[210] Die realen Unterschiede, i. e., the distinctions of the body viewed as part of the physical process of Nature.
[211] Zu ihrer subjektiven Einheit, that is to say, their unity with the notion of Life as objectively realized in Nature, subjective only in the sense that it is ideal, not apprehended by sense-perception as such.
[212] Nähere. I think Hegel uses nähe in the idiomatic sense in which he uses it in the phrase (p. 150) when he speaks of Nature as das nächst Daseyn der Idee, i.e., most elementary, more near to it when the notion first presses out of abstraction into totality.
[213] Lötze apparently disputes this distinction, but it appears to me very clear.
[214] Seyn. The logical terms are here employed in their technical Hegelian sense. Seyn is "being" as part of a process, it is rather a tendency to become than a particular or determinate being (daseyn.)
[215] Das Negiren, the negation of them as entirely independent structures.
[216] Des Idealisirens, e.g., the principle of ideality which is in one aspect of it negation.
[217] Affirmatives Fürsichseyn, e.g., the explicit ideal totality of Life apart from the process.
[218] Bilderin.
[219] Das Innere, otherwise called subjective (see note above) and meaning what is not externally visible as materia, though it may be visible indirectly as explained further on.