John Russell is gone to Paris, not for any political object, but merely to see one of his wife's sisters; but his journey there and conversations with the Emperor may not be without some consequences. I hear almost daily from the Duke of Bedford on the subject of John's conduct, the conduct of the war, and the state of the Government. For the present he appears to desist from doing anything to make an explosion. The curious thing is that the public, and particularly the Derbyite, newspapers should be so well informed as they are of what is going on. Though the immediate danger of a break up seems to be over, I still think the animus Lord John exhibits, the manifold difficulties of the Government, and their undoubted though unjust unpopularity, will before long break them to pieces.
January 14th.—I met Clarendon last night and had a talk about affairs at home and abroad. John Russell at Paris is satisfied with his conversation with the Emperor, who agreed that we could make no peace but one which would be glorious for us. Clarendon does not believe the Emperor of Russia really means to sacrifice Sebastopol, and thinks when he sent his acceptance of the four points he was not apprised of what had passed in the Conference, which was merely verbal. Gortschakoff, in a passion, said, 'I suppose you mean to limit our naval force, or to dismantle Sebastopol, or both;' to which they replied, 'Yes'; but nothing was put in writing to this effect. This makes a great difference, but I do not despair. There is a great question about a negotiator, and the Queen and Prince want Clarendon himself to go. He refused point blank; he does not like to leave it to Westmorland alone. I suggested Canning, but he thought Canning had not had experience enough, and that it ought to be a Cabinet Minister, and asked, 'Why not Palmerston?' I objected the difficulty of relying on him, his hatred of Austria, and the terror he would inspire; and I said Granville might do, but that I saw no reason why he should not go himself if he had reason to think it was likely to succeed, though I would not go merely to return re infect?. We then talked of Lord John and of Newcastle. He said that Newcastle is exceedingly slow, and has a slow mind, but that there is no case whatever for turning him out, and he cannot be blamed for the failures in matters of detail, and as for the great measures the responsibility belongs alike to all. Lord John never is and never will be satisfied without being again Prime Minister, which is impossible. I said the Duke of Bedford assured me that his brother did not now want to be Prime Minister. 'What does he want then?—to retire altogether?' 'Yes,' said Clarendon, 'that is his intense selfishness; utterly regardless of the public interests, or of what may happen, he wants to relieve himself from the responsibility of a situation which is not so good as he desires, and to run away from his post at a moment of danger and difficulty. If we had some great success—if Sebastopol were taken, for example—we should hear no more of his retirement.' As matters are, however, Clarendon thinks very ill of them abroad and at home. This disposition of Lord John's keeps the Government in constant hot water, and no confidence can be placed in Raglan, while it is impossible to find anybody who would, as far as we can judge, do any better.
LORD RAGLAN'S COMPOSURE.
The Court are exceedingly annoyed and alarmed at Raglan's failure; the Prince showed Clarendon (or told him of) a letter from Colonel Steele, who said that he had no idea how great a mind Raglan really had, but that he now saw it, for in the midst of distresses and difficulties of every kind in which the army was involved he was perfectly serene and undisturbed, and his health excellent! Steele meant this as a panegyric, and did not see that it really conveyed a severe reproach. The conviction of his incapacity for so great a command gains ground every day; he has failed in those qualities where everybody expected he would have succeeded best, even those who thought nothing of his military genius. But, having learnt what he knows of war under the Duke, he might at least have known how he carried on war, and have imitated his attention to minute details and a general supervision of the different services, seeing that all was in order and the merely mechanical parts properly attended to on which so much of the efficiency as well as of the comfort of the army depended.[1]
[1] [It may be proper to remark that a different and far more favourable view of Lord Raglan's capacity as a General will be found infra at the beginning of Chapter XII. of this Journal, upon the evidence of Sir Edmund Lyons, who was entirely in the confidence of the Commander-in-Chief.]
January 19th.—We are still uncertain as to the real intentions of the Emperor of Russia, and whether he means to accept the terms offered by the Allies; but my own impression is that he will not accept them in our sense, and that he never will consent to the sacrifice of Sebastopol till we have taken the place and destroyed the fortifications, thereby rendering its dismantling a fait accompli. There is certainly nothing in the present state of our affairs which warrants our lofty pretensions, and the proposal of terms so humiliating to the Emperor. The only possible grounds that can be imagined for his acceptance are, his own knowledge of the state of his own country and of the resources he can command for carrying on the war, and a dispassionate and farsighted calculation of the disposition and of the resources of his opponents. It is not impossible that he may foresee that he must eventually succumb in a contest so unequal and in which the number of his enemies increases every day. He may deem it better to make certain sacrifices now, with the view of being able before long to retrieve his losses, than to expose himself to the chance and great probability of being obliged to make much greater sacrifices hereafter, and such as it will be more difficult for him to repair. The Duke of Bedford tells me that Aberdeen and Clarendon are both hopeless of peace, and that Lord John and Palmerston do not consider it so absolutely hopeless; Aberdeen says the negotiations will not last half an hour.
ILL CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
The accounts from the army are as bad as possible; one-third of it is in the hospitals, and the quays of Balaklava are loaded with enormous stores of every kind, which it was impossible to transport to the camp. Very intelligent people therefore entertain the greatest apprehension of some catastrophe occurring whenever the severity of the winter, which has hitherto been comparatively mild, sets in. The best security is in the equally distressed state of the Russians, and in fact nothing but this can account for their having left us alone so long.
The Duke of Bedford and I talked over the state of affairs here, and the political possibilities in the event of this Government falling to pieces or being compelled to resign. We both desire any arrangement rather than another Derby Government, and we agree in thinking that on the whole the best would be for Lord Lansdowne to undertake the formation of a Government, if he can be persuaded to do so, which does not appear wholly impossible. This would satisfy Lord John, who would then remain in his present office, half a dozen of the present Cabinet would go out, some Whigs might replace them, and the thing would undoubtedly go on for a time. It is impossible for Newcastle to continue to conduct the war, with the universal clamour there is against him and the opinion of his own colleagues (at least of such of them as I know the opinions of) that he is unfit for the post. He has two very great faults which are sufficient to disqualify him: he is exceedingly slow, and he knows nothing of the qualifications of other men, or how to provide himself with competent assistants; nor has he any decision or foresight. He chose for his under-secretaries two wholly incompetent men who have been of no use to him in managing and expediting the various details of the service, and he has a rage for doing everything himself, by which means nothing is done, or done so tardily as to be of no use. Then all the subordinate Boards are miserably administered, and the various useless, inefficient, or worn out officers have been suffered to remain at their posts, to the enormous detriment of the service. The genius of Lord Chatham or the energy and will of the Duke of Wellington would have failed with such a general staff here, and with such a Commander-in-Chief as Hardinge, and with the fain?antise of Raglan.