
“The German field police disarmed and arrested a Ustashi company because of atrocities committed against the civilian population in Eastern Bosnia.”
I should like to add here that this is noteworthy because this Ustashi company was something like an SS troop in Croatia and was fighting on the German side. Because of the atrocities, the German field police arrested this Ustashi company.
“The Führer did not approve of this measure, which was carried out by order of the commander of the 708th Division, as it undermined the authority of the Ustashi on which the whole Croatian State rests. This is bound to have a more harmful effect on peace and order in Croatia than the unrest of the population caused by the atrocities.”
Was this the incident of which you were thinking just now?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Have you another example?
JODL: After the issuing of the Commando Order, I reported enemy violations of international law to the Führer only when he would be certain to have heard of them through other channels. I reported cases of Commando undertakings and capture of Commandos only when I could be quite sure that he would hear of them through other channels. In this respect I did try to hold back any new spontaneous emotional decisions.
DR. EXNER: Was it possible to hold Hitler back?
JODL: Unfortunately not.
DR. EXNER: I do not understand.
JODL: I can only say, unfortunately not. There were endless ways through which the Führer was informed about military matters. Every individual and every office could hand in reports direct to the adjutant’s department. The photographer sent out by the Führer to take pictures at the front, found it expedient to use this opportunity to report to the Führer on military matters also. When I objected to this, the Führer answered, “I do not care from whom I hear the truth; the main thing is that I hear it.” These reports, however, were not reports of atrocities, but just the opposite. Unfortunately, through many channels hostile to the Wehrmacht, inciting reports against the correct and chivalrous attitude of the Wehrmacht reached the Führer. It was these reports which brought about these decisions which led to brutal proceedings. A tremendous amount of damage would have been avoided if we soldiers had been in a position to hold the Führer back.
DR. EXNER: What role did Canaris play in this connection?
JODL: Canaris saw the Führer dozens of times. Canaris could report to him what he wanted and whatever he knew. It seems to me that he knew far more than I, for I was concerned exclusively with the operational conduct of the war. But he never said a word. He never said one word to me, and it is quite clear why; this witness was on the best of terms—this man, who is now dead, was on the very best of terms with Himmler and with Heydrich. It was necessary that he should be so that they would not become suspicious of this nest of conspirators.
DR. EXNER: The witness Gisevius said a great deal about revolts and intentions to carry out a Putsch. Did you personally ever learn anything about such plans?
JODL: I never heard a single word or intimation about any revolt or about any intentions to carry out a Putsch.
DR. EXNER: At any time, before or during the war, would you have considered a revolt possible or promising?
JODL: The witness spoke of revolts as casually as of washing his hands. That alone proves to me that he never thought about it seriously. The results of the Kapp Putsch in 1921, of the Hitler Putsch of 1923, are well known. If more proof is necessary, there is the result of 20 July 1944. At that time no one any longer hoped for victory in the true sense of the word. Nevertheless, in this revolt, in this attempt, not one soldier, not a single arm of the Wehrmacht, not one worker, rose up. All the perpetrators and all the members of the Putsch were alone. To overthrow this system a revolution would have been necessary, a mightier, a more powerful revolution than the National Socialist one had been. And behind such a revolution there would have had to be the mass of the workers and the majority of the Wehrmacht as a whole, and not simply the commander of the Potsdam garrison of whom the witness spoke.
But how one could wage a war for life or death with other countries and at the same time carry on a revolution and expect to gain anything positive for the German people, I do not know. Only geniuses who lived in Switzerland can judge that. The German Wehrmacht and the German officers were not trained for revolution. Once the Prussian officers struck the ground with their swords—that was the only revolutionary deed of the German Armed Forces that I know of. That was in the year 1848. If today people who co-operated actively to bring Hitler to power, who had a part in the laws which we soldiers with our oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler were bound to support, if these people demanded revolution and mutiny of the Wehrmacht when they no longer liked the man, or when reverses occurred, then I can only call that wicked.
DR. EXNER: Did tension and crises arise in your relations with Hitler? You have already intimated something in that connection.
JODL: I could write a book about that more easily than give a brief answer. I should like to say only that, apart from many exalting moments, our life in the Führer’s headquarters was in the long run a martyrdom for us soldiers; for it was not a military headquarters, it was a civilian one, and we soldiers were guests there. It is not easy to be a guest anywhere for 5½ years. I should like to add just one thing. Among the few officers who dared to look the Führer squarely in the face, and to speak in a tone and manner that made listeners hold their breath because they feared a catastrophe—among these few officers, I myself belonged.
DR. EXNER: Give us an example of such a crisis in your relations with Hitler.
JODL: The worst crisis was in August 1942, in Vinnitza, when I defended Generaloberst Halder against unjustified criticism. It was my operational problem, the details of which will not interest the Court. Never in my life did I experience such an outbreak of rage from any human being. From that day on he never came to dinner.
DR. EXNER: To your mess?
JODL: No, he never came to the mess during the remainder of the war. The report on the situation was no longer given in my map room but in the Führer’s quarters. At every report on the situation from that day on an SS officer took part. Eight stenographers were ordered to be there, and from then on they took down every word. The Führer refused to shake hands with me any more. He did not greet me any more, or rarely. This situation lasted until 30 January 1943. He told me, through Field Marshal Keitel, that he could no longer work with me and that I would be replaced by General Paulus as soon as Paulus had taken Stalingrad.
DR. EXNER: Did you yourself not try during this time to be released from the OKW?
JODL: During all this time, every other day I asked General Schmundt to see to it that I should be sent at last to a position at the front with the mountain troops in Finland. I wanted to go there. But nothing happened.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution has asserted that you enjoyed the good graces of the Führer and that the Führer lavished his favor on you. How much of that is true?
JODL: I need not waste many words on that. What I said is the actual truth. I am afraid that what the Prosecution said is imagination.
DR. EXNER: It was also said that you were ambitious in your military career. How about that?
JODL: If the Prosecution mean that as a so-called political soldier I was promoted especially quickly, they are mistaken. I became a general in my fiftieth year. That is quite normal. In July 1940, when I was appointed general of Artillery it is true I skipped the grade of lieutenant general, but that was only an accident. A much younger general in the Air Force, Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, was to be promoted to Air Chief Marshal. Then Schmundt said to the Führer: “Jodl could perhaps do that too.” Thereupon, shortly before the Reichstag session, the Führer decided to promote me also—to general of Artillery. This Jeschonnek, who is much younger than I am, became Generaloberst much sooner than I. Zeitzler, who was formerly my subordinate, became Generaloberst at the same time as I did.
THE PRESIDENT: I think we will break off.
[A recess was taken.]
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn this afternoon at 4:30.
DR. EXNER: We were discussing to what extent you enjoyed the favor of the Führer, that is with regard to—
Did you not receive exceptional decorations from Hitler?
JODL: To my surprise, when the Vinnitza crisis was over, on 30 January 1943, I received from the Führer the Golden Party Badge. That was the only decoration I received from the Führer.
DR. EXNER: In the entire 5½ years of war?
JODL: Yes.
DR. EXNER: Did you receive a gift or donation from Hitler, or from the Party?
JODL: Not a single cent. If I am to conceal nothing I must mention the fact that at headquarters we received a package of coffee from the Führer each Christmas.
DR. EXNER: Did you acquire any property in the territories occupied by us, or receive any as a gift or as a token of remembrance?
JODL: Nothing at all. When in the Indictment the sentence is found to the effect that the defendants enriched themselves from the occupied territories, as far as I am concerned I have only one word for that, and I must be frank—it is a libel against a decent German officer.
DR. EXNER: During the war you saved some of your pay as a Generaloberst. How did you invest this money?
JODL: My entire savings of this war are at the moment in Reich bonds...
THE PRESIDENT: He said that he could not save a penny. He has not yet been cross-examined about it.
DR. EXNER: During the entire period of the war you were with Hitler and therefore you must really know him best. So I should like to ask you in detail about the personality of the Führer, but the Court is not very fond of repetition. Therefore tell us quite briefly what particularly influenced you in Hitler’s behavior, what impressed you particularly? What were the things you disliked?
JODL: Hitler was a leader to an exceptional degree. His knowledge and his intellect, his rhetoric, and his will power triumphed in the end in every spiritual conflict over everyone. He combined to an unusual extent logic and clarity of thought, skepticism and excess of imagination, which very frequently foresaw what would happen, but also very often went astray. I really marveled at him when in the winter of 1941-42, by his faith and his energy, he established the wavering Eastern Front; for at that time, as in 1812, a catastrophe was imminent. His life in the Führer headquarters was nothing but duty and work. The modesty in his mode of life was impressive. There was not one day during this war...
THE PRESIDENT: One moment. As you said, Dr. Exner, the Tribunal has had to listen to this sort of thing over and over again already. We are not interested in that.
DR. EXNER: Perhaps you can tell the Tribunal something which they have heard less frequently, namely what you disliked in the personality of Hitler.
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that, put in that general way, it is of any interest to the Tribunal, what he disliked in Hitler. I mean, can he not get on with his own case?
DR. EXNER: Did you feel that you were close to the Führer personally?
JODL: No; in no way at all.
DR. EXNER: All your relations were essentially official?
JODL: Yes, purely official. I did not belong to his private circle, and he did not know any more about me than that my name was Jodl, and that therefore, presumably, I came from Bavaria.
DR. EXNER: Who belonged to the private circle?
JODL: Chiefly all the old guard from the time when the Party was in its developing stage: Bormann first of all, the original women secretaries, his personal physician, and the political or SS adjutants.
DR. EXNER: Your Gauleiter speech was used by the Prosecution to prove that you were an unconditional follower of the Führer and his enthusiastic adherent. Tell us, how did you come to make that speech?
JODL: Bormann proposed this speech to the Führer, and the Führer ordered it, though I undertook this speech very reluctantly, chiefly because of lack of time. But it was generally the wish in this period of crisis...
DR. EXNER: When was this speech?
JODL: In November 1943. The Italian defection had preceded it. It was the time of the heavy air attacks. At that moment it was naturally necessary to give the political leaders at home a completely unembroidered picture of the whole military situation, but at the same time to fill them with a certain amount of confidence in the supreme leadership. This speech, which had the title, “The strategic situation of Germany at the beginning of the fifth year of the war,” could obviously not be made by a Blockleiter, it could only be made by an officer of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and so I came to deliver this speech.
DR. EXNER: What were the contents of this speech?
JODL: The contents, as I have already said, were an over-all picture of the strategic situation. Here, before the Tribunal naturally only the introduction was read. This introduction painted a picture of what lay behind us, but not from the political point of view, rather from the strategic angle. I described the operational necessity for all the operations of the so-called wars of aggression. In no way did I identify myself with the National Socialist Party, but, as is only natural for a General Staff officer, with my Supreme Commander; for at that time it was no longer a question of National Socialism or democracy. The question was the “to be or not to be” of the German people. And there were patriots in Germany too, not only in the neighboring states; and I shall count myself among these patriots while I have breath. Moreover, it is not important to whom one speaks, but it is important what one says and what one speaks about. Besides, I may also state that I delivered that same speech to the military district commanders and to the senior officers of the reserve army.
DR. EXNER: The beginning and the end of the speech contain a eulogy of the Party and the Führer that is incontestable. Why did you include that in a purely objective military speech?
JODL: It was impossible for me to begin a speech of that kind with a critical controversy about the Party or about my Supreme Commander. It was necessary to create confidence between the officer and the Party leader; for this confidence was not only necessary in order that the speech would serve its purpose; this confidence was the prerequisite for victory. Moreover, I should like to make an important point; that which the Prosecution submitted as Document Number L-172...
DR. EXNER: Is that the Gauleiter speech?
JODL: That is not the Gauleiter speech at all; it is not the speech which I delivered. That is nothing else but the “wastepaper basket” version of this speech. It is the first rough draft which was completely revised and altered because it contained many things which were not important. The entire nucleus of the speech, namely the section about the situation at the time, the part dealing with the enemy and the means at his disposal and his intentions, all that is missing. The things contained in this document are many hundreds of notes for the speech which were sent to me by my staff. I compiled my speech from these notes, and then I returned all this material to my staff.
DR. EXNER: Then it is not the manuscript of your speech?
JODL: It is in no way the manuscript; that looks entirely different.
DR. EXNER: Now we shall turn to a different point. Which leaders of the Party did you get to know from the time of the seizure of power until the outbreak of the war?
JODL: Not mentioning the soldiers, Reich Minister Frick alone. I was with him twice when the questions of Reich reform were to be discussed.
DR. EXNER: And which of the defendants here present did you know before 1939, or before the beginning of the war?
JODL: Of the defendants here, I knew only the Reich Marshal, Grossadmiral Raeder, Field Marshal Keitel, and Minister Frick; no one else.
DR. EXNER: In the meantime, had you concerned yourself at all with the literature of National Socialism?
JODL: No.
DR. EXNER: Did you participate in Reich Party rallies?
JODL: In the year 1937, in my official capacity, I participated the last 3 days in Nuremberg, when the Labor Service, the SA, and the Wehrmacht were reviewed.
DR. EXNER: Did you participate in the commemorations at Munich, that is, every year on 9 November?
JODL: No. I really did not belong there.
DR. EXNER: Can you tell us what your position was with respect to the semimilitary units of the Party?
JODL: These semimilitary organizations sprang up like mushrooms after the seizure of power; but only the SA under Röhm tried to seize complete power. The witness Gisevius said here that there was no Röhm Putsch. That is correct, but it was just about to happen. At that time in the Reich War Ministry we were armed to the teeth, and Röhm was a real revolutionary, not a frock coat insurgent. When the Führer intervened in June 1934, from that moment there were no more conflicts between the Wehrmacht and the SA. The Wehrmacht became all the more suspicious of the units of the SS, which from that moment multiplied in an extraordinary fashion. The Army, one can very well say, was never reconciled to this dualism of two armed organizations within the country.
DR. EXNER: Now I should like to quote various excerpts from your diary—Document Number 1780-PS, Page 2 of the first volume of the document book—in order to show that Jodl again and again concerned himself with this infiltration of the SS into the Army. On 19 April—that is the second paragraph—or before that, on 22 March, there is an entry to this effect. Then on the 19th of April: “H. visits chief of the Armed Forces Department; tells him his misgivings concerning development of the SS.”
In the French translation this “H” is replaced by “Heydrich.” That, of course, has no sense, for Heydrich certainly had no misgivings concerning the development of the SS; but the “H” quite obviously stands for “Halder,” who was Quartermaster General. I do not know whether this correction was made in the French document book. I am sorry to say that I noted quite a few mistakes in translation in the English and French document books and have applied to the General Secretary in this connection to have corrections made. I must certainly say that this large number of errors in translation makes a doubtful impression, especially if for an “H” the word “Heydrich” is substituted, and the chief of the Armed Forces is connected with one of the most unpleasant figures in the SS. I must say that I am filled with misgivings—I must emphasize this—because in the course of the last few months hundreds of documents have been submitted to the Tribunal, the translation of which we could not check. When we did make a check on one occasion we found quite a few defects, as did Dr. Siemers recently.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you are supposed to be asking the questions. You are making some long statements now.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer to the next to the last point of 3 February, on the same page...
THE PRESIDENT: Professor Exner, we cannot have counsel making long statements which are not in evidence. You cannot make statements of that sort. If there is any mistranslation you can draw our attention to it; but that is not the way to do it, making general statements about the translation of the documents.
DR. EXNER: Mr. President, I do not wish to give any more explanations now, but I should like to quote passages from my document book referring to 3 February...
THE PRESIDENT: You have corrected one apparent mistranslation or misinterpretation of the letter “H.” Well, you can do so again, if necessary, in other places. You cannot make general statements about it.
DR. EXNER: I will only read what is permissible. I will read extracts from the document book without making any criticism. I have nothing further to say about that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. EXNER: It says, on 3 February:
“General Thomas reports that the liaison officer to the Ministry of Economy ... Lieutenant Colonel Drews, visited him by order of Schacht. He was of the opinion that the SS would employ all means to cast suspicion on the Wehrmacht and to force it to the wall in its present weak state.”
Then it says under the date of 10 February:
“Himmler is said to be distressed that senior officers of the Wehrmacht had made unheard of accusations against him.”
Then perhaps one other passage; from the next document, on Page 4 of the document book, again the same diary, Document Number 1809-PS, the entry of 25 May 1940:
“The plan for the unlimited expansion of the SS sounds generally suspicious.”
Did you, even at that time, have misgivings about the dangers of this dualism that you just mentioned?
JODL: As a man very well versed in history, I had many misgivings about this. Not only did I have misgivings, but even during the war I quite openly expressed these misgivings to Himmler and Bormann.
DR. EXNER: How did it come about that Himmler acquired more and more influence in military spheres?
JODL: That can be explained by the fact that the Führer had the feeling—which perhaps on the whole was right—that a large section of the officer corps opposed his ideas. He saw in this attitude not only an inner political danger but also saw in it a danger to victory, which he believed was to be attained only through ruthless methods.
DR. EXNER: And what practical results came about through this?
JODL: The practical results were these: The SS units were multiplied tremendously; the Police received authority which extended even into the operational sphere of the Army, and later, the Higher SS and Police Leaders were created; the intelligence service was transferred to the SS—where, by the way, it was organized by Kaltenbrunner far better than before—the reserve army was put under the jurisdiction of Himmler, and, in the end, also the entire Prisoners of War Organization.
DR. EXNER: In your diary you express satisfaction at the appointment by the Führer of General Von Brauchitsch as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. At that time there was a choice between him and General Reichenau. Why were you glad that Brauchitsch was chosen?
JODL: General Von Reichenau was known as a truly political general, and I was afraid that he might perhaps have no scruples in sacrificing all the good old tradition of the Army to the new regime.
DR. EXNER: I should like to refer in this connection to Jodl’s diary, Document Number 1780-PS, Page 6, first volume, with the entry of 2 February 1938, second paragraph, and again to the entry of 3 February 1938 to be found on Page 7, where he appears particularly happy:
“The chief of the Armed Forces Department informs me that the battle has been won. The Führer has decided that General Von Brauchitsch should be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Army.”
THE PRESIDENT: I do not think you need read this. It simply says that he is in favor of Von Brauchitsch.
DR. EXNER: You thought about the particular consequences for the generals concerned in case Von Reichenau were appointed?
JODL: Yes. There was no doubt that the senior generals, such as Rundstedt, Bock, Adam, List, Halder, and so on, would never have subordinated themselves to Von Reichenau.
DR. EXNER: After this introduction, let us turn to the crimes against the laws of war and humanity which have been charged against you. There is very little time left. Therefore, I should like to clarify your participation in the Commissar Decree. A draft by the High Command of the Army on the treatment of Soviet commissars was submitted to you, and you put a notation in the margin of this draft on the grounds of which the Prosecution has accused you...
THE PRESIDENT: What is the number of the document?
DR. EXNER: The number of the document is 884-PS, Exhibit Number USSR-351, Page 152, second volume of my document book. The whole is a set of notes on a report.
[Turning to the defendant.] Perhaps you can tell us this first of all: What connection did you have with this matter, that is, with the treatment of commissars?
JODL: I did not participate in preparing this draft. I was not concerned with prisoners of war nor with questions of martial law at that time. But the draft was submitted to me before it was transmitted to Field Marshal Keitel.
DR. EXNER: All right. Now you added: “We must count on retaliation against German fliers. It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action as retaliation.”
What do you mean by this statement?
JODL: The intention of the Führer which was set forth in this draft was rejected unanimously by all soldiers. Very heated discussions took place about this also with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army. This resistance ended with the characteristic sentence by the Führer: “I cannot demand that my generals should understand my orders, but I do demand that they follow them.” Now, in this case, by my notation I wanted to indicate to Field Marshal Keitel a new way by which one might possibly still circumvent this order which had been demanded.
DR. EXNER: The Prosecution, as you probably remember, have made this order the subject of such a serious charge against the German military authorities because it was drafted before the beginning of the war. These notes are dated 12 May 1941, and there you say: “It is best to brand the entire action as retaliation.” What did you mean by that?
JODL: It is correct that, because of his ideological opposition to Bolshevism, the Führer counted on the possible authorization of the commissars (decree) as a certainty. He was confirmed in this belief, and gave his reasons by saying: “I have carried on the war against Communism for 20 years. I know Communism, but you do not know it.” I must add that we as well were, of course, to a certain extent under the influence of what had been written in the literature of the entire world about Bolshevism since 1917. We also had had some experiences, for example, the Räte Republic in Munich. Despite that, I was of the opinion that first of all we should wait and see whether the commissars would actually act as the Führer expected them to act; and if his suspicions were confirmed, we could then make use of reprisals. That was what I meant by my notation in the margin.
DR. EXNER: That is to say, you wanted to wait until the beginning of the war; then you wanted to wait until you had had experiences in this war; and then you wanted to propose measures which, if necessary, could be considered as reprisals against the methods of fighting used by the enemy. Was that what you meant when you said: “It is best, therefore, to brand the entire action as retaliation”? What do you mean by “Man zieht auf”? These words were translated by the Prosecution as...
MR. G. D. ROBERTS (Leading Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, in the examination of my learned friend, Dr. Exner, he has for several minutes now been asking the defendant very long leading questions as to what was the meaning of the passage in that letter. In my submission, that is not evidence at all by the witness; it is a speech by Dr. Exner, and I would ask him not to make another one now.
DR. EXNER: I still think that it is necessary in the presentation of evidence to determine what the defendant thought when he wrote those words.
THE PRESIDENT: You have heard me say on several occasions that when counsel ask leading questions, which put the answer into the mouth of the witness, it carries very little weight with the Tribunal. It is perfectly obvious that if you wanted to ask what the witness meant by his note he could have answered; and that is the proper way to put the question, and not to suggest the answer to him.
DR. EXNER: First of all I put the question, and then I believe I was summarizing the main points of what the witness said.
There is also a difficulty here with translation which I should like to overcome; that is, I am not sure about it. “Es wird aufgezogen” or “man zieht es am besten auf als Repressalie” is translated as, “It is best therefore to brand” in English, and in French as stigmatiser. It seems to me as though this were not quite correct, and as though one should say, “It is best to handle it as a reprisal,” and in French to say traiter.
[Turning to the defendant.] Then what happened?
JODL: I believe one should further explain the expression “aufziehen.” The German word “aufziehen” also has something doubtful about it. It has been said that that was a typical military expression used by the Defendant Jodl at that time. That does not mean, as is assumed by the Prosecution, “to camouflage.” Rather, I would say literally: “I believe we must handle this operation quite differently,” that is, tackle it in a different way. We would say that we would handle the demonstration to the Führer of new weapons in a different way; that means, for instance, “in a different sequence; in a different manner.” Among us soldiers “aufziehen,” to handle, meant exactly the same as “to tackle” or “to arrange” something. But it did not mean “to deceive.”
DR. EXNER: You mean that the word “aufziehen” has no secondary meaning indicating deception?
JODL: No.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.