[105] Diog. L. vii 33.
[106] ‘placet Stoicis, suo quamque rem nomine appellare. sic enim disserunt, nihil esse obscenum, nihil turpe dictu’ Cic. Fam. ix 22, 1. See further below, § [344].
[107] ‘postea tuus ille Poenulus, causam non obtinens repugnante natura, verba versare coepit et primum rebus iis, quas non bonas dicimus, concessit ut haberentur † aestimabiles, et ad naturam accommodatae’ Fin. iv 20, 56; ‘the stricter Stoic theory of the good was modified by the admission of προηγμένα’ Zeller, Stoics, p. 290. The true note is struck by Rendall, Introd. p. xlv: ‘the course of Stoic ethics is, in fact, the progressive enlargement and clarification of the Cynic ideal of conduct, under the stress of that larger conception of “nature” which was inherent in Stoic monism. The full content and interpretation of the formula was only gradually realised. Its deeper implications unfolded themselves through life even more than through thought, and find their fullest exposition in the pages of the Roman Stoics.’
[108] Stob. ii 7, 5 a.
[109] ‘aestimatio, quae ἀξία dicitur’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 34. Posidonius seems to have practically substituted ἀξίαν ἔχοντα for προηγμένα, but in strict usage the latter term is narrower, and includes only such things as have measurable worth.
[110] ‘inter illa, quae nihil valerent ad beate misereve vivendum, aliquid tamen quo differrent esse voluerunt, ut essent eorum alia aestimabilia, alia contra, alia neutrum’ ib. 15, 50; τῶν δὲ ἀξίαν ἐχόντων τὰ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀξίαν, τὰ δὲ βραχεῖαν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπαξίαν ἐχόντων ἃ μὲν ἔχειν πολλὴν ἀπαξίαν, ἃ δὲ βραχεῖαν Stob. ii 7, 7 g; ‘quae essent sumenda ex iis alia pluris esse aestimanda, alia minoris’ Cic. Ac. i 10, 37.
[111] Stob. ii 7, 7.
[112] Arnim iii 122.
[113] Plut. Sto. rep. 23, 6.
[114] ‘cetera autem, etsi nec bona nec mala essent, tamen alia secundum naturam dicebat [Zeno], alia naturae esse contraria. his ipsis alia interiecta et media numerabat’ Cic. Ac. i 10, 36.