On the 19th, having taken a sloop and a brigantine in ballast, with a sloop laden with building timber, I proposed another project to M. Cottineau, which would have been highly honourable though not profitable; many difficulties were made, and our situation was represented as being the most perilous. The enemy, he said, would send against us a superior force, and that if I obstinately continued on the coast of England two days longer, we should all be taken. The Vengeance having chased along shore to the southward, Captain Cottineau said he would follow her with the prizes, as I was unable to make much sail, having that day been obliged to strike the main-top-mast to repair damages; and as I afterward understood, he told M. de Chamillard that unless I joined them the next day, both the Pallas and the Vengeance would leave that coast. I had thoughts of attempting the enterprize alone after the Pallas had made sail to join the Vengeance. I am persuaded, even now, that I would have succeeded, and to the honour of my young officers, I found them as ardently disposed to the business as I could desire; nothing prevented me from pursuing my design but the reproach that would have been cast upon my character, as a man of prudence, had the enterprize miscarried. It would have been said, was he not forewarned by Capt. Cottineau and others?
I made sail along shore to the southward, and next morning took a coasting sloop, in ballast, which, with another that I had taken the night before, I ordered to be sunk. In the evening I again met with the Pallas and Vengeance, off Whitby. Captain Cottineau told me he had sunk the brigantine, and ransomed the sloop, laden with building timber, that had been taken the day before. I had told Captain Cottineau, the day before, that I had no authority to ransom prizes.
On the 21st we saw and chased two sail, off Flamborough Head, the Pallas in the N. E. quarter, while the Bonhomme Richard followed by the Vengeance in the S. W. The one I chased, a brigantine collier in ballast, belonging to Scarborough, was soon taken, and sunk immediately afterward, as a fleet then appeared to the southward. It was so late in the day that I could not come up with the fleet before night; at length, however, I got so near one of them as to force her to run ashore, between Flamborough Head and the Spurn. Soon after I took another, a brigantine from Holland, belonging to Sunderland; and at daylight the next morning, seeing a fleet steering towards me from the Spurn, I imagined them to be a convoy, bound from London for Leith, which had been for some time expected; one of them had a pendant hoisted, and appeared to be a ship of force. They had not, however, courage to come on, but kept back, all except the one which seemed to be armed, and that one also kept to windward very near the land, and on the edge of dangerous shoals, where I could not with safety approach. This induced me to make a signal for a pilot, and soon afterward two pilot boats came off; they informed me that the ship that wore a pendant was an armed merchant ship, and that a king's frigate lay there in sight, at anchor within the Humber, waiting to take under convoy a number of merchant ships bound to the northward. The pilots imagined the Bonhomme Richard to be an English ship of war, and, consequently, communicated to me the private signal which they had been required to make. I endeavoured by this means to decoy the ships out of the port, but the wind then changing, and with the tide becoming unfavourable for them, the deception had not the desired effect, and they wisely put back. The entrance of the Humber is exceedingly difficult and dangerous, and, as the Pallas was not in sight, I thought it not prudent to remain off the entrance; I, therefore, steered out again to join the Pallas off Flamborough Head. In the night we saw and chased two ships until three o'clock in the morning, when, being at a very small distance from them, I made the private signal of recognizance, which I had given to each captain before I sailed from Groaix. One half of the answer only was returned. In this position both sides lay to till daylight, when the ships proved to be the Alliance and the Pallas.
On the morning of that day, the 23d of September, the brig from Holland not being in sight, we chased a brigantine that appeared laying to windward. About noon we saw and chased a large ship that appeared coming round Flamborough Head, from the northward, and at the same time I manned and armed one of the pilot boats to sail in pursuit of the brigantine, which now appeared to be the vessel that I had forced ashore. Soon after this a fleet of forty-one sail appeared off Flamborough Head, bearing N. N. E.; this induced me to abandon the single ship which had then anchored in Burlington Bay; I also called back the pilot boat and hoisted a signal for a general chase. When the fleet discovered us bearing down all the merchant ships crowded sail towards the shore. The two ships of war that protected the fleet at the same time steered from the land, and made the disposition for the battle. In approaching the enemy I crowded every possible sail, and made the signal for the line of battle, to which the Alliance showed no attention. Earnest as I was for the action, I could not reach the commodore's ship until seven in the evening, being then within pistol shot, when he hailed the Bonhomme Richard. We answered him by firing a whole broadside.
The battle being thus begun, was continued with unremitting fury. Every method was practised on both sides to gain an advantage, and rake each other; and I must confess that the enemy's ship being much more manageable than the Bonhomme Richard, gained thereby several times an advantageous situation, in spite of my best endeavours to prevent it. As I had to deal with an enemy of greatly superior force, I was under the necessity of closing with him, to prevent the advantage which he had over me in point of manœuvre. It was my intention to lay the Bonhomme Richard athwart the enemy's bow, but as that operation required great dexterity in the management of both sails and helm, and some of our braces being shot away, it did not exactly succeed to my wishes; the enemy's bowsprit, however, came over the Bonhomme Richard's poop, by the mizzen mast, and I made both ships fast together in that situation, which, by the action of the wind on the enemy's sails, forced her stern close to the Bonhomme Richard's bow, so that the ships lay square alongside of each other, the yards being all entangled, and the cannon of each ship touching the opponent's side. When this position took place it was eight o'clock, previous to which the Bonhomme Richard had received sundry eighteen pound shot below the water and leaked very much. My battery of 12-pounders, on which I had placed my chief dependence, being commanded by Lieut. Dale and Col. Weibert, and manned principally with American seamen and French volunteers, were entirely silenced and abandoned. As to the six old 18-pounders that formed the battery of the lower gun-deck, they did no service whatever; two out of three of them burst at the first fire, and killed almost all the men who were stationed to manage them. Before this time, too, Col. de Chamillard, who commanded a party of twenty soldiers on the poop, had abandoned that station, after having lost some of his men. These men deserted their quarters. I had now only two pieces of cannon, 9-pounders, on the quarter-deck that were not silenced, and not one of the heavier cannon was fired during the rest of the action. The purser, Mr. Mease, who commanded the guns on the quarter-deck, being dangerously wounded in the head, I was obliged to fill his place, and with great difficulty rallied a few men, and shifted over one of the lee quarter-deck guns, so that we afterwards played three pieces of 9-pounders upon the enemy. The tops alone seconded the fire of this little battery, and held out bravely during the whole of the action; especially the main top, where Lieut. Stack commanded. I directed the fire of one of the three cannon against the main-mast with double-headed shot, while the other two were exceedingly well served with grape and canister-shot to silence the enemy's musketry, and clear her decks, which was at last effected. The enemy were, as I have since understood, on the instant of calling for quarter, when the cowardice or treachery of three of my under officers induced them to call to the enemy. The English commodore asked me if I demanded quarter, and I having answered him in the most determined negative, they renewed the battle with double fury; they were unable to stand the deck, but the fire of their cannon, especially the lower battery, which was entirely formed of 18-pounders, was incessant. Both ships were set on fire in various places, and the scene was dreadful beyond the reach of language. To account for the timidity of my three under officers, I mean the gunner, the carpenter, and the master-at-arms, I must observe that the two first were slightly wounded, and as the ship had received various shots under water, and one of the pumps being shot away, the carpenter expressed his fear that she would sink, and the other two concluded that she was sinking, which occasioned the gunner to run aft on the poop, without my knowledge, to strike the colours; fortunately for me, a cannon ball had done that before, by carrying away the ensign staff; he was, therefore, reduced to the necessity of sinking, as he supposed, or of calling for quarter, and he preferred the latter.
All this time the Bonhomme Richard had sustained the action alone, and the enemy, though much superior in force, would have been very glad to have got clear, as appeared by their own acknowledgments, and their having let go an anchor the instant I laid them on board, by which means they would have escaped, had I not made them well fast to the Bonhomme Richard.
At last, at half-past nine o'clock, the Alliance appeared, and I now thought the battle at an end; but to my utter astonishment, he discharged a broadside full into the stern of the Bonhomme Richard. We called to him for God's sake to forbear firing into the Bonhomme Richard; yet he passed along the off side of the ship, and continued firing. There was no possibility of his mistaking the enemy's ship for the Bonhomme Richard, there being the most essential difference in their appearance and construction; besides it was then full moonlight, and the sides of the Bonhomme Richard were all black, while the sides of the prizes were yellow; yet, for their greater security, I showed the signal of our reconnoissance by putting out three lanterns, one at the head (bow), another at the stern (quarter), and the third in the middle, in a horizontal line. Every tongue cried that he was firing into the wrong ship, but nothing availed, he passed round, firing into the Bonhomme Richard's head, stern, and broadside, and by one of his volleys killed several of my best men and mortally wounded a good officer on the forecastle. My situation was really deplorable. The Bonhomme Richard received various shots under water from the Alliance; the leak gained on the pumps; and the fire increased much on board both ships. Some officers persuaded me to strike, of whose courage and good sense I entertain a high opinion. My treacherous master-at-arms let loose all my prisoners, without my knowledge, and my prospect became gloomy indeed. I would not, however, give up the point. The enemy's main-mast began to shake, their firing decreased, ours rather increased, and the British colours were struck at half an hour past ten o'clock.
This prize proved to be the British ship-of-war the Serapis, a new ship of 44 guns, built on their most approved construction, with two complete batteries, one of them 18-pounders, and commanded by the brave Commodore Richard Pearson. I had yet two enemies to encounter far more formidable than the Britons—I mean fire, and water. The Serapis was attacked only by the first, but the Bonhomme Richard was assailed by both: there were five feet water in the hold, and though it was moderate from the explosion of so much gunpowder, yet the three pumps that remained could with difficulty only keep the water from gaining. The fire broke out in various parts of the ship, in spite of all the water that could be thrown to quench it, and at length broke out as low as the powder magazine, and within a few inches of the powder. In that dilemma, I took out the powder upon deck, ready to be thrown overboard at the last extremity, and it was 10 o'clock the next day, the 24th, before the fire was entirely extinguished. With respect to the situation of the Bonhomme Richard, the rudder was cut entirely off the stern frame, and the transoms were almost entirely cut away; the timbers, by the lower deck especially, from the mainmast to the stern, being greatly decayed with age, were mangled beyond my power of description; and a person must have been an eye witness to form a just idea of the tremendous scene of carnage, wreck, and ruin that everywhere appeared. Humanity cannot but recoil from the prospect of such finished horror, and lament that war should produce such fatal consequences.
After the carpenters, as well as Capt. de Cottineau, and other men of sense had well examined and surveyed the ship (which was not finished before five in the evening), I found every person to be convinced that it was impossible to keep the Bonhomme Richard afloat so as to reach a port if the wind should increase, it being then only a very moderate breeze. I had but little time to remove my wounded, which now became unavoidable, and which was effected in the course of the night and next morning. I was determined to keep the Bonhomme Richard afloat, and, if possible, to bring her into port. For that purpose, the first lieutenant of the Pallas continued on board with a party of men to attend the pumps, with boats in waiting, ready to take them on board, in case the water should gain on them too fast. The wind augmented in the night and the next day, on the 25th, so that it was impossible to prevent the good old ship from sinking. They did not abandon her until after 9 o'clock; the water was then up to the lower deck, and a little after ten, I saw with inexpressible grief the last glimpse of the Bonhomme Richard. No lives were lost with the ship, but it was impossible to save the stores of any sort whatever. I lost even the best part of my clothes, books, and papers; and several of my officers lost all their clothes and effects.
Having thus endeavoured to give a clear and simple relation of the circumstances and events that have attended the little armament under my command, I shall freely submit my conduct therein to the censure of my superiors and the impartial public. I beg leave, however, to observe, that the force that was put under my command was far from being well composed; and as the great majority of the actors in it have appeared bent on the pursuit of interest only, I am exceedingly sorry that they and I have been at all concerned. I am in the highest degree sensible of the singular attentions which I have experienced from the court of France, which I shall remember with perfect gratitude until the end of my life, and will always endeavour to merit, while I can, consistent with my honour, continue in the public service. I must speak plainly. As I have always been honoured with the full confidence of Congress, and as I always flattered myself with enjoying in some measure the confidence of the court of France, I could not but be astonished at the conduct of M. de Chaumont, when, in the moment of my departure from Groaix, he produced a paper, a concordat, for me to sign, in common with the officers whom I had commissioned but a few days before. Had that paper, or even a less dishonourable one, been proposed to me at the beginning, I would have rejected it with just contempt, and the word déplacement, among others, should have been necessary. I cannot, however, even now suppose that he was authorized by the court to make such a bargain with me; nor can I suppose that the minister of marine meant that M. de Chaumont should consider me merely as a colleague with the commanders of the other ships, and communicate to them not only all he knew, but all he thought, respecting our destination and operations. M. de Chaumont has made me various reproaches on account of the expense of the Bonhomme Richard, wherewith I cannot think I have been justly chargeable. M. de Chamillard can attest that the Bonhomme Richard was at last far from being well fitted or armed for war. If any person or persons who have been charged with the expense of that armament have acted wrong, the fault must not be laid to my charge. I had no authority to superintend that armament, and the persons who had authority were so far from giving me what I thought necessary that M. de Chaumont even refused, among other things, to allow me irons to secure the prisoners of war.