[92] See above, § [319]. It does not seem possible to accept Pearson’s view (on Z. fr. 128) that Zeno intended πόνος to be the προηγμένον, and ἡδονή the ἀποπροηγμένον; but both he and his successors undoubtedly recognised the value of πόνος (toil) as a discipline. The following remarks communicated to the writer by Mr Pearson throw much light on a really difficult question. ‘Even the Cynics are forced to admit that not all “pleasure” is to be condemned (the evidence is in Zeller’s Socratics, p. 308), but the only form of it which deserves consideration is that which is the result and after-effect of πόνος. In other words, it may be argued that true pleasure is the cessation of pain (Plat. Phileb. 44 B). The glorification of Heracles the toilsome hero corresponds; but pleasure as understood by the vulgar is unhesitatingly to be rejected. Zeno was the inheritor of all this, and, if he ever said that ἡδονή was προηγμένον, his remark can only have applied to the ἀπονία-ἡδονή; and such certainly was the view of Chrysippus (Plut. Sto. rep. 30, 2).’ In the passage here referred to from Plutarch ἀπονία takes the place of ἡδονή as a προηγμένον; so also in Stob. ii 7, 7 e and Cic. Fin. iii 15, 51. See further §§ [347], [371].
[93] ἡδονή as an advantage is contrasted with πόνος (suffering) as a disadvantage in the list attributed to these writers in Diog. L. vii 102.
[94] Cic. Fin. ii 21, 69.
[95] Κλεάνθης μήτε κατὰ φύσιν αὐτὴν [ἡδονὴν] εἶναι μήτ’ ἀξίαν ἔχειν ἐν τῷ βίῳ Sext. math. xi 74 (Arnim iii 155).
[96] Arnim iii 136, 155.
[97] ‘sit impudens, si [voluptas] pluris esse contendat dulcedinem corporis, et titillationem, ex eave natam laetitiam, quam gravitatem animi’ Cic. Fin. iii 1, 1; ‘quis mortalium per diem noctemque titillari velit?’ Sen. Dial. vii 5, 4; ‘quidni ista bene penset cum minutis et frivolis et non perseverantibus corpusculi motibus?’ ib. 4, 4.
[98] ‘voluptas habet quiddam simile naturali bono’ Cic. Leg. i 11, 31; ‘[voluptas] condimenti fortasse nonnihil, utilitatis certe nihil habebit’ Off. iii 33, 120; ‘voluptatem natura necessariis rebus admiscuit, non ut illam peteremus, sed ut ea, sine quibus non possumus vivere, gratiora nobis illius faceret accessio’ Sen. Ep. 116, 3; ‘[virtus voluptatem] non praestat, sed et hanc; nec huic laborat, sed labor eius, quamvis aliud petat, hoc quoque adsequetur’ Dial. vii 9, 1. That this view was held by Chrysippus appears from Diog. L. vii 86 (cf. Arnim iii 229 a); see also above, notes 92 and 93.
[99] Eth. N. x 7.
[100] ἡδονὴ δέ ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις ἐφ’ αἱρετῷ δοκοῦντι ὑπάρχειν Diog. L. vii 114 (of Chrysippus); ‘hoc interest, quod voluptas dicitur etiam in animo, vitiosa res, ut Stoici putant, qui eam sic definiunt; sublationem animi sine ratione, opinantis se magno bono frui’ Cic. Fin. ii 4, 13; ‘vitium esse voluptatem credimus’ Sen. Ep. 59, 1.
[101] ‘quam [perturbationem] Stoici ἡδονήν appellant, ego malo laetitiam appellare, quasi gestientis animi elationem voluptariam’ Cic. Fin. iii 10, 35. Sometimes Cicero translates with more fulness by laetitia gestiens or nimia; Tusc. disp. iv 6, 13.