[B] Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἱστορίας, εἰ καί τισιν ἀπίθανα δόξει καὶ φιλοσόφῳ προσήκειν οὐδὲν οὐδὲ θεολόγῳ, λεγέσθω μὴ μεῖον, κοινῇ μὲν ὑπὸ πλείστων ἱστοριογράφων ἀναγραφόμενα, σωζόμενα δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ χαλκῶν εἰκόνων ἐν τῇ κρατίστῃ καὶ θεοφιλεῖ Ῥώμῃ. καίτοι με οὐ λέληθεν ὅτι φήσουσιν αὐτά τινες τῶν λίαν σοφῶν ὕθλους εἶναι γρᾳδίων οὐκ ἀνεκτούς. ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκεῖ ταῖς πόλεσι πιστεύειν μᾶλλον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ τουτοισὶ τοῖς κομψοῖς, ὧν τὸ ψυχάριον δριμὺ μέν, ὑγιὲς δὲ οὐδὲ ἓν βλέπει.[804]
(As for this narrative, though some will think it incredible and wholly unworthy of a philosopher or a theologian, nevertheless let it here be related. For besides the fact that it is commonly recorded by most historians, it has been preserved too on bronze statues in mighty Rome, beloved of the gods.[805] And yet I am well aware that some over-wise persons will call it an old wives' tale, not to be credited. But for my part I would rather trust the traditions of cities than those too clever people, whose puny souls are keen-sighted enough, but never do they see aught that is sound.)
Ὕπὲρ δὲ ὧν εἰπεῖν ἐπῆλθέ μοι παρ᾽ αὐτὸν ἄρτι [pg 450] τὸν τῆς ἁγιστείας καιρόν, ἀκούω μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ Πορφυρίῳ τινὰ πεφιλοσοφῆσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, οὐ μὴν οἶδά γε, οὐ γὰρ ἐνέτυχον, εἰ καὶ συνενεχθῆναί που συμβαίη τῷ λόγῳ. τὸν Γάλλον δὲ ἐγὼ τουτονὶ καὶ τὸν Ἄττιν αὐτὸς οἴκοθεν ἐπινοῶ τοῦ γονίμου καὶ δημιουργικοῦ νοῦ τὴν ἄχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης ἅπαντα γεννῶσαν οὐσίαν εἶναι, ἔχουσάν τε ἐν ἑαυτῇ πάντας τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν· [D] οὐ γὰρ δὴ πάντων ἐν πᾶσι τὰ εἴδη, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἀνωτάτω καὶ πρώτοις αἰτίοις τὰ τῶν ἐσχάτων καὶ τελευταίων, μεθ᾽ ἃ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἣ τὸ τῆς στερῆσεως ὄνομα μετὰ ἀμυδρᾶς ἐπινοίας. οὐσῶν δὴ πολλῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πολλῶν πάνυ δημιουργῶν τοῦ τρίτου δημιουργοῦ, ὃς τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν τοὺς λόγους ἐξῃρημένους ἔχει καὶ συνεχεῖς τὰς αἰτίας, ἡ τελευταία καὶ μέχρι γῆς ὑπὸ περιουσίας τοῦ γονίμου [162] διὰ τῆς ἄνωθεν παρὰ τῶν ἄστρων καθήκουσα φύσις ὁ ζητούμενός ἐστιν Ἀττις. ἴσως δὲ ὑπὲρ οὗ λέγω χρὴ διαλαβεῖν σαφέστερον. εἶναί τι λέγομεν ὕλην, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔνυλον εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τούτων εἰ μή τις αἰτία προτέτακται, λανθάνοιμεν ἂν ἑαυτοὺς εἰσάγοντες τὴν Ἐπικούρειον δόξαν. ἀρχαῖν γὰρ δυοῖν εἰ μηδέν ἐστι πρεσβύτερον, αὐτόματός τις αὐτὰς φορὰ καὶ τύχη συνεκλήρωσεν. ἀλλ᾽ ὁρῶμεν, [pg 452] φησὶ Περιπατητικός [B] τις ἀγχίνους ὥσπερ ὁ Ξέναρχος, τούτων αἴτιον ὂν τὸ πέμπτον καὶ κυκλικὸν σῶμα. γελοῖος δὲ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὑπὲρ τούτων ζητῶν τε καὶ πολυπραγμονῶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Θεόφραστος· ἠγνόησε γοῦν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φωνήν. ὥσπερ γὰρ εἰς τὴν ἀσώματον οὐσίαν ἐλθὼν καὶ νοητὴν ἔστη μὴ πολυπραγμονῶν τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀλλὰ φὰς οὕτω ταῦτα πεφυκέναι· χρῆν δὲ δήπουθεν καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πέμπτου σώματος τὸ πεφυκέναι ταῦτῃ λαμβάνοντα μηκέτι ζητεῖν τὰς αἰτίας, ἵστασθαι δὲ ἐπὶ αὐτῶν καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸ νοητὸν ἐκπίπτειν ὂν μὲν οὐδὲν [C] φύσει καθ᾽ ἑαυτό, ἔχον δὲ ἄλλως κενὴν ὑπόνοιαν. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ μέμνημαι τοῦ Ξενάρχου λέγοντος ἀκηκοώς. εἰ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος ἔφη, τοῖς ἄγαν ἐφείσθω Περιπατητικοῖς ὀνυχίζειν, ὅτι δὲ οὐ προσηνῶς ἐμοὶ παντί που δῆλον, ὅπου γε καὶ τὰς Ἀριστοτελικὰς ὑποθέσεις ἐνδεεστέρως ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, εἰ μή τις αὐτὰς ἐς ταὐτὸ τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἄγοι, [D] μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ταῖς ἐκ θεῶν δεδομέναις προφητείαις.
(I am told that on this same subject of which I am impelled to speak at the very season of these sacred rites, Porphyry too has written a philosophic treatise. But since I have never met with it I do not know whether at any point it may chance to agree with my discourse. But him whom I call Gallus or Attis I discern of my own knowledge to be the substance of generative and creative Mind which engenders all things down to the lowest plane of matter,[806] and comprehends in itself all the concepts and causes of the forms that are embodied in matter. For truly the forms of all things are not in all things, and in the highest and first causes we do not find the forms of the lowest and last, after which there is nothing save privation[807] coupled with a dim idea. Now there are many substances and very many creative gods, but the nature of the third creator,[808] who contains in himself the separate concepts of the forms that are embodied in matter and also the connected chain of causes, I mean that nature which is last in order, and through its superabundance of generative power descends even unto our earth through the upper region from the stars,—this is he whom we seek, even Attis. But perhaps I ought to distinguish more clearly what I mean. We assert that matter exists and also form embodied in matter. But if no cause be assigned prior to these two, we should be introducing, unconsciously, the Epicurean doctrine. For if there be nothing of higher order than these two principles, then a spontaneous motion and chance brought them together. “But,” says some acute Peripatetic like Xenarchus, “we see that the cause of these is the fifth or cyclic substance. Aristotle is absurd when he investigates and discusses these matters, and Theophrastus likewise. At any rate he overlooked the implications of a well-known utterance of his. For just as when he came to incorporeal and intelligible substance he stopped short and did not inquire into its cause, and merely asserted that this is what it is by nature; surely in the case of the fifth substance also he ought to have assumed that its nature is to be thus; and he ought not to have gone on to search for causes, but should have stopped at these, and not fallen back on the intelligible, which has no independent existence by itself, and in any case represents a bare supposition.” This is the sort of thing that Xenarchus says, as I remember to have heard. Now whether what he says is correct or not, let us leave to the extreme Peripatetics to refine upon. But that his view is not agreeable to me is, I think, clear to everyone. For I hold that the theories of Aristotle himself are incomplete unless they are brought into harmony with those of Plato[809]; or rather we must make these also agree with the oracles that have been vouchsafed to us by the gods.)
Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἴσως ἄξιον πυθέσθαι, πῶς τὸ κυκλικὸν σῶμα δύναται τὰς ἀσωμάτους ἔχειν αἰτίας τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ δίχα τούτων [pg 454] ὑποστῆναι τὴν γένεσιν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, πρόδηλόν ἐστί που καὶ σαφές. τοῦ χάριν γάρ ἐστι τοσαῦτα τὰ γιγνόμενα; πόθεν δὲ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ; πόθεν δὲ ἡ κατὰ γένος τῶν ὄντων ἐν ὡρισμένοις εἴδεσι διαφορά, [163] εἰ μή τινες εἶεν προϋπάρχοντες καὶ προϋφεστῶτες[810] λόγοι αἰτίαι τε ἐν παραδείγματος λόγῳ προϋφεστῶσαι; πρὸς ἃς εἴπερ ἀμβλυώττομεν, ἔτι καθαιρώμεθα τὰ ὄμματα τῆς ψυχῆς. κάθαρσις δὲ ὀρθὴ στραφῆναι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ κατανοῆσαι, πῶς μὲν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἔνυλος νοῦς ὥσπερ ἐκμαγεῖόν τι τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν καὶ εἰκών ἐστιν. ἓν γὰρ οὐδέν ἐστι τῶν σωμάτων ἢ τῶν [B] περὶ τὰ σώματα γινομένων τε καὶ θεωρουμένων ἀσωμάτων, οὗ τὴν φαντασίαν ὁ νοῦς οὐ δύναται λαβεῖν ἀσωμάτως, ὅπερ οὔποτ᾽ ἂν ἐποίησεν, εἰ μή τι ξυγγενὲς εἶχεν αὐτοῖς φύσει. ταῦτά τοι καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ψυχὴν τόπον εἰδῶν ἔφη, πλὴν οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ψυχὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπεστραμμένην πρὸς τὸ σῶμα δυνάμει ταῦτα ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖον· εἰ δέ τις ἄσχετος εἴη καὶ ἀμιγὴς ταύτῃ, τοὺς λόγους οὐκέτι δυνάμει, [C] πάντας δὲ [pg 456] ὑπάρχειν ἐνεργείᾳ νομιστέον. λάβωμεν δὲ αὐτὰ σαφέστερον διὰ τοῦ παραδείγματος, ᾧ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ[811] πρὸς ἕτερον μὲν λόγον, ἐχρήσατο δ᾽ οὖν ὅμως. τὸ παράδειγμα δὲ οὐκ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν φέρω τοῦ λόγου· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀποδείξει χρὴ λαβεῖν αὐτόν,[812] ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιβολῇ μόνῃ, περὶ γὰρ τῶν πρώτων αἰτιῶν ἐστιν ἢ τῶν γε ὁμοστοίχων τοῖς πρώτοις, εἴπερ ἡμῖν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ οὖν ἄξιον νομίζειν, [D] καὶ ὁ Ἄττις θεός. τί δὲ καὶ ποῖόν ἐστι τὸ παράδειγμα; φησί[813] που Πλάτων, τῶν περὶ τὴν μίμησιν διατριβόντων εἰ μὲν ἐθέλοι τις μιμεῖσθαι, ὥστε καθυφεστάναι τὰ μιμητά, ἐργώδη τε εἶναι καὶ χαλεπὴν καὶ νὴ Δία γε τοῦ ἀδυνάτου πλησίον μᾶλλον, εὔκολον δὲ καὶ ῥᾳδίαν καὶ σφόδρα δυνατὴν τὴν διὰ τοῦ δοκεῖν τὰ ὄντα μιμουμένην. ὅταν οὖν τὸ κάτοπτρον λαβόντες περιφέρωμεν ἐκ πάντων τῶν ὄντων ῥᾳδίως ἀπομαξάμενοι, [164] δείκνυμεν ἑκάστου τοὺς τύπους. ἐκ τούτου τοῦ παραδείγματος ἐπὶ τὸ εἰρημένον μεταβιβάσωμεν τὸ ὁμοίωμα, ἵν᾽ ᾖ τὸ μὲν κάτοπτρον ὁ λεγόμενος ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους δυνάμει τόπος εἰδῶν.
(But this it is perhaps worth while to inquire, how the cyclic substance[814] can contain the incorporeal causes of the forms that are embodied in matter. For that, apart from these causes, it is not possible for generation to take place is, I think, clear and manifest. For why are there so many kinds of generated things? Whence arise masculine and feminine? Whence the distinguishing characteristics of things according to their species in well-defined types, if there are not pre-existing and pre-established concepts, and causes which existed beforehand to serve as a pattern?[815] And if we discern these causes but dimly, let us still further purify the eyes of the soul. And the right kind of purification is to turn our gaze inwards and to observe how the soul and embodied Mind are a sort of mould[816] and likeness of the forms that are embodied in matter. For in the case of the corporeal, or of things that though incorporeal come into being and are to be studied in connection with the corporeal, there is no single thing whose mental image the mind cannot grasp independently of the corporeal. But this it could not have done if it did not possess something naturally akin to the incorporeal forms. Indeed it is for this reason that Aristotle himself called the soul the “place of the forms,”[817] only he said that the forms are there not actually but potentially. Now a soul of this sort, that is allied with matter, must needs possess these forms potentially only, but a soul that should be independent and unmixed in this way we must believe would contain all the concepts, not potentially but actually. Let us make this clearer by means of the example which Plato himself employed in the Sophist, with reference certainly to another theory, but still he did employ it. And I bring forward the illustration, not to prove my argument; for one must not try to grasp it by demonstration, but only by apprehension. For it deals with the first causes, or at least those that rank with the first, if indeed, as it is right to believe, we must regard Attis also as a god. What then, and of what sort is this illustration? Plato says that, if any man whose profession is imitation desire to imitate in such a way that the original is exactly reproduced, this method of imitation is troublesome and difficult, and, by Zeus, borders on the impossible; but pleasant and easy and quite possible is the method which only seems to imitate real things. For instance, when we take up a mirror and turn it round we easily get an impression of all objects, and show the general outline of every single thing. From this example let us go back to the analogy I spoke of, and let the mirror stand for what Aristotle calls the “place of the forms” potentially.)
Αὐτὰ δὲ χρὴ τὰ εἴδη πρότερον ὑφεστάναι πάντως ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ δυνάμει. τῆς τοίνυν ἐν ἡμῖν ψυχῆς, ὡς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλει δοκεῖ, δυνάμει τῶν ὄντων ἐχούσης τὰ εἴδη, ποῦ πρῶτον ἐνεργείᾳ θησόμεθα ταῦτα; πότερον ἐν τοῖς ἐνύλοις; [B] ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι γε ταῦτα φανερῶς τὰ τελευταῖα. λείπεται [pg 458] δὴ λοιπὸν ἀύλους αἰτίας ζητεῖν ἐνεργείᾳ προτεταγμένας τῶν ἐνύλων, αἷς παρυποστᾶσαν καὶ συμπροελθοῦσαν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν δέχεσθαι μὲν ἐκεῖθεν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ὄντων τινῶν τὰ ἔσοπτρα, τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν ἀναγκαῖον λόγους, ἐνδιδόναι δὲ διὰ τῆς φύσεως τῇ τε ὕλῃ καὶ τοῖς ἐνύλοις τουτοισὶ σώμασιν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐστὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν σωμάτων ἴσμεν, ὡς ὅλη τις οὖσα τοῦ παντός, ἡ δὲ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον [C] ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τῶν ἐν μέρει, πρόδηλόν ἐστί που καὶ σαφές, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἐνεργείᾳ δίχα φαντασίας ἐν ἡμῖν, ἡ δὲ ὑπὲρ ταύτης ψυχὴ καὶ τὴν φαντασίαν προσείληφεν. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ φύσις καὶ ὧν οὐκ ἔχει τὴν φαντασίαν ἔχειν ὅμως ὁμολογεῖται τὴν αἰτίαν, ἀνθ᾽ ὅτου πρὸς θεῶν οὐχὶ τοῦτο αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἔτι καὶ πρεσβύτερον τῇ ψυχῇ δώσομεν, ὅπου καὶ φανταστικῶς αὐτὸ γιγνώσκομεν ἤδη [D] καὶ λόγῳ καταλαμβάνομεν; εἶτα τίς οὕτως ἐστὶ φιλόνεικος, ὡς τῇ φύσει μὲν ὑπάρχειν ὁμολογεῖν τοὺς ἐνύλους λόγους, εἰ καὶ μὴ πάντας καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει γε πάντας, τῇ ψυχῇ δὲ μὴ δοῦναι τοῦτο αὐτό; οὐκοῦν εἰ δυνάμει μὲν ἐν τῇ φύσει καὶ οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ τὰ εἴδη, δυνάμει δὲ ἔτι καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθαρώτερον καὶ δικεκριμένως [pg 460] μᾶλλον, ὥστε δὴ καὶ καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ γινώσκεσθαι, ἐνεργείᾳ δὲ οὐδαμοῦ· πόθεν ἀναρτήσομεν τῆς ἀειγενεσίας τὰ πείσματα; ποῦ δὲ ἑδράσομεν [165] τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῆς ἀιδιότητος κόσμου λόγους; τὸ γὰρ τοι κυκλικὸν σῶμα ἐξ ὑποκειμένου καὶ εἴδους ἐστίν. ἀνάγκη δὴ οὖν, εἰ καὶ μήποτε ἐνεργείᾳ ταῦτα δίχα ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ ταῖς γε ἐπινοίαις ἐκεῖνα πρῶτα ὑπάρχοντα εἶναί τε καὶ νομίζεσθαι πρεσβύτερα. οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δέδοταί τις καὶ τῶν ἐνύλων εἰδῶν αἰτία προηγουμένη παντελῶς ἄυλος ὑπὸ τὸν τρίτον δημιουργόν, ὃς ἡμῖν οὐ τούτων μόνον ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ πέμπτου σώματος πατὴρ καὶ δεσπότης· [B] ἀποδιελόντες ἐκείνου τὸν Ἄττιν, τὴν ἄχρι τῆς ὕλης καταβαίνουσαν αἰτίαν, καὶ θεὸν γόνιμον Ἄττιν εἶναι καὶ Γάλλον πεπιστεύκαμεν, ὃν δή φησιν ὁ μῦθος ἀνθῆσαι μὲν ἐκτεθέντα παρὰ Γάλλου ποταμοῦ ταῖς δίναις, εἶτα καλὸν φανέντα καὶ μέγαν ἀγαπηθῆναι παρὰ τῆς Μητρὸς τῶν θεῶν. τὴν δὲ τά τε ἄλλα πάντα ἐπιτρέψαι αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν ἀστερωτὸν περιθεῖναι[818] πῖλον. [C] ἀλλ᾽ εἰ τὴν κορυφὴν σκέπει τοῦ Ἄττιδος ὁ φαινόμενος οὐρανὸς οὑτοσί, τὸν Γάλλον ποταμὸν ἄρα μή ποτε χρὴ τὸν γαλαξίαν αἰνίττεσθαι[819] κύκλον; ἐνταῦθα γάρ φασι μίγνυσθαι τὸ παθητὸν σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ἀπαθῆ τοῦ [pg 462] πέμπτου κυκλοφορίαν. ἄχρι τοι τούτων ἐπέτρεψεν ἡ Μήτηρ τῶν θεῶν σκιρτᾶν τε καὶ χορεύειν τῷ καλῷ τούτῳ καὶ ταῖς ἡλιακαῖς ἀκτῖσιν ἐμφερεῖ τῷ νοερῷ θεῷ, τῷ Ἄττιδι. ὁ δὲ ἐπειδὴ προïὼν ἦλθεν ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων, ὁ μῦθος αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ ἄντρον[820] κατελθεῖν ἔφη καὶ συγγενέσθαι τῇ νύμφῃ, [D] τὸ δίυγρον αἰνιττόμενος τῆς ὕλης· καὶ οὐδὲ τὴν ὕλην αὐτὴν νῦν ἔφη, τὴν τελευταίαν δὲ αἰτίαν ἀσώματον, ἣ τῆς ὕλης προüφέστηκε.[821] λέγεταί τοι καὶ πρὸς Ἡρακλείτου[822]
(Now the forms themselves must certainly subsist actually before they subsist potentially. If, therefore, the soul in us, as Aristotle himself believed, contains potentially the forms of existing things, where shall we place the forms in that previous state of actuality? Shall it be in material things? No, for the forms that are in them are evidently the last and lowest. Therefore it only remains to search for immaterial causes which exist in actuality prior to and of a higher order than the causes that are embodied in matter. And our souls must subsist in dependence on these and come forth together with them, and so receive from them the concepts of the forms, as mirrors show the reflections of things; and then with the aid of nature it bestows them on matter and on these material bodies of our world. For we know that nature is the creator of bodies, universal nature in some sort of the All; while that the individual nature of each is the creator of particulars is plainly evident. But nature exists in us in actuality without a mental image, whereas the soul, which is superior to nature, possesses a mental image besides. If therefore we admit that nature contains in herself the cause of things of which she has however no mental image, why, in heaven's name, are we not to assign to the soul these same forms, only in a still higher degree, and with priority over nature, seeing that it is in the soul that we recognise the forms by means of mental images, and comprehend them by means of the concept? Who then is so contentious as to admit on the one hand that the concepts embodied in matter exist in nature—even though not all and equally in actuality, yet all potentially—while on the other hand he refuses to recognise that the same is true of the soul? If therefore the forms exist in nature potentially, but not actually, and if also they exist potentially in the soul,[823] only in a still purer sense and more completely separated, so that they can be comprehended and recognised; but yet exist in actuality nowhere at all; to what, I ask, shall we hang the chain of perpetual generation, and on what shall we base our theories of the imperishability of the universe? For the cyclic substance[824] itself is composed of matter and form. It must therefore follow that, even though in actuality these two, matter and form, are never separate from one another, yet for our intelligence the forms must have prior existence and be regarded as of a higher order. Accordingly, since for the forms embodied in matter a wholly immaterial cause has been assigned, which leads these forms under the hand of the third creator[825]—who for us is the lord and father not only of these forms but also of the visible fifth substance—from that creator we distinguish Attis, the cause which descends even unto matter, and we believe that Attis or Gallus is a god of generative powers. Of him the myth relates that, after being exposed at birth near the eddying stream of the river Gallus, he grew up like a flower, and when he had grown to be fair and tall, he was beloved by the Mother of the Gods. And she entrusted all things to him, and moreover set on his head the starry cap.[826] But if our visible sky covers the crown of Attis, must one not interpret the river Gallus as the Milky Way?[827] For it is there, they say, that the substance which is subject to change mingles with the passionless revolving sphere of the fifth substance. Only as far as this did the Mother of the Gods permit this fair intellectual god Attis, who resembles the sun's rays, to leap and dance. But when he passed beyond this limit and came even to the lowest region, the myth said that he had descended into the cave, and had wedded the nymph. And the nymph is to be interpreted as the dampness of matter; though the myth does not here mean matter itself, but the lowest immaterial cause which subsists prior to matter. Indeed Heracleitus also says:)
ψυχῇσιν θάνατος ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι·
(“It is death to souls to become wet.”)