It now behooved Cortés to look well to himself. He might win a score of Marathons, but one Paros would ruin all. When embarking in this enterprise, he was to all appearance little above the common adventurer. But rare talents were constantly appearing as required by occasion. Though sometimes carried away by excess of zeal, he had proved himself an adept in diplomacy. And for one hitherto so sportive and pleasure-loving, his temper was now grave, particularly in times of peril, when his calm self-mastery increased with increasing danger. The rhythm of battle was the sweetest harmony that could stir his soul, and yet he never fought but for a purpose. On gaining an advantage he indulged in no holiday of retrospect or repose; so long as anything remained to be done no time was wasted in self-gratulations. He never turned from danger, but hastened to seek it out, perceiving it even in the darkness, intuitively, and always looking it full in the face. It was while preparing to strike that the enemy received the staggering blow, and the advantage thus gained was followed up to yet greater advantage At no time appears this hero stronger, grander, than now, when, without authority, without the royal sanction, in one sense an outlaw, with the people of the country against him, his own countrymen coming to war on him, his force insignificant as compared with that of any one of his several enemies, he yet holds them all at bay, by his iron nerve and ever ready strategic resources, keeping them asunder, pitting one against another, playing on the foibles of them all as easily and serenely as a lady fingers her guitar.
Greatly imperilled were now the conqueror’s brilliant visions of conquest and conversion, of fame and wealth. If Narvaez were to advance on Mexico, the Aztecs could not fail to take advantage of the opportunity, either to join the professed liberator of their emperor and themselves, or to attack the foreigners’ quarters on their own account. This would place him between two fires, to which famine would prove an effective ally. If Narvaez remained on the coast, it would be to cut off both retreat and reinforcement, leaving him to Aztec vengeance. To abandon Mexico for a campaign against the enemy would be to surrender the most important part of the conquest.
To divide his forces, so as at once to retain his hold on the capital and meet this new visitation—such a measure would render his already small force less able to cope with an enemy not only its equal in courage and military art, but far superior to it in number and resources. Yet this he determined to do. The revelations of Narvaez’ messengers had shown how possible it might be, by judicious gifts and promises, to sow discord in the enemy’s camp. The priests Guevara and Olmedo, and others of both parties, were even then at work, and chiefly on their efforts depended his prospects. Thus would he seduce to his purpose the opponent’s troops, in so far at least as to effect a compromise by which Narvaez might leave him in comparative peace.[654] Who shall say that his good fortune may not still favor him! And thereupon he resolved to move his camp nearer to the enemy, so as to be ready for any emergency, and further, to give himself a more imposing appearance by the addition of native auxiliaries. Another reason for this advance was by his presence to counteract the defection of Indian allies, arising from the parade of a superior force by Narvaez, and from the stamping of Cortés as an impostor.
He laid the project before his council, showing the danger of awaiting the advance of Narvaez, whose ill-will had already caused their property to be declared confiscated and their names branded with dishonor. Deserters to Sandoval had brought news of serious discontent in the enemy’s camp. Hundreds, they said, would be ready to come over or to remain neutral if Cortés showed a bold front. Indeed, the protests of Aillon against a fratricidal war had been echoed by most of them, intent as they were on obtaining gold, not on slaughtering countrymen. It was in any case better to advance and secure a good position, perhaps to surprise the careless Narvaez. With God and the king on their side, so they claimed, they could not fail to conquer. Some objections were ventured upon, but promptly suppressed by one of the captains, who reminded his comrades of their glorious achievements under Cortés, and their probable fate should Narvaez gain the ascendancy. The result was an unanimous approval of the plan proposed; and Cortés thereupon commissioned the captains to represent the matter to the men, and to ascertain who were willing to follow, and who should remain in Mexico.[655]
On acquainting Montezuma with his intention, the monarch questioned him as to the reason of the hostility shown by the other force. Cortés well knew that it was useless wholly to conceal the state of affairs. He had been silent, he replied, in order not to give him pain. He and his men had been sent by their king on this mission, and were from the royal province of Castile, whilst the forces on the coast were a rebellious horde from the outside province of Biscay, and inferior to them, as Otomís, for instance, were inferior to the nobler Aztecs. They had come with the design of injuring the natives, and Cortés as their protector; but with the aid of his patron saint he would have no trouble in chastising them, and in securing their vessels for his speedy departure.[656] Alvarado, the tonatiuh, would remain in Mexico, and him he recommended to the monarch’s consideration, requesting that supplies be provided and peace maintained. Any attempt at revolt would react with terrible effect on himself and his people. The emperor promised that this should be done, and offered not only guides, but an army to aid him. The latter was declined, chiefly because Aztec troops could not be relied on.[657]
It was decided that all who were not wholly in sympathy with Cortés, should remain with the garrison left in charge of Mexico, since self-preservation would constrain them to act in the direction of his interest. This force numbered one hundred and forty men, and with the loyal Alvarado for captain, Mexico was regarded as secured. The defences of the Spanish quarters were strengthened; all the guns and most of the fire-locks, cross-bows, and ammunition were left with the garrison, also seven horses. Supplies being not over abundant, owing to the drought, maize and other provisions were brought from Tlascala to serve in case of need. The men were promised wealth and honors if they remained faithful, and their somewhat hot-headed commander was exhorted to prudence. “You are few in number,” said Cortés to them on leaving, “and yet you are strong; finally, have a care of your prisoner.”[658]
About the middle of May Cortés set out from Mexico with seventy Spaniards, sworn to implicit obedience.[659] There were also native carriers, a number of prominent Mexicans as hostages, and guides who were to take them by a short southern route through Aztec territory to the coast. Montezuma accompanied him to the Iztapalapan causeway, and there took his leave with friendly demonstration, while a number of chieftains continued with him for some distance on the way to the Huitzilapan plateau. He had no intention of encumbering himself with heavy war material, for the little he possessed could not avail against the superior armament of the enemy. His must be a light corps, capable of quick movements; stratagem should supply the place of numbers. And now what hopes and fears were theirs as they marched on toward the sea! Surely so brave a little army was never more beset by pitfalls and snares.
On reaching Cholula they were joined by Velazquez and Rangel, with one hundred and fifty men, who were now the mainstay of the expedition. About a score of these, suspected of favoring too strongly the Cuban governor, were sent back to Mexico, so that the enterprise might not be imperilled by treason. Among the remainder were distributed the gold collected by the expedition in the Tochtepec and adjoining region, in order to encourage loyalty.[660]
Unable himself to visit Tlascala, Cortés sent Francisco Rodriguez, with instructions to raise a force of her stanch warriors. He succeeded in enlisting several thousand; but as it became evident whom they were to meet, the natives recalled only too vividly the terrible effect of Spanish arms and prowess, and began rapidly to desert, so that only a few presented themselves before Cortés, and they were dismissed with presents.[661]
During the march to the coast scouts were sent out by the main road and through by-paths to gather information of the enemy. Not far from Cholula Olmedo rejoined the army, with a letter from Narvaez demanding submission. Of this no notice was taken, for although the latter had endeavored to intimidate the envoy by holding a review of his troops, the brave friar had sounded the disposition of the men too truly to be alarmed. He seemed rather disposed to underrate the strength of Narvaez, and with a sense of the ludicrous he amused the camp with his description of the vanity and carelessness of the leader, and the arrogant assumption of the officers. When, therefore, at Quecholac[662] they encountered Alonso de Mata,[663] notary of Narvaez, who had been sent with four witnesses to advise Cortés of his commission and demands, he was told first to produce his own credentials as royal notary, and being unable to do so he was refused a hearing.[664] The official mission of the messengers being thus disposed of, Cortés soothed their wounded pride with soft words and hospitable cheer; he gave them presents, and took care before dismissing them to feast their eyes on the gold and jewels which he caused his men to display, and to let them know that thousands of Tlascaltec and other troops were on the way to join him. Their report to Narvaez was a confirmation of Guevara’s statement, and did much to promote the growing disaffection toward Narvaez.