The commercial disputes with the French Government which, as you know, I always apprehended, are coming thick upon us. I foresaw what was coming and begged Thiers, Rémusat and other members of the Government over and over again to guard against vexations in the execution of the Treaty while it lasted. I make little doubt, notwithstanding, that all these violent and unfair proceedings are prompted, not checked, from Paris.
The Spaniards have found out the only way to deal with the Protectionist spirit here. The slightest hint at retaliation would have such an effect in the Assembly as to stop the onward career of illiberality. As things now are, the extortioners have the game in their own hands. They levy what duty they please, and pay just as much or as little attention as may suit them, to our remonstrances. It is a very disagreeable affair for one who, like myself, is really anxious that there should be good feeling between the two countries. We are in a fix. On the one hand, we cannot, without injuring ourselves and abandoning our principles, retaliate; and on the other hand, while they feel sure we shall do no more than remonstrate, the Protectionist officials will care very little. If indeed the general opinion is to be relied upon, the present Government and its chief may come down with a crash at any moment, but I don't know whether a change would benefit us commercially.
Lord Lyons, like Lord Granville and other English public men and officials of the day, was a Free Trader, as has already been stated. But it would be difficult for the most ardent Protectionist to make out a stronger case against the helplessness of a Free Trade policy when negotiating with a foreign Government than is disclosed in these letters, and there are any number of others all in the same strain. All the protestations of goodwill, of sympathy, and benefit to the human race, etc., were, and presumably are still, a pure waste of time when addressed to a country about to frame a tariff in accordance with its own interests, unless the threat of retaliation is used in order to retain some bargaining power, as apparently the Spaniards had already discovered.
It has already been stated that Thiers's plans of military re-organization and his somewhat imprudent language had caused some agitation in Germany, and when the German Ambassador, Count Arnim, returned to his post at Paris in the spring of 1872, it was freely rumoured that he was the bearer of remarkably unpleasant communications. These apprehensions turned out to be exaggerated, and Thiers in conversation always assumed a lamb-like attitude of peace. He denied that the Germans had addressed any representations to him, said that all suspicions against him were grossly unjust, that it would be absolute madness for France to think of going to war, and that, for his part, the keystone of all his foreign policy was peace. As for his army reform schemes, he was a much misunderstood man. He was undoubtedly reorganizing the military forces of France, and it was his duty to place them upon a respectable footing, and so provide a guarantee for peace. It was, however, quite false to say that he was arming, for that term implied that he was making preparations for war, and that he was putting the army into a condition to pass at once from a state of peace to a state of war. He was doing nothing of the sort; on the contrary, his efforts were directed to obtaining the evacuation of the territory, by providing for the payment of the war indemnity to Germany, and it could hardly be supposed that if he were meditating a renewal of the contest, he would begin by making over three milliards to her.
From Arnim's language, it appeared that the German public was irritated and alarmed at the perpetual harping of the French upon the word 'Revenge,' and that the German military men (the militaires who were always so convenient to Bismarck for purposes of argument) conceived that the best guarantee for peace would be to keep their soldiers as long as possible within a few days' march of Paris.
The German fears were, no doubt, greatly exaggerated, but if they existed at all they were largely due to Thiers's own language, who, while not talking indeed of immediate revenge, was fond of boasting of the strength and efficiency of the French army, and even of affirming that it was at that very moment equal to cope with the Germans. That he was conscious of having created suspicion may be inferred from the fact that when the Prince of Wales passed through Paris on his way from Nice to Germany, he begged H.R.H. to use his influence at the Court of Berlin to impress upon the Emperor and all who were of importance there, that the French Government, and the President himself in particular, desired peace above all things, and were resolved to maintain it. A letter from the British Ambassador at Berlin throws some light upon the prevalent German feeling.
Mr. Odo Russell[4] to Lord Lyons.
British Embassy, Berlin, April 27, 1872.
Since your letter of the 9th inst. reached me feelings have changed in Berlin.
Thiers's Army bill and Speech have irritated the Emperor, Bismarck and indeed everybody.
The Generals tell the Emperor it would be better to fight France before she is ready than after; but Bismarck, who scorns the Generals, advises the Emperor to fight France morally through Rome and the Catholic alliances against United Germany.
Although he denies it, Bismarck probably caused those violent articles against Thiers to appear in the English newspapers, and he tells everybody that Thiers has lost his esteem and may lose his support. The next grievance they are getting up against him is that he is supposed to have made offers through Le Flô to Russia against Germany.
In short, from having liked him and praised him and wished for him, they are now tired of him and think him a traitor because he tries to reform the French Army on too large a scale!
Gontaut[5] does not appear to do anything beyond play the agreeable, which he does perfectly, and every one likes him. But it is said that Agents, financial Agents I presume, are employed by Thiers to communicate through Jewish Bankers here indirectly with Bismarck. Through these agents Thiers is supposed to propose arrangements for an early payment of the 3 milliards and an early withdrawal of the German troops of occupation,—the payment to be effected by foreign loans and the guarantee of European Bankers,—in paper not in gold. Bismarck has not yet pronounced definitely, but the Emperor William won't hear of shortening the occupation of France. Indeed, he regrets he cannot by Treaty leave his soldiers longer still as a guarantee of peace while he lives, for he is most anxious to die at peace with all the world.
So that nothing is done and nothing will be done before Arnim returns to Paris. He has no sailing orders yet and seems well amused here.