SUMMARY.
| Men. | Guns. | |
|---|---|---|
| Infantry | 20,611 | |
| Cavalry | 2,405 | |
| Artillery | 964 | 48 |
| ——— | ||
| Total | 23,980 | |
| ====== |
As regards organisation, the Corps was an early form of the modern Army Corps, although there were no “divisional” troops attached to the infantry divisions, and the “corps” troops consisted of the cavalry and artillery brought together as “reserves” under separate commanders, and the necessary engineers and train. It is curious to note that, in the actual fighting, the artillery and cavalry, more especially the former, were divided up, as soon as the battle began. The idea which prevailed in those days, of cavalry “reserves” and cavalry corps, composed of two or more “divisions,” is a marked feature of the later Napoleonic era; and the fact that both disappeared after 1815 goes some way to proving the futility, or, rather, the disadvantages of such organisations, as Napoleon meant them. No larger bodies of cavalry than divisions have been used since; nor has any army since gone forth with a cavalry “reserve.”
The Prussian infantry regiment had three battalions, one of which was the Fusilier battalion. The battalions averaged from 750 to 600 men each; the divisions, from six to nine battalions. The cavalry regiment was composed of from three to five squadrons; the brigade, of from three to four regiments. The batteries of artillery, horse and foot, consisted of 8 guns each, and the personnel of the battery numbered 160 on the average. Thielemann’s Corps was weak in cavalry and artillery, as measured by modern notions; the proportions were 1 cavalryman to nearly every 10 infantry, and 2·4 guns per 1,000 infantry.
The spirit of the troops was excellent, and they were led by brave and capable officers. The old hatred of the French still burned in the hearts of the Prussian soldiers, and they desired nothing so much as to be given an opportunity of revenging Jena and Auerstadt. Their officers were well trained and full of enthusiasm; they had confidence in their men, and the latter had confidence in them.
At Ligny, the Corps won praise for its firm behaviour, and although, during the battle, it had not been hard pressed at any time, at the close of the day, when the Prussian right and centre were broken, it maintained its original position before Sombreffe and on Blucher’s left, enabling the First and Second Corps to withdraw from the field in safety. When it was almost too dark to distinguish friend from foe, Thielemann made a bold counter-stroke with two of his battalions. Major Dittfurth, with the First and Second Battalions of the 30th Prussian Regiment, moved out from Mont Potriaux, which village he had held throughout the afternoon, crossed the Ligny, and made a demonstration against Grouchy on the French right, in order to hinder the pursuit of the broken Prussian centre. A regiment of Dragoons from Excelmans’ Corps charged the Second Battalion, but was repulsed, and Dittfurth, gaining courage, pushed his men further and seized a hill occupied in force by the French. Two more cavalry charges were launched against them, but were also repulsed. And now a division of Lobau’s Corps, in a heavy column, advanced against the First Battalion; but Dittfurth, with great skill and presence of mind, so disposed the Second Battalion as to bring a heavy flanking fire on the French, who suffered severe losses from this fire, and who, being uncertain in the darkness of the strength of the enemy, withdrew. Dittfurth now checked his advance, having successfully prevented the French from pressing too hard on the Prussian centre, and withdrew his battalions to Mont Potriaux. A French cavalry brigade charged up to the barrier on the Fleurus high-road to gain Sombreffe, but the Prussians of the Ninth Division beat them off.
When the battle died out in the darkness, Thielemann held the line Sombreffe-Point du Jour. He remained in position until 3 A.M. on the 17th, when the whole field had been evacuated by the First and Second Corps; and then he commenced, in perfect order, his retreat to Gembloux, where he was to join the Fourth Corps, under Bulow, who had arrived there during the night.
Thielemann’s men were not discouraged by the loss of the battle of Ligny; on the contrary, they were full of spirit and determination; their behaviour under fire had been excellent, and they eagerly waited for a further opportunity of trying their strength with their formidable enemies.
The losses in the corps at Ligny amounted to about 1,000 men killed and wounded, and 7 guns lost.
The force detached by Napoleon for the pursuit of the Prussians, and given over to Marshal Grouchy, numbered 33,611 men and 96 guns. It was composed as follows:—
| THIRD CORPS—Vandamme. | Battns.} | Men. |
|---|---|---|
| Eighth Division—(Lefol) 15th Light Infantry, 23rd, 37th, and 64th Regiments of the Line | 11 } | 14,508 |
| Tenth Division—(Habert) 22nd, 34th, 70th and 88th Regiments of the Line | 12 } | |
| Eleventh Division—(Berthézène) 12th, 33rd, 56th, and 86th Regiments of the Line | 8 } | |
| — | ||
| Battalions Infantry | 31 | |
| — | ||
| Artillery | Men. | Guns. |
| 4 batteries Foot[4] Artillery (8 guns each) | 782 | 32 |
| Engineers | 146 | |
| TOTALS, THIRD CORPS | ||
| Infantry | 14,508 | |
| Artillery | 782, | 32 |
| Engineers | 146 | |
| ——— | ||
| 15,536 | ||
| ====== | ||
| FOURTH CORPS—Gérard. | Battns. | Men. |
| Twelfth Division—(Pecheux) 30th, 63rd, and 96th Regiments of the Line | 10} | 12,589 |
| Thirteenth Division—(Vichery) 48th, 59th, 69th, and 76th Regiments of the Line | 8} | |
| Fourteenth Division—(Hulot) 9th Light Infantry, 44th, 50th, and 111th Regiments of the Line | 8} | |
| — | ||
| Battalions Infantry | 26 | |
| === | ||
| Seventh Cavalry Division—(Maurin) | Squadrons. | Men. |
| 6th Hussars | 3} | 758 |
| 8th Chasseurs | 3} | |
| Reserve Cavalry Division—(Jacquinot) | ||
| 6th, 11th, 15th, and 16th Dragoons | 16 | 1,608 |
| Artillery | Guns. | |
| 4 Batteries Foot Artillery | 32} | 1,538 |
| 1 Battery Horse Artillery | 6} | |
| Engineers | 201 | |
| TOTALS, FOURTH CORPS | Men. | Guns. |
| Infantry | 12,589 | |
| Cavalry | 2,366 | |
| Artillery | 1,538 | |
| Engineers | 201 | |
| ——— | ||
| Total | 16,694 | 38 |
| ====== | ||
| TWENTY-FIRST DIVISION—Teste. Detached from Lobau’s Corps. | Battns. | Men. |
| 8th Light Infantry, 40th, 65th, and 75th Regiments of the Line | 5 | 2,316 |
| Artillery attached to the Division— | Guns. | Men. |
| 1 Battery Foot Artillery | 8 | 161 |
| Men. | Guns. | |
| Total, Teste’s Division | 2,477 | 8 |
| Cavalry | Squadrons. | Men. |
| FOURTH CAVALRY DIVISION (belonging to 1st Cavalry Corps) under Pajol (commanding First Cavalry Corps)— | ||
| 1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars | 12 | 1,234 |
| Artillery attached to this Cavalry Division— | Guns. | Men. |
| 1 Battery Horse Artillery | 6 | 154 |
| SECOND CAVALRY CORPS (Excelmans’)— | Squadrons. | Men. |
| Ninth Cavalry Division—(Strolz) 5th, 13th, 15th, and 20th Dragoons | 16} | 2,817 |
| Tenth Cavalry Division (Chastel) 4th, 12th, 14th, and 17th Dragoons | 15} | |
| Artillery attached to the Second Cavalry Corps— | Guns. | Men. |
| 2 Batteries Horse Artillery | 12 | 246 |