296. I. THE RIGHT OF CHOICE BELONGS TO THE MAN, AND NOT TO THE WOMAN. This is because the man is born to be understanding, but the woman to be love; also because with the men there generally prevails a love of the sex, but with the women a love of one of the sex; and likewise because it is not unbecoming for men to speak openly about love, as it is for women; nevertheless women have the right of selecting one of their suitors. In regard to the first reason, that the right of choice belongs to the men, because they are born to understanding, it is grounded in the consideration that the understanding can examine agreements and disagreements, and distinguish them, and from judgement choose that which is suitable: it is otherwise with the women, because they are born to love, and therefore have no such discrimination; and consequently their determinations to marriage would proceed only from the inclinations of their love; if they have the skill of distinguishing between men and men, still their love is influenced by appearances. In regard to the other reason, that the right of choice belongs to the men, and not to the women, because with men there generally prevails a love of the sex, and with women a love of one of the sex, it is grounded in the consideration, that those in whom a love of the sex prevails, can freely look around and also determine: it is otherwise with women, in whom is implanted a love for one of the sex. If you wish for a proof of this, ask, if you please, the men you meet, what their sentiments are respecting monogamical and polygamical unions; and you will seldom meet one who will not reply in favor of the polygamical; and this also is a love of the sex: but ask the women their sentiments on the subject, and almost all, except the vilest of the sex, will reject polygamical unions; from which consideration it follows, that with the women there prevails a love of one of the sex, thus conjugial love. In regard to the third reason, that it is not unbecoming for men to speak openly about love, whereas it is for women, it is self-evident; hence also it follows, that declaration belongs to the men, and therefore so does choice. That women have the right of selecting in regard to their suitors, is well known; but this species of selection is confined and limited, whereas that of the men is extended and unlimited.
297. II. THE MAN OUGHT TO COURT AND INTREAT THE WOMAN RESPECTING MARRIAGE WITH HIM, AND NOT THE WOMAN THE MAN. This naturally follows the right of choice; and besides, to court and intreat women respecting marriage is in itself honorable and becoming for men, but not for women. If women were to court and entreat the men, they would not only be blamed, but, after intreaty, they would be reputed as vile, or after marriage as libidinous, with whom there would be no association but what was cold and fastidious; wherefore marriages would thereby be converted into tragic scenes. Wives also take it as a compliment to have it said of them, that being conquered as it were, they yielded to the pressing intreaties of the men. Who does not foresee, that if the women courted the men, they would seldom be accepted? They would either be indignantly rejected, or be enticed to lasciviousness, and also would dishonor their modesty. Moreover, as was shewn above, the men have not any innate love of the sex; and without love there is no interior pleasantness of life: wherefore to exalt their life by that love, it is incumbent on the men to compliment the women; courting and intreating them with civility, courtesy, and humility, respecting this sweet addition to their life. The superior comeliness of the female countenance, person, and manners, above that of the men, adds itself as a proper object of desire.
298. III. THE WOMAN OUGHT TO CONSULT HER PARENTS, OR THOSE WHO ARE IN THE PLACE OF PARENTS, AND THEN DELIBERATE WITH HERSELF, BEFORE SHE CONSENTS. The reason why parents are to be consulted is, because they deliberate from judgement, knowledge, and love; from judgement, because they are in an advanced age, which excels in judgement, and discerns what is suitable and unsuitable: from knowledge, in respect to both the suitor and their daughter; in respect to the suitor they procure information, and in respect to their daughter they already know; wherefore they conclude respecting both with united discernment: from love, because to consult the good of their daughter, and to provide for her establishment, is also to consult and provide for their own and for themselves.
299. The case would be altogether different, if the daughter consents of herself to her urgent suitor, without consulting her parents, or those who are in their place; for she cannot from judgement, knowledge, and love, make a right estimate of the matter which so deeply concerns her future welfare: she cannot from judgement, because she is as yet in ignorance as to conjugial life, and not in a state of comparing reasons, and discovering the morals of men from their particular tempers; nor from knowledge, because she knows few things beyond the domestic concerns of her parents and of some of her companions; and is unqualified to examine into such things as relate to the family and property of her suitor: nor from love, because with daughters in their first marriageable age, and also afterwards, this is led by the concupiscences originating in the senses, and not as yet by the desires originating in a refined mind. The daughter ought nevertheless to deliberate on the matter with herself, before she consents, lest she should be led against her will to form a connection with a man whom she does not love; for by so doing, consent on her part would be wanting; and yet it is consent that constitutes marriage, and initiates the spirit into conjugial love; and consent against the will, or extorted, does not initiate the spirit, although it may the body; and thus it converts chastity, which resides in the spirit, into lust; whereby conjugial love in its first warmth is vitiated.
300. IV. AFTER A DECLARATION OF CONSENT, PLEDGES ARE TO BE GIVEN. By pledges we mean presents, which, after consent, are confirmations, testifications, first favors, and gladnesses. Those presents are confirmations, because they are certificates of consent on each side; wherefore, when two parties consent to anything, it is customary to say, "Give me a token;" and of two, who have entered into a marriage engagement, and have secured it by presents, that they are pledged, thus confirmed. They are testifications, because those pledges are continual visible witnesses of mutual love; hence also they are memorials thereof; especially if they be rings, perfume-bottles or boxes, and ribbons, which are worn in sight. In such things there is a sort of representative image of the minds (animorum) of the bridegroom and the bride. Those pledges are first favors, because conjugial love engages for itself everlasting favor; whereof those gifts are the first fruits. That they are the gladnesses of love, is well known, for the mind is exhilarated at the sight of them; and because love is in them, those favors are dearer and more precious than any other gifts, it being as if their hearts were in them. As those pledges are securities of conjugial love, therefore presents after consent were in use with the ancients; and after accepting such presents the parties were declared to be bridegroom and bride. But it is to be observed that it is at the pleasure of the parties to bestow those presents either before or after the act of betrothing; if before, they are confirmations and testifications of consent to betrothing; if after it, they are also confirmations and testifications of consent to the nuptial tie.
301. V. CONSENT IS TO BE SECURED AND ESTABLISHED BY SOLEMN BETROTHING. The reasons for betrothings are these: 1. That after betrothing the souls of the two parties may mutually incline towards each other. 2. That the universal love for the sex may be determined to one of the sex. 3. That the interior affections may be mutually known, and by applications in the internal cheerfulness of love, may be conjoined. 4. That the spirits of both parties may enter into marriage, and be more and more consociated. 5. That thereby conjugial love may advance regularly from its first warmth even to the nuptial flame. Consequently: 6. That conjugial love may advance and grow up in just order from its spiritual origin. The state of betrothing may be compared to the state of spring before summer; and the internal pleasantness of that state to the flowering of trees before fructification. As the beginning and progressions of conjugial love proceed in order for the sake of their influx into the effective love, which commences at the nuptials, therefore, there are also betrothings in the heavens.