But so slow was this work that it was necessary to train men particularly how to appeal to officers and commanders on the subject. Indeed the following phrase, used first by Colonel Mayo-Smith, became a watchword throughout the Service in the latter part of the war—“Chemical Warfare Service officers have got to go out and sell gas to the Army.” In other words we had to adopt much the same means of making gas known that the manufacturer of a new article adopts to make a thing manufactured by him known to the public.
Fig. 12.—A Typical Shell Dump near the Front.
This work was exceedingly trying, requiring great skill, great patience and above all a most thorough knowledge of the subject. As illustrating some of these difficulties, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 (Operations) of a certain American Corps refused to consider a recommendation to use gas on a certain point in the battle of the Argonne unless the gas officer would state in writing that if the gas was so used it could not possibly result in the casualty of a single American soldier. Such an attitude was perfectly absurd.
The Infantry always expects some losses from our own high explosive when following a barrage, and though realizing the tremendous value of gas, this staff officer refused to use it without an absolute guarantee in writing that it could not possibly injure a single American soldier. Another argument often used was that a gas attack brought retaliatory fire on the front where the gas was used. Such objectors were narrow enough not to realize that the mere fact of heavy retaliation indicated the success of the gas on the enemy for everyone knows an enemy does not retaliate against a thing which does not worry him.
But on the other hand, when the value of gas troops had become fully known, the requests for them were so great that a single platoon had to be assigned to brigades, and sometimes even to whole Divisions. Thus it fell to the Lieutenants commanding these platoons to confer with Division Commanders and Staffs, to recommend how, when and where to use gas, and do so in a manner which would impress the Commanding General and the Staff sufficiently to allow them to undertake the job. That no case of failure has been reported is evidence of the splendid ability of these officers on duty with the gas troops. Efficiency in the big American battles was demanded to an extent unheard of in peace, and had any one of these officers made a considerable failure, it certainly would have been reported and Fries would have heard of it.
Equally hard, and in many cases even more so, was the work of the gas officers on Division, Corps and Army Staffs, who handled the training in Divisions, and who also were required to recommend the use of gas troops, the use of gas in artillery shell and in grenades, and the use of smoke by the infantry in attack. However, the success of the Chemical Warfare Service in the field with these Staff officers was just as great as with the Regiment.
To the everlasting credit of those Staff Officers and the Officers of the Gas Regiment from Colonel Atkisson down, both Staff Gas officers and officers of the Gas Regiment worked together in the fullest harmony with the single object of defeating the Germans.
Chemical Warfare Troops
Chemical Warfare troops were divided into two distinct divisions—gas regiments and staff troops.