But it is also quite clear that to the interests of this policy, indispensable to a self-sufficient economic unit, important interests of the different parts of Russia have been sacrificed. For instance, the corn-growing central provinces of Russia have lost the English market, with difficulty retaining the much less profitable market in Germany.
On the other hand, Latvia, in no way interested in the export of cereals, was obliged, in order to assist the Russian grain export, and in virtue of the commercial treaties concluded between Russia and Germany in 1894 and 1904, to submit to concessions in regard to German industry which were incompatible with her own industrial interests.
By the case of Finland, it is possible to form an idea of the results of such an economic system. From the importation of Russian corn, Finland passed to the importation of German and American flour; instead of Russian sugar she used German. In return the products of Russian industry have not been able to conquer the Finnish market, in view of the impossibility of their competition with German products. Finland, having Customs frontiers with Russia, was able to avoid the too disadvantageous consequences for her of that Russian economic policy which sacrificed local economic interests to a centralised economic system for Russia. If there had not been Customs frontiers between Finland and Russia, Finland would have had to pay much dearer for her bread and to purchase industrial products at a much higher price. The other parts of Russia, not enjoying economic autonomy, have not been able to avoid the disastrous consequences of the Russian policy as Finland has done.
Consequently, the founders of Federated Russia will have to solve the following question: Must we revert to a centralised policy and neglect the local interests of the different parts of Russia, or must we grant the right of an autonomous economic policy to the different members of the Federation? In the former case, there would remain very little of the “free co-existence of the peoples forming part of it on principles of autonomy and federation.” From this point of view the nationalities would be less favoured than Finland, which, as is well known, was far from feeling outside the danger of Russian pretensions. If, on the contrary, the founders of the Federated Republic of Russia propose to give to the various States the right of an autonomous economic policy, then the Federation will very soon fall to pieces, for the economic interests of the different States tend in different directions, and economic interests are much more powerful than historical memories.
The economic problem will therefore be solved either to the advantage of a Russia which supports herself, but is at the same time centralised, or to the advantage of the independence of the nationalities which have separated themselves from Russia. In either case there is no place for federation!
The All-Russian Federation from the Point of View of Constitutional Law
There still remains to be elucidated the project of an All-Russian Federation from the point of view of constitutional law, i.e., the possibility of creating, with the aid of the nationalities of Russia, a durable State on the basis of federation.
The definite and authorised answer to this question was given by the late M. Kokoshkin, professor at the University of Moscow, in his report (Summer, 1917) to the Congress of the Constitutional Democratic Party on the subject of the desirable form for the future State of Russia. He proved the utter impossibility, from the point of view of constitutional law, of reconstructing Russia on a federative basis; and the Congress of the Party entirely subscribed to his opinion. There remains little to say after the view of Professor Kokoshkin.
All federations of States can work on one condition only, viz., that there is one among them which has the power, owing to its importance and influence, to support and unite all the other members. Germany gives us an instance of this law. First, in 1866, Bismarck was compelled to exclude Austria by force from the German Confederation, on account of her competition with Prussia, so that he could, in 1871, gather round him the German Federation, in which Prussia, both by her real force and in accordance with constitutional law, became the predominant partner. And the Prussian spirit guided Germany. Prussia was the cause of Germany’s extraordinary development, and also of her unprecedented defeat. The contrary is instanced by Austria-Hungary, which tottered in proportion as German Austria increasingly lost her preponderance.
Can one reckon on finding, among the nationalities of Russia, a member of the projected Federation with enough authority, from the point of view of constitutional law, to unite and support the other members of the Federation? To this question Professor Kokoshkin has given a negative and categorical reply, and we must abide by this opinion.