[172] ‘Y aquel oro que rescatauamos dauamos â los hombres que traiamos de la mar, que iban â pescar, â trueco de su pescado.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 27. If so it was probably after the Indians deserted.
[173] Gomara refers to an order to stop all barter for gold, with a view to let it appear that the Spaniards cared not for the metal, and thus to induce the Indians to make no secret of the manner in which it was obtained. Hist. Mex., 39. As if the natives had not already learned what we wanted, sneers Bernal Diaz.
[174] ‘Que se dezia Quintalbor, no bolvió mas, porque auia adolecido en el camino.’ Bernal Diaz, Hist. Verdad., 27.
[175] According to Gomara, Hist. Mex., 45, Cortés told the governor that he would not leave without seeing Montezuma. Solis elaborates this as usual into a long speech, to which Teuhtlile replies with threats, and turning his back stalks out of the camp. Conq. Mex., i. 153-5; Herrera, dec. i. lib. v. cap. vi.
CHAPTER IX.
THE MIGHTY PROJECT IS CONCEIVED.
May, 1519.
Serious Dilemma of Cortés—Authority without Law—Montejo Sent Northward—Recommends another Anchorage—Dissensions at Vera Cruz—Prompt and Shrewd Action of Cortés—A Municipality Organized—Cortés Resigns—And is Chosen Leader by the Municipality—Velazquez’ Captains Intimate Rebellion—Cortés promptly Arrests Several of Them—Then he Conciliates them all—Important Embassy from Cempoala—The Veil Lifted—The March to Cempoala—What was Done there—Quiahuiztlan—The Coming of the Tribute Gatherers—How They were Treated—Grand Alliance.
At this point in his career Hernan Cortés found himself less master of the situation than suited him. The color of his command was not sufficiently pronounced. He had no authority to settle; he had no authority to conquer; he might only discover and trade. He did not care for Velazquez; anything that pertained to Velazquez he was prepared to take. But Velazquez had no legal power to authorize him further. Cortés cared little for the authorities at Española; the king was his chief dependence; the king to whose favor his right arm and mother wit should pave the way. Some signal service, in the eyes of the monarch, might atone for slight irregularities; if he failed, the severest punishments were already come. But where was the service? Had Montezuma granted him an interview, he might make report of that, and find listeners. As it was, he could land and slay a few thousand natives, but his men would waste away and no benefits accrue. Nevertheless, if he could plant himself somewhat more firmly on this soil than his commission seemed to justify, chance might offer opportunity, and the signal service find achievement. Such were the thoughts that just now filled his sagacious brain, but the way was by no means clear before him.
While the events narrated in the preceding chapter were in progress, Montejo, with two vessels, had been sent northward to seek a harbor less unwholesome than the present, where many of those wounded at Tabasco had died.[176] As second in command went Rodrigo Álvarez Chico, and as pilots, Alaminos, and Álvarez el Manquillo. On reaching the extreme point attained by Grijalva, the strong current prevented further advance, as in the former attempt.[177] They were obliged by a gale to throw overboard part of their cargo. Water failed, and in the attempt to land an artilleryman perished. Prayer was now their only recourse, and this not only changed the wind, but brought rain. After a fortnight of misadventures[178] they returned to San Juan de Ulua, and hastened bareheaded to the cross to offer thanks. More wholesome airs were not difficult to find, but good harbors were not abundant thereabout. The only favorable spot found by Montejo lay some ten leagues north of the camp, close to the native fortress of Quiahuiztlan.[179] A high rock affording shelter from north winds gave the place some resemblance to the Spanish harbor of Bernal, which name was accordingly applied to it. Extending inland were green fields fringed with fine timber, and supplied with creeks of good water.[180]
The fifty men comprising the expedition of Montejo had been picked from the adherents of Velazquez, in order that by weakening this faction Cortés might be allowed to develop his plans. For the army was slowly but surely drifting into division, as we have so often found in adventures of this kind, and the Velazquez party comprised all who desired immediately to return. In this clique were many wealthy and influential men who cared no more for Velazquez than for Cortés, but who had possessions in Cuba, and were becoming impatient to return to them. Nor was there much difficulty in giving form to discontent. There were grave suspicions afloat as to the loyalty of the commander; but these, which assuredly were more conspicuous in Cuba than here, were of little moment when they harmonized with the wishes of the men. What stupidity in forming camp amidst such malaria, and in so early making enemies of the people. It was evident, so they argued, that the commander intended to sacrifice the company to his ambition.
The action of Cortés here as elsewhere marks the great man, the man of genius, the born master of men, and rightfully places him beside the Cæsars and the Napoleons of the world. The commander wished to remain. All his fortune, all the fortunes of his friends were staked on this adventure, and he would rather die than return unsuccessful. Little hope there would be of his obtaining command again; he would not return, neither would he just at present die. In desperate cases spirited counsels and spirited actions are usually safest.