Chemical warfare

by Amos A. Fries; Clarence J. West

Fries was at the front visiting the Headquarters of the First Army and the Headquarters of the 1st, 3d, and 5th Corps from two days before the beginning of the battle of the Argonne to four days afterwards. He watched reports of the battle on the morning of the attack at the Army Headquarters and later at the 1st, 5th and 3d Corps headquarters in the order named. No reports of any gas casualties were received. This situation continued throughout the day. It was so remarkable that he told the Chief of Staff he could attribute the German failure to use gas to only one of two possible conditions; first, the enemy was out of gas; second, he was preparing some master stroke. The first proved to be the case as examination after the Armistice of German shell dumps captured during the advance revealed less than 1 per cent of mustard gas shell. Even under these circumstances the Germans caused quite a large number of gas casualties during the later stages of the fighting in the Argonne-Meuse sector.

Evidently the Germans, immediately after the opening of the attack, or more probably some days before, began to gather together all available mustard gas and other gases along the entire western battle front, and ship them to the American sector. This conclusion seems justified because the enemy never had a better chance to use gas effectively than he did the first three or four days of the Argonne fight, and knowing this fact he certainly would never have failed to use the gas if it had been available. Had he possessed 50 per cent of his artillery shell in the shape of mustard gas, our losses in the Argonne-Meuse fight would have been at least 100,000 more than it was. Indeed, it is more than possible we would never have succeeded in taking Sedan and Mezieres in the fall of 1918.

Officers’ Training Camp. The first lot of about 100 officers were sent to France in July, 1918, with only a few days’ training, and in some cases with no training at all. Accordingly, arrangements were made to train these men in the duties of the soldier in the ranks, and then as officers. Their training in gas defense and offense followed a month of strenuous work along the above mentioned lines.

This camp was established near Hanlon (Experimental) Field, at a little town called Choignes. The work as laid out included squad and company training for the ordinary soldier, each officer taking turns in commanding the company at drill. They were given work in map reading as well as office and company administration.

This little command was a model of cleanliness and military discipline, and attracted most favorable comment from staff officers on duty at General Headquarters less than two miles distant. Just before the Armistice arrangements were made to transfer this work to Chignon, about 25 miles southeast of Tours, where ample buildings and grounds were available to carry out not alone training of officers but of soldiers along the various lines of work they would encounter, from the handling of a squad, to being Chief Gas Officer of a Division.

Educating the Army in the Use of Gas. As has been remarked before, the Medical Department in starting the manufacture of gas masks and other defensive appliances, and the Bureau of Mines in starting researches into poisonous gases as well as defensive materials, were the only official bodies who early interested themselves in gas warfare. Due to this early work of the Bureau of Mines and the Medical Department in starting mask manufacture as well as training in the wearing of gas masks, the defensive side of gas warfare became known throughout the army very far in advance of the offensive side. On the other hand, since the Ordnance Department, which was at first charged with the manufacture of poisonous gases, made practically no move for months, the offensive use of gas did not become known among United States troops until after they landed in France.

Moreover, no gas shell was allowed to be fired by the artillery in practice even in France, so that all the training in gas the artillery could get until it went into the line was defensive, with lectures on the offensive.

The work of raising gas troops was not begun until the late fall of 1917 and as their work is highly technical and dangerous, they were not ready to begin active work on the American front until June, 1918.

By that time the army was getting pretty well drilled in gas defense and despite care in that respect were getting into a frame of mind almost hostile to the use of gas by our own troops. Among certain staff officers, as well as some commanders of fighting units, this hostility was outspoken and almost violent.

Much the hardest, most trying and most skillful work required of Chemical Warfare Service officers was to persuade such Staffs and Commanders that gas was useful and get them to permit of a demonstration on their front. Repeatedly Chemical Warfare Service officers on Division staffs were told by officers in the field that they had nothing to do with gas in offense, that they were simply defensive officers. And yet no one else knew anything about the use of gas. Gradually, however, by constantly keeping before the General Staff and others the results of gas attacks by the Germans, by the British, by the French, and by ourselves, headway was made toward getting our Armies to use gas effectively in offense.