Evidently, the section of the Great-Russians could, in the first place, lay claim to such a part. But they count only 65 millions out of the 180 millions forming the population of Russia. Besides, this section is far from having preponderant economic importance, and it has remained, in the matter of civilisation, well behind the other members of the projected All-Russian Federation. If the leading part is given to this section—a majority of votes in the Council of the Federation, for instance—it would be a great injustice to the other nationalities, and they would never consent to it; an otherwise senseless injustice, because the section of the Great-Russians will evidently never be in a position to perform the part assigned to them, nor could they perform it except by using physical force, i.e., by re-establishing the policy of centralist absolutism, the policy which has sustained so complete a defeat, and that not only by a mere historical chance.
If there is no directing centre, it is clear that the All-Russian Federation will fall to pieces on the morrow of its foundation on paper, for there will be no power in a position to reconcile the divergent interests of the various members of the Federation. Georgia, for instance, will never consent to vote credits for the development of Northern railway systems. Latvia will give no contribution for the construction of Black Sea ports; and Ukraine will not send her sons to defend the Baltic Sea. The combination of these interests, so different and so scattered, would only result in a State-structure so weak that it would fall to pieces at the first serious blow.
Thus, from the point of view of constitutional law, we arrive at the same conclusion to which the analysis of the tendencies of civilisation and economic life led us—that the All-Russian Federation will transform itself either into a centralised State maintained by force, or it will divide itself into independent States.
There is no place for a Federation in Russia! Neither the land nor the men upon it were made for it; this is proved by History. The history of Russia in her beginnings shows us a certain number of principalities, independent of one another, and on the whole not subject to any authority. Owing to the efforts of the more powerful princes, and under the duress of the Tartar yoke, the principalities united, not into a Federation, but into a centralised State; and each principality, deprived of its independence, did not become a member of a Federation, but passed into another State.
The same course was followed in regard to the contiguous and neighbouring countries conquered by Russia.
Not only Finland and Poland, but also the Baltic, Ukraine, and Georgia were united to Russia, and received from her at least the guarantee of their special rights and of their separate position in the Russian State; but Russia did not keep her word in regard to all these States, but had them all subject to a centralised policy, after having destroyed, or attempted to destroy, all the individuality of these countries. And this is in no way by mere chance. The Russian plain, having almost no natural divisions, is not a favourable field for the creation of a Federation, and the Russian soul, understanding no via media between “all” and “nothing,” is not the cement with which it would be possible to build a Federation always based on the limitation of one will by other wills, and on a clever and experienced blend of the different inclinations.
The Leaning of the Peoples of Russia towards Independence
Not being able to put their trust in the All-Russian Federation and not finding therein enough guarantee for their natural rights, the peoples of Russia have separated themselves from her and are building up their independent national life. This is what is rousing the opposition of the representatives of the Russian groups. The grounds for it are given by M. Mandelstam in several pamphlets published by the Russian Political Conference.
Economic Disadvantage of Separation from Russia
First of all, M. Mandelstam finds that the independence to which the nationalities detached from Russia are aspiring is disadvantageous to these peoples themselves: “So they would merely find in their independence a satisfaction of their national vanity, too heavily paid for by the loss of their economic prosperity.” (Memorandum on the Delimitation of the Rights of States and Nations, p. 79.) Concerning Latvia in particular, M. Mandelstam foresees that the commerce of her ports will enormously suffer, for they will lose the benefit of the Russian transit trade. Agriculture, which will lose the Russian market, will equally suffer from it; her industry will be deprived of fuel and raw materials (p. 60). Finally, Latvia will not be in a position to guarantee “the reimbursement of the enormous amounts spent for the development of her economic prosperity and for her defence” (p. 79).