History for ready reference, Volume 5, Tunnage to Zyp and Supplement

by J. N. Larned

Johnson, at the German Flats, held a conference with the
various nations, and settled a definite peace. At this meeting
two propositions were made; the one to fix some boundary line,
west of which the Europeans should not go; and the savages
named, as this line, the Ohio or Alleghany and Susquehannah;
but no definite agreement was made, Johnson not being
empowered to act. The other proposal was, that the Indians
should grant to the traders, who had suffered in 1763, a tract
of land in compensation for the injuries then done them, and
to this the red men agreed. … During the very year that
succeeded the treaty of German Flats, settlers crossed the
mountains and took possession of lands in western Virginia and
along the Monongahela. The Indians, having received no pay for
these lands, murmured, and once more a border war was feared.
… And not only were frontier men thus passing the line tacitly
agreed on, but Sir William himself was even then meditating a
step which would have produced, had it been taken, a general
Indian war again. This was the purchase and settlement of an
immense tract south of the Ohio River, where an independent
colony was to be formed. How early this plan was conceived we
do not learn, but, from Franklin's letters, we find that it
was in contemplation in the spring of 1766. At that time
Franklin was in London, and was written to by his son,
Governor Franklin of New Jersey, with regard to the proposed
colony. The plan seems to have been to buy of the Six Nations
the lands south of the Ohio, a purchase which it was not
doubted Sir William might make, and then to procure from the
King a grant of as much territory as the Company which it was
intended to form would require. Governor Franklin,
accordingly, forwarded to his father an application for a
grant, together with a letter from Sir William, recommending
the plan to the ministry; all of which was duly communicated
to the proper department. But at that time there were various
interests bearing upon this plan of Franklin. The old Ohio
Company [see OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1748-1754] was still suing,
through its agent, Colonel George Mercer, for a perfection of
the original grant. …
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General Lyman, from Connecticut we believe, was soliciting a
new grant similar to that now asked by Franklin; and the
ministers themselves were divided as to the policy and
propriety of establishing any settlements so far in the
interior,—Shelburne being in favor of the new colony,
Hillsborough opposed to it. The Company was organized,
however, and the nominally leading man therein being Mr.
Thomas' Walpole, a London banker of eminence, it was known as
the Walpole Company. … Before any conclusion was come to, it
was necessary to arrange definitely that boundary line which
had been vaguely talked of in 1765, and with respect to which
Sir William Johnson had written to the ministry, who had
mislaid his letters and given him no instructions. The
necessity of arranging this boundary was also kept in mind by
the continued and growing irritation of the Indians, who found
themselves invaded from every side. … Franklin, the father,
all this time, was urging the same necessity upon the
ministers in England; and about Christmas of 1767, Sir
William's letters on the subject having been found, orders
were sent him to complete the proposed purchase from the Six
Nations, and settle all differences. But the project for a
colony was for the time dropped, a new administration coming
in which was not that way disposed. Sir William Johnson having
received, early in the spring, the orders from England
relative to a new treaty with the Indians, at once took steps
to secure a full attendance. Notice was given to the various
colonial governments, to the Six Nations, the Delawares, and
the Shawanese, and a Congress was appointed to meet at Fort
Stanwix during the following October. It met upon the 24th of
that month, and was attended by representatives from New
Jersey, Virginia, and Pennsylvania; by Sir William and his
deputies; by the agents of those traders who had suffered in
the war of 1763; and by deputies from all of the Six Nations,
the Delawares, and the Shawanese. The first point to be
settled was the boundary line which was to determine the
Indian lands of the West from that time forward; and this line
the Indians, upon the 1st of November, stated should begin on
the Ohio at the mouth of the Cherokee (or Tennessee) river;
thence go up the Ohio and Alleghany to Kittaning; thence
across to the Susquehannah, &c.; whereby the whole country
south of the Ohio and Alleghany, to which the Six Nations had
any claim, was transferred to the British. One deed, for a
part of this land, was made on the 3d of November to William
Trent, attorney for twenty-two traders, whose goods had been
destroyed by the Indians in 1763. The tract conveyed by this
was between the Kenhawa and Monongahela, and was by the
traders named 'Indiana.' Two days afterward, a deed for the
remaining western lands was made to the King, and the price
agreed on paid down. These deeds were made upon the express
agreement, that no claim should ever be based upon previous
treaties, those of Lancaster, Logstown, &c.; and they were
signed by the chiefs of the Six Nations, for themselves, their
allies and dependents, the Shawanese, Delawares, Mingoes of
Ohio, and others; but the Shawanese and Delaware deputies
present did not sign them. Such was the treaty of Stanwix,
whereon rests the title by purchase to Kentucky, western
Virginia, and Pennsylvania. It was a better foundation,
perhaps, than that given by previous treaties, but was
essentially worthless; for the lands conveyed were not
occupied or hunted on by those conveying them. In truth, we
cannot doubt that this immense grant was obtained by the
influence of Sir William Johnson, in order that the new
colony, of which he was to be governor, might be founded
there. … The white man could now quiet his conscience when
driving the native from his forest home, and feel sure that an
army would back his pretensions. … Meantime more than one bold
man had ventured for a little while into the beautiful valleys
of Kentucky, and, on the 1st of May, 1769, there was one going
forth from his 'peaceable habitation on the Yadkin river in
North Carolina,' whose name has since gone far and wide over
this little planet of ours, he having become the type of his
class. This was Daniel Boone. He crossed the mountains, and
spent that summer and the next winter in the West. But, while
he was rejoicing in the abundance of buffalo, deer, and
turkeys among the cane-brakes, longer heads were meditating
still that new colony, the plan of which had been lying in
silence for two years and more. The Board of Trade was again
called on to report upon the application, and Lord
Hillsborough, the President, reported against it. This called
out Franklin's celebrated 'Ohio Settlement,' a paper written
with so much ability, that the King's Council put by the
official report, and granted the petition, a step which
mortified the noble lord so much that he resigned his official
station. The petition now needed only the royal sanction,
which was not given until August 14th, 1772; but in 1770, the
Ohio Company was merged in Walpole's, and, the claims of the
soldiers of 1756 being acknowledged both by the new Company
and by government, all claims were quieted. Nothing was ever
done, however, under the grant to Walpole, the Revolution soon
coming upon America. After the Revolution, Mr. Walpole and his
associates petitioned Congress respecting their lands, called
by them 'Vandalia,' but could get no help from that body. What
was finally done by Virginia with the claims of this and other
companies, we do not find written, but presume their lands
were all looked on as forfeited."
J. H. Perkins,
English Discoveries in the Ohio Valley
(North American Review, July, 1839).
ALSO IN:
W. L. Stone,
Life and Times of Sir William Johnson,
volume 2, chapter 16.
B. Franklin, Works,
(edited by Sparks),
volume 4, pages 233-241, and 302-380.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1766.
Examination of Dr. Franklin before Parliament.
On the 28th of January, 1766, while the bill for the repeal of
the Stamp Act was pending in Parliament, Dr. Franklin was
examined before the House of Commons, in Committee. The
questions and answers of this very interesting examination, as
reported in the Parliamentary History, were as follows:
Q. What is your name, and place of abode?
A. Franklin, of Philadelphia.
Q. Do the Americans pay any considerable taxes among
themselves?
A. Certainly many, and very heavy taxes.
Q. What are the present taxes in Pennsylvania,
laid by the laws of the colony?
A. There are taxes on all estates real and personal, a
poll-tax, a tax on all offices, professions, trades, and
businesses, according to their profits; an excise on all wine,
rum, and other spirit; and a duty of ten pounds per head on all
negroes imported, with some other duties.
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Q. For what purposes are those taxes laid?
A. For the support of the civil and military establishments
of the country, and to discharge the heavy debt contracted
in the last war.
Q. How long are those taxes to continue?
A. Those for discharging the debt are to continue till 1772,
and longer, if the debt should not be then all discharged. The
others must always continue.
Q. Was it not expected that the debt would have been sooner
discharged?
A. It was, when the peace was made with France and Spain; but
a fresh war breaking out with the Indians, a fresh load of
debt was incurred, and the taxes, of course, continued longer
by a new law.
Q. Are not all the people very able to pay those taxes?
A. No. The frontier counties, all along the continent, having
been frequently ravaged by the enemy, and greatly
impoverished, are able to pay very little tax. And therefore,
in consideration of their distresses, our late tax laws do
expressly favour those counties, excusing the sufferers; and I
suppose the same is done in other governments.
Q. Are not you concerned in the management of the post office
in America?
A. Yes; I am deputy post-master general of North America.
Q. Don't you think the distribution of stamps, by post, to all
the inhabitants, very practicable, if there was no opposition?
A. The posts only go along the sea coasts; they do not, except
in a few instances, go back into the country; and if they did,
sending for stamps by post would occasion an expense of
postage, amounting, in many cases, to much more than that of
the stamps themselves.
Q. Are you acquainted with Newfoundland?
A. I never was there.
Q. Do you know whether there are any post-roads on that
island?
A. I have heard that there are no roads at all; but that the
communication between one settlement and another is by sea
only.
Q. Can you disperse the stamps by post in Canada?
A. There is only a post between Montreal and Quebec. The
inhabitants live so scattered and remote from each other, in
that vast country, that posts cannot be supported among them,
and therefore they cannot get stamps per post. The English
colonies too, along the frontiers, are very thinly settled.
Q. From the thinness of the back settlements,
would not the Stamp Act be extremely inconvenient
to the inhabitants if executed?
A. To be sure it would; as many of the inhabitants could not
get stamps when they had occasion for them, without taking
long journeys, and spending, perhaps, three or four pounds,
that the crown might get sixpence.
Q. Are not the colonies, from their circumstances, very able
to pay the stamp duty?
A. In my opinion, there is not gold and silver enough in the
colonies to pay the stamp duty for one year.
Q. Don't you know that the money arising from the stamps was
all to be laid out in America?
A. I know it is appropriated by the act to the American
service; but it will be spent in the conquered colonies, where
the soldiers are, not in the colonies that pay it.
Q. Is there not a balance of trade due from the colonies where
the troops are posted, that will bring back the money to the
old colonies?
A. I think not. I believe very little would come back. I know
of no trade likely to bring it back. I think it would come
from the colonies where it was spent directly to England; for
I have always observed, that in every colony the more plenty
of means of remittance to England, the more goods are sent
for, and the more trade with England carried on.
Q. What number of white inhabitants do you think there are in
Pennsylvania?
A. I suppose there may be about 160,000.
Q. What number of them are Quakers?
A. Perhaps a third.
Q. What number of Germans?
A. Perhaps another third; but I cannot speak with certainty.
Q. Have any number of the Germans seen service, as soldiers,
in Europe?
A. Yes, many of them, both in Europe and America.
Q. Are they as much dissatisfied with the stamp duty as the
English?
A. Yes, and more; and with reason, as their stamps are, in
many cases, to be double.
Q. How many white men do you suppose there are in North
America?
A. About 300,000, from 16 to 60 years of age.
Q. What may be the amount of one year's imports into
Pennsylvania from Britain?
A. I have been informed that our merchants compute the imports
from Britain to be above 500,000l.
Q. What may be the amount of the produce of your province
exported to Britain?
A. It must be small, as we produce little that is wanted
in Britain. I suppose it cannot exceed 40,000l.
Q. How then do you pay the balance?
A. The balance is paid by our produce carried to the West
Indies, and sold in our own islands, or to the French,
Spaniards, Danes, and Dutch; by the same carried to other
colonies in North America, as to New England, Nova Scotia,
Newfoundland, Carolina, and Georgia; by the same carried to
different parts of Europe, as Spain, Portugal and Italy. In
all which places we receive either money, bills of exchange,
or commodities that suit for remittance to Britain; which,
together with all the profits on the industry of our merchants
and mariners, arising in those circuitous voyages, and the
freights made by their ships, centre finally in Britain to
discharge the balance, and pay for British manufactures
continually used in the province, or sold to foreigners by our
traders.
Q. Have you heard of any difficulties lately laid on the
Spanish trade?
A. Yes, I have heard that it has been greatly obstructed by
some new regulations, and by the English men of war and
cutters stationed all along the coast in America.
Q. Do you think it right, that America should be protected by
this country, and pay no part of the expense?
A. That is not the case. The colonies raised, clothed and
paid, during the last war, nearly 25,000 men, and spent many
millions.
Q. Were you not reimbursed by parliament? A. We were only
reimbursed what, in your opinion, we had advanced beyond our
proportion, or beyond what might reasonably be expected from
us; and it was a very small part of what we spent.
Pennsylvania, in particular, disbursed about 500,000l,
and the reimbursements, in the whole, did not exceed
60,000l.
Q. You have said that you pay heavy taxes in Pennsylvania;
what do they amount to in the pound?
A. The tax on all estates, real and personal, is eighteen
pence in the pound, fully rated; and the tax on the profits of
trades and professions, with other taxes, do, I suppose, make
full half a crown in the pound.
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Q. Do you know any thing of the rate of exchange in
Pennsylvania, and whether it has fallen lately?
A. It is commonly from 170 to 175. I have heard that it has
fallen lately from 175 to 162 and a half, owing, I suppose, to
their lessening their orders for goods; and when their debts
to this country are paid, I think the exchange will probably
be at par.
Q. Do not you think the people of America would submit to pay
the stamp duty, if it was moderated?
A. No, never, unless compelled by force of arms.
Q. Are not the taxes in Pennsylvania laid on unequally, in
order to burden the English trade, particularly the tax on
professions and business?
A. It is not more burdensome in proportion than the tax on
lands. It is intended, and supposed to take an equal
proportion of profits.
Q. How is the assembly composed? Of what kinds of people are
the members, landholders or traders?
A. It is composed of landholders, merchants, and artificers.
Q. Are not the majority landholders?
A. I believe they are.
Q. Do not they, as much as possible, shift the tax off from
the land, to ease that; and lay the burthen heavier on trade?
A. I have never understood it so. I never heard such a thing
suggested. And indeed an attempt of that kind could answer no
purpose. The merchant or trader is always skilled in figures,
and ready with his pen and ink. If unequal burdens are laid on
his trade, he puts an additional price on his goods; and the
consumers, who are chiefly landholders, finally pay the
greatest part, if not the whole.
Q. What was the temper of America towards Great Britain before
the year 1763?
A. The best in the world. They submitted willingly to the
government of the crown, and paid, in all their courts,
obedience to acts of parliament. Numerous as the people are in
the several old provinces, they cost you nothing in forts,
citadels, garrisons or armies, to keep them in subjection.
They were governed by this country at the expense only of a
little pen, ink, and paper. They were led by a thread. They
had not only a respect, but an affection for Great Britain,
for its laws, its customs and manners, and even a fondness for
its fashions, that greatly increased the commerce. Natives of
Britain were always treated with particular regard; to be an
Old-England man was, of itself, a character of some respect,
and gave a kind of rank among us.
Q. And what is their temper now?
A. O, very much altered.
Q. Did you ever hear the authority of parliament to make laws
for America questioned till lately?
A. The authority of parliament was allowed to be valid in all
laws, except such as should lay internal taxes. It was never
disputed in laying duties to regulate commerce.
Q. In what proportion hath population increased in America?
A. I think the inhabitants of all the provinces together,
taken at a medium, double in about 25 years. But their demand
for British manufactures increases much faster, as the
consumption is not merely in proportion to their numbers, but
grows with the growing abilities of the same numbers to pay
for them. In 1723, the whole importation from Britain to
Pennsylvania, was but about 15,000l. sterling; it is
now near half a million.
Q. In what light did the people of America use to consider the
parliament of Great Britain?
A. They considered the parliament as the great bulwark and
security of their liberties and privileges, and always spoke
of it with the utmost respect and veneration. Arbitrary
ministers, they thought, might possibly, at times, attempt to
oppress them; but they relied on it, that the parliament, on
application, would always give redress. They remembered, with
gratitude, a strong instance of this, when a bill was brought
into parliament, with a clause to make royal instructions laws
in the colonies, which the House of Commons would not pass,
and it was thrown out.
Q. And have they not still the same respect for parliament?
A. No; it is greatly lessened.
Q. To what causes is that owing?
A. To a concurrence of causes; the restraints lately laid on
their trade, by which the bringing of foreign gold and silver
into the colonies was prevented; the prohibition of making
paper money among themselves; and then demand a new and heavy
tax by stamps; taking away at the same time, trials by juries,
and refusing to receive and hear their humble petitions.
Q. Don't you think they would submit to the Stamp Act, if it
was modified, the obnoxious parts taken out, and the duty
reduced to some particulars, of small moment?
A. No; they will never submit to it.
Q. What do you think is the reason that the people of America
increase faster than in England?
A. Because they marry younger, and more generally.
Q. Why so?
A. Because any young couple that are industrious, may easily
obtain land of their own, on which they can raise a family.
Q. Are not the lower rank of people more at their ease in
America than in England?
A. They may be so, if they are sober and diligent, as they
are better paid for their labour.
Q. What is your opinion of a future tax, imposed on the same
principle with that of the Stamp Act, how would the Americans
receive it?
A. Just as they do this. They would not pay it.
Q. Have not you heard of the resolution of this House, and of
the House of Lords, asserting the right of parliament relating
to America, including a power to tax the people there?
A. Yes, I have heard of such resolutions.
Q. What will be the opinion of the Americans on those
resolutions?
A. They will think them unconstitutional and unjust.
Q. Was it an opinion in America before 1763, that the
parliament had no right to lay taxes and duties there?
A. I never heard any objection to the right of laying duties
to regulate commerce; but a right to lay internal taxes was
never supposed to be in parliament, as we are not represented
there.
Q. On what do you found your opinion, that the people in
America made any such distinction?
A. I know that whenever the subject has occurred in
conversation where I have been present, it has appeared to be
the opinion of every one, that we could not be taxed in a
parliament where we were not represented. But the payment of
duties laid by act of parliament, as regulations of commerce,
was never disputed.
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Q. But can you name any act of assembly, or public act of
any of your governments, that made such distinction?
A. I do not know that there was any; I think there was never
an occasion to make any such act, till now that you have
attempted to tax us: that has occasioned resolutions of
assembly, declaring the distinction, in which I think every
assembly on the continent, and every member in every assembly,
have been unanimous.
Q. What then could occasion conversations on that subject
before that time?
A. There was, in 1754, a proposition made (I think it came
from hence) that in case of a war, which was then apprehended,
the governors of the colonies should meet, and order the
levying of troops, building of forts, and taking every other
necessary measure for the general defence; and should draw on
the treasury here, for the sums expended, which were
afterwards to be raised in the colonies by a general tax, to
be laid on them by act of parliament. This occasioned a good
deal of conversation on the subject, and the general opinion
was, that the parliament neither would, nor could lay any tax
on us, till we were duly represented in parliament, because it
was not just, nor agreeable to the nature of an English
constitution.
Q. Don't you know there was a time in New York, when it was
under consideration to make an application to parliament, to
lay taxes on that colony, upon a deficiency arising from the
assembly's refusing or neglecting to raise the necessary
supplies for the support of the civil government?
A. I never heard of it.
Q. There was such an application under consideration in New
York; and do you apprehend they could suppose the right of
parliament to lay a tax in America was only local, and
confined to the case of a deficiency in a particular colony,
by a refusal of its assembly to raise the necessary supplies?
A. They could not suppose such a case, as that the assembly
would not raise the necessary supplies to support its own
government. An assembly that would refuse it, must want common
sense, which cannot be supposed. I think there was never any
such case at New York, and that it must be a
misrepresentation, or the fact must be misunderstood. I know
there have been some attempts, by ministerial instructions
from hence, to oblige the assemblies to settle permanent
salaries on governors, which they wisely refused to do; but I
believe no assembly of New York, or any other colony, ever
refused duly to support government, by proper allowances, from
time to time, to public officers.
Q. But in case a governor, acting by instruction, should call
on an assembly to raise the necessary supplies, and the
assembly should refuse to do it, do you not think it would
then be for the good of the people of the colony, as well as
necessary to government, that the parliament should tax them?
A. I do not think it would be necessary. If an assembly could
possibly be so absurd as to refuse raising the supplies
requisite for the maintenance of government among them, they
could not long remain in such a situation; the disorders and
confusion occasioned by it, must soon bring them to reason.
Q. If it should not, ought not the right to be in Great
Britain of applying a remedy?
A. A right only to be used in such a case, I should have no
objection to, supposing it to be used merely for the good of
the people of the colony.
Q. But who is to judge of that, Britain or the colony?
A. Those that feel can best judge.
Q. You say the colonies have always submitted to external
taxes, and object to the right of parliament only in laying
internal taxes; now can you shew that there is any kind of
difference between the two taxes to the colony on which they
may be laid?
A. I think the difference is very great. An external tax is a
duty laid on commodities imported; that duty is added to the
first cost, and other charges on the commodity, and when it is
offered to sale, makes a part of the price. If the people do
not like it at that price, they refuse it: they are not
obliged to pay it. But an internal tax is forced from the
people without their consent, if not laid by their own
representatives. The Stamp Act says, we shall have no
commerce, make no exchange of property with each other,
neither purchase nor grant, nor recover debts; we shall
neither marry nor make our wills, unless we pay such sums, and
thus it is intended to extort our money from us, or ruin us by
the consequences of refusing to pay it.
Q. But supposing the internal tax or duty to be laid on the
necessaries of life imported into your colony, will not that
be the same thing in its effects as an internal tax?
A. I do not know a single article imported into the northern
colonies, but what they can either do without or make
themselves.
Q. Don't you think cloth from England absolutely necessary to
them?
A. No, by no means absolutely necessary; with industry and
good management, they may very well supply themselves with all
they want.
Q. Will it not take a long time to establish that manufacture
among them; and must they not in the mean while suffer
greatly?
A. I think not. They have made a surprising progress already.
And I am of opinion, that before their old clothes are worn
out, they will have new ones of their own making.
Q. Can they possibly find wool enough in North America?
A. They have taken steps to increase the wool. They entered
into general combination to eat no more lamb, and very few
lambs were killed last year. This course persisted in, will
soon make a prodigious difference in the quantity of wool. And
the establishing of great manufactories, like those in the
clothing towns here, is not necessary, as it is where the
business is to be carried on for the purposes of trade. The
people will all spin and work for themselves, in their own
houses.
Q. Can there be wool and manufacture enough in one or two
years?
A. In three years, I think, there may.
Q. Does not the severity of the winter, in the northern
colonies, occasion the wool to be of bad quality?
A. No, the wool is very fine and good.
Q. In the more southern colonies, as in Virginia, don't you
know that the wool is coarse, and only a kind of hair?
A. I don't know it. I never heard it. Yet I have been
sometimes in Virginia. I cannot say I ever took particular
notice of the wool there, but I believe it is good, though I
cannot speak positively of it; but Virginia, and the colonies
south of it, have less occasion for wool; their winters are
short, and not very severe, and they can very well clothe
themselves with linen and cotton of their own raising for the
rest of the year.
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Q. Are not the people in the more northern colonies obliged to
fodder their sheep all the winter?
A. In some of the most northern colonies they may be obliged
to do it some part of the winter.
Q. Considering the resolutions of parliament as to the right,
do you think, if the Stamp Act is repealed, that the North
Americans will be satisfied?
A. I believe they will.
Q. Why do you think so?
A. I think the resolutions of right will give them very little
concern, if they are never attempted to be carried into
practice. The colonies will probably consider themselves in
the same situation, in that respect, with Ireland; they know
you claim the same right with regard to Ireland, but you never
exercise it. And they may believe you never will exercise it
in the colonies, any more than in Ireland, unless on some very
extraordinary occasion.
Q. But who are to be the judges of that extraordinary
occasion? Is not the parliament?
A. Though the parliament may judge of the occasion, the people
will think it can never exercise such right, till
representatives from the colonies are admitted into
parliament, and that whenever the occasion arises,
representatives will be ordered.
Q. Did you never hear that Maryland, during the last war, had
refused to furnish a quota towards the common defence?
A. Maryland has been much misrepresented in that matter.
Maryland, to my knowledge, never refused to contribute, or
grant aids to the crown. The assemblies every year, during the
war, voted considerable sums, and formed bills to raise them.
The bills were, according to the constitution of that
province, sent up to the council, or upper house, for
concurrence, that they might be presented to the governor, in
order to be enacted into laws. Unhappy disputes between the
two houses, arising from the defects of that constitution
principally, rendered all the bills but one or two abortive.
The proprietary's council rejected them. It is true, Maryland
did not contribute its proportion, but it was, in my opinion,
the fault of the government, not of the people.
Q. Was it not talked of in the other provinces as a proper
measure to apply to parliament to compel them?
A. I have heard such discourse: but as it was well known that
the people were not to blame, no such application was ever
made, or any step taken towards it.
Q. Was it not proposed at a public meeting?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Do you remember the abolishing of the paper currency in New
England, by act of assembly?
A. I do remember its being abolished in the Massachusetts Bay.
Q. Was not lieutenant governor Hutchinson principally
concerned in that transaction?
A. I have heard so.
Q. Was it not at that time a very unpopular law?
A. I believe it might, though I can say little about it, as I
lived at a distance from that province.
Q. Was not the scarcity of gold and silver an argument used
against abolishing the paper?
A. I suppose it was.
Q. What is the present opinion there of that law? Is it as
unpopular as it was at first?
A. think it is not
.
Q. Have not instructions from hence been sometimes sent over
to governors, highly oppressive and unpolitical?
A. Yes.
Q. Have not some governors dispensed with them for that
reason?
A. Yes, I have heard so.
Q. Did the Americans ever dispute the controuling
power of parliament to regulate the commerce?
A. No.
Q. Can any thing less than a military force carry the Stamp
Act into execution?
A. I do not see how a military force can be applied to that
purpose.
Q. Why may it not?
A. Suppose a military force sent into America, they
will find nobody in arms; what are they then to do?
They cannot force a man to take stamps who chuses
to do without them. They will not find a rebellion;
they may indeed make one.
Q. If the act is not repealed, what do you think will be the
consequences?
A. A total loss of the respect and affection the people of
America bear to this country, and of all the commerce that
depends on that respect and affection.
Q. How can the commerce be affected?
A. You will find, that if the act is not repealed, they will
take very little of your manufactures in a short time.
Q. Is it in their power to do without them?
A. I think they may very well do without them.
Q. Is it their interest not to take them?
A. The goods they take from Britain are either necessaries,
mere conveniencies, or superfluities. The first, as cloth, &c.
with a little industry they can make at home: the second they
can do without, till they are able to provide them among
themselves; and the last, which are much the greatest part,
they will strike off immediately. They are mere articles of
fashion, purchased and consumed, because the fashion in a
respected country, but will now be detested and rejected. The
people have already struck off, by general agreement, the use
of all goods fashionable in mournings, and many thousand
pounds worth are sent back as unsaleable.
Q. Is it their interest to make cloth at home?
A. I think they may at present get it cheaper from Britain, I
mean of the same fineness and neatness of workmanship; but
when one considers other circumstances, the restraints on
their trade, and the difficulty of making remittances, it is
their interest to make every thing.
Q. Suppose an act of internal regulations connected with the
tax, how would they receive it?
A. I think it would be objected to.
Q. Then no regulation with a tax would be submitted to?
A. Their opinion is, that when aids to the crown are wanted,
they are to be asked of the several assemblies according to
the old established usage, who will, as they have always done,
grant them freely. And that their money ought not to be given
away, without their consent, by persons at a distance,
unacquainted with their circumstances and abilities. The
granting aids to the crown, is the only means they have of
recommending themselves to their sovereign, and they think it
extremely hard and unjust, that a body of men, in which they
have no representatives, should make a merit to itself of
giving and granting what is not its own, but theirs, and
deprives them of a right they esteem of the utmost value and
importance, as it is the security of all their other rights.
Q. But is not the post office, which they have long received,
a tax as well as a regulation?
A. No; the money paid for the postage of a letter is not of
the nature of a tax; it is merely a quantum meruit for a
service done; no person is compellable to pay the money, if he
does not chuse to receive the service. A man may still, as
before the act, send his letter by a servant, a special
messenger, or a friend, if he thinks it cheaper and safer.
{3197}
Q. But do they not consider the regulations of the
post-office, by the act of last year, as a tax?
A. By the regulations of last year the rate of postage was
generally abated near thirty per cent. through all America;
they certainly cannot consider such abatement as a tax.
Q. If an excise was laid by parliament, which they might
likewise avoid paying, by not consuming the articles excised,
would they then not object to it?
A. They would certainly object to it, as an excise is
unconnected with any service done, and is merely an aid which
they think ought to be asked of them, and granted by them if
they are to pay it, and can be granted for them, by no others
whatsoever, whom they have not impowered for that purpose.
Q. You say they do not object to the right of parliament, in
laying duties on goods to be paid on their importation; now,
is there any kind of difference between a duty on the
importation of goods and an excise on their consumption?
A. Yes; a very material one; an excise, for the reasons I have
just mentioned, they think you can have no right to lay within
their country. But the sea is yours; you maintain, by your
fleets, the safety of navigation in it, and keep it clear of
pirates; you may have therefore a natural and equitable right
to some toll or duty on merchandizes carried through that part
of your dominions, towards defraying the expense you are at in
ships to maintain the safety of that carriage.
Q. Does this reasoning hold in the case of a duty laid on the
produce of their lands exported? And would they not then
object to such a duty?
A. If it tended to make the produce so much dearer abroad as
to lessen the demand for it, to be sure they would object to
such a duty; not to your right of laying it, but they would
complain of it as a burden, and petition you to lighten it.
Q. Is not the duty paid on the tobacco exported a duty of that
kind?
A. That, I think, is only on tobacco carried coastwise from
one colony to another, and appropriated as a fund for
supporting the college at Williamsburgh, in Virginia.
Q. Have not the assemblies in the West Indies the same natural
rights with those in North America?
A. Undoubtedly.
Q. And is there not a tax laid there on their sugars exported?
A. I am not much acquainted with the West Indies, but the duty
of four and a half per cent., on sugars exported, was, I
believe, granted by their own assemblies.
Q. How much is the poll tax in your province laid on unmarried
men?
A. It is, I think, fifteen shillings, to be paid by every
single freeman, upwards of twenty one years old.
Q. What is the annual amount of all the taxes in Pennsylvania?
A. I suppose about 20,000l. sterling.
Q. Supposing the Stamp Act continued, and enforced, do you
imagine that ill humour will induce the Americans to give as
much for worse manufactures of their own and use them,
preferably to better of ours?
A. Yes, I think so. People will pay as freely to gratify one
passion as another, their resentment as their pride.
Q. Would the people at Boston discontinue their trade?
A. The merchants are a very small number compared with the
body of the people, and must discontinue their trade, if
nobody will buy their goods.
Q. What are the body of the people in the colonies?
A. They are farmers, husbandmen or planters.
Q. Would they suffer the produce of their lands to rot?
A. No; but they would not raise so much. They would
manufacture more, and plough less.
Q. Would they live without the administration of justice in
civil matters, and suffer all the inconveniencies of such a
situation for any considerable time, rather than take the
stamps, supposing the stamps were protected by a sufficient
force, where everyone might have them?
A. I think the supposition impracticable, that the stamps
should be so protected as that everyone might have them. The
Act requires sub-distributors to be appointed in every county
town, district, and village, and they would be necessary. But
the principal distributors, who were to have had a
considerable profit on the whole, have not thought it worth
while to continue in the office, and I think it impossible to
find sub-distributors fit to be trusted, who, for the trifling
profit that must come to their share, would incur the odium,
and run the hazard that would attend it; and if they could be
found, I think it impracticable to protect the stamps in so
many distant and remote places.
Q. But in places where they could be protected, would not the
people use them rather than remain in such a situation, unable
to obtain any right, or recover, by law, any debt?
A. It is hard to say what they would do. I can only judge what
other people will think, and how they will act, by what I feel
within myself. I have a great many debts due to me in America,
and I had rather they should remain unrecoverable by any law
than submit to the Stamp Act. They will be debts of honour. It
is my opinion the people will either continue in that
situation, or find some way to extricate themselves, perhaps
by generally agreeing to proceed in the courts without stamps.
Q. What do you think a sufficient military force to protect
the distribution of the stamps in every part of America?
A. A very great force; I cannot say what, if the disposition
of America is for a general resistance.
Q. What is the number of men in America able to bear arms, or
of disciplined militia?
A. There are, I suppose, at least—[Question objected to. He
withdrew. Called in again.]
Q. Is the American Stamp Act an equal tax on that country?
A. I think not.
Q. Why so?
A. The greatest part of the money must arise from lawsuits for
the recovery of debts, and be paid by the lower sort of
people, who were too poor easily to pay their debts. It is
therefore a heavy tax on the poor, and a tax upon them for
being poor.
Q. But will not this increase of expense be a means of
lessening the number of lawsuits?
A. I think not; for as the costs all fall upon the debtor, and
are to be paid by him, they would be no discouragement to the
creditor to bring his action.
Q. Would it not have the effect of excessive usury?
A. Yes, as an oppression of the debtor.
{3198}
Q. How many ships are there laden annually in
North America with flax seed for Ireland?
A. I cannot speak to the number of ships, but I know that in
1752, 10,000 hogsheads of flax seed, each containing seven
bushels, were exported from Philadelphia to Ireland. I suppose
the quantity is greatly increased since that time; and it is
understood that the exportation from New York is equal to that
from Philadelphia.
Q. What becomes of the flax that grows with that flax seed?
A. They manufacture some into coarse, and some into a middling
kind of linen.
Q. Are there any slitting mills in America?
A. I think there are three, but I believe only one at present
employed. I suppose they will all be set to work, if the
interruption of the trade continues.
Q. Are there any fulling mills there?
A. A great many.
Q. Did you never hear that a great quantity of stockings were
contracted for, for the army, during the war, and manufactured
in Philadelphia?
A. I have heard so.
Q. If the Stamp Act should be repealed, would not the
Americans think they could oblige the parliament to repeal
every external tax law now in force?
A. It is hard to answer questions what people at such a
distance will think.
Q. But what do you imagine they will think were the motives of
repealing the Act?
A. I suppose they will think that it was repealed from a
conviction of its inexpediency; and they will rely upon it,
that while the same inexpediency subsists, you will never
attempt to make such another.
Q. What do you mean by its inexpediency?
A. I mean its inexpediency on several accounts; the poverty
and inability of those who were to pay the tax; the general
discontent it has occasioned; and the impracticability of
enforcing it. If the Act should be repealed, and the
legislature should shew its resentment to the opposers of the
Stamp Act, would the colonies acquiesce in the authority of
the legislature?
Q. What is your opinion they would do?
A. I don't doubt at all, that if the legislature repeal the
Stamp Act, the colonies will acquiesce in the authority.
Q. But if the legislature should think fit to ascertain its
right to lay taxes, by any act laying a small tax, contrary to
their opinion, would they submit to pay the tax?
A. The proceedings of the people in America have been
considered too much together. The proceedings of the
assemblies have been very different from those of the mobs,
and should be distinguished, as having no connection with each
other. The assemblies have only peaceably resolved what they
take to be their rights; they have not built a fort, raised a
man, or provided a grain of ammunition, in order to such
opposition. The ringleaders of riot they think ought to be
punished; they would punish them themselves, if they could.
Every sober, sensible man would wish to see rioters punished,
as otherwise peaceable people have no security of person or
estate. But as to an internal tax, how small soever, laid by
the legislature here on the people there, while they have no
representatives in this legislature, I think it will never be
submitted to.—They will oppose it to the last.—They do not
consider it as at all necessary for you to raise money on them
by your taxes, because they are, and always have been, ready
to raise money by taxes among themselves, and to grant large
sums, equal to their abilities, upon requisition from the
crown.—They have not only granted equal to their abilities,
but, during all the last war, they granted far beyond their
abilities, and beyond their proportion with this country, you
yourselves being judges, to the amount of many hundred
thousand pounds, and this they did freely and readily, only on
a sort of promise from the secretary of state, that it should
be recommended to parliament to make them compensation. It was
accordingly recommended to parliament, in the most honourable
manner, for them. America has been greatly misrepresented and
abused here, in papers, and pamphlets, and speeches, as
ungrateful, and unreasonable, and unjust, in having put this
nation to immense expense for their defence, and refusing to
bear any part of that expense. The colonies raised, paid, and
clothed, near 25,000 men during the last war, a number equal
to those sent from Britain, and far beyond their proportion;
they went deeply into debt in doing this, and all their taxes
and estates are mortgaged, for many years to come, for
discharging that debt. Government here was at that time very
sensible of this; The colonies were recommended to parliament.
Every year the King sent down to the House a written message
to this purpose, That his Majesty, being highly sensible of
the zeal and vigour with which his faithful subjects in North
America had exerted themselves, in defence of his Majesty's
just rights and possessions, recommended it to the House to
take the same into consideration, and enable him to give them
a proper compensation. You will find those messages on your
own journals every year of the war to the very last, and you
did accordingly give 200,000l. annually to the crown,
to be distributed in such compensation to the colonies. This
is the strongest of all proofs that the colonies, far from
being unwilling to bear a share of the burden, did exceed
their proportion; for if they had done less, or had only
equalled their proportion, there would have been no room or
reason for compensation. Indeed the sums reimbursed them, were
by no means adequate to the expense they incurred beyond their
proportion; but they never murmured at that; they esteemed
their sovereign's approbation of their zeal and fidelity, and
the approbation of this House, far beyond any other kind of
compensation; therefore there was no occasion for this act, to
force money from a willing people; they had not refused giving
money for the purposes of the act; no requisition had been
made: they were al ways willing and ready to do what could
reasonably be expected from them, and in this light they wish
to be considered.
Q. But suppose Great Britain should be engaged in a war in
Europe, would North America contribute to the support of it?
A. I do think they would, as far as their circumstances would
permit. They consider themselves as a part of the British
empire, and as having one common interest with it; they may be
looked on here as foreigners, but they do not consider
themselves as such. They are zealous for the honour and
prosperity of this nation, and while they are well used, will
always be ready to support it, as far as their little power
goes. In 1739 they were called upon to assist in the
expedition against Carthagena, and they sent 3,000 men to join
your army. It is true Carthagena is in America, but as remote
from the northern colonies as if it had been in Europe. They
make no distinction of wars, as to their duty of assisting in
them.
{3199}
I know the last war is commonly spoke of here as entered into
for the defence, or for the sake of the people of America. I
think it is quite misunderstood. It began about the limits
between Canada and Nova Scotia, about territories to which the
crown indeed laid claim, but were not claimed by any British
colony; none of the lands had been granted to any colonist; we
had therefore no particular concern or interest in that
dispute. As to the Ohio, the contest there began about your
right of trading in the Indian country, a right you had by the
treaty of Utrecht, which the French infringed; they seized the
traders and their goods, which were your manufactures; they
took a fort which a company of your merchants, and their
factors and correspondents, had erected there to secure that
trade. Braddock was sent with an army to re-take that fort
(which was looked on here as another incroachment on the
King's territory) and to protect your trade. It was not till
after his defeat that the colonies were attacked. They were
before in perfect peace with both French and Indians; the
troops were not therefore sent for their defence. The trade
with the Indians, though carried on in America, is not an
American interest. The people of America are chiefly farmers
and planters; scarce any thing that they raise or produce is
an article of commerce with the Indians. The Indian trade is a
British interest; it is carried on with British manufactures,
for the profit of British merchants and manufacturers;
therefore the war, as it commenced for the defence of
territories of the crown, the property of no American, and for
the defence of a trade purely British, was really a British
war—and yet the people of America made no scruple of
contributing their utmost towards carrying it on, and bringing
it to a happy conclusion.
Q. Do you think then that the taking possession of the King's
territorial rights, and strengthening the frontiers, is not an
American interest?
A. Not particularly, but conjointly a British and an American
interest.
Q. You will not deny that the preceding war, the war with
Spain, was entered into for the sake of America; was it not
occasioned by captures made in the American seas?
A. Yes; captures of ships carrying on the British trade there,
with British manufactures.
Q. Was not the late war with the Indians, since the peace with
France, a war for America only?
A. Yes: it was more particularly for America than the former,
but it was rather a consequence or remains of the former war,
the Indians not having been thoroughly pacified, and the
Americans bore by much the greatest share of the expense. It
was put an end to by the army under general Bouquet; there
were not above 300 regulars in that army, and above 1,000
Pennsylvanians.
Q. Is it not necessary to send troops to America, to defend

the Americans against the Indians?
A. No, by no means; it never was necessary. They defended
themselves when they were but a handful, and the Indians much
more numerous. They continually gained ground, and have driven
the Indians over the mountains, without any troops sent to
their assistance from this country. And can it be thought
necessary now to send troops for their defence from those
diminished Indian tribes, when the colonies are become so
populous, and so strong? There is not the least occasion for
it; they are very able to defend themselves.
Q. Do you say there were no more than 300 regular troops
employed in the late Indian war?
A, Not on the Ohio, or the frontiers of Pennsylvania, which
was the chief part of the war that affected the colonies.
There were garrisons at Niagara, Fort Detroit, and those
remote posts kept for the sake of your trade; I did not reckon
them, but I believe that on the whole the number of Americans,
or provincial troops, employed in the war, was greater than
that of the regulars. I am not certain, but I think so.
Q. Do you think the assemblies have a right to levy money on
the subject there, to grant to the crown?
A. I certainly think so; they have always done it.
Q. Are they acquainted with the Declaration of Rights; and do
they know that by that statute, money is not to be raised on
the subject but by consent of parliament?
A. They are very well acquainted with it.
Q. How then can they think they have a right to levy money for
the crown, or for any other than local purposes?
A. They understand that clause to relate to subjects only
within the realm; that no money can be levied on them for the
crown, but by consent of parliament. The colonies are not
supposed to be within the realm; they have assemblies of their
own, which are their parliaments, and they are, in that
respect, in the same situation with Ireland. When money is to
be raised for the crown upon the subject in Ireland, or in the
colonies, the consent is given in the parliament of Ireland,
or in the assemblies of the colonies. They think the
parliament of Great Britain cannot properly give that consent
till it has representatives from America; for the Petition of
Right expressly says, it is to be by common consent in
parliament, and the people of America have no representatives
in parliament, to make a part of that common consent.
Q. If the Stamp Act should be repealed, and an act should
pass, ordering the assemblies of the colonies to indemnify the
sufferers by the riots, would they obey it?
A. That is a question I cannot answer.
Q. Suppose the King should require the colonies to grant a
revenue, and the parliament should be against their doing it,
do they think they can grant a revenue to the King, without
the consent of the parliament of Great Britain?
A. That is a deep question. As to my own opinion I should
think myself at liberty to do it, and should do it, if I liked
the occasion.
Q, When money has been raised in the colonies, upon
requisitions, has it not been granted to the King?
A. Yes, always; but the requisitions have generally been for
some service expressed, as to raise, clothe, and pay troops,
and not for money only.
Q. If the act should pass, requiring the American Assemblies
to make compensation to the sufferers, and they should disobey
it, and then the parliament should, by another act, lay an
internal tax, would they obey it?
A. The people will pay no internal tax: and I think an act to
oblige the assemblies to make compensation is unnecessary, for
I am of opinion, that as soon as the present heats are abated,
they will take the matter into consideration, and if it is
right to be done, they will do it of themselves.
{3200}
Q. Do not letters often come into the post offices in America,
directed into some inland town where no post goes?
A. Yes.
Q. Can any private person take up those letters, and carry
them as directed?
A. Yes; any friend of the person may do it, paying the postage
that has accrued.
Q. But must not he pay an additional postage for the distance
to such an inland town?
A. No.
Q. Can the post-master answer delivering the letter, without
being paid such additional postage?
A. Certainly he can demand nothing, where he does no service.
Q. Suppose a person, being far from home, finds a letter in a
post office directed to him, and he lives in a place to which
the post generally goes, and the letter is directed to that
place, will the post-master deliver him the letter, without
his paying the postage received at the place to which the
letter is directed?
A. Yes; the office cannot demand postage for a letter that it
does not carry, or farther than it does carry it.
Q. Are not ferrymen in America obliged, by act of parliament,
to carry over the posts without pay?
A. Yes.
Q. Is not this a tax on the ferrymen?
A. They do not consider it as such, as they have an advantage
from persons travelling with the post.
Q. If the Stamp Act should be repealed, and the crown should
make a requisition to the colonies for a sum of money, would
they grant it?
A. I believe they would.
Q. Why do you think so?
A. I can speak for the colony I live in; I had it in
instruction from the assembly to assure the ministry, that as
they always had done, so they should always think it their
duty to grant such aids to the crown as were suitable to their
circumstances and abilities, whenever called upon for the
purpose, in the usual constitutional manner; and I had the
honour of communicating this instruction to that honorable
gentleman then minister.
Q. Would they do this for a British concern; as suppose a war
in some part of Europe, that did not affect them?
A. Yes, for any thing that concerned the general interest.
They consider themselves as a part of the whole.
Q. What is the usual constitutional manner of calling on the
colonies for aids?
A. A letter from the secretary of state.
Q. Is this all you mean, a letter from the secretary of state?
A. I mean the usual way of requisition, in a circular letter
from the secretary of state, by his Majesty's command,
reciting the occasion, and recommending it to the colonies to
grant such aids as became their loyalty, and were suitable to
their abilities.
Q. Did the secretary of state ever write for money for the
crown?
A. The requisitions have been to raise clothe, and pay men,
which cannot be done without money.
Q. Would they grant money alone, if called on?
A. In my opinion they would, money as well as men, when they
have money, or can procure it.
Q. If the parliament should repeal the Stamp Act, will the
assembly of Pennsylvania rescind their resolutions?
A. I think not.
Q. Before there was any thought of the Stamp Act, did they
wish for a representation in parliament?
A. No.
Q. Don't you know that there is, in the Pennsylvania charter,
an express reservation of the right of parliament to lay taxes
there?
A. I know there is a clause in the charter, by which the King
grants that he will levy no taxes on the inhabitants, unless
it be with the consent of the assembly, or by an act of
parliament.
Q. How then could the assembly of Pennsylvania assert, that
laying a tax on them by the Stamp Act was an infringement of
their rights?
A. They understand it thus: by the same charter, and
otherwise, they are entitled to all the privileges and
liberties of Englishmen; they find in the Great Charters, and
the Petition and Declaration of Rights, that one of the
privileges of English subjects is, that they are not to be
taxed but by their common consent; they have therefore relied
upon it, from the first settlement of the province, that the
parliament never would, nor could, by colour of that clause in
the charter, assume a right of taxing them, till it had
qualified itself to exercise such right, by admitting
representatives from the people to be taxed, who ought to make
a part of that common consent.
Q. Are there any words in the charter that justify that
construction?
A. The common rights of Englishmen, as declared by Magna
Charta, and the Petition of Right, all justify it.
Q. Does the distinction between internal and external taxes
exist in the words of the charter?
A. No, I believe not.
Q. Then may they not, by the same interpretation, object to
the parliament's right of external taxation?
A. They never have hitherto. Many arguments have been lately
used here to shew them that there is no difference, and that
if you have no right to tax them internally, you have none to
tax them externally, or make any other law to bind them. At
present they do not reason so, but in time they may possibly
be convinced by these arguments.
Q. Do not the resolutions of the Pennsylvania assemblies say,
all taxes?
A. If they do, they mean only internal taxes; the same words
have not always the same meaning here and in the colonies. By
taxes they mean internal taxes; by duties they mean customs;
these are the ideas of the language.
Q. Have you not seen the resolutions of the Massachusetts Bay
assembly?
A. I have.
Q. Do they not say, that neither external nor internal taxes
can be laid on them by parliament?
A. I don't know that they do; I believe not.
Q. If the same tax should say neither tax nor imposition could
be laid, does not that province hold the power of parliament
can lay neither?
A. I suppose that by the word imposition, they do not intend
to express duties to be laid on goods imported, as regulations
of commerce.
Q. What can the colonies mean then by imposition as distinct
from taxes?
A. They may mean many things, as impressing of men, or of
carriages, quartering troops on private houses, and the like;
there may be great impositions that are not properly taxes.
Q. Is not the post-office rate an internal tax laid by act of
parliament?
A. I have answered that.
Q. Are all parts of the colonies equally able to pay taxes?
A. No, certainly; the frontier parts, which have been ravaged
by the enemy, are greatly disabled by that means, and
therefore, in such cases, are usually favoured in our tax
laws.
{3201}
Q. Can we, at this distance, be competent judges of what
favours are necessary?
A. The parliament have supposed it, by claiming a right to
make tax laws for America; I think it impossible.
Q. Would the repeal of the Stamp Act be any discouragement of
your manufactures? Will the people that have begun to
manufacture decline it?
A. Yes, I think they will; especially if, at the same time,
the trade is opened again, so that remittances can be easily
made. I have known several instances that make it probable. In
the war before last, tobacco being low, and making little
remittance, the people of Virginia went generally into family
manufactures. Afterwards, when tobacco bore a better price,
they returned to the use of British manufactures. So fulling
mills were very much disused in the last war in Pennsylvania,
because bills were then plenty, and remittances could easily
be made to Britain for English cloth and other goods.
Q. If the Stamp Act should be repealed, would it induce the
assemblies of America to acknowledge the right of parliament
to tax them, and, would they erase their resolutions?
A. No, never.
Q. Is there no means of obliging them to erase those
resolutions?
A. None, that I know of; they will never do it, unless
compelled by force of arms.
Q. Is there a power on earth that can force them to erase
them?
A. No power, how great soever, can force men to change their
opinions.
Q. Do they consider the post office as a tax, or as a
regulation?
A. Not as a tax, but as a regulation and conveniency; every
assembly encouraged it, and supported it in its infancy, by
grants of money, which they would not otherwise have done; and
the people have always paid the postage.
Q. When did you receive the instructions you mentioned?
A. I brought them with me, when I came to England, about 15
months since.
Q. When did you communicate that instruction to the minister?
A. Soon after my arrival, while the stamping of America was
under consideration, and before the Bill was brought in.
Q. Would it be most for the interest of Great Britain, to
employ the hands of Virginia in tobacco, or in manufactures?
A. In tobacco, to be sure.
Q. What used to be the pride of the Americans?
A. To indulge in the fashions and manufactures of Great
Britain.
Q. What is now their pride?
A. To wear their old clothes over again, till they can make
new ones.
Withdrew.
Parliamentary History of England,
volume 16, pages 138-160.
"Mr. Sparks very justly says that there was no event in
Franklin's life more creditable to his talents and character,
or which gave him so much celebrity, as this examination
before the House of Commons. His further statement, however,
that Franklin's answers were given without premeditation and
without knowing beforehand the nature or form of the question
that was to be put, is a little too sweeping. In a memorandum
which Franklin gave to a friend who wished to know by whom the
several questions were put, he admitted that many were put by
friends to draw out in answer the substance of what he had
before said upon the subject."
J. Bigelow,
Life of Benjamin Franklin,
volume 1, page 507, foot-note.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1766.
The repeal of the Stamp Act and passage of the
Declaratory Act.
Speech of Pitt.
"The Grenville Ministry had fallen in July [1765], and had
been succeeded by that of Rockingham; and Conway, who had been
one of the few opponents of the Stamp Act, was now Secretary
of State for the Colonies. … The Stamp Act had contributed
nothing to the downfall of Grenville; it attracted so little
attention that it was only in the last days of 1765 or the
first days, of 1766 that the new ministers learnt the views of
Pitt upon the subject; it was probably a complete surprise to
them to learn that it had brought the colonies to the verge of
rebellion, and in the first months of their power they appear
to have been quite uncertain what policy they would pursue. …
Parliament met on December 17, 1765, and the attitude of the
different parties was speedily disclosed. A powerful
Opposition, led by Grenville and Bedford, strenuously urged
that no relaxation or indulgence should be granted to the
colonists. … Pitt, on the other hand, rose from his sick-bed,
and in speeches of extraordinary eloquence, and which produced
an amazing effect on both sides of the Atlantic, he justified
the resistance of the colonists."
W. E. H. Lecky,
History of England in the 18th Century,
chapter 12 (volume 3).
The following is the main part of the speech delivered by Pitt
(not yet made Lord Chatham) on the 14th of January, 1766, as
imperfectly reported: "It is my opinion, that this kingdom has
no right to lay a tax upon the colonies. At the same time, I
assert the authority of this kingdom over the colonies to be
sovereign and supreme, in every circumstance of government and
legislation whatsoever. They are the subjects of this kingdom;
equally entitled with yourselves to all the natural rights of
mankind and the peculiar privileges of Englishmen; equally
bound by its laws, and equally participating in the
constitution of this free country, The Americans are the sons,
not the bastards of England! Taxation is no part of the
governing or legislative power. The taxes are a voluntary gift
and grant of the Commons alone. In legislation the three
estates of the realm are alike concerned; but the concurrence
of the peers and the Crown to a tax is only necessary to
clothe it with the form of a law. The gift and grant is of the
Commons alone. … When … in this House, we give and grant, we
give and grant what is our own. But in an American tax, what
do we do? 'We, your Majesty's Commons for Great Britain, give
and grant to your Majesty'—what? Our own property! No! 'We
give and grant to your Majesty' the property of your Majesty's
Commons of America! It is an absurdity in terms. … There is an
idea in some that the colonies are virtually represented in
the House. I would fain know by whom an American is
represented here. Is he represented by any knight of the
shire, in any county in this kingdom? Would to God that
respectable representation was augmented to a greater number!
Or will you tell him that he is represented by any
representative of a borough? a borough which, perhaps, its own
representatives never saw! This is what is called the rotten
part of the Constitution. It cannot continue a century. If it
does not drop, it must be amputated. The idea of a virtual
representation of America in this House is the most
contemptible idea that ever entered into the head of a man. It
does not deserve a serious refutation. The Commons of America
represented in their several assemblies, have ever been in the
possession of this, their constitutional right, of giving and
granting their own money.
{3202}
They would have been slaves if they had not enjoyed it! At the
same time, this kingdom, as the supreme governing and
legislative power, has always bound the colonies by her laws,
by her regulations, and restrictions in trade, in navigation,
in manufactures, in every thing, except that of taking their
money out of their pockets without their consent. Here I would
draw the line. … Gentlemen, sir, have been charged with giving
birth to sedition in America. They have spoken their
sentiments with freedom against this unhappy act, and that
freedom has become their crime. Sorry I am to hear the liberty
of speech in this House imputed as a crime. But the imputation
shall not discourage me. It is a liberty I mean to exercise.
No gentleman ought to be afraid to exercise it. It is a
liberty by which the gentleman who calumniates it might have
profited. He ought to have desisted from his project. The
gentleman tells us America is obstinate; America almost in
open rebellion. I rejoice that America has resisted. Three
millions of people, so dead to all the feelings of liberty as
voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would have been fit
instruments to make slaves of the rest. … Since the accession
of King William, many ministers, some of great, others of more
moderate abilities, have taken the lead of government. … None
of these thought or even dreamed, of robbing the colonies of
their constitutional rights. That was reserved to mark the era
of the late administration. Not that there were wanting some,
when I had the honor to serve his Majesty, to propose to me to
burn my fingers with an American stamp act. With the enemy at
their back, with our bayonets at their breasts, in the day of
their distress, perhaps the Americans would have submitted to
the imposition; but it would have been taking an ungenerous,
an unjust advantage. The gentleman boasts of his bounties to
America! Are not these bounties intended finally for the
benefit of this kingdom? If they are not, he has misapplied
the national treasures! I am no courtier of America. I stand
up for this kingdom. I maintain that the Parliament has a
right to bind, to restrain America. Our legislative power over
the colonies is sovereign and supreme. I would advise every
gentleman to sell his lands, if he can, and embark for that
country. When two countries are connected together like
England and her colonies, without being incorporated, the one
must necessarily govern. The greater must rule the less. But
she must so rule it as not to contradict the fundamental
principles that are common to both. … The gentleman asks, When
were the colonies emancipated? I desire to know, when were
they made slaves? But I dwell not upon words. When I had the
honor of serving his Majesty, I availed myself of the means of
information which I derived from my office. I speak,
therefore, from knowledge. My materials were good. I was at
pains to collect, to digest, to consider them; and I will be
bold to affirm, that the profits to Great Britain from the
trade of the colonies through all its branches, is two
millions a year. This is the fund that carried you
triumphantly through the last war. The estates that were
rented at two thousand pounds a year, three-score years ago,
are at three thousand at present. Those estates sold then from
fifteen to eighteen years purchase; the same may now be sold
for thirty. You owe this to America. This is the price America
pays you for her protection. And shall a miserable financier
come with a boast, that he can bring 'a pepper-corn' into the
exchequer by the loss of millions to the nation? I dare not
say how much higher these profits may be augmented. … I am
convinced on other grounds that the commercial system of
America may be altered to advantage. You have prohibited where
you ought to have encouraged. You have encouraged where you
ought to have prohibited. Improper restraints have been laid
on the continent in favor of the islands. You have but two
nations to trade with in America. Would you had twenty! Let
acts of Parliament in consequence of treaties remain; but let
not an English minister become a custom-house officer for
Spain, or for any foreign power. Much is wrong! Much may be
amended for the general good of the whole! … A great deal has
been said without doors of the power, of the strength of
America. It is a topic that ought to be cautiously meddled
with. In a good cause, on a sound bottom, the force of this
country can crush America to atoms. I know the valor of your
troops. I know the skill of your officers. There is not a
company of foot that has served in America, out of which you
may not pick a man of sufficient knowledge and experience to
make a governor of a colony there. But on this ground, on the
Stamp Act, which so many here will think a crying injustice, I
am one who will lift up my hands against it. In such a cause
your success would be hazardous. America, if she fell, would
fall like the strong man; she would embrace the pillars of the
State, and pull down the Constitution along with her. Is this
your boasted peace—not to sheathe the sword in its scabbard,
but to sheathe it in the bowels of your countrymen? … The
Americans have not acted in all things with prudence and
temper: they have been wronged: they have been driven to
madness by injustice. Will you punish them for the madness you
have occasioned? Rather let prudence and temper come first
from this side. I will undertake for America that she will
follow the example. … Upon the whole I will beg leave to tell
the House what is my opinion. It is that the Stamp Act be
repealed absolutely, totally and immediately. That the reason
for the repeal be assigned, viz., because it was founded on an
erroneous principle. At the same time, let the sovereign
authority of this country over the colonies be asserted in as
strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every
point of legislation whatsoever; that we may bind their trade,
confine their manufactures, and exercise every power
whatsoever except that of taking their money out of their
pockets without their consent."
Representative British Orations,
pages 98-119.
The views of Pitt "were defended in the strongest terms by
Lord Camden, who pledged his great legal reputation to the
doctrine that taxation is not included under the general right
of legislation, and that taxation and representation are
morally inseparable. … The task of the ministers in dealing
with this question was extremely difficult. The great majority
of them desired ardently the repeal of the Stamp Act; but the
wishes of the King, the abstention of Pitt, and the divided
condition of parties had compelled Rockingham to include in
his Government Charles Townshend, Barrington, and Northington,
who were all strong advocates of the taxation of America. …
{3203}
In addition to all these difficulties the ministers had to
deal with the exasperation which was produced in Parliament by
the continual outrages and insults to which all who
represented the English Government in America were exposed.
Their policy consisted of two parts. They asserted in the
strongest and most unrestricted form the sovereignty of the
British Legislature, first of all by resolutions and then by a
Declaratory Act affirming the right of Parliament to make laws
binding the British colonies 'in all cases whatsoever,' and
condemning as unlawful the votes of the colonial Assemblies
which had denied to Parliament the right of taxing them. Side
by side with this measure they brought in a bill repealing the
Stamp Act. … The great and manifest desire of the commercial
classes throughout England had much weight; the repeal was
carried [March, 1766] through the House of Commons, brought up
by no less than 200 members to the Lords, and finally carried
amid the strongest expressions of public joy. Burke described
it as 'an event that caused more universal joy throughout the
British dominions than perhaps any other that can be
remembered.'"
W. E. H. Lecky,
History of England in the 18th Century,
chapter 12 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
Parliamentary History,
volume 16, pages 112-205.
B. Franklin,
Works (Sparks' editor),
volume 4.
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England 1713-1783,
chapter 45.
See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1765-1768.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1766-1767.
The Townshend measures.
"The liberal Rockingham administration, after a few months of
power, disappeared [July, 1766], having signalized itself as
regarded America by the repeal of the Stamp Act, and by the
Declaratory Act. Of the new ministry the leading spirit was
Charles Townshend, a brilliant statesman, but unscrupulous and
unwise. His inclinations were arbitrary; he regretted the
repeal of the Stamp Act, as did also the king and Parliament
in general, who felt themselves to have been humiliated. Pitt,
indeed, now Earl of Chatham, was a member of the government;
but, oppressed by illness, he could exercise no restraint upon
his colleague, and the other members were either in sympathy
with Townshend's views, or unable to oppose him. Townshend's
three measures affecting America, introduced on the 13th of
May, 1767, were: a suspension of the functions of the
legislature of New York for contumacy in the treatment of the
royal troops; the establishment of commissioners of the
customs, appointed with large powers to superintend laws
relating to trade; and lastly an impost duty upon glass, red
and white lead, painters' colors, paper, and tea [see ENGLAND:
A. D. 1765-1768]. This was an 'external' duty to which the
colonists had heretofore expressed a willingness to submit;
but the grounds of the dispute were shifting. Townshend had
declared that he held in contempt the distinction sought to be
drawn between external and internal taxes, but that he would
so far humor the colonists in their quibble as to make his tax
of that kind of which the right was admitted. A revenue of
£40,000 a year was expected from the tax, which was to be
applied to the support of a 'civil list,' namely, the paying
the salaries of the new commissioners of customs, and of the
judges and governors, who were to be relieved wholly or in
part from their dependence upon the annual grants of the
Assemblies; then, if a surplus remained, it was to go to the
payment of troops for protecting the colonies. To make more
efficient, moreover, the enforcement of the revenue laws, the
writs of assistance, the denunciation of which by James Otis
had formed so memorable a crisis, were formally legalized. The
popular discontent, appeased by the repeal of the Stamp Act,
was at once awake again, and henceforth in the denial of the
right of Parliament to tax, we hear no more of acquiescence in
commercial restrictions and in the general legislative
authority of Parliament. … The plan for resistance adopted by
the cooler heads was that of Samuel Adams, namely, the
non-importation and the non-consumption of British products.
From Boston out, through an impulse proceeding from him,
town-meetings were everywhere held to encourage the
manufactures of the Province and reduce the use of
superfluities, long lists of which were enumerated. Committees
were appointed everywhere to procure subscriptions to
agreements looking to the furtherance of home industries and
the disuse of foreign products. … Before the full effects of
the new legislation could be seen, Townshend suddenly died;
but in the new ministry that was presently formed Lord North
came to the front, and adopted the policy of his predecessor,
receiving in this course the firm support of the king, whose
activity and interest were so great in public affairs that he
'became his own minister.'"
J. K. Hosmer,
Samuel Adams,
chapter 7.
ALSO IN:
R. Frothingham,
Life and Times of Joseph Warren,
chapter 3.
W. Belsham,
Memoirs of the Reign of George III.,
volume 1, page 139-142.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1767-1768.
The Farmer's Letters of John Dickinson.
The Circular Letter of Massachusetts,
and the "Unrescinding Ninety-two."
"The English ministry was probably misled by the strong
emphasis which had been laid here during the controversies
concerning the Stamp Act upon the alleged distinction between
external and internal taxation. We had refused to submit to
the latter, but admitted that the former might be binding upon
the whole empire as a commercial regulation. In form the
duties levied on paints, glass, tea, etc., were undoubtedly
such a regulation, but it was at once contended here that, in
point of fact and of principle, this was as much an exercise
of the alleged right of Parliamentary taxation for the purpose
of raising a revenue for imperial purposes as the Stamp Act
itself. Although it was passed by the opponents of the Stamp
Act, and by the Rockingham ministry, who professed to be our
friends, the act met at once with opposition here. Late in
October, 1767, it was denounced by a public meeting in Boston,
which suggested a non-importation agreement as the best means
of rendering its operations ineffective. These agreements were
favorite expedients for manifesting political discontent in
those days, but, as they were voluntary, their obligation sat
somewhat loosely upon those who signed them. The truth is,
that those who were most decided in opposition to the course
of the ministry were somewhat puzzled as to the plan they
should adopt to exhibit the earnestness of their discontent. …
While the leaders of the opposition throughout the country
were doubtful and hesitating, there appeared in the
Pennsylvania Chronicle for the 2d of December, 1767, the first
of a series of letters on the political situation, afterwards
known as the 'Farmer's Letters.'
{3204}
… The letters, fourteen in number, followed one another in
quick succession, and they were read by men of all classes and
opinions throughout the continent as no other work of a
political kind had been hitherto read in America. It was, of
course, soon known that John Dickinson was their author, and
people remembered that he was the person who had formulated
what was a genuine Bill of Rights in the Stamp Act Congress.
The more these letters were read, the more convinced people
became that in the comprehensive survey they took of our
political relations with the mother-country, especially as
these were affected by the last obnoxious act of Parliament,
and in the plans which were proposed to remedy the evil, Mr.
Dickinson had struck the true key-note of the opposition to
the ministerial measures. He appeared at this crisis, as he
did in the Stamp Act Congress, as the leader and guide in the
controversy. From this time until the Declaration of
Independence the Pennsylvania idea, which was embodied by Mr.
Dickinson in these Farmer's Letters, 'controlled the destinies
of the country;' and Mr. Bancroft only does justice to Mr.
Dickinson's position when he recognizes fully his commanding
influence during that period. We may say with pardonable pride
(and it is one of those truths which many of our historians
have managed in various ways to relegate to obscurity), that,
as the leading spirit in the Stamp Act Congress, Dickinson
gave form and color to the agitation in this country which
brought about the repeal of that act, and that the arguments
by which the claim of the ministry to tax us for revenue by
such an act of Parliament as that levying duties on glass,
paints, etc. was answered in the 'Farmer's Letters' first
convinced the whole body of our countrymen, groping blindly
for a cure for their grievances, that there was a legal
remedy, and then forced the ministry to consent in a measure
to the demand for a repeal of some of its most obnoxious
provisions. It is worth remarking that when the ministry
yielded at all it yielded to argument, and not to the boastful
threats which were so common. The 'Farmer's Letters' gave
courage and force to those who in February denounced the law
in Pennsylvania; they formed the mainspring of the movement
which resulted in the circular letter sent by the legislature
of Massachusetts on the 17th of that month to the Assemblies
of the other Colonies; in short, they had the rare good
fortune not only of convincing those who suffered that the
remedy was in their own hands, but also of pursuading those
who had the power to abandon, or at least to modify their
arbitrary measures. … Mr. Dickinson begins these grave essays
with an air of simplicity as charming as it is calculated to
attract the attention of the reader. 'I am a farmer,' he says,
'settled, after a variety of fortunes, near the banks of the
river Delaware, in the Province of Pennsylvania. I received a
liberal education, and have been engaged in the busy scenes of
life, but am now convinced that a man may be as happy without
bustle as with it. Being generally master of my time, I spend
a good deal of it in my library, which I think the most
valuable part of my small estate. I have acquired, I believe,
a greater knowledge of history and of the laws and
constitution of my country than is generally attained by men
of my class,' etc. He then explains the nature of the
controversy with the mother-country, making it so clear that
the points in dispute are comprehensible by a child. … As to
our method of asserting our rights, he says, with an elevation
of sentiment which reminds one of Edmund Burke more than of
any other political writer, 'The cause of liberty is a cause
of too much dignity to be sullied by turbulence and tumult. It
ought to be maintained in a manner suitable to her nature.
Those who engage in it should breathe a sedate yet fervent
spirit, animating them to actions of prudence, justice,
modesty, bravery, humanity, and magnanimity.' He shrinks,
evidently with terror, from speaking of what may be the
consequences of the persistent refusal of England to change
her oppressive measures. … After showing in the most striking
manner the nature of our wrongs, the letters turn gladly to
the remedy that lies open to us. That remedy is based upon a
cultivation of the spirit of conciliation on both sides, and
Mr. Dickinson urges again and again upon his English readers
the folly of their policy, by showing them the value of the
American Colonies to them, and especially how the trade and
wealth of the English merchants are bound up in the adoption
of a liberal policy towards us. This is one of the most
interesting and important topics discussed in these letters,
and the subject is treated with elaborate skill, leading to
convincing conclusions drawn from our history. It must not be
forgotten that prior to the Revolution an impression widely
prevailed among the most thoughtful of our own people, as well
as among our friends in England, that if the English people
could be made to understand the frightful losses they would
suffer in case of a war in which we should be fighting for our
independence, or even during a short interruption of the trade
between the two countries, they would force the government to
yield rather than run the risk of the consequences. … Even Dr.
Franklin in London, who had had so many proofs of the
indifference and contempt with which the representations of
the Colonies in England were regarded … thought the appeal of
the Farmer to Englishmen so irresistible that, although no
friend of Dickinson's, he arranged that these letters should
be reprinted in London."
C. J. Stillé,
The Life and Times of John Dickinson,
chapter 4.
In February, 1768, "the Legislature of Massachusetts sent a
Circular Letter [ascribed to Samuel Adams] to the Assemblies
of the other colonies, in which was set forth the necessity of
all acting together harmoniously, and of freely communicating
the mind of each to the others. The course Massachusetts had
pursued was described, with the contents of the petition and
letters which had been written, and with the hope expressed
that she would have their cordial co-operation in resistance
to the ministerial measures. The notion that political
independence was aimed at was strenuously denied, and the
trust was entertained that what had been done would meet the
approval of their 'common head and father,' and that the
liberties of the colonies would be confirmed. This letter
elicited response from some, others returned none officially,
but all who answered replied favorably. It gave, however, the
greatest offence to the ministry, and particularly to Lord
Hillsborough, the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
{3205}
It seems that he read it entirely by the light which a letter
from Governor Bernard to Lord Barrington had shed upon it.
This epistle declared the real motive of the colonies to be a
determination to be independent. Hillsborough, filled with
this idea, communicated it to the other members of the
cabinet, and thus the Circular Letter was laid before them,
prejudged. It was determined that it merited consideration,
but that the only notice to be given it should be one of
censure, and, on the spur of the moment, they resolved upon
two things: to require the Massachusetts Assembly to rescind
the Letter, and to require the other legislatures before whom
it had been laid to reject it. This was done, and the
consequences were, that the General Court, or Legislature, of
Massachusetts voted, by ninety-two to seventeen, that they
would do nothing of the kind, and that the other legislatures
gave the outcast a hearty welcome. As for the people, they
showed their approval of their representatives by toasting,
from one end of the country to the other, 'The unrescinding
Ninety-two,' with whom was coupled the number Forty-five, or
that of the famous' North Briton'; while the Bostonians added
fuel to the flame by a riot on the score of the sloop Liberty,
in which they attacked the houses of the Commissioners of the
Customs, and made a bonfire of the Collector's boat. Shortly
afterward, (but not by reason of the riot), four ships of war
anchored in Boston harbor, and two regiments of soldiers were
quartered on the town."
E. G. Scott,
The Development of Constitutional Liberty,
chapter 10 (with corrections by the author).
ALSO IN:
R. Frothingham,
The Rise of the Republic of the United States,
chapter 6.
W. Thornton,
The Pulpit of the Revolution,
page 150.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1768-1770.
The quartering of troops in Boston.
The Massacre, and the removal of the troops.
See BOSTON: A. D. 1768; and 1770.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1769.
Massachusetts threatened, and Virginia roused to her support.
"The proceedings in Massachusetts attracted in England the
greatest attention, elicited the severest comment, and,
because a military force had been ordered to Boston to support
the stand of the administration, created the greatest
solicitude. … The king, on opening parliament, characterized
the action of Boston as a subversion of the Constitution and
evincing a disposition to throw off dependence on Great
Britain. The indictment against the colonies was presented in
sixty papers laid before parliament. Both Houses declared that
the proceedings of the Massachusetts assembly in opposition to
the revenue acts were unconstitutional, and derogatory to the
rights of the crown and the parliament; that the Circular
Letter tended to create unlawful combinations; that the call
of a convention by the selectmen of Boston was proof of a
design of setting up an independent authority; and both Houses
proposed to transport the originators of the obnoxious
proceedings to England for trial and condign punishment, under
the cover of an obsolete act of Henry VIII. … The
administration determined to make an example of Massachusetts,
as the ring-leading province in political mischief, by
transporting its popular leaders to England to be tried for
their lives in the king's bench. Such was the purport of an
elaborate despatch which Lord Hillsborough sent to Governor
Bernard, directing an inquiry to be instituted into the
conduct of any persons who had committed any overt act of
resistance to the laws. … Thus a great issue was created that
affected all the colonies. … There was no adequate step taken
to meet the threatened aggression until the House of Burgesses
of Virginia convened in May."
R. Frothingham,
The Rise of the Republic of the United States,
chapter 6.
"On the day of the prorogation of parliament [May 9, 1769] the
legislature of Virginia assembled at Williamsburg. Great men
were there; some who were among the greatest—Washington,
Patrick Henry, and, for the first time, Jefferson. Botetourt
[the governor], who opened the session in state, was in
perfect harmony with the council, received from the house of
burgesses a most dutiful address, and entertained fifty-two
guests at his table on the first day, and as many more on the
second. … But the assembly did not forget its duty, and
devised a measure which became the example for the continent.
It claimed the sole right of imposing taxes on the inhabitants
of Virginia. With equal unanimity, it asserted the lawfulness
and expediency of a concert of the colonies in defence of the
violated rights of America. It laid bare the flagrant tyranny
of applying to America the obsolete statute of Henry VIII.;
and it warned the king of 'the dangers that would ensue' if
any person in any part of America should be seized and carried
beyond sea for trial. It consummated its work by communicating
its resolutions to every legislature in America, and asking
their concurrence. The resolves were concise, simple, and
effective; so calm in manner and so perfect in substance that
time finds no omission to regret, no improvement to suggest.
The menace of arresting patriots lost its terrors; and
Virginia's declaration and action consolidated union. … The
next morning, the assembly had just time to adopt an address
to the king, when the governor summoned them, and said: 'I
have heard of your resolves, and augur ill of their effects;
you have made it my duty to dissolve you, and you are
dissolved accordingly.' Upon this, the burgesses met together
as patriots and friends, with their speaker as moderator. They
adopted the resolves which "Washington had brought with him
from Mount Vernon, and which formed a well-digested,
stringent, and practicable scheme of non-importation, until
all the 'unconstitutional' revenue acts should be repealed. …
The voice of the Old Dominion roused the merchants of
Pennsylvania to approve what had been done. The assembly of
Delaware adopted the Virginia resolves word for word; and
every colony south of Virginia followed the example."
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States (Author's last revision),
pages 347-348.
ALSO IN:
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 1, chapter 29.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1770.
Repeal of the Townshend duties except on Tea.
On the 5th of March, 1770—the same day on which the tragical
encounter of the king's troops with citizens of Boston
occurred—Lord North introduced a motion in Parliament for the
partial repeal of Townshend's revenue act; "not on the
petitions of America, because they were marked by a denial of
the right, but on one from merchants and traders of London.
'The subject,' said he, 'is of the highest importance.
{3206}
The combinations and associations of the Americans for the
temporary interruption of trade have already been called
unwarrantable in an address of this house; I will call them
insolent and illegal. The duties upon paper, glass, and
painters' colors bear upon the manufacturers of this country,
and ought to be taken off. It was my intention to have
extended the proposal to the removal of the other duties; but
the Americans have not deserved indulgence. The preamble to
the act and the duty on tea must be retained, as a mark of the
supremacy of parliament and the efficient declaration of its
right to govern the colonies.' … Thomas Pownall moved the
repeal of the duty on tea. The house of commons, like Lord
North in his heart, was disposed to do the work of
conciliation thoroughly. … Had the king's friends remained
neutral, the duty on tea would have been repealed; with all
their exertions, in a full house, the majority for retaining
it was but 62. Lord North seemed hardly satisfied with his
success; and reserved to himself liberty to accede to the
repeal, on some agreement with the East India Company. The
decision came from the king."
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 3, pages 381-382.
ALSO IN:
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 48 (volume 5.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1771.
Suppression of the Regulators of North Carolina.
See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1766-1771.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1772.
The Watauga Association.
The founding of the State of Tennessee.
See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1769-1772.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1772.
The burning of the Gaspe.
"One of the first overt acts of resistance that took place in
this celebrated struggle [in the war of independence] occurred
in 1772, in the waters of Rhode Island. A vessel of war had
been stationed on the coast to enforce the laws, and a small
schooner, with a light armament and twenty-seven men, called
the Gaspé, was employed as a tender, to run into the shallow
waters of that coast. On the 17th of June, 1772, a Providence
packet, that plied between New York and Rhode Island, named
the Hannah, and commanded by a Captain Linzee, hove in sight
of the man-of-war, on her passage up the bay. The Hannah was
ordered to heave-to, in order to be examined; but her master
refused to comply; and being favoured by a fresh southerly
breeze, that was fast sweeping him out of gunshot, the Gaspé
was signalled to follow. The chase continued for
five-and-twenty miles, under a press of sail, when the Hannah
coming up with a bar, with which her master was familiar, and
drawing less water than the schooner, Captain Linzee led the
latter on a shoal, where she struck. The tide falling, the
Gaspé … was not in a condition to be removed for several
hours. The news of the chase was circulated on the arrival of
the Hannah at Providence. A strong feeling was excited among
the population, and towards evening the town drummer appeared
in the streets, assembling the people in the ordinary manner.
As soon as a crowd was collected, the drummer led his
followers in front of a shed that stood near one of the
stores, when a man disguised as an Indian suddenly appeared on
the roof, and proclaimed a secret expedition for that night,
inviting all of 'stout hearts' to assemble on the wharf,
precisely at nine, disguised like himself. At the appointed
hour, most of the men in the place collected at the spot
designated, when sixty-four were selected for the bold
undertaking that was in view. This party embarked in eight of
the launches of the different vessels lying at the wharves,
and taking with them a quantity of paving stones, they pulled
down the river in a body. … On nearing the Gaspé, about two in
the morning, the boats were hailed by a sentinel on deck. This
man was driven below by a volley of the stones. The commander
of the Gaspé now appeared, and ordering the boats off, he
fired a pistol at them. This discharge was returned from a
musket, and the officer was shot through the thigh. By this
time, the crew of the Gaspé had assembled, and the party from
Providence boarded. The conflict was short, the schooner's
people being soon knocked down and secured. All on board were
put into the boats, and the Gaspé was set on fire. Towards
morning she blew up."
J. F. Cooper,
Naval History of the United States,
volume 1, chapter 3.
ALSO IN:
S. G. Arnold,
History of Rhode Island,
chapter 19 (volume 2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1772-1173.
The instituting of the Committees of Correspondence.
The Tea Ships and "the Boston Tea-Party."
"The surest way to renew and cement the union [of the
colonies] was to show that the ministry had not relaxed in its
determination to enforce the principal of the Townshend acts.
This was made clear in August, 1772, when it was ordered that
in Massachusetts the judges should henceforth be paid by the
crown. Popular excitement rose to fever heat, and the judges
were threatened with impeachment should they dare accept a
penny from the royal treasury. The turmoil was increased next
year by the discovery in London of the package of letters
which were made to support the unjust charge against
Hutchinson and some of his friends that they had instigated
and aided the most extreme measures of the ministry. In the
autumn of 1772 Hutchinson refused to call an extra session of
the assembly to consider what should be done about the judges.
Samuel Adams then devised a scheme by which the towns of
Massachusetts could consult with each other and agree upon
some common course of action in case of emergencies. For this
purpose each town was to appoint a standing committee, and as
a great part of their work was necessarily done by letter they
were called 'committees of correspondence.' This was the step
that fairly organized the Revolution."
J. Fiske,
The War of Independence,
chapter 5.
"The town records of Boston [November 2, 1772] say:—
'It was then moved by Mr. Samuel Adams that a Committee of
Correspondence be appointed, to consist of twenty-one persons,
to state the rights of the colonists and of this Province in
particular as men and Christians and as subjects; and to
communicate and publish the same to the several towns and to
the world as the sense of this town, with the infringements
and violations thereof that have been or from time to time may
be made.' The motion occasioned some debate and seems to have
been carried late at night; the vote in its favor, at last,
was nearly unanimous. The colleagues of Adams, who had left
him almost alone thus far, now declined to become members of
the committee, regarding the scheme as useless or trifling.
The committee was at last constituted without them; it was
made up of men of little prominence but of thorough
respectability. James Otis, in another interval of sanity, was
made chairman, a position purely honorary, the town in this
way showing its respect for the leader whose misfortunes they
so sincerely mourned.
{3207}
The Committee of Correspondence held its first meeting in the
representatives' chamber at the town-house, November 3, 1772,
where at the outset each member pledged himself to observe
secrecy as to their transactions, except those which, as a
committee, they should think it proper to divulge. According
to the motion by which the committee was constituted, three
duties were to be performed: 1st, the preparation of a
statement of the rights of the colonists, as men, as
Christians, and as subjects; 2d, a declaration of the
infringement and violation of those rights; 3d, a letter to be
sent to the several towns of the Province and to the world,
giving the sense of the town. The drafting of the first was
assigned to Samuel Adams, of the second to Joseph Warren, of
the third to Benjamin Church. In a few days tidings came from
the important towns of Marblehead, Roxbury, Cambridge, and
Plymouth, indicating that the example of Boston was making
impression and was likely to be followed. On November 20, at a
town-meeting in Faneuil Hall, the different papers were
presented: Otis sat as moderator, appearing for the last time
in a sphere where his career had been so magnificent. The
report was in three divisions, according to the motion. … In
the last days of 1772, the document, having been printed, was
transmitted to those for whom it had been intended, producing
at once an immense effect. The towns almost unanimously
appointed similar committees; from every quarter came replies
in which the sentiments of Samuel Adams were echoed. In the

library of Bancroft is a volume of manuscripts, worn and
stained by time, which have an interest scarcely inferior to
that possessed by the Declaration of Independence itself, as
the fading page hangs against its pillar in the library of the
State Department at Washington. They are the original replies
sent by the Massachusetts towns to Samuel Adams's committee
sitting in Faneuil Hall, during those first months of 1773.
One may well read them with bated breath, for it is the touch
of the elbow as the stout little democracies dress up into
line, just before they plunge into actual fight at Concord and
Bunker Hill. There is sometimes a noble scorn of the
restraints of orthography, as of the despotism of Great
Britain, in the work of the old town clerks, for they
generally were secretaries of the committees; and once in a
while a touch of Dogberry's quaintness, as the punctilious
officials, though not always 'putting God first,' yet take
pains that there shall be no mistake as to their piety by
making every letter in the name of the Deity a rounded
capital. Yet the documents ought to inspire the deepest
reverence. They constitute the highest mark the town-meeting
has ever touched. Never before and never since have
Anglo-Saxon men, in lawful folk-mote assembled, given
utterance to thoughts and feelings so fine in themselves and
so pregnant with great events. To each letter stand affixed
the names of the committee in autograph. This awkward scrawl
was made by the rough fist of a Cape Ann fisherman, on shore
for the day to do at town-meeting the duty his fellows had
laid upon him: the hand that wrote this other was cramped from
the scythe-handle, as its possessor mowed an intervale on the
Connecticut; this blotted signature, where smutted fingers
have left a black stain, was written by a blacksmith of
Middlesex, turning aside a moment from forging a barrel that
was to do duty at Lexington. They were men of the plainest;
but as the documents containing statements of the most
generous principles find the most courageous determination,
were read in the town-houses, the committees who produced
them, and the constituents for whom the committees stood, were
lifted above the ordinary level. Their horizon expanded to the
broadest; they had in view not simply themselves, but the
welfare of the continent; not solely their own generation, but
remote posterity. It was Samuel Adams's own plan, the
consequences of which no one foresaw, neither friend nor foe.
Even Hutchinson, who was scarcely less keen than Samuel Adams
himself, was completely at fault. 'Such a foolish scheme,' he
called it, 'that the faction must necessarily make themselves
ridiculous.' But in January the eyes of men were opening. One
of the ablest of the Tories, Daniel Leonard, wrote:—'This is
the foulest, subtlest, and most venomous serpent ever issued
from the egg of sedition. I saw the small seed when it was
implanted; it was a grain of mustard. I have watched the plant
until it has become a great tree.' It was the transformation
into a strong cord of what had been a rope of sand."
J. K. Hosmer,
Samuel Adams,
chapter 13.
"In the spring of 1773, Virginia carried this work of
organization a long step further, when Dabney Carr suggested
and carried a motion calling for committees of correspondence
between the several colonies. From this point it was a
comparatively short step to a permanent Continental Congress.
It happened that these preparations were made just in time to
meet the final act of aggression which brought on the
Revolutionary War. The Americans had thus far successfully
resisted the Townshend acts and secured the repeal of all the
duties except on tea. As for tea they had plenty, but not from
England; they smuggled it from Holland in spite of
custom-houses and search-warrants. Clearly unless the
Americans could be made to buy tea from England and pay the
duty on it, the king must own himself defeated. Since it
appeared that they could not be forced into doing this, it
remained to be seen if they could be tricked into doing it. A
truly ingenious scheme was devised. Tea sent by the East India
Company to America had formerly paid a duty in some British
port on the way. This duty was now taken off, so that the
price of the tea for America might be lowered. The company's
tea thus became so cheap that the American merchant could buy
a pound of it and pay the threepence duty beside for less than
it cost him to smuggle a pound of tea from Holland. It was
supposed that the Americans would of course buy the tea which
they could get most cheaply, and would thus be beguiled into
submission to that principle of taxation which they had
hitherto resisted. Ships laden with tea were accordingly sent
in the autumn of 1773 to Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and
Charleston; and consignees were appointed to receive the tea
in each of these towns. Under the guise of a commercial
operation, this was purely a political trick.
{3208}
It was an insulting challenge to the American people, and
merited the reception which they gave it. They would have
shown themselves unworthy of their rich political heritage had
they given it any other. In New York, Philadelphia, and
Charleston mass-meetings of the people voted that the
consignees should be ordered to resign their offices, and they
did so. At Philadelphia the tea-ship was met and sent back to
England before it had come within the jurisdiction of the
custom-house. At Charleston the tea was landed, and as there
was no one to receive it or pay the duty, it was thrown into a
damp cellar and left there to spoil. In Boston things took a
different turn."
J. Fiske,
The War of Independence,
chapter 5.
"Acting upon the precedent of the time of the Stamp Act, when
Oliver, the stamp commissioner, had resigned his commission
under the Liberty Tree, a placard was posted everywhere on the
3d of November, inviting the people of Boston and the
neighboring towns to be present at Liberty Tree that day at
noon, to witness the resignation of the consignees of the tea,
and hear them swear to re-ship to London what teas should
arrive. The placard closed,—'Show me the man that dares take
this town.' At the time appointed, representatives Adams,
Hancock, and Phillips, the selectmen and town clerk, with
about five hundred more, were present at the Liberty Tree. But
no consignees arrived, whereupon Molineux and Warren headed a
party who waited upon them. The consignees, Clarke, a rich
merchant, and his sons, Benjamin Faneuil, Winslow, and the two
sons of Hutchinson, Thomas and Elisha, sat together in the
counting-house of Clarke in King Street. Admittance was
refused the committee, and a conversation took place through a
window, during which the tone of the consignees was defiant.
There was some talk of violence, and when an attempt was made
to exclude the committee and the crowd attending them from the
building, into the first story of which they had penetrated,
the doors were taken off their binges and threats uttered.
Molineux, generally impetuous enough, but now influenced
probably by cooler heads, dissuaded the others from violence.
… A town-meeting on November 5, in which an effort of the
Tories to make head against the popular feeling came to
naught, showed how overwhelming was the determination to
oppose the introduction of the tea. … When news arrived on the
17th that three tea-ships were on the way to Boston, for a
second time a town-meeting demanded through a committee, of
which Samuel Adams was a member, the resignation of the
consignees. They evaded the demand; the town-meeting voted
their answer not satisfactory, and at once adjourned without
debate or comment. The silence was mysterious; what was
impending none could tell. … On the 28th, the first of the
tea-ships, the Dartmouth, Captain Hall, sailed into the
harbor. Sunday though it was, the Committee of Correspondence
met, obtained from Benjamin Rotch, the Quaker owner of the
Dartmouth, a promise not to enter the vessel until Tuesday,
and made preparations for a mass-meeting at Faneuil Hall for
Monday forenoon, to which Samuel Adams was authorized to
invite the surrounding towns. A stirring placard the next
morning brought the townsmen and their neighbors to the place.
After the organization, Samuel Adams, arising among the
thousands, moved that: 'As the town have determined at a late
meeting legally assembled that they will to the utmost of
their power prevent the landing of the tea, the question be
now put,—whether this body are absolutely determined that the
tea now arrived in Captain Hall shall be returned to the place
from whence it came.' There was not a dissenting voice. … In
the afternoon, the meeting having resolved that the tea should
go back in the same ship in which it had come, Rotch, the
owner of the Dartmouth, protested, but was sternly forbidden,
at his peril, to enter the tea. Captain Hall also was
forbidden to enter any portion of it. 'Adams was never in
greater glory,' says Hutchinson. The next morning, November
30, the people again assembling, the consignees made it known
that it was out of their power to send the tea back; but they
promised that they would store it until word should come from
their 'constituents' as to its disposal. … The Dartmouth each
night was watched by a strong guard; armed patrols, too, were
established, and six couriers held themselves ready, if there
should be need to alarm the country. … During the first week
in December arrived the Eleanor and the Beaver, also
tea-ships, which were moored near the Dartmouth, and subjected
to the same oversight. The 'True Sons of Liberty' posted about
the town the most spirited placards. … The days flew by. At
length came the end of the time of probation. If the cargo of
the Dartmouth had not been 'entered' within that period, the
ship according to the revenue laws, must be confiscated.
Rotch, the Quaker owner, had signified his willingness to send
the ship back to England with the cargo on board, if he could
procure a clearance. The customs officials stood on
technicalities; under the circumstances a clearance could not
be granted. The grim British admiral ordered the Active and
the Kingfisher from his fleet to train their broadsides on the
channels, and sink whatever craft should try to go to sea
without the proper papers. The governor alone had power to
override these obstacles. It was competent for him to grant a
permit which the revenue men and the admiral must respect. If
he refused to do this, then on the next day the legal course
was for the revenue officers to seize the Dartmouth and land
the tea under the guns of the fleet. It was the 16th of
December. A crowd of seven thousand filled the Old South and
the streets adjoining. Nothing like it had ever been known.
Town-meeting had followed town-meeting until the excitement
was at fever heat. The indefatigable Committee of
Correspondence had, as it were, scattered fire throughout the
whole country. … Poor Quaker Rotch … felt himself, probably,
the most persecuted of men, when the monster meeting forced
him in the December weather to make his way out to Milton Hill
to seek the permit from Hutchinson. … Meantime darkness had
fallen upon the short winter day. The crowd still waited in
the gloom of the church, dimly lighted here and there by
candles. Rotch reappeared just after six, and informed the
meeting that the governor refused to grant the permit until
the vessels were properly qualified. As soon as the report had
been made, Samuel Adams arose, for it was he who had been
moderator, and exclaimed: 'This meeting can do nothing more to
save the country.'
{3209}
It was evidently a concerted signal, for instantly … the
famous war-whoop was heard, and the two or three score of
'Mohawks' rushed by the doors, and with the crowd behind them
hurried in the brightening moonlight to Griffin's wharf, where
lay the ships. The tea could not go back to England; it must
not be landed. The cold waters of the harbor were all that
remained for it. Three hundred and forty-two chests were cast
overboard. Nothing else was harmed, neither person nor
property. All was so quiet that those at a distance even could
hear in the calm air the ripping open of the thin chests as
the tea was emptied. The 'Mohawks' found helpers, so that in
all perhaps one hundred and fifty were actively concerned. Not
far off in the harbor lay the ships of the fleet, and the
Castle with the 'Sam Adams Regiments.' But no one interfered."
J. K. Hosmer,
Samuel Adams,
chapter 16.
ALSO IN:
W. V. Wells,
Life of Samuel Adams,
volume 1, pages 372-375, 495-512;
volume 2, pages 1-9, 24-29, 61-63, 80-81, 103-130.
R. Frothingham,
Life of Joseph Warren,
chapter 9.
Force's American Archives,
volume 1.
See, also, BOSTON: A. D. 1773;
and NEW YORK: A. D. 1773-1774.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1774 (March-April).
The Boston Port Bill.
The Massachusetts Act and the Quebec Act.
"The spoken defiance of the other colonies had been quite as
efficient as the combination of threats and force to which
Boston was compelled to resort, but Lord North launched the
first retaliatory and punitive measure against that city. …
The first of Lord North's bills was the Boston Port Act, which
closed the harbor until indemnity for the tea there destroyed
should be paid and the king be satisfied that thereafter the
city would obey the laws. The demand for indemnity was fair
but the indefinite claim of obedience was not only infamous in
itself but, as Burke said, punished the innocent with the
guilty. … North's second bill was a virtual abrogation of the
Massachusetts charter. The council of twenty-eight had been
hitherto elected every year in joint session of the assembly.
The king might now appoint the whole body to any number, from
twelve to thirty-six, and remove them at pleasure. The men so
appointed were designated mandamus councillors. Thereafter
town-meetings could be held only by permission of the governor
and for the sole purpose of electing officers [General Gage
was made governor under this act, and four regiments were
placed in Boston for his support]. Sheriffs were to return all
juries, and were to be named by the governor and hold office
during his pleasure. The third bill was really a device of the
king's, and it is said that the ministry was confused and
shamefaced in presenting it. It ordained that magistrates,
revenue officers, or other officials indicted in Massachusetts
for capital offences were to be tried either in Nova Scotia or
Great Britain. Another measure made legal the billeting of
troops, against which Boston had hitherto striven with
success, and a fifth, known as the Quebec Act, though
depriving that province of the right of habeas corpus,
restored the French customary law ('coutume de Paris'),
established Roman Catholicism as the state religion, and by
extending its boundaries to the Ohio and Mississippi, shut off
the Northern English Colonies from westward extension. This
was intended as an arbitrary settlement of a vexed question.
The Puritans, however, … exclaimed that the next step would be
the establishment among them of English episcopacy."
W. M. Sloane,
The French War and the Revolution,
chapter 14.
ALSO IN:
A. Johnston,
The United States: its History and Constitution,
sections. 57-58.
Parliamentary History,
volume 17.
American Archives,
series 4, volume 1, pages 35-220.
Lord Fitzmaurice,
Life of the Earl of Shelburne,
volume 2, chapter 8.
On the Quebec Act.
See, also, CANADA: A. D. 1763-1774.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1774 (April-October).
Lord Dunmore's War with the Indians.
The Western territorial claims of Virginia.
See OHIO (VALLEY): A. D. 1774.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1774 (May-June).
Effects of the Boston Port Bill.
The call for a Continental Congress.
"The Boston Port Bill was received in America with honors not
accorded even to the Stamp Act. It was cried through the
streets as 'A barbarous, cruel, bloody, and inhuman murder,'
and was burnt by the common hangman on a scaffold forty-five
feet high. The people of Boston gathered together in
town-meeting at Faneuil Hall, and expresses were sent off with
an appeal to all Americans throughout America. The responses
from the neighborhood came like snow-flakes. Marblehead
offered the use of its wharves to the Boston merchants; Salem
averred that it would be lost to all feelings of humanity were
it to raise its fortunes on the ruins of its neighbor.
Newburyport voted to break off trade with Great Britain, and
to lay up its ships. Connecticut, as her wont is, when moved
by any vital occurrence, betook herself to prayer and
humiliation, first, however, ordering an inventory to be taken
of her cannon and military stores. Virginia, likewise,
resolved to invoke the divine interposition, but, before
another resolution which called for a Congress could be
introduced, her House was precipitately dissolved; whereupon
the resolution was brought up and passed at a meeting called
in 'the Apollo,' where it was further declared that an attack
on one colony was an attack upon all. Two days later the
Massachusetts letter itself was received, upon which the
Virginians called a convention. From all parts contributions
in money poured into Boston, and resolutions were everywhere
passed, declaring that no obedience was due the late acts of
Parliament; that the right of imperial taxation did not exist;
that those who had accepted office under pay of the king had
violated their public duty; that the Quebec act establishing
Roman Catholicism in Canada was hostile to the Protestant
religion, and that the inhabitants of the colonies should use
their utmost diligence to acquaint themselves with the art of
war, and for that purpose should turn out under arms at least
once a week. In the fulness of time, a cordon of ships was
drawn around Boston, and six regiments and a train of
artillery were encamped on the Common—the only spot in the
thirteen colonies where the government could enforce an order.
The conflict between constitutional liberty and absolutism had
now reached that dangerous point where physical force became
one of its elements. … The situation was at once recognized
throughout the colonies, and the knowledge that in union there
is strength, manifested itself in one general impulse toward a
Colonial Congress. Committees of Correspondence were organized
in every county, and throngs attended the public meetings.
{3210}
'One great, wise, and noble spirit; one masterly soul
animating one vigorous body,' was the way John Adams described
this impulse. The Canadas alone remained inanimate. … But not
so those to whom constitutional liberty was as the breath of
life. On the 17th of June (1774) the Massachusetts Assembly,
which had been removed by a royal order to Salem, answered
Virginia by resolving on a call for a Continental Congress at
Philadelphia. The governor, hearing of what was going on, sent
the secretary of the colony to dissolve the Assembly, but,
finding the doors shut upon him, he had to content himself
with reading the message to the crowd outside. The House went
on with its work, while, at the same time, a great meeting,
with John Adams in the chair, was being held at Boston in
Faneuil Hall. Twelve colonies agreed to send delegates to a
Continental Congress to be held at Philadelphia in September."
E. G. Scott,
The Development of Constitutional Liberty in the
English Colonies of America,
chapter 11 (with corrections by the author).
ALSO IN:
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision)
volume 4, chapter 1.
See, also, BOSTON: A. D. 1774.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1774(May-July).
Governor Hutchinson's departure for England.
His conversation with King George.
In May, 1774, Governor Hutchinson, of Massachusetts, who had
applied some months before for leave of absence to visit
England, was relieved by General Gage and took his departure.
General Gage was temporarily commissioned to be "Captain
General and Governor-in-Chief" of the Province of
Massachusetts, and "Vice-Admiral of the same," combining the
civil and military powers in himself. It was then supposed
that Hutchinson's absence would be brief; but, to his endless
grief, he never saw the country again. Soon after his arrival
in England he had an interview with the king, which is
reported at length in his Diary. The conversation is one of
great historical interest, exhibiting King George's knowledge
and ideas of American affairs, and representing the opinions
of a high-minded American loyalist. It is reprinted here
exactly as given in Governor Hutchinson's Diary, published by
his great-grandson in 1883:
"July 1st.—Received a card from Lord Dartmouth desiring to see
me at his house before one o'clock. I went soon after 12, and
after near an hour's conversation, his Lordship proposed
introducing me immediately to the King. I was not dressed as
expecting to go to Court, but his Lordship observing that the
King would not be at St. James's again until Wednesday [this
was Friday], I thought it best to go; but waited so long for
his Lordship to dress, that the Levée was over; but his
Lordship going in to the King, I was admitted, contrary, as
Lord Pomfret observed to me, to custom, to kiss His Majesty's
hand in his closet: after which, as near as I can recollect,
the following conversation passed.
K.—How do you do Mr. H. after y voyage?
H.—Much reduced Sir by sea-sickness; and unfit upon that
account, as well as my New England dress, to appear before
your Majesty. Lord D. observed—Mr. H. apologised to me for his
dress, but I thought it very well, as he is just come ashoar;
to which the K. assented.
K.—How did you leave your Government, and how did the people
receive the news of the late measures in Parliament?
H.—When I left Boston we had no news of any Act of Parliament,
except the one for shutting up the port, which was extremely
alarming to the people.
(Lord D. said, Mr. H. came from Boston the day that Act was to
take place, the first of June. I hear the people of Virginia
have refused to comply with the request to shut up their
ports, from the people of Boston, and Mr. H. seems to be of
opinion that no colony will comply with that request.)
K.—Do you believe, Mr. H., that the account from Virginia is
true?
H.—I have no other reason to doubt it, except that the
authority for it seems to be only a newspaper; and it is very
common for articles to be inserted in newspapers without any
foundation. I have no doubt that when the people of Rhode
Island received the like request, they gave this answer—that
if Boston would stop all the vessels they then had in port,
which they were hurrying away before the Act commenced, the
people of R. Island would then consider of the proposal. The
King smiled.
Lord D.—Mr. H., may it please your Majesty, has shewn me a
newspaper with an address from a great number of Merchants,
another from the Episcopal Clergy, another from the Lawyers,
all expressing their sense of his conduct in the most
favourable terms. Lord Dartmouth thereupon took the paper out
of his pocket and shewed it.
K.—I do not see how it could be otherwise. I am sure his
conduct has been universally approved of here by people of all
parties.
H.—I am very happy in your Majesty's favourable opinion of my
administration.
K.—I am intirely satisfied with it. I am well acquainted with
the difficulties you have encountered, and with the abuse &
injury offered you. Nothing could be more cruel than the
treatment you met with in betraying your private letters.
The K., turning to Lord D.—My Lord, I remember nothing in them
to which the least exception could be taken.
Lord D.—That appears, Sir, from the report of the Committee of
Council, and from your Majesty's orders thereon.
H.—The correspondence, Sir, was not of my seeking. It was a
meer matter of friendly amusement, chiefly a narrative of
occurrences, in relating of which I avoided personalities as
much as I could, and endeavoured to treat persons, when they
could not be avoided, with tenderness, as much as if my
letters were intended to be exposed; whereas I had no reason
to suppose they ever would be exposed.
K.—Could you ever find Mr. H. how those letters came to New
England?
H.—Doctor F., may it please your Majesty, has made a publick
declaration that he sent them, and the Speaker has
acknowledged to me that he received them: I do not remember
that he said directly from Doctor F., but it was understood
between us that they came from him. I had heard before that
they came either direct from him, or that he had sent them
through another channel, and that they were to be communicated
to six persons only, and then to be returned without suffering
any copies to be taken, I sent for the Speaker and let him
know what I had heard, which came from one of the six to a
friend, and so to me. The Speaker said they were sent to him,
and that he was at first restrained from shewing them to any
more than six persons.
{3211}
K.—Did he tell you who were the persons?
H.—Yes, sir. There was Mr. Bowdoin, Mr. Pitts, Doctor
Winthrop, Doctor Chauncy, Doctor Cooper, and himself. They are
not all the same which had been mentioned before. The two Mr.
Adamses had been named to me in the room of Mr. Pitts and
Doctor Winthrop.
K.—Mr. B. I have heard of Lord D.—I think he is father-in-law
to Mr. T. [Temple].
K.—Who is Mr. Pitts?
H.—He is one of the Council—married Mr. B.'s sister.
K.—I have heard of Doctor Ch. and Doctor Cooper, but who is
Doctor Winthrop?
H.—He is not a Doctor of Divinity, Sir, but of Law; a
Professor of Mathematicks and Natural Philosophy at the
College, and last year was chose of the Council.
K.—I have beard of one Mr. Adams, but who is the other?
H.—He is a Lawyer, Sir.
K.—Brother to the other?
H. No, Sir, a relation. He has been of the House, but is not
now. He was elected by the two Houses to be of the Council,
but negatived. The speaker further acquainted me that, after
the first letter, he received another, allowing him to shew
the Letters to the Committee of Correspondence; and afterwards
a third, which allowed him to shew them to such persons as he
could confide in, but always enjoined to send them back
without taking copies. I asked him how he could be guilty of
such a breach of trust as to suffer them to be made publick?
He excused it by saying that he was against their being
brought before the House, but was overruled; and when they had
been read there, the people abroad compelled their
publication, or would not be satisfied without it. Much more
passed with which I will not trouble your Majesty; but after
the use had been made of the Letters, which is so well known,
they were all returned.
K., turning to Lord D—This is strange:—where is Doctor F., my
lord?
Lord D.—I believe, Sir, he is in Town. He was going to
America, but I fancy he is not gone.
K.—I heard he was going to Switzerland, or to some part of the
Continent.
Lord D.—I think, Sir, there has been such a report.
K.—In such abuse, Mr. H., as you met with, I suppose there
must have been personal malevolence as well as party rage?
H.—It has been my good fortune, Sir, to escape any charge
against me in my private character. The attacks have been upon
my publick conduct, and for such things as my duty to your
Majesty required me to do, and which you have been pleased to
approve of. I don't know that any of my enemies have
complained of a personal injury.
K.—I see they threatened to pitch and feather you.
H.—Tarr & feather, may it please your Majesty; but I don't
remember that ever I was threatened with it.
Lord D.—Oh! yes, when Malcolm was tarred and feathered
[Almanac for 1770, May, MS. Note], the committee for tarring
and feathering blamed the people for doing it, that being a
punishment reserved for a higher person, and we suppose you
was intended.
H.—I remember something of that sort, which was only to make
diversion, there being no such committee, or none known by
that name.
K.—What guard had you, Mr. H.?
H.—I depended, Sir, on the protection of Heaven. I had no
other guard. I was not conscious of having done anything of
which they could justly complain, or make a pretence for
offering violence to my person. I was not sure, but I hoped
they only meant to intimidate. By discovering that I was
afraid, I should encourage them to go on. By taking measures
for my security I should expose myself to calumny, and being
censured as designing to render them odious for what they
never intended to do. I was, therefore, obliged to appear to
disregard all the menaces in the newspapers, and also private
intimations from my friends who frequently advised me to take
care of myself.
K.—I think you generally live in the country,
Mr. H.; what distance are you from town?
H.—I have lived in the country, Sir, in the summer for 20
years; but, except the winter after my house was pulled down,
I have never lived in the country in winter until the last. My
house is 7 or 8 miles from the Town, a pleasant situation, and
most gentlemen from abroad say it has the finest prospect from
it they ever saw, except where great improvements have been
made by art, to help the natural view. The longest way the
road is generally equal to the turnpike roads here; the other
way rather rough.
K.—Pray, what does Hancock do now? How will the late affair
affect him?
H.—I don't know to what particular affair your Majesty refers.
K.—Oh, a late affair in the city, his bills being refused.
(Turning to Lord D.) Who is that in the city, my Lord?
Lord D. not recollecting—
H.—I have heard, Sir, that Mr. Haley, a merchant in the city,
is Mr. Hancock's principal correspondent.
K.—Ay, that's the name.
H.—I heard, may it please your Majesty, before I came from New
England, that some small sums were returned, but none of
consequence.
K.—Oh, no, I mean within this month, large sums.
Lord D.—I have heard such rumours, but don't know the
certainty.
H.—Mr. Hancock, Sir, had a very large fortune left him by his
uncle, and I believe his political engagements have taken off
his attention from his private affairs. He was sensible not
long ago of the damage it was to him, and told me he was
determined to quit all publick business, but soon altered his
mind.
K.—Then there's Mr. Cushing: I remember his name a long time:
is not he a great man of the party?
H.—He has been many years Speaker, but a Speaker, Sir, is not
always the person of the greatest influence. A Mr. Adams is
rather considered as the opposer of Government, and a sort of
Wilkes in New England.
{3212}
K.—What gave him his importance?
H.—A great pretended zeal for liberty, and a most inflexible
natural temper. He was the first that publickly asserted the
Independency of the colonies upon the Kingdom, or the supreme
Authority of it.
K.—I have heard, Mr. H., that your ministers preach that, for
the sake of promoting liberty or the publick good, any
immorality or less evil may be tolerated?
H.—I don't know, Sir, that such doctrine has ever been
preached from the pulpit; but I have no doubt that it has been
publickly asserted by some of the heads of the party who call
themselves sober men, that the good of the publick is above
all other considerations, and that truth may be dispensed
with, and immorality is excusable, when this great good can be
obtained by such means.
K.—That's a strange doctrine, indeed. Pray, Mr. H., what is
your opinion of the effect from the new regulation of the
Council? Will it be agreeable to the people, and will the new
appointed Councillors take the trust upon them?
H.—I have not, may it please your Majesty, been able to inform
myself who they are. I came to Town late last evening, and
have seen nobody. I think much will depend upon the choice
that has been made.
K.—Enquiry was made and pains taken that the most suitable
persons should be appointed.
H.—The body of the people are Dissenters from the Church of
England; what are called Congregationalists. If the Council
shall have been generally selected from the Episcopalians, it
will make the change more disagreeable.
K.—Why are they not Presbyterians?
H.—There are very few Churches which call themselves
Presbyterians, and form themselves voluntarily into a
Presbytery without any aid from the civil government, which
the Presbyterian Church of Scotland enjoys.
Lord D.—The Dissenters in England at this day are scarce any
of them Presbyterians, but like those in New England,
Congregationalists, or rather Independents.
K.—Pray, what were your Ancestors, Mr. H.?
H.—In general, Sir, Dissenters.
K.—Where do you attend?
H.—With both, Sir. Sometimes at your Majesty's chapel, but
more generally at a Congregational church, which has a very
worthy minister, a friend to Government, who constantly prays
for your Majesty, and all in authority under you.
K.—What is his name?
H.—Doctor Pemberton.
K.—I have heard of Doctor Pemberton that he is a very good
man. Who is minister at the chapel?
H.—The Rector is Dr. Caner, a very worthy man also, who
frequently inculcates upon his hearers due subjection to
Government, and condemns the riotous violent opposition to it;
and besides the prayers in the Liturgy, generally in a short
prayer before sermon, expressly prays for your Majesty, and
for the chief Ruler in the Province.
K.—Why do not the Episcopal ministers in general do the same?
H.—In general, Sir, they use no other prayer before sermon
than a short collect out of the Liturgy.
K.—No—(turning to Lord D.) It is not so here, my Lord?
Lord D.—I believe it is, Sir. In your Majesty's Chapel they
always use such a prayer. It is a form adapted.
K.—I think you must be mistaken.
Lord D.—No, Sir. This prayer used to be printed formerly, but
of late it has not been printed with the service. In general
the ministers use a collect, as Mr. Hutchinson says; sometimes
the collect in the Communion service—'Prevent us, O Lord,'
&c., but I think oftener the collect for the second Sunday in
Advent.
H.—My education, Sir, was with the Dissenters. I conceive
there is no material difference between reading a prayer out
of a book, and saying it 'memoriter,' without book.
Lord D.—I think, Sir, it is not very material. The prayers of
the Dissenters are in substance very much the same with those
in the service of' the church.
K.—I see no material difference, if the prayers be equally
good, but will not that depend upon the minister? But, pray,
Mr. H., why do your ministers generally join with the people
in their opposition to Government?
H.—They are, Sir, dependent upon the people. They are elected
by the people, and when they are dissatisfied with them, they
seldom leave till they get rid of them.
K.—That must be very dangerous. If the people oblige them to
concur with them in their erroneous principles on Government,
they may do it in religion also, and this must have a most
fatal tendency.
H.—There is one check, Sir, upon the people. Unless a minister
be dismissed by a council of Churches, the Province law makes
provision for the recovery of the salary; but we have no
instance where a minister, for any length of time, has brought
suits for the recovery of his salary, after the people refuse
to hear him. They generally weary him, and sooner or later
they get clear of him.
Lord D.—That's a considerable tye, however.
K.—Pray, Mr. H., does population greatly increase in your
Province?
H.—Very rapidly, Sir. I used to think that Doctor F., who has
taken such pains in his calculations, carried it too far when
he supposed the inhabitants of America, from their natural
increase, doubled their number in 25 years; but I rather think
now that he did not; and I believe it will appear from the
last return I made to the Secretary of State, that the
Massachusets has increased in that proportion. And the
increase is supposed, including the importation of foreigners,
to be, upon the whole, greater in most of the Southern
Colonies than in the Massachusets. We import no settlers from
Europe, so as to make any sensible increase.
K.—Why do not foreigners come to your Province as well as to
the Southern Governments?
H.—I take it, Sir, that our long cold winters discourage
them. Before they can bring the land to such a state as to be
able in summer to provide for their support in winter, what
little substance they can bring with them is expended, and
many of them have greatly suffered. The Southern colonies are
more temperate.
K.—What is the reason you raise no wheat in your Province?
{3213}
H.—In most places, especially near the sea, it blasts.
K.—To what cause is that owing?
H.—It has been observed that when the grain is so forward as
to be out of the milk the beginning of July, it seldom blasts;
and that about the 8th or 10th of that month the weather
becomes exceeding hot, and what are called the honey dews of
the night are fixed upon the grains by the scalding sun in a
hot morning, and if the grain be then in the milk it shrivels
up, and the straw becomes rusty and black. This is a pretty
general opinion of the cause.
K.—To what produce is your climate best adapted?
H.—To grazing, Sir; your Majesty has not a finer Colony for
grass in all your dominions: and nothing is more profitable in
America that pasture, because labour is very dear.
K.—Then you import all your bread corn from the other
Colonies?
H.—No, Sir, scarce any, except for the use of the maritime
towns. In the country towns the people raise grain enough for
their own expending, and sometimes for exportation. They live
upon coarse bread made of rye and corn mixed, and by long use
they learn to prefer this to flour or wheat bread.
K.—What corn?
H.—Indian corn, or, as it is called in Authors, Maize.
K.—Ay, I know it. Does that make good bread?
H.—Not by itself, Sir; the bread will soon be dry and husky;
but the Rye keeps it moist, and some of our country people
prefer a bushel of Rye to a bushel of Wheat, if the price
should be the same.
K.—That's very strange.
Lord D.—In many parts of Scotland, Sir, Rye is much esteemed
as making good and wholesome bread.
The King enquired very particularly into many other parts of
the produce of the country, and the natural history of it, to
which I gave the best answers I was capable of.
K.—New York, I think, comes the next to Boston in their
opposition to Government?
H.—Does your Majesty think nearer than Pennsilvania?
K.—Why, I can't say that they do of late.
K.—Rhode Island, Mr. H., is a strange form of Government.
H.—They approach, Sir, the nearest to a Democracy of any of
your Colonies. Once a year all power returns to the people,
and all their Officers are new elected. By this means the
Governor has no judgment of his own, and must comply with
every popular prejudice.
K.—Who is their Governor now?
H.—His name, Sir, is Wanton, a Gentleman who I have reason to
think wishes to see Government maintained as much as any they
could find in the Colonies.
K.—How is it with Connecticut? are they much better?
H.—The constitutions, Sir, are much the same; but Connecticut
are a more cautious people; strive to make as little noise as
may be, and have in general retained a good share of that
virtue which is peculiarly necessary in such a form of
Government.
More was said upon the state of these and some of the other
Colonies. There being something of a pause about this time, I
turned to Lord Dartmouth and asked—Does your Lordship remember
when you had the first account of the Lieutenant Governor's
death, and whether it was before the Letters which I wrote by
Governor Tryon?
Lord D.—Oh, yes, I had a letter from you several weeks before
that, giving an account of it.
H.—There was a vessel sailed for Lisbon the day after he died,
and I gave a letter to the master in charge, to put it on
board the first Vessel for London, but was doubtful of the
conveyance.
K.—We never could find out which way that letter came. Is the
present L. Governor a relation to the late Mr. Oliver?
H.—No, Sir, not of the same family. I have no connection with
him, nor did I ever let him know that I had mentioned him as
one of the persons I thought might be proper for a Lieutenant
Governor.
K.—The Chief Justice, I think, is brother to the late
Lieutenant Governor?
H.—Yes, Sir.
K.—We had thought of him, but as he was not one of those you
had named, the present Gentleman, upon enquiry, appeared under
all circumstances the most proper.
H.—I had some particular inducement not to mention the Chief
Justice. He is related to me, and his appointment would have
increased the envy against both of us.
K.—How is he related to you?
H.—One of his sons, Sir, married one of my daughters. I was,
besides, uncertain whether the salary would be continued; and
if it should be, his salary as Chief Justice exceeded it,
except in case of my absence, and then the expense of living,
and the additional trouble from his post, I considered as more
than an equivalent. I considered further, that the controversy
in which he had been engaged as Chief Justice would render the
administration peculiarly difficult just at that time; and I
supposed it would immediately devolve upon him by my absence,
having then no expectation of being superseded. I never took
more pains to divest myself of all personal views than in
mentioning proper persons for this place. I should have been
more anxious, if I had not thought it not improbable that some
person might be appointed, and sent from England.
K.—What number of Indians had you in your Government?
H.—They are almost extinct. Perhaps there are 50 or 60
families at most upon the Eastern Frontier, where there is a
small fort maintained; tho' I conceive the inhabitants would
not be in the least danger. It looks, Sir, as if in a few
years the Indians would be extinct in all parts of the
Continent.
K.—To what is that owing?
H.—I have thought, Sir, in part to their being dispirited at
their low despicable condition among the Europeans, who have
taken possession of their country, and treat them as an
inferior race of beings; but more to the immoderate use of
spirituous liquors. There are near 100 families, perhaps more,
of Indians who are domiciliated, and live, some in other towns,
but most of them at a place called Mashpee, where they have a
church, and a Missionary to preach to them, and also an Indian
Minister who has been ordained, and preaches sometimes in
their own language.
K.—What, an Episcopal Minister?
H.—No, Sir, of the Congregational persuasion or form of
worship.
{3214}
The King was particular in many other enquiries relative to my
Administration, to the state of the Province, and the other
Colonies. I have minuted what remained the clearest upon my
mind, and as near the order in which they passed as I am able.
He asked also what part of my family I brought with me, and
what I left behind, and at length advised me to keep house a
few days for the recovery of my health. I then withdrew. I was
near two hours in the K. closet. Lord D. feared I was tired so
long standing. I observed that so gracious a reception made me
insensible of it."
Diary and Letters of Thomas Hutchinson.
chapter 5.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1774 (September).
The meeting of the First Continental Congress.
"On the 5th day of September most of the delegates elected to
the congress were in Philadelphia. They were invited by the
speaker of the Pennsylvania assembly to hold their sessions in
the State House, but decided to meet in the hall owned by the
carpenters,—a fine brick building, having commodious rooms for
the use of the committees, and an excellent library in the
chambers. It is still in good preservation. At ten o'clock in
the morning the delegates met at the City Tavern, walked to
Carpenters' Hall, and began the sessions of the Continental
Congress. This assembly, when all the members had taken their
seats, consisted of 55 delegates, chosen by 12 colonies. They
represented a population of 2,200,000, paying a revenue of
£80,000 sterling. Georgia, which did not elect delegates, gave
a promise to concur with her 'sister colonies' in the effort
to maintain their right to the British Constitution. … In
general, the delegates elect were men of uncommon ability, who
had taken a prominent part in the political action of their
several localities. … New England presented, in John Sullivan,
vigor; in Roger Sherman, sterling sense and integrity; in
Thomas Cushing, commercial knowledge; in John Adams, large
capacity for public affairs; in Samuel Adams, a great
character, with influence and power to organize. The Middle
colonies presented, in Philip Livingston, the merchant prince
of enterprise and liberality; in John Jay, rare public virtue,
juridical learning, and classic taste; in William Livingston,
progressive ideas tempered by conservatism; in John Dickinson,
'The Immortal Farmer,' erudition and literary ability; in
Cæsar Rodney and Thomas McKean, working power; in James Duane,
timid Whiggism, halting, but keeping true to the cause; in
Joseph Galloway, downright Toryism, seeking control, and at
length going to the enemy. The Southern colonies presented, in
Thomas Johnson, the grasp of a statesman; in Samuel Chase,
activity and boldness; in the Rutledges, wealth and
accomplishment; in Christopher Gadsden, the genuine American;
and in the Virginia delegation, an illustrious group,—in
Richard Bland, wisdom; in Edmund Pendleton, practical talent;
in Peyton Randolph, experience in legislation; in Richard
Henry Lee, statesmanship in union with high culture; in
Patrick Henry, genius and eloquence; in Washington, justice
and patriotism. 'If,' said Patrick Henry, 'you speak of solid
information and sound judgment, Washington unquestionably is
the greatest man of them all.' … The congress was organized by
the choice of Peyton Randolph of Virginia for President, and
Charles Thomson of Philadelphia, not a member, for Secretary.
… A discussion … arose on the rules to be observed in
determining questions, … which was renewed the next day, when
it was agreed that each colony should have one vote."
R. Frothingham,
The Rise of the Republic of the United States,
chapter 9.
ALSO IN:
J. T. Scharf and. T. Westcott,
History of Philadelphia,
volume 1, chapter 16.
C. J. Stillé,
Life and Times of John Dickinson,
chapter 5.
V. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the! United States,
volume 3, chapter 13.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1774 (September-October).
The action of the Congress.
"The Congress first resolved 'to state the rights of the
colonies in general, the several instances in which those
rights were violated or infringed, and the means most proper
for a restoration of them.' Next, 'to examine and report the
several statutes which affect the trade and manufactures of
the colonies,' not earlier than the last nine years. While
these subjects were under consideration, resolutions of Boston
and its neighbors [Middlesex and Suffolk counties] were laid
before them, stating their wrongs and merely defensive
measures to which they would adhere, 'as long as such conduct
may be vindicated by reason and the principles of
self-preservation, but no longer.' … Congress unanimously
approved and recommended 'a perseverance in this firm and
temperate conduct,' trusting a change in the councils of the
British nation. The merchants were urged not to order goods,
and to suspend those ordered; and it was resolved, that after
the first of next December there should be no importation of
British goods, and no consumption of, or traffic in them. A
loyal petition to the king was ordered, assuring him that by
abolishing the system of laws and regulations of which the
colonies complained, enumerating them, the jealousies they had
caused would be removed, and harmony restored. 'We ask but for
peace, liberty and safety. We wish not a diminution of the
prerogative, nor do we solicit the grant of any new right in
our favor. Your royal authority over us, and our connection
with Great Britain, we shall always carefully and zealously
endeavor to support and maintain.' General Gage was entreated
to discontinue the erection of the fortifications on Boston
Neck, and to prevent all injuries on the part of the troops;
and Massachusetts was asked 'temporarily to submit to a
suspension of the administration of justice where it could not
be procured in a legal and peaceable manner.' Persons
accepting office under the recent act, changing the form of
her government, were denounced, 'as the wicked tools of that
despotism which is preparing to destroy those rights which
God, nature, and compact have given to America.' A memorial
was next ordered to the inhabitants of the British colonies
there represented, exposing their common wrongs and urging a
united 'commercial opposition,' warning them to extend their
views 'to mournful events,' to be 'in all respects prepared
for every contingency, and to implore the favor of Almighty
God.'
{3215}
An appeal was made to the enlightened sympathies of the
British people. … Finally, an address was made to the
inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, inviting their
co-operation. In the meantime, the form of a non-exportation,
non-consumption association was adopted, and signed by each of
the delegates. … A declaration of the rights and injuries of
the colonies was made, in which the most difficult question
was disposed of. The right to participate in the legislative
council of their common country, was declared to be the
foundation of English liberty and of all free government. … Of
all these proceedings the language was that of peace, except
where other language was demanded. For they approved the
opposition of the inhabitants of Massachusetts Bay to the
execution of the late acts of Parliament, and declared, 'If
these acts shall be attempted to be carried into execution by
force, in such case all America ought to support them in their
opposition,' and 'that seizing or attempting to seize any
person in America, in order to transport such person beyond
the sea for trial of offences committed within the body of a
county in America, being against law, will justify, and ought
to meet with, resistance and reprisal.' These were the
essential resolutions. They bound the colonies to a common
resistance to acts of force against all, or any one of them.
They also declared their opinion of the necessity that another
Congress should be held in the ensuing month of May, unless
the redress of grievances which they had desired was obtained
before that time, and that all the colonies in North America
choose deputies, as soon as possible, to attend such Congress.
On the twenty-sixth of October, after a secret session of

fifty-one days, this body adjourned. The recommendations of
this Congress were received with marked respect among the
patriots of the colonies."
J. C. Hamilton,
History of the United States as traced
in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton,
chapter 3 (volume 1).
"Trained in all the theories of the mercantile system, America
had been taught to believe (1) that two countries could
continue to trade, though one of necessity did so at a loss;
(2) that in the trade between England and the colonies, the
former both through natural advantages and through law was the
party to which the profit accrued; (3) that England was 'a
shop-keeping nation,' whose very existence depended on her
trade and manufactures. A suspension of trade between England
and America therefore would mean misery, if not ruin, to the
mother country, while the colonies would 'both save and gain.'
With measures of non-importation, non-exportation and
non-consumption, accordingly, did this otherwise powerless
body hope to coerce the English people and government. Though
founded on an economic fallacy, this method of action was
certain to have a great effect in England. Twice already had
it been employed on a limited scale—against the Stamp Act and
against the revenue acts,—and each time with sufficient
success to warrant the belief that its wider application would
result in victory. Now the agents of the colonies in London
were writing home: 'If you have virtue enough to resolve to
stop, and to execute the resolution of stopping, your exports
and imports for one year, this country must do you justice.' …
In both England and America the temporary destruction of
British trade was viewed not merely as an effective weapon,
but as the only peaceful one which the colonies possessed. A
failure to unite in a non-importation agreement against
England would, according to a prominent English politician,
leave nothing for the colonies 'but to decide between ruin and
submission.' The question for the Congress was not, therefore,
a choice of remedies, but merely whether, and to how great an
extent, the dele·gates could be brought to agree to the only
one within their reach. For even while accepting the system as
effective against Great Britain, the delegates and their
constituents had so far progressed as to realize that it bore
with uneven force on the different colonies. The southern
colonies were really no more diversified in their industries
than the West India islands. South Carolina grew rice and
indigo; North Carolina depended largely on tar, pitch and
turpentine; Virginia raised tobacco. Unless these products
could be exported to Europe, those colonies might suffer for
the necessaries of life. … The first consideration of the
subject in the Congress revealed serious difficulties. The
Virginia delegation, 'to avoid the heavy injury that would
arise,' were prevented by their instructions from agreeing to
an immediate cessation of trade relations. Imports would cease
on November 1, 1774, but exports must continue till August 10,
1775. It was in vain they were told 'that a non-exportation at
a future day cannot avail,' and that at the Virginia date
non-exportation would not operate before the fall of 1776. The
Virginians had determined to cure and sell their tobacco crop
of 1774 before 'consideration of interest and of equality of
sacrifice should be laid aside.' So vital, however, did most
of the delegates consider the immediate enforcement, that it
was proposed to act without Virginia; for Boston and New
England, it was said, would need active support before that
date. This proposition was defeated by the refusal of the
delegates of North Carolina and Maryland to join unless
Virginia should also make the sacrifice. With sorry grace the
Congress had to accept the dictation of Virginia. But the
trouble did not end here. Virginia's selfish interest having
been triumphant, the South Carolina delegation sought for an
equal advantage, and demanded that the two great products of
that colony should be especially reserved from the
non-exportation clause. … Rather than yield, the Congress
preferred a cessation of business for several days, in order
'to give Our [South Carolina] deputies time to recollect
themselves.' But when the Association was ready for signing,
the South Carolina delegates, with but one exception, seceded
from the Congress, and their assent was only secured
eventually through a compromise, by virtue of which rice alone
was excluded from the agreement, while indigo was brought
under its terms. Such were the secret deliberations of the
Congress, in endeavoring to unite the colonies in the use of
their only weapon. The first public results appeared in the
form of a unanimous resolution, passed and published on
September 22, requesting 'the merchants and others in the
several colonies not to send to Great Britain any orders for
goods,' and to delay or suspend orders already sent. Five days
later it was unanimously resolved that after December 1, 1774,
'there should be no importation into British America from
Great Britain or Ireland, or from any other place,' of any
goods, wares or merchandise exported from Great Britain or
Ireland.
{3216}
Three days later, with no assertion of unanimity, a resolution
was announced to the effect 'that from and after the 10th day
of September, 1775, the exportation of all merchandise and
every commodity whatsoever to Great Britain, Ireland and the
West Indies ought to cease, unless the grievances of America
are redressed before that time,' and a committee was appointed
to draft a plan for carrying into effect these resolves. On
October 12 this committee brought in a report, which, after
consideration and amendment, was on the 18th of October agreed
to and ordered signed. On October 20 it was signed and ordered
to be printed. Possessed of no real power, the Congress relied
on the people to enforce this agreement. It was recommended
that in every county, city and town a committee be chosen
'whose business it shall be attentively to observe the conduct
of all persons touching this Association.' With hardly an
exception, this recommendation was adopted. … As America had
refused to trade with Great Britain and her colonies, the
government replied by acts prohibiting any such trade. The
policy of 'exhausting its opponent by injuring itself' was at
last to have a fair trial, but through British, not American
action. The colonies were by law interdicted from all
commerce, trade and fishing. But before the legislation went
into effect blood had been shed at Lexington. The contest
could no longer be fought with acts of Parliament and resolves
of Congress; 'blows must decide.' The Association was
distinctively a peace weapon. Had the Congress really expected
war, no action could have been more foolish. A garrison soon
to be beleaguered virtually shut its ports to supplies. No
better proof is needed of how little the delegates wished or
worked for separation."
P. L. Ford,
The Association of the First Congress
(Political Science Quarterly, December, 1891.)
'That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free
government, is a right in the people to participate in their
legislative council; and us the English colonists are not
represented, and from their local and other circumstances
cannot be properly represented in the British Parliament, they
are entitled to a free and exclusive power of legislation in
their several provincial legislatures, where their rights of
representation can alone be preserved, in all cases of
taxation and internal polity, subject only to the negative of
their sovereign, in such manner as has been heretofore used
and accustomed. But from the necessity of the case, and a
regard to the mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully
consent to the operation of such acts of the British
Parliament as are bona fide restrained to the regulation of
our external commerce, for the purpose of securing the
commercial advantages of the whole empire to the mother
country; and the commercial benefits of its respective
members; excluding every idea of taxation, internal or
external, for raising a revenue on the subjects in America,
without their consent.' This was not precisely what John Adams
wanted, but it was much. When this declaration went forth, the
cause of Massachusetts, in whatever it might eventuate, was
the cause of the colonies. It was nationalized. This was John
Adams's greatest feat of statesmanship. On it the Success of
the impending war, and the Declaration of Independence
rested."
M. Chamberlain,
John Adams, the Statesman of the
American Revolution,
pages 78-80.
"How far the authority of this first congress extended,
according to the instructions of the delegates, it is
impossible to determine with certainty at this distance of
time. But it is probable that the original intention was that
it should consult as to the ways and means best calculated to
remove the grievances and to guaranty the rights and liberties
of the colonies, and should propose to the latter a series of
resolutions, furthering these objects. But the force of
circumstances at the time compelled it to act and order
immediately, and the people, by a consistent following of its
orders, approved this transcending of their written
instructions. The congress was therefore not only a
revolutionary body from its origin, but its acts assumed a
thoroughly revolutionary character. The people, also, by
recognizing its authority, placed themselves on a
revolutionary footing, and did so not as belonging to the
several colonies, but as a moral person; for to the extent
that congress assumed power to itself and made bold to adopt
measures national in their nature, to that extent the
colonists declared themselves henceforth to constitute one
people, inasmuch as the measures taken by congress could be
translated from words into deeds only with the consent of the
people. This state of affairs essentially continued up to
March 1, 1781.
{3217}
Until that time, that is, until the adoption of the articles
of confederation by all the states, congress continued a
revolutionary body, which was recognized by all the colonies
as 'de jure' and 'de facto' the national government, and which
as such came in contact with foreign powers and entered into
engagements, the binding force of which on the whole people
has never been called in question. The individual colonies, on
the other hand, considered themselves, up to the time of the
Declaration of Independence, as legally dependent upon England
and did not take a single step which could have placed them
before the mother country or the world in the light of 'de
facto' sovereign states. They remained colonies until the
'representatives of the United States' 'in the name of the
good people of these colonies' solemnly declared 'these united
colonies' to be 'free and independent states.' The
transformation of the colonies into 'states' was, therefore,
not the result of the independent action of the individual
colonies. It was accomplished through the 'representatives of
the United States'; that is, through the revolutionary
congress, in the name of the whole people. Each individual
colony became a state only in so far as it belonged to the
United States and in so far as its population constituted a
part of the people."
H. von Holst,
Constitutional and Political History of the
United States,
volume 1, chapter 1.
ALSO IN:
W. V. Wells,
Life of Samuel Adams,
volume 2, pages 213-247.
J. Adams,
Diary (Works, volume 2)
pages 358-401.
Journal of the Congress which met at Philadelphia
September 5, 1774
(London: J. Almon).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1774-1775.
Provincial Congress of Massachusetts and
Committee of Safety.
Military preparations.
"Governor Gage issued writs, dated September 1, convening the
General Court at Salem on the 5th of October, but dissolved it
by a proclamation dated September 28, 1774. The members
elected to it, pursuant to the course agreed upon, resolved
themselves into a Provincial Congress. This body, on the 26th
of October, adopted a plan for organizing the militia,
maintaining it, and calling it out when circumstances should
render it necessary. It provided that one quarter of the
number enrolled should be held in readiness to muster at the
shortest notice, who were called by the popular name of
minute-men. An executive authority—the Committee of
Safety—was created, clothed with large discretionary powers;
and another called the Committee of Supplies. On the 27th
Jedediah Preble, (who did not accept,) Artemas Ward, and Seth
Pomeroy, were chosen general officers; and on the 28th, Henry
Gardner was chosen treasurer of the colony, under the title of
Receiver-General. Among the energetic acts of this memorable
Congress, was one authorizing the collection of military
stores. It dissolved December 10. The committee of safety, as
early as November, authorized the purchase of materials for an
army, and ordered them to be deposited at Concord and
Worcester. These proceedings were denounced by General Gage,
in a proclamation dated November 10, as treasonable, and a
compliance with them was forbidden. In a short time the king's
speech and the action of Parliament were received, which
manifested a firm determination to produce submission to the
late acts, and to maintain 'the supreme authority' of Great
Britain over the colonies. General Gage regarded this
intelligence as having 'cast a damp upon the faction,' and as
having produced a happy effect upon the royalist cause.
However, a second Provincial Congress (February 1 to 16, 1775)
renewed the measures of its predecessor; and gave definiteness
to the duties of the committee of safety, by 'empowering and
directing' them (on the 9th of February) to assemble the
militia whenever it was required to resist the execution of
the two acts, for altering the government and the
administration of justice. At the same time it appointed two
additional generals, John Thomas, and William Heath, and made
it the duty of the five general officers to take charge of the
militia when called out by the committee of safety, and to
'effectually oppose and resist such attempt or attempts as
shall be made for carrying into execution by force' the two
acts. … The conviction was fast becoming general that force
only could decide the contest. Stimulated and sustained by
such a public opinion, the committees of safety and supplies
were diligent, through the gloomy months of winter, in
collecting and storing at Concord and Worcester materials for
the maintenance of an army."
R. Frothingham, Jr.,
History of the Siege of Boston,
chapter 1.
The following citizens composed the Committee of Public
Safety, viz., "John Hancock, Joseph Warren, Benjamin Church,
Richard Devens, Benjamin White, Joseph Palmer, Abraham Watson,
Azor Orne, John Pigeon, William Heath, and Thomas Gardner. The
following 'Committee of Supplies' was announced, viz.,
Elbridge Gerry, David Cheever, Benjamin Lincoln, Moses Gill,
and Benjamin Hall. … By the first day of January, 1775, the
garrison of Boston had been increased to thirty-five hundred
men, and mounted three hundred and seventy men as a daily
guard-detail, besides a field officers' guard of one hundred
and fifty men on Boston Neck. Three brigades were organized
and were officered, respectively by Generals Lord Percy,
Pigott and Jones. In November of 1774, General Gage had
advised the British government, that he, 'was confident, that
to begin with an army twenty thousand strong, would in the end
save Great Britain blood and treasure.' Meanwhile, the militia
drilled openly, rapidly completed company organizations, and
made many sacrifices to procure arms, powder and other
materials of war. The Home government, in view of the serious
aspect of affairs, ordered Generals Howe, Clinton, and
Burgoyne to join General Gage, and announced that 'ample
reinforcements would be sent out, and the most speedy and
effectual measures would be taken to put down the rebellion,'
then pronounced to already exist. On the eighth of April, the
Provincial Congress resolved to take effectual measures to
raise an army, and requested the cooperation of Rhode Island,
New Hampshire and Connecticut. On the thirteenth, it voted to
raise six companies of artillery, to pay them and keep them at
drill. On the fourteenth it advised citizens to leave Boston
and to remove to the country. On the fifteenth, it solemnly
appointed a day for 'Public Fasting and Prayer,' and adjourned
to the tenth day of May. The Committee of Public Safety at
once undertook the task of securing powder, cannon and small
arms. A practical embargo was laid upon all trade with Boston.
The garrison could obtain supplies only with great difficulty,
and, as stated by Gordon, 'nothing was wanting but a spark, to
set the whole continent in a flame.'"
H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution.
chapter 2.
ALSO IN:
J. Fiske,
The American Revolution,
chapter 3 (volume 1).
{3218}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (January-March).
Vain efforts toward pacific statesmanship in the British
Parliament, by Chatham, Burke, and others.
A newly elected British Parliament "met on November 30, 1774;
but no serious measure relating to America was taken till
January 1775, when the House reassembled after the Christmas
vacation. The Ministers had a large majority, and even apart
from party interest the genuine feeling of both Houses ran
strongly against the Americans. Yet at no previous period were
they more powerfully defended. I have already noticed that
Chatham, having returned to active politics after his long
illness in 1774, had completely identified himself with the
American cause, and had advocated with all his eloquence
measures of conciliation. He … moved an address to the King
praying that he would as soon as possible, 'in order to open
the way towards a happy settlement of the dangerous troubles
in America,' withdraw the British troops stationed in Boston.
In the course of his speech he represented the question of
American taxation as the root-cause of the whole division, and
maintained that the only real basis of conciliation was to be
found in a distinct recognition of the principle that
'taxation is theirs, and commercial regulation ours;' that
England has a supreme right of regulating the commerce and
navigation of America, and that the Americans have an
inalienable right to their own property. He fully justified
their resistance, predicted that all attempts to coerce them
would fail, and eulogised the Congress at Philadelphia as
worthy of the greatest periods of antiquity. Only eighteen
peers voted for the address, while sixty-eight opposed it. On
February 1 he reappeared with an elaborate Bill for settling
the troubles in America. It asserted in strong terms the right
of Parliament to bind the colonies in all matters of imperial
concern, and especially in all matters of commerce and
navigation. It pronounced the new colonial doctrine that the
Crown had no right to send British soldiers to the colonies
without the assent of the Provincial Assemblies, dangerous and
unconstitutional in the highest degree, but at the same time
it recognised the sole right of the colonists to tax
themselves, guaranteed the inviolability of their charters,
and made the tenure of their judges the same as in England. It
proposed to make the Congress which had met at Philadelphia an
official and permanent body, and asked it to make a free grant
for imperial purposes. England, in return, was to reduce the
Admiralty Courts to their ancient limits, and to suspend for
the present the different Acts complained of by the colonists.
The Bill was not even admitted to a second reading. Several
other propositions tending towards conciliation were made in
this session. On March 22, 1775, Burke, in one of his greatest
speeches, moved a series of resolutions recommending a repeal
of the recent Acts complained of in America, reforming the
Admiralty Court and the position of the judges, and leaving
American taxation to the American Assemblies, without touching
upon any question of abstract right. A few days later, Hartley
moved a resolution calling upon the Government to make
requisitions to the colonial Assemblies to provide of their
own authority for their own defence; and Lord Camden in the
House of Lords and Sir G. Savile in the House of Commons
endeavoured to obtain a repeal of the Quebec Act. All these
attempts, however, were defeated by enormous majorities. The
petition of Congress to the King was referred to Parliament,
which refused to receive it, and Franklin, after vain efforts
to effect a reconciliation, returned from England to America."
W. E. H. Lecky,
History of England in the 18th Century,
chapter 12. (volume 3).
The following are the more important passages of the speech of
Burke, on moving the resolutions which he introduced in the
House of Commons, March 22, 1775:
"The proposition is peace. Not peace through the medium of
war; not peace to be hunted through the labyrinth of intricate
and endless negotiations; not peace to arise out of universal
discord, fomented from principle, in all parts of the empire;
not peace to depend on the juridical determination of
perplexing questions, or the precise marking the shadowy
boundaries of a complex government. It is simple peace, sought
in its natural course and in its ordinary haunts. It is peace
sought in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely
pacific. I propose, by removing the ground of the difference,
and by restoring the former unsuspecting confidence of the
colonies in the mother country, to give permanent satisfaction
to your people,—and (far from a scheme of ruling by discord)
to reconcile them to each other in the same act and by the
bond of the very same interest which reconciles them to
British government. My idea is nothing more. Refined policy
ever has been the parent of confusion,—and ever will be so, as
long as the world endures. Plain good intention, which is as
easily discovered at the first view as fraud is surely
detected at last, is, let me say, of no mean force in the
government of mankind. Genuine simplicity of heart is an
healing and cementing principle. … The capital leading
questions on which you must this day decide are these two:
First, whether you ought to concede; and secondly, what your
concession ought to be. On the first of these questions we
have gained … some ground. But I am sensible that a good deal
more is still to be done. Indeed, Sir, to enable us to
determine both on the one and the other of these great
questions with a firm and precise judgment, I think it may be
necessary to consider distinctly the true nature and the
peculiar circumstances of the object which we have before us:
because, after all our struggle, whether we will or not, we
must govern America according to that nature and to those
circumstances, and not according to our own imaginations, not
according to abstract ideas of right, by no means according to
mere general theories of government, the resort to which
appears to me, in our present situation, no better than arrant
trifling. … The first thing that we have to consider with
regard to the nature of the object is the number of people in
the colonies. I have taken for some years a good deal of pains
on that point. I can by no calculation justify myself in
placing the number below two millions of inhabitants of our
own European blood and color,—besides at least 500,000 others,
who form no inconsiderable part of the strength and opulence
of the whole. This, Sir, is, I believe, about the true number.
There is no occasion to exaggerate, where plain truth is of so
much weight and importance. But whether I put the present
numbers too high or too low is a matter of little moment.
{3219}
Such is the strength with which population shoots in that part
of the world, that, state the numbers as high as we will,
whilst the dispute continues, the exaggeration ends. Whilst we
are discussing any given magnitude, they are grown to it.
Whilst we spend our time in deliberating on the mode of
governing two millions, we shall find we have millions more to
manage. Your children do not grow faster from infancy to
manhood than they spread from families to communities, and
from villages to nations. … But the population of this
country, the great and growing population, though a very
important consideration, will lose much of its weight, if not
combined with other circumstances. The commerce of your
colonies is out of all proportion beyond the numbers of the
people. … The trade with America alone is now within less than
£500,000 of being equal to what this great commercial nation,
Eng]and, carried on at the beginning of this century with the
whole world! … But, it will be said, is not this American
trade an unnatural protuberance, that has drawn the juices
from the rest of the body? The reverse. It is the very food
that has nourished every other part into its present
magnitude. Our general trade has been greatly augmented, and
augmented more or less in almost every part to which it ever
extended, but with this material difference: that of the six
millions which in the beginning of the century constituted the
whole mass of our export commerce the colony trade was but one
twelfth part; it is now (as a part of sixteen millions)
considerably more than a third of the whole. … I choose, Sir,
to enter into these minute and particular details; because
generalities, which in all other cases are apt to heighten and
raise the subject, have here a tendency to sink it. When we
speak of the commerce of our colonies, fiction lags after
truth, invention is unfruitful, and imagination cold and
barren. … I pass … to the colonies in another point of
view,—their agriculture. This they have prosecuted with such a
spirit, that, besides feeding plentifully their own growing
multitude, their annual export of grain, comprehending rice,
has some years ago exceeded a million in value. Of their last
harvest, I am persuaded, they will export much more. At the
beginning of the century some of these colonies imported corn
from the mother country. For some time past the Old World has
been fed from the New. The scarcity which you have felt would
have been a desolating famine, if this child of your old age,
with a true filial piety, with a Roman charity, had not put
the full breast of its youthful exuberance to the mouth of its
exhausted parent. As to the wealth which the colonies have
drawn from the sea by their fisheries, you had all that matter
fully opened at your bar. You surely thought those
acquisitions of value, for they seemed even to excite your
envy; and yet the spirit by which that enterprising employment
has been exercised ought rather, in my opinion, to have raised
your esteem and admiration. And pray, Sir, what in the world
is equal to it? Pass by the other parts, and look at the
manner in which the people of New England have of late carried
on the whale-fishery. Whilst we follow them among the tumbling
mountains of ice, and behold them penetrating into the deepest
frozen recesses of Hudson's Bay and Davis's Straits, whilst we
are looking for them beneath the arctic circle, we hear that
they have pierced into the opposite region of polar cold, that
they are at the antipodes, and engaged under the frozen
serpent of the South. Falkland Island, which seemed too remote
and romantic an object for the grasp of national ambition, is
but a stage and resting-place in the progress of their
victorious industry. Nor is the equinoctial heat more
discouraging to them than the accumulated winter of both the
poles. … I am sensible, Sir, that all which I have asserted in
my detail is admitted in the gross, but that quite a different
conclusion is drawn from it. America, gentlemen say, is a
noble object,—it is an object well worth fighting for.
Certainly it is, if fighting a people be the best way of
gaining them. Gentlemen in this respect will be led to their
choice of means by their complexions and their habits. Those
who understand the military art will of course have some
predilection for it. Those who wield the thunder of the state
may have more confidence in the efficacy of arms. But I
confess, possibly for want of this knowledge, my opinion is
much more in favor of prudent management than of
force,—considering force not as an odious, but a feeble
instrument, for preserving a people so numerous, so active, so
growing, so spirited as this, in a profitable and subordinate
connection with us. First, Sir, permit me to observe, that the
use of force alone is but temporary. It may subdue for a
moment; but it does not remove the necessity of subduing
again: and a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be
conquered. My next objection is its uncertainty. Terror is not
always the effect of force, and an armament is not a victory.
If you do not succeed, you are without resource: for,
conciliation failing, force remains; but, force failing, no
further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and authority
are sometimes bought by kindness; but they can never be begged
as alms by an impoverished and defeated violence. A further
objection to force is, that you impair the object by your very
endeavors to preserve it. The thing you fought for is not the
thing which you recover, but depreciated, sunk, wasted, and
consumed in the contest. Nothing less will content me than
whole America. I do not choose to consume its strength along
with our own; because in all parts it is the British strength
that I consume. I do not choose to be caught by a foreign
enemy at the end of this exhausting conflict, and still less
in the midst of it. I may escape, but I can make no insurance
against such an event. Let me add, that I do not choose wholly
to break the American spirit; because it is the spirit that
has made the country. Lastly, we have no sort of experience in
favor of force as an instrument in the rule of our colonies.
Their growth and their utility has been owing to methods
altogether different. Our ancient indulgence has been said to
be pursued to a fault. It may be so; but we know, if feeling
is evidence, that our fault was more tolerable than our
attempt to mend it, and our sin far more salutary than our
penitence. These, Sir, are my reasons for not entertaining
that high opinion of untried force by which many gentlemen,
for whose sentiments in other particulars I have great
respect, seem to be so greatly captivated. But there is still
behind a third consideration concerning this object, which
serves to determine my opinion on the sort of policy which
ought to be pursued in the management of America, even more
than its population and its commerce: I mean its temper and
character.
{3220}
In this character of the Americans a love of freedom is the
predominating feature which marks and distinguishes the whole.
… This fierce spirit of liberty is stronger in the English
colonies, prob·ably, than in any other people of the earth,
and this from a great variety of powerful causes; which, to
understand the true temper of their minds, and the direction
which this spirit takes, it will not be amiss to lay open
somewhat more largely. First, the people of the colonies are
descendants of Englishmen. England, Sir, is a nation which
still, I hope, respects, and formerly adored, her freedom. The
colonists emigrated from you when this part of your character
was most predominant; and they took this bias and direction
the moment they parted from your hands. They are therefore not
only devoted to liberty, but to liberty according to English
ideas and on English principles. … Your mode of governing
them, whether through lenity or indolence, through wisdom or
mistake, confirmed them in the imagination, that they, as well
as you, had an interest in these common principles. They were
further confirmed in this pleasing error by the form of their
provincial legislative assemblies. Their governments are
popular in an high degree: some are merely popular; in all,
the popular representative is the most weighty; and this share
of the people in their ordinary government never fails to
inspire them with lofty sentiments, and with a strong aversion
from whatever tends to deprive them of their chief importance.
If anything were wanting to this necessary operation of the
form of government, religion would have given it a complete
effect. Religion, always a principle of energy, in this new
people is no way worn out or impaired; and their mode of
professing it is also one main cause of this free spirit. The
people are Protestants, and of that kind which is the most
adverse to all implicit submission of mind and opinion. … All
Protestantism, even the most cold and passive, is a sort of
dissent. But the religion most prevalent in our northern
colonies is a refinement on the principle of resistance; it is
the dissidence of dissent, and the protestantism of the
Protestant religion. … Permit me, Sir, to add another
circumstance in our colonies, which contributes no mean part
towards the growth and effect of this untractable spirit: I
mean their education. In no country, perhaps, in the world is
the law so general a study. The profession itself is numerous
and powerful, and in most provinces it takes the lead. The
greater number of the deputies sent to the Congress were
lawyers. But all who read, and most do read, endeavour to
obtain some smattering in that science. I have been told by an
eminent bookseller, that in no branch of his business, after
tracts of popular devotion, were so many books as those on the
law exported to the plantations. The colonists have now fallen
into the way of printing them for their own use. I hear that
they have sold nearly as many of Blackstone's 'Commentaries'
in America as in England. General Gage marks out this
disposition very particularly in a letter on your table. He
states, that all the people in his government are lawyers, or
smatterers in law,—and that in Boston they have been enabled,
by successful chicane, wholly to evade many parts of one of
your capital penal constitutions. … The last cause of this
disobedient spirit in the colonies is hardly less powerful
than the rest, as it is not merely moral, but laid deep in the
natural constitution of things. Three thousand miles of ocean
lie between you and them. No contrivance can prevent the
effect of this distance in weakening government. Seas roll,
and months pass, between the order and the execution; and the
want of a speedy explanation of a single point is enough to
defeat an whole system. … Then, Sir, from these six capital
sources, of descent, of form of government, of religion in the
northern provinces, of manners in the southern, of education,
of the remoteness of situation from the first mover of
government,—from all these causes a fierce spirit of liberty
has grown up. It has grown with the growth of the people in
your colonies, and increased with the increase of their
wealth: a spirit, that, unhappily meeting with an exercise of
power in England, which, however lawful, is not reconcilable
to any ideas of liberty, much less with theirs, has kindled
this flame that is ready to consume us. … The question is not,
whether their spirit deserves praise or blame,—what, in the
name of God, shall we do with it? You have before you the
object, such as it is,—with all its glories, with all its
imperfections on its head. You see the magnitude, the
importance, the temper, the habits, the disorders. By all
these considerations we are strongly urged to determine
something concerning it. We are called upon to fix some rule
and line for our future conduct, which may give a little
stability to our politics, and prevent the return of such
unhappy deliberations as the present. … It should seem, to my
way of conceiving such matters, that there is a very wide
difference, in reason and policy, between the mode of
proceeding on the irregular conduct of scattered individuals,
or even of bands of men, who disturb order within the state,
and the civil dissensions which may, from time to time, on
great questions, agitate the several communities which compose
a great empire. It looks to me to be narrow and pedantic to
apply the ordinary ideas of criminal justice to this great
public con·test. I do not know the method of drawing up an
indictment against an whole people. … I am not ripe to pass
sentence on the gravest public bodies, intrusted with
magistracies of great authority and dignity, and charged with
the safety of their fellow-citizens, upon the very same title
that I am. I really think that for wise men this is not
judicious, for sober men not decent, for minds tinctured with
humanity not mild and merciful."
In the closing part of his speech, Mr. Burke introduced
successively and commented upon the following propositions, or
resolutions, which formed in their entirety his plan of
conciliation. At the end of his speaking they were rejected by
a vote of 270 against 78:
"That the colonies and plantations of Great Britain in North
America, consisting of 14 separate governments, and containing
two mil·lions and upwards of free inhabitants, have not had
the liberty and privilege of electing and sending any knights
and burgesses, or others, to represent them in the high court
of Parliament.
{3221}
That the said colonies and plantations have been made liable
to, and bounden by, several subsidies, payments, rates, and
taxes, given and granted by Parliament, though the said
colonies and plantations have not their knights and burgesses
in the said high court of Parliament, of their own election,
to represent the condition of their country; by lack whereof
they have been oftentimes touched and grieved by subsidies,
given, granted, and assented to, in the said court, in a
manner prejudicial to the common wealth, quietness, rest, and
peace of the subjects inhabiting within the same.
That, from the distance of the said colonies, and from other
circumstances, no method hath hitherto been devised for
procuring a representation in Parliament for the said
colonies.
That each of the said colonies hath within itself a body,
chosen, in part or in the whole, by the freemen, freeholders,
or other free inhabitants thereof, commonly called the General
Assembly, or General Court, with powers legally to raise,
levy, and assess, according to the several usages of such
colonies, duties and taxes towards defraying all sorts of
public services.
That the said general assemblies, general courts, or other
bodies legally qualified as aforesaid, have at sundry times
freely granted several large subsidies and public aids for his
Majesty's service, according to their abilities, when required
thereto by letter from one of his Majesty's principal
Secretaries of State; and that their right to grant the same,
and their cheerfulness and sufficiency in the said grants,
have been at sundry times acknowledged by Parliament. That it
hath been found by experience, that the manner of granting the
said supplies and aids by the said general assemblies hath
been more agreeable to the inhabitants of said colonies, and
more beneficial and conducive to the public service, than the
mode of giving and granting aids and subsidies in Parliament,
to be raised and paid in the said colonies.
That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 7th year
of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for
granting certain duties in the British colonies and
plantations in America; for allowing a drawback of the duties
of customs, upon the exportation from this kingdom, of coffee
and cocoa-nuts, of the produce of the said colonies or
plantations; for discontinuing the drawbacks payable on China
earthen ware exported to America; and for more effectually
preventing the clandestine running of goods in the said
colonies and plantations.'
That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year
of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act to
discontinue, in such manner and for such time as are therein
mentioned, the landing and discharging, lading or shipping, of
goods, wares, and merchandise, at the town and within the
harbor of Boston, in the province of Massachusetts Bay, in
North America.'
That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year
of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for
the impartial administration of justice, in the cases of
persons questioned for any acts done by them, in the execution
of the law, or for the suppression of riots and tumults, in
the province of the Massachusetts Bay, in New England.'
That it may be proper to repeal an act, made in the 14th year
of the reign of his present Majesty, intituled, 'An act for
the better regulating the government of the province of the
Massachusetts Bay, in New England.'
That it may be proper to explain and amend an act, made in the
35th year of the reign of King Henry VIII., intituled, 'An act
for the trial of treasons committed out of the king's
dominions.'
That, from the time when the general assembly, or general
court, of any colony or plantation in North America, shall
have appointed, by act of assembly duly confirmed, a settled
salary to the offices of the chief justice and other judges of
the superior courts, it may be proper that the said chief
justice and other judges of the superior courts of such colony
shall hold his and their office and offices during their good
behaviour, and shall not be removed therefrom, but when the
said removal shall be adjudged by his Majesty in council, upon
a hearing on complaint from the general assembly, or on a
complaint from the governor, or the council, or the house of
representatives, severally, of the colony in which the said
chief justice and other judges have exercised the said
offices.
That it may be proper to regulate the courts of admiralty or
vice-admiralty, authorized by the 15th chapter of the 4th
George III., in such a manner as to make the same more
commodious to those who sue or are sued in the said courts;
and to provide for the more decent maintenance of the judges
of the same."
Edmund Burke,
Works,
volume 2.
ALSO IN:
T. MacKnight,
Life and Times of Edmund Burke,
chapter 21 (volume 2).
J. Adolphus,
History of England, Reign of George III.,
chapter 25 (volume 2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (January-April).
Aims at independence disclaimed.
"The denial that independence was the final object, was
constant and general. To obtain concessions and to preserve
the connection with England was affirmed everywhere; and John
Adams, after the peace, went farther than this, for he
said:—'There was not a moment during the Revolution, when I
would not have given everything I possessed for a restoration
to the state of things before the contest began, provided we
could have had a sufficient security for its continuance.' If
Mr. Adams be regarded as expressing the sentiments of the
Whigs, they were willing to remain Colonists, provided they
could have had their rights secured to them; while the Tories
were contented thus to continue, without such security. Such,
as it appears to me, was the only difference between the two
parties prior to hostilities. … Franklin's testimony, a few
days before the affair at Lexington, was, that he had 'more
than once travelled almost from one end of the continent to
the other, and kept a variety of company, eating, drinking,
and conversing with them freely, [and] never had heard from
any person, drunk or sober, the least expression of a wish for
a separation, or a hint that such a thing would be
advantageous to America.' Mr. Jay is quite as explicit.
'During the course of my life,' said he, 'and until the second
petition of Congress in 1775, I never did hear an American of
any class, or of any description, express a wish for the
independence of the Colonies.' 'It has always been, and still
is, my opinion and belief, that our country was prompted and
impelled to independence by necessity, and not by choice.'
{3222}
Mr. Jefferson affirmed, 'What, eastward of New York, might
have been the dispositions towards England before the
commencement of hostilities, I know not; but before that I
never heard a whisper of a disposition to separate from Great
Britain; and after that its possibility was contemplated with
affliction by all.' Washington, in 1774, fully sustains these
declarations, and, in the 'Fairfax County Resolves,' it was
complained that 'malevolent falsehoods' were propagated by the
ministry to prejudice the mind of the king: 'particularly that
there is an intention in the American Colonies to set up for
independent States.' Mr. Madison was not in public life until
May, 1776, but he says, 'It has always been my impression,
that a reëstablishment of the Colonial relations to the parent
country, as they were previous to the controversy, was the
real object of every class of the people, till the despair of
obtaining it,' &c. … The only way to dispose of testimony like
this, is to impeach the persons who have given it."
L. Sabine,
Biographical Sketches of Loyalists
of the American Revolution,
volume 1, pages 64-66.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (January-September).
Revolution in South Carolina.
See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (April).
The Beginning of the War of the American Revolution.
Lexington.
Concord.
"On April 19, 1775, the Committees of safety could only count
up twelve field-pieces in Massachusetts; and there had been
collected in that colony 21,549 fire-arms, 17,441 pounds of
powder, 22,191 pounds of ball, 144,699 flints, 10,108
bayonets, 11,979 pouches, 15,000 canteens. There were also
17,000 pounds of salt fish, 35,000 pounds of rice, with large
quantities of beef and pork. Viewed as an evidence of the
forethought of the colonists, these statistics are remarkable;
but there was something heroic and indeed almost pathetic in
the project of going to war with the British government on the
strength of twelve field-pieces and seventeen thousand pounds
of salt fish. Yet when, on the night of the 18th of April,
1775, Paul Revere rode beneath the bright moonlight through
Lexington to Concord, with Dawes and Prescott for comrades, he
was carrying the signal for the independence of a nation. He
had seen across the Charles River the two lights from the
church-steeple in Boston which were to show that a British
force was going out to seize the patriotic supplies at
Concord; he had warned Hancock and Adams at Reverend Jonas
Clark's parsonage in Lexington, and had rejected Sergeant
Monroe's caution against unnecessary noise, with the
rejoinder, 'You'll have noise enough here before long—the
regulars are coming out.' As he galloped on his way the
regulars were advancing with steady step behind him, soon
warned of their own danger by alarm-bells and signal-guns.
When Revere was captured by some British officers who happened
to be near Concord, Colonel Smith, the commander of the
expedition, had already halted, ordered Pitcairn forward, and
sent back prudently for reinforcements. It was a night of
terror to all the neighboring Middlesex towns, for no one knew
what excesses the angry British troops might commit on their
return march. The best picture we have of this alarm is in the
narrative of a Cambridge woman, Mrs. Hannah Winthrop,
describing 'the horrors of that midnight cry,' as she calls
it. The women of that town were roused by the beat of drums
and ringing of bells; they hastily gathered their children
together and fled to the outlying farm-houses; seventy or
eighty of them were at Fresh Pond, within hearing of the guns
at Menotomy, now Arlington. The next day their husbands bade
them flee to Andover, whither the college property had been
sent, and thither they went, alternately walking and riding,
over fields where the bodies of the slain lay unburied. Before
5 A. M. on April 19, 1775, the British troops had reached
Lexington Green, where thirty-eight men, under Captain Parker,
stood up before six hundred or eight hundred to be shot at,
their captain saying, 'Don't fire unless you are fired on; but
if they want a war let it begin here.' It began there; they
were fired upon; they fired rather ineffectually in return,
while seven were killed and nine wounded. The rest, after
retreating, reformed and pursued the' British towards Concord,
capturing seven stragglers—the first prisoners taken in the
war. Then followed the fight at Concord, where four hundred
and fifty Americans, instead of thirty-eight, were rallied to
meet the British. The fighting took place between two
detachments at the North Bridge, where 'once the embattled
farmers stood, And fired the shot heard round the world.'
There the American captain, Isaac Davis, was killed at the
first shot—he who had said, when his company was placed at the
head of the little column, 'I haven't a man that is afraid to
go.' He fell and Major Buttrick gave the order, 'Fire! for
God's sake fire!' in return. The British detachment retreated
in disorder, but their main body was too strong to be
attacked, so they disabled a few cannon, destroyed some
barrels of flour, cut down the liberty-pole, set fire to the
court-house and then began their return march. It ended in a
flight; they were exposed to a constant guerilla fire;
minute-men flocked behind every tree and house; and only the
foresight of Colonel Smith in sending for reinforcements had
averted a surrender. At 2 P. M., near Lexington, Percy with
his troops met the returning fugitives, and formed a hollow
square, into which they ran and threw themselves on the ground
exhausted. Then Percy in turn fell back. Militia still came
pouring in from Dorchester, Milton, Dedham, as well as the
nearer towns. A company from Danvers marched sixteen miles in
four hours. The Americans lost ninety-three in killed, wounded
and missing that day; the British, two hundred and
seventy-three. But the important result was that every
American colony now recognized that war had begun."
T. W. Higginson,
History of the United States of America,
chapter 10.
ALSO IN:
R. Frothingham,
History of the Siege of Boston,
chapter 2.
E. H. Goss,
Life of Paul Revere,
volume 1, chapter 7.
J. L. Watson,
Paul Revere's Signal
(Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings,
November 1876).
P. Force, editor,
American Archives,
series 4, volume 2.
E. Phinney,
History of Battle at Lexington.
C. Hudson,
History of Lexington,
chapters 6-8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (April).
The first Provincial Convention in New York.
See NEW YORK: A. D. 1775 (APRIL).
{3223}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (April-May).
The siege of Boston begun.
"Reinforcements of foreign troops and supplies were constantly
arriving in Boston. Howe, Clinton, and Burgoyne came, as
generals, on the 25th of May. Bitterness, ridicule, and
boasting, with all the irritating taunts of a mercenary
soldiery, were freely poured on the patriots and on the 'mixed
multitude' which composed the germ of their army yet to be.
The British forces had cooped themselves up in Bos·ton, and
the provincials determined that they should remain there, with
no mode of exit save by the sea. The pear-shaped peninsula,
hung to the mainland only by the stem called the 'Neck,' over
which the tide-waters sometimes washed, was equally an
inconvenient position for crowding regiments in war-like
array, and a convenient one for the extemporized army which
was about to beleaguer them there. … The town of Charlestown,
which lay under the enemy's guns, had contained a population
of between two and three thousand. The interruption of all the
employments of peace, and the proximity of danger, had brought
poverty and suffering upon the people. They had been steadily
leaving the town, with such of their effects as they could
carry with them. It proved to be well for them that they had
acted upon the warning. It would seem that there were less
than 200 of its inhabitants remaining in it at the time of the
battle, when the flames kindled by the enemy and bombs from a
battery on Copp's Hill laid it in ashes. On the third day
after the affair at Concord, the Provincial Congress again
assembled, voted to raise at once 13,000 men, to rally at
Cambridge and the neighborhood, and asked aid from the other
provinces, to which Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New
Hampshire responded. The forts, magazines, and arsenals, such
as they then were, were secured for the country. … Of the
15,000 men then gathered, by the cry of war, at Cambridge and
Roxbury, all virtually, but not by formal investment, under
the command of General Ward, nearly 10,000 belonged to
Massachusetts, and the remainder to New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, and Connecticut. They have been designated since, at
various times and by different writers, under the extreme
contrast of terms, as an 'organized army,' and a 'mob.' Either
of these terms would be equally inappropriate. … Our troops
were 'minute-men' extemporized into fragmentary companies and
skeleton regiments. The officers, chosen on the village-green
or in its public-house, paying for the honor by a treat, or
perhaps because they kept the premises where the treat could
be most conveniently furnished, were not commissioned or
ranked as the leaders of an army for campaign service. The
yeomen of town and village had not come together at the
summons of a commander-in-chief through adjutant, herald, or
advertisement. They came unbidden, at an alarm from the bell
on their meeting-house, or from a post-rider, or from the
telegrams transmitted by tongue and ear. … And for the most
part they were as free to go away as they had been to come.
They were enlisted after a fashion, some prime conditions of
which were their own convenience or pleasure. … Such of them
as came from the seaboard might bring with them old sails for
tents, while the midsummer days made it scarcely a hardship to
many to have only the heavens for a roof. Generally their
towns were expected to keep them supplied with food. … The
forces then mustered at Cambridge as a central camp, and,
stretching from the left at Chelsea almost round to Dorchester
on the right, for nearly three quarters of a circle, were
indeed not organized, nor yet had they any characteristic of a
mere mob. They combined in fact four inde·pendent armies,
united in resistance to a foreign enemy. … Each of the
Provinces had raised, commissioned, and assumed the supply of
its respective forces, holding them subject to their several
orders. After the battle in Charlestown, the Committee of War
in Connecticut ordered their generals, Spencer and Putnam,

while they were on the territory of this Province, to regard
General Ward as the commander-in-chief, and suggested to Rhode
Island and New Hampshire to issue the same instructions to
their soldiers. … General Artemas Ward was a conscientious and
judicious patriot. In the French war he had earned some
military experience and fame. … On October 27, 1774, the
Provincial Congress, in which he was a delegate, appointed him
a general officer, and on May 19 following,
Commander-in-chief. As such he served at Cambridge till the
arrival of Washington. On the very day of the battle in
Charlestown, when the great chieftain was selected for his
high service, Ward was chosen by the Continental Congress as
its first major-general. Though he was only in his 48th year
when he was burdened with the responsibility of the opening
warfare, his body was infirm from disease and exposure.
Lieutenant-General Thomas, two years the senior of Ward, was
second in command. … General Israel Putnam preceded his
Connecticut troops in hurrying to the scene of war on the news
of the affair at Lexington and Concord. His men soon followed
him, with like enthusiasm. The New Hampshire troops, on their
arrival at Medford, made choice of Colonel John Stark as their
leader. Colonel Nathaniel Greene commanded a regiment from
Rhode Island. … A few days after the affair at Lexington, when
virtually the siege began, General Gage, the British
commander, at the solicitation of some of the leading citizens
assembled in Faneuil Hall, had, by a mutual understanding,
entered into an agreement that such of the inhabitants as
wished to depart from the town should be at liberty to do so,
if they would leave their arms behind them and covenant not to
engage in any hostility against his army. The agreement was
availed of by many of the suffering and frightened people. …
But the original freedom and fulness of this understanding, on
the part of General Gage, were soon reduced by a very strict
examination of those who sought to go out of the town, and by
a rigid search of the effects which they wished to take with
them. … Several of the inhabitants remained in it from
different motives: some as devoted loyalists; some as timid
neutrals; some as spies, to watch each hostile movement and to
communicate it to their friends outside. … After hostilities
commenced, General Gage, of course, regarded the citizens as
alike prisoners, either in the same sense in which he was
himself under restraint, or as abettors of those who were his
enemies. … The population of the town, independent of the
military, was then about 18,000. To all those who were not in
sympathy with them the British behaved in an insulting and
exasperating manner. … To show, as members of the English
Church establishment, their contempt of congregational places
of worship, they removed the pews and pulpit from the Old
South meeting-house, and, covering the floor with earth, they
converted it into a riding-school for Burgoyne's squadron of
cavalry.
{3224}
The two eastern galleries were allowed to remain, one for
spectators, the other for a liquor-shop, while the fire in the
stove was occasionally kindled by books and pamphlets from the
library of a former pastor, Dr. Prince, which were in a room
in the tower. … At the time of the skirmishes at Lexington and
Concord there were about 4,000 British troops in Boston and at
the Castle. The number was increased to more than 10,000
before the action in Charlestown."
G. E. Ellis,
History of the Battle of Bunker's Hill,
pages 4-26.
ALSO IN:
R. Frothingham,
History of the Siege of Boston,
chapter 3.
George Washington,
Writings,
edited by W. C. Ford,
volume 3.
Joseph Reed,
Life and Correspondence,
volume 1.
C. Stedman [English],
History of the American War,
volume 1, chapters 1 and 5.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (April-June).
The spreading of revolt.
All the colonies in line with New England.
"On the 23d of April, the day after the dissolution of the
provincial Congress of New York, the news from Lexington burst
upon the city. Though it was Sunday, the inhabitants speedily
unloaded two sloops which lay at the wharfs, laden with flour
and supplies for the British at Boston, of the value of
£80,000. … The royal government lay hopelessly prostrate.
Isaac Sears concerted with John Lamb to stop all vessels going
to Quebec, Newfoundland, Georgia, or Boston, where British
authority was still supreme. The people shut up the
custom-house, and the merchants whose vessels were cleared out
dared not let them sail. In the following days the military
stores of the city of New York were secured, and volunteer
companies paraded in the streets. … On the 1st of May the
people, at the usual places of election, chose for the city
and county a new general committee of one hundred, who
'resolved in the most explicit manner to stand or fall with
the liberty of the continent.' All parts of the colony were
summoned to send delegates to a provincial convention, to
which the city and county of New York deputed one-and-twenty
as their representatives. … On the 2d of May the New Jersey
committee of correspondence called a provincial congress for
the 23d at Trenton. To anticipate its influence, the governor
convened the regular assembly eight days earlier at
Burlington, and laid before them the project of Lord North
[adopted by the British parliament in February, offering to
each colony freedom from taxation on its making satisfactory
provision for the general defense and for support of
government]. The assembly could see in the proposition no
avenue to reconciliation, and declared their intention to
'abide by the united voice of the continental congress.' Such,
too, was the spirit of Pennsylvania. 'Let us not have it said
of Philadelphia that she passed noble resolutions and
neglected them,' were the words of Mifflin, youngest of the
orators who on the 25th of April addressed the town-meeting
called in that city on receiving the news from Lexington.
Thousands were present, and agreed 'to associate for the
purpose of defending with arms their lives, their property,
and liberty.' Thomas Paine from that day 'rejected the sullen
Pharaoh of the British throne forever.' … In Philadelphia,
thirty companies, with 50 to 100 in each, daily practiced the
manual exercise of the musket. One of them was raised from the
Quakers. … The Pennsylvania assembly, which met on the first
day of May, rejecting the overtures of the governor, 'could
form no prospect of lasting advantages for Pennsylvania but
from a communication of rights and property with the other
colonies.' … On the 5th Franklin arrived, after a voyage over
the smoothest seas, and the next morning was unanimously
elected a deputy to the congress. … In Maryland, at the
request of the colonels of militia, Eden, at Annapolis, gave
up the arms and ammunition of the province to the freemen of
the county. Pleased with his concession, the provincial
convention distinguished itself by its moderation; and its
delegates to congress determined to labor for a
reconciliation. In Virginia [where, in the night of April
20th, Governor Dunmore had carried off the gunpowder stored in
the colony's magazine at Williamsburg, and where, as a
consequence, the excited people were already in arms, though
no further action had yet been taken], on the 2d of May, at
the cry from Lexington, the independent company of Hanover and
its county committee were called together by Patrick Henry.
The soldiers, most of them young men, elected him their chief,
and marched for Williamsburg, on the way greatly increasing in
numbers. Alarmed by the 'insurrections,' Dunmore convened the
council, and in a proclamation of the 3d pretended that he had
removed the ammunition, lest it should be seized by slaves.
Message after message could not arrest the march or change the
purpose of Henry. … At sunrise on the 4th the governor's
messenger met Henry at New Kent, and, as a compensation for
the gunpowder taken out of the magazine, paid him £330, for
which he was to account to the convention of Virginia. The sum
was found to be more than the value of the powder, and the
next Virginia convention directed the excess to be paid back.
… In twelve or thirteen days the message from Lexington was
borne to Newbern, in North Carolina, where it 'wrought a great
change.' The governor, in his panic, ordered the cannon in the
town to be dismounted; and, after a remonstrance made in the
name of the inhabitants by Abner Nash, 'the oracle of their
committee and a principal promoter of sedition,' he shipped
his wife to New York and fled to Fort Johnston, where a
sloop-of-war had its station. In South Carolina, Charles
Pinckney, on learning the inflexibility of parliament, using
power intrusted to him by the provincial congress, appointed a
committee of five to place the colony in a state of defence;
on the 21st of April, the very night after their organization,
men of Charleston, without disguise, under their direction,
seized all the powder in the public magazines, and removed 800
stand of arms and other military stores from the royal
arsenal. The tidings from Lexington induced the general
committee to hasten the meeting of the provincial congress,
whose members, on the 2d of June, Henry Laurens being their
president, associated themselves for defence against every
foe; 'ready to sacrifice their lives and fortunes to secure
her freedom and safety.' They resolved to raise two regiments
of infantry and a regiment of rangers. … The people of
Charleston are as mad as they are here in Boston,' was the
testimony of Gage. The skirmish at Lexington became known in
Savannah on the 10th of May, and added Georgia to the union.
At that time she had about 17,000 white inhabitants and 15,000
Africans. Her militia was not less than 3,000.
{3225}
Her frontier, which extended from Augusta to St. Mary's, was
threatened by the Creeks, with 4,000 warriors; the Chickasas,
with 450; the Cherokees, with 3,000; the Choctas, with 2,500.
But danger could not make her people hesitate. On the night of
the 11th, Noble Wimberley Jones, Joseph Habersham, Edward
Telfair, and others, broke open the king's magazine in the
eastern part of the city, and took from it over 500 pounds of
powder. To the Boston wanderers they sent 63 barrels of rice
and £122 in specie; and they kept the king's birthday by
raising a liberty-pole."
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 4, chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
T. Jones,
History of New York during the Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 2.
W. Wirt,
Life of Patrick Henry,
section 5.
W. B. Stevens,
History of Georgia,
book 4, chapter 1 (volume 2).
Proceedings of New York Provincial Congress
(New York State Archives, volume 1).
W. H. Egle,
History of Pennsylvania,
chapter 8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (May).
The surprising of Ticonderoga and Crown Point.
"Early in the year 1775, as soon as it was made manifest by
the attitude assumed on the part of the British government
against the colonies, and by the conduct of General Gage in
Boston, that open hostilities must inevitably commence in a
short time, it began to be secretly whispered among the
principal politicians in New England that the capture of
Ticonderoga was an object demanding the first attention. In
the month of March, Samuel Adams and Dr. Joseph Warren, as
members of the Committee of Correspondence in Boston, sent an
agent privately into Canada, on a political mission, with
instructions to ascertain the feelings of the people there in
regard to the approaching contest, and to make such reports as
his observations should warrant. … This agent sent back
intelligence from Montreal, and among other things advised,
that by all means the garrison of Ticonderoga should be seized
as quickly as possible after the breaking out of hostilities,
adding that the people of the New Hampshire Grants had already
agreed to undertake the task, and that they were the most
proper persons to be employed in it. This hint was given three
weeks anterior to the battle of Lexington, and how far it
influenced future designs may not be known; but it is certain
that, eight days after that event, several gentlemen at that
time attending the Assembly in Hartford, Connecticut,
concerted a plan for surprising Ticonderoga and seizing the
cannon in that fortress, for the use of the army then marching
from all quarters to the environs of Boston."
J. Sparks,
Life of Ethan Allen
(Library of American Biographies, volume 1),
page 270.
The gentlemen above mentioned "borrowed of the Connecticut
Treasury some 1,800 dollars, and enlisted Mott and Phelps of
Hartford, and Blagden of Salisbury, to beat up recruits. With
these they went northward, and at Pittsfield got the
co-operation of Captains Easton and Brown. No time was to be
lost, and they pushed on with some forty men to find that
Vermont giant, Ethan Allen, at Bennington. Allen at once
agreed to go; he sought out Seth Warner, and roused the 'Green
Mountain Boys,' who were mostly Connecticut and Massachusetts
men; so that, in a few days, there gathered at Castleton (7th
of May, 1775) two hundred and seventy strong men. Allen was
their first leader, Easton second, and Warner third. Their
larger body was to cross the Lake in boats from Shoreham, and
surprise 'Ty.' Captain Herrick, with thirty men, was to seize
the pass of Skenesborough (now Whitehall) at the head of the
Lake, and Captain Douglass was to search for and seize all
boats and batteaux. While these things were in progress, the
ambitious, active, and daring Benedict Arnold heard of this
expedition, and at once got leave from the Committee of Safety
at Cambridge, to lead it. He rode post-haste through
Massachusetts to raise men, and, with a single follower,
reached Castleton, and claimed the command. These rough cubs
of the forest could not well understand why he should lead
them, for had they not Allen, and Warner, and Easton, and
Phelps, and Biggelow, and others? But they consented that he
should join Allen as an equal; and so forward they went. On
the 8th of May Captain Noah Phelps, disguised with rough
farmer clothes, and a long beard, blundered into the fort at
Ticonderoga, pretending he wanted to be shaved. He found the
gates open, and discipline loose; for no telegraph had carried
the Lexington news to them, nor had the winds wafted the smell
of blood, or the sounds of muskets there. When the darkness
was deepest on the night of the 9th, Allen and Arnold, with 83
men, pulled across the Lake, landed near the fort, and then
sent back the boats for Warner and his men. They had a boy,
Nathan Beman, for a guide, and were full of courage. Allen
formed his men, made them a little speech, and all was ready,
when the question arose as to who should have the honor of
entering the fort first. The dispute was warm between Arnold
and Allen, but was finally quieted; and, side by side, at
daylight, they rushed through the gate of the fort, defended
only by sleeping men. The sentinel snapped his musket, and
ran, giving the alarm; the garrison hastily turned out, to
find themselves in the face of superior numbers. Allen sought
and found the Commander's bed-room, and when Captain Delaplace
waked, he saw any thing but an Angel of Mercy with white
wings. Delaplace opened the door, with trowsers in hand, and
there the great gaunt Ethan stood, with a drawn sword in his
hand. 'Surrender!' said Ethan. 'To you?' asked Delaplace.
'Yes, to me, Ethan Allen.' 'By whose authority?' asked
Laplace. Ethan was growing impatient, and raising his voice,
and waving his sword, he said: 'In the name of the Great
Jehovah, and of the Continental Congress, by God!' Delaplace
little comprehended the words, but surrendered at once. Thus,
on the morning of 10th of May, the strong fortress of
Ticonderoga was taken by the border-men, and with it 44
prisoners, 120 iron cannon, with swivels, muskets, balls, and
some powder, without the loss of a single man. The surprise
was planned and paid for by Connecticut, and was led by Allen,
a Connecticut-born man, but was carried out by the 'Green
Mountain Boys.' Skenesborough (Whitehall) was surprised and
seized, while Major Skene was out shooting. Arnold at once
manned a schooner, taken at Skenesborough, and led an attack
against an armed sloop at St. John's; he took her and the
place, and returned in triumph to meet Allen, who, in
batteaux, was coming to sustain him. Warner led a party
against Crown Point, and took it, with its hundred cannon, and
small garrison of 12 men.
{3226}
News of these things was carried to the Continental Congress,
reassembled at Philadelphia, which caused almost as much
surprise there, as Allen's demand did to Captain Delaplace,
and more exultation. They requested the Committees of Safety
of New York and Albany, to have an inventory made of the
stores, so that they might be returned 'when the restoration
of harmony between Great Britain and the Colonies' should
render it safe."
C. W. Elliott,
The New England History,
volume 2, chapter 18.
ALSO IN:
J. Fiske,
The American Revolution,
chapter 3 (volume 1).
W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 3, chapter 17.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (May).
The Mecklenburg Declaration.
See NORTH CAROLINA:. A. D. 1775 (MAY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (May-August).
The Second Continental Congress and its work.
Its powers, theoretical and actual.
Its opportunity.
Its influence.
The New England Army adopted as the "Continental Army,"
and Washington made Commander-in-chief.
"The second General Congress assembled at Philadelphia on the
10th of May. Peyton Randolph was again elected as president;
but being obliged to return, and occupy his place as speaker
of the Virginia Assembly, John Hancock, of Massachusetts, was
elevated to the chair. … Many of those most active in
vindicating colonial rights, and Washington among the number,
still indulged the hope of an eventual reconciliation, while
few entertained, or, at least, avowed the idea of complete
independence. A second 'humble and dutiful' petition to the
king was moved, but met with strong opposition. John Adams
condemned it as an imbecile measure, calculated to embarrass
the proceedings of Congress. He was for prompt and vigorous
action. Other members concurred with him. Indeed, the measure
itself seemed but a mere form, intended to reconcile the
half-scrupulous; for subsequently, when it was carried,
Congress, in face of it, went on to assume and exercise the
powers of a sovereign authority. A federal union was formed,
leaving to each colony the right of regulating its internal
affairs according to its own individual constitution, but
vesting in Congress the power of making peace or war; of
entering into treaties and alliances; of regulating general
commerce; in a word, of legislating on all such matters as
regarded the security and welfare of the whole community. The
executive power was to be vested in a council of twelve,
chosen by Congress from among its own members, and to hold
office for a limited time. Such colonies as had not sent
delegates to Congress might yet become members of the
confederacy by agreeing to its conditions. Georgia, which had
hitherto hesitated, soon joined the league, which thus
extended from Nova Scotia to Florida. Congress lost no time in
exercising their federated powers. In virtue of them, they
ordered the enlistment of troops, the construction of forts in
various parts of the colonies, the provision of armies,
ammunition, and military stores; while, to defray the expense
of these, and other measures, avowedly of self-defence, they
authorized the emission of notes to the amount of $3,000,000,
bearing the inscription of 'The United Colonies'; the faith of
the confederacy being pledged for their redemption. A
retaliating decree was passed, prohibiting all supplies of
provisions to the British fisheries; and another, declaring
the province of Massachusetts Bay absolved from its compact
with the crown, by the violation of its charter; and
recommending it to form an internal government for itself. …
The situation of the New England army, actually besieging
Boston, became an early and absorbing consideration. It was
without munitions of war, without arms, clothing, or pay; in
fact, without legislative countenance or encouragement. Unless
sanctioned and assisted by Congress, there was danger of its
dissolution. … The disposition to uphold the army was general;
but the difficult question was, who should be
commander-in-chief? … The opinion evidently inclined in favor
of Washington; yet it was promoted by no clique of partisans
or admirers. More than one of the Virginia delegates, says
Adams, were cool on the subject of this appointment. … Adams,
in his diary, claims the credit of bringing the members of
Congress to a decision. … On the 15th of June, the army was
regularly adopted by Congress, and the pay of the
commander-in-chief fixed at $500 a month. Many still clung to
the idea, that in all these proceedings they were merely
opposing the measures of the ministry, and not the authority
of the crown, and thus the army before Boston was designated
as the Continental Army, in contradistinction to that under
General Gage, which was called the Ministerial Army. In this
stage of the business, Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, rose, and
nominated Washington for the station of commander-in-chief.
The election was by ballot, and was unanimous. It was formally
announced to him by the president, on the following day, when
he had taken his seat in Congress. Rising in his place, he
briefly expressed his high and grateful sense of the honor
conferred on him, and his sincere devotion to the cause.
'But,' added he, 'lest some unlucky event should happen
unfavorable to my reputation, I beg it may be remembered by
every gentleman in the room, that I this day declare, with the
utmost sincerity, I do not think myself equal to the command I
am honored with. As to pay, I beg leave to assure the Congress
that, as no pecuniary consideration could have tempted me to
accept this arduous employment, at the expense of my domestic
ease and happiness, I do not wish to make any profit on it. I
will keep an exact account of my expenses. Those, I doubt not,
they will discharge, and that is all I desire.'" Four
major-generals,—Artemas Ward, Charles Lee, Philip Schuyler and
Israel Putnam,—and eight brigadier-generals—Seth Pomeroy,
Richard Montgomery, David Wooster, William Heath, Joseph
Spencer, John Thomas, John Sullivan, and Nathaniel Greene—were
appointed. "At Washington's express request, his old friend,
Major Horatio Gates, then absent at his estate in Virginia,
was appointed adjutant-general, with the rank of brigadier."
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 1, chapter 39.
"The Congress of 1775 was not content with mere expression of
opinions. It took a large view of its powers. It realized that
its efficiency depended wholly upon the acceptance of its acts
by the principals of the different delegations; but, following
its judgment as to what the patriotism of the colonies would
approve and sustain, it initiated action of various kinds,
which, from the beginning, assumed the certainty of adoption
by the colonies, and derived all its energy from the
probability of such ratification.
{3227}
The Congress doubtless exceeded the letter of the instructions
received by a portion of its members; but this was not from
any misconception of those instructions. … In pointing out to
the colonies the direction which their preparations for
resistance ought to take, the Congress no more acted upon an
imagined authority to command the colonies than does the
lookout at the bow of the ship, when he reports the direction
of danger to the officer of the deck. The Congress
unquestionably enjoyed a prestige at this juncture which it
subsequently lost. The people, and even the provincial
conventions, occasionally addressed it in a tone which
indicated that they unconsciously attributed to it power which
it plainly did not possess."
A. W. Small,
The Beginnings of American Nationality
(Johns Hopkins University Studies, 8th series, 1-2)
page 73.
"With the energy and recklessness of a French revolutionary
body it might have blotted out the distinctions between
colonies, and established a centralized government, to be
modified in time by circumstances. In fact, it took no such
direction. It began its course by recommendations to the new
colonial governments; it relied on them for executive acts;
and, as soon as the new colonies were fairly under way, they
seized on the power of naming and recalling the delegates to
the Congress. From that time the decadence of the Congress was
rapid; the national idea became dimmer; and the assertions of
complete sovereignty by the political units became more
pronounced."
A. Johnston,
The United States: its History and Constitution,
sections 63-66 (chapter 3).
ALSO IN:
R. Frothingham,
The Rise of the Republic,
chapter 10.
H. von Holst,
Constitutional and Political History of the United States,
volume 1, chapter 1.
P. Force,
American Archives,
volume 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (June).
End of Royal Government in New Hampshire.
See NEW HAMPSHIRE: A. D. 1775-1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (June).
The end of Royal Government In Virginia.
See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1775.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (June).
The Battle of Bunker Hill.
"British reinforcements, under three generals, Howe, Clinton,
and Burgoyne, arrived at Boston soon after the fight at
Lexington. Gage had now about 10,000 men. These occupied the
town of Boston, which lay on a peninsula covering the middle
of the harbor. Around them, on the hills of the mainland,
there were about twice their number of undisciplined and
poorly-armed Americans, without cannon and almost without
food. Just north of Boston, another peninsula ran out into the
harbor. On it there were several hills, and the Americans
determined to seize and fortify one of them, called Bunker
Hill. About 1,000 men, under Colonel Prescott, were sent into
the peninsula for this on a suitable night. For some reason,
they passed beyond Bunker Hill, and seized Breed's Hill, much
closer to Boston. Breed's Hill is now usually called Bunker
Hm, and the Bunker Hill monument is erected upon it. The
American fortification was continued silently and swiftly
through the night. In the morning of June 17, 1775, the
British in Boston woke to see a long line of intrenchments
running across the hill above them, and an American
working-party busily strengthening it. For a time, the British
frigates in the harbor kept up a slow and distant fire, to
which the working-party paid no attention; but at noon the
work was stopped, for the British troops were coming across
the harbor in boats. Three thousand well armed, uniformed, and
drilled soldiers, who had never known defeat in equal fight,
landed near Charlestown, under General Howe. Here they formed
at the water-side, and in a long, steady line began to move
upward to scatter the 1,500 farmers who were watching them
from the top of the hill. From the roofs of the houses in
Boston, the rest of the British army and the townspeople were
watching, anxious to see 'whether the Yankees would fight.'
Most of the watchers expected to see the untrained soldiers in
the fort fire a few hasty shots at a safe distance, and run.
The fort held a threatening silence until the attacking column
was within 150 feet. Then, at the word, came a sheet of fire
from the marksmen within; and, when the smoke lifted, part of
the British line was lying dead or wounded, and the rest were
retreating hastily down the hill. The British were not
cowards: the officers re-formed the line at the bottom of the
hill, and, after setting fire to Charlestown, again advanced
to the attack. Again there was a steady silence in the fort, a
close and deadly fire, and the British line was driven down
the hill again. The British then moved up the hill for the
third time. The powder in the fort was now gone, and the
garrison fought for a few minutes with gun stocks and stones
against the British bayonets. But such a struggle was
hopeless, and the British gained the fort. They were too tired
to pursue the garrison, who escaped to the mainland."
A. Johnston,
History of the United States for schools,
sections 195-197.
"As soon as Prescott saw the defence was hopeless, he ordered
a retreat, and friend and foe mingled together as they surged
out of the sally-port amid the clouds of dust which the
trampling raised, for a scorching sun had baked the new-turned
soil. It was now, while the confused mass of beings rocked
along down the rear slope of the hill, that Warren [who had
joined the defending force that morning as a volunteer] fell,
shot through the head. No one among the Americans knew
certainly that he was dead, as they left him. … Prescott did
not conceal his indignation at not having been better
supported, when he made his report at Ward's headquarters. He
knew he had fought well; but neither he nor his contemporaries
understood at the time how a physical defeat might be a moral
victory. Not knowing this, there was little else than
mortification over the result,—indeed, on both sides. … The
general opinion seems to be that the Americans had about 1,500
men engaged at one time, and that from 3,000 to 4,000 at
different times took some part in it. The British had probably
about the same numbers in all, but were in excess of the
Americans at all times while engaged. The conflict with small
arms lasted about ninety minutes."
J. Winsor,
The Conflict Precipitated
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 6, chapter 2).
"How can we exaggerate the relative importance of this day's
action? Did it not, in fact, not only open, but make the
contest, dividing into two parties not only those determined
for the ministry or for enfranchisement, but also all timid,
hesitating, reluctant neutrals? It was impossible after this
to avoid taking a side. It rendered all reconciliation
impossible, till it should offer itself in the shape of
independence.
{3228}
It echoed the gathering cry that brought together our people
from their farms and workshops, to learn the terrible art
which grows more merciful only as it is more ferociously, that
is, skilfully, pursued. The day needs no rhetoric to magnify
it in our revolutionary annals. When its sun went down, the
provincials had parted with all fear, hesitation, and
reluctance. They found that it was easy to fight. … General
Gage's account of the battle, acknowledging the loss of 226
killed and 828 wounded, was received in London, July 25th.
While the ministry received with dismay this official
intelligence, and kept it back from publication, many private
letters accompanying it in its transit anticipated with
exaggerations its humiliating details."
G. E. Ellis,
History of the Battle of Bunker's Hill,
pages 102-105.
ALSO IN:
R. Frothingham,
History of the Siege of Boston,
chapters 4-7.
R. Frothingham,
Life and Times of Joseph Warren,
chapter 16.
I. N. Tarbox,
Life of Israel Putnam,
chapters 7-11.
H. B. Dawson,
Bunker Hill
(Historical Magazine, June, 1868).
S. A. Drake,
Historic Fields and Mansions of Middlesex,
chapter 3.
P. Force, editor,
American Archives,
series 4, volume 2.
F. Moore, editor,
Diary of the American Revolution,
volume 1, pages 97-103.
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the American Revolution,
volume 1.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (August-December).
Unsuccessful expedition to Canada.
"The exploits of Allen and Arnold at Ticonderoga … had invited
further conquests; but the Continental Congress hesitated to
take any steps which might seem to carry war across the line
till the Canadians had the opportunity of casting in their lot
with their neighbors. On the 1st of June, 1775, Congress had
distinctly avowed this purpose of restraint; and they well
needed to be cautious, for the Canadian French had not
forgotten the bitter aspersions on their religion which
Congress had, with little compunction, launched upon its
professors, under the irritation of the Quebec Act. Still
their rulers were aliens, and the traditional hatred of
centuries between races is not easily kept in abeyance. Ethan
Allen was more eager to avail himself of this than Congress
was to have him; but the march of events converted the
legislators, and the opportunity which Allen grieved to see
lost was not so easily regained when Congress at last
authorized the northern invasion. Arnold and Allen had each
aimed to secure the command of such an expedition, the one by
appealing to the Continental Congress, the other by
representations to that of New York. Allen had also gone in
person to Philadelphia, and he and his Green Mountain Boys
were not without influence upon Congress, in their quaint and
somewhat rough ways, as their exuberant patriotism later made
the New York authorities forget their riotous opposition to
the policy which that province had been endeavoring to enforce
in the New Hampshire Grants. Connecticut had already sent
forward troops to Ticonderoga to hold that post till Congress
should decide upon some definite action; and at the end of
June, 1775, orders reached Schuyler which he might readily
interpret as authorizing him, if the Canadians did not object,
to advance upon Canada. He soon started to assume command, but
speedily found matters unpromising. The Johnsons were arming
the Indians up the Mohawk and beyond in a way that boded no
good, and they had entered into compacts with the British
commanders in Canada. Arnold had been at Ticonderoga, and had
quarrelled with Hinman, the commander of the Connecticut
troops. Schuyler heard much of the Green Mountain Boys, but he
only knew them as the lawless people of the Grants, and soon
learned that Allen and Warner had themselves set to
quarrelling. … In August the news from Canada began to be
alarming. Richard Montgomery, an Irish officer who had some
years before left the army to settle on the Hudson and marry,
was now one of the new brigadiers. He urged Schuyler to
advance and anticipate the movement now said to be intended by
Carleton, the English general commanding in Canada. At this
juncture Schuyler got word from Washington that a coöperating
expedition would be dispatched by way of the Kennebec, which,
if everything went well, might unite with Schuyler's before
Quebec."
J. Winsor,
The Conflict Precipitated
(Narrative and Critical History of America, volume 6).
The two movements were made, from Ticonderoga and from the
Kennebec, with results which will be found related under
CANADA: A. D. 1775-1776. "No expedition during the American
Revolution had less elements of permanent value than those
which were undertaken against Canada during the year 1775.
Great results were anticipated, but none were realized. The
obstacles were too substantial, and failure was inevitable.
Wonderful endurance and great physical courage were
manifested, and these were accompanied by a prodigious amount
of faith, but there was neither ability nor opportunity for
works commensurate with the faith. Certain Acts of Parliament,
known as the Canadian Acts, were as offensive to Canadians as
other legislation was to Americans; but the former were not
pressed to the extremity of armed resistance. The people
themselves having no harmony of religious or political views,
were equally divided in language and race. Neither did the
Canadians invite the aid of the colonies. The hypothesis that
Canada would blend her destiny with that of New England, and
would unite in resistance to the crown, certainly involved
some identity of interest as well as of action. But the
characters of the two people were too unlike to be unified by
simple opposition to English legislation, and Canadians had no
antecedents such as would prompt a hearty sympathy with New
England and its controlling moral sentiment. Neither was there
such a neighborly relation as admitted of prompt and adequate
aid from one to the other, in emergencies calling for a
combined effort. As a base of operations for a British army
moving upon the colonies, Canada had the single advantage of
being less distant from England than an Atlantic base, and
many supplies could be procured without the expense and delay
of their transportation across the Atlantic; but between
Canada and the American colonies there was an actual
wilderness. Hence a British offensive movement from Canada
involved constant waste of men and materials, a deep line
through an uninhabited or hostile region, and such a constant
backing, as was both inconsistent with the resources of the
base, and with a corresponding support of armies resting upon
the sea coast. The British government was not ready for
operations so extensive and so exhaustive of men and treasure;
neither did it realize the necessity for that expenditure.
{3229}
There were two alternatives, one illustrated by General
Carleton's plan, viz., to hold the forts of Lake Champlain, as
advanced, defensive positions; and the other, that of
Burgoyne, to strike through the country and depend upon
support from the opposite base. The true defense of the
colonies from such expeditions depended upon the prompt
seizure and occupation of the frontier posts. An American
advance upon Canada was not only through a country
strategically bad, but the diversion of forces for that
purpose endangered the general issue, and entrusted its
interests to the guardianship of an army already insufficient
to meet the pressing demands of the crisis. The occupation of
New York in 1775, by an adequate British force, would have
infinitely outweighed all possible benefit from the complete
conquest of Canada. At the very time when Washington could
hardly hold the British garrison of Boston in check,—when he
had an average of but nine rounds of ammunition per man, he
was required to spare companies, ammunition, and supplies for
a venture, profitless at best,—with the certainty that
reinforcements could not be supplied as fast as the enemy
could draw veteran regiments from Great Britain and Ireland,
to defend or recover Canadian soil. In giving a rapid outline
of this first attempt of the colonies to enlarge the theatre
of active operations, it should be noticed that the initiative
had been taken before General Washington had been elected
commander-in-chief, and that Congress itself precipitated the
final movement."
H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapter 19.
ALSO IN:
B. J. Lossing,
Life and Times of Philip Schuyler,
volume 1, chapters 19-29,
and volume 2, chapters 1-4.
J. Armstrong,
Life of Richard Montgomery
(Library of American Biographies, volume 1).
J. Henry,
Account of Arnold's Campaign against Quebec,
by one of the Survivors.
I. N. Arnold,
Life of Benedict .Arnold,
chapters 3-5.
W. Irving,
Life of Washington.
volume 2, chapters 4-5, 8-9, 12, 15-16, 19-20.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775 (September).
Flight of Govern or Tryon from New York.
See NEW YORK: A. D. 1775 (APRIL-SEPTEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775-1776.
Washington in command at Cambridge.
The British forced out of Boston.
Washington "arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the 2d of
July [1775], and on the following day presented himself at the
head of the army. His head-quarters remained at Cambridge,
till the evacuation of Boston by the royal forces on the 17th
of March, 1776. The position of affairs was one of vast
responsibility and peril. The country at large was highly
excited, and expected that a bold stroke would be struck and
decisive successes obtained. But the army was without
organization and discipline; the troops unused to obey, the
officers for the most part unaccustomed, some of them
incompetent, to command. A few of them only had had a limited
experience in the Seven Years' War. Most of the men had rushed
to the field on the first alarm of hostilities, without any
enlistment; and when they were enlisted, it was only till the
end of the year. There was no military chest; scarce anything
that could be called a commissariat. The artillery consisted
of a few old field-pieces of various sizes, served with a very
few exceptions by persons wholly untrained in gunnery. There
was no siege train, and an almost total want of every
description of ordnance stores. Barrels of sand, represented
as powder, were from time to time brought into the camp, to
prevent the American army itself from being aware of its
deficiency in that respect. In the autumn of 1775, an alarm of
small-pox was brought from Boston, and the troops were
subjected to inoculation: There was no efficient power, either
in the Provincial Assembly or the Congress at Philadelphia, by
which these wants could be supplied and these evils remedied.
Such were the circumstances under which General Washington
took the field, at the head of a force greatly superior in
numbers to the royal army, but in all other respects a very
unequal match. Meantime the British were undisputed masters of
the approaches to Boston by water. Washington's letters
disclose extreme impatience under the inaction to which he was
condemned; but the gravest difficulties attended the expulsion
of the royal forces from Boston. It could only be effected by
the bombardment and assault of that place; an attempt which
must in any event have been destructive to the large
non-combatant population, that had been unable to remove into
the country, and which would have been of doubtful success,
for the want of a siege train, and with troops wholly unused
to such an undertaking. Having in the course of the year
received some captured ordnance from Canada [from Fort
Ticonderoga], and a supply of ammunition taken by privateers
at sea, Washington was strongly disposed to assault the town,
as soon as the freezing of the bay on the western side of the
peninsula would allow the troops to pass on the ice. The
winter, however, remained open longer than usual, and a
council of war dissuaded this attempt. He then determined to
occupy Nook's Hill (an eminence at the extremity of Dorchester
'Neck,' as it was called, separated from Boston by a narrow
arm of the harbor), and Dorchester Heights, which commanded
Nook's Hill and the town itself. In this way the royal forces
would be compelled to take the risk of a general action, for
the purpose of dislodging the Americans, or else to evacuate
the town. The requisite preparations having been made with
secrecy, energy, and despatch, the heights were covered with
breastworks on the night of the 4th of March, 1776, as 'by
enchantment.' A partial movement, undertaken by the royal army
to dislodge the Americans, was frustrated by stress of
weather; and on the 17th of March, in virtue of an agreement
to that effect with the municipal government, the town and
harbor of Boston were evacuated by the British army and army
without firing a gun. Thus, without a battle and without the
destruction of a building in Boston, the first year of the war
was brought to a successful and an auspicious close."
E. Everett,
Life of Washington,
chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
G. Washington,
Writings; edited. by Ford,
volume 3.
R. Frothingham,
History of the Siege of Boston,
chapters 8-13.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1775-1776.
The beginning of the American Navy,
and the early fitting out of Privateers.
"Before the end of 1775 the Continental Congress ordered that
five ships of 32 guns should be built, five of 28, and three
of 24. This order was carried out, and these vessels are the
proper beginning of the navy of the United States. Almost
everyone of them, before the war was over, had been captured,
or burned to avoid capture.
{3230}
But the names of the little fleet will always be of interest
to Americans, and some of those names have always been
preserved on the calendar of the navy. They are the
'Washington,' 'Raleigh,' 'Hancock,' 'Randolph,' 'Warren,'
'Virginia,' 'Trumbull,' 'Effingham,' 'Congress,' 'Providence,'
'Boston,' 'Delaware,' 'Montgomery.' The State of Rhode Island,
at the very outbreak of hostilities, commissioned Abraham
Whipple, who went with his little vessel as far as Bermuda,
and, from his experience in naval warfare earned in the French
War, he was recognized as commodore of the little fleet of
American cruisers. … Meanwhile, every maritime State issued
commissions to privateers, and established admiralty or prize
courts, with power to condemn prizes when brought in.
Legitimate commerce had been largely checked, and … the seamen
of the country, who had formerly been employed in the
fisheries, or in our large foreign trade with the West India
Islands and with Europe, gladly volunteered in the private
service. Till the end of the war the seamen preferred the
privateer service to that of the government. … The larger
maritime States had in commission one or more vessels from the
beginning, but they found the same difficulty which the
Congress found in enlisting seamen, when any bold privateer
captain came into rivalry with them. … As early as the 22d of
December, in 1775, Congress had appointed Esek Hopkins, of
Rhode Island, commander-in-chief of its navy, and had named
four captains besides, with several lieutenants, the first of
whom was John Paul Jones. … On the 10th of October [1776] a
resolution of Congress fixed the rank of captains in the navy,
… Paul Jones eighteenth on a list of twenty-four. Jones was
not pleased that his rank was not higher, but eventually his
achievements were such that his reputation probably now stands
higher as a successful officer than that of any of the
number."
E. E. Hale,
Naval History of the American Revolution
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 6, chapter 7).
ALSO IN:
J. F. Cooper,
Naval History of the United States,
volume 1, chapters 4-6.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (January).
Adoption of a Constitution in New Hampshire.
See NEW HAMPSHIRE: A. D. 1775-1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (January-June).
King George's war measures and Paine's "Common Sense."
The setting of the tide of opinion toward national independence.
"Disastrous news arrived from England before the close of the
winter of 1775-6. The King had opened Parliament with a speech
in which he had denounced the Colonists as rebels, seeking,
with deceitful pretences, to establish an independent empire;
and his Majesty recommended decisive, coercive measures
against them. … The answer to the Royal Address (adopted by a
vote of seventy-six to thirty-three in the Lords, and two
hundred and seventy-eight to one hundred and eight in the
Commons) gave assurances of the firm support of Parliament to
the proposed measures. The very moderately conciliatory
propositions made by the Duke of Richmond, Mr. Burke, and the
Duke of Grafton, were summarily voted down, and not far from
the middle of December the atrocious' Prohibitory Act,' as it
was generally designated, passed. It was, in effect, a
declaration of war, and a war unrestrained by the customs, and
unmitigated by the decencies of civilization. It authorized
the confiscation of American vessels and cargoes, and those of
all nations found trading in American ports. It authorized
British commanders to impress American crews into the British
Navy, and to place them on the same footing with voluntarily
enlisted seamen; that is, to give them a choice between
parricide and being hung at a yardarm! Finally, it referred
all future negotiations to two Commissioners, to be sent out
along with a conquering armament, who were allowed to grant
pardons to individuals and Colonies, on submission, thus
leaving no future alternative opposed to the latter but the
sword, and indicating that henceforth all appeals to King or
Parliament were cut off. … Concurrently with these legislative
steps, the practical ones for carrying on the war, with a
large army, were entered upon. Finding it difficult or
impossible to obtain the necessary recruits at home, and that
the existing English and Irish regiments embarked with such
reluctance that it was necessary to keep a guard upon the
transports 'to keep them from deserting by wholesale,' the
Ministry successively applied to Russia, the States-General,
and finally, several of the German States for mercenaries. …
The infamy of filling up the British armament was reserved for
the Princes of three or four petty German States. … As the
news of these events successively reached the American
Congress and people, in the winter and spring of 1775-6, the
contest took a new coloring. Not only the bold, but the
moderate began now to see the real alternative before them.
And at a critical moment the remedy, and the path to it, were
pointed out by a master hand. 'Common Sense' was published by
Thomas Paine, and a more effective popular appeal never went
to the bosoms of a nation. Its tone, its manner, its biblical
illusions, its avoidance of all openly impassioned appeals to
feeling, and its unanswerable common sense were exquisitely
adapted to the great audience to which it was addressed; and
calm investigation will satisfy the historical student that
its effect in preparing the popular mind for the Declaration
of Independence, exceeded that of any other paper, speech, or
document made to favor it, and it would scarcely be
exaggeration to add, than all other such means put together.
John Adams, with a childish perpetuance, and with a rancor so
vehement that it appears ridiculous, spares no occasion to
underrate Paine's services, and to assault his opinions and
character. … His transparent motive seems to be to decry the
author of a paper which had too much the credit of preparing
the public mind for the Declaration of Independence, a credit
which Mr. Adams was more than anxious to monopolize. Let us be
just. Paine's services in paving the way to the Declaration
are not to be mentioned on the same page with John Adams's.
Moreover, Independence would have been declared, and, perhaps,
nearly as early, had Paine never written. But he did, at a
propitious moment, and with consummate adaptation, write a
paper which went like the arrow which pierces the centre of
the target. Its effect was instantaneous and tremendous. … The
work ran through innumerable editions in America and France.
The world rung with it. … It admits of no doubt that pretty
early in 1776, all the true Whigs in Congress, moderates as
well as ultras, became satisfied of the necessity and
expediency of separation, and that henceforth it was only a
question of time with them.
{3231}
Enactments placing the struggle on the footing of open war,
instead of mere insurrection—issuing letters of marque and
reprisal against the enemies of our commerce—advising the
local authorities to disarm the disaffected—opening the ports
of the country to all nations but Great Britain—directing
negotiations for foreign alliances to be undertaken—were
successively made. Finally, on the 10th of May, a resolution,
prepared by John Adams and R. H. Lee, passed the House,
advising all the Colonies to form governments for themselves;
and in this, unlike preceding instances of giving advice on
the same subject, no limitation of the duration of the
governments to be formed 'to the continuance of the present
dispute' was inserted. This, with a befitting preamble,
written by John Adams, was adopted on the 15th, … and was,
obviously, a long and bold stride in the direction of
independence, and must have been understood by all as its
signal and precursor. … Congress cheered on those whom
peculiar circumstances had rendered more backward, and it
tarried for them a little by the way; on the other hand, it
prudently waited for the prompting of the more forward. Thus
it avoided the appearance of dominating over public
opinion—thus it 'kept front and rear together.' Early in April
(12th), North Carolina 'empowered' her delegates 'to concur
with the delegates of other Colonies in declaring
independency.' At its 'May session' (the day of the month not
appearing in the record under our eye), the General Assembly
of Rhode Island abolished its act of allegiance, and directed
all commissions and legal processes henceforth to issue in the
name and under the authority of the 'Governor and Company.'
The Connecticut General Assembly, which met on the 9th of May,
before its adjournment (date not before us), repealed its act
against high treason, and made the same order with Rhode
Island in regard to legal processes. On the 15th of May,
Virginia took a still more decisive step, by instructing its
delegates in Congress to move for a Declaration of
Independence. … The Virginia delegates in Congress made choice
of Richard H. Lee to move the resolutions contained in their
instructions of May 15th; and he did so on Friday, the 7th day
of June, John Adams seconding them. Their consideration was
postponed until the next day, when they were referred to a
committee of the whole, and debated throughout Saturday and
the succeeding Monday. On the latter day (10th) Congress
resolved: 'That the consideration of the first resolution be
postponed to Monday, the first day of July next; and in the
meanwhile, that no time be lost, in case the Congress agree
thereto, that a committee be appointed to prepare a
declaration to the effect of the said first resolution, which
is in these words: That these Colonies are, and of right ought
to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved

from all allegiance to the British Crown; and that all
Political connection between them and the State of Great
Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved.'"
H. S. Randall,
Life of Jefferson,
volume 1, chapter 4.
ALSO IN:
G. Bancroft,
History of United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 4, chapters 24-28.
R. Frothingham,
Rise of the Republic,
chapter 11.
W. C. Rives,
Life and Times of Madison,
volume 1, chapters 4-5.
American Archives,
series 4, volume 6.
E. G. Scott,
The Development of Constitutional Liberty in the
English Colonies,
chapter 11.
C. J. Stille,
Life and Times of John Dickinson,
chapter 5.
See, also, NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776;
and VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (January-June).
Engagement of hireling Hessians
to reinforce the British arms.
"The [British] Cabinet had entertained some hopes of Russian
auxiliaries [application for 20,000 of whom had been made to
the Empress Catherine, who refused them with hardly concealed
scorn], but the negotiation for that object could not be
matured. Early in the year treaties were signed with the
Landgrave of Hesse for taking into British pay 12,000 of his
men; with the Duke of Brunswick and other petty potentates of
Germany for 5,000 more. These little princes, seeing the need
of England, which did not choose to lean, as she might and
should have done, on her own right arm, insisted on obtaining,
and did obtain, most usurious terms. Under the name of
levy-money, there was to be paid to them the price of 30
crowns for every foot-soldier. Under the name of subsidy, each
of their Serene Highnesses was moreover to be indulged with a
yearly sum, irrespective of the pay and subsistence of the
troops; and on the plea that in this case no certain number of
years was stipulated as the term of service, the Landgrave of
Hesse claimed and was promised a double subsidy, namely
450,000 crowns a year. The men were to enter into pay before
they began to march! The subsidies were to be continued for
one full year at least after the war was over and the troops
had returned to their respective homes. Never yet, in short,
was the blood of brave men sold on harder terms. The disgrace
of this transaction to the German Princes who engaged in it
requires little comment. … The ablest by far of the German
Princes at that time, Frederick of Prussia, was not in general
a man of compassionate feelings. He had no especial love or
care for the North American cause. … Yet even Frederick
expressed in strong terms his contempt for the scandalous
man-traffic of his neighbours. It is said that whenever any of
the newly hired Brunswickers or Hessians had to pass through
any portion of his territory he claimed to levy on them the
usual toll as for so many head of cattle, since he said they
had been sold as such! Nor can the British ministry in this
transaction be considered free from blame. … Certain it is
that among the various causes which at this period wrought
upon our trans-Atlantic brethren to renounce their connection
with us, there was none more cogent in their minds than the
news that German mercenaries had been hired and were coming to
fight against them."
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope),
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 53 (volume 6).
"The first German troops to start for America were the
Brunswickers. These marched from Brunswick on February 22d,
1776, 2,282 strong, and were embarked at Stade, near the mouth
of the Elbe. The second division of Brunswickers embarked at
the end of May—about 2,000 men. The first Hessians set out
from Cassel early in March, and were shipped at Bremerlehe,
near the mouth of the Weser. The second division was embarked
in June. Together they numbered between 12,000 and 13,000 men.
{3232}
They were for the most part excellent troops and well
equipped, for the Landgrave's little army was one of the best
in Germany. … The Prince of Waldeck sent his regiment through
Cassel without trouble. The Prince of Hesse-Hanau, the
Margrave of Anspach-Bayreuth, and the Prince of Anhalt-Zerbst
had a longer road."
E. J. Lowell,
The Hessians in the Revolutionary War,
chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
M. von Eelking,
Memoirs of General Riedesel,
volume 1, pages 18-88, and appendix.
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 4, chapter 22.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (February).
Flight of the Royal Governor from Georgia.
See GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (March).
State government organized and a Constitution adopted in
South Carolina.
See SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY-APRIL).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (April).
North Carolina the first colony to declare for independence.
See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (May).
Rhode Island renounces allegiance to the King.
See RHODE ISLAND: A. D. 1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (May).
Popular vote for independence in Massachusetts.
See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1776 (APRIL-MAY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (May).
Arnold's retreat from Canada.
See CANADA: A. D. 1775-1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (May-June).
Independence declared and Constitution adopted in Virginia.
See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (June).
The British repulsed at Charleston.
"Early in 1776 the task was assigned to Clinton, who had in
January departed from Boston, … to force and hold the Southern
colonies to their allegiance.
See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1775-1776.
Cornwallis, with troops, was sent over under convoy of Sir
Peter Parker's fleet, to give Clinton the army he needed. The
fleet did not reach North Carolina till May. In March,
[Charles] Lee, while in New York, had wished to be ordered to
the command in Canada, as 'he was the only general officer on
the continent who could speak and think in French.' He was
disappointed, and ordered farther south. By May he was in
Virginia, ridding the country of Tories, and trying to find
out where Parker intended to land. It was expected that
Clinton would return north to New York in season to operate
with Howe, when he opened the campaign there in the early
summer, as that general expected to do, and the interval for a
diversion farther south was not long. Lee had now gone as far
as Charleston (South Carolina), and taken command in that
neighborhood, while in charge of the little fort at the
entrance of the harbor was William Moultrie, upon whom Lee was
inculcating the necessity of a slow and sure fire, in case it
should prove that Parker's destination, as it might well be,
was to get a foothold in the Southern provinces, and break up
the commerce which fed the rebellion through that harbor. The
people of Charleston had been for some time engaged on their
defences, and 'seem to wish a trial of their mettle,' wrote a
looker-on. The fort in question was built of palmetto logs,
and was unfinished on the land side. Its defenders had four
days' warning, and the neighboring militia were summoned. On
the 4th of June the hostile fleet appeared, and having landed
troops on an adjacent island, it was not till the 27th that
their dispositions were made for an attack. Their ships threw
shot at the fort all day, which did very little damage, while
the return fire was rendered with a precision surprising in
untried artillerists, and seriously damaged the fleet, of
which one ship was grounded and abandoned. The expected land
attack from Clinton's troops, already ashore on Long Island,
was not made. A strong wind had raised the waters of the
channel between that island and Sullivan's Island so high that
it could not be forded, and suitable boats for the passage
were not at hand. A few days later the shattered vessels and
the troops left the neighborhood, and Colonel Moultrie had
leisure to count the cost of his victory, which was twelve
killed and twice as many wounded. The courage of Sergeant
Jasper, in replacing on the bastion a flag which had been shot
away, became at once a household anecdote."
J. Winsor,
The Conflict Precipitated
(Narrative and Critical History of America.
volume 6, chapter 2).
ALSO IN:
H. Flanders,
Life of John Rutledge,
chapter 10
(Lives of the Chief Justices, volume 1).
C. B. Hartley,
Life of General William Moultrie
(Heroes and Patriots of the South),
chapter 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (June).
Resolutions for Independence.
Making ready for the Declaration.
"Things were now verging on every side to the same point.
North Carolina had conferred the necessary powers to vote for
independence and foreign alliances as early as the 12th of
April. And now came the news from Richard Lee, to Mr. Adams,
that on the very day of the passage of the significant
preamble in congress, the 15th of May, the convention of
Virginia had gone a step further, and had instructed their
delegates to propose independence. Authority to assent to its
natural consequences, a confederation and foreign alliances,
followed as a matter of course. On the other hand, the
convention of Massachusetts had referred the subject back to
the people, to be considered and acted upon at their primary
town meetings, and the responses had been for some time
corning in unequivocally enough. So decided was the feeling
that Joseph Hawley, impatient of the delay, was stimulating
the nowise reluctant Gerry to greater exertions. Perceiving
these encouraging indications in opposite quarters, the
friends of independence now consulted together, and made up
their minds that the moment had come for a final
demonstration. Resolutions, embracing the three great points,
were carefully matured, which it was arranged that Richard
Henry Lee, on behalf of the delegates of Virginia, should
present, and John Adams should second, for Massachusetts. The
movement took place, accordingly, on the 7th of June. It
appears on the journal, recorded with the customary caution,
as follows:
'Certain resolutions respecting independency being moved and
seconded,—Resolved, that the consideration of them be referred
till to-morrow morning; and that the members be enjoined to
attend punctually at ten o'clock, in order to take the same
into their consideration.' It was well that a measure of so
momentous a character should be accompanied with as much of
the forms of notice and special assignment as the body could
properly give it. The record of what passed at the appointed
time has come down to us very barren of details.
{3233}
We only know that the resolutions were referred to the
committee of the whole, where they were debated with great
spirit during that day, Saturday, and again on Monday, the
10th, by which time it had become quite clear that a majority
of the colonies were prepared to adopt the first and leading
resolution. This majority was composed of the four New
England, and three out of the four southern colonies. But it
being deemed unadvisable to place this great act upon so
narrow a basis, and a prospect being held out of securing a
more general concurrence by delaying the decision, a
postponement until the 1st of July was effected by a change of
the votes of two colonies. In the mean while, however, as it
was thought suitable to accompany the act with an elaborate
exposition of the causes which were held to justify it, a
committee was ordered to have in charge the preparation of
such a paper in season for the adjourned debate. … At the same
time that Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin,
Roger Sherman, and Robert R. Livingston, all but the last
named being of the movement, were appointed the committee to
prepare a declaration, as mentioned, the congress formally
voted a second committee, with powers to prepare and digest a
form of confederation to be entered into between the colonies;
and yet a third, to mature a plan of treaties to be proposed
to foreign powers. In this compass were included all the
elements of national sovereignty abroad and at home. … The
bulk of opposition now centred in the five middle colonies,
and the pillar upon which it leaned was John Dickinson. But
under the combined assaults conducted by the leading colonies
of Virginia and Massachusetts, it was plain that victory was
become a mere question of time. Jonathan D. Sergeant, who had
left congress to hasten a change in the counsels of New
Jersey, had been so successful in spiriting up the assembly as
to be able to write, on the 15th of June, to Mr. Adams, that
the delegates about to be elected would be on the spot by the
1st of July, the day to which the question had been assigned,
and that they would 'vote plump.' Equally favorable news soon
came from Maryland. … Thus were two States secured. But
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New York yet remained to move. In
the first of these, recourse was had once more to the
so-called committees of conference. … And here, on the 23d of
June, Dr. Benjamin Rush, then a young man, but acting entirely
in sympathy and co-operation with the leaders in congress,
moved and carried the appointment of a committee to declare
the sense of the conference with respect to an independence of
the province on the crown of Great Britain. He and James Smith
were then joined with Thomas McKean, the chairman of the
conference, in a committee, which was ready the next day with
a report affirming the willingness of the deputies of the
conference to concur in a vote declaring the United Colonies
free and independent States. The report was adopted
unanimously, was presented to congress on the 25th, and,
doubtless, had its effect in determining those delegates of
the colony to absent themselves on the final vote, upon whose
resistance its adverse decision depended. As the hesitation of
Delaware was chiefly owing to the feeling that pervaded the
county of Sussex, Mr. Rodney had repaired thither for the
purpose of bringing about a favorable change, in which errand
the news came that he was laboring with success. The delegates
from New York, no longer interposing any active opposition,
yet unwilling to assume a responsibility which their
constituents had not authorized, preferred to withdraw from
participation in the decision. Such was the state of affairs
on the 1st of July, to which day the discussion had been
adjourned. There was then little doubt of an affirmative vote
on the part of all but four colonies."
J. Q. Adams and C. F. Adams,
Life of John Adams,
volume 1, pages 308-318.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (June).
End of proprietary and royal government in Maryland.
See MARYLAND: A. D. 1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (July).
Authorship, adoption and signing
of the Declaration of Independence.
For the last hundred years one of the first facts taught to
any child of American birth is, that Jefferson wrote the
Declaration of Independence. The original draft in his
handwriting was afterward deposited in the State Department.
It shows two or three trifling alterations, interlined in the
handwritings of Franklin and Adams. Otherwise it came before
Congress precisely as Jefferson wrote it. Many years afterward
John Adams gave an account of the way in which Jefferson came
to be the composer of this momentous document, differing
slightly from the story told by Jefferson. But the variance is
immaterial. … Jefferson's statement seems the better entitled
to credit, and what little corroboration is to be obtained for
either narrator is wholly in his favor. He says simply that
when the Committee came together he was pressed by his
colleagues unanimously to undertake the draft; that he did so;
that, when he had prepared it, he submitted it to Dr. Franklin
and Mr. Adams, separately, requesting their corrections,
'which were two or three only and merely verbal,' 'interlined
in their own handwritings'; that the report in this shape was
adopted by the committee, and a 'fair copy,' written out by
Mr. Jefferson, was then laid before Congress. A somewhat more
interesting discussion concerns the question, how Jefferson
came to be named first on the committee, to the entire
exclusion of Lee, to whom, as mover of the resolution,
parliamentary etiquette would have assigned the chairmanship.
See, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (JANUARY-JUNE).
Many explanations have been given, of which some at least
appear the outgrowth of personal likings and dislikings. It is
certain that Jefferson was not only preëminently fitted for
the very difficult task of this peculiar composition, but also
that he was a man without an enemy. His abstinence from any
active share in debate had saved him from giving irritation;
and it is a truth not to be concealed, that there were cabals,
bickerings, heart-burnings, perhaps actual enmities among the
members of that famous body, which, grandly as it looms up,
and rightly too, in the mind's eye, was after all composed of
jarring human ingredients. It was well believed that there was
a faction opposed to Washington, and it was generally
suspected that irascible, vain, and jealous John Adams, then
just rising from the ranks of the people, made in this matter
common cause with the aristocratic Virginian Lees against
their fellow-countrymen. … So it is likely enough that a
timely illness of Lee's wife was a fortunate excuse for
passing him by, and that partly by reason of admitted
aptitude, partly because no risk could be run of any
interference of personal feelings in so weighty a matter,
Jefferson was placed first on the committee, with the natural
result of doing the bulk of its labor.
{3234}
On July 1, pursuant to assignment, Congress, in committee of
the whole, resumed consideration of Mr. Lee's resolution, and
carried it by the votes of nine colonies. South Carolina and
Pennsylvania voted against it. The two delegates from Delaware
were divided. Those from New York said that personally they
were in favor of it and believed their constituents to be so,
but they were hampered by instructions drawn a twelvemonth
since and strictly forbidding any action obstructive of
reconciliation, which was then still desired. The committee
reported, and then Edward Rutledge moved an adjournment to the
next day, when his colleagues, though disapproving the
resolution, would probably join in it for the sake of
unanimity. This motion was carried, and on the day following
the South Carolinians were found to be converted; also a third
member 'had come post from the Delaware counties' and caused
the vote of that colony to be given with the rest;
Pennsylvania changed her vote; and a few days later the
Convention of New York approved the resolution, 'thus
supplying the void occasioned by the withdrawing of her
delegates from the vote.' On the same day, July 2, the House
took up Mr. Jefferson's draft of the Declaration, and debated
it during that and the following day and until a late hour on
July 4. Many verbal changes were made, most of which were
conducive to closer accuracy of statement, and were
improvements. Two or three substantial amendments were made by
the omission of passages; notably there was stricken out a
passage in which George III. was denounced for encouraging the
slave-trade. … No interpolation of any consequence was made.
Jefferson had ample cause to congratulate himself upon this
event of the discussion. … He himself spoke not a word in the
debate. … The burden of argument, from which Jefferson wisely
shrank, was gallantly borne by John Adams, whom Jefferson
gratefully called 'the colossus of that debate.' Jefferson
used afterward to take pleasure in tingeing the real solemnity
of the occasion with a coloring of the ludicrous. The debate,
he said, seemed as though it might run on interminably, and
probably would have done so at a different season of the year.
But the weather was oppressively warm, and the room occupied
by the deputies was hard by a stable, whence the hungry flies
swarmed thick and fierce, alighting on the legs of the
delegates and biting hard through their thin silk stockings.
Treason was preferable to discomfort, and the members voted
for the Declaration and hastened to the table to sign it and
escape from the horse-fly. John Hancock, making his great
familiar signature, jestingly said that John Bull could read
that without spectacles; then, becoming more serious, began to
impress on his comrades the necessity of their 'all hanging
together in this matter.' 'Yes, indeed,' interrupted Franklin,
'we must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang
separately.' … Amid such trifling, concealing grave thoughts,
Jefferson saw his momentous document signed at the close of
that summer afternoon."
J. T. Morse, Jr.,
Thomas Jefferson,
chapter 3.
"The statements relative to signing the Declaration are
conflicting. Jefferson states that it was signed generally on
the 4th (Memoirs i, 94), and he in other places reiterates
this statement, but this manuscript is not known to be extant.
… According to the journals, Congress, on the 19th of July,
resolved that the 'declaration, passed on the 4th, be fairly
engrossed on parchment, with the title and style of "The
unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of
America," and that the same, when engrossed, be signed by
every member of Congress.' On the 2d day of August, the
journals say, 'The Declaration being engrossed, and compared
at the table, was signed by the members.' … This manuscript is
preserved in the office of the Secretary of State."
R. Frothingham,
The Rise of the Republic,
page 545 and foot-note.
"Because statesmen like Dickinson and communities like
Maryland were slow in believing that the right moment for a
declaration of independence had come, the preposterous theory
has been suggested that the American Revolution was the work
of an unscrupulous and desperate minority, which, through
intrigue mingled with violence, succeeded in forcing the
reluctant majority to sanction its measures. Such a
misconception has its root in an utter failure to comprehend
the peculiar character of American political life, like the
kindred misconception which ascribes the rebellion of the
colonies to a sordid unwillingness to bear their due share of
the expenses of the British Empire. It is like the
misunderstanding which saw an angry mob in every town-meeting
of the people of Boston, and characterized as a 'riot' every
deliberate expression of public opinion. No one who is
familiar with the essential features of American political
life can for a moment suppose that the Declaration of
Independence was brought about by any less weighty force than
the settled conviction of the people that the priceless
treasure of self-government could be preserved by no other
means. It was but slowly that this unwelcome conviction grew
upon the people; and owing to local differences of
circumstances it grew more slowly in some places than in
others. Prescient leaders, too, like the Adamses and Franklin
and Lee, made up their minds sooner than other people. Even
those conservatives who resisted to the last, even such men as
John Dickinson and Robert Morris, were fully agreed with their
opponents as to the principle at issue between Great Britain
and America, and nothing would have satisfied them short of
the total abandonment by Great Britain of her pretensions to
impose taxes and revoke charters. Upon this fundamental point
there was very little difference of opinion in America. As to
the related question of independence, the decision, when once
reached, was everywhere alike the reasonable result of free
and open discussion; and the best possible illustration of
this is the fact that not even in the darkest days of the war
already begun did any state deliberately propose to reconsider
its action in the matter. The hand once put to the plough,
there was no turning back."
J. Fiske,
The American Revolution,
chapter 4 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 4, chapter 28.
H. S. Randall,
Life of Jefferson,
volume 1, chapter 5.
C. F. Adams,
Life of John Adams,
chapter 4.
J. Madison,
Papers,
volume 1, pages 9-27.
J. Sanderson,
Biographies of the Signers of the Declaration.
See, also, INDEPENDENCE HALL.
{3235}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (July).
Text of the Declaration of Independence.
The following is the text of the great manifesto:
"When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for
one people to dissolve the political bands which have
connected them with another, and to assume among the Powers of
the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of
Nature and of Nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to
the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the
causes which impel them to the separation. We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of Government
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed,
will dictate that Governments long established should not be
changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all
experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to
suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves
by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when
a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably
the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute
Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off
such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future
security.—Such has been the patient sufferance of these
Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them
to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of
the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated
injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To
prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world. He has
refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary
for the public good. He has forbidden his Governors to pass
Laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in
their operation till his Assent should be obtained; and when
so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He
has refused to pass other Laws for the accommodation of large
districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the
right of Representation in the Legislature, a right
inestimable to them and formidable to tyrants only. He has
called together legislative bodies at places unusual,
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public
Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into
compliance with his measures. He has dissolved Representative
Houses repeatedly, for opposing with manly firmness his
invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused for a
long time, after such dissolutions, to cause others to be
elected; whereby the Legislative Powers, incapable of
Annihilation, have returned to the People at large for their
exercise; the State remaining in the mean time exposed to all
the dangers of invasion from without, and convulsions within.
He has endeavoured to prevent the population of these States;
for that purpose obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of
Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their
migration hither, and raising the conditions of new
Appropriations of Lands. He has obstructed the Administration
of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for establishing
Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will
alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and
payment of their salaries. He has erected a multitude of New
Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our
People, and eat out their substance. He has kept among us, in
times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our
legislature. He has affected to render the Military
independent of and superior to the Civil Power. He has
combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign
to our constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving
his Assent to their Acts of pretended Legislation: For
quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For
protecting them, by a mock Trial, from Punishment for any
Murders which they should commit on the Inhabitants of these
States: For cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world:
For imposing taxes on us without our Consent: For depriving us
in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury: For
transporting us beyond Seas to be tried for pretended
offences: For abolishing the free System of English Laws in a
neighbouring Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary
government, and enlarging its Boundaries so as to render it at
once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same
absolute rule into these Colonies: For taking away our
Charters, abolishing our most valuable Laws, and altering
fundamentally the Forms of our Governments: For suspending our
own Legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with Power
to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated
Government here, by declaring us out of his Protection and
waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our
Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our
people. He is at this time transporting large armies of
foreign mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation
and tyranny, already begun with circumstances of Cruelty &
perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and
totally unworthy the Head of a civilized nation. He has
constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas
to bear Arms against their Country, to become the executioners
of their friends and Brethren, or to fall themselves by their
Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and
has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers,
the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is
an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and
conditions. In every stage of these Oppressions We have
Petitioned for Redress in the most humble terms: Our repeated
Petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A
Prince, whose character is thus marked by every act which may
define a Tyrant, is unfit to be the ruler of a free People.
Nor have We been wanting in attention to our Brittish
brethren. We have warned them from time to time of attempts by
their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over
us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our
emigration and settlement here.
{3236}
We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and
we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to
disavow these usurpations, which, would inevitably interrupt
our connections and correspondence. They too have been deaf to
the voice of justice and of consanguinity. We must, therefore,
acquiesce in the necessity, which denounces our Separation,
and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, Enemies in War,
in Peace Friends. We, therefore, the Representatives of the
united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled,
appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude
of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the
good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare,
That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free
and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all
Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political
connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and
ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and
Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude
Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all
other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right
do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm
reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually
pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred
Honor.
John Hancock.
New Hampshire
Josiah Bartlett,
Wm. Whipple,
Matthew Thornton.
Massachusetts Bay
Saml. Adams, John Adams, Robt. Treat Paine,
Elbridge Gerry.
Rhode Island
Step. Hopkins, William Ellery.
Connecticut.
Roger Sherman, Sam'el Huntington, Wm. Williams,
Oliver Wolcott.
New York
Wm. Floyd, Phil. Livingston, Frans. Lewis, Lewis Morris.
New Jersey
Richd. Stockton, Jno. Witherspoon, Fras. Hopkinson,
John Hart, Abra. Clark.
Pennsylvania
Robt. Morris, Benjamin Rush, Benja. Franklin, John Morton,
Geo. Clymer, Jas. Smith, Geo. Taylor, James Wilson,
Geo. Ross.
Delaware.
Cæsar Rodney, Geo. Read, Tho. M'Kean.
Maryland
Samuel Chase, Wm. Paca, Thos. Stone,
Charles Carroll of Carrollton.
Virginia.
George Wythe, Richard Henry Lee, Th Jefferson,
Benja. Harrison, Thos. Ne]son, jr., Francis Lightfoot Lee,
Carter Braxton.
North Carolina.
Wm. Hooper, Joseph Hewes, John Penn.
South Carolina.
Edward Rutledge, Thos. Heyward, Junr.,
Thomas Lynch, Junr., Arthur Middleton.
Georgia.
Button Gwinnett, Lyman Hall, Geo. Walton."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (July).
Constitutional effect of the Declaration of Independence.
"The Declaration of Independence did not create thirteen
sovereign states, but the representatives of the people
declared that the former English colonies, under the name
which they had assumed of the United States of America,
became, from the 4th day of July, 1776, a sovereign state and
a member of the family of nations, recognized by the law of
nations; and further, that the people would support their
representatives with their blood and treasure, in their
endeavor to make this declaration a universally recognized
fact. Neither congress nor the people relied in this upon any
positive right belonging either to the individual colonies
or to the colonies as a whole. Rather did the Declaration of
Independence and the war destroy all existing political jural
relations, and seek their moral justification in the right of
revolution inherent in every people in extreme emergencies. …
Political theories had nothing to do with this development of
things. It was the natural result of given circumstances and
was an accomplished fact before anyone thought of the legal
consequences which might subsequently be deduced from it."
H. von Holst,
Constitutional and Political History of the United States,
volume 1, chapter 1.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (July).
Independence declared in New Jersey
and Governor Franklin arrested.
See NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1774-1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (August).
The struggle for New York and the Hudson.
Battle of Long Island.
"Washington had been informed, early in January, that General
Sir Henry Clinton had sailed from Boston, with a considerable
body of troops, on a secret expedition. Apprehending that the
city of New York was his destination, he immediately
dispatched General Charles Lee to Connecticut to raise troops,
and to proceed to that city to watch and oppose Clinton
wherever he might attempt to land. Six weeks before the
evacuation of Boston [March 17, 1776], Lee had encamped near
New York with twelve hundred militia. Already the Sons of
Liberty had been busy, and overt acts of rebellion had been
committed by them. They had seized the cannons at Fort George,
and driven Tryon, the royal governor, on board the Asia, a
British armed vessel in the harbor. In March, Clinton arrived
at Sandy Hook, just outside New York harbor, and on the same
day, the watchful Lee providentially entered the city. The
movement, although without a knowledge of Clinton's position,
was timely, for it kept him at bay. Foiled in his attempt upon
New York, that commander sailed southward. … The destination
of Howe, when he left Boston, was also unknown to Washington.
Supposing he, too, would proceed to New York, he put the main
body of his army in motion toward that city, as soon as he had
placed Boston in a state of security. He arrived in New York
about the middle of April [April 14], and proceeded at once to
fortify the town and vicinity, and also the passes of the
Hudson Highlands, fifty miles above. In the mean while,
General Lee, who had been appointed to command the American
forces in the South, had left his troops in the charge of
General Lord Stirling [March 7], and was hastening toward the
Carolinas to watch the movements of Clinton, arouse the Whigs,
and gather an army there. … Pursuant to instructions, General
Howe proceeded toward New York, to meet General Clinton and
Parker's fleet. He left Halifax on the 11th of June, [1776],
and arrived at Sandy Hook on the 29th. On the 2d of July he
took possession of Staten Island, where he was joined by Sir
Henry Clinton [July 11], from the South, and his brother,
Admiral Lord Howe [July 12], with a fleet and a large land
force, from England. Before the first of August, other vessels
arrived with a part of the Hessian troops, and on that day,
almost 30,000 soldiers, many of them tried veterans, stood
ready to fall upon the republican army of 17,000 men, mostly
militia, which lay intrenched in New York and vicinity, less
than a dozen miles distant. The grand object in view was the
seizure of New York and the country along the Hudson, so as to
keep open a communication with Canada, separate the patriots of
New England from those of the other states, and to overrun the
most populous portion of the revolted colonies.
{3237}
This was the military plan, arranged by ministers. They had
also prepared instructions to their commanding generals, to be
pacific, if the Americans appeared disposed to submit. Lord
Howe and his brother, the general, were commissioned to 'grant
pardon to all who deserved mercy,' and to treat for peace, but
only on terms of absolute submission on the part of the
colonies, to the will of the King and parliament. After making
a foolish display of arrogance and weakness, in addressing
General Washington as a private gentleman, and being assured
that the Americans had been guilty of no offense requiring a
'pardon' at their hands, they prepared to strike an immediate
and effective blow. The British army was accordingly put in
motion on the morning of the 22d of August [1776], and during
that day, 10,000 effective men, and forty pieces of cannon,
were landed on the western end of Long Island, between the
present Fort Hamilton and Gravesend village. Already
detachments of Americans under General Sullivan, occupied a
fortified camp at Brooklyn, opposite New York, and guarded
seven passes on a range of hills which extend from the Narrows
to the village of Jamaica. When intelligence of the landing of
the invading army reached Washington, he sent General Putnam,
with large reinforcements, to take the chief command on Long
Island; and to prepare to meet the enemy. The American troops
on the island now [August 26], numbered about 5,000. The
British moved in three divisions. The left, under General
Grant, marched along the shore toward Gowanus; the right,
under Clinton and Cornwallis, toward the interior of the
island; and the center, composed chiefly of Hessians, under De
Heister, marched up the Flatbush road, south of the hills.
Clinton moved under cover of night, and before dawn on the
morning of the 27th, he had gained possession of the Jamaica
pass, near the present East New York. At the same time, Grant
was pressing forward along the shore of New York Bay, and at
day-break, he encountered Lord Stirling, where the monuments
of Greenwood cemetery now dot the hills. De Heister advanced
from Flatbush at the same hour, and attacked Sullivan, who,
having no suspicions of the movements of Clinton, was watching
the Flatbush Pass. A bloody conflict ensued, and while it was
progressing, Clinton descended from the wooded hills, by the
way of Bedford, to gain Sullivan's rear. As soon as the latter
perceived his peril, he ordered a retreat to the American
lines at Brooklyn. It was too late; Clinton drove him back
upon the Hessian bayonets, and after fighting desperately,
hand to hand, with the foe in front and rear, and losing a
greater portion of his men, Sullivan was compelled to
surrender. As usual, misfortunes did not come single. While
these disasters were occurring on the left, Cornwallis
descended the port-road to Gowanus, and attacked Stirling.
They fought desperately, until Stirling was made prisoner.
Many of his troops were drowned while endeavoring to escape
across the Gowanus Creek, as the tide was rising; and a large
number were captured. At noon the victory for the British was
complete. About 500 Americans were killed or wounded, and
1,100 were made prisoners. These were soon suffering dreadful
horrors in prisons and prison-ships, at New York. The British
loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, was 367. It was with
the deepest anguish that Washington had viewed, from New York,
the destruction of his troops, yet he dared not weaken his
power in the city, by sending reinforcements to aid them. He
crossed over on the following morning [August 28], with
Mifflin, who had come down from the upper end of York island
with a thousand troops, and was gratified to find the enemy
encamped in front of Putnam's lines, and delaying an attack,
until the British fleet should co-operate with him. This delay
allowed Washington time to form and execute a plan for the
salvation of the remainder of the army, now too weak to resist
an assault with any hope of success. Under cover of a heavy
fog, which fell upon the hostile camps at midnight of the
29th, and continued until the morning of the 30th, he silently
withdrew them from the camp, and, unperceived by the British,
they all crossed over to New York in safety, carrying
everything with them but their heavy cannons. … Howe, who felt
sure of his prey, was greatly mortified, and prepared to make
an immediate attack upon New York, before the Americans should
become reinforced, or should escape from it."
B. J. Lossing,
Family History of the United States,
period 5, chapter 3.
ALSO IN:
H. P. Johnston,
The Campaign of 1776 around New York and Brooklyn,
chapters 1-5,
(Members of Long Island History Society, volume 3).
T. W. Field,
The Battle of Long island
(Members of Long Island History Society, volume 2).
W. A. Duer,
Life of Wm. Alexander, Earl of Stirling,
chapter 5.
J. Fiske,
The American Revolution,
chapter 5 (volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (September).
Quiet death of proprietary government in Pennsylvania
and adoption of a State Constitution.
See PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (September-November).
The struggle for New York and the Hudson.
Successes of the British.
Washington's retreat into New Jersey.
"At daybreak the British awoke, but it was too late. They had
fought a successful battle, they had had the American army in
their grasp, and now all was over. The victory had melted
away, and, as a grand result, they had a few hundred
prisoners, a stray boat with three camp-followers, and the
deserted works in which they stood. To make such a retreat as
this was a feat of arms as great as most victories, and in it
we see, perhaps as plainly as anywhere, the nerve and
quickness of the man who conducted it. It is true it was the
only chance of salvation, but the great man is he who is
entirely master of his opportunity, even if he have but one.
The outlook, nevertheless, was, as Washington wrote, 'truly
distressing.' The troops were dispirited, and the militia
began to disappear, us they always did after a defeat.
Congress would not permit the destruction of the city,
different interests pulled in different directions,
conflicting opinions distracted the councils of war, and, with
utter inability to predict the enemy's movements, everything
led to halfway measures and to intense anxiety, while Lord
Howe tried to negotiate with Congress, and the Americans
waited for events, Washington, looking beyond the confusion of
the moment, saw that he had gained much by delay, and had his
own plan well defined. … Everyone else, however, saw only past
defeat and present peril.
{3238}
The British ships gradually made their way up the river, until
it became apparent that they intended to surround and cut off
the American army. Washington made preparations to withdraw,
but uncertainty of information came near rendering his
precautions futile. September 15th the men-of-war opened fire,
and troops were landed near Kip's Bay. The militia in the
breastworks at that point had been at Brooklyn and gave way at
once, communicating their panic to two Connecticut regiments.
Washington, galloping down to the scene of battle, came upon
the disordered and flying troops. He dashed in among them,
conjuring them to stop, but even while he was trying to rally
them they broke again on the appearance of some sixty or
seventy of the enemy, and ran in all directions. In a tempest
of anger Washington drew his pistols, struck the fugitives
with his sword, and was only forced from the field by one of
his officers seizing the bridle of his horse and dragging him
away from the British, now within a hundred yards of the spot.
… The rout and panic over, Washington quickly turned to deal
with the pressing danger. With coolness and quickness he
issued his orders, and succeeded in getting his army off,
Putnam's division escaping most narrowly. He then took post at
King's Bridge, and began to strengthen and fortify his lines.
While thus engaged, the enemy advanced, and on the 16th a
sharp skirmish was fought, in which the British were repulsed,
and great bravery was shown by the Connecticut and Virginia
troops, the two commanding officers being killed. This affair,
which was the first gleam of success, encouraged the troops,
and was turned to the best account by the general. Still a
successful skirmish did not touch the essential difficulties
of the situation, which then as always came from within,
rather than without. To face and check 25,000 well equipped
and highly disciplined soldiers, Washington had now some
12,000 men, lacking in everything which goes to make an army,
except mere individual courage and a high average of
intelligence. Even this meagre force was an inconstant and
diminishing quantity, shifting, uncertain, and always
threatening dissolution. The task of facing and fighting the
enemy was enough for the ablest of men; but Washington was
obliged also to combat and overcome the inertness and dullness
born of ignorance, and to teach Congress how to govern a
nation at war. … Meanwhile the days slipped along, and
Washington waited on the Harlem Plains, planning descents on
Long Island, and determining to make a desperate stand where
he was, unless the situation decidedly changed. Then the
situation did change, as neither he nor anyone else apparently
had anticipated. The British warships came up the Hudson past
the forts, brushing aside our boasted obstructions, destroying
our little fleet, and getting command of the river. Then
General Howe landed at Frog's Point, where he was checked for
the moment by the good disposition of Heath, under
Washington's direction. These two events made it evident that
the situation of the American army was full of peril, and that
retreat was again necessary. Such certainly was the conclusion
of the council of war, on the 16th, acting this time in
agreement with their chief. Six days Howe lingered on Frog's
Point, bringing up stores or artillery or something, … and
gave six days to Washington. They were of little value to
Howe, but they were of inestimable worth to Washington, who
employed them in getting everything in readiness, in holding
his council of war, and then on the 17th in moving
deliberately off to very strong ground at White Plains. … On
the 28th, Howe came up to Washington's position, and found the
Americans quite equal in numbers, strongly intrenched, and
awaiting his attack with confidence. He hesitated, doubted,
and finally feeling that he must do something, sent 4,000 men
to storm Chatterton Hill, an outlying post, where some 1,400
Americans were stationed. There was a short, sharp action, and
then the Americans retreated in good order to the main army,
having lost less than half as many men as their opponents.
With caution now much enlarged, Howe sent for reinforcements,
and waited two days. The third day it rained, and on the
fourth Howe found that Washington had withdrawn to a higher
and quite impregnable line of hills, where he held all the
passes in the rear and awaited a second attack. Howe
contemplated the situation for two or three days longer, and
then broke camp and withdrew to Dobbs Ferry. Such were the
great results of the victory of Long Island, two wasted
months, and the American army still untouched. Howe was
resolved, however, that his campaign, should not be utterly
fruitless, and therefore directed his attention to the
defences of the Hudson, Fort Lee, and Fort Washington, and
here he met with better success. Congress, in its military
wisdom, had insisted that these forts must and could be held.
… An attempt was made to hold both forts, and both were lost,
as he [Washington] had foreseen. From Fort Lee the garrison
withdrew in safety. Fort Washington was carried by storm,
after a severe struggle. Twenty-six hundred men and all the
munitions of war fell into the hands of the enemy. It was a
serious and most depressing loss, and was felt throughout the
continent. Meantime Washington had crossed into the Jerseys,
and, after the loss of Fort Lee, began to retreat before the
British, who, flushed with victory, now advanced rapidly under
Lord Cornwallis."
H. C. Lodge,
George Washington,
volume 1, chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapters 33-36.
G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathanael Greene,
chapters 8-11 (volume 1).
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the American Revolution,
volume 2, chapter 23.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776 (October).
Connecticut assumes independence and sovereignty.
See CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1777.
Washington's retreat through New Jersey and his
masterly return movement.
The victories at Trenton and Princeton
retrieving the situation.
"On the 17th [of November] Washington ordered Lee [who had
lately returned from the south, and who had command of 7,000
men at Northcastle] to come over and join him; but Lee
disobeyed, and in spite of repeated orders from Washington he
stayed at Northcastle till the 2d of December. General Ward
had some time since resigned, so that Lee now ranked next to
Washington. A good many people were finding fault with the
latter for losing the 3,000 men at Fort Washington, although,
as we have seen, that was not his fault but the fault of
Congress.
{3239}
Lee now felt that if Washington were ruined, he would surely
become his successor in the command of the army, and so,
instead of obeying his orders, he spent his time in writing
letters calculated to injure him. Lee's disobedience thus
broke the army in two, and did more for the British than they
had been able to do for themselves since they started from
Staten Island. It was the cause of Washington's flight through
New Jersey, ending on the 8th of December, when he put himself
behind the Delaware river, with scarcely 3,000 men. Here was
another difficulty. The American soldiers were enlisted for
short terms, and when they were discouraged, as at present,
they were apt to insist upon going home as soon as their time
had expired. It was generally believed that Washington's army
would thus fall to pieces within a few days. Howe did not
think it worth while to be at the trouble of collecting boats
wherewith to follow him across the Delaware. Congress fled to
Baltimore. People in New Jersey began taking the oath of
allegiance to the crown. Howe received the news that he had
been knighted for his victory on Long Island, and he returned
to New York to celebrate the occasion. While the case looked
so desperate for Washington, events at the north had taken a
less unfavourable turn. Carleton [who began preparations to
invade the province of New York as soon as Arnold retreated
from Canada] had embarked on Lake Champlain early in the
autumn with his fine army and fleet. Arnold had fitted up a
small fleet to oppose his advance, and on the 11th of October
there had been a fierce naval battle between the two near
Valcour Island, in which Arnold was defeated, while Carleton
suffered serious damage. The British general then advanced
upon Ticonderoga, but suddenly made up his mind that the

season was too late for operations in that latitude. The
resistance he had encountered seems to have made him despair
of achieving any speedy success in that quarter, and on the 3d
of November he started back for Canada. This retreat relieved
General Schuyler at Albany of immediate cause for anxiety, and
presently he detached seven regiments to go southward to
Washington's assistance. On the 2d of December Lee crossed the
Hudson with 4,000 men, and proceeded slowly to Morristown.
Just what he designed to do was never known, but clearly he
had no intention of going beyond the Delaware to assist
Washington, whom he believed to be ruined. Perhaps he thought
Morristown a desirable position to hold, as it certainly was.
Whatever his plans may have been, they were nipped in the bud.
For some unknown reason he passed the night of the 12th at an
unguarded tavern, about four miles from his army; and there he
was captured next morning by a party of British dragoons, who
carried him off to their camp at Princeton. The dragoons were
very gleeful over this unexpected exploit, but really they
could not have done the Americans a greater service than to
rid them of such a worthless creature. The capture of Lee came
in the nick of time, for it set free his men to go to the aid
of Washington. Even after this force and that sent by Schuyler
had reached the commander-in-chief, he found he had only 6,000
men fit for duty. With this little force Washington instantly
took the offensive. It was the turning-point in his career and
in the history of the Revolutionary War. On Christmas, 1776,
and the following nine days, an Washington's most brilliant
powers were displayed. The British centre, 10,000 strong, lay
at Princeton. The principal generals, thinking the serious
business of the war ended, had gone to New York. An advanced
party of Hessians, 1,000 strong, was posted on the bank of the
Delaware at Trenton, and another one lower down, at
Burlington. Washington decided to attack both these outposts,
and arranged his troops accordingly, but when Christmas night
arrived, the river was filled with great blocks of floating
ice, and the only division which succeeded in crossing was the
one that Washington led in person. It was less than 2,500 in
number, but the moment had come when the boldest course was
the safest. By daybreak Washington had surprised the Hessians
at Trenton and captured them all. The outpost at Burlington,
on hearing the news, retreated to Princeton. By the 31st
Washington had got all his available force across to Trenton.
Some of them were raw recruits just come in to replace others
who had just gone home. At this critical moment the army was
nearly helpless for want of money, and on New Year's morning
Robert Morris was knocking at door after door in Philadelphia,
waking up his friends to borrow the $50,000, which he sent off
to Trenton before noon. The next day Cornwallis arrived at
Princeton, and taking with him all the army, except a
rear-guard of 2,000 men left to protect his communications,
came on toward Trenton. When he reached that town, late in the
afternoon, he found Washington entrenched behind a small creek
just south of the town, with his back toward the Delaware
river. 'Oho!' said Cornwallis, 'at last we have run down the
old fox, and we will bag him in the morning.' He sent back to
Princeton, and ordered the rearguard to come up. He expected
next morning to cross the creek above Washington's right, and
then press him back against the broad and deep river, and
compel him to surrender. Cornwallis was by no means a careless
general, but he seems to have gone to bed on that memorable
night and slept the sleep of the just. Washington meanwhile
was wide awake. He kept his front line noisily at work digging
and entrenching, and made a fine show with his camp-fires.
Then he marched his army to the right and across the creek,
and got around Cornwallis's left wing and into his rear, and
so went on gayly toward Princeton. At daybreak he encountered
the British rear-guard, fought a sharp battle with it and sent
it flying, with the loss of one-fourth of its number. The
booming guns aroused Cornwallis too late. To preserve his
communications with New York, he was obliged to retreat with
all haste upon New Brunswick, while Washington's victorious
army pushed on and occupied the strong position at Morristown.
There was small hope of dislodging such a general from such a
position. But to leave Washington in possession of Morristown
was to resign to him the laurels of this half-year's work. For
that position guarded the Highlands of the Hudson on the one
hand, and the roads to Philadelphia on the other. Except that
the British had taken the city of New York-which from the
start was almost a foregone conclusion—they were no better off
than in July when Lord Howe had landed on Staten Island. In
nine days the tables had been completely turned.
{3240}
The attack upon, an outpost had developed into a campaign
which quite retrieved the situation. The ill-timed
interference of Congress, which had begun the series of
disasters, was remedied; the treachery of Lee was checkmated;
and the cause of American Independence, which on Christmas Eve
had seemed hopeless, was now fairly set on its feet. Earlier
successes had been local; this was continental. Seldom has so
much been done with such slender means."
J. Fiske,
The War of Independence,
chapter 6.
"The effect of these two unexpected strokes at Trenton and
Princeton was to baffle Howe, and utterly disconcert his
plans. Expecting to march upon Philadelphia at his leisure, he
suddenly finds Washington turning about and literally cutting
his way through the British posts, back to a point where he
threatened Howe's flank and rear. The enemy were at once
compelled to retire from all their positions below Brunswick,
give up the thought of wintering in Philadelphia, and fall
back to the vicinity of New York. When Horace Walpole heard of
these movements, he wrote to Sir Horace Mann: 'Washington has
shown himself both a Fabius and a Camillus. His march through
our lines is allowed to have been a prodigy of generalship. In
one word, I look upon a great part of America as lost to this
country.' Here the campaign closed. Washington could not be
dislodged from his strong mountain position, and Howe was
satisfied to rest his troops and postpone further operations
until the next season. Meantime the country took heart,
Congress voted troops and supplies, and the army was recruited
and organized on a better basis. 'The business of war is the
result of Experience,' wrote Wolcott from Congress, with faith
unshaken during the darkest hours of the campaign; and
experience was now put to good profit. The crisis was passed.
Events proved decisive. Hardship and anxiety were yet to come
during succeeding years of the war; but it was the result of
this year's struggle that cleared away misgivings and
confirmed the popular faith in final success. England could do
no more than she had done to conquer America; while America
was now more ready than ever to meet the issue. Independence
was established in the present campaign—in the year of its
declaration; and more than to any others we owe this political
privilege to the men who fought from Long Island to
Princeton."
H. P. Johnston,
Campaign of 1776,
Memoirs of the Long Island Historical Society,
volume 3, part 1, chapter 8.
ALSO IN:
J. F. Hageman,
History of Princeton,
chapter 4, sections 4-5 (volume 1).
J. O. Raum,
History of New Jersey,
chapter 20 (volume 2).
W. B. Reed,
Life of Joseph Reed,
volume 1, chapter 4.
W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 3, chapter 21.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1777.
Prisoners and exchanges.
British treatment of captives.
The Jersey Prison-ship and the Sugar-house prison.
In New York, during the British occupation of the city,
"wretched indeed was the condition of the poor refugee, of the
sick soldier, and, above all, the patriot prisoner. The
newspapers are filled with calls for charitable contributions
for women and children perishing with cold and hunger, for
disabled soldiers and families without a shelter. … But if the
favored Tories suffered, what must have been the condition of
the patriot prisoners, confined by thousands in bleak
barracks, churches, and prison-ships? Let us pass up Broadway,
amidst the uncleared ruins, and, turning down Liberty Street,
pause before a huge brick building near the Middle Dutch
Church. It is five stories high, with broken windows, through
which the fierce winds of winter rush unrestrained. Through
its imperfect roof and various openings, snow, ice, and water
penetrate to every part of the building. Sentries pace round
its walls prepared to fire upon any of its maddened inmates
who attempt in desperation to escape. Wounded men crawl to the
windows begging aid; but the impassive sentinel turns back the
gifts of the charitable. No communication with the prisoners
can be allowed. The walls within are bare and cheerless, nor
do any of the common conveniences of life soften the horrors
of those dreary chambers. Yet the old Sugar-House is the most
crowded building in New York, and hundreds of prisoners, some
chained, others at large, fill its comfortless interior. In
the old Sugar-House were confined the prisoners of Long
Island, the captives of sudden forays, the patriot citizen,
and the heroes of the rebel army. Clothed in rags and scarcely
covered from the winter air, crowded in narrow apartments and
broken by hunger and disease, the prisoners died by thousands.
The sick lay down on beds of snow to perish; the feeble
wounded quivered in the February blast. Food of the coarsest
kind was served out to them in scanty measure, and devoured
with the eagerness of famine. Every night ten or twenty died;
every day their corpses were thrown into pits without a single
rite of burial. When led out to be exchanged, the glad hope of
freedom gave them no joy—they died on the way to their
friends, or lingered out a few weeks of miserable decline in
the hospitals of the Jerseys. So wretched was their condition
that Washington refused to consider them fit subjects for
exchange. 'You give us only the dead or dying,' he wrote to
Howe, 'for our well-fed and healthy prisoners.' Howe, as if in
mockery, replied that they had been kept in 'airy, roomy
buildings,' on the same fare as his own soldiers. Washington
pointed to the condition in which they reached him—diseased,
famished, emaciated, and dying, as they were conducted to his
quarters. Across the river, in Wallabout Bay, lay the
prison-ship 'Jersey.' She was the hulk of a 64 gun ship, long
unseaworthy, her masts and rigging gone, her figurehead broken
off, and her whole appearance singularly repulsive. Yet on
board of the Jersey were confined 1,200 captured seamen. She
was never cleansed, and lay in that condition seven years. No
fires warmed her occupants in winter, no screen sheltered them
from the August sun; no physician visited the sick, no
clergyman consoled the dying there. Poor and scanty food, the
want of clothing, cleanliness, and exercise, and raging
diseases that never ceased their ravages, made the Jersey a
scene of human suffering to which the Black Hole of Calcutta
might favorably compare. Benevolent Tories would sometimes
convey by stealth food or clothing to her unhappy inmates; but
this was little. Toward the close of the war the British, from
shame or pity, made some improvement in her condition; but she
remained throughout the contest a centre of sickness and
death, always decimated by disease and always replenished with
new victims. The bones of her dead, estimated at 11,000, lie
buried on the Brooklyn shore. The crowded city itself was
never free from contagion. In winter the smallpox made fearful
ravages."
E. Lawrence,
New York in the Revolution
(Harper's Magazine, July, 1868).
ALSO IN:
Force's American Archives,
4th Series, volume 6,
5th Series, volumes 1-3.
History Magazine, 1866, sup.
W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 3, chapter 21.
{3241}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1778.
Attitude and feeling of France.
Her disposition to aid the colonies and the reasons for it.
The American embassy to the French court.
Silas Deane and Beaumarchais.
Franklin at Passy.
"On March 17, 1776, Vergennes presented to his associates in
the cabinet—Maurepas, Turgot (controller-general), Sartine
(secretary of the navy), and St. Germain (secretary of war)—a
paper entitled 'Considerations,' which, after for many years
evading the search of historians, … was brought to light by De
Witt and republished by Doniol. In this important paper
Vergennes, after some general reflections on the advantages
which the two crowns of France and Spain derived from the
continuance of the civil war in America, and, on the other
hand, on the inconveniences which might arise from the
independence of the Colonies, and the probability that, in
case of failure in North America, England would, to recover
its credit, turn its arms against the French and Spanish
possessions in America, proceeds to consider the course at
once to be pursued. He bitterly attacks the English for their
habitual breach of good faith, violation of treaties, and
disregard of that observance of the sacred laws of morality
which distinguish the French, and infers that they will take
the first opportunity to declare war against France or invade
Mexico. No doubt, if the kings of France and Spain had martial
tendencies; if they obeyed the dictates of their own
interests, and perhaps the justice of their cause, which was
that of humanity, so often outraged by England; if their
military resources were in a sufficiently good condition, they
would feel that Providence had evidently chosen that very hour
for humiliating England and revenging on her the wrongs she
had inflicted on those who had the misfortune to be her
neighbors and rivals, by rendering the resistance of the
Americans as desperate as possible. The exhaustion produced by
this internecine war would prostrate both England and her
Colonies, and would afford an opportunity to reduce England to
the condition of a second-rate power; to tear from her the
empire she aimed at establishing in the four quarters of the
world with so much pride and injustice, and relieve the
universe of a tyranny which desires to swallow up both all the
power and all the wealth of the world. But the two crowns not
being able to act in this way, they must have recourse to a
circumspect policy." Vergennes "draws the following
inferences:
(1) That they should continue dexterously to keep the English
ministry in a state of false security with respect to the
intentions of France and Spain.
(2) That it would be politic to give the insurgents secret
assistance in military stores and money; that the admitted
utility would justify this little sacrifice, and no loss of
dignity or breach of equity would be involved in it.
(3) That it would not be consistent with the king's dignity or
interest to make an open contract with the insurgents until
their independence was achieved.
(4) That in case France and Spain should furnish assistance,
they should look for no other return than the success of the
political object they had at that moment in view, leaving
themselves at liberty to be guided by circumstances as to any
future arrangements.
(5) That perhaps a too-marked inactivity at the present crisis
might be attributed by the English to fear, and might expose
France to insults to which it might not be disposed to submit.
The English, he adds, respect only those who can make
themselves feared.
(6) That the result to which all these considerations led was
that the two crowns should actively prepare means to resist or
punish England, more especially as, of all possible issues,
the maintenance of peace with that power was the least
probable.
… It would be a mistake, however, to attribute the French
support of America exclusively to a feeling of revenge for the
humiliations of the prior war. Other motives came in and
exercised a decisive influence. There was a conviction, and a
right one, in France that for Britain to hold under control
the whole of North America as well as of India would give her
a maritime supremacy, as well as a superiority in wealth,
which would constitute a standing menace to the rest of the
civilized world. There was, again, an enthusiasm among the
young nobility and among officers in the army for America,
which, even aside from the bitterness towards Britain with
which it was mingled, had great effect on people as well as on
court; and to this was added the sympathy of doctrinaire
political philosophers who then and for some time afterwards
had great power in forming French public opinion. By the
enthusiasm of the young nobility the queen—brilliant, bold,
weary of the traditions of the old court, inconsiderate as to
ultimate political results—was affected, and through her her
husband was reached. But above this was the sense of right
which was uppermost in the breast of the unfortunate sovereign
who then, with little political experience but high notions of
duty as well as of prerogative, occupied the throne."
F. Wharton, editor,
Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence
of the United States,
Introduction, chapter 4 (volume 1).
"From the earliest moment France had been hopefully regarded
by the colonists as probably their friend and possibly their
ally. To France, therefore, the first American envoy was
dispatched with promptitude [receiving his instructions in
March and reaching Paris in the following June, 1776] even
before there was a declaration of independence or an
assumption of nationality. Silas Deane was the man selected.
He was the true Yankee jack-at-all-trades; he had been
graduated at Yale College, then taught school, then practiced
law, then engaged in trade, had been all the while advancing
in prosperity and reputation, had been a member of the first
and second congresses, had failed of reëlection to the third,
and was now without employment. Mr'. Parton describes him as
'of somewhat striking manners and good appearance, accustomed
to live and entertain in liberal style, and fond of showy
equipage and appointment.' Perhaps his simple-minded
fellow-countrymen of the provinces fancied that such a man
would make an imposing figure at an European court.
{3242}
He developed no other peculiar fitness for his position; he
could not even speak French; and it proved an ill hour for
himself in which he received this trying and difficult honor.
… Deane arrived in France in June, 1776. He had with him a
little ready money for his immediate personal expenses, and
some letters of introduction from Franklin. It was intended to
keep him supplied with money by sending cargoes of tobacco,
rice, and indigo consigned to him, the proceeds of which would
be at his disposal for the public service. He was instructed
to seek an interview with de Vergennes, the French minister
for foreign affairs, and to endeavor with all possible
prudence and delicacy to find out what signs of promise the
disposition of the French government really held for the
insurgents. He was also to ask for equipment for 25,000
troops, ammunition, and 200 pieces of field artillery, all to
be paid for—when Congress should be able! In France he was to
keep his mission cloaked in secure secrecy, appearing simply
as a merchant conducting his own affairs. … Before the arrival
of Deane the interests of the colonies had been already taken
in hand and substantially advanced in France by one of the
most extraordinary characters in history. Caron de
Beaumarchais was a man whom no race save the French could
produce, and whose traits, career, and success lie hopelessly
beyond the comprehension of the Anglo-Saxon. Bred a
watchmaker, he had the skill, when a mere youth, to invent a
clever escapement balance for regulating watches; had he been
able to insert it into his own brain he might have held more
securely his elusive good fortunes. From being an ingenious
inventor he became an adventurer general, watchmaker to the
king, the king's mistresses, and the king's daughters, the
lover, or rather the beloved, of the wife of the controller of
the king's kitchen, then himself the controller, thence a
courtier, and a favorite of the royal princesses. Through a
clever use of his opportunities he was able to do a great
favor to a rich banker, who in return gave him chances to
amass a fortune, and lent him money to buy a patent of
nobility. This connection ended in litigation, which was near
ruining him; but he discovered corruption on the part of the
judge, and thereupon wrote his Memorials, of which the wit,
keenness, and vivacity made him famous. He then rendered a
private, personal, and important service to Louis XV., and
soon afterwards another to the young Louis XVI. … He became
frenzied in the American cause. In long and ardent letters he
opened upon King Louis and his ministers a rattling fire of
arguments sound and unsound, statements true and untrue,
inducements reasonable and unreasonable, forecastings probable
and improbable, politics wise and unwise, all designed to show
that it was the bounden duty of France to adopt the colonial
cause."
J. T. Morse, Jr.,
Benjamin Franklin,
chapter 9.
Soon after the arrival of Deane in Paris, the American
Congress, having determined to declare the independence of the
states represented in it, appointed a committee "to prepare
the plan of a treaty to be proposed to foreign powers, which,
after a long discussion, was at length agreed to, and
ministers were appointed to negotiate the treaties proposed.
Mr. Franklin, Mr. Deane, and Mr. Jefferson, were elected; but,
the last mentioned gentleman having declined accepting the
appointment offered him, Mr. Arthur Lee, then in London, was
chosen in his place. These transactions were placed on the
secret journals, and no member was permitted to give any
specific information concerning them; or to state more than,
'that congress had taken such steps as they judged necessary
for obtaining foreign alliances.' The secret committee were
directed to make an effectual lodgment in France of £10,000
sterling, subject to the order of these commissioners. They
assembled in Paris early in the winter, and had an immediate
interview with the count De Vergennes. It was perceived that
the success of the American cruisers, whose captures had been
so considerable as to raise the price of insurance higher than
it had been at any time during the war with both France and
Spain, had excited a very favourable opinion of the capacities
and energies of the nation. They were assured that the ports
of France would remain open to their ships, and that the
American merchants might freely vend in them every article of
commerce, and purchase whatever might be useful for their
country. But it was apparent that the minister wished to avoid
a rupture with England, and was, therefore, unwilling to
receive them openly as the ministers of the United States, or
to enter into any formal negotiation with them."
J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 7.
"It is … a settled rule of diplomacy that a minister should
not be pressed upon a foreign court by which it is understood
that he will not be received. To this may be added the rule
that applications for loans should, unless as part of a treaty
alliance, be made through business channels. In disregard of
these rules the majority of Congress, under the influence of
Richard H. Lee and Samuel Adams, instituted a series of
missions to European courts for the bare purpose of borrowing
money, when the courts so addressed not only gave no
intimation that they would receive these envoys, but when,
from the nature of things, as well as from unofficial
intimation, it should have been known that such reception
would be refused. With France there was no difficulty, as
France had intimated unofficially that such envoys would be
received, at least in a private capacity, France being then
ready to take the consequence of war with Britain. And this
reception was accorded … first to Silas Deane, then to
Franklin, and then to Arthur Lee. Here Franklin thought
Congress should stop, saying that ministers should not be sent
to sovereigns without first having some sort of assurance of
recognition of the United States as an independent
sovereignty, and that a 'virgin' republic, as he called it,
should wait till there was some such recognition before
thrusting embassies on foreign courts with demands for money.
Congress thought differently. Arthur Lee was instructed to go
to Madrid with an alternate commission to Berlin; William Lee
was sent to Vienna, Dana to St. Petersburg, Adams to The
Hague, Izard to Florence, and the instructions in each case
were to demand not only recognition, but subsidy. … The policy
of sending ministers to European courts where such ministers
were not received worked injuriously to the United States from
the mere fact of their non-reception. Another difficulty arose
from the circumstance that several of these ministers took up
their residence in Paris, and, without specific authority,
considered it their duty to take part in the counsels of the
American legation.
{3243}
Thus Ralph Izard, commissioned to Tuscany, never went there,
but remained in Paris, claiming a right to be informed of all
the details of the negotiations with France, and occupying no
small share of the time and care of Franklin with discussions
of this claim, which Franklin could not accede to, but on
which Izard continued to insist. When the triple legation of
Franklin, Deane, and Arthur Lee (and afterwards Franklin,
Arthur Lee, and Adams), was commissioned, it was understood
that its members were to divide, so that one (Franklin) should
remain in Paris, while the others should take charge of the
missions to other capitals. But Arthur Lee, when he found that
he could not be received in Madrid, or in Vienna, or in
Berlin, made but brief excursions to Spain, to Austria, and to
Berlin, reporting himself after each short trip promptly at
Paris, there to differ from Franklin not only as to important
business details, but as to the whole policy of the mission.
When Adams was in Paris, during their joint mission, he
concurred with Arthur Lee in what turned out to be the
disastrous measure of removing Williams as commercial agent
and putting in his place William Lee, with a nephew of William
and Arthur Lee as clerk; while on the whole question of
sending legations to foreign courts which had not consented to
receive them, and in the still more important question of the
attitude to be assumed by the commissioners to the French
court, Adams agreed with Lee. … It is due to Adams to say that
he saw the inherent difficulties of permanent missions
conducted by three joint commissioners; that he recommended
that there should be but one permanent minister to France; and
that he recognized Franklin's great influence with the French
ministry as a strong reason for his retention though without
colleagues. But there can be no doubt that down to the period
when Franklin became sole minister, the American cause in
Europe was much embarrassed by the fact that he had colleagues
associated with him."
F. Wharton,
Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of The United States,
chapter 1, sections 16-17,
and chapter 9, section 106 (volume 1).
Before Franklin or Lee reached France, Silas Deane had already
entered into negotiations with Beaumarchais and opened a train
of dealings which proved unfortunate for both. Leaving aside
"all the long controversy about the rights and wrongs of
Beaumarchais, which have never been completely and
satisfactorily solved, … it appears that a large part of the
misunderstanding between him and Deane and Arthur Lee is
attributable to a change of plan between April and July, 1776.
Beaumarchais's scheme of operation, when he saw Lee in London,
was to expend money which should, at least in pretence and
form, be obtained from the voluntary contributions of wealthy
Frenchmen in aid of the American cause; but in July, when he
saw Deane, that scheme had been dropped, and the project was
that he should appear as a merchant. … In May, there was a
plan on the part of the French government to employ a real
merchant; now the plan was to employ a comedy merchant. This
was exactly the role which Beaumarchais was qualified to fill,
and he proceeded to establish and open a large house, with all
the accessories of a house of business, as the same are
understood and represented on the stage, At that time it was
believed that the colonists had plenty of exportable products
which they could and would contribute for the purpose
[purchase?] of arms and ammunition. It was thought that their
main difficulty would be to find any market in which they
could purchase contraband of war. The chief assistance,
therefore, which they would need from France would be secret
permission to make this exchange in France. Beaumarchais's
commercial operations would be real commercial operations, and
at worst could only issue in some expenses and losses, on the
balance of account, which the French government might have to
make good. Beaumarchais approached Deane with all the forms
and reality of a commercial proposition, and Deane assured him
that he should have some returns in six months, and full pay
for everything which he supplied in a year. Two days later
they made a contract by which Congress was to pay the current
price of the goods in America when they should arrive, or take
them at the cost price, with insurance, charges, and
commission 'proportioned to the trouble and care, which cannot
now be fixed.' … August 18, Beaumarchais writes to the
Committee of Secret Correspondence that, led by esteem for a
people struggling for liberty, he has established an extensive
commercial house, solely for the purpose of supplying them
with all things useful, even gold for the payment of troops;
and that without waiting for their consent he has already
procured 200 cannons, 200,000 pounds of powder, 20,000 guns,
with balls, lead, clothing, etc. He wants the cargoes
consigned to him in return, and promises that he has great
power to use any consignments whatsoever; but he wants
especially tobacco. He signs this letter Roderique Hortales &
Co. … A million livres were advanced by Spain to Beaumarchais,
August 11, 1776, and the Farmers-general of France advanced a
million livres, but took advantage of the distress of the
Americans to stipulate that it should be paid for in tobacco
at half its then current price. Beaumarchais also advanced
money to Deane for his personal expenses; and it has never
been doubted that he exerted himself with the utmost energy,
if not always with the greatest prudence, to expedite the
shipment of the goods. Of the three ships which he despatched
at the end of the year, two were captured by the English; but
the one which arrived was of the greatest possible value to
the cause. … When Arthur Lee received his appointment as
Commissioner to France and entered upon the discharge of his
duties, he found that the promises made to him by Beaumarchais
… had not been kept. He reported to the Committee of Secret
Correspondence that a change in the mode of sending had been
settled between Deane and Hortales. … Arthur Lee always held
the attitude of suspicion that Deane and Beaumarchais were in
a conspiracy to levy contributions for themselves on the free
gifts of France to the United States. Franklin always affected
to ignore the dealings with Beaumarchais, and to treat them as
exclusively in the hands of Deane; while Congress always
showed themselves very careful not to pay for anything which
possibly was intended as a gift. Therefore Deane and
Beaumarchais were left for years to claim and protest that
there had been genuine mercantile contracts which had not been
fulfilled, and they could scarcely obtain attention. … September
8, 1777, Congress voted that Deane had no authority to make
contracts with persons to come to America.
{3244}
November 21, they voted to recall him. Undoubtedly the
vexation which Deane had caused them by sending over a great
number of persons to serve in the army, under contracts which
enabled them to demand large pay and high rank, was the chief
cause of irritation against him; but Arthur Lee had also been
poisoning the mind of his brother, and through him, of the
whole Lee-Adams faction in Congress, with suspicions of
Deane's honesty. Deane had found himself transferred, within a
period of two or three years, from an utterly obscure
existence at Wethersfield, Connecticut, to the position of a
quasi-ambassador at the court of France. He adopted a large
and expensive style of living, and kept open house for the
Americans at Paris. It is very reasonable to suppose that this
large expenditure on his part was one of the chief grounds of
belief that he was making great gain out of his position. …
The affair of Silas Deane has importance far beyond the merits
or the fate of that individual. The quarrel over him and his
rights and wrongs, as will presently be seen, entered into the
hottest party contests in Congress during the next two or
three years, and it comes up again often subsequently. It has
even been asserted that the intimacy into which John Adams was
thrown with the Lees, in this connection, was what made him
President of the United States, by winning him votes from
Virginia in 1796. January 1, 1778, Beaumarchais, having heard
that money had been given to the Americans through Grand, the
banker, writes to Vergennes: 'So I have lost the fruit of the
most noble and incredible labour by those very exertions which
conduct others to glory.' … He is in terror of bankruptcy.
Inasmuch as a treaty of alliance between France and the United
States was now made, matters had entered upon a new stage.
Beaumarchais, with his fictitious firm of Hortales, was no
longer necessary or useful. The French government dealt
directly with the American envoys in granting supplies and
subsidies. April 7, Congress made a contract with Hortales
that they should pay, for all the cargoes already shipped and
those to be shipped, the first cost, charges, and freight, in
France. The contract between Beaumarchais and Deane is
recognized. Hortales is to pay bills drawn every two months at
double usance for twenty-four million livres annually. This
article, however, is subject to ratification by the house in
Paris and the American Commissioners at Paris. American
produce is to be exported and consigned to this house.
Interest is to be paid on all sums due, with a commission of
two and a half per cent. From this time Beaumarchais falls out
of sight as an agent of aid and supplies to the American
cause, and becomes a claimant, who considers that he has been
treated with injustice and ingratitude by the United States."
W. G. Sumner,
The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution,
chapter 8 (volume 1).
"The episode of Beaumarchais … was a survival of the secret
diplomacy of Louis XV, for a short time exercising an
extraordinary influence in the first period of the reign of
Louis XVI. Louis XVI, on reaching the throne, found the
machinery of secret diplomacy so ingeniously constructed by
his predecessor in full operation; and, … for one or two
delicate inquiries at the outset of the new reign,
Beaumarchais, who of all the diplomatists of this peculiar
breed was the most adroit and fertile in expedients, was well
fitted. Hence came his employment, and from his employment
came his suggestions, full of brilliant wit and effective
reasoning, as to America. But the antagonism between him and
Vergennes was too marked to permit sustained political
relationship; and when Franklin entered into diplomatic life
in Paris Beaumarchais ceased to take a prominent political
position. And even during the period of Beaumarchais' greatest
activity it must be remembered that he was not technically
Vergennes' subordinate. It was one of the peculiarities of the
secret diplomacy of Louis XIV and Louis XV, as depicted by
Broglie in his admirable treatise on that topic, that even the
existence of the secret agent was not to be supposed to be
known to the king's ostensible ministers. This was not the
case with Beaumarchais; but at the same time Beaumarchais'
political influence ceased … when, on the arrival of Franklin,
Vergennes, with Franklin's aid, took control of Anglo-American
diplomacy."
F. Wharton,
Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States,
chapter 4, section 55 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
E. E. Hale,
Franklin in France.
J. Bigelow, editor,
Life of Franklin, by himself,
volume 2, chapters 13-15.
J. Parton,
Life of Franklin,
part 6 (volume 2).
L. de Lomenie,
Beaumarchais and his Times,
chapters 20-23 (volume 3).
Papers in relation to the Case of Silas Deane
(Seventy-Six Society, 1855).
C. Tower, Jr.,
The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 5.
See, also,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (FEBRUARY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1779.
The Thirteen Colonies become States.
The framing and adoption of State Constitutions.
"The recommendations to form governments proceeded from the
general congress; the work was done by the several states, in
the full enjoyment of self-direction. Each of them claimed to
be of right a free, sovereign, and independent state; each
bound its officers to bear to it true allegiance, and to
maintain its freedom and independence. Massachusetts, which
was the first state to frame a government independent of the
king, deviated as little as possible from the letter of its
charter; and, assuming that the place of governor was vacant
from the 19th of July 1775, it recognised the council as the
legal successor to executive power. On the 1st day of May
1776, in all commissions and legal processes, it substituted
the name of its 'government and people' for that of the king.
In June 1777, its legislature assumed power to prepare a
constitution; but, on a reference to the people, the act was
disavowed. In September 1779, a convention, which the people
themselves had specially authorized, framed a constitution. It
was in a good measure the compilation of John Adams, who was
guided by the English constitution, by the bill of rights of
Virginia, and by the experience of Massachusetts herself; and
this constitution, having been approved by the people, went
into effect in 1780. On the 5th of January 1776, New Hampshire
shaped its government with the fewest possible changes from
its colonial forms, like Massachusetts merging the executive
power in the council. Not till June 1783 did its convention
agree upon a more perfect instrument, which was approved by
the people, and established on the 31st of the following
October.
{3245}
The provisional constitution of South Carolina dates from the
26th of March 1776. In March 1778, a permanent constitution
was introduced by an act of the legislature. Rhode Island
enjoyed under its charter a form of government so thoroughly
republican that the rejection of monarchy, in May 1776,
required no change beyond a renunciation of the king's name in
the style of its public acts. A disfranchisement of Catholics
had stolen into its book of laws; but, so soon as it was
noticed, the clause was expunged. In like manner, Connecticut
had only to substitute the people of the colony for the name
of the king; this was done provisionally on the 14th of June
1776, and made perpetual on the 10th of the following October.
Before the end of June of the same year Virginia, sixth in the
series, first in the completeness of her work, by a
legislative convention without any further consultation of the
people, framed and adopted a bill of rights, a declaration of
independence, and a constitution. On the second of July 1776,
New Jersey perfected its new, self-created charter. Delaware
next proclaimed its bill of rights, and, on the 20th of
September 1776, the representatives in convention having been
chosen by the freemen of the state for that very purpose,
finished its constitution. The Pennsylvania convention adopted
its constitution on the 28th of September 1776; but the
opposition of the Quakers whom it indirectly disfranchised,
and of a large body of patriots, delayed its thorough
organization for more than five months. The delegates of
Maryland, meeting on the 14th of August 1776, framed its
constitution with great deliberation; it was established on
the 9th of the following November. On the 18th of December
1776, the constitution of North Carolina was ratified in the
congress which framed it. On the 5th of February 1777, Georgia
perfected its organic law by the unanimous agreement of its
convention. Last of the thirteen came New York, whose
empowered convention, on the 20th of April 1777, established a
constitution that, in humane liberality, excelled them all.
The privilege of the suffrage had been far more widely
extended in the colonies than in England; by general consent,
the extension of the elective franchise was postponed. The age
of twenty-one was a qualification universally required. So,
too, was residence, except that in Virginia and South Carolina
it was enough to own in the district or town a certain
freehold or 'lot.' South Carolina required the electors to
'acknowledge the being of a God, and to believe in a future
state of rewards and punishments.' 'White men alone could
claim the franchise in Virginia, in South Carolina, and in
Georgia; but in South Carolina a benign interpretation of the
law classed the free octaroon as a white, even though
descended through an unbroken line of mothers from an imported
African slave; the other ten states raised no question of
color. In Pennsylvania, in New Hampshire, and partially in
North Carolina, the right to vote belonged to every resident
taxpayer; Georgia extended it to any white inhabitant 'of any
mechanic trade'; with this exception, Georgia and all the
other colonies required the possession of a freehold, or of
property variously valued, in Massachusetts at about $200, in
Georgia at £10. Similar conditions had always existed, with
the concurrence or by the act of the colonists themselves.
Maryland prescribed as its rule that votes should be given by
word of mouth; Virginia and New Jersey made no change in their
usage; in Rhode Island each freeman was in theory summoned to
be present in the general court; he therefore gave his proxy
to his representative by writing his own name on the back of
his vote; all others adopted the ballot, New York at the end
of the war, the other eight without delay."
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, chapter 9.
ALSO IN:
American Archives,
series 5, volumes 2-3 (as indexed).
See, also,
VIRGINIA: A. D. 1776;
SOUTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1776 (FEBRUARY-APRIL);
NEW YORK: A. D. 1777;
CONNECTICUT: A. D. 1776;
NEW JERSEY: A. D. 1774-1776;
PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1776;
MARYLAND: A. D. 1776;
GEORGIA: A. D. 1775-1777;
NEW HAMPSHIRE: 1775-1776.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (January-December).
The campaign on the Delaware.
Lord Howe in possession of Philadelphia.
Battles on the Brandywine and at Germantown.
The winter of Washington's army at Valley Forge.
"Washington remained at Morristown from the 7th of January
until the 28th of May, during which time no military movement
of importance took place. His men left for their homes as soon
as their terms of service expired, and as few militia entered
the camp to take their places, at times it seemed as if the
army would be so reduced as to be unworthy of the name. It was
not until late in the spring that the new levies reached
headquarters. On the 28th of May the Americans marched to
Middlebrook and took position behind the Raritan. On the 13th
of June Howe marched from Brunswick and … endeavored to bring
on a general engagement, … but Washington refused to leave the
strong position he occupied, and Howe retired to Amboy. Early
in April Howe had settled upon a campaign having for its
object the capture of Philadelphia. He determined to embark
his troops and transport them to the banks of the Delaware or
Chesapeake, and march directly on the city. … On the 23d of
July, after Howe's troops had been three weeks on the vessels,
the fleet sailed, shaping its course southwesterly. … Signal
fires were lighted along the Jersey coast as it was seen from
time to time by those who were watching for it, and messengers
carried inland the news of its progress. At last, on the 30th,
it was spoken off the capes of Delaware, but Lord Howe deemed
it too hazardous to sail up that river, and after consulting
with his brother, the general, continued on his course
southward. On the 15th of August he entered Chesapeake Bay,
and on the 25th the troops were landed at Elk Ferry."
Meantime, Washington had been in great uncertainty as to the
destination and intentions of his antagonist, but had drawn
his army near to Philadelphia. It had just been joined by
several distinguished foreign officers, Lafayette, De Kalb and
Pulaski in the number. At Philadelphia there was consternation
on the approach of the enemy, but "the pacific influence which
the presence of a large Quaker population exercised seemed to
bear down all military efforts. … To impress the lukewarm with
the strength of his forces, and to inspire hopes in the
breasts of the patriotic, on the 24th of August Washington
marched his army through the streets of Philadelphia.
{3246}
The men were poorly armed and clothed, and to give them some
uniformity they wore sprigs of green in their hats." The
advance of Howe from Elk Ferry was slow, and it was not until
the 11th of September that the Americans encountered him, at
Chad's Ford, on the Brandywine, where they had taken position.
In the battle which occurred that day the British gained a
clear victory, by means of a successful flank movement which
Cornwallis executed, crossing the river some miles above,
while General Knyphausen made feigned attempts at Chad's Ford.
"The American loss was about 1,000, killed, wounded, and
prisoners; that of the British, 579. … The day after the
battle Washington marched from Chester to Philadelphia. He
rested his army two days at Germantown, and then recrossed the
Schuylkill; public opinion demanding that another battle
should be risked before the city should be given up. On the
16th the two armies met on the high ground south of Chester
Valley and prepared for action. The skirmishing had actually
begun, when a violent storm stopped the engagement by ruining
the ammunition of both armies. Washington withdrew to the
hills north of the valley, and, finding it impossible to
repair the damage done by the storm, retreated again over the
Schuylkill, leaving Wayne behind him to watch the enemy and
attack their rear should they attempt to follow." But Wayne
was surprised at Paoli, and Washington was deceived by a
feigned movement, so that Howe succeeded in entering
Philadelphia without another battle, on the 26th, having
occupied Germantown the day before. "The main portion of
Howe's army remained at Germantown, a village of a single
street, two miles in length, and five from the city." Here, on
the morning of October 4th, Washington attacked him, and, for
a time, with great success; but confusion and
misunderstandings on the part of the attacking columns arose,
which turned the half-won victory into a defeat. "The
Americans lost nearly 1,100 killed, wounded, and prisoners;
the British 521. … While the Americans were defeated in their
object, the moral results of the battle were in their favor.
It inspired them with confidence, and showed the world that,
though driven from the field of Brandywine, they were still
aggressive." The next few weeks were employed by Howe in
reducing the forts which commanded the Delaware. Fort Mifflin
was taken after a severe siege, and this compelled the
abandonment of Fort Mercer, from which the British had been
repulsed with heavy loss. Early in December Howe moved upon
Washington's lines, at Whitemarsh, intending an attack; but
found them so strong that he dared not venture the attempt,
and returned to Philadelphia. "As the season was advancing,
and the Americans were in no condition to keep the field, it
was decided to go into winter-quarters at Valley Forge, on the
west side of the Schuylkill, where the Valley Creek empties
into the river. The surrounding hills were covered with woods
and presented an inhospitable appearance. The choice was
severely criticised, and De Kalb described it as a wilderness.
But the position was central and easily defended. The army
arrived there about the middle of December, and the erection
of huts began. They were built of logs, and were 14 by 15 feet
each. The windows were covered with oiled paper, and the
openings between the logs were closed with clay. The huts were
arranged in streets, giving the place the appearance of a
city. It was the first of the year, however, before they were
occupied, and previous to that the suffering of the army had
become great. Although the weather was intensely cold the men
were obliged to work at the buildings, with nothing to support
life but flour mixed with water, which they baked into cakes
at the open fires. … The horses died of starvation by
hundreds, and the men were obliged to haul their own
provisions and firewood. As straw could not be found to
protect the men from the cold ground, sickness spread through
their quarters with fearful rapidity. 'The unfortunate
soldiers,' wrote Lafayette in after-years, 'were in want of
everything; they had neither coats, hats, shirts, nor shoes;
their feet and their legs froze till they became black, and it
was often necessary to amputate them. … The army frequently
remained whole days without provisions, and the patient
endurance of both soldiers and officers was a miracle which
each moment served to renew.' … While the country around
Valley Forge was so impoverished by the military operations of
the previous summer as to make it impossible for it to support
the army, the sufferings of the latter were chiefly owing to
the inefficiency of Congress. That body met at Lancaster after
leaving Philadelphia, and at once adjourned to York, where its
sessions were continued. But it in no way equalled the
congresses which had preceded it. 'The Continental Congress
and the currency,' wrote Gouverneur Morris in 1778, 'have
greatly depreciated.'"
F. D. Stone,
The Struggle for the Delaware
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 6, chapter 5).
The sufferings of the army at Valley Forge, and the shameful
neglect which it experienced, were indignantly described by
Washington, in a letter addressed to the President of
Congress, December 23, 1777: "Since the month of July," he
wrote, "we have had no assistance from the
quartermaster-general, and to want of assistance from this
department the commissary-general charges great part of his
deficiency. To this I am to add, that, notwithstanding it is a
standing order, and often repeated, that the troops shall
always have two days' provisions by them, that they might be
ready at any sudden call; yet an opportunity has scarcely ever
offered, of taking an advantage of the enemy, that has not
been either totally obstructed, or greatly impeded on this
account. And this, the great and crying evil, is not all. The
soap, vinegar, and other articles allowed by Congress, we see
none of, nor have we seen them, I believe, since the battle of
Brandywine. The first, indeed, we have now little occasion
for; few men having more than one shirt, many only the moiety
of one, and some none at all. In addition to which, as a proof
of the little benefit received from a clothier-general, and as
a further proof of the inability of an army, under the
circumstances of this, to perform the common duties of
soldiers, (besides a number of men confined to hospitals for
want of shoes, and others in farmers' houses on the same
account,) we have, by a field-return this day made, no less
than two thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight men now in
camp unfit for duty, because they are barefoot and otherwise
naked.
{3247}
By the same return it appears, that our whole strength in
Continental troops, including the eastern brigades, which have
joined us since the surrender of General Burgoyne, exclusive
of the Mary]and troops sent to Wilmington, amounts to more
than eight thousand two hundred in camp fit for duty;
notwithstanding which; and that since the 4th instant, our
numbers fit for duty, from the hardships and exposures they
have undergone, particularly on account of blankets (numbers
having been obliged, and still are, to sit up all night by
fires, instead of taking comfortable rest in a natural and
common way), have decreased near two thousand men. We find
gentlemen, without knowing whether the army was really going
into winter-quarters or not (for I am sure no resolution of
mine would warrant the Remonstrance), reprobating the measure
as much as if they thought the soldiers were made of stocks or
stones, and equally insensible of frost and snow; and
moreover, as if they conceived it easily practicable for an
inferior army, under the disadvantages I have described ours
to be, which are by no means exaggerated, to confine a
superior one, in all respects well-appointed and provided for
a winter's campaign, within the city of Philadelphia, and to
cover from depredation and waste the States of Pennsylvania
and Jersey. But what makes this matter still more
extraordinary in my eye is, that these very gentlemen,—who
were well apprized of the nakedness of the troops from ocular
demonstration, who thought their own soldiers worse clad than
others, and who advised me near a month ago to postpone the
execution of a plan I was about to adopt, in consequence of a
resolve of Congress for seizing clothes, under strong
assurances that an ample supply would be collected in ten days
agreeably to a decree of the State (not one article of which,
by the by, is yet come to hand),—should think a winter's
campaign, and the covering of these States from the invasion
of an enemy, so easy and practicable a business. I can assure
those gentlemen, that it is a much easier and less distressing
thing to draw remonstrances in a comfortable room by a good
fireside, than to occupy a cold, bleak hill, and sleep under
frost and snow, without clothes or blankets. However, although
they seem to have little feeling for the naked and distressed
soldiers, I feel superabundantly for them, and, from my soul,
I pity those miseries, which it is neither in my power to
relieve or prevent. It is for these reasons, therefore, that I
have dwelt upon the subject; and it adds not a little to my
other difficulties and distress to find, that much more is

expected of me than is possible to be performed, and that upon
the ground of safety and policy I am obliged to conceal the
true state of the army from public view, and thereby expose
myself to detraction and calumny."
George Washington,
Writings,
edited by W. C. Ford,
volume 6, pages 259-262.
It was during this trying winter, while the army suffered at
Valley Forge, that it was joined by Baron Steuben, an
accomplished Prussian officer, trained in the school of
Frederick the Great, with a record of distinguished service in
the Seven Years War. He came as a volunteer, and was welcomed
by Washington, who found in him the organizer, the
disciplinarian, the instructor, which the rudely formed
American army so greatly needed. The services rendered by
Baron Steuben during that first winter of his stay in America
were especially valuable, beyond measure. In his own account
of the state of things which he found he says: "'My
determination must have been very firm that I did not abandon
my design when I saw the troops. Matters had to be remedied,
but where to commence was the great difficulty. In the first
place, I informed myself relative to the military
administration. I found that the different branches were
divided into departments. There were those of the
quarter-master general, war commissary, provisions commissary,
commissary of the treasury, or paymaster of forage, etc., etc.
But they were all bad copies of a bad original. That is to
say, they had imitated the English administration, which is
certainly the most imperfect in Europe. The general asked me
to give him some statements concerning the arrangements of the
departments, and their various branches in the European
armies. I gave them to him, and, detailing therein the duties
of each department and of its different branches, dilated upon
the functions of the quarter-masters (maréchaux généraux de
logis) in particular, in which branch I had served myself for
a long time in the Seven Years' War. But the English system,
bad as it is, had already taken root. Each company and
quarter-master had a commission of so much per cent. on all
the money he expended. It was natural, therefore, that expense
was not spared—that wants were discovered where there were
none; and it was also natural that the dearest articles were
those that suited the commissioners best. Hence the
depreciation of our currency—hence the expense of so many
millions. I pointed out to General Washington and several
members of Congress the advantages of the contract system. I
even drew up a memorandum on the subject, which Colonel
Laurens translated into English, showing the way in which
things were contracted for in the Prussian and French armies.
But whether it was that they thought such a system
impracticable in this country, or whether they were unable to
check the torrent of expense, things remained as they were. I
directed my attention to the condition of the troops, and I
found an ample field, where disorder and confusion were
supreme. … The number of men in a regiment was fixed by
Congress, as well as in a company—so many infantry, cavalry,
and artillery. But the eternal ebb and flow of men engaged for
three, six, and nine months, who went and came every day,
rendered it impossible to have either a regiment or a company
complete; and the words company, regiment, brigade, and
division, were so vague that they did not convey any idea upon
which to form a calculation, either of a particular corps or
of the army in general. They were so unequal in their number,
that it would have been impossible to execute any maneuvers.
Sometimes a regiment was stronger than a brigade. I have seen
a regiment consisting of thirty men, and a company of one
corporal! … The soldiers were scattered about in every
direction. The army was looked upon as a nursery for servants,
and every one deemed it his right to have a valet; several
thousand soldiers were employed in this way. We had more
commissaries and quarter-masters at that time than all the
armies of Europe together; the most modest had only one
servant, but others had two and even three.
{3248}
If the captains and colonels could give no account of their
men, they could give still less an account of their arms,
accouterments, clothing, ammunition, camp equipage, etc.
Nobody kept an account but the commissaries, who furnished all
the articles. A company, which consisted, in May, of fifty
men, was armed, clothed and equipped in June. It then
consisted of thirty men; in July it received thirty recruits,
who were to be clothed, armed and equipped; and not only the
clothes, but the arms were carried off by those who had
completed their time of service. General Knox assured me that,
previous to the establishment of my department, there never
was a campaign in which the military magazines did not furnish
from 5,000 to 8,000 muskets to replace those which were lost
in the way I have described above. The loss of bayonets was
still greater. The American soldier, never having used this
arm, had no faith in it, and never used it but to roast his
beefsteak, and indeed often left it at home. This is not
astonishing when it is considered that the majority of the
States engaged their soldiers for from six to nine months.
Each man who went away took his musket with him, and his
successor received another from the public store. No captain
kept a book. Accounts were never furnished nor required. As
our army is, thank God, little subject to desertion, I venture
to say that during an entire campaign there have not been
twenty muskets lost since my system came into force. … The men
were literally naked, some of them in the fullest extent of
the word. The officers who had coats had them of every color
and make. I saw officers, at a grand parade at Valley Forge,
mounting guard in a sort of dressing-gown, made of an old
blanket or woolen bed-cover. With regard to their military
discipline, I may safely say no such thing existed. … I
commenced operations by drafting 120 men from the line, whom I
formed into a guard for the general-in-chief. I made this
guard my military school. I drilled them myself twice a day;
and to remove that English prejudice which some officers
entertained, namely, that to drill a recruit was a sergeant's
duty and beneath the station of an officer, I often took the
musket myself to show the men the manual exercise which I
wished to introduce. All my inspectors were present at each
drill. We marched together, wheeled, etc., etc., and in a
fortnight my company knew perfectly how to bear arms, had a
military air, knew how to march, to form in column, deploy,
and execute some little maneuvers with excellent precision. …
I paraded them in presence of all the officers of the army,
and gave them an opportunity of exhibiting all they knew. They
formed in column; deployed; attacked with the bayonet; changed
front, etc., etc. It afforded a new and agreeable sight for
the young officers and soldiers. Having gained my point, I
dispersed my apostles, the inspectors, and my new doctrine was
eagerly embraced. I lost no time in extending my operations on
a large scale. I applied my system to battalions, afterward to
brigades, and in less than three weeks I executed maneuvers
with an entire division in presence of the
commander-in-chief.' … The most interesting narrative of the
energy employed by Steuben, and the success of his system, is
given by his favorite aid-de-camp and intimate friend, William
North, who was with him from the beginning. He says in his
biographical sketch: 'Certainly it was a brave attempt!
Without understanding a word of the English language, to think
of bringing men, born free, and joined together to preserve
their freedom, into strict subjection; to obey without a word,
a look, the mandates of a master! that master once their
equal, or possibly beneath them, in whatever might become a
man! It was a brave attempt, which nothing but virtue, or
high-raised hopes of glory, could have supported. At the first
parade, the troops neither understanding the command, nor how
to follow in a changement to which they had not been
accustomed, even with the instructor at their head, were
getting fast into confusion. At this moment, Captain B.
Walker, then of the second New York regiment, advanced from
his platoon, and offered his assistance to translate the
orders and interpret to the troops. "If," said the baron, "I
had seen an angel from heaven, I should not have more
rejoiced." … Walker became from that moment his aid-de-camp,
and remained to the end of the baron's life his dear and most
worthy friend. From the commencement of instruction, no time,
no pains, no fatigue were thought too great, in pursuit of
this great object. Through the whole of each campaign, when
troops were to maneuver, and that was almost every day, the
baron rose at three o'clock; while his servant dressed his
hair he smoked a single pipe and drank one cup of coffee, was
on horseback at sunrise, and, with or without his suite,
galloped to the parade. There was no waiting for a tardy
aid-de-camp, and those who followed wished they had not slept.
Nor was there need of chiding; when duty was neglected, or
military etiquette infringed, the baron's look was quite
sufficient.' … Steuben enjoyed the confidence of both officers
and men, and every thing he proposed was executed with as much
precision as if it were an order from the commander-in-chief.
Although he was only a volunteer, without any specific rank in
the army, he had greater power and authority than any general
could boast of."
F. Kapp,
Life of Frederick William von Steuben,
chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapters 13, 18-19, and 23-27.
G. W. Greene,
Life of General Nathanael Greene,
book 2, chapters 16-25 (volume l).
J. T. Scharf and T. Westcott,
History of Philadelphia,
chapter 17 (volume l).
C. J. Stille,
Major-General Anthony Wayne,
Chapter 3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (June).
Vermont denied admission to the Union.
See VERMONT; A. D. 1777-1778.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (July).
The coming of Lafayette.
"La Fayette, barely nineteen years old, was in garrison at
Metz, when he was invited to a dinner that his commander, the
Count de Broglie, gave to the brother of the king of England,
the Duke of Gloucester, then on his way through the city. News
had just been received of the proclamation of the independence
of the United States, and, the conversation having naturally
fallen on this subject, La Fayette plied the duke with
questions to acquaint himself with the events, entirely new to
him, which were happening in America. Before the end of the
dinner he had made his decision, and, from that moment, he no
longer thought of anything else except setting out for the new
world.
{3249}
He went to Paris and confided his project to his friends, the
Count de Segur and the Viscount de Noailles, who were to
accompany him. The Count de Broglie, whom he also informed,
tried to turn him from his design. 'I saw your uncle die in
Italy,' he said to him, 'and your father at Min·den, and I do
not wish to contribute to the ruin of your family by allowing
you to go.' Nevertheless, he put La Fayette in communication
with the former agent of Choiseul in Canada, the Baron de
Kalb, who became his friend. De Kalb presented him to Silas
Deane, who, considering him too young, wished to dissuade him
from his project. But the news of the disasters experienced by
the Americans before New York, at White Plains and in New
Jersey, confirmed La Fayette in his resolution. He bought and
fitted out a vessel at his own expense, and disguised his
preparations by making a journey to London. Nevertheless his
design was disclosed at Court. His family became angry with
him. He was forbidden to go to America, and, to render this
order effective, a lettre de cachet was issued against him.
Nevertheless he left Paris with an officer named Mauroy,
disguised himself as a courier, went on board his ship at
Passage in Spain, and set sail April the 26th, 1777. He had
several officers on board. La Fayette successfully avoided the
English cruisers and the French vessels sent in pursuit of
him. Finally, after a hazardous passage of seven weeks, he
reached Georgetown, and, furnished with letters of
recommendation from Deane, he reported to Congress."
T. Balch,
The French in America during the War of Independence,
chapter 7.
In consideration of the great personal sacrifice he had made
in quitting France, and his offer to serve the American cause
at his own expense and without pay, Congress, with hesitation,
conferred on the young marquis the rank of Major General, but
without command. He succeeded, too, in procuring a like
commission for Baron de Kalb, who had accompanied him. While
Lafayette was still busy with these arrangements, Washington
came to Philadelphia, and they met at a dinner party. They
seem to have been drawn to one another at the first exchange
of words, and a friendship began which lasted through their
lives. Lafayette was soon invited to become a member of the
military family of the commander-in-chief.
B. Tuckerman,
Life of General Lafayette,
chapter 2.
ALSO IN:
C. Tower, Jr.,
The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 1.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (July-October).
The struggle for the Hudson.
Burgoyne's expedition from Canada.
His surrender at Saratoga.
Early in the summer of 1777 a formidable expedition under
General Burgoyne was set in motion from Canada toward Lake
Champlain. "It was a part of Burgoyne's plan, not merely to
take Ticonderoga, but to advance thence upon Albany, and, with
the co-operation of the troops at New York, to get possession
also of the posts in the Highlands. The British would then
command the Hudson through its whole extent, and New England,
the head of the rebellion, would be completely cut off from
the middle and southern colonies. Burgoyne started on this
expedition with a brilliant army of 8,000 men, partly British
and partly Germans, besides a large number of Canadian
boatmen, laborers and skirmishers. On the western shore of
Lake Champlain, near Crown Point, he met the Six Nations in
council, and after a feast and a speech, some 400 of their
warriors joined this army. His next step was to issue a
proclamation … threatening with all the extremities of war all
who should presume to resist his arms. Two days after the
issue of this proclamation, Burgoyne appeared [July 1] before
Ticonderoga." The commander of that important fort, General
St. Clair, found defense impracticable and evacuated the
place. He was vigorously pursued in his retreat and only
escaped with the loss of most of his bag·gage and stores,
besides several hundred men, in killed, wounded, and
prisoners. "After a seven days' march, he joined Schuyler at
Fort Edward, on the Hudson. Here was assembled the whole force
of the northern army, amounting to about 5,000 men; but a
considerable part were militia hastily called in; many were
without arms; there was a great deficiency of ammunition and
provisions; and the whole force was quite disorganized. The
region between Skenesborough [now Whitehall, where Burgoyne
had halted] and the Hudson was an almost unbroken wilderness.
Wood Creek was navigable as far as Fort Anne [which the
Americans had fired and abandoned]; from Fort Anne to the
Hudson, over an exceedingly rough country, … extended a single
military road. While Burgoyne halted a few days at
Skenesborough to put his forces in order, and to bring up the
necessary supplies, Schuyler hastened to destroy the
navigation of Wood Creek," and to make the road from Fort Anne
as nearly impassable as a wilderness road can be made. "All
the stock in the neighborhood was driven off, and the militia
of New England was summoned to the rescue. … The advance from
Skenesborough cost the British infinite labor and fatigue; but
… [the] impediments were at length overcome; and Burgoyne,
with his troops, artillery, and baggage, presently appeared
[July 29] on the banks of the Hudson. … Fort Edward was
untenable. As the British approached, the Americans crossed
the river, and retired, first to Saratoga, and then to
Stillwater, a short distance above the mouth of the Mohawk.
Hardly had Schuyler taken up this position, when news arrived
of another disaster and a new danger. While moving up Lake
Champlain, Burgoyne had detached Colonel St. Leger, with 200
regulars, Sir John Johnson's Royal Greens, some Canadian
Rangers, and a body of Indians under Brant, to harass the New
York frontier from the west. St. Leger laid siege to Fort
Schuyler, late Fort Stanwix, near the head of the Mohawk, then
the extreme western post of the State of New York. General
Herkimer raised the militia of Tryon county, and advanced to
the relief of this important post, which was held by
Gansevoort and Willett, with two New York regiments. About six
miles from the fort [near Oriskany, August 6], owing to want
of proper precaution, Herkimer fell into an ambush. Mortally
wounded, he supported himself against a stump, and encouraged
his men to the fight. By the aid of a successful sally by
Willett, they succeeded at last in repulsing the assailants,
but not without a loss of 400, including many of the leading
patriots of that region, who met with no mercy at the hands of
the Indians and refugees. Tryon county, which included the
whole district west of Albany, abounded with Tories.
{3250}
It was absolutely necessary to relieve Fort Schuyler." General
Arnold was accordingly despatched thither, with three
regiments, and on his approach St. Leger, deserted by most of
his Indian allies, retreated precipitately, leaving most of
his stores and baggage behind. Meantime, Burgoyne was
beginning to find his situation serious. To feed and otherwise
supply his army was the chief difficulty. He could bring
enough of stores to the head of Lake George, by the water
carriage which he commanded, from Canada; but to transport
them thence to the Hudson, though the distance was only
eighteen miles, proved nearly impracticable. "The roads were
so bad, and the supply of draft cattle so small, that, after a
fortnight's hard labor, the British army had only four days'
provision in advance." To improve his supplies, and partly,
moreover, in the hope of finding discontent among the settlers
of the New Hampshire Grants, Burgoyne sent 800 men, under
Colonel Baum, into Vermont, They were defeated [August 16] at
Bennington by the New Hampshire and Vermont militia under
Colonel John Stark, and again defeated a second time the same
day, after reinforcements had been sent to them. "Besides the
killed, about 200 in number, the Americans took near 600
prisoners, 1,000 stand of arms, as many swords, and four
pieces of artillery. … The American loss was only 14 killed
and 42 wounded. … The victory of Stark had a magical effect in
reviving the spirits of the people and the courage of the
soldiers."
R. Hildreth,
History of the United States,
chapter 36 (volume 3).
"Burgoyne's position was by this time very dangerous. His
Indians were leaving him; many of his best men had been killed
or captured; and he was getting short of provisions. The army
opposed to him was increasing: Congress was hurrying men up
the Hudson; and the country militia were coming in rapidly.
Burgoyne, therefore, desperately attempted to force his way
through the American army. He crossed the Hudson, and moved
slowly down its west bank toward the Mohawk. About the same
time, Gates, who had been sent by Congress to take Schuyler's
place, felt strong enough to move up the west bank of the
Hudson, away from the Mohawk. The two armies met [September
19] at Bemis Heights, between Saratoga Lake and the Hudson.
The battle which followed [called by some writers the battle
of Freeman's Farm] was not decisive: the British held the
ground; but the Americans had shown that Burgoyne could not
break through."
A. Johnston,
History of the United States for Schools,
sections 222-223.
"Burgoyne now halted again, and strengthened his position by
field-works and redoubts; and the Americans also improved
their defences. The two armies remained nearly within
cannon-shot of each other for a considerable time, during
which Burgoyne was anxiously looking for intelligence of the
promised expedition from New York, which, according to the
original plan, ought by this time to have been approaching
Albany from the south. At last, a messenger from Clinton made
his way, with great difficulty, to Burgoyne's camp, and
brought the information that Clinton was on his way up the
Hudson to attack the American forts which barred the passage
up that river to Albany. Burgoyne, in reply, on the 30th of
September, urged Clinton to attack the forts as speedily as
possible, stating that the effect of such an attack, or even
the semblance of it, would be to move the American army from
its position before his own troops. By another messenger, who
reached Clinton on the 5th of October, Burgoyne informed his
brother general that he had lost his communications with
Canada, but had provisions which would last him till the 20th.
Burgoyne described himself as strongly posted, and stated that
though the Americans in front of him [at Stillwater] were
strongly posted also, he made no doubt of being able to force
them, and making his way to Albany; but that he doubted
whether he could subsist there, as the country was drained of
provisions. He wished Clinton to meet him there, and to keep
open a communication with New York. Burgoyne had
over-estimated his resources, and in the very beginning of
October found difficulty and distress pressing him hard. The
Indians and Canadians began to desert him; while, on the other
hand, Gates's army was continually reinforced by fresh bodies
of the militia. … Finding the number and spirit of the enemy
to increase daily, and his own stores of provisions to
diminish, Burgoyne determined on attacking the Americans in
front of him, and by dislodging them from their position, to
gain the means of moving upon Albany, or at least of relieving
his troops from the straitened position in which they were
cooped up. Burgoyne's force was now reduced to less than 6,000
men. The right of his camp was on some high ground a little to
the west of the river; thence his entrenchments extended along
the lower ground to the bank of the Hudson, the line of their
front being nearly at a right angle with the course of the
stream. The lines were fortified with redoubts and
field-works. … The numerical force of the Americans was now
greater than the British, even in regular troops, and the
numbers of the militia and volunteers which had joined Gates
and Arnold were greater still. General Lincoln, with 2,000 New
England troops, had reached the American camp on the 29th of
September. Gates gave him the command of the right wing, and
took in person the command of the left wing, which was
composed of two brigades under Generals Poor and Leonard, of
Colonel Morgan's rifle corps, and part of the fresh New
England Militia. The whole of the American lines had been ably
fortified under the direction of the celebrated Polish
General, Kosciusko, who was now serving as a volunteer in
Gates's army. The right of the American position, that is to
say, the part of it nearest to the river, was too strong to be
assailed with any prospect of success: and Burgoyne therefore
determined to endeavour to force their left. For this purpose
he formed a column of 1,500 regular troops, with two
twelve-pounders, two howitzers, and six six-pounders. He
headed this in person, having Generals Philips, Riedesel; and
Fraser under him. The enemy's force immediately in front of
his lines was so strong that he dared not weaken the troops
who guarded them, by detaching any more to strengthen his
column of attack. It was on the 7th of October that Burgoyne
led his column forward; and on the preceding day, the 6th,
Clinton had successfully executed a brilliant enterprise
against the two American forts which barred his progress up
the Hudson.
{3251}
He had captured them both, with severe loss to the American
forces opposed to him; he had destroyed the fleet which the
Americans had been forming on the Hudson, under the protection
of their forts; and the upward river was laid open to his
squadron. He had also, with admirable skill and industry,
collected in small vessels, such as could float within a few
miles of Albany, provisions sufficient to supply Burgoyne's
army for six months. He was now only 156 miles distant from
Burgoyne; and a detachment of 1,700 men actually advanced
within 40 miles of Albany. Unfortunately Burgoyne and Clinton
were each ignorant of the other's movements; but if Burgoyne
had won his battle on the 7th, he must on advancing have soon
learned the tidings of Clinton's success, and Clinton would
have heard of his. A junction would soon have been made of the
two victorious armies, and the great objects of the campaign
might yet have been accomplished. All depended on the fortune
of the column with which Burgoyne, on the eventful 7th of
October, 1777, advanced against the American position." It
failed in the attempt to break the American line. Arnold, who
bad been deprived of his command by Gates, rushed into the
fight at its fiercest stage and assumed a lead, without
authority, which contributed greatly to the result. General
Fraser, on the British side, was wounded mortally by a
sharp-shooter under Morgan's command. Burgoyne's whole force
was driven back, with heavy losses in killed and wounded,
leaving six cannon behind them, and the Americans, pursuing,
carried part of their entrenchments by storm. By this success,
the latter "acquired the means of completely turning the right
flank of the British, and gaining their rear. To prevent this
calamity, Burgoyne effected during the night an entire change
of position. With great skill he removed his whole army to
some heights near the river, a little northward of the former
camp, and he there drew up his men, expecting to be attacked
on the following day. But Gates was resolved not to risk the
certain triumph which his success had already secured for him.
He harassed the English with skirmishes, but attempted no
regular attack. Meanwhile he detached bodies of troops on both
sides of the Hudson to prevent the British from recrossing
that river, and to bar their retreat. When night fell, it
became absolutely necessary for Burgoyne to retire again, and,
accordingly, the troops were marched through a stormy and
rainy night towards Saratoga, abandoning their sick and
wounded, and the greater part of their baggage, to the enemy.
… Burgoyne now took up his last position on the heights near
Saratoga; and hemmed in by the enemy, who refused any
encounter, and baffled in all his attempts at finding a path
of escape, he there lingered until famine compelled him to
capitulate. The fortitude of the British army during this
melancholy period has been justly eulogised by many native
historians, but I prefer quoting the testimony of a foreign
writer, as free from all possibility of partiality. Botta
says: 'It exceeds the power of words to describe the pitiable
condition to which the British army was now reduced. The
troops were worn down by a series of toil, privation,
sickness, and desperate fighting. They were abandoned by the
Indians and Canadians; and the effective force of the whole
army was now diminished by repeated and heavy losses, which
had principally fallen on the best soldiers and the most
distinguished officers, from 10,000 combatants to less than
one-half that number. Of this remnant, little more than 3,000
were English. In these circumstances, and thus weakened, they
were invested by an army of four times their own number, whose
position extended three parts of a circle round them; who
refused to fight them, as knowing their weakness, and who,
from the nature of the ground, could not be attacked in any
part. In this helpless condition, obliged to be constantly
under arms, while the enemy's cannon played on every part of
their camp, and even the American rifle-balls whistled in many
parts of the lines, the troops of Burgoyne retained their
customary firmness, and while sinking under a hard necessity,
they showed themselves worthy of a better fate. They could not
be reproached with an action or a word, which betrayed a want
of temper or of fortitude.' At length the 13th of October
arrived, and as no prospect of assistance appeared, and the
provisions were nearly exhausted, Burgoyne, by the unanimous
advice of a council of war, sent a messenger to the American
camp to treat of a convention. General Gates in the first
instance demanded that the royal army should surrender
prisoners of war. He also proposed that the British should
ground their arms. Burgoyne replied, 'This article is
inadmissible in every extremity; sooner than this army will
consent to ground their arms in their encampment, they will
rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter.' After
various messages, a convention for the surrender of the army
was settled, which provided that 'The troops under General
Burgoyne were to march out of their camp with the honours of
war, and the artillery of the intrenchments, to the verge of
the river, where the arms and artillery were to be left. The
arms to be piled by word of command from their own officers. A
free passage was to be granted to the army under
Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to Great Britain, upon condition
of not serving again in North America during the present
contest.' The articles of capitulation were settled on the
15th of October; and on that very evening a messenger arrived
from Clinton with an account of his successes, and with the
tidings that part of his force had penetrated as far as
Esopus, within 50 miles of Burgoyne's camp. But it was too
late. The public faith was pledged; and the army was, indeed,
too debilitated by fatigue and hunger to resist an attack if
made; and Gates certainly would have made it, if the
convention had been broken off. Accordingly, on the 17th, the
convention of Saratoga was carried into effect. By this
convention 5,790 men surrendered themselves as prisoners. The
sick and wounded left in the camp when the British retreated
to Saratoga, together with the numbers of the British, German,
and Canadian troops, who were killed, wounded, or taken, and
who had deserted in the preceding part of the expedition, were
reckoned to be 4,689. The British sick and wounded who had
fallen into the hands of the Americans after the battle of the
7th, were treated with exemplary humanity; and when the
convention was executed, General Gates showed a noble delicacy
of feeling, which deserves the highest degree of honour. Every
circumstance was avoided which could give the appearance of
triumph.
{3252}
The American troops remained within their lines until the
British had piled their arms; and when this was done, the
vanquished officers and soldiers were received with friendly
kindness by their victors, and their immediate wants were
promptly and liberally supplied. Discussions and disputes
afterwards arose as to some of the terms of the convention;
and the American Congress refused for a long time to carry
into effect the article which provided for the return of
Burgoyne's men to Europe; but no blame was imputable to
General Gates or his army, who showed themselves to be
generous as they had proved themselves to be brave."
Sir E. Creasy,
Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World,
chapter 13.
ALSO IN:
General J. Burgoyne,
State of the Expedition from Canada.
S. A. Drake,
Burgoyne's Invasion.
W. L. Stone,
Campaign of Burgoyne.
M. von Eelking,
Memoir of General Riedesel,
volume 1, pages 88-218.
B. J. Lossing,
Life and Times of Philip Schuyler,
volume 2, chapters 6-21.
Colonel M. Willett,
Narrative of Military Actions,
chapter 5.
C. Stark,
Memoir of General John Stark,
pages 46-140.
T. Dwight,
Travels in New England and New York,
volume 3, pages 220-233.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1778.
The British in Philadelphia.
Their gay winter.
See PHILADELPHIA: A. D. 1777-1778.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1778.
The Conway Cabal.
The capitulation of Burgoyne at Saratoga "was an all-important
event in its influence on the progress of the war; but its
immediate effect was unpropitious to the reputation of the
Commander-in-chief, who was compelled, at the close of the
year, to place his army in a state of almost total destitution
in winter-quarters at Valley Forge. The brilliant success of
General Gates at Saratoga, in contrast with the reverses which
had befallen the American Army under the immediate command of
Washington, encouraged the operations of a cabal against him,
which had been formed by certain disaffected officers of the
army, and was countenanced by a party in Congress. The design
was, by a succession of measures implying a want of
confidence, to drive Washington to retire from the service in
disgust: and, when this object was effected, to give the
command of the army to General Gates, who lent a willing ear
to these discreditable intrigues. A foreign officer in the
American Army, of the name of Conway, was the most active
promoter of the project, which was discovered by the
accidental disclosure of a part of his correspondence with
Gates. Washington bore himself on this occasion with his usual
dignity, and allowed the parties concerned, in the army and in
Congress, to take refuge in explanations, disclaimers, and
apologies, by which those who made them gained no credit, and
those who accepted them were not deceived. A part of the
machinery of this wretched cabal was the publication, in
London, and the republication in New York of [a] collection of
forged letters … bearing the name of Washington, and intended
to prove his insincerity in the cause of the Revolution.
Nothing perhaps more plainly illustrates his conscious
strength of character, than the disdainful silence with which
he allowed this miserable fabrication to remain for twenty
years without exposure. It was only in the year 1796, and when
about to retire from the Presidency, that he filed, in the
department of Slate, a denial of its authenticity."
E. Everett,
Life of Washington,
chapter 6.
In a letter written May 30, 1778, addressed to Landon Carter,
from the camp at Valley Forge, Washington alluded to the
subject of the cabal as follows: "With great truth I think I
can assure you, that the information you received from a
gentleman at Sabine Hall, respecting a disposition in the
northern officers to see me superseded in my command by
General G--s is without the least foundation. I have very
sufficient reasons to think, that no officers in the army are
more attached to me, than those from the northward, and of
those, none more so than the gentlemen, who were under the
immediate command of G--s last campaign. That there was a
scheme of this sort on foot, last fall, admits of no doubt:
but it originated in another quarter; with three men who
wanted to aggrandize themselves; but finding no support, on
the contrary, that their conduct and views, when seen into,
were likely to undergo severe reprehension, they slunk back,
disavowed the measure, and professed themselves my warmest
admirers. Thus stands the matter at present. Whether any
members of Congress were privy to this scheme, and inclined to
aid and abet it, I shall not take upon me to say; but am well
informed, that no whisper of the kind was ever heard in
Congress."
George Washington,
Writings,
edited by W. C. Ford,
volume 7, page 39.
ALSO IN:
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapters 28-30.
J. C. Hamilton,
History of the United States
in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton,
volume 1, chapters 13-14.
J. Sparks,
Life of Gouverneur Morris,
volume 1, chapter 10.
W. V. Wells,
Life of Samuel Adams,
chapter 46 (volume 2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777-1781.
Adoption and ratification of the Articles of Confederation.
"On the 11th of June, 1776, the same day on which the
committee for preparing the declaration of independence was
appointed, congress resolved, that 'a committee be appointed
to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be
entered into between these colonies'; and on the next day a
committee was accordingly appointed, consisting of a member
from each colony. Nearly a year before this period (viz. on
the 21st of July, 1775), Dr. Franklin had submitted to
congress a sketch of articles of confederation, which does
not, however, appear to have been acted on. … On the 12th of
July, 1776, the committee appointed to prepare articles of
confederation presented a draft, which was in the hand-writing
of Mr. Dickenson, one of the committee, and a delegate from
Pennsylvania. The draft, so reported, was debated from the 22d
to the 31st of July, and on several days between the 5th and
20th of August, 1776. On this last day, congress, in committee
of the whole, reported a new draft, which was ordered to be
printed for the use of the members. The subject seems not
again to have been touched until the 8th of April, 1777, and
the articles were debated at several times between that time
and the 15th of November of the same year. On this last day
the articles were reported with sundry amendments, and finally
adopted by congress. A committee was then appointed to draft,
and they accordingly drafted, a circular letter, requesting
the states respectively to authorize their delegates in
congress to subscribe the same in behalf of the state. … It
carried, however, very slowly conviction to the minds of the
local legislatures. Many objections were stated, and many
amendments were proposed.
{3253}
All of them, however, were rejected by congress, not probably
because they were all deemed inexpedient or improper in
themselves; but from the danger of sending the instrument back
again to all the states, for reconsideration. Accordingly, on
the 26th of June, 1778, a copy, engrossed for ratification,
was prepared, and the ratification begun on the 9th day of
July following. It was ratified by all the states, except
Delaware and Maryland, in 1778; by Delaware in 1779, and by
Maryland on the 1st of March, 1781, from which last date its
final ratification took effect, and was joyfully announced by
congress. In reviewing the objections taken by the various
states to the adoption of the confederation in the form in
which it was presented to them, … that which seemed to be of
paramount importance, and which, indeed, protracted the
ratification of the confederation to so late a period, was the
alarming controversy in respect to the boundaries of some of
the states, and the public lands, held by the crown, within
these reputed boundaries."
J. Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States,
book 2, chapter 2 (volume 1).
The following is the text of the Articles of Confederation:
"Article I.
The style of this Confederacy shall be,
'The United States of America.'
Article II.
Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence,
and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States in
Congress assembled.
Article III.
The said States hereby severally enter into a firm league of
friendship with each other, for their common defense, the
security of their liberties, and their mutual and general
welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all
force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them,
on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other
pretense whatever.
Article IV.
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different States in this
Union, the free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in
the several States; and the people of each State shall have
free ingress and egress to and from any other State, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce subject
to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the
inhabitants thereof respectively; provided that such
restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal
of property imported into any State to any other State of
which the owner is an inhabitant; provided also, that no
imposition, duties, or restriction shall be laid by any State
on the property of the United States or either of them. If any
person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or other
high misdemeanor in any State shall flee from justice and be
found in any of the United States, he shall, upon demand of
the governor or executive power of the State from which he
fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having
jurisdiction of his offense. Full faith and credit shall be
given in each of these States to the records, acts, and
judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every
other State.
Article V.
For the more convenient management of the general interests of
the United States, delegates shall be annually appointed in
such manner as the Legislature of each State shall direct, to
meet in Congress on the first Monday in November, in every
year, with a power reserved to each State to recall its
delegates, or any of them, at any time within the year, and to
send others in their stead for the remainder of the year. No
State shall be represented in Congress by less than two, nor
by more than seven members; and no person shall be capable of
being a delegate for more than three years in any term of six
years; nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of
holding any office under the United States for which he, or
another for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or
emolument of any kind. Each State shall maintain its own
delegates in any meeting of the States and while they act as
members of the Committee of the States. In determining
questions in the United States in Congress assembled, each
State shall have one vote. Freedom of speech and debate in
Congress shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or
place out of Congress; and the members of Congress shall be
protected in their persons from arrests and imprisonment
during the time of their going to and from, and attendance on,
Congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the peace.
Article VI.
No State, without the consent of the United States, in
Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any
embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement,
alliance, or treaty with any king, prince, or state; nor shall
any person holding any office of profit or trust under the
United States, or any of them, accept of any present,
emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever from any
king, prince, or foreign state; nor shall the United States,
in Congress assembled, or any of them, grant any title of
nobility. No two or more States shall enter into any treaty,
confederation, or alliance whatever between them, without the
consent of the United States, in Congress assembled,
specifying accurately the purposes for which the same is to be
entered into, and how long it shall continue. No State shall
lay any imposts or duties which may interfere with any
stipulations in treaties entered into by the United States, in
Congress assembled, with any king, prince, or state, in
pursuance of any treaties already proposed by Congress to the
courts of France and Spain. No vessel of war shall be kept up
in time of peace by any State, except such number only as
shall be deemed necessary by the United States, in Congress
assembled, for the defense of such State or its trade, nor
shall any body of forces be kept up by any State in time of
peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the
United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed
requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defense of
such State; but every State shall always keep up a
well-regulated and disciplined militia, sufficiently armed and
accoutred, and shall provide and constantly have ready for use
in public stores a due number of field-pieces and tents, and a
proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. No
State shall engage in any war without the consent of the
United States, in Congress assembled, unless such State be
actually invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain
advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians
to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not to
admit of a delay till the United States, in Congress
assembled, can be consulted; nor shall any State grant
commissions to any ships or vessels of war, nor letters of
marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration of war by
the United States, in Congress assembled, and then only
against the kingdom or state, and the subjects thereof,
against which war has been so declared, and under such
regulations as shall be established by the United States, in
Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates,
in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that
occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or
until the United States, in Congress assembled, shall
determine otherwise.
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Article VII.
When land forces are raised by any State for the common
defense, all officers of or under the rank of Colonel shall be
appointed by the Legislature of each State respectively by
whom such forces shall be raised, or in such manner as such
State shall direct, and all vacancies shall be filled up by
the State which first made the appointment.
Article VIII.
All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be
incurred for the common defense, or general welfare, and
allowed by the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be
defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be supplied by
the several States in proportion to the value of all land
within each State, granted to, or surveyed for, any person, as
such land and the buildings and improvements thereon shall be
estimated, according to such mode as the United States, in
Congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and
appoint. The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid
and levied by the authority and direction of the Legislatures
of the several States, within the time agreed upon by the
United States, in Congress assembled.
Article IX.
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall have the sole
and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war,
except in the cases mentioned in the sixth Article; of sending
and receiving ambassadors; entering into treaties and
alliances, provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made,
whereby the legislative power of the respective States shall
be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on
foreigners as their own people are subjected to, or from
prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species of
goods or commodities whatever; of establishing rules for
deciding, in all cases, what captures on land and water shall
be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land or naval
forces in the service of the United States shall be divided or
appropriated; of granting letters of marque and reprisal in
times of peace; appointing courts for the trial of piracies
and felonies committed on the high seas; and establishing
courts for receiving and determining finally appeals in all
cases of captures; provided that no member of Congress shall
be appointed a judge of any of the said courts. The United
States, in Congress assembled, shall also be the last resort
on appeal in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or
that hereafter may arise between two or more States concerning
boundary, jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever; which
authority shall always be exercised in the manner following:
Whenever the legislative or executive authority, or lawful
agent of any State in controversy with another, shall present
a petition to Congress, stating the matter in question, and
praying for a hearing, notice thereof shall be given by order
of Congress to the legislative or executive authority of the
other State in controversy, and a day assigned for the
appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall
then be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners
or judges to constitute a court for hearing and determining
the matter in question; but if they cannot agree, Congress
shall name three persons out of each of the United States, and
from the list of such persons each party shall alternately
strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number
shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less
than seven nor more than nine names, as Congress shall direct,
shall, in the presence of Congress, be drawn out by lot; and
the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of
them, shall be commissioners or judges, to hear and finally
determine the controversy, so always as a major part of the
judges who shall hear the cause shall agree in the
determination; and if either party shall neglect to attend at
the day appointed, without showing reasons which Congress
shall judge sufficient, or being present, shall refuse to
strike, the Congress shall proceed to nominate three persons
out of each State, and the secretary of Congress shall strike
in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the judgment
and sentence of the court, to be appointed in the manner
before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any
of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such
court, or to appear or defend their claim or cause, the court
shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce sentence or judgment,
which shall in like manner be final and decisive; the judgment
or sentence and other proceedings being in either case
transmitted to Congress, and lodged among the acts of Congress
for the security of the parties concerned; provided, that
every commissioner, before he sits in judgment, shall take an
oath, to be administered by one of the judges of the supreme
or superior court of the State where the cause shall be tried,
'well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question,
according to the best of his judgment, without favor,
affection, or hope of reward.' Provided, also, that no State
shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United
States. All controversies concerning the private right of soil
claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose
jurisdictions, as they may respect such lands, and the States
which passed such grants are adjusted, the said grants or
either of them being at the same time claimed to have
originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdiction,
shall, on the petition of either party to the Congress of the
United States, be finally determined, as near as may be, in
the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding disputes
respecting territorial jurisdiction between different States.
The United States, in Congress assembled, shall also have the
sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and
value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the
respective States; fixing the standard of weights and measures
throughout the United States; regulating the trade and
managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of
the States; provided that the legislative right of any State,
within its own limits, be not infringed or violated;
{3255}
establishing and regulating post-offices from one State to
another, throughout all the United States, and exacting such
postage on the papers passing through the same as may be
requisite to defray the expenses of the said office;
appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of
the United States, excepting regimental officers; appointing
all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all
officers whatever in the service of the United States; making
rules for the government and regulation of the said land and
naval forces, and directing their operations. The United
States, in Congress assembled, shall have authority to appoint
a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be
denominated 'A Committee of the States,' and to consist of one
delegate from each State, and to appoint such other committees
and civil officers as may be necessary for managing the
general affairs of the United States under their direction; to
appoint one of their number to preside; provided that no
person be allowed to serve in the office of president more
than one year in any term of three years; to ascertain the
necessary sums of money to be raised for the service of the
United States, and to appropriate and apply the same for
defraying the public expenses; to borrow money or emit bills
on the credit of the United States, transmitting every half
year to the respective States an account of the sums of money
so borrowed or emitted; to build and equip a navy; to agree
upon the number of land forces, and to make requisitions from
each State for its quota, in proportion to the number of white
inhabitants in such State, which requisition shall be binding;
and thereupon the Legislature of each State shall appoint the
regimental officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip
them in a soldier-like manner, at the expense of the United
States; and the officers and men so clothed, armed, and
equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the
time agreed on by the United States, in Congress assembled;
but if the United States, in Congress assembled, shall, on
consideration of circumstances, judge proper that any State
should not raise men, or should raise a smaller number than
its quota, and that any other State should raise a greater
number of men than the quota thereof, such extra number shall
be raised, officered, clothed, armed, and equipped in the same
manner as the quota of such State, unless the Legislature of
such State shall judge that such extra number can not be
safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise,
officer, clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra number
as they judge can be safely spared, and the officers and men
so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place
appointed, and within the time agreed on by the United States,
in Congress assembled. The United States, in Congress
assembled, shall never engage in a war, nor grant letters of

marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor enter into any
treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value
thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the
defense and welfare of the United States, or any of them, nor
emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United
States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of
vessels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land
or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commander-in-chief
of the army or navy, unless nine States assent to the same,
nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning
from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a
majority of the United States, in Congress assembled. The
Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to
any time within the year, and to any place within the United
States, so that no period of adjournment be for a longer
duration than the space of six months, and shall publish the
journal of their proceedings monthly, except such parts
thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military
operations as in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas
and nays of the delegates of each State, on any question,
shall be entered on the journal when it is desired by any
delegate; and the delegates of a State, or any of them, at his
or their request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the
said journal except such parts as are above excepted, to lay
before the Legislatures of the several States.
Article X.
The Committee of the States, or any nine of them, shall be
authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the
powers of Congress as the United States, in Congress
assembled, by the consent of nine States, shall, from time to
time, think expedient to vest them with; provided that no
power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of
which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine
States in the Congress of the United States assembled is
requisite.
Article XI.
Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the
measures of the United States, shall be admitted into, and
entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other
colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission
be agreed to by nine States.
Article XII.
All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts
contracted by or under the authority of Congress, before the
assembling of the United States, in pursuance of the present
Confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge
against the United States, for payment and satisfaction
whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby
solemnly pledged.
Article XIII.
Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United
States, in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this
Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this
Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State, and
the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any
time hereafter be made in any of them, unless such alteration
be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be
afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every State. AND
WHEREAS it hath pleased the great Governor of the world to
incline the hearts of the Legislatures we respectively
represent in Congress to approve of, and to authorize us to
ratify, the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual
Union, know ye, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue
of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do,
by these presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective
constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and
every of the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual
Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein
contained. And we do further solemnly plight and engage the
faith of our respective constituents, that they shall abide by
the determinations of the United States, in Congress
assembled, on all questions which by the said Confederation
are submitted to them; and that the Articles thereof shall be
inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent,
and that the Union shall be perpetual.
{3256}
In witness whereof we have hereunto set our hands in Congress.
Done at Philadelphia in the State of Pennsylvania the ninth
day of July in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred
and seventy-eight, and in the third year of the independence
of America."
"Under these Articles of Confederation the treaty of peace
with England was concluded and the American nation was
governed until the final adoption of the Constitution of the
United States. The main defect of the Articles of
Confederation was, that although powers sufficiently adequate
to create a government were ceded, there was no power to raise
revenue, to levy taxes, or to enforce the law, except with the
consent of nine States; and although the government had power
to contract debts, there were no means by which to discharge
them. The government had power to raise armies and navies, but
no means wherewith to pay them, unless the means were voted by
the States themselves; they could make treaties with foreign
powers, but had no means to coerce a State to obey such
treaty. In short, it was a government which had the power to
make laws, but no power to punish infractions thereof.
Washington himself said: 'The Confederation appears to me to
be little more than the shadow without the substance, and
Congress a nugatory body.' Chief Justice Story, in summing up
the leading defects of the Articles of Confederation, says:
'There was an utter want of all coercive authority to carry
into effect its own constitutional measures; this of itself
was sufficient to destroy its whole efficiency as a
superintendent government, if that may be called a government
which possessed no one solid attribute of power. In truth,
Congress possessed only the power of recommendation. Congress
had no power to exact obedience or punish disobedience of its
ordinances; they could neither impose fines nor direct
imprisonments, nor divest privileges, nor declare forfeitures,
nor suspend refractory officers. There was no power to
exercise force.'"
S. Sterne,
Constitutional History of the United States,
chapter 1.
"The individual states had attributed to themselves, in the
Articles of Confederation, no powers which could place them in
relation to foreign nations in the light of sovereign states.
They felt that all such claims would be considered ridiculous,
because back of these claims there was no real corresponding
power. Congress therefore remained, as heretofore, the sole
outward representative of sovereignty. But the power to
exercise the prerogatives was taken from it, and this without
placing it in any other hands. The changes effected by the
Articles of Confederation were rather of a negative than of a
positive nature. They did not give the State which was just
coming into being a definite form, but they began the work of
its dissolution. … The practical result … was that the United
States tended more and more to split up into thirteen
independent republics, and … virtually ceased to be a member
of the family of nations bound together by the 'jus gentium.'"
H. von Holst,
Constitutional and Political History of the United States,
volume 1, chapter 1.
ALSO IN:
G. Bancroft,
History of the Formation of the Constitution,
volume 1, chapter 1.
D. R. Goodloe,
The Birth of the Republic,
pages 353-366.
H. W. Preston,
Documents illustrative of American History,
pages 218-231.
On the operation and failure of the Articles of Confederation.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1787.
On the question of the western territorial claims of several
of the States, and the obstacle which it brought in the way of
the ratification of the Articles of Confederation.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1781-1786.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (February).
The Treaty with France.
"The account of Burgoyne's surrender, which was brought to
France by a swift-sailing ship from Boston, threw Turgot and
all Paris into transports of joy. None doubted the ability of
the states to maintain their independence. On the 12th of
December their commissioners had an interview with Vergennes.
'Nothing,' said he, 'has struck me so much as General
Washington's attacking and giving battle to General Howe's
army. To bring troops raised within the year to this, promises
everything. The court of France, in the treaty which is to be
entered into, intend to take no advantage of your present
situation. Once made, it should be durable; and therefore it
should contain no condition of which the Americans may
afterward repent, but such only as will last as long as human
institutions shall endure, so that mutual amity may subsist
forever. Entering into a treaty will be an avowal of your
independence. Spain must be consulted, and Spain will not be
satisfied with an undetermined boundary on the west. Some of
the states are supposed to run to the South Sea, which might
interfere with her claim to California.' It was answered that
the last treaty of peace adopted the Mississippi as a
boundary. 'And what share do you intend to give us in the
fisheries?' asked Vergennes; for in the original draft of a
treaty the United States had proposed to take to themselves
Cape Breton and the whole of the island of Newfoundland.
Explanations were made by the American commissioners that
their later instructions removed all chances of disagreement
on that subject. … The question of a French alliance … was
discussed by Vergennes with the Marquis d'Ossun, the late
French ambassador in Madrid, as the best adviser with regard
to Spain, and the plan of action was formed. Then these two
met the king at the apartment of Maurepas, where the plan,
after debate, was finally settled. Maurepas, at heart opposed
to the war, loved ease and popularity too well to escape the
sway of external opinion; and Louis XVI. sacrificed his own
inclination and his own feeling of justice to policy of state
and the opinion of his advisers. So, on the 6th of February, a
treaty of amity and commerce and an eventual defensive treaty
of alliance were concluded between the king of France and the
United States, on principles of equality and reciprocity, and
for the most part in conformity to the proposals of congress.
In commerce each party was to be placed on the footing of the
most favored nation. The king of France promised his good
offices with the princes and powers of Barbary. As to the
fisheries, each party reserved to itself the exclusive
possession of its own. Accepting the French interpretation of
the treaties of Utrecht and of Paris, the United States
acknowledged the right of French subjects to fish on the banks
of Newfoundland, and their exclusive right to half the coast
of that island for drying-places.
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On the question of ownership in the event of the conquest of
Newfoundland the treaty was silent. The American proposal,
that free ships give freedom to goods and to persons, except
to soldiers in actual service of an enemy, was adopted.
Careful lists were made out of contraband merchandises. The
absolute and unlimited independence of the United States was
described as the essential end of the defensive alliance; and
the two parties mutually engaged not to lay down their arms
until it should be assured by the treaties terminating the
war. Moreover, the United States guaranteed to France the
possessions then held by France in America, as well as those
which it might acquire by a future treaty of peace; and, in
like manner, the king of France guaranteed to the United
States their present possessions and acquisitions during the
war from the dominions of Great Britain in North America. A
separate and secret act reserved to the king of Spain the
power of acceding to the treaties. Within forty-two hours of
the signature of these treaties of commerce and alliance the
British ministry received the news by special messenger from
their spy in Paris, but it was not divulged." It was
officially communicated to the British government on the 13th
of March, when ambassadors were withdrawn on both sides and
war soon followed.
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, chapter 17.
ALSO IN:
Treaties and Conventions of the United States
(edition of 1889),
page 296.
T. Balch,
The French in America during the War of Independence,
chapter 8.
See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1776-1778.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (June).
Peace-proposals from England.
British evacuation of Philadelphia and march to New York.
Battle of Monmouth.
"On May 11th, Sir Henry Clinton relieved Sir William Howe at
Philadelphia, and the latter took his departure in a blaze of
mock glory. … The new commander was more active than his
predecessor, but no cleverer, and no better fitted to cope
with Washington. … Expecting a movement by the enemy,
Washington sent Lafayette forward to watch Philadelphia.
Clinton, fresh in office, determined to cut him off, and by a
rapid movement nearly succeeded in so doing. Timely
information, presence of mind, and quickness, alone enabled
the young Frenchman to escape, narrowly but completely.
Meantime, a cause for delay, that curse of the British
throughout the war, supervened. A peace commission, consisting
of the Earl of Carlisle, William Eden, and Governor Johnstone,
arrived. They were excellent men, but they came too late.
Their propositions three years before would have been well
enough, but as it was they were worse than nothing. Coolly
received, they held a fruitless interview with a committee of
Congress, tried to bribe and intrigue, found that their own
army had been already ordered to evacuate Philadelphia [in
apprehension of the arrival of the expected French fleet]
without their knowledge, and finally gave up their task in
angry despair, and returned to England to join in the chorus
of fault-finding which was beginning to sound very loud in
ministerial ears. Meanwhile, Washington waited and watched,
puzzled by the delay, and hoping only to harass Sir Henry with
militia on the march to New York. But, as the days slipped by,
the Americans grew stronger, while Sir Henry weakened himself
by sending 5,000 men to the West Indies, and 3,000 to Florida.
When he finally started [evacuating Philadelphia June 17], he
had with him less than 10,000 men, while the Americans had
13,000, nearly all continental troops. Under these
circumstances, Washington determined to bring on a battle. He
was thwarted at the outset by his officers, as was wont to be
the case. Lee had returned more whimsical than ever, and at
the moment was strongly adverse to an attack. … Washington was
harassed of course by all this, but he did not stay his
purpose, and as soon as he knew that Clinton actually had
marched, he broke camp at Valley Forge and started in pursuit.
There were more councils of an old-womanish character, but
finally Washington took the matter into his own hands, and
ordered forth a strong detachment to attack the British
rear-guard. They set out on the 25th, and as Lee, to whom the
command belonged, did not care to go, Lafayette [see above: A.
D. 1777 (JULY)] was put in charge. As soon as Lafayette had
departed, however, Lee changed his mind, and insisted that all
the detachments in front, amounting to 6,000 men, formed a
division so large that it was unjust not to give him the
command. Washington, therefore, sent him forward next day with
two additional brigades, and then Lee by seniority took
command on the 27th of the entire advance. In the evening of
that day, Washington came up, reconnoitred the enemy, and saw
that, although their position was a strong one, another day's
unmolested march would make it still stronger. He therefore
resolved to attack the next morning, and gave Lee then and
there explicit orders to that effect. In the early dawn he
despatched similar orders, but Lee apparently did nothing
except move feebly forward, saying to Lafayette, 'You don't
know the British soldiers; we cannot stand against them.' He
made a weak attempt to cut off a covering party, marched and
countermarched, ordered and countermanded, until Lafayette and
Wayne, eager to fight, knew not what to do, and sent hot
messages to Washington to come to them. Thus hesitating and
confused, Lee permitted Clinton to get his baggage and train
to the front, and to mass all his best troops in the rear
under Cornwallis, who then advanced against the American
lines. Now there were no orders at all, and the troops did not
know what to do, or where to go. They stood still, then began
to fall back, and then to retreat. A very little more and
there would have been a rout. As it was, Washington alone
prevented disaster. … As the ill tidings grew thicker,
Washington spurred sharper and rode faster through the deep
sand and under the blazing mid-summer sun. At last he met Lee
and the main body all in full retreat. He rode straight at
Lee, savage with anger, not pleasant to look at, one may
guess, and asked fiercely and with a deep oath, tradition
says, what it all meant. … Lee gathered himself and tried to
excuse and palliate what had happened, but although the brief
words that followed are variously reported to us across the
century, we know that Washington rebuked him in such a way,
and with such passion, that all was over between them. Lee …
went to the rear, thence to a court-martial, thence to
dismissal and to a solitary life. … Having put Lee aside,
Washington rallied the broken troops, brought them into
position, turned them back, and held the enemy in check.
{3258}
It was not an easy feat, but it was done, and when Lee's
division again fell back in good order the main army was in
position, and the action became general. The British were
repulsed, and then Washington, taking the offensive, drove
them back until he occupied the battlefield of the morning.
Night came upon him still advancing. He halted his army, lay
down under a tree, his soldiers lying on their arms about him,
and planned a fresh attack, to be made at daylight. But when
the dawn came it was seen that the British had crept off, and
were far on their road. The heat prevented a rapid pursuit,
and Clinton got into New York. Between there and Philadelphia
he had lost 2,000 men, Washington said, and modern authorities
put it at about 1,500, of whom nearly 500 fell at Monmouth. …
Monmouth has never been one of the famous battles of the
Revolution, and yet there is no other which can compare with
it as an illustration of Washington's ability as a soldier. …
Its importance lies in the evidence which it gives of the way
in which Washington, after a series of defeats, during a
winter of terrible suffering and privation, had yet developed
his ragged volunteers into a well-disciplined and effective
army. The battle was a victory, but the existence and the
quality of the army that won it were a far greater triumph.
The dreary winter at Valley Forge had indeed borne fruit."
H. C. Lodge,
George Washington,
volume 1, chapter 7.
ALSO IN:
H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapters 54-56.
Mrs. M. Campbell,
Life of General W. Hull,
chapter 14.
The Lee Papers,
volumes 2-3
(New York Historical Society Collection, 1872-1873).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (June-November).
The war on the border.
Activity of Tories and Indians.
The Massacre at Cherry Valley.
"The Six Nations were stirred to hostility by Sir John Johnson
and the Mohawk chief Joseph Brant, with Walter Butler, of
infamous name. Their tory partisans were more cruel than the
red men. At Cobleskill, Schoharie county, June 1, 1778, Brant
won a savage triumph with a mixed force, and burned and
plundered the settlement. Springfield was also destroyed, and
the assailants retired. A month later the Indians were again
at Cobleskill, and, burning where they went, beat off a force
that attempted to check them. The valley of the Schohariekill
was in the succeeding year subjected to invasions from the
Senecas, and suffered severely. About Fort Stanwix the tories
and red men were continually hovering, and more than once
persons were pounced upon and scalped in sight of the works.
In 1778, in the early autumn, German Flats was visited by
Brant and his followers, and was entirely destroyed, although
all the inhabitants but two were warned in season to escape
with their lives. An expedition was sent after the Indians,
but failed to bring the warriors to battle, and was rewarded
only by laying waste the Indian villages of Unadilla and
Oquaga, and capturing a large supply of cattle and provisions.
At Cherry Valley a fort had been built, and the village was
occupied by a band of colonial troops under Colonel Ichabod
Alden. He rested in security, and the settlers were scattered
in their habitations, regardless of warnings of approaching
foes. Under cover of a severe storm of snow and rain, November
11, Brant and Butler, with 800 Indians and tories, swooped
upon the homes, and 43 persons, including women and children,
were butchered, 40 taken prisoners, all the buildings were
burned, and the domestic animals seized. So brutal was the
massacre that Brant charged Butler and the tories with acting
against his protests. Brant himself was content, July 19,
1779, with destroying the church, mills, houses, and barns at
Minnisink, Orange county, without sacrificing lives, but
turned upon a party sent in pursuit, and, after capturing a
detachment, butchered the wounded, and slew 45 who tried to
escape. Such deeds produced a terror in the colony. No one
knew where the red men and tories would strike next. To check
and counteract them, excursions were made against the tribes
in their homes. One of these was led by Colonels Van Schaick
and Willett from Fort Stanwix in April, 1779). Proceeding by
Wood Creek and Oneida Lake, they penetrated the villages of
the Onondagas, which they destroyed, and seized the provisions
and even the weapons of the red men, who fled into the
wilderness."
E. H. Roberts,
New York,
chapter 24 (volume 2).
The following account of the attack on Cherry Valley is from a
pen friendly to Butler and from sources favorable to the Tory
side: "After an exhausting march next day through a blinding
snow-storm and over ground covered with deep wet snow and mud,
Butler halted his men at dark in a pine wood which afforded
them some shelter, six miles from Cherry Valley. He assembled
the chiefs and proposed that as soon as the moon rose, they
should resume their march and surround the house occupied by
the officers, while he made a rush upon the fort with the
rangers. They readily assented, but before the time appointed
arrived it began to rain violently, and they obstinately
refused to move until daybreak. It was then arranged that
Captain McDonnel with 50 picked rangers and some Indians
should storm the house, while Butler with the remainder
assailed the fort. Without tents, blankets or fires, they
spent a sleepless night cowering beneath the pines, and were
glad to move as soon as day appeared. They had approached
unperceived within a mile of the fort by passing through a
dense swamp, when the Indians in front fired at two men
cutting wood. One fell dead; the other, though bleeding, ran
for his life and the entire body of Indians set up a whoop and
followed at full speed. Unhappily the rangers had just been
halted to fix flints and load their rifles, and the Indians
obtained a long start. The Continental officers attempted to
escape to the fort but only two or three reached it. The
colonel, five other officers and twenty soldiers, were killed
on the way and the lieutenant-colonel, three subalterns, and
ten privates were taken. The colors of the regiment were
abandoned in the house and burnt in it. The garrison of the
fort was fully alarmed, and opened a fierce fire of artillery
and small arms. The rangers seized and burnt a detached
block-house, and fired briskly at the loop-holes in the
palisades for ten minutes, when Butler saw with horror and
consternation that the Indians had set their officers at
defiance, and dispersed in every direction to kill and
plunder. Their wretched misconduct forced him to collect all
the rangers into a compact body on an eminence near the
principal entrance to the fort, to oppose a sally by the
garrison, which then undoubtedly outnumbered them
considerably.
{3259}
There he was obliged to remain inactive all day under a
ceaseless, chilling rain, while blazing houses and shrieks of
agony told their pitiful tale in the settlement below. At
nightfall he marched a mile down the valley and encamped. He
then struggled with indifferent success to rescue the
prisoners. Those surrendered were placed next the camp fires
and protected by his whole force. Next morning most of the
Indians and the feeblest men among the rangers were sent away
with a huge drove of captured cattle for the supply of the
garrison at Niagara, and McDonnel and Brant, with 60 rangers
and 50 Indians, swept the valley from end to end, ruthlessly
burning every building and stack in sight, while Butler, with
the remainder, again stood guard at the gate of the fort. He
hoped that this appalling spectacle would provoke the garrison
to sally out and fight, but the lesson of Wyoming had not been
lost on them, and they continued to look on from the walls in
silent fury. Another great herd of cattle was collected, and
Butler leisurely began his retreat, having had only two
rangers and three Indians wounded during the expedition. He
did not disguise the dark side of the story in his letter to
Colonel Bolton of the 17th November. 'I have much to lament,'
he said, 'that notwithstanding my utmost precautions to save
the women and children, I could not prevent some of them
falling victims to the fury of the savages. They have carried
off many of the inhabitants and killed more, among them Colin
Cloyd, a very violent rebel. I could not prevail on the
Indians to leave the women and children behind, though the
second morning Captain Johnson (to whose knowledge of the
Indians and address in managing them I am much indebted) and I
got them to permit twelve, who were loyalists, and whom I
concealed, with the humane assistance of Mr. Joseph Brant and
Captain Jacobs of Ochquaga, to return. The death of the women
and children on this occasion may, I believe, be truly
ascribed to the rebels having falsely accused the Indians of
cruelty at Wyomen. This has much exasperated them, and they
are still more incensed at finding that the colonel and those
who had then laid down their arms, soon after marching into
their country intending to destroy their villages, and they
declared that they would be no more accused falsely of
fighting the enemy twice, meaning they would in future give no
quarter.'"
E. Cruikshank,
The Story of Butler's Rangers,
pages 55-56.
ALSO IN:
W. W. Campbell,
Annals of Tryon County,
chapter 5.
Centennial Celebrations of New York,
pages 359-383.
W. L. Stone,
Life of Brant,
volume 1, chapter 17.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (July).
The war on the border.
Bloody work of the Tories and their Indian allies.
The Massacre at Wyoming.
"In 1778, according to the plan of campaign as given by Guy
Johnson in his correspondence, the English forces on the
western borders of New York were divided into two bodies: one,
consisting of Indians under Brant, to operate in New York,
while Deputy Superintendent Butler with the other should
penetrate the settled district on the Susquehanna. Brant
[Joseph Brant, the Mohawk chief], who, according to Colonel
Claus, 'had shown himself to be the most faithful and zealous
subject his majesty could have in America,' did his work
unsparingly, and ruin marked his track. In the valley of the
upper Mohawk and the Schoharie nothing but the garrison-houses
escaped, and labor was only possible in the field when muskets
were within easy reach. Occasionally blows were struck at the
larger settlements. … In July, 1778, the threatened attack on
Wyoming took place. This region was at that time formally
incorporated as the county of Westmoreland of the colony of
Connecticut. … In the fall of 1776, two companies, on the
Continental establishment, had been raised in the valley, in
pursuance of a resolution of Congress, and were shortly
thereafter ordered to join General Washington. Several
stockaded forts had been built during the summer at different
points. The withdrawal of so large a proportion of the
able-bodied men as had been enlisted in the Continental
service threw upon the old men who were left behind the duty
of guarding the forts. … In March, 1778, another military
company was organized, by authority of Congress, to be
employed for home defence. In May, attacks were made upon the
scouting parties by Indians, who were the forerunners of an
invading army. The exposed situation of the settlement, the
prosperity of the inhabitants, and the loyalty with which they
had responded to the call for troops, demanded consideration
from Connecticut, to whose quota the companies had been
credited, and from Congress, in whose armies they had been
incorporated; but no help came. On June 30th, an armed labor
party of eight men, which went out from the upper fort, was
attacked by Major Butler, who, with a force estimated by the
American commander in his report at 800 men, Tories and
Indians in equal numbers, had arrived in the valley. This
estimate was not far from correct; but if we may judge from
other raiding forces during the war, the proportion of whites
is too large, for only a few local Tories had joined Butler.
The little forts at the upper end of the valley offered no
resistance to the invaders. On July 3d, there were collected
at 'Forty Fort,' on the banks of the river, about three miles
above Wilkesbarre, 230 Americans, organized in six companies
(one of them being the company authorized by Congress for home
defence), and commanded by Colonel Zebulon Butler, a resident
in the valley and an officer in the Continental army. It was
determined, after deliberation, to give battle. In the
afternoon of that day, this body of volunteers, their number
being swelled to nearly 300 by the addition of old men and
boys, marched up the valley. The invaders had set fire to the
forts of which they were in possession. This perplexed the
Americans, as was intended, and they pressed on towards the
spot selected by the English officer for giving battle. This
was reached about four in the afternoon, and the attack was at
once made by the Americans, who fired rapidly in platoons. The
British line wavered, but a flanking fire from a body of
Indians concealed in the woods settled the fate of the day
against the Americans. They were thrown into confusion. No
efforts of their officers could rally them while exposed to a
fire which in a short time brought down every captain in the
band. The Indians now cut off the retreat of the
panic-stricken men, and pressed them towards the river. All
who could saved their lives by flight. Of the 300 who went out
that morning from Forty Fort, the names are recorded of 162
officers and men killed in the action or in the massacre which
followed.
{3260}
Major Butler, the British officer in command, reported the
taking of 'two hundred and twenty-seven scalps' 'and only five
prisoners.' Such was the exasperation of the Indians,
according to him, that it was with difficulty he saved these
few. He gives the English loss at two whites killed and eight
Indians wounded. During the night the worst passions of the
Indians seem to have been aroused in revenge for Oriskany.
Incredible tales are told of the inhumanity of the Tories.
These measures of vengeance fell exclusively upon those who
participated in the battle, for all women and children were
spared. As soon as the extent of the disaster was made known,
the inhabitants of the lower part of the valley deserted their
homes, and fled in the direction of the nearest settlements.
Few stayed behind who had strength and opportunity to escape.
In their flight many of the fugitives neglected to provide
themselves with provisions, and much suffering and some loss
of life ensued. The fugitives from the field of battle took
refuge in the forts lower down the valley. The next day,
Colonel Zebulon Butler, with the remnants of the company for
home defence, consisting of only fourteen men, escaped from
the valley. Colonel Denison, in charge of Forty Fort,
negotiated with Major Butler the terms of capitulation which
were ultimately signed. In these it was agreed that the
inhabitants should occupy their farms peaceably, and their
lives should be preserved 'intire and unhurt.' With the
exception that Butler executed a British deserter whom he
found among the prisoners, no lives were taken at that time.
Shortly thereafter, the Indians began to plunder, and the
English commander, to his chagrin, found himself unable to
check them. Miner even goes so far as to say that he promised
to pay for the property thus lost. Finding his commands
disregarded, Butler mustered his forces and withdrew, without
visiting the lower part of the valley. The greater part of the
Indians went with him, but enough remained to continue the
devastation, while a few murders committed by straggling
parties of Indians ended the tragedy. The whole valley was
left a scene of desolation."
A. McF. Davis,
The Indians and the Border Warfare of the Revolution
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 6, chapter 8).
"Rarely, indeed, does it happen that history is more at fault
in regard to facts than in the case of Wyoming. The remark may
be applied to nearly every writer who has attempted to narrate
the events connected with the invasion of Colonel John Butler.
Ramsay, and Gordon, and Marshall—nay, the British historians
themselves—have written gross exaggerations. Marshall,
however, in his revised edition, has made corrections. … Other
writers, of greater or less note, have gravely recorded the
same fictions, adding, it is to be feared, enormities not even
conveyed to them by tradition. The grossest of these
exaggerations are contained in Thatcher's Military Journal and
Drake's Book of the Indians. The account of the marching out
of a large body of Americans from one of the forts, to hold a
parley, by agreement, and then being drawn into an ambuscade
and all put to death, is false; the account of 70 Continental
soldiers being butchered, after having surrendered, is also
totally untrue. No regular troops surrendered, and all escaped
who survived the battle of the 3d. … There is still another
important correction to be made. … This correction regards the
name and the just fame of Joseph Brant, whose character has
been blackened with all the infamy, both real and imaginary,
connected with this bloody expedition. Whether Captain Brant
was at any time in company with this expedition is doubtful;
but it is certain, in the face of every historical authority,
British and American, that, so far from being engaged in the
battle, he was many miles distant at the time of its
occurrence. … It will, moreover, be seen, toward the close of
the present work, that after the publication of Campbell's
'Gertrude of Wyoming,' in which poem the Mohawk chieftain was
denounced as 'the Monster Brant,' his son repaired to England,
and, in a correspondence with the poet, successfully
vindicated his father's memory."
W. L. Stone,
Life of Joseph Brant,
volume 1, page 339, foot-note, page 338 and footnote.
"No lives were taken by the Indians after the surrender; but
numbers of women and children perished in the dismal swamp on
the Pokono range of mountains, in the flight. … The whole
number of people killed and missing was about 300. … The
greatest barbarities of this celebrated massacre were
committed by the tories."
W. L. Stone,
Poetry and History of Wyoming,
chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
W. P. Miner,
History of Wyoming,
Letters 17-18.
G. Peck,
Wyoming.
J. Fiske,
The American Revolution,
chapter 11 (volume 2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (July-November).
The French fleet and army and their undertakings.
Ill fortune and ill-feeling between the new allies.
The failure at Newport.
"The first minister of France to the United States, M. Gérard,
came accompanied by a fleet and army, under D'Estaing, (July.)
'Unforeseen and unfavorable circumstances,' as Washington
wrote, 'lessened the importance of the French services in a
great degree.' In the first place, the arrival was just late
enough to miss the opportunity of surprising the British fleet
in the Delaware, not to mention the British army on its
retreat to New York. In the next place, the French vessels
proved to be of too great draught to penetrate the channel and
cooperate in an attack upon New York. Thus disappointing and
disappointed, D'Estaing engaged in an enterprise against
Newport, still in British hands. It proved another failure.
But not through the French alone; the American troops that
were to enter the island at the north being greatly
behindhand. The same day that they took their place, under
Sullivan, Greene, and Lafayette, the French left theirs at the
lower end of the island, in order to meet the British fleet
arriving from New York, (August 10.) A severe storm prevented
more than a partial engagement; but D'Estaing returned to
Newport only to plead the injuries received in the gale as
compelling his retirement to Boston for repairs. The orders of
the French government had been peremptory, that in case of any
damage to the fleet it should put into port at once. So far
was D'Estaing from avoiding action on personal grounds, that
when Lafayette hurried to Boston to persuade his countrymen to
return, the commander offered to serve as a volunteer until
the fleet should be refitted. The Americans, however, talked
of desertion and of inefficiency,—so freely, indeed, as to
affront their faithful Lafayette.
{3261}
At the same time, large numbers of them imitated the very
course which they censured, by deserting their own army. The
remaining forces retreated from their lines to the northern
end of the island, and, after an engagement, withdrew to the
mainland, (August 30.) It required all the good offices of
Lafayette, of Washington, and of Congress, to keep the peace
between the Americans and their allies. D'Estaing, soothed by
the language of those whom he most respected, was provoked, on
the other hand, by the hostility of the masses, both in the
army and amongst the people. Collisions between his men and
the Bostonians kept up his disgust; and, when his fleet was
repaired, he sailed for the West Indies, (November.) … On the
part of the British, there was nothing attempted that would
not have been far better unattempted. Marauding parties from
Newport went against New Bedford and Fairhaven. Others from
New York went against Little Egg Harbor. Tories and Indians
—'a collection of banditti,' as they were rightly styled by
Washington, descended from the northern country to wreak
massacre at Wyoming and at Cherry Valley. The war seemed to be
assuming a new character: it was one of ravages unworthy of
any cause, and most unworthy of such a cause as the British
professed to be. Affairs were at a low state amongst the
Americans."
S. Eliot,
History of the United States,
part 3, chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
S. G. Arnold,
History of Rhode Island,
chapters 21-22 (volume 2).
O. W. B. Peabody,
Life of General John Sullivan
(Library of American Biographies,
series 2, volume 3).
J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 9.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778 (December).
Anxieties of Washington.
His opinion of Congress.
The serious defects and errors of that body.
"Much of the winter was passed by Washington in Philadelphia,
occupied in devising and discussing plans for the campaign of
1779. It was an anxious moment with him. Circumstances which
inspired others with confidence, filled him with solicitude.
The alliance with France had produced a baneful feeling of
security, which, it appeared to him, was paralyzing the
energies of the country. England, it was thought, would now be
too much occupied in securing her position in Europe, to
increase her force or extend her operations in America. Many,
therefore, considered the war as virtually at an end; and were
unwilling to make the sacrifices, or supply the means
necessary for important military undertakings. Dissensions,
too, and party feuds were breaking out in Congress, owing to
that relaxation of that external pressure of a common and
imminent danger, which had heretofore produced a unity of
sentiment and action. That august body had, in fact, greatly
deteriorated since the commencement of the war. Many of those
whose names had been as watchwords at the Declaration of
Independence had withdrawn from the national councils;
occupied either by their individual affairs, or by the affairs
of their individual States. Washington, whose comprehensive
patriotism embraced the whole Union, deprecated and deplored
the dawning of this sectional spirit."
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 38.
The following, from a letter written by Washington in
December, 1778, to Benjamin Harrison, Speaker of the Virginia
House of Delegates, intimates the grave anxieties which filled
his mind, and the opinion of Congress with which he had
returned from a visit to Philadelphia:
"It appears as clear to me as ever the Sun did in its meridian
brightness, that America never stood in more eminent need of
the wise, patriotic, and spirited exertions of her Sons than
at this period; and if it is not a sufficient cause for
general lamentation, my misconception of the matter impresses
it too strongly upon me, that the States, separately, are too
much engaged in their local concerns, and have too many of
their ablest men withdrawn from the general council, for the
good of the common weal. … As there can be no harm in a pious
wish for the good of one's Country, I shall offer it as mine,
that each State would not only choose, but absolutely compel
their ablest men to attend Congress; and that they would
instruct them to go into a thorough investigation of the
causes, that have produced so many disagreeable effects in the
army and Country; in a word, that public abuses should be
corrected & an entire reformation worked. Without these, it
does not in my Judgment require the spirit of divination to
foretell the consequences of the present administration; nor
to how little purpose the States individually are framing
constitutions, providing laws, and filling offices with the
abilities of their ablest men. These, if the great whole is
mismanaged, must sink in the general wreck, and will carry
with it the remorse of thinking, that we are lost by our own
folly and negligence, or the desire perhaps of living in ease
and tranquillity during the expected accomplishment of so
great a revolution, in the effecting of which the greatest
abilities, and the honestest men our (i. e. the American)
world affords, ought to be employed. It is much to be feared,
my dear Sir, that the States, in their separate capacities,
have very inadequate ideas of the present danger. Removed
(some of them) far distant from the scene of action, and
seeing and hearing such publications only, as flatter their
wishes, they conceive that the contest is at an end, and that
to regulate the government and police of their own State is
all that remains to be done; but it is devoutly to be wished,
that a sad reverse of this may not fall upon them like a
thunder-clap, that is little expected. I do not mean to
designate particular States. I wish to cast no reflections
upon any one. The Public believe (and, if they do believe it,
the fact might almost as well be so), that the States at this
time are badly represented, and that the great and important
concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want either
of abilities or application in the members, or through the
discord & party views of some individuals. … P. S.
Philadelphia: 30th. This letter was to have gone by Post from
Middlebrook but missed that conveyance, since which I have
come to this place at the request of Congress whence I shall
soon return. I have seen nothing since I came here (on the 22d
Inst.) to change my opinion of Men or Measrs., but abundant
reason to be convinced that our affairs are in a more
distressed, ruinous and deplorable condition than they have
been in since the commencement of the War.—By a faithful
laborer then in the cause—By a man who is daily injuring his
private Estate without even the smallest earthly advantage not
common to all in case of a favorable Issue to the dispute—By
one who wishes the prosperity of America most devoutly and
sees or thinks he sees it, on the brink of ruin, you are
beseeched most earnestly, my dear Colonel Harrison, to exert
yourself in endeavoring to rescue your Country by (let me add)
sending your ablest and best Men to Congress—these characters
must not slumber nor sleep at home in such times of pressing
danger—they must not content themselves in the enjoyment of
places of honor or profit in their own Country while the
common interests of America are mouldering and sinking into
irretrievable (if a remedy is not soon applied) ruin in which
theirs also must ultimately be involved.
{3262}
If I was to be called upon to draw a picture of the times and
of Men, from what I have seen, and heard, and in part know, I
should in one word say that idleness, dissipation &
extravagance seems to have laid fast hold of most of
them.—That speculation—peculation—and an insatiable thirst
for riches seems to have got the better of every other
consideration and almost of every order of Men.—That party
disputes and personal quarrels are the great business of the
day whilst the momentous concerns of an empire—a great and
accumulated debt—ruined finances—depreciated money—and want
of credit (which in their consequences is the want of
everything) are but secondary considerations and postponed
from day to day—from week to week as if our affairs wear the
most promising aspect—after drawing this picture, which from
my Soul I believe to be a true one, I need not repeat to you
that I am alarmed and wish to see my Countrymen roused.—I
have no resentments, nor do I mean to point at any particular
characters,—this I can declare upon my honor for I have every
attention paid me by Congress that I can possibly expect and
have reason to think that I stand well in their estimation,
but in the present situation of things I cannot help asking—
Where is Mason—Wythe—Jefferson—Nicholas—Pendleton—Nelson—and
another I could name—and why, if you are sufficiently
impressed with your danger do you not (as New York has done in
the case of Mr. Jay) send an extra member or two for at least
a certain limited time till the great business of the Nation
is put upon a more respectable and happy establishment.—Your
Money is now sinking 5 Pr. ct. a day in this city; and I shall
not be surprized if in the course of a few months a total stop
is put to the currency of it.—And yet an Assembly—a concert—a
Dinner—or supper (that will cost three or four hundred pounds)
will not only take Men off from acting in but even from thinking
of this business while a great part of the Officers of ye Army
from absolute necessity are quitting the service and ye more
virtuous few rather than do this are sinking by sure degrees
into beggary and want.—I again repeat to you that this is not
an exaggerated acct.; that it is an alarming one I do not
deny, and confess to you that I feel more real distress on
account of the prest. appearances of things than I have done
at any one time since the commencement of the dispute—but it
is time to bid you once more adieu.—Providence has heretofore
taken me up when all other means and hope seemed to be
departing from me in this."
George Washington,
Writings,
edited by W: C. Ford,
volume 7, pages 297-303.
"The first Continental Congress enjoyed and deserved in a
remarkable degree the respect and confidence of the country.
The second Congress was composed of eminent men, and
succeeded, for a time, to the honors and reputation of the
first. But when it attempted to pass from discussion to
organization, and to direct as well as to frame the machinery
of administration, its delays and disputes and errors and
contradictions and hesitations excited a well-founded distrust
of its executive skill. Conscious of this distrust, it became
jealous of its authority; and instead of endeavoring to
regain, by correcting its errors, the ground which it had lost
by committing them, it grew suspicious and exacting in
proportion to the decay of its strength. And while this
critical change in its relations to the country was taking
place, important changes took place also in the materials of
which it was composed,—some of its wisest members being
removed by death, or imperative calls to other fields of duty,
or by failing of re-election at the regular expiration of
their terms of office. Among the first elements with which it
was brought into collision were the newly organized
governments of the States. The question of State rights, that
unsolved problem of our history, begins almost with the
beginning of the war. How abundant and active the materials of
disunion were, and how difficult it was even for leading men
to rise above them might be proved by numerous passages in the
letters of Washington and Greene, if it were not still more
evident from the conduct of the local legislatures. How far
this spirit might have been counteracted or controlled if the
policy of the Congress had been that policy of prompt decision
and energetic action which, commanding respect at all times,
commands in times of general danger general and implicit
obedience, it is impossible to say. … Another element with
which it was brought into immediate and constant relations was
the army; and, unfortunately for both, these relations, from
their very nature, brought into immediate and constant
contrast the elements of opposition which they both contained,
rather than the elements of harmonious action, which they also
contained in an almost equal degree. If the Congress was
composed of the representatives of the people, the army was
composed in a large proportion of the constituents of the
Congress. More than once also, during the course of the war,
men who had done good work for their country as soldiers,
withdrawing from their original field of action, did equally
good service for her as statesmen. And more than once, too,
men who had proved themselves wise and eloquent in counsel
were found at the head of a regiment, or even in more
subordinate positions in the army. … The real interest and the
real object of the citizen in arms and of the citizen in the
toga were still the same. But their point of view was
different. The ever-present object of Congress was discussion
as a means of organization. The ever-present object of the
leaders of the army was decision as a means of action.
Congress counted obstacles, weighed difficulties, balanced
opposing advantages, eating and sleeping meanwhile and
refreshing mind and body as nature bade. But while Congress
was deliberating upon the best way of procuring meat, the army
was often brought to the verge of starvation for the want of
it. While Congress was discussing by a warm fire the most
eligible method of providing the army with tents and blankets,
half the army was sleeping on the snow without either blanket
or tent.
{3263}
While Congress was framing elaborate resolutions, and drawing
out and equipping regiments upon paper, officers in the field
were standing disheartened before their thinned and
disheartened ranks. … Errors of statesmanship, like errors of
generalship, would easily have been forgiven and forgotten;
for both statesmen and generals had still much to learn.
Unfortunately, while the best generals strove earnestly to
correct their errors by their experience, Congress, in too
many things, clung obstinately to its errors, in spite of the
most decisive experience. Those errors were twofold,—errors of
policy and errors of principle,—the one tending to undermine
the respect which, in the beginning, was felt for their
wisdom; the other, to awaken a general distrust of their
justice. The first year of the war demonstrated the danger of
short enlistments and temporary levies. But more than half the
second year was allowed to pass before it was decided to raise
an army for the whole duration of the war. The first campaign
demonstrated the necessity of providing by regularly organized
departments for the food, clothing, and transportation of the
army; but it was not till late in the second year that a board
of war was organized; and not till later still that the
Quartermaster-General and Commissary-General were allowed to
devote themselves to their duty in camp, instead of waiting
idly for orders at the door of Congress. All experience and
the simplest reasoning showed the importance of strengthening
the hands of their General by passing promptly all the acts
needed for the conduct of an army in the field, or the support
and instruction of an army in quarters; but, in spite of all
experience and the plainest reason, Congress persisted in its
unseasonable delays. … The policy of the Congress, in the
organization and support of the army, was a policy of
tergiversation and delay. No wonder that the army, leaders and
all, should early lose their confidence in its wisdom! But the
dissatisfaction did not end here. One of the earliest felt of
the numerous wants of the army was the want of good officers.
… To select them in the beginning from the mass of unproved
candidates was impossible; but in the course of two campaigns,
the characters and pretensions of men were well tried, the
chaff thoroughly sifted, and what remained might be
confidently accepted as sound. … It was evidently the policy
of Congress to secure by all proper and reasonable inducements
the services of such officers for the war. It was the duty of
Congress, in its dealings with them, to remember that in
becoming soldiers, and exposing themselves to the dangers and
privations of a soldier's life, they adopted, with the ideas
of subordination that lie at the basis of military discipline,

the ideas of rank and grade which define and circumscribe that
subordination. But Congress remembered nothing of this. It
required of them the service of officers, but gave them a pay
hardly sufficient to enable them to live like private
soldiers. It demanded the present sacrifice of cold, hunger,
hard service, and exposure to sickness, wounds, and death; and
refused the prospective reward of half-pay or pension when
sickness or wounds should have incapacitated them for further
exertion, or death should have made their wives unprotected
widows, and their children helpless orphans. Forgetting that
pride is an essential element of the military character, and
that self-respect is essential to a healthy and sustaining
pride, it trifled with their claims to rank by the accepted
rules of service, and claimed and exercised the power of
dealing with commissions according to its own good pleasure."
G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathanael Greene,
book 2, chapter 18 (volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779.
Clark's conquest of the Northwest for Virginia, and its
annexation to the district of Kentucky.
"Virginia … had more western enterprise than any other colony.
In 1774 Dunmore's war gave her the 'back-lands,' into which
her frontiersmen had been for some time pressing. Boone was a
Carolinian, but Kentucky was a distinctively Virginia colony.
In 1776 the Virginia legislature erected the County of
Kentucky, and the next year a Virginia judge dispensed justice
at Harrodsburg. Soon the colony was represented in the
legislature of the parent state. While thus extending her
jurisdiction over the region southwest of the Ohio, the Old
Dominion did not forget the language of [her charter] of 1609,
'up into the land throughout from sea to sea, west and
northwest.' George Rogers Clark, a Virginian who had made
Kentucky his home, was endowed with something of the general's
and statesman's grasp. While floating down the Ohio in 1776,
being then 24 years of age, he conceived the conquest of the
country beyond the river. … Clark says he had since the
beginning of the war taken pains to make himself acquainted
with the true situation of the Northwestern posts; and in 1777
he sent two young hunters to spy out the country more
thoroughly, and especially to ascertain the sentiments of the
'habitants.' On the return of these hunters with an
encouraging report, he went to Williamsburg, then the capital
of Virginia, where he enlisted Governor Patrick Henry and
other leading minds in a secret expedition to the Illinois.
Acting under a vaguely worded law, authorizing him to aid 'any
expedition against their Western enemies,' Governor Henry gave
Clark some vague public instructions, directing him to enlist,
in any county of the commonwealth, seven companies of men who
should act under his command as a militia, and also private
instructions that were much more full and definite. … Both the
public and private instructions are dated January 2, 1778. The
governor also gave the young captain a small supply of money.
Clark immediately re-crossed the mountains and began to
recruit his command. … Overcoming as best he could the
difficulties that environed him, he collected his feeble
command at the Falls of the Ohio. On June 26, 1778, he began
the descent of the river. Leaving the Ohio at Fort Massac,
forty miles above its mouth, he began the march to Kaskaskia.
This fell into his hands, July 5th, and Cahokia soon after,
both without the loss of a single life. Clark found few
Englishmen in these villages, and the French, who were weary
of British rule, he had little difficulty in attaching to the
American interest. Vincennes, soon after, surrendered to a
mere proclamation, when there was not an American soldier
within one hundred miles of the place. … Clark prevailed upon
100 men to re-enlist for eight months; he then filled up his
companies with recruits from the villages, and sent an urgent
call to Virginia for re-enforcements. The salutary influence
of the invasion upon the Indians was felt at once; it 'began
to spread among the nations even to the border of the lakes;'
and in five weeks Clark settled a peace with ten or twelve
different tribes. …
{3264}
And now Clark began really to feel the difficulties of his
situation. Destitute of money, poorly supplied, commanding a
small and widely scattered force, he had to meet and
circumvent an active enemy who was determined to regain what
he had lost. Governor Hamilton [the British governor at
Detroit] projected a grand campaign against the French towns
that had been captured and the small force that held them. The
feeble issue was the capture, in December, 1778, of Vincennes,
which was occupied by but two Americans. Clark, who was in the
Illinois at the time of this disaster, at once put his little
force in motion for the Wabash, knowing, he says, that if he
did not take Hamilton, Hamilton would take him; and, February
25, 1779, at the end of a march of 250 miles, that ranks in
peril and hardship with Arnold's winter march to Canada, he
again captured the town, the fort, the governor, and his whole
command. Hamilton was sent to Virginia a prisoner of war,
where he was found guilty of treating American prisoners with
cruelty, and of offering the Indians premiums for scalps, but
none for prisoners." Clark was ambitious to extend his march
to Detroit, but could not compass the necessary means.
"'Detroit lost for a few hundred men,' was his pathetic lament
as he surrendered an enterprise that lay near his heart. Had
he been able to achieve it, he would have won and held the
whole Northwest. As it was he won and held the Illinois and
the Wabash in the name of Virginia and of the United States.
The bearing of this conquest on the question of western
boundaries will be considered in another place, but here it is
pertinent to remark that the American Commissioners, in 1782,
at Paris, could plead 'uti possidetis' in reference to much of
the country beyond the Ohio, for the flag of the Republic,
raised over it by George Rogers Clark, had never been lowered.
It would not be easy to find in our history a case of an
officer accomplishing results that were so great and
far-reaching with so small a force. Clark's later life is
little to his credit, but it should not be forgotten that he
rendered the American cause and civilization a very great
service. All this time the British were not idle. War-party
after war-party was sent against the American border. In 1780
a grand expedition was organized at Detroit and sent to
Kentucky under the command of Captain Bird. But it
accomplished nothing commensurate with its magnitude and cost.
… The Northwest had been won by a Virginia army, commanded by
a Virginia officer, put in the field at Virginia's expense.
Governor Henry had promptly announced the conquest to the
Virginia delegates in Congress. … But before Patrick Henry
wrote this letter, Virginia had welded the last link in her
chain of title to the country beyond the Ohio. In October,
1778, her Legislature declared: 'All the citizens of the
commonwealth of Virginia, who are actually settlers there, or
who shall hereafter be settled, on the west side of the Ohio,
shall be included in the district of Kentucky which shall be
called Illinois County.' Nor was this all. Soon after,
Governor Henry appointed a lieutenant-commandant for the new
county, with full instructions for carrying on the government.
The French settlements remained under Virginia jurisdiction
until March, 1784."
B. A. Hinsdale,
The Old Northwest,
chapter 9.
ALSO IN:
Clark's Campaign in the Illinois
(Ohio Valley History Series, 3).
J. H. Perkins,
Annals of the West,
chapter 7.
A. Davidson and B. Stuvé,
History of Illinois,
chapters 16-18.
T. Roosevelt,
The Winning of the West,
volume 2, chapters 2-3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779.
The French Alliance.
Peril of France.
Doubtful feeling in America.
Spanish mediation with England.
"From the third volume of Doniol's comprehensive work on the
'Participation de la France a l'etablissement des Ètats Unis,'
published in 1888, we are able to learn for the first time the
extreme peril of France in 1778-1779. When Vergennes advised
the recognition of the independence of the United States, it
was on the same grounds that Canning advised the recognition
of the independence of the Spanish South American States many
years afterwards. The fair distribution of power in the
civilized world, which was threatened in the latter period by
the Holy Alliance, was threatened in the former period by the
assumption of maritime supremacy by Britain. In each the
object was to call up a new sovereignty in America, so as to
check an undue concentration of sovereignty in Europe,
Undoubtedly Vergennes was aided, as Canning was aided, by the
enthusiasm felt by men of liberal views for a revolution that
was expected to extend the domain of liberalism; but with
Vergennes, as with Canning, the object was the establishing of
a power abroad which could resist a dangerous aggression at
home. When in February, 1778, France acknowledged the
independence of the United States, Vergennes had good reason
to hold either that Britain would not resent the insult by
war, or that she would find that in such a war the odds were
against her. A British army had just capitulated at Saratoga.
America, so it was reported to Vergennes and so he believed,
was unanimous in determining to defend her liberties to the
last. In Holland there was a strong party which was expected
to force the States-General into a recognition of their sister
republic. Spain had already secretly advanced a million of
francs to the American commissioners. From Frederick the
Great, delighted to see his British relatives, who had not
always supported him in his troubles, annoyed by a revolt in
their own domain, came words very encouraging to the American
envoys. Catharine II listened with apparent satisfaction to a
scheme which would relieve her infant shipping from British
oppression. It looked as if, should Britain declare war
against France, she would have against her the armies and
navies of all continental Europe, aided by the people of her
American Colonies in a compact mass. But in a few months there
came a great change. The British army under Howe was so
largely reenforced as for the immediate present to give it a
great superiority over any army Congress could bring against
it in open field. … It is true that the news in April of the
French treaty revived the energies of the revolutionists; but
this treaty had its drawbacks, as the old dislike of France,
in part inherited from England, in part the product of the
Seven-years war, intensified the yearning for the mother
country which in many hearts still remained. French officers
complained that on their first arrival in New England they
were received with sullen aversion by the people, though
welcomed by the revolutionary leaders.
{3265}
The French army and navy, for the first year in which they
were engaged in America, did no good to the American cause;
and so great was the popular irritation at their inactivity,
so strong, it was said, continued to be the old race
attachment to England, that intelligent French observers in
America advised Vergennes that he must move warily, for at any
moment America might make a separate peace with Britain and
then join the British forces against France. No doubt these
reports, so far as they pronounced this to be the drift of a
large minority in Congress, were unfounded in fact. They were
nevertheless communicated under high sanction to Vergennes,
and produced in his mind the liveliest anxiety. … English
influence had for a time regained its ascendency in Holland.
Prussia and Russia, having tasted the delights of neutral
commerce, let it be plainly understood that they would not
abandon a neutrality so profitable for the risks of
belligerency. And Spain had taken alarm and was backing out
not merely from the family compact, but from her recent
promise to aid the insurgents. Aiding the insurgents, her
minister declared, would be cutting her own throat, and no aid
to the insurgents should be given except on a very heavy
equivalent. If France was to meet the shock of the British
navy alone she might be swept from the seas, and, aside from
this danger, her finances were in such a ruinous condition
that her bankruptcy was imminent. One of two courses must be
adopted, not only to save France but to save the independence
of the United States and the consequent equipoise of power for
which France has gone to war. There must be either a general
peace, which would include the independence of the United
States, or there must be war, with Spain joining the allies. …
It was in this condition of affairs that the position of Spain
in 1778-1779 became of commanding importance. She offered
herself as mediator between the allies and their common enemy,
and through her the terms of pacification were discussed. In
the negotiations, protracted and on both sides largely
insincere, between Spain and Britain relative to the proposed
pacification, the winter of 1778-1779 was consumed."
F. Wharton,
Introduction to The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States,
chapter 5, section 86 (volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779.
The War carried into the South.
Savannah taken and Georgia subdued.
Towards the end of November, 1778, a "body of troops, under
Lieutenant-colonel Campbell, sailed [from New York] for
Georgia In the squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker; the British
cabinet having determined to carry the war into the Southern
States. At the same time General Prevost, who commanded in
Florida, was ordered by Sir Henry Clinton to march to the
banks of the Savannah River, and attack Georgia in flank,
while the expedition under Campbell should attack it in front
on the seaboard. … The squadron of Commodore Hyde Parker
anchored in the Savannah River towards the end of December. An
American force of about 600 regulars, and a few militia under
General Robert Howe, were encamped near the town, being the
remnant of an army with which that officer had invaded
Florida, in the preceding summer, but had been obliged to
evacuate it by a mortal malady which desolated his camp.
Lieutenant-colonel Campbell landed his troops on the 29th of
December, about three miles below the town. The whole country
bordering the river is a deep morass, cut up by creeks, and
only to be traversed by causeways. Over one of these, 600
yards in length, with a ditch on each side, Colonel Campbell
advanced, putting to flight a small party stationed to guard
it. General Howe had posted his little army on the main road,
with the river on his left and a morass in front. A negro gave
Campbell information of a path leading through the morass, by
which troops might get unobserved to the rear of the
Americans. Sir James Baird was detached with the light
infantry by this path, while Colonel Campbell advanced in
front. The Americans, thus suddenly attacked in front and
rear, were completely routed; upwards of 100 were either
killed on the spot, or perished in the morass; 38 officers and
415 privates were taken prisoners, the rest retreated up the
Savannah River and crossed into South Carolina. Savannah, the
capital of Georgia, was taken possession of by the victors,
with cannon, military stores and provisions; their loss was
only seven killed and nineteen wounded. Colonel Campbell
conducted himself with great moderation; protecting the
persons and property of the inhabitants, and proclaiming
security and favor to all that should return to their
allegiance. Numbers in consequence flocked to the British
standard: the lower part of Georgia was considered as subdued,
and posts were established by the British to maintain
possession. While Colonel Campbell had thus invaded Georgia in
front, General Prevost" entered the State from Florida, "took
Sunbury, the only remaining fort of importance, and marched to
Savannah, where he assumed the general command, detaching
Colonel Campbell against Augusta. By the middle of January
(1779) all Georgia was reduced to submission. A more
experienced American general than Howe had by this time
arrived to take command of the Southern Department,
Major-general Lincoln, who had gained such reputation in the
campaign against Burgoyne, and whose appointment to this
station had been solicited by the delegates from South
Carolina and Georgia. He had received his orders from
Washington in the beginning of October."
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapter 37.
ALSO IN:
W. B. Stevens,
History of Georgia,
book 4, chapter 4 (volume 2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779.
Washington guarding the Hudson.
The storming of Stony Point.
Marauding warfare of the British.
"After Clinton slipped away from Monmouth and sought refuge in
New York, Washington took post at convenient points and
watched the movements of the enemy. In this way the summer
passed. As always, Washington's first object was to guard the
Hudson, and while he held this vital point firmly, he waited,
ready to strike elsewhere if necessary. It looked for a time
as if the British intended to descend on Boston, seize the
town, and destroy the French fleet, which had gone there to
refit. Such was the opinion of Gates, then commanding in that
department, and as Washington inclined to the same belief, the
fear of this event gave him many anxious moments.
{3266}
He even moved his troops so as to be in readiness to march
eastward at short notice; but he gradually became convinced
that the enemy had no such plan. … The main army, therefore,
remained quiet, and when the autumn had passed went into
winter-quarters in well-posted detachments about New York. In
December Clinton made an ineffectual raid [in New Jersey], and
then all was peaceful again, and Washington was able to go to
Philadelphia and struggle with Congress, leaving his army more
comfortable and secure than they had been in any previous
winter. … He now hoped and believed that the moment would come
when, by uniting his army with the French, he should be able
to strike the decisive blow. Until that time came, however, he
knew that he could do nothing on a great scale, and he felt
that meantime the British, abandoning practically the eastern
and middle States, would make one last desperate struggle for
victory, and would make it in the south. Long before anyone
else, he appreciated this fact, and saw a peril looming large
in that region. … All this, however, did not change his own
plans one jot. He believed that the south must work out its
own salvation, as New York and New England had done with
Burgoyne, and he felt sure that in the end it would be
successful. But he would not go south, nor take his army
there. … The British might overrun the north or invade the
south, but he would stay where he was, with his grip upon New
York and the Hudson River. The tide of invasion might ebb and
flow in this region or that, but the British were doomed if
they could not divide the eastern colonies from the others.
When the appointed hour came, he was ready to abandon
everything and strike the final and fatal blow; but until then
he waited and stood fast with his army, holding the great
river in his grasp. He felt much more anxiety about the south
than he had felt about the north, and expected Congress to
consult him as to a commander, having made up his mind that
Greene was the man to send. But Congress still believed in
Gates, who had been making trouble for Washington all winter;
and so Gates was sent, and Congress in due time got their
lesson, and found once more that Washington understood men
better than they did. In the north the winter was
comparatively uneventful. The spring passed, and in June
Clinton came out and took possession of Stony Point and
Verplanck's Point, and began to fortify them. It looked a
little as if Clinton might intend to get control of the Hudson
by slow approaches, fortifying, and then advancing until he
reached West Point. With this in mind, Washington at once
determined to check the British by striking sharply at one of
their new posts. Having made up his mind, he sent for Wayne
and asked him if he would storm Stony Point. Tradition says
that Wayne replied, 'I will storm hell, if you will plan it.'
A true tradition, probably, in keeping with Wayne's character,
and pleasant to us to-day as showing with a vivid gleam of
rough human speech the utter confidence of the army in their
leader, that confidence which only a great soldier can
inspire. So Washington planned, and Wayne stormed [July 15,
1779], and Stony Point fell. It was a gallant and brilliant
feat of arms, one of the most brilliant of the war. Over 500
prisoners were taken, the guns were carried off, and the works
destroyed, leaving the British to begin afresh with a good
deal of increased caution and respect. Not long after, Harry
Lee stormed Paulus Hook with equal success, and the British
were checked and arrested, if they intended any extensive
movement. On the frontier, Sullivan, after some delays, did
his work effectively. … In these various ways Clinton's circle
of activity was steadily narrowed, but it may be doubted
whether he had any coherent plan. The principal occupation of
the British was to send out marauding expeditions and cut off
outlying parties. Tryon burned and pillaged in Connecticut [at
New Haven, Fairfield and Norwalk], Matthews in Virginia [at
Norfolk, Portsmouth and elsewhere], and others on a smaller
scale elsewhere in New Jersey and New York. … It was enough
for Washington to hold fast to the great objects he had in
view, to check Clinton and circumscribe his movements.
Steadfastly he did this through the summer and winter of
1779."
H. C. Lodge,
George Washington,
volume 1, chapter 8.
ALSO IN:
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 3, chapters 38-40,
and volume 4, chapter 1.
B. J. Lossing,
Field-book of the Revolution,
volume 1, chapter 31.
J. Armstrong,
Life of Anthony Wayne
(Library of American Biographies, volume 4).
C. J. Stillé,
Major-General Anthony Wayne,
chapter 5
G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathaniel Greene,
book 3, chapters 3-7 (volume. 2).
See, also, WEST POINT.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (August-September).
General Sullivan's expedition against the Senecas.
For the purpose of putting an end to the destructive and
bloody incursions of Tories and Indians from western New York,
directed against the border settlements of that state and
Pennsylvania—as at Cherry Valley and Wyoming—General
Washington, in the early part of the year 1779, determined
upon a measure for carrying the war into the home of the
invaders. "The command was entrusted to General Sullivan. The
army organized for the expedition was in three divisions. That
part of it under the immediate command of General Sullivan,
coming from Pennsylvania, ascended the Susquehannah to Tioga
Point. Another division under the command of General James
Clinton, constructing batteaux at Schenectady, ascended the
Mohawk and rendezvoused at Canajoharrie, opened a road to the
head of Otsego Lake, and from thence proceeded in a formidable
fleet of over 200 batteaux, to Tioga Point, forming a junction
with the force under General Sullivan, on the 22d of August.
Previous to the arrival of General Clinton, Sullivan had sent
forward a detachment which fell in with a scouting party of
Indians, and a skirmish ensued. The combined forces amounted
to 5,000 men. The expedition had been so long preparing, and
upon the march, that the enemy were well apprized of an that
was going on. Their plan of defence contemplated a decisive
engagement upon the Chemung river. For this purpose the
Rangers and regular British troops, under the command of
Colonel John Butler, Colonels Guy and Sir John Johnson, Major
Walter N. Butler and Captain M'Donald, and the Indians under
Brant, had concentrated their forces upon a bend of the river,
near the present village of Elmira [then called Newtown],
where they had thrown up a long breast work of logs. The
united forces of the British allies, as computed by General
Sullivan, was about 1,500.
{3267}
Having ascertained their position, General Sullivan marched in
full force and attacked them in the forenoon of the 29th of
August. … The battle had been waged about two hours, when the
British and Indians perceiving their forces inadequate, and
that a maneuver to surround them was likely to be successful,
broke and fled in great disorder. 'This,' says John Salmon, of
Livingston county, who belonged to the expedition and gave an
account of it to the author of the Life of .Mary Jemison, 'was
the only regular stand made by the Indians. In their retreat
they were pursued by our men to the Narrows, where they were
attacked and killed in great numbers, so that the sides of the
rocks next the River looked as if blood had been poured on
them by pailfuls.' The details of all that transpired in this
campaign are before the public in so many forms, that their
repetition here is unnecessary. The route of the army was via
'French Catherine's Town,' head of Seneca Lake, down the east
shore of the Lake to the Indian village of Kanadesaga (Old
Castle), and from thence to Canandaigua, Honeoye, head of
Conesus Lake, to Groveland. The villages destroyed (with the
apple trees and growing crops of the Indians,) were at
Catherinestown, Kendai, or 'Apple Town' on the east side of
the Lake, eleven miles from its foot, Kanadesaga, Honeoye,
Conesus, Canascraga, Little Beard's Town, Big Tree, Canawagus,
and on the return of the army, Scawyace, a village between the
Cayuga and Seneca Lakes, and several other Cayuga villages. …
The march of Sullivan, the devastations committed by his army,
would at this distant period seem like Vandalism, in the
absence of the consideration that he was acting under strict
orders; and that those orders were approved, if not dictated,
by Washington. The campaign was a matter of necessity; to be
effectual, it was not only necessary that its acts should be
retaliatory and retributive, but that the haunts, the
retreats, of a foe so ruthless, must be broken up. The object
was to destroy all the means of subsistence of the Senecas,
desolate their homes, prevent their return to them, and if
possible, induce their permanent retreat beyond the Niagara
River. The imprudence, the want of sagacity, which Colonel
Stone has imputed to General Sullivan in alarming every
village he approached by the sound of his cannon, the author
conceives a misapprehension of his motives. Stealthy, quiet
approaches, would have found as victims, in every village, the
old men, the women and children—the warriors away, banded with
their British allies. Humanity dictated the forewarning, that
those he did not come to war against could have time to flee.
… The march of General Sullivan, after leaving the Chemung,
was bloodless, except in a small degree—just as it should have
been, if he could not make victims of those he was sent to
punish. The third expedition of this campaign, which has
generally been lost sight of by historians, was that of
General Broadhead. He left Fort Pitt in August with 600 men,
and destroyed several Mingo and Muncey tribes living on the
Allegany, French Creek, and other tributaries of the Ohio. The
heavy artillery that General Sullivan brought as far as
Newton, would indicate that Niagara was originally the
destination. There the General and his officers, seeing how
long it had taken to reach that point, in an probability
determined that too much of the season had been wasted, to
allow of executing their tasks in the Indian country, making
their roads and moving the army and all its appointments to
Niagara before the setting in of winter. Besides, before the
army had reached the valley of the Chemung, the fact was
ascertained that there would be a failure in a contemplated
junction with the army under General Broadhead. After the
expedition of General Sullivan, the Indians never had any
considerable permanent re-occupancy of their villages east of
the Genesee river. They settled down after a brief flight, in
their villages on the west side of the river in the
neighborhood of Geneseo, Mt. Morris and Avon, and at Gardeau,
Canadea, Tonawanda, Tuscarora, Buffalo Creek, Cattaraugus and
Allegany."
O. Turner,
History of the Pioneer Settlement
of Phelps and Gorham's Purchase,
part 1, chapter 4.
"In his general orders of the 17th of October, General
Washington announced to the army the result of the expedition,
as follows: 'The Commander-in-chief has now the pleasure of
congratulating the army on the complete and full success of
Major General Sullivan, and the troops under his command,
against the Seneca and other tribes of the Six Nations, as a
just and necessary punishment for their wanton depredations,
their unparalleled and innumerable cruelties, their deafness
to all remonstrances and entreaty, and their perseverance in
the most horrid acts of barbarity. Forty of their towns have
been reduced to ashes, some of them large and commodious; that
of the Genesee alone containing one hundred and twenty-eight
houses. Their crops of corn have been entirely destroyed,
which, by estimation, it is said, would have provided 160,000
bushels, besides large quantities of vegetables of various
kinds. Their whole country has been overrun and laid waste,
and they themselves compelled to place their security in a
precipitate flight to the British fortress at Niagara. And the
whole of this has been done with the loss of less than forty
men on our part, including the killed, wounded, captured, and
those who died natural deaths. The troops employed in this
expedition, both officers and men, throughout the whole of it,
and in the action they had with the enemy, manifested a
patience, perseverance and valor that do them the highest
honor. In the course of it, when there still remained a large
extent of the enemy's country to be prostrated, it became
necessary to lessen the issues of provisions to half the usual
allowance. In this the troops acquiesced with a most general
and cheerful concurrence, being fully determined to surmount
every obstacle, and to prosecute the enterprise to a complete
and successful issue. Major General Sullivan, for his great
perseverance and activity, for his order of march and attack,
and the whole of his dispositions; the Brigadiers and officers
of all ranks, and the whole of the soldiers engaged in the
expedition, merit and have the Commander-in-chief's warmest
acknowledgements for their important services upon this
occasion.' On the 9th of November, 1779, General Sullivan
wrote to the President of Congress: 'It is with the deepest
regret I find myself compelled to request from Congress
liberty to retire from the army. My health is so much impaired
by a violent bilious disorder, which seized me in the
commencement and continued during the whole of the western
expedition, that I have not the smallest hope of a perfect
recovery.' …
{3268}
General Sullivan, in transmitting to Congress an official
account of his operations, reported that … 'Every creek and
river has been traced, and the whole country explored in
search of Indian settlements, and I am well persuaded that,
except one town situated near the Alleghany, about fifty-eight
miles from Chinesee, there is not a single town left in the
country of the Five Nations. … I flatter myself that the
orders with which I was entrusted are fully executed, as we
have not left a single settlement or field of corn in the
country of the Five Nations, or is there even the appearance
of an Indian on this side of Niagara. Messengers and small
parties have been constantly passing, and some imprudent
soldiers who straggled from the army mistook the route and
went back almost to Chinesee without discovering even the
track of an Indian.' Sullivan was mistaken in regard to the
destruction of all the Indian towns as there were several
small villages undiscovered by his troops. The principal
villages, however, and probably nine-tenths of the growing
crops, upon which the Indians had depended for sustenance
during the following winter, were effectually destroyed. …
While Sullivan fully accomplished the task given him to
perform, the results expected were not fully realized. The
power of the savages had been weakened, but they were not
entirely subdued until years afterward, when 'Mad Anthony
Wayne' defeated the confederated bands of the Indians of the
west, in 1794, a measure which thoroughly humbled the Indians
of Western New York, and gave to the settlers peace and
security. Sullivan's expedition was fruitful of great results
in other ways, however, than the temporary subjugation of the
Indians. The fertile and beautiful country now forming the
western part of the State of New York, was then an unknown
wilderness, and its value and attractiveness were first made
known to the white people through this expedition. … Soon
after the close of the war the tide of emigration commenced to
flow westward. From the New England States, Pennsylvania and
New Jersey, came hardy pioneers, led on by the glowing
accounts they had heard of the new country, and the vicinity
of the inland lakes, the borders of the flowing streams, the
forest-covered hills became the dwelling places of a rapidly
growing band of settlers. The road which Sullivan had opened
from the Susquehanna valley was followed by many of the
settlers, even to the banks of the Genesee. Thus many of those
who had shared the perils and privations of Sullivan's
expedition against the Indian tribes of Western New York,
afterward became settlers of the land they had aided to
conquer."
A. T. Norton,
History of Sullivan's Campaign against the Iroquois,
chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
L. L. Doty,
History of Livingston County, New York,
chapter 7.
O. W. B. Peabody,
Life of John Sullivan
(Library of American Biographies,
series 2, volume. 3), chapter 7.
Journals of the Military Expedition of Major General John
Sullivan, with records of Centennial Celebrations
(including Historical Address by Reverend David Craft,
pages 331-388).
J. E. Seaver,
Life of Mary Jemison,
appendix 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (September).
Paul Jones' great sea-fight.
The Bon Homme Richard and the Serapis.
"Near the end of July [1779], Paul Jones, a Scot by birth, in
the service of the United States, sailed from l'Orient as
commander of a squadron, consisting of the Poor Richard ['Bon
Homme Richard,' Jones named her, in compliment to Franklin and
to the language of the country from which Franklin's influence
procured the ship] of 40 guns, many of them unserviceable; the
Alliance of 36 guns, both American ships-of-war; the Pallas, a
French frigate of 32; and the Vengeance, a French brig of 12
guns. They ranged the western coast of Ireland, turned
Scotland, and, cruising off Flamborough Head, descried the
British merchant fleet from the Baltic, under the convoy of
the Serapis of 44 guns and the Countess of Scarborough of 20
guns. An hour after sunset, on the 23d of September, the
Serapis, having a great superiority in strength, engaged the
Poor Richard. Paul Jones, after suffering exceedingly in a
contest of an hour and a half within musket-shot, bore down
upon his adversary, whose anchor he hooked to his own quarter.
The muzzles of their guns touched each other's sides. Jones
could use only three nine-pounders beside muskets from the
round-tops, but combustible matters were thrown into every
part of the Serapis, which was on fire no less than ten or
twelve times. There were moments when both ships were on fire.
After a two-hours' conflict in the first watch of the night,
the Serapis struck its flag. Jones raised his pendant on the
captured frigate, and the next day had but time to transfer to
it his wounded men and his crew before the Poor Richard went
down. The French frigate engaged and captured the Countess of
Scarborough. The Alliance, which from a distance had raked the
Serapis during the action, not without injuring the Poor
Richard, had not a man injured. On the fourth of October the
squadron entered the Texel with its prizes. The British
ambassador, of himself and again under instructions, reclaimed
the captured British ships and their crews, 'who had been
taken by the pirate Paul Jones of Scotland, a rebel and a
traitor.' 'They,' he insisted, 'are to be treated as pirates
whose letters of marque have not emanated from a sovereign
power.' The grand pensionary would not apply the name of
pirate to officers bearing the commissions of congress. In
spite of the stadholder, the squadron enjoyed the protection
of a neutral port."
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, page 350.
ALSO IN.
A. S, Mackenzie,
Life of Paul Jones,
chapters 8-9 (volume 1).
Life and Correspondence of John Paul Jones,
pages 179-235.
W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 3, chapter 24.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1779 (September-October).
Unsuccessful attack on Savannah by the Americans and French.
"The state of affairs in the South had called so imperatively
for the attention of Congress that a portion of Washington's
army had been detached to join General Lincoln. Washington
solicited more powerful aid from D'Estaing, who then commanded
in the West Indies an army sufficiently powerful to crush
entirely the English in Georgia. The French admiral received
this application just after having fought a hard battle
against Commodore Byron without any decisive result, yet such
as obliged the latter to go into port to refit. The former,
being thus for a time master of the sea, determined at once to
comply with the request, took on board 6,000 land-troops, and
steered direct for Savannah, where, arriving quite
unexpectedly, he captured by surprise a fifty-gun ship and
three frigates. Prevost, too, was very unprepared, having his
force broken up into detachments distributed along the
frontier; but these being instantly ordered in, obeyed with
such promptitude that, before the French had landed and formed
a junction with Lincoln, nearly all had arrived.
{3269}
On the 16th of September, D'Estaing appeared before the place
and summoned it to surrender. Prevost, under pretext of
negotiation, obtained a suspension for twenty-four hours,
during which Colonel Maitland entered with the last and
largest detachment, eluding the Americans by a route supposed
impassable; and the full determination to resist was then
announced. The opinion of all military men now is that
D'Estaing was guilty of the most outrageous folly in not
marching at once to the attack of the city, without summoning
the weakened garrison to surrender at all. The surprise would
have then been complete, and the victory sure. … A regular
siege was now commenced. Heavy ordnance and stores were
brought up from the fleet, and the besieging army broke
ground. By the 1st of October they had pushed their sap within
300 yards of the abattis, on the left of the British lines.
Several batteries were opened on the besieged, which played
almost incessantly upon their works, but made no impression on
them. The situation of D'Estaing was becoming critical. More
time had already been consumed on the coast of Georgia than he
had supposed would be necessary for the destruction of the
British force in that State. He became uneasy for the
possessions of France in the West Indies, and apprehensive for
the safety of the ships under his command. The naval officers
remonstrated strenuously against longer exposing his fleet on
an insecure coast, at a tempestuous season of the year, and
urged the danger of being overtaken by a British squadron when
broken and scattered by a storm." D'Estaing accordingly
decided that he must either raise the siege or attempt the
enemy's works by storm. "The latter part of the alternative
was adopted. … On the morning of the 9th of October, before
day, … about 3,500 French and 1,000 Americans, of whom between
600 and 700 were regulars and the residue militia of
Charleston, advanced in three columns, led by D'Estaing and
Lincoln, aided by the principal officers of both nations, and
made a furious assault on the British lines. Their reception
was warmer than had been expected. … Both the French and
Americans planted their standards on the walls, and were
killed in great numbers while endeavoring to force their way
into the works. For about fifty minutes the contest was
extremely obstinate." Then the assailants gave way and a
retreat was ordered. "In this unsuccessful attempt the French
lost in killed and wounded about 700 men. Among the latter
were the Count D'Estaing himself, Major General De Fontanges,
and several other officers of distinction. The continental
troops lost 234 men, and the Charleston militia, who, though
associated with them in danger, were more fortunate, had one
captain killed and six privates wounded. Count Pulaski was
among the slain. The loss of the garrison was astonishingly
small. In killed and wounded it amounted only to 55. So great
was the advantage of the cover afforded by their works. …
Count D'Estaing, having committed a blunder at the beginning,
had committed a worse blunder at the end, by insisting on the
assault, as unnecessary as it was rash. … He [now] insisted on
raising the siege, and both the French and American armies
moved from their ground on the evening of the 18th of October.
D'Estaing sailed for the West Indies; and Lincoln recrossed
the Savannah at Zubly's Ferry and again encamped in South
Carolina."
C. B. Hartley,
Life of General Marion
(Heroes and Patriots of the South),
chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
C. C. Jones, Jr.,
History of Georgia,
volume 2, chapters 20-21.
J. Sparks,
Life of Pulaski
(Library of American Biographies,
series 2, volume 4).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (January-April).
The gloomy winter at Morristown.
Depreciation to worthlessness of the Continental Currency.
Consequent sufferings of the army and the country.
"The year 1780 opened upon a famishing camp. 'For a fortnight
past,' writes Washington, on the 8th of January, 'the troops,
both officers and men, have been almost perishing with want.
Yet,' adds he, feelingly, 'they have borne their sufferings
with a patience that merits the approbation, and ought to
excite the sympathies, of their countrymen.' The severest
trials of the Revolution, in fact, were not in the field,
where there were shouts to excite and laurels to be won; but
in the squalid wretchedness of ill-provided camps, where there
was nothing to cheer and everything to be endured. To suffer
was the lot of the revolutionary soldier. A rigorous winter
had much to do with the actual distresses of the army, but the
root of the evil lay in the derangement of the currency.
Congress had commenced the war without adequate funds, and
without the power of imposing direct taxes. To meet pressing
emergencies, it had emitted paper money, which, for a time,
passed currently at par; but sank in value as further
emissions succeeded, and that already in circulation remained
unredeemed. The several States added to the evil by emitting
paper in their separate capacities: thus the country gradually
became flooded with a 'continental currency,' as it was
called; irredeemable, and of no intrinsic value. The
consequence was a general derangement of trade and finance.
The continental currency declined to such a degree that forty
dollars in paper were equivalent to only one in specie.
Congress attempted to put a stop to this depreciation by
making paper money a legal tender, at its nominal value, in
the discharge of debts, however contracted. This opened the
door to knavery, and added a new feature to the evil. The
commissaries now found it difficult to purchase supplies for
the immediate wants of the army, and impossible to provide any
stores in advance. They were left destitute of funds, and the
public credit was prostrated by the accumulating debts
suffered to remain uncancelled. The changes which had taken
place in the commissary department added to this confusion.
The commissary-general, instead of receiving, as heretofore, a
commission on expenditures, was to have a fixed salary in
paper currency, and his deputies were to be compensated in
like manner, without the usual allowance of rations and
forage. No competent agents could be procured on such terms. …
In the present emergency Washington was reluctantly compelled,
by the distresses of the army, to call upon the counties of
the State for supplies of grain and cattle, proportioned to
their respective abilities. … Wherever a compliance with this
call was refused, the articles required were to be impressed:
it was a painful alternative, yet nothing else could save the
army from dissolution or starving. … As the winter advanced,
the cold increased in severity.
{3270}
It was the most intense ever remembered in the country. The
great bay of New York was frozen over. … The insular security
of the place was at an end. … Washington was aware of the
opportunity which offered itself for a signal 'coup de main,'
but was not in a condition to profit by it."
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapters 1 and 4.
"Paper for $9,000,000 was issued before any depreciation
began. The issues of the separate colonies must have affected
it, but the popular enthusiasm went for something. Pelatiah
Webster, almost alone as it seems, insisted on taxation, but a
member of Congress indignantly asked if he was to help tax the
people when they could go to the printing-office and get a
cartload of money. In 1776, when the depreciation began,
Congress took harsh measures to try to sustain the bills.
Committees of safety also took measures to punish those who
'forestalled' or 'engrossed,' these being the terms for
speculators who bought up for a rise. … The enemy, perceiving
the terrible harm the Americans were doing themselves, thought
it well to help on the movement. They counterfeited the bills
and passed them through the lines. At the end of 1779 Congress
was at its wit's end for money. Its issues had put specie
entirely out of reach, and the cause was in danger of being
drowned under the paper sea. … The French alliance helped more
by giving means of procuring loans in Europe than by military
assistance. Congress promised to limit its issues to
$200,000,000, and tried a new form of note; also loan offices
and lotteries. Over 350,000,000 were issued in all, but it is
doubtful if more than 200,000,000 were out at any one time. In
the spring of 1780 the bills were worth two cents on the
dollar, and then ceased to circulate. Specie now came into
circulation, being brought by the French, and also that
expended by the English passing the lines. The paper was now
worth more for an advertisement or a joke than for any
prospect of any kind of redemption. A barber's shop in
Philadelphia was papered with it, and a dog, coated with tar,
and with the bills stuck all over him, was paraded in the
streets."
W. G. Sumner,
History of American Currency,
pages 44-47.
ALSO IN:
W. G. Sumner,
The Financier and Finances of the American Revolution,
chapter 4 (volume 1).
A. S. Bolles,
Financial History of the United States, 1774-1789,
book 1.
J. J. Knox,
United States Notes,
chapter 2.
See, also, MONEY AND BANKING, A. D. 1775-1780.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (February-August).
The siege and capture of Charleston by the British.
Defeat of Gates at Camden.
South Carolina subdued.
"After the failure of the attack on Savannah was learned by
Sir Henry Clinton, he sent a large additional force to the
South. Reinforcements were also sent on to Lincoln, while the
main body of the American army went into winter quarters near
Morristown, New Jersey. Sir Henry Clinton, as soon as his
forces, which had been dispersed by a storm, had been
collected at Savannah, proceeded to invest Charleston,"
landing his troops on St. John's Island in February. The
blockading of the port and operations for the investment of
the city were conducted cautiously and with success. On the
12th of May, the American commander, General Lincoln, "finding
himself incapable of defending Charleston, decided on
capitulating; and he acceded to the terms which the besiegers
had first offered. The fortifications, shipping, artillery,
and public stores were all surrendered. The garrison, and all
who had borne arms, were prisoners of war. The militia were
allowed to return home on parole. In the siege the British
lost 76 killed, and 189 wounded. The Americans about an equal
number. The prisoners, exclusive of sailors, amounted to
5,618, counting all the adult males of the town. To bring the
country entirely under subjection, Clinton sent forth three
detachments. The first and largest, in the northern part of
the State, was under Lord Cornwallis. He detached Colonel
Tarleton with his legion of cavalry and mounted infantry, to
disperse Colonel Buford, then encamped near the North Carolina
line. [Buford] was overtaken at the Waxhaws, and, on his
refusal to surrender, Tarleton made a furious charge on
Buford's men, when some, in dismay, threw down their arms and
asked for quarter, and some fired on the enemy. After this
partial resistance, no quarter was given. Colonel Buford, with
a few of the horse, and about 100 infantry, escaped; 113 were
killed on the spot; 150 so badly wounded as to be incapable of
being moved; and 53 were brought away as prisoners. The
American officers deny (what the British assert), that any who
had laid down their arms had again taken them up. All further
resistance to the enemy in South Carolina and Georgia seems
then to have ceased. The two other detachments of the British
army every where received the submission of the inhabitants,
who either gave their parole not again to bear arms against
the king, or took the oath of allegiance. In a proclamation
for settling the government, Sir Henry Clinton required all to
return to their allegiance on pain of being treated as rebels
and enemies. He then returned to New York, leaving Lord
Cornwallis in command, with 4,000 troops. … Lord Cornwallis,
considering South Carolina as entirely reannexed to Great
Britain, would admit of no neutrality among the inhabitants;
but insisted on their taking the oath of allegiance, which,
however, was generally taken with reluctance by the people of
the lower country. … A considerable force, under Baron de
Kalb, had been ordered for the Southern army by Congress; but,
for want of money, and a sufficient Commissary department,
they were so delayed in their march, that it was late in July
before they reached Cape Fear River. Here they were joined by
General Gates, who had been appointed to the command of the
Southern army. The men of this detachment, ill-fed, suffered
greatly from dysentery. In South Carolina, Gates was joined by
Porterfield's Virginia regiment, Rutherford's corps of North
Carolina militia, and Armaud's legion. … Gates having under
him about 4,000 men, of whom the regulars were less than
1,000, took post at Clermont. As the force of the Americans
was daily increasing, Cornwallis, having under him about 2,000
men, of whom 1,900 were regulars, decided on attacking the
American army. It so happened, that the period chosen by
Cornwallis to surprise Gates, was the very moment in which
Gates proposed to surprise his adversary; and thus the
advanced corps of both armies unexpectedly met at two o'clock
in the morning [August 6, near Camden].
{3271}
After some skirmishing, in which the British seemed to have
had a decided advantage, both parties suspended their
operations till the morning. On the first onset of the
British, the Virginia militia under General Stevens fled with
precipitation, and were followed by the infantry of Armstrong;
and, except Colonel Dixon's regiment, the whole South Carolina
division followed the example. Very few of the militia of
either State discharged a single musket. Gates was borne away
by the torrent, and, with General Caswell, retreated to
Clermont, in the hope of collecting a sufficient number of the
fugitives to cover the retreat of the regulars; but the hope
was vain. He was fain to proceed to Hillsborough, to concert
the future plan of operations. Thus left with an inadequate
force on the field, De Kalb made a stout resistance; but in an
impetuous charge he fell, after having received twelve wounds.
His troops were then unable to rally, and their discomfiture
was complete. Their loss, in killed, wounded and prisoners,
could not have been less than 1,000 men. The British lost 325
men. Just before the action, Sumter had captured a convoy, and
made 200 prisoners; but was subsequently surprised by
Tarleton, who recaptured the stores, killed 150, and took 300
prisoners. Sumter escaped with difficulty. There was no longer
any armed American force in South Carolina, and Cornwallis
resorted to energetic means of preventing disaffection. All
those who were found in arms after they had submitted to
British protection were considered as having forfeited their
lives, and several of them were hung on the spot. But these
severities, instead of their intended effect, produced a
strong reaction; and Sumter was able to collect a new force,
with which he greatly annoyed the north-western parts of the
State."
G. Tucker,
History of the United States,
chapter 3 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
D. Ramsey,
History of South Carolina,
section 7 (volume l).
H. Lee,
Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department,
chapter 17.
F. Bowen,
Life of Benjamin Lincoln,
chapter 5.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (July).
Fresh help from France.
The arrival of Rochambeau and his army, with a fleet.
"La Fayette's second visit to his native country [1770], was
most opportune. He arrived in Paris at the moment when the war
for the independence of America was in high popularity
throughout France. He was put in arrest a week for his
disobedience to the order not to leave France, but this was a
mere formality. Vergennes received him in private. His example
had roused the spirit of the French nobles. The stage
resounded with his applauses. Crowds followed his steps. Marie
Antoinette, with her quick, enthusiastic spirit, joyed at his