Lord Lyons to Mr. Odo Russell.
Paris, May 7, 1872.
Many thanks for your interesting letter.
Arnim's account of public opinion at Berlin entirely confirms that which you give, only he says Bismarck would be personally willing to come to an arrangement with France for payment of the milliards and the evacuation of the territory, but that he will not run any risk of injuring his own position by opposing either Moltke or public opinion on this point.
I don't think the Germans need the least fear the French attacking them for many years to come. The notion of coming now to destroy France utterly, in order to prevent her ever in the dim future being able to revenge herself, seems simply atrocious. The French are so foolish in their boasts, and the Germans so thin-skinned, that I am afraid of mischief.
I should doubt Bismarck's being wise in setting himself in open hostility to the Vatican. The favour of the Holy See is seldom of any practical use, so far as obtaining acts in its favour, to a Protestant or even to a Roman Catholic Government; but the simple fact of being notoriously in antagonism to it, brings a vast amount of opposition and ill-will on a Government that has Catholic subjects. The fear of this country's being able at this moment to work the Catholic element in Germany or elsewhere against the German Emperor appears to me to be chimerical.
I wish the Germans would get their milliards as fast as they can, and go: then Europe might settle down, and they need not be alarmed about French vengeance, or grudge the French the poor consolation of talking about it.
Arnim was a good deal struck by the decline in Thiers's vigour, since he took leave of him before his journey to Rome, but he saw Thiers some days ago, when the little President was at his worst.
Mr. Odo Russell to Lord Lyons.
British Embassy, Berlin, May 11, 1872.
I have nothing new to say about the relations of France and Germany, but my friends here seem so alarmed at the idea that France cannot pay the much longed for three milliards, that if Thiers really does pay them, all the rest will be forgiven and forgotten, and the withdrawal of the German troops will then be impatiently called for. Like yourself I write the impressions of the moment and am not answerable for future changes of public opinion. Clearly the thing to be desired for the peace of the world is the payment by France and the withdrawal by Germany, after which a normal state of things can be hoped for—not before.
The Pope, to my mind, has made a mistake in declining to receive Hohenlohe. He ought to have accepted and in return sent a Nuncio to Berlin, thereby selling Bismarck, and controlling his German Bishops and the Döllinger movement.
Bismarck is going away on leave to Varzin. He is so irritable and nervous that he can do no good here at present, and rest is essential to him.
Your letter of the 7th is most useful to me, many thanks for it. I shall not fail to keep you as well informed as I can.
In reality, the Germans made little difficulty about the arrangements for the payment of the indemnity and evacuation of French territory, and early in July Thiers was able to state confidently that he felt certain of being able to pay the whole of the indemnity by March, 1874, and that he had only obtained an additional year's grace in order to guard against accidents.
A curious incident which occurred in July, 1872, showed how, if sufficient ingenuity be employed, a trivial personal question may be turned to important political use. The Comte de Vogué, French Ambassador at Constantinople, who possessed little or no diplomatic experience, before proceeding on leave from his post, had an audience of the Sultan. The Sultan received him standing, and began to talk, when Vogué interrupted His Majesty, and begged to be allowed to sit down, as other Ambassadors had been accustomed to do, according to him, on similar occasions. What the Sultan actually did at the moment was not disclosed, but he took dire offence, and telegrams began to pour in upon the Turkish Ambassador at Paris desiring him to represent to the French Government that if Vogué came back his position would be very unpleasant—intimating in fact that his return to Constantinople must be prevented. The French Foreign Minister, however, refused this satisfaction to the Sultan, and the Turkish Ambassador in his perplexity sought the advice of Lord Lyons, who preached conciliation, and urged that, at all events, no steps ought to be taken until Vogué had arrived at Paris, and was able to give his version of the incident. The French, naturally enough, were at that moment peculiarly susceptible on all such matters, and more reluctant to make a concession than if they were still on their former pinnacle of grandeur at Constantinople, although Vogué was clearly in the wrong, for Lord Lyons admitted that he had himself never been asked to sit. The importance of the incident consisted in the fact that it gave an opportunity of cultivating the goodwill of Russia, as the traditional enemy of Turkey. No Frenchman had ever lost sight of the hope that some day or other an ally against Germany might be found in Russia, and there were not wanting signs of a reciprocal feeling on the part of the latter. It had, for instance, been the subject of much remark, that the Russian Ambassador at Paris, Prince Orloff, had recently been making immense efforts to become popular with all classes of the French: Legitimists, Orleanists, Imperialists, Republicans, and especially newspaper writers of all shades of politics. As it was well known that neither Prince nor Princess Orloff were really fond of society, these efforts were almost overdone, but nevertheless they met with a hearty response everywhere, from Thiers downwards, for all Frenchmen were eagerly hoping for a quarrel between Russia and Germany, and were ready to throw themselves into the arms of the former in that hope. Russia, on her side, was clearly not unwilling to cultivate a friendship which cost nothing, and might conceivably be of considerable profit.