History for ready reference, Volume 5, Tunnage to Zyp and Supplement

by J. N. Larned

distinction. The council of state, the Parliament, the towns,
the corporations mingled in the noble excitement. The Royal
Treasury was assured support by patriotic offers of
contributions, and then was formed the auxiliary army that was
to bear succor to America. This public enthusiasm triumphed
over the hesitating reluctance of Maurepas, and the economical
prudence of Necker. The army, placed under the command of the
veteran Rochambeau, commended for his 'steadiness, wisdom,
ability and prudence,' a pupil of the Marshal de Belle Isle,
distinguished in frequent service, was to be composed of 6,000
troops. Among these shone forth the most brilliant of the
nobility."
J. C. Hamilton,
History of the United States,
as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton,
chapter 20 (volume 2).
"La Fayette … made the ministers understand that if he was not
placed in command of the expedition, which would surprise the
Americans, at least it was imperative to place over it a
French general who would consent to serve under the American
commander-in-chief. But he knew well that his old companions
in arms in France were jealous of his rapid military fortune
and brilliant renown. He knew still better that the officers
who were his seniors in rank would be unwilling to serve under
him. His first proposition, therefore, was only made to
satisfy public feeling in America, which left the management
of this affair almost entirely in his hands. In view of the
serious difficulties that necessarily would result from the
adoption of such a decision—difficulties that might have most
disastrous consequences for the cause to which he had devoted
himself—he promised to make the Americans understand that he
had preferred remaining at the head of one of their divisions
and that he had refused the command of the French forces. But
he insisted upon this point, that, in order to avoid wounding
the self-respect of the Americans, it was indispensable to
choose a general to command the expedition, whose promotion
had been recent and whose talents were certainly equal to his
mission, but who, considering this mission as a distinction,
would consent to acknowledge General Washington's supremacy.
The choice that was made, under these conditions, of the Count
de Rochambeau was perfectly satisfactory to him, and, without
waiting for the departure of the expedition, he embarked at
Rochefort, on February the 18th, 1780, on board the frigate
Hermione, which the king had given him as being a swift
sailer. … He was anxious to inform Washington of the good news
himself, and immediately upon his landing at Boston, on April
the 28th, he hastened to Morristown to rejoin his well-beloved
and revered friend, as he called him in his letters. … General
Heath, who commanded the militia in the State of Rhode Is]and,
announced on the 11th of July, the arrival of the French
squadron to General Washington, who was then with his staff at
Bergen. La Fayette set out almost immediately, provided with
instructions from the commander-in-chief, dated the 15th, to
repair to the French general and admiral to confer with them.
For some time Washington had been considering a plan of
offensive operation for the capture of the city and the
garrison of New York. This plan, which conformed with the
wishes of the French government, was only to be carried out
upon certain conditions. First, it was necessary that the
French troops should unite with the American forces, and,
secondly, that the French should have a naval superiority over
the forces of Admirals Graves and Arbuthnot, who had effected
their junction at New York the day after the arrival of the
French at Newport. This last condition was far from being
fulfilled. … It had been foreseen that the English, who had
concentrated their land and naval forces at New York, would
not give the French time to establish themselves on Rhode
Island; and Washington informed Rochambeau that Sir Henry
Clinton was embarking his troops and would come shortly to
attack the forces of the expedition with the squadrons
assembled under the command of Admiral Arbuthnot, which were
anchored at Sandy Hook, beyond New York, at the mouth of the
Hudson River.
{3272}
The American general watched these movements, and, while he
gave frequent information to the French of the projected
attack upon them, he tried to prevent it. … At the same time,
Washington crossed the Hudson above West Point with the
greater part of his troops, and proceeded to King's Bridge, at
the northern end of the island, where he made some hostile
demonstrations. This manœuvre detained General Clinton, who
had already embarked eight thousand men upon the ships of
Arbuthnot. He landed his troops and gave up his project.
Nevertheless, the English admiral set sail and appeared before
Rhode Island with eleven ships of the line and a few frigates,
twelve days after the French had landed. … On August the 9th,
when La Fayette had returned to the headquarters of
Washington, which were at Dobb's Ferry, ten miles above King's
Bridge, on the right bank of the North River, he wrote to
Rochambeau and de Ternay an urgent dispatch, in which he
finished, in the name of the American general, by proposing to
the French generals to come at once to attempt an attack on
New York. … On the other hand, the same courier brought a
letter from Washington which made no mention of this project,
but which only replied by a kind of refusal to the request of
Rochambeau for a conference, 'wherein in an hour of
conversation they could agree upon more things than in volumes
of correspondence.' Washington said with truth that he did not
dare to leave his army in front of New York, for it might be
attacked at any moment, and that by his presence he prevented
the departure of the large body of the English forces that
might have been sent against Rhode Island. Indeed, it is
certain that if some differences had not arisen between
General Clinton and Admiral Arbuthnot, the French might have
found themselves in a dangerous position at the beginning.
From the earliest letters exchanged upon this occasion some
discord resulted between La Fayette, Rochambeau and
Washington, but, owing to the good sense of Rochambeau,
matters were soon smoothed over. He wrote in English to the
American general to ask him thereafter to address himself
directly to him, and to explain the reasons that induced him
to postpone assuming the offensive. At the same time he
urgently requested a conference. From that moment the
relations between the two leaders were excellent. The mere
presence of the French squadron and army, though they were
still paralyzed and really blockaded by Admiral Arbuthnot, had
effected a useful diversion, since the English had not been
able to profit by all the advantages resulting from the
capture of Charleston, and, instead of carrying on operations
in the Carolinas with superior forces, they had had to bring
the greater part of them back to New York."
T. Balch,
The French in America in the War of Independence,
chapters 10-11.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (August-September).
The Treason of Benedict Arnold.
"Washington contemplated the aspect of affairs with the
greatest alarm. Doubtful if the army could be kept together
for another campaign, he was exceedingly anxious to strike
some decisive blow. He proposed to Rochambeau, commanding the
French troops at Newport, an attack upon New York; but that
was not thought feasible without a superior naval force.
Letters were sent to the French admiral in the West Indies
entreating assistance; and Washington presently proceeded to
Hartford, there to meet Rochambeau, to devise some definite
plan of operations. During Washington's absence at Hartford, a
plot came to light for betraying the important fortress of
West Point and the other posts of the Highlands into the hands
of the enemy, the traitor being no other than Arnold, the most
brilliant officer and one of the most honored in the American
army. The qualities of a brilliant soldier are unfortunately
often quite distinct from those of a virtuous man and a good
citizen. … Placed in command at Philadelphia, … he [Arnold]
lived in a style of extravagance far beyond his means, and he
endeavored to sustain it by entering into privateering and
mercantile speculations, most of which proved unsuccessful. He
was even accused of perverting his military authority to
purposes of private gain. The complaints on this point, made
to Congress by the authorities of Pennsylvania, had been at
first unheeded; but, being presently brought forward in a
solemn manner, and with some appearance of offended dignity on
the part of the Pennsylvania council, an interview took place
between a committee of that body and a committee of Congress,
which had resulted in Arnold's trial by a court martial.
Though acquitted of the more serious charges, on two points he
had been found guilty, and had been sentenced to be
reprimanded by the commander-in-chief. Arnold claimed against
the United States a large balance, growing out of the
unsettled accounts of his Canada expedition. This claim was
greatly cut down by the treasury officers and when Arnold
appealed to Congress, a committee reported that more had been
allowed than was actually due. Mortified and soured, and
complaining of public ingratitude, Arnold attempted, but
without success, to get a loan from the French minister. Some
months before, he had opened a correspondence with Sir Henry
Clinton under a feigned name, carried on through Major Andre,
adjutant general of the British army. Having at length made
himself known to his correspondents, to give importance to his
treachery, he solicited and obtained from Washington, who had
every confidence in him, the command in the Highlands, with
the very view of betraying that important position into the
hands of the enemy. To arrange the terms of the bargain, an
interview was necessary with some confidential British agent;
and Andre, though not without reluctance, finally volunteered
for that purpose. Several previous attempts having failed, the
British sloop-of-war Vulture, with Andre on board, ascended
the Hudson as far as the mouth of Croton River, some miles
below King's Ferry. Information being sent to Arnold under a
flag, the evening after Washington left West Point for
Hartford he dispatched a boat to the Vulture, which took Andre
on shore, for an interview on the west side of the river, just
below the American lines. Morning appeared before the
arrangements for the betrayal of the fortress could be
definitely completed, and Andre was reluctantly persuaded to
come within the American lines, and to remain till the next
night at the house of one Smith, a dupe or tool of Arnold's,
the same who had been employed to bring Andre from the ship.
{3273}
For some reason not very clearly explained, Smith declined to
convey Andre back to the Vulture. … Driven thus to the
necessity of returning by land, Andre laid aside his uniform,
assumed a citizen's dress, and, with a pass from Arnold in the
name of John Anderson, a name which Andre had often used in
their previous correspondence, he set off toward sunset on
horseback, with Smith for a guide. They crossed King's Ferry,
passed all the American guards in safety, and spent the night
near Crom Pond, with an acquaintance of Smith's. The next
morning, having passed Pine's Bridge, across Croton River,
Smith left Andre to pursue his way alone. The road led through
a district extending some thirty miles above the island of New
York, not included in the lines of either army, and thence
known as the 'Neutral Ground,' a populous and fertile region,
but very much infested by bands of plunderers called 'Cow
Boys' and 'Skinners.' The 'Cow Boys' lived within the British
lines, and stole or bought cattle for the supply of the
British army. The rendezvous of the 'Skinners' was within the
American lines. They professed to be great patriots, making it
their ostensible business to plunder those who refused to take
the oath of allegiance to the State of New York." On the
morning of Andre's journey, the road to Tarrytown, on which he
rode, was being guarded by a small party of men, who watched
for cattle thieves, and for suspicious travelers generally.
Three of these intercepted the unfortunate young officer and
discovered his character. Arnold received intelligence of what
had happened in time to make his escape to the Vulture. Andre
was examined before a board of which Lafayette, Steuben and
Greene were members, and on his own statements was executed as
a spy. The sympathy with him was very great, among Americans
as well as among his own countrymen; but lenity in the case
appeared too dangerous to Washington and his military
advisers.
R. Hildreth,
History of the United States,
chapter 41 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapters 2, 7, and 9-11.
B. J. Lossing,
The Two Spies.
J. Sparks,
Life and Treason of Benedict Arnold
(Library of American Biographies,
volume 3, chapters 8-15).
W. Sargent,
Life of Major John André,
chapters 11-21.
I. N. Arnold,
Life of Benedict Arnold,
chapters 13-18.
J. H. Smith,
Authentic Narrative of the Causes which led
to the Death of Major André.
B. J. Lossing,
Field-book of the Revolution,
volume 1, chapters 30-32.
See, also, WEST POINT.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780 (August-December).
Partisan warfare in South Carolina.
Sumter and Marion.
A name "which recalls thrilling tales of desperate enterprise,
surprises at midnight, sudden attacks in the gray twilight of
morning, lurking-places in the depths of forests, restless
activity, and untiring perseverance, is the name of Thomas
Sumter. He comes before us tall, vigorous, dauntless, with a
bold bearing, and imperious brow, stern to look upon, fierce
in his self-will, arrogant in his decisions, tenacious in his
prejudices, resolute and vigorous in the execution of his own
plans, remiss and almost luke-warm in carrying out the plans
of others. Born in South Carolina just as that colony had
passed from the control of the Proprietaries to the control of
the King, he lived to see her take the first decided step
towards passing out of the Union. Little has been preserved of
his early life, although his subsequent career in the Senate
of the United States proves that he was not deficient in
education then, wherever or whenever acquired. In the
Revolution be took an early part, and soon made himself
conspicuous as a bold and enterprising officer. But it was not
till after the siege of Charleston that his talents were
brought fully into play. Then at the head of a body of
volunteers he moved rapidly from point to point, keeping alive
the hopes of the Whigs and the fears of the Tories in the
regions watered by the Broad River, the Ennoree, and the
Tiger. … History, like tradition, has her favorite characters,
on which she dwells with peculiar fondness, delighting herself
in preserving the memory of every exploit, and giving the
brightest tints to every circumstance connected with their
career. … Of these children of a happy star, no one holds in
our Revolutionary history the same place as Francis Marion.
His story, irregularly told by a friend and companion, took an
early hold upon the heart of the people; and the romantic
traits of his career, warming the imagination of a great poet,
have been recorded in beautiful verse. Impartial judgment and
sober research have left his own laurels unimpaired, although
they have dissipated the halo which tradition and fancy had
shed around his men. His life forms one of those pictures upon
which the mind loves to dwell, from the singular combination
of rare qualities which it displays. His ancestors were
Huguenot exiles, who took refuge in South Carolina, from the
dragonnades of Louis XIV. His father was a planter near
Georgetown, who, portioning out his estate to his children as
they came of age, had nothing left for Francis, the youngest,
and his next nearest brother, while they were yet children. At
sixteen Francis found himself compelled to choose a pursuit
for his support. With only a common English education, and no
money to carry him through the preparatory courses, he could
neither be a physician nor a lawyer. He resolved to be a
sailor, and started upon a voyage to the West Indies. But his
ship was burnt in a gale, and after tossing about eight days
in an open boat, without water and with nothing but the raw
flesh and skin of a single dog to eat, and seeing several of
his companions die of hunger, he, with the starving survivors,
were rescued, barely alive. He renounced the sea, returned to
Georgetown, and engaged in farming. The Cherokee war of 1759
found him hard at his work. He was now twenty-six, small in
frame, low in stature, but vigorous, active, and healthy. By
nature he was taciturn and reticent, with nothing in the
expression of his face to attract or interest a casual
observer, but still inspiring confidence and commanding
respect in those who were brought into intimate relations with
him. When, therefore, a company of volunteers was raised to
serve against the Indians, he was chosen lieutenant. In a
second expedition, which soon after became necessary, he was
made captain. Next came the War of Independence; and joining
the first South Carolina levies, he was presently made a
major; and with this rank took part in the gallant defense of
Fort Moultrie in 1776. His next promotion was to the command
of a regiment as lieutenant-colonel.
{3274}
During the siege of Charleston his leg was accidentally
broken, a lucky accident, which left him free when the city
fell, to engage in an adventurous system of warfare which was
the only possible system in that low state of our fortunes.
In the course of this he was promoted by Governor Rutledge to
a brigadiership. When he first appeared in Gates's camp, he
had but twenty men with him, or rather twenty between men and
boys. Some of them were negroes. With these he rescued 150 of
the prisoners of Camden, coming upon the British escort by
surprise and overpowering it. Early in September a body of 200
Tories attempted to surprise him. He had 53 men with him when
he heard of their intention, and instantly setting forward,
surprised an advance party of 45, killing or wounding all but
15, and then attacked the main body of 200, and put them to
flight. Before the end of the month he surprised another body
of 60 men; and in October one of 200. His force was constantly
fluctuating between 20 men and 70. Up to the 18th of October
he had never had over 70. They went and came as they chose,
their number ever ebbing and flowing like the tide. Sometimes
the very men who had fought with him were ranged in arms
against him; a few only serving from honest zeal and true love
of country. … As his slender form concealed a lion heart, so
under his cold, impassive face, there was a perpetual glow of
tender sympathies. … Without claiming for Marion those powers
of combination which belong to the highest order of military
genius, he must be allowed to have excelled in all the
qualities which form the consummate partisan,—vigilance,
promptitude, activity, energy, dauntless courage, and unshaken
self-control. … Two principles controlled all his actions, and
shaped all his ends; the love of country, pure, earnest, and
profound; the love of right, sincere, undeviating, and
incorruptible."
G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathanael Greene,
book 4, chapter 7 (volume 3).
"The other partisans … had been compelled to take refuge in
the mountains. Marion found his security in the swamps. This
able partisan maintained his ground below and along the Santee
river, and managed, among the defiles and swamps of that
region, to elude all the activity of his enemies. His force
had been collected chiefly among his own neighbors, were
practised in the swamps, and familiar with the country. Like
Sumter, utterly unfurnished with the means of war at first, he
procured them by similar means. He took possession of the saws
from the mills, and converted them into sabres. So much was he
distressed for ammunition that he has engaged in battle when
he had not three rounds of powder to each man of his party. …
Various were the means employed to draw off or drive away his
followers. The houses on the banks of the Pedee, Lynch's
Creek, and Black river, from whence they were chiefly taken,
were destroyed by fire, the plantations devastated, and the
negroes carried away. But the effect of this wantonness was
far other than had been intended. Revenge and despair
confirmed the patriotism of these ruined men, and strengthened
their resolution. … For months, their only shelter was the
green wood and the swamp—their only cover the broad forest and
the arch of heaven. … With a policy that nothing could
distract—a caution that no artifice could mislead—Marion led
his followers from thicket to thicket in safety, and was never
more perfectly secure than when he was in the neighborhood of
his foe. He hung upon his flanks along the march—he skirted
his camp in the darkness of the night—he lay in wait for his
foraging parties—he shot down his sentries, and, flying or
advancing, he never failed to harass the invader, and extort
from him a bloody toll at every passage through swamp,
thicket, or river, which his smaller parties made. In this
sort of warfare—which is peculiarly adapted to the
peculiarities of the country in Carolina, and consequently to
the genius of her people—he contrived almost wholly to break
up the British communications by one of the most eligible
routes between the seaboard and the interior."
W. G. Simms,
History of South Carolina,
book 5, chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
C. B. Hartley,
Life of General Francis Marion
(Heroes and Patriots of the South),
chapters 14-15.
W. G. Simms,
Life of Francis Marion.
Horry and Weems,
Life of Marion.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781.
Vermont as an independent State negotiating with the British.
See VERMONT: A. D. 1781.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1780-1781.
Greene's campaign in the south.
King's Mountain.
The Cowpens.
Guilford Court House.
Hobkirk's Hill.
Eutaw Springs.
The British shut up in Charleston.
Cornwallis withdrawn to Virginia.
"After his victory at Camden, Lord Cornwallis found it
necessary to give his army some rest from the intense August
heat. In September he advanced into North Carolina, boasting
that he would soon conquer all the states south of the
Susquehanna river. … In traversing Mecklenburg county
Cornwallis soon found himself in a very hostile and dangerous
region, where there were no Tories to befriend him. One of his
best partisan commanders, Major Ferguson, penetrated too far
into the mountains. The back-woodsmen of Tennessee and
Kentucky, the Carolinas, and western Virginia were aroused;
and under their superb partisan leaders—Shelby, Sevier,
Cleaveland, McDowell, Campbell, and Williams—gave chase to
Ferguson, who took refuge upon what he deemed an impregnable
position on the top of King's Mountain. On the 7th of October
the backwoodsmen stormed the mountain, Ferguson was shot
through the heart, 400 of his men were killed and wounded, and
all the rest, 700 in number, surrendered at discretion. The
Americans lost 28 killed and 60 wounded. … In the series of
events which led to the surrender of Cornwallis, the battle of
King's Mountain played a part similar to that played by the
battle of Bennington in the series of events which led to the
surrender of Burgoyne. It was the enemy's first serious
disaster, and its immediate result was to check his progress
until the Americans could muster strength enough to overthrow
him. The events, however, were much more complicated in
Cornwallis's case, and took much longer to unfold themselves.
… As soon as he heard the news of the disaster he fell back to
Winnsborough, in South Carolina, and called for
reinforcements. While they were arriving, the American army,
recruited and reorganized since its crushing defeat at Camden,
advanced into Mecklenburg county. Gates was superseded by
Greene, who arrived upon the scene on the 2d of December.
Under Greene were three Virginians of remarkable
ability,—Daniel Morgan; William Washington, who was a distant
cousin of the commander-in-chief; and Henry Lee, familiarly
known as 'Light-horse Harry,' father of the great general,
Robert Edward Lee.
{3275}
The little army numbered only 2,000 men, but a considerable
part of them were disciplined veterans, fully a match for the
British infantry." To increase this small force, Baron
Steuben, the military organizer and disciplinarian of the
Revolutionary armies, was sent down to Virginia, for the
purpose of recruiting and organizing troops.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1777 (JANUARY-DECEMBER).
Thereupon detachments from the British army at New York were
dispatched by sea to Virginia, and Arnold, the traitor, was
given command of them. "The presence of these subsidiary
forces in Virginia was soon to influence in a decisive way the
course of events. Greene, on reaching South Carolina, acted
with boldness and originality. He divided his little army into
two bodies, one of which cooperated with Marion's partisans in
the northeastern part of the state, and threatened
Cornwallis's communications with the coast. The other body he
sent under Morgan to the southwestward, to threaten the inland
posts and their garrisons. Thus worried on both flanks,
Cornwallis presently divided his own force, sending Tarleton
with 1,100 men to dispose of Morgan. Tarleton came up with
Morgan on the 17th of January, 1781, at a grazing-ground known
as the Cowpens, not far from King's Mountain. The battle which
ensued was well fought, and on Morgan's part it was a
wonderful piece of tactics. With only 900 men in open field he
surrounded and nearly annihilated a superior force. The
British lost 230 in killed and wounded, 600 prisoners, and all
their guns. Tarleton escaped with 270 men. The Americans lost
12 killed and 61 wounded. The two battles, King's Mountain and
the Cowpens, deprived Cornwallis of nearly all his light-armed
troops, and he was just entering upon a game where swiftness
was especially required. It was his object to intercept Morgan
and defeat him before he could effect a junction with the
other part of the American army. It was Greene's object to
march the two parts of his army in converging directions
northwards across North Carolina and unite them in spite of
Cornwallis. By moving in this direction Greene was always
getting nearer to his reinforcements from Virginia, while
Cornwallis was always getting further from his supports in
South Carolina. … The two wings of the American army came
together and were joined by the reinforcements; so that at
Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March, Cornwallis found
himself obliged to fight against heavy odds, 200 miles from
the coast and almost as far from the nearest point in South
Carolina at which he could get support. The battle of Guilford
was admirably managed by both commanders and stubbornly fought
by the troops. At nightfall the British held the field, with
the loss of nearly one third of their number, and the
Americans were repulsed. But Cornwallis could not stay in such
a place, and could not afford to risk another battle. There
was nothing for him to do but retreat to Wilmington, the
nearest point on the coast. There he stopped and pondered. His
own force was sadly depleted, but he knew that Arnold in
Virginia was being heavily reinforced from New York. The only
safe course seemed to march northward and join the operations
in Virginia; then afterwards to return southward. This course
Cornwallis pursued, arriving at Petersburg and taking command
of the troops there on the 20th of May. Meanwhile Greene,
after pursuing Cornwallis for about 50 miles from Guilford,
faced about and marched with all speed upon Camden, 160 miles
distant. … Lord Rawdon held Camden. Greene stopped at
Hobkirk's Hill, two miles to the north, and sent Marion and
Lee to take Fort Watson, and thus cut the enemy's
communications with the coast. On April 23 Fort Watson
surrendered; on the 25th Rawdon defeated Greene at Hobkirk's
Hill, but as his communications were cut the victory did him
no good. He was obliged to retreat toward the coast, and
Greene took Camden on the 10th of May. Having thus obtained
the commanding point, Greene went on until he had reduced
every one of the inland posts. At last, on the 8th of
September, he fought an obstinate battle at Eutaw Springs, in
which both sides claimed the victory. … Here, however, as
always after one of Greene's battles, it was the enemy who
retreated and he who pursued. His strategy never failed. After
Eutaw Springs the British remained shut up in Charleston under
cover of their ships, and the American government was
reëstablished over South Carolina. Among all the campaigns in
history that have been conducted with small armies, there have
been few, if any, more brilliant than Greene's."
J. Fiske,
The War of Independence,
chapter 7.
ALSO IN:
J. Fiske,
The American Revolution,
chapter 15 (volume 2).
H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapters 65-71.
G. W. Greene,
Life of Nathanael Greene,
volume 3, chapters 1-23.
L. C. Draper,
King's Mountain and its Heroes.
H. Lee,
Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department,
chapters 18-34.
J. Graham,
Life of General Daniel Morgan,
chapters 13-17.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January).
The Mutiny of the Pennsylvania Line.
"As the year 1781 opened and the prospect of a new year of
struggle became certain, and the invasion of the Southern
States began to indicate the prospect of a southern campaign,
which was at all times unpopular with northern troops, a
disaffection was developed which at last broke forth in open
mutiny, and a peremptory demand for discharge. This irritation
was aggravated by hunger, cold, and poverty. Marshall says:
'The winter brought not much relaxation from toil, and none
from suffering. The soldiers were perpetually on the point of
starvation, were often entirely without food, were exposed
without proper clothing to the rigors of winter; and had now
served almost twelve months without pay.' … On the 1st of
January the Pennsylvania line revolted; Captain Billings was
killed in an attempt to suppress the mutiny; General Wayne was
powerless to restore order, and 1,300 men, with six guns,
started to Princeton, with the declared purpose to march to
Philadelphia, and obtain redress. They demanded clothing, the
residue of their bounty, and full arrears of pay. A committee
from Congress and the State authorities of Pennsylvania at
once entered into negotiations with the troops for terms of
compromise. The American Commander-in-chief was then at New
Windsor. A messenger from General Wayne informed him on the 3d
of January of the revolt, and the terms demanded. It appears
from Washington's letters that it was his impulse, at the
first intimation of the trouble, to go in person and attempt
its control. His second impression was to reserve his
influence and authority until all other means were exhausted.
{3276}
The complaint of the mutineers was but a statement of the
condition of all the army, so far as the soldiers had served
three years; and the suffering and failure to receive pay were
absolutely universal. Leaving the preliminary discussion with
the civil authorities who were responsible for much of the
trouble, the Commander-in-chief appealed to the Governors of
the northern States for a force of militia to meet any attacks
from New York, and declined to interfere until he found that
the passion had passed and he could find troops who would at
all hazards execute his will. It was one of the most difficult
passages in the war, and was so handled that the
Commander-in-chief retained his prestige and regained control
of the army. … General Clinton received information of the
revolt as early as Washington, on the morning of the 23d, and
sent messengers to the American army with propositions,
looking to their return to British allegiance. He entirely
misconceived the nature of the disaffection, and his agents
were retained in custody. It is sufficient to say that a
portion of the troops were discharged without critical
examination of their enlistments, on their own oath; that many
promptly reenlisted, that as soon as Washington found that he
had troops who did not share in the open mutiny, he used force
and suppressed the disaffection, and that the soldiers
themselves hung several agents who brought propositions from
General Clinton which invited them to abandon their flag and
join his command. The mutiny of the American army at the
opening of the campaign of 1781, was a natural outbreak which
human nature could not resist, and whatever of discredit may
attach to the revolt, it will never be unassociated with the
fact that, while the emergency was one that overwhelmed every
military obligation by its pressure, it did not affect the
fealty of the soldiers to the cause for which they took up
arms. … La Fayette thus wrote to his wife, 'Human patience has
its limits. No European army would suffer the tenth part of
what the Americans suffer. It takes citizens to support
hunger, nakedness, toil, and the total want of pay, which
constitute the condition of our soldiers, the hardiest and
most patient that are to be found in the world.'"
H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapter 67.
ALSO IN:
W. H. Egle,
History of Pennsylvania,
chapter 12.
C. J. Stillé,
Major-General Anthony Wayne,
chapter 6.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (January-May).
Benedict Arnold and the British in Virginia.
Opening of Lafayette's campaign in that state.
"In January, 1781, the news reached headquarters in the
Highlands of New York that General [Benedict] Arnold had
landed in Virginia with a considerable force, was laying waste
the country, and had already destroyed the valuable stores
collected at Richmond; opposed to him were only the small
commands of Steuben and Muhlenberg. The situation was very
alarming, and threatened to place all the Southern States in
the hands of the British. If Arnold succeeded in destroying
the few American troops in Virginia, he could then march to
the assistance of Cornwallis, who, with a superior force, was
pressing General Greene very hard in the Carolinas. To defeat
or capture Arnold before he could further prosecute his
designs was, therefore, of the utmost importance. For this
purpose it was necessary to send a detachment from the main
army against Arnold by land, and a naval force to Chesapeake
Bay to prevent his escape by sea. Washington at once
communicated the state of affairs to Rochambeau, who, with the
French fleet, had long been blockaded at Newport. Taking
advantage of the serious injuries lately suffered by the
blockading English fleet in consequence of a storm, Admiral
Destouches despatched M. de Tilly to the Chesapeake with a
ship-of-the-line and two frigates. To cooperate with these
French vessels, Washington detached 1,200 light infantry from
the main army, and placed them under the command of Lafayette.
That officer was particularly chosen for this important trust,
because the confidence reposed in him by both the American and
French troops made him, in Washington's opinion, the fittest
person to conduct a combined expedition. Thus opened the only
campaign in America which afforded Lafayette an opportunity to
show what abilities he possessed as an independent commander,
and on this campaign his military reputation must chiefly
rest. Lafayette moved rapidly southward," to Annapolis; but,
the coöperating movement of the French fleet having, meantime,
been frustrated by an attack from the English squadron, his
instructions required him to abandon the expedition and
return. He had already set his troops in motion northward when
different instructions reached him. Two more British regiments
had been sent to Virginia, under General Philips, who now took
command of all the forces there, and this had increased the
anxiety of Washington. "The situation of the Southern States
had become extremely perilous. General Greene had all he could
do to fight Lord Cornwallis's superior force in North
Carolina. Unless a vigorous opposition could be made to
Philips, he would have no difficulty in dispersing the militia
of Virginia, and in effecting a junction with Cornwallis.
With their forces so combined, the British would be masters in
the South. Washington at once determined to place the defence
of Virginia in Lafayette's hands. … Lafayette marched with
such rapidity … that he reached Richmond, where there were
valuable stores to be protected, a day in advance of General
Philips. From his post on the heights of the town he saw the
British set fire to the tobacco warehouses at Manchester, just
across the river, but there were neither men nor boats enough
to make an attack possible. Philips, on his part, was too much
impressed with the show of strength made by the Americans to
prosecute his plans on Richmond, and retreating down the James
river, burning and laying waste as he went, he camped at Hog
Island. Lafayette followed, harassing the enemy's rear, as far
as the Chickahominy. Here the situation underwent a
considerable change. Lord Cornwallis, after his long and
unsuccessful campaign against Greene in North Carolina, made
up his mind that his exhausting labors there would prove
unprofitable until Virginia should be subjugated. His men were
worn out with incessant marching and fighting, while no
substantial advantage had been gained. Hearing that General
Greene had marched to attack Lord Rawdon at Camden in South
Carolina, he determined to join Philips.
{3277}
That officer, accordingly, received orders while at Hog Island
to take possession of Petersburg and there await Cornwallis's
arrival. … On the 13th of May, General Philips died at
Petersburg of a fever. … Cornwallis arrived at Petersburg on
the 20th of May. His forces now amounted to over 5,000 men,
which number was soon increased to 8,000."
B. Tuckerman,
Life of Lafayette,
chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
J. E. Cooke,
Virginia,
part 3, chapter 17.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781 (May-October).
Cornwallis in Virginia and the trap into which he fell.
Siege of Yorktown by the French and Americans.
Surrender of the British army.
"On the 24th of May, Cornwallis, having rested his troops,
marched from Petersburg, and endeavored to engage the American
forces. But Lafayette, having removed the military stores from
Richmond, retreated across the Chickahominy to Fredericksburg,
where he expected to meet General Wayne and a battalion of
Pennsylvania troops, without whose assistance he could not
venture any fighting. … Cornwallis … moved between Lafayette
and the town of Albemarle, where had been placed a great part
of the military stores from Richmond, which now seemed doomed
to destruction. But on the 10th of June Lafayette had received
his expected reënforcement of Wayne's Pennsylvanians, and thus
strengthened felt able to assume the offensive. Rapidly
crossing the Rapidan he approached close to the British army
which blocked the road to Albemarle. Nothing could have better
suited Cornwallis, who prepared for a conflict in which he
felt sure of a decisive victory. Lafayette, however, had not
lost sight of the vital feature of his campaign,—to protect
the property of the State without losing his army. Through his
scouts he discovered an old unused road to Albemarle, unknown
to the enemy. While Cornwallis was preparing for battle, he
had the road cleared, and under cover of the night marched his
men through it and took up a strong position before the town.
There he was joined by militia from the neighboring mountains,
and he showed so strong a front that the British commander did
not venture an attack. … The British commander, so far foiled
in his objects, had to march back to Richmond and thence to
Williamsburg, near the coast, thus practically abandoning
control over any part of Virginia except where naval forces
gave possession. Lafayette effected a junction with Baron
Steuben on the 18th of June, and thus increased his force to
about four thousand men. The Americans had now become the
pursuers instead of the pursued, and followed the British,
harassing their rear and flanks."
B. Tuckerman,
Life of General Lafayette,
volume 1, chapter 6.
"There now came a pause in the Virginia Campaign, at least in
daily operations and excitements. The State north of the James
was relieved. Cornwallis crossed to the south side, at Cobham,
on the 7th [July]; and Lafayette, retiring up the river,
encamped, about the 20th, on the now historic Malvern Hill,
then described as one of the healthiest and best watered spots
in the State. … The entire British army was soon after
concentrated at Portsmouth, and preparations made to transport
a considerable portion of it to New York. Lafayette,
meanwhile, at Malvern Hill, could only await developments. He
thought of sending re-enforcements to Greene, and asked
Washington if, in case Cornwallis left Virginia, he might not
return to the Northern army. … But while the marquis and
Washington and Greene were speculating on the future movements
of Cornwallis and were persuaded, from embarkations at
Portsmouth, that he was to be deprived of a large part of his
force by Clinton, unexpected intelligence came to hand.
Instead of any part going to New York, the British force
suddenly made its appearance, during the first days in August,
at Yorktown, on the Virginia peninsula, which it had abandoned
but three weeks before. Here again was a new situation.
Cornwallis, at last, at Yorktown—the spot he was not to leave
except as a prisoner of war. Why he went there is a simple
explanation. Clinton decided, upon certain dissenting opinions
expressed by Cornwallis respecting the situation in Virginia,
not to withdraw the force in the Chesapeake which he had
called for, and which was about to sail for New York, but
permitted Cornwallis to retain the whole—all with which he had
been pursuing Lafayette and the large garrison at Portsmouth,
a total of about seven thousand, rank and file. His new
instructions, conveyed at the same time, were to the effect
that his Lordship should abandon Portsmouth, which both
generals agreed was too unhealthy for the troops, and fortify
Old Point Comfort, where Fort Monroe now stands, as a naval
station for the protection of the British shipping. In
addition, if it appeared necessary, for the better security of
the Point, to occupy Yorktown also, that was to be done.
Obeying these instructions, Cornwallis ordered a survey of Old
Point Comfort; but, upon the report of his engineers, was
obliged to represent to Clinton that it was wholly unfit and
inadequate for a naval station, as it afforded little
protection for ships, and could not command the channel, on
account of its great width. Then, following what he believed
to be the spirit of his orders, Cornwallis, before hearing
from Clinton, moved up to Yorktown, and began to fortify it in
connection with Gloucester, on the opposite shore, as the best
available naval station. Clinton made no subsequent
objections, and there Cornwallis remained until his surrender.
His occupation of the place was simply an incident of the
campaign—a move taken for convenience and in the interests of
the navy and the health of his command."
H. P. Johnston,
The Yorktown Campaign,
chapter 3.
"The march of Lord Cornwallis into Virginia was the first
emphatic fact which enabled General Washington to plan an
efficient offensive. The repeated detachment of troops from
New York so sensibly lessened the capacity of its garrison for
extensive field service at the north, that the American
Commander-in-chief determined to attack that post, and as a
secondary purpose, thereby to divert General Clinton from
giving further aid to troops in the Southern States. As a
matter of fact, the prudent conduct of the Virginia campaign
eventually rallied to the support of General La Fayette an
army, including militia, nearly as large as that of
Washington, and the nominal strength of the allied army near
Yorktown, early in September, was nearly or quite as great as
that of Lord Cornwallis. There were other elements which, as
in previous campaigns, hampered operations at the north. The
Indians were still troublesome in Western New York, and the
Canadian frontier continued to demand attention. The American
navy had practically disappeared.
{3278}
The scarcity of money and a powerless recruiting service,
increased the difficulties of carrying on the war in a manner
that would use to the best advantage the troops of France. …
The position of the American Commander-in-chief at this time
was one of peculiar personal mortification. Appeals to State
authorities failed to fill up his army. Three thousand Hessian
reinforcements had landed at New York, and the government as
well as himself would be compromised before the whole world by
failure to meet the just demands which the French auxiliaries
had a right to press upon his attention. Relief came most
opportunely. The frigate Concorde arrived at Newport, and a
reiteration of the purpose of Count de Grasse to leave St.
Domingo on the 3d of August, for the Chesapeake direct, was
announced by a special messenger. The possibilities of the
future at once quickened him to immediate action. With a
reticence so close that the army could not fathom his plans,
he re-organized his forces for a false demonstration against
New York and a real movement upon Yorktown. … Letters to the
Governors of northern States called for aid as if to capture
New York. Letters to La Fayette and the Count de Grasse
embodied such intimations of his plans as would induce proper
caution to prevent the escape of Lord Cornwallis, and secure
transportation at Head of Elk. Other letters to authorities in
New Jersey and Philadelphia, expressly defining a plan of
operations against New York via Staten Island, with the
assurance of ample naval support, were exposed to interception
and fell into the hands of General Clinton. As late as the
19th, the roads leading to King's Bridge were cleared of
obstructions, and the army was put in readiness to advance
against New York Island. On the same day the New Jersey
regiment and that of Colonel Hazen crossed the Hudson at
Dobb's Ferry, to threaten Staten Island, and ostensibly to
cover some bake-houses which were being erected for the
purpose of giving color to the show of operations against New
York. The plan of a large encampment had been prepared, which
embraced Springfield and the Chatham Pass to Morristown, and
this was allowed to find its way to Clinton's headquarters.
General Heath was assigned to command of the Hudson-river
posts, with two regiments from New Hampshire, ten from
Massachusetts, five from Connecticut, the Third artillery,
Sheldon's dragoons, the invalid corps, all local companies,
and the militia. The following forces were selected to
accompany the Commander-in-chief, viz., the light infantry
under Colonel Scammel, four light companies from New York and
Connecticut, the Rhode Island regiment, under the new army
establishment, two New York regiments, that of New Jersey and
Hazen's regiment, (the last two already across the Hudson) and
Lamb's artillery, in all about 2,000 men. The American troops
crossed on the 21st, at King's Ferry, and encamped near
Haverstraw. The French army followed, and the army was united
on the 25th. … General Washington and suite reached
Philadelphia about noon, August 30th. The army had already
realized the fact that they were destined southward. Some
dissatisfaction was manifested; but Count de Rochambeau
advanced $20,000 in gold upon the pledge of Robert Morris that
he would refund the sum by the 1st of October, and the effect
upon the troops, who had long been without any pay, was
inspiring."
H. B. Carrington,
Battles of the American Revolution,
chapter 74.
"Leaving Philadelphia, with the Army, on the 5th of September,
Washington meets an express near Chester, announcing the
arrival, in Chesapeake Bay, of the Count de Grasse, with a
fleet of twenty-eight ships of the line, and with 3,500
additional French troops, under the command of the Marquis de
St. Simon, who had already been landed at Jamestown, with
orders to join the Marquis de La Fayette! 'The joy' says the
Count William de Deux-Ponts, in his precious journal, 'the joy
which this welcome news produces among all the troops, and
which penetrates General Washington and the Count de
Rochambeau, is more easy to feel than to express.' But, in a
foot-note to that passage, he does express and describe it, in
terms which cannot be spared and could not be surpassed, and
which add a new and charming illustration of the emotional
side of Washington's nature. 'I have been equally surprised
and touched,' says the gallant Deux-Ponts, 'at the true and
pure joy of General Washington. Of a natural coldness and of a
serious and noble approach, which in him is only true dignity,
and which adorn so well the chief of a whole nation, his
features, his physiognomy, his deportment, all were changed in
an instant. He put aside his character as arbiter of North
America, and contented himself for a moment with that of a
citizen, happy at the good fortune of his country. A child,
whose every wish had been gratified, would not have
experienced a sensation more lively, and I believe I am doing
honor to the feelings of this rare man in endeavoring to
express all their ardor.' Thanks to God, thanks to France,
from all our hearts at this hour, for 'this true and pure joy'
which lightened the heart, and at once dispelled the anxieties
of our incomparable leader. It may be true that Washington
seldom smiled after he had accepted the command of our
Revolutionary Army, but it is clear that on the 5th of
September he not only smiled but played the boy. … 'All now
went merry,' with him, 'as a marriage bell.' Under the
immediate influence of this joy, which he had returned for a
few hours to Philadelphia to communicate in person to
Congress, … and while the Allied Armies are hurrying
southward, he makes a hasty trip with Colonel Humphreys to his
beloved Mount Vernon and his more beloved wife—his first visit
home since he left it for Cambridge in 1775. Rochambeau, with
his suite, joins him there on the 10th, and Chastellux and his
aids on the 11th; and there with Mrs. Washington, he dispenses
for two days, 'a princely hospitality' to his foreign guests.
But the 13th finds them all on their way to rejoin the Army at
Williamsburg, where they arrive on the 15th, 'to the great joy
of the troops and the people,' and where they dine with the
Marquis de St. Simon. On the 18th Washington and Rochambeau,
with Knox and Chastellux and Du Portail, and with two of
Washington's aids, Colonel Cobb of Massachusetts, and Colonel
Jonathan Trumbull, jr., of Connecticut, embark on the
'Princess Charlotte' for a visit to the French fleet. … A few
days more are spent at Williamsburg on their return, where
they find General Lincoln already arrived with a part of the
troops from the North, having hurried them as Washington
besought him, 'on the wings of speed,' and where the word is
soon given, 'On, on, to York and Gloucester!'
{3279}
Washington takes his share of the exposure of this march, and
the night of the 28th of September finds him, with all his
military family, sleeping in an open field within two miles of
Yorktown, without any other covering, as the journal of one of
his aids states, 'than the canopy of the heavens, and the
small spreading branches of a tree,' which the writer predicts
'will probably be rendered venerable from this circumstance
for a length of time to come.' … Everything now hurries,
almost with the rush of a Niagara cataract, to the grand fall
of Arbitrary Power in America. Lord Cornwallis had taken post
here at Yorktown as early as the 4th of August, after being
foiled so often by 'that boy' as he called La Fayette, whose
Virginia campaign of four months was the most effective
preparation for all that was to follow, and who, with singular
foresight, perceived at once that his lordship was now fairly
entrapped, and wrote to Washington, as early as the 21st of
August, that 'the British army must be forced to surrender.'
Day by day, night by night, that prediction presses forward to
its fulfillment. The 1st of October finds our engineers
reconnoitering the position and works of the enemy. The 2d
witnesses the gallantry of the Duke de Lauzun and his legion
in driving back Tarleton, whose raids had so long been the
terror of Virginia and the Carolinas. On the 6th, the Allied
Armies broke ground for their first parallel, and proceeded to
mount their batteries on the 7th and 8th. On the 9th, two
batteries were opened—Washington himself applying the torch to
the first gun; and on the 10th three or four more were in
play—silencing the enemy's works, and making,' says the
little diary of Colonel Cobb, 'most noble music.' On the 11th,
the indefatigable Baron Steuben was breaking the ground for
our second parallel, within less than four hundred yards of
the enemy, which was finished the next morning, and more
batteries mounted on the 13th and 14th. But the great
achievement of the siege still awaits its accomplishment. Two
formidable British advanced redoubts are blocking the way to
any further approach, and they must be stormed. The allied
troops divide the danger and the glory between them, and
emulate each other in the assault. One of these redoubts is
assigned to the French grenadiers and chasseurs, under the
general command of the Baron de Viomesnil. The other is
assigned to the American light infantry, under the general
command of La Fayette. But the detail of special leaders to
conduct the two assaults remains to be arranged. Viomesnil
readily designates the brave Count William to lead the French
storming party, who, though he came off from his victory
wounded, counts it 'the happiest day of his life.' A question
arises as to the American party, which is soon solved by the
impetuous but just demand of our young Alexander Hamilton to
lead it. And lead it he did, with an intrepidity, a heroism,
and a dash unsurpassed in the whole history of the war. … Both
redoubts were soon captured; and these brilliant actions
virtually sealed the fate of Cornwallis. 'A small and
precipitate sortie,' as Washington calls it, was made by the
British on the following evening, resulting in nothing; and

the next day a vain attempt to evacuate their works, and to
escape by crossing over to Gloucester, was defeated by a
violent and, for us … most providential storm of rain and
wind. … A suspension of hostilities, to arrange terms of
capitulation, was proposed by Cornwallis on the 17th; the 18th
was occupied at Moore's House in settling those terms; and on
the 19th the articles were signed by which the garrison of
York and Gloucester, together with all the officers and seamen
of the British ships in the Chesapeake, 'surrender themselves
Prisoners of War to the Combined Forces of America and
France.'"
Robert C. Winthrop,
Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Surrender
of Lord Cornwallis at Yorktown, Oct. 19, 1881.
ALSO IN:
Marquis Cornwallis,
Correspondence,
volume 1, chapters 4-5.
Marquis Cornwallis,
Answer to Sir H. Clinton.
Count de Deux-Ponts,
My Campaigns in America, 1781.
T. Balch,
The French in America during the War of Independence,
chapters 13-22.
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 25-26, and 28.
George Washington,
Writings, edited by W. C. Ford,
volume 9.
C. Tower,
The Marquis de La Fayette in the American Revolution,
volume 2, chapters 25-28.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A, D, 1781-1782.
Practical suspension of hostilities.
Difficulty of maintaining the army.
Financial distress of the country.
"Immediately after the surrender of Yorktown Washington
returned with his army to the vicinity of New York [see
NEWBURGH], but he felt himself far too weak to attempt its
capture, and hostilities were restricted to a few indecisive
skirmishes or predatory enterprises. It is curious to notice
how far from sanguine Washington appeared even after the event
which in the eyes of most men, outside America, had determined
the contest without appeal. It was still impossible, he
maintained, to do anything decisive unless the sea were
commanded by a naval force hostile to England, and France
alone could provide this force. The difficulties of
maintaining the army were unabated. 'All my accounts,' he
wrote in April 1782, 'respecting the recruiting service are
unfavourable; indeed, not a single recruit has arrived to my
knowledge from any State except Rhode Island, in consequence
of the requisitions of Congress in December last.' He strongly
urged the impossibility of recruiting the army by voluntary
enlistment, and recommended that, in addition to the
compulsory enrolment of Americans, German prisoners should be
taken into the army. Silas Deane, in private letters,
expressed at this time his belief that it would be utterly
impossible to maintain the American army for another year; and
even after the surrender of Cornwallis, no less a person than
Sir Henry Clinton assured the Government that, with a
reinforcement of only 10,000 men he would be responsible for
the conquest of America. … Credit was gone, and the troops had
long been unpaid. 'The long sufferance of the army,' wrote
Washington in October 1782, 'is almost exhausted. It is high
time for a peace.' Nothing, indeed, except the great
influence, the admirable moderation and good sense, and the
perfect integrity of Washington could have restrained the army
from open revolt. … Holland, immediately after the surrender
of Yorktown, had recognised the independence of America, which
had as yet only been recognised by France. John Adams was
received as representative at the Hague, and after several
abortive efforts he succeeded in raising a Dutch loan. France,
as her ablest ministers well knew, was drifting rapidly
towards bankruptcy, yet two American loans, amounting together
to £600,000, were extorted in the last year of the war.
{3280}
Up to the very eve of the formal signature of peace, and long
after the virtual termination of the war, the Americans found
it necessary to besiege the French Court for money. As late as
December 5, 1782, Franklin wrote from Paris to Livingston
complaining of the humiliating duty which was imposed on him.
… The reply of Livingston was dated January 6, 1783, and it
paints vividly the extreme distress in America. 'I see the
force,' he writes, 'of your objections to soliciting the
additional twelve millions, and I feel very sensibly the
weight of our obligations to France, but every sentiment of
this kind must give way to our necessities. It is not for the
interest of our allies to lose the benefit of all they have
done by refusing to make a small addition to it. … The army
demand with importunity their arrears of pay. The treasury is
empty, and no adequate means of filling it presents itself.
The people pant for peace; should contributions be exacted, as
they have hitherto been, at the point of the sword, the
consequences may be more dreadful than is at present
apprehended. I do not pretend to justify the negligence of the
States in not providing greater supplies. Some of them might
do more than they have done; none of them all that is
required. It is my duty to confide to you, that if the war is
continued in this country, it must be in a great measure at
the expense of France. If peace is made, a loan will be
absolutely necessary to enable us to discharge the army, that
will not easily separate without pay.' It was evident that the
time for peace had come. The predatory expeditions which still
continued in America could only exasperate still further both
nations, and there were some signs—especially in the conflicts
between loyalists and revolutionists—that they were having
this effect. England had declared herself ready to concede the
independence America demanded. Georgia and South Carolina,
where the English had found so many faithful friends, were
abandoned in the latter half of 1782, and the whole force of
the Crown was now concentrated at New York and in Canada.
France and Spain for a time wished to protract negotiations in
hopes that Rodney might be crushed, that Jamaica and
afterwards Gibraltar might be captured; but all these hopes
had successively vanished. … If the war continued much longer
America would almost certainly drop away, and France, and
perhaps Spain, become bankrupt."
W. E. H. Lecky,
History of England in the 18th Century,
chapter 15 (volume 4).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1781-1786.
The cession of Western Territory
by the States to the Federal Union.
The Western Reserve of Connecticut.
Although the Articles of Confederation were adopted by
Congress in 1777 and ratified immediately by most of the
States, it was not until 1781 that they became operative by
the assent of all. "New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland held out
against ratifying them for from two to four years. The secret
of their resistance was in the claims to the western
territory. … The three recalcitrant States had always had
fixed western boundaries, and had no legal claim to a share in
the western territory. … New Jersey and Delaware gave up the
struggle in 1778 and 1779; but Maryland would not and did not
yield, until her claims were satisfied. Dr. H. B. Adams has
shown that the whole question of real nationality for the
United States was bound up in this western territory; that
even a 'league government' could not continue long to govern a
great and growing territory like this without developing into
a real national government, even without a change of strict
law; and that the Maryland leaders were working under a
complete consciousness of these facts."
A. Johnston,
The United States: Its History and Constitution,
sections 89-90.
The western claims of Virginia were the most sweeping and were
founded upon the oldest historical document. "The charter
granted by James I. to South Virginia, in 1600 [see VIRGINIA:
A. D. 1609-1616] … embraced the entire north-west of North
America, and, within certain limits, all the islands along the
coast of the South Sea or Pacific Ocean. … The following is
the grant: 'All those lands, countries and territories
situate, lying and being in that part of America called
Virginia, from the point of land called Cape or Point Comfort,
all along the sea-coast to the northward 200 miles; and from
the said Point or Cape Comfort, all along the sea-coast to the
southward 200 miles; and all that space and circuit of land
lying from the sea-coast of the precinct aforesaid, up into
the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and north-west; and
also all the islands lying within 100 miles along the coast of
both seas of the precinct aforesaid.' The extraordinary
ambiguity of this grant of 1609, which was always appealed to
as a legal title by Virginia, was first shown by Thomas Paine.
… The chief ambiguity … lay in the interpretation of the words
'up into the land throughout, from sea to sea, west and
north-west.' From which point was the north-west line to be
drawn, from the point on the sea-coast 200 miles above, or
from the point 200 miles below Cape Comfort? … The more
favorable interpretation for Virginia and, perhaps, in view of
the expression 'from sea to sea,' more natural interpretation,
was to draw the north-western line from the point on the
sea-coast 200 miles above Point Comfort, and the western line
from the southern limit below Point Comfort. This gave
Virginia the greater part, at least, of the entire north-west,
for the lines diverged continually. … At the outbreak of the
Revolution, Virginia had annexed the 'County of Kentucky' to
the Old Dominion, and, in 1778, after the capture of the
military posts in the north-west by Colonel George Rogers
Clarke, … that enterprising State proceeded to annex the lands
beyond the Ohio, under the name of the County of Illinois
See, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1778-1779,
CLARKE'S CONQUEST.
The military claims of Virginia were certainly very strong,
but it was felt by the smaller States that an equitable
consideration for the services of other colonies in defending
the back country from the French, ought to induce Virginia to
dispose of a portion of her western territory for the common
good. It is easy now to conceive how royal grants to
Massachusetts and Connecticut of lands stretching from ocean
to ocean, must have conflicted with the charter claims and
military title of Virginia to the great north-west. … The
claims of Massachusetts were based upon the charter granted by
William and Mary, in 1691, and those of Connecticut upon the
charter granted by Charles II., in 1662. …
{3281}
The former's claim embraced the lands which now lie in
southern Michigan and Wisconsin, or, in other words, the
region comprehended by the extension westward of her present
southern boundary and of her ancient northern limit, which was
'the latitude of a league north of the inflow of Lake
Winnipiseogee in New Hampshire. The western claims of
Connecticut [the zone lying between her northern and southern
boundaries—41° and 42° 2' north latitude—extended westward]
covered portions of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Michigan. …
The extension of charter boundaries over the far west by
Massachusetts and Connecticut led to no trespass on the
intervening charter claims of New York. Connecticut fell into
a serious controversy, however, with Pennsylvania, in regard
to the possession of certain lands in the northern part of the
latter State, but the dispute, when brought before a court
appointed by Congress, was finally decided in favor of
Pennsylvania. But in the western country, Massachusetts and
Connecticut were determined to assert their chartered rights
against Virginia and the treaty claims of New York; for, by
virtue of various treaties with the Six Nations and allies,
the latter State was asserting jurisdiction over the entire
region between Lake Erie and the Cumberland mountains, or, in
other words, Ohio and a portion of Kentucky. These claims were
strengthened by the following facts: First, that the chartered
rights of New York were merged in the Crown by the accession
to the throne, in 1685, of the Duke of York as James II.;
again, that the Six Nations and tributaries had put themselves
under the protection of England, and that they had always been
treated by the Crown as appendant to the government of New
York; moreover, in the third place, the citizens of that State
had borne the burden of protecting these Indians for over a
hundred years. New York was the great rival of Virginia in the
strength and magnitude of her western claims." In 1780,
Maryland still insisting upon the surrender of these western
land claims to the federal government, and refusing to ratify
the Articles of Confederation until such cession was made, the
claimant States began to yield to her firmness. On the 1st of
March, 1781, the offer of New York to cede her claims,
providing Congress would confirm her western boundary, was
made in Congress. "On that very day, Maryland ratified the
Articles and the first legal union of the United States was
complete. The coincidence in dates is too striking to admit of
any other explanation than that Maryland and New York were
acting with a mutual understanding. … The offer of Virginia,
reserving to herself jurisdiction over the County of Kentucky;
the offer of Connecticut, withholding jurisdiction over all
her back lands; and the offer of New York, untrammeled by
burdensome conditions and conferring upon Congress complete
jurisdiction over her entire western territory,—these three
offers were now prominently before the country. … On the 29th
of October, 1782, Mr. Daniel Carroll, of Maryland, moved that
Congress accept the right, title, jurisdiction, and claim of
New York, as ceded by the agents of that state on the first of
March, 1781. … On the 13th day of September, 1783, it was
voted by Congress to accept the cession offered by Virginia,
of the territory north-west of the Ohio, provided that state
would waive the obnoxious conditions concerning the guaranty
of Virginia's boundary, and the annulling of all other titles
to the north-west territory. Virginia modified her conditions
as requested, and on the 20th of October, 1783, empowered her
delegates in Congress to make the cession, which was done by
Thomas Jefferson, and others, March 1, 1784."
H. B. Adams,
Maryland's Influence upon Land Cessions to the United States
(Johns Hopkins University Studies, 3d series, Number 1),
pages 9-11, 19-22, 36-39.
The Massachusetts deed of cession was executed April 19, 1785.
It conveyed the right and title of the state to all lands
"west of a meridian line drawn through the western bent or
inclination of Lake Ontario, provided such line should fall 20
miles or more west of the western limit of the Niagara River"
—that being the western boundary of New York, fixed four years
before. In May, 1786, Connecticut authorized a cession which
was not complete. Instead of beginning at the western boundary
line of Pennsylvania, her conveyance was of lands beyond a
line 120 miles west of the Pennsylvania line—thus retaining
her claim to the large tract in Ohio known subsequently as the
Western Reserve, or Connecticut Reserve. "The acceptance of
this cession was strongly opposed in Congress. … After a
severe struggle it was accepted, May 26, 1786, Maryland alone
voting in the negative."
B. A. Hinsdale,
The Old Northwest,
chapter 13.
South Carolina executed the cession of her western claims in
1787; North Carolina in 1790, and Georgia in 1802.
A. Johnston,
Connecticut,
chapter 15.
ALSO IN:
T. Donaldson,
The Public Domain: its History,
chapter 3.
See, also, OHIO: A. D. 1786-1796.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (February-May).
Peace Resolutions in the British House of Commons.
Retirement of Lord North.
Pacific overtures through General Carleton.
"Fortunately for the United States, the temper of the British
nation on the question of continuing the American war was not
in unison with that of its sovereign. That war into which the
nation had entered with at least as much eagerness as the
minister had now become almost universally unpopular. Motions
against the measures of administration respecting America were
repeated by the opposition, and on every new experiment the
strength of the minority increased. At length, on the 27th of
February [1782], general Conway moved in the house of commons,
'that it is the opinion of this house that a further
prosecution of offensive war against America, would, under
present circumstances, be the means of weakening the efforts
of this country against her European enemies, and tend to
increase the mutual enmity so fatal to the interests both of
Great Britain and America.' The whole force of administration
was exerted to get rid of this question, but was exerted in
vain; and the resolution was carried. An address to the king
in the words of the motion was immediately voted, and was
presented by the whole house. The answer of the crown being
deemed inexplicit, it was on the 4th of March resolved by the
commons, 'that the house will consider as enemies to his
majesty and the country, all those who should advise or
attempt a further prosecution of offensive war on the
continent of North America.' These votes were soon followed by
a change of administration [Lord North resigning and being
succeeded by Lord Rockingham, with Fox, Shelburne, Burke and
Sheridan for colleagues], and by instructions to the
commanding officers of his Brittanic majesty's forces in
America which conformed to them. …
{3282}
Early in May, Sir Guy Carleton, who had succeeded Sir Henry
Clinton in the command of all the British forces in the United
States, arrived at New York. Having been also appointed in
conjunction with admiral Digby a commissioner to negotiate a
peace, he lost no time in conveying to general Washington
copies of the votes of the British parliament, and of a bill
which had been introduced on the part of administration,
authorizing his majesty to conclude a peace or truce with
those who were still denominated the revolted colonies of
North America. These papers he said would manifest the
dispositions prevailing with the government and people of
England towards those of America, and if the like pacific
temper should prevail in this country, both inclination and
duty would lead him to meet it with the most zealous
concurrence. He had addressed to congress, he said, a letter
containing the same communications, and he solicited from the
American general a passport for the person who should convey
it. At this time, the bill enabling the British monarch to
conclude a peace or truce with America had not passed into a
law; nor was any assurance given that the present
commissioners possessed the power to offer other terms, than
those which had formerly been rejected. General Carleton
therefore could not hope that negotiations would commence on
such a basis; nor be disappointed that the passports he
requested were refused by congress, to whom the application
was, of course, referred. … The several states passed
resolutions expressing their objections to separate
negotiations, and declaring those to be enemies to America who
should attempt to treat without the authority of congress. But
the public votes which have been stated, and probably the
private instructions given to the British general, restrained
him from offensive war, and the state of the American army
disabled general Washington from making any attempt on the
posts held by the enemy. The campaign of 1782 consequently
passed away without furnishing any military operations of
moment between the armies under the immediate direction of the
respective commanders in chief."
J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
Lord Mahon (Earl Stanhope)
History of England, 1713-1783,
chapter 65 (volume 7).
See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (April).
Recognition by the Dutch Republic.
"Henry Laurens, the American plenipotentiary to the
Netherlands, having been taken captive and carried to England,
John Adams was appointed in his place. The new envoy had
waited more than eight months for an audience of reception.
Encouraged by the success at Yorktown, on the 9th of January
1782 Adams presented himself to the president of the
states-general, renewed his formal request for an opportunity
of presenting his credentials, and 'demanded a categorical
answer which he might transmit to his sovereign.' He next went
in person to the deputies of the several cities of Holland,
and, following the order of their rank in the confederation,
repeated his demand to each one of them. The attention of
Europe was drawn to the sturdy diplomatist, who dared, alone
and unsupported, to initiate so novel and bold a procedure.
Not one of the representatives of foreign powers at the Hague
believed that it could succeed;" but, beginning with
Friesland, in February, the seven states, one by one, declared
in favor of receiving the American envoy. "On the day which
chanced to be the seventh anniversary of 'the battle of
Lexington' their high mightinesses, the states-general,
reporting the unanimous decision of the seven provinces,
resolved that John Adams should be received as the minister of
the United States of America. The Dutch republic was the
second power in the world to recognise their independence."
G. Bancroft,
History of the United States
(Author's last revision),
volume 5, page 527.
ALSO IN:
J. Q. and C. F. Adams,
Life of John Adams,
chapter 6 (volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September).
The opening of negotiations for Peace.
The Rockingham ministry, which succeeded Lord North's in the
British government, in March, 1782 (see ENGLAND: A. D.
1782-1783), "though soon dissolved by the death of the Marquis
of Rockingham, were early distracted by a want of unanimity,
and early lost the confidence of the people. The negotiation
with America during May and June made no progress. Mr. Oswald
was the agent of Lord Shelburne, known to be opposed to the
acknowledgment, and Mr. Grenville, of Mr. Fox. This ministry
had been forced upon the king by a vote of the House of
Commons. The hopes of regaining America were again excited by
the decisive victory of Lord Rodney in the West Indies [see
ENGLAND: A. D. 1780-1782], and the unexpected successes of Sir
Eyre Coote against Hyder Ali in the East; and, if credit may
be given to the reports of the day, the government looked
forward with some confidence to the making a separate peace
with Congress by means of Sir Guy Carleton, who had been
appointed to the command of the forces in North America. … Mr.
Adams, writing from the Hague, June 13, 1782, observes, 'I
cannot see a probability that the English will ever make
peace, until their finances are ruined, and such distress
brought upon them, as will work up their parties into a civil
war.' It was not till September of the same year, under Lord
Shelburne's administration, formed upon the dissolution of the
Rockingham, that the British government took a decisive and
sincere step to make peace, and authorized their commissioner,
Mr. Oswald, at Paris, to acknowledge the independence of the
colonies. … This is the first instruction given by the British
Ministry in which it was proposed to recognize the celebrated
act of July 4th, 1776. A great and immediate progress was now
made in the preliminaries. … The commission, under which the
preliminaries of the treaty were actually concluded, was
issued by Congress in June 1781. It empowered 'John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas
Jefferson, or the majority of them, or such of them as may
assemble, or in case of the death, absence, indisposition, or
other impediment of the others, to any one of them, full power
and authority, general and special commission, … to sign, and
thereupon make a treaty or treaties, and to transact every
thing that may be necessary for completing, securing and
strengthening the great work of pacification, in as ample
form, and with the same effect, as if we were personally
present and acted therein.'
{3283}
All the commissioners, except Mr. Jefferson, were present
during the discussions, being in Europe at the time the
meeting was appointed. Mr. Jefferson was in America, and did
not leave it, as a report reached the government that the
preliminaries were already signed. Mr. Oswald's commission in
proper form was not issued till the 21st of September."
The Diplomacy of the United States,
chapter 8.
"At the moment … that negotiations were set on foot, there
seemed but little hope of finding the Court of France
peaceably inclined. Fox alone among the Ministers, though
strongly opposed to a French alliance, inclined to a contrary
opinion, and imagined that the independence of America once
recognized, no further demands would be made upon England. It
was therefore his wish to recognize that independence
immediately, and by a rapid negotiation to insure the
conclusion of what he believed would prove a favourable peace.
Shelburne on the contrary believed that further concessions
would be asked by France, and that the best chance England
possessed of obtaining honourable terms, was to reserve the
recognition of independence as part of the valuable
consideration to be offered to the Colonies for favourable
terms, and to use the points where the interests of France,
Spain, and the Colonies were inconsistent, to foment
difficulties between them, and be the means of negotiating, if
necessary, a separate peace with each of the belligerents, as
opportunity might offer. The circumstances of the time
favoured the design. Vergennes had not gone to war for the
sake of American independence, but in order to humiliate
England. He not only did not intend to continue the war a day
longer than was necessary to establish a rival power on the
other side of the Atlantic, but was desirous of framing the
peace on conditions such as would leave England, Spain, and
the United States to balance one another, and so make France
paramount. He therefore intended to resist the claim which the
Colonies had invariably advanced of pushing their frontiers as
far west as the Mississippi, and proposed following the
example of the Proclamation of 1763, to leave the country
between Florida and the Cumberland to the Indians, who were to
be placed under the protection of Spain and the United States,
and the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by
the Quebec Act of 1774. Nor was he prepared to support the
claim of the New Englandmen to fish on the banks off
Newfoundland, over a considerable portion of which he desired
to establish an exclusive right for his own countrymen, in
keeping with the French interpretation of the Treaties of
Utrecht and Paris. Of a still more pronounced character were
the views of Spain. Her troops had recently conquered West
Florida and threatened East Florida as well. She had
determined to obtain formal possession of these territories,
and to claim that they ran into the interior till they reached
the great lakes. The United States, according to both the
French and Spanish idea, were therefore to be restricted to a
strip of land on the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, bounded by
almost the same line which France had contended for against
England after the Treaty of Utrecht. In 1779, when the
alliance of France was not a year old, and the great triumph
over Burgoyne was fresh, Congress notwithstanding the pressure
of M. Gerard, the French envoy, had adopted the following
conditions as the ultimatum of peace:
(l.) The acknowledgment of the independence of the United
States by Great Britain, previous to any treaty or negotiation
for peace.
(2.) The Mississippi as their western boundary.
(3.) The navigation of that river to the southern boundary of
the States with a port below it.
They also passed a resolution to the effect that any
interference after the conclusion of peace by any power with
the fishery off Newfoundland hitherto exercised by the
inhabitants of the Colonies, should be regarded as a casus
belli. 'The advice of the allies, their knowledge of American
interests, and their own discretion,' were in other matters to
guide the American Commissioners sent to the European Courts.
As however the war progressed, and French assistance,
especially in money, became of greater and greater importance
to the Congress, the tone of their instructions became
sensibly modified, under the pressure, first of M. Gérard and
then of Count Luzerne, his successor. On the 25th January
1780, M. Gérard having obtained the appointment of a Committee
of Congress, informed them that the territories of the United
States extended no further west than the limits to which
settlements were permitted by the English proclamation of
1763; that the United States had no right to the navigation of
the Mississippi, having no territories adjoining any part of
the river; that Spain would probably conquer both Floridas,
and intended holding them; and that the territory on the east
side of the Mississippi belonged to Great Britain, and would
probably be conquered by Spain. He at the same time urged upon
Congress the immediate conclusion of an alliance with that
power, to which Jay had been sent as Commissioner in 1779. On
the 15th February, Congress having considered this
communication, resolved to instruct Jay to abandon the claim
to the navigation of the Mississippi. This practically implied
the abandonment of the claim to that river as the western
boundary. Shortly after, and again on the demand of Luzerne,
the instructions to Adams, who had been appointed Commissioner
for negotiating a peace, and was then in Europe, were altered.
Independence was to be the sole ultimatum, and Adams was to
undertake to submit to the guidance of the French Minister in
every respect. 'You are to make the most candid and
confidential communications,' so his amended instructions ran,
'upon all subjects to the Ministers of our generous ally the
King of France; to undertake nothing in the negotiations for
peace or truce without their knowledge or concurrence, and to
make them sensible how much we rely upon his Majesty's
influence for effectual support in every thing that may be
necessary to the present security or future prosperity of the
United States of America.' As a climax Count Luzerne suggested
and Congress agreed to make Jay, Franklin, Jefferson, and
Laurens, joint Commissioners with Mr. Adams. Of the body thus
appointed Jefferson refused to serve, while Laurens, as
already seen, was captured on his way to England. Of the
remaining Commissioners, John Adams was doubly odious to the
diplomatists of France and Spain, because of his fearless
independence of character, and because of the tenacity with
which as a New Englander he clung to the American rights in
the Newfoundland fisheries; Jay had been an enthusiastic
advocate for the Spanish alliance, but the cavalier treatment
he had received at Madrid, and the abandonment of the
Mississippi boundary by Congress, had forced upon him the
conviction that his own country was being used as a tool by
the European powers, for their own ulterior objects. The
French he hated.
{3284}
He said 'they were not a moral people, and did not know what
it was.' Not so Franklin, influenced partly by his long
residence in the French capital, and by the idea that the
Colonies were more likely to obtain their objects, by a firm
reliance upon France than by confidence in the generosity of
England. He also pointed to the terms of the treaty he had
negotiated with the former power, which forbade either party
to conclude a separate peace without the leave previously
obtained of the other, as imposing a moral and legal
obligation on his countrymen to follow the policy which he
believed their interests as a power required them to adopt.
Meanwhile the King of France congratulated Congress on having
entrusted to his care the interests of the United States, and
warned them that if France was to be asked to continue
hostilities for purely American objects it was impossible to
say what the result might be, for the system of France
depended not merely on America, but on the other powers at
war."
Lord E. Fitzmaurice,
Life of William, Earl of Shelburne,
volume 3, chapter 4.
"Benjamin Franklin, now venerable with years, had been doing
at the court of Versailles a work hardly less important than
that of Washington on the battle-fields of America. By the
simple grace and dignity of his manners, by his large good
sense and freedom of thought, by his fame as a scientific
discoverer, above all by his consummate tact in the management
of men, the whilom printer, king's postmaster-general for
America, discoverer, London colonial agent, delegate in the
Continental Congress, and signer of the Declaration of
Independence, had completely captivated elegant, free-thinking
France. Learned and common folk, the sober and the frivolous
alike swore by Franklin. Snuff-boxes, furniture, dishes, even
stoves were gotten up 'à la Franklin.' The old man's portrait
was in every house. That the French Government, in spite of a
monarch who was half afraid of the rising nation beyond sea,
had given America her hearty support, was in no small measure
due to the influence of Franklin. And his skill in diplomacy
was of the greatest value in the negotiations now pending."
E. B. Andrews,
History of the United States,
volume 1, pages 208-209.
ALSO IN:
E. E. Hale,
Franklin in France,
volume 2, chapters 3-4.
Lord J. Russell,
Life of Fox,
chapters 16-17 (volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782 (September-November).
The Peace parleyings at Paris.
Distrust of French aims by Jay and Adams.
A secret and separate negotiation with England.
"The task of making a treaty of peace was simplified both by
[the change of ministry which placed Lord Shelburne at the
head of affairs in England] … and by the total defeat of the
Spaniards and French at Gibraltar in September [see ENGLAND;
A. D. 1780-1782]. Six months before, England had seemed
worsted in every quarter. Now England, though defeated in
America was victorious as regarded France and Spain. The
avowed object for which France had entered into alliance with
the Americans, was to secure the independence of the United
States, and this point was now substantially gained. The chief
object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France
was to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was
now decidedly lost. France had bound herself not to desist
from the war until Spain should recover Gibraltar; but now
there was little hope of accomplishing this, except by some
fortunate bargain in the treaty, and Vergennes tried to
persuade England to cede the great stronghold, in exchange for
West Florida, which Spain had lately conquered, or for Oran or
Guadaloupe. Failing in this, he adopted a plan for satisfying
Spain at the expense of the United States; and he did this the
more willingly as he had no love for the Americans, and did
not wish to see them become too powerful. France had strictly
kept her pledges; she had given us valuable and timely aid in
gaining our independence; and the sympathies of the French
people were entirely with the American cause. But the object
of the French government had been simply to humiliate England,
and this end was sufficiently accomplished by depriving her of
her thirteen colonies. The immense territory extending from
the Alleghany Mountains to the Mississippi River, and from the
border of West Florida to the Great Lakes, had passed from the
hands of France into those of England at the peace of 1763;
and by the Quebec Act of 1774 England had declared the
southern boundary of Canada to be the Ohio River. … Vergennes
maintained that the Americans ought to recognize the Quebec
Act, and give up to England all the territory north of the
Ohio River. The region south of this limit should, he thought,
be made an Indian territory, and placed under the protection
of Spain and the United States. … Upon another important point
the views of the French government were directly opposed to
American interests. The right to catch fish on the banks of
Newfoundland had been shared by treaty between France and
England; and the New England fishermen, as subjects of the
king of Great Britain, had participated in this privilege. The
matter was of very great importance, not only to New England,
but to the United States in general. … The British government
was not inclined to grant the privilege, and on this point
Vergennes took sides with England, in order to establish a
claim upon her for concessions advantageous to France in some
other quarter. … Jay [who had lately arrived in Paris to take
part in the negotiations] soon began to suspect the designs of
the French minister. He found that he was sending M. de
Rayneval as a secret emissary to Lord Shelburne under an
assumed name; he ascertained that the right of the United
States to the Mississippi valley was to be denied; and he got
hold of a dispatch from Marbois, the French secretary of
legation at Philadelphia, to Vergennes, opposing the American
claim to the Newfoundland fisheries. As soon as Jay learned
these facts, he sent his friend Dr. Benjamin Vaughan to Lord
Shelburne to put him on his guard, and while reminding him
that it was greatly for the interest of England to dissolve
the alliance between America and France, he declared himself
ready to begin the negotiations without waiting for the
recognition of independence, provided that Oswald's commission
should speak of the thirteen United States of America, instead
of calling them colonies and naming them separately.
{3285}
This decisive step was taken by Jay on his own responsibility,
and without the knowledge of Franklin, who had been averse to
anything like a separate negotiation with England. It served
to set the ball rolling at once. … Lord Shelburne at once
perceived the antagonism that had arisen between the allies,
and promptly took advantage of it. A new commission was made
out for Oswald, in which the British government first
described our country as the United States; and early in
October negotiations were begun and proceeded rapidly. On the
part of England the affair was conducted by Oswald, assisted
by Strachey and Fitzherbert, who had succeeded Grenville. In
the course of the month John Adams arrived in Paris, and a few
weeks later Henry Laurens. … The arrival of Adams fully
decided the matter as to a separate negotiation with England.
He agreed with Jay that Vergennes should be kept as far as
possible in the dark until everything was cut and dried, and
Franklin was reluctantly obliged to yield. The treaty of
alliance between France and the United States had expressly
stipulated that neither power should ever make peace without
the consent of the other. … In justice to Vergennes, it should
be borne in mind that he had kept strict faith with us in
regard to every point that had been expressly stipulated. … At
the same time, in regard to matters not expressly stipulated,
Vergennes was clearly playing a sharp game against us; and it
is undeniable that, without departing technically from the
obligations of the alliance, Jay and Adams—two men as
honourable as ever lived—played a very sharp defensive game
against him. … The treaty with England was not concluded until
the consent of France had been obtained, and thus the express
stipulation was respected; but a thorough and detailed
agreement was reached as to what the purport of the treaty
should be, while our not too friendly ally was kept in the
dark."
J. Fiske,
The Critical Period of American History,
chapter 1.
"If his [Vergennes'] policy had been carried out, it seems
clear that he would have established a claim for concessions
from England by supporting her against America on the
questions of Canada and the Canadian border and the
Newfoundland fishery. … The success of such a policy would
have been extremely displeasing to the Congress, and Jay and
Adams defeated it. … The act was done, and if it can be
justified by success, that justification, at least, is not
wanting."
W. E. H. Lecky,
History of England in the 18th Century,
chapter 15 (volume 4).
"The instructions of congress, given to the American
commissioners under the instigation of the French court, were
absolute and imperative, 'to undertake nothing without the
knowledge and concurrence of that court, and ultimately to
govern themselves by their advice and opinion.' These orders,
transmitted at the time of the enlargement of the commission,
had just been reinforced by assurances given to quiet the
uneasiness created in France by the British overtures through
Governor Carleton. Thus far, although the commissioners had
felt them to be derogatory to the honor of their country, as
well as to their own character as its representatives, there
had been no necessity for action either under or against them.
But now that matters were coming to the point of a serious
negotiation, and the secondary questions of interest to
America were to be determined, especially those to which
France had shown herself indifferent, not to say adverse, it
seemed as if no chance remained of escaping a decision. Mr.
Jay, jealous of the mission of De Rayneval, of which not a
hint had been dropped by the French court, suspicious of its
good faith from the disclosures of the remarkable dispatch of
Marbois, and fearful of any advice like that of which he had
received a foretaste through M. de Rayneval, at the same time
provoked that the confidence expected should be all on one
side, the Count communicating nothing of the separate French
negotiation, came to the conclusion that the interests of
America were safest when retained in American hands. He
therefore declared himself in favor of going on to treat with
Great Britain, without consulting the French court. Dr.
Franklin, on the other hand, expressing his confidence in that
court, secured by his sense of the steady reception of
benefits by his country, signified his willingness to abide by
the instructions he had received. Yet it is a singular fact,
but lately disclosed, that, notwithstanding this general
feeling, which was doubtless sincerely entertained, Dr.
Franklin had been the first person to violate those
instructions, at the very inception of the negotiations, by
proposing to Lord Shelburne the cession of Canada, and
covering his proposal with an earnest injunction to keep it
secret from France, because of his belief that she was adverse
to the measure. … It may fairly be inferred that, whatever
Franklin might have been disposed to believe of the French
court, his instincts were too strong to enable him to trust
them implicitly with the care of interests purely American.
And, in this, there can be no reasonable cause for doubt that
he was right. The more full the disclosures have been of the
French policy from their confidential papers, the more do they
show Count de Vergennes assailing England in America, with
quite as fixed a purpose as ever Chatham had to conquer
America in Germany. Mr. Adams had no doubt of it. He had never
seen any signs of a disposition to aid the United States from
affection or sympathy. On the contrary, he had perceived their
cause everywhere made subordinate to the general
considerations of continental politics. Perhaps his
impressions at some moments carried him even further, and led
him to suspect in the Count a positive desire to check and
depress America. In this he fell into the natural mistake of
exaggerating the importance of his own country. In the great
game of nations which was now playing at Paris under the
practised eye of France's chief (for Count de Maurepas was no
longer living), the United States probably held a relative
position, in his mind, not higher than that of a pawn, or
possibly a knight, on a chess-table. Whilst his attention was
absorbed in arranging the combinations of several powers, it
necessarily followed that he had not the time to devote that
attention to any one, which its special representative might
imagine to be its due. But even this hypothesis was to Mr.
Adams justification quite sufficient for declining to submit
the interests of his country implicitly to the Count's
control. If not so material in the Count's eyes, the greater
the necessity of keeping them in his own care. He therefore
seized the first opportunity to announce to his colleagues his
preference for the views of Mr. Jay.
{3286}
After some little reflection, Dr. Franklin signified his
acquiescence in this decision. His objections to it had
doubtless been increased by the peculiar relations he had
previously sustained to the French court, and by a very proper
desire to be released from the responsibility of what might
from him be regarded as a discourteous act. No such delicacy
was called for on the part of the other commissioners. Neither
does it appear that Count de Vergennes manifested a sign of
discontent with them at the time. He saw that little
confidence was placed in him, but he does not seem to have
made the slightest effort to change the decision or even to
get an explanation of it. The truth is, that the course thus
taken had its conveniences for him, provided only that the
good faith of the American negotiators, not to make a separate
peace, could be depended upon. Neither did he ever affect to
complain of it, excepting at one particular moment when he
thought he had cause to fear that the support he relied on
might fail."
J. Q. and C. F. Adams,
The Life of John Adams,
volume 2, chapter 7.
"The radical difference between Franklin and his colleagues
was in the question of trust. Franklin saw no reason to
distrust the fidelity of France at any time to her engagements
to the United States during the revolutionary war. His
colleagues did not share this confidence, and yet, while
impressed by this distrust of their ally, they made no appeal
for explanation. The weight of opinion, as will hereafter be
more fully seen, is now that Franklin was right, and they in
this respect wrong. But whatever may have been the correctness
of their view, it was proper that, before making it the basis
of their throwing off the burden of treaty obligation and
their own instructions, they should have first notified France
of their complaint. Obligations cannot be repudiated by one
party on the ground of the failure of the other party to
perform some condition imposed on him, without giving him
notice of the charge against him, so that he could have the
opportunity of explanation. It may be added, on the merits,
that the extenuation set up by Jay and Adams, that France was
herself untrue to her obligations, however honestly they
believed it, can not now be sustained. Livingston, who knew
more of the attitude of France than any public man on the
American side except Franklin, swept it aside as groundless.
Edward Everett, one of the most accomplished historical
writers and diplomatists the country has ever produced,
speaks, as we shall see, to the same effect, and other
historical critics of authority, to be also hereafter cited,
give us the same conclusion. Yet there are other reasons which
may excuse their course, and that of Franklin, who concurred
with them rather than defeat a peace. In the first place, such
was their isolation, that their means of communication with
Congress was stopped; and they might well have argued that if
Congress knew that the English envoys refused to treat with
them except in secret conference their instructions would have
been modified. In the second place we may accept Adams'
statement that Vergennes was from time to time informally
advised of the nature of the pending propositions. In the
third place, the articles agreed on in 1782 were not to be a
definite treaty except with the assent of France. … It now
appears that the famous Marbois letter, handed to Jay by one
of the British loyalists, and relied on by him as showing
France's duplicity, was disavowed by Marbois; and there are,
aside from this, very strong reasons to distrust its
genuineness. In the second place, we have in the
correspondence of George III a new light thrown, on the action
taken by Jay in consequence of this letter. … Benjamin
Vaughan, while a gentleman of great amiability and personal
worth, was, when Jay sent him without Franklin's knowledge on
a confidential mission to the British ministry, in the employ
of that ministry as secret agent at Paris. It is due to Jay to
say that he was ignorant of this fact, though he would have
been notified of it had he consulted Franklin. One of the most
singular incidents of this transaction is that George III,
seeking double treachery in thus sending back to him his own
agent in the guise of an agent from the American legation,
regarded it as a peculiarly subtle machination of Franklin,
which it was his duty to baffle by utterly discrediting
Benjamin Vaughan. It should be added that Franklin's
affection for Benjamin Vaughan was in no wise diminished by
Vaughan's assumption, with an honesty which no one who knew
him would question, of this peculiar kind of mediatorship. And
in Jay Franklin's confidence was unabated. He more than once
said that no one could be found more suited than Jay to
represent the United States abroad. And when, in view of
death, he prepared to settle his estate, he selected; Jay as
his executor."
F. Wharton,
The Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence
of the United States,
chapter 9, section 111,
and chapter 13, section 158 (volume 1).
Writing to M. de la Luzerne, the French Minister in the United
States, under date of December 19, 1782, Count de Vergennes
expressed himself on the conduct of the American Commissioners
as follows: "You will surely be gratified, as well as myself,
with the very extensive advantages, which our allies, the
Americans, are to receive from the peace; but you certainly
will, not be less surprised than I have been, at the conduct
of the Commissioners. According to the instructions of
Congress, they ought to have done nothing without our
participation. I have informed you, that the King did not seek
to influence the negotiation any further than his offices
might be necessary to his friends. The American Commissioners
will not say that I have interfered, and much less that I have
wearied them with my curiosity. They have cautiously kept
themselves at a distance from me. Mr. Adams, one of them,
coming from Holland, where he had been received and served by
our ambassador, had been in Paris nearly three weeks, without
imagining that he owed me any mark of attention, and probably
I should not have seen him till this time, if I had not caused
him to be reminded of it. Whenever I have had occasion to see
anyone of them, and inquire of them briefly respecting the
progress of the negotiation, they have constantly clothed
their speech in generalities, giving me to understand that it
did not go forward, and that they had no confidence in the
sincerity of the British ministry. Judge of my surprise, when,
on the 30th of November, Dr. Franklin informed me that the
articles were signed. The reservation retained on our account
does not save the infraction of the promise, which we have
mutually made, not to sign except conjointly.
{3287}
I owe Dr. Franklin the justice to state, however, that on the
next day he sent me a copy of the articles. He will hardly
complain that I received them without demonstrations of
sensibility. It was not till some days after, that, when this
minister had come to see me, I allowed myself to make him
perceive that his proceeding in this abrupt signature of the
articles had little in it, which could be agreeable to the
King. He appeared sensible of it, and excused, in the best
manner he could, himself and his colleagues. Our conversation
was amicable."
J. Bigelow,
Life of Benjamin Franklin,
volume 3, page 207, note.
ALSO IN:
J. Jay,
The Peace Negotiations of 1782-3
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 7, chapter 2).
E. Fitzmaurice,
Life of the Earl of Shelburne,
volume 3, chapter 6.
E. E. Hale,
Franklin in France,
volume 2, chapters 5-8.
H. Doniol,
Histoire de la Participation de la France
à l'établissement des États-Unis d'Amérique, tome 5.
See, also, ENGLAND: A. D. 1782-1783.

Map of the United States.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782-1783.
Grievances of the Army.
The Newburgh Addresses.
"Nothing had been done by Congress for the claims of the army,
and it seemed highly probable that it would be disbanded
without even a settlement of the accounts of the officers, and
if so, that they would never receive their dues. Alarmed and
irritated by the neglect of Congress; destitute of money and
credit and of the means of living from day to day; oppressed
with debts; saddened by the distresses of their families at
home, and by the prospect of misery before them,—they
presented a memorial to Congress in December [1782], in which
they urged the immediate adjustment of their dues, and offered
to commute the half-pay for life, granted by the resolve of
October, 1780, for full pay for a certain number of years, or
for such a sum in gross as should be agreed on by their
committee sent to Philadelphia to attend the progress of the
memorial through the house. It is manifest from statements in
this document, as well as from other evidence, that the
officers were nearly driven to desperation, and that their
offer of commutation was wrung from them by a state of public
opinion little creditable to the country. … The committee of
the officers were in attendance upon Congress during the whole
winter, and early in March, 1783, they wrote to their
constituents that nothing had been done. At this moment, the
predicament in which Washington stood, in the double relation
of citizen and soldier, was critical and delicate in the
extreme. In the course of a few days, all his firmness and
patriotism, all his sympathies as an officer, on the one side,
and his fidelity to the government, on the other, were
severely tried. On the 10th of March, an anonymous address was
circulated among the officers at Newburgh, calling a meeting
of the general and field officers, and of one officer from
each company, and one from the medical staff, to consider the
late letter from their representatives at Philadelphia, and to
determine what measures should be adopted to obtain that
redress of grievances which they seemed to have solicited in
vain. It was written with great ability and skill [by John
Armstrong, afterwards General]. … Washington met the crisis
with firmness, but also with conciliation. He issued orders
forbidding an assemblage at the call of an anonymous paper,
and directing the officers to assemble on Saturday, the 15th,
to hear the report of their committee, and to deliberate what
further measures ought to be adopted as most rational and best
calculated to obtain the just and important object in view.
The senior officer in rank present [General Gates] was
directed to preside, and to report the result to the
Commander-in-chief. On the next day after these orders were
issued, a second anonymous address appeared from the same
writer. In this paper he affected to consider the orders of
General Washington, assuming the direction of the meeting, as
a sanction of the whole proceeding which he had proposed.
Washington saw, at once, that he must be present at the
meeting himself, or that his name would be used to justify
measures which he intended to discountenance and prevent. He
therefore attended the meeting, and under his influence,
seconded by that of Putnam, Knox, Brooks, and Howard, the
result was the adoption of certain resolutions, in which the
officers, after reasserting their grievances, and rebuking all
attempts to seduce them from their civil allegiance, referred
the whole subject of their claims again to the consideration
of Congress. Even at this distant day, the peril of that
crisis can scarcely be contemplated without a shudder. Had the
Commander-in-chief been other than Washington, had the leading
officers by whom he was surrounded been less than the noblest
of patriots, the land would have been deluged with the blood
of a civil war."
G. T. Curtis,
History of the Constitution of the United States,
book 2, chapter 1 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
J. Marshall,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 11.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1782-1784.
Persecution and flight of the Tories or Loyalists.
See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (April).
Formation of the Society of the Cincinnati.
See CINCINNATI, THE SOCIETY OF THE.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (September).
The definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and
the United States.
The four difficult questions on which the British and American
negotiators at Paris arrived, after much discussion and wise
compromise, at a settlement of differences originally wide,
were
(1) Boundaries;
(2) Fishing rights;
(3) Payment of debts from American to British merchants that
were outstanding when the war began;
(4) Amnesty to American loyalists, or Tories, and restoration
of their confiscated property.
Within two months after the separate negotiations with England
opened an agreement had been reached, and preliminary or
provisional articles were signed on the 30th of November,
1782. The treaty was not to take effect, otherwise than by the
cessation of hostilities, until terms of peace should be
agreed upon between England and France. This occurred in the
following January, and on the 3d of September, 1783, the
definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the
United States was signed [at Paris]. Its essential provisions
were the following:
"Article 1.
His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United States,
viz. New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island, and
Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and
independent States; that he treats with them as such, and for
himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to
the Government, propriety and territorial rights of the same,
and every part thereof.
{3288}
Article II.
And that all disputes which might arise in future, on the
subject of the boundaries of the United States may be
prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the
following are, and shall be their boundaries, viz: From the
north-west angle of Nova Scotia, viz. that angle which is
formed by a line drawn due north from the source of Saint
Croix River to the Highlands; along the said Highlands which
divide those rivers that empty themselves into the river St.
Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean, to
the northwestern most head of Connecticut River; thence down
along the middle of that river, to the 45th degree of north
latitude; from thence, by a line due west on the said
latitude, until it strikes the river Iroquois or Cataraquy;
thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario,
through the middle of said lake until it strikes the
communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie; thence
along the middle of said communication into Lake Erie, through
the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water
communication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence along
the middle of said water communication into the Lake Huron;
thence through the middle of said lake to the water
communication between that lake and Lake Superior; thence
through Lake Superior northward of the Isles Royal and
Philipeaux, to the Long Lake; thence through the middle of
said Long Lake, and the water communication between it and the
Lake of the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through
the said lake to the most northwestern point thereof, and from
thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi; thence
by a line to be drawn along the middle of the said river
Mississippi until it shall intersect the northernmost part of
the 31st degree of north latitude. South, by a line to be
drawn due east from the determination of the line last
mentioned, in the latitude of 31 degrees north of the Equator,
to the middle of the river Apalachicola or Catahouche; thence
along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River;
thence strait to the head of St. Mary's River; and thence down
along the middle of St. Mary's River to the Atlantic Ocean.
East, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river St.
Croix, from its mouth in the Bay of Fundy to its source, and
from its source directly north to the aforesaid Highlands,
which divide the rivers that fall into the Atlantic Ocean from
those which fall into the river St. Lawrence; comprehending all
islands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the
United States, and lying between lines to be drawn due east
from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova
Scotia on the one part, and East Florida on the other, shall
respectively touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean;
excepting such islands as now are, or heretofore have been,
within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.
Article III.
It is agreed that the people of the United States shall
continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fish of every
kind on the Grand Bank, and on all the other banks of
Newfoundland; also in the Gulph of Saint Lawrence, and at all
other places in the sea where the inhabitants of both
countries used at any time heretofore to fish. And also that
the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to
take fish of every kind on such part of the coast of
Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use (but not to dry or
cure the same on that island) and also on the coasts, bays, and
creeks of all other of His Britannic Majesty's dominions in
America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to
dry and cure fish in any of the unsettled bays, harbours, and
creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long
as the same shall remain unsettled; but so soon as the same or
either of them shall be settled, it shall not be lawful for
the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement,
without a previous agreement for that purpose with the
inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.
Article IV.
It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no
lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in
sterling money, of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.
Article V.
It is agreed that the Congress shall earnestly recommend it to
the legislatures of the respective States, to provide for the
restitution of all estates, rights, and properties which have
been confiscated, belonging to real British subjects, and also
of the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in
districts in the possession of His Majesty's arms, and who
have not borne arms against the said United States. …
Article VI.
That there shall be no future confiscations made, nor any
prosecutions commenced, against any person or persons for, or
by reason of the part which he or they may have taken in the
present war. …
Article VII.
There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between His
Britannic Majesty and the said States, and between the
subjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore
all hostilities, both by sea and land, shall from henceforth
cease: All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty,
and His Britannic Majesty shall, with all convenient speed,
and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any
negroes or other property of the American inhabitants,
withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said
United States. …
Article VIII.
The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to
the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects
of Great Britain, and the citizens of the United States."
Documents Illustrative of American History,
edited by H. W. Preston,
page 232.
ALSO IN:
Treaties and Conventions between the United States
and other Powers (edition of 1889),
pages 370-379.
Parliamentary History of England,
volume 23.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783 (November-December).
The British evacuation of New York.
Dissolution of the Continental Army and Washington's
farewell to it.
"The definitive treaty had been signed at Paris on the 3d of
September, 1783, and was soon to be ratified by the United
States in Congress assembled. The last remnant of the British
army in the east had sailed down the Narrows on the 25th of
November, a day which, under the appellation of Evacuation
Day, was long held in grateful remembrance by the inhabitants
of New York, and was, till a few years since, annually
celebrated with fireworks and with military display. Of the
continental army scarce a remnant was then [at the beginning
of 1784] in the service of the States, and these few were
under the command of General Knox. His great work of
deliverance over, Washington had resigned his commission, had
gone back to his estate on the banks of the Potomac, and was
deeply engaged with plans for the improvement of his
plantations.
{3289}
The retirement to private life of the American Fabius, as the
newspapers delighted to call him, had been attended by many
pleasing ceremonies, and had been made the occasion for new
manifestations of affectionate regard by the people. The same
day that witnessed the departure of Sir Guy Carleton from New
York also witnessed the entry into that city of the army of
the States. Nine days later Washington bid adieu to his
officers. About noon on Thursday, the 4th of December, the
chiefs of the army assembled in the great room of Fraunces's
Tavern, then the resort of merchants and men of fashion, and
there Washington joined them. Rarely as he gave way to his
emotions, he could not on that day get the mastery of them. …
He filled a glass from a decanter that stood on the table,
raised it with a trembling hand, and said: 'With a heart full
of love and gratitude I now take leave of you, and most
devoutly wish your latter days may be as prosperous and happy
as your former ones have been glorious and honorable.' Then he
drank to them, and, after a pause, said: 'I cannot come to
each of you to take my leave, but shall be obliged if you will
each come and shake me by the hand.' General Knox came forward
first, and Washington embraced him. The other officers
approached one by one, and silently took their leave. A line
of infantry had been drawn up extending from the tavern to
Whitehall ferry, where a barge was in waiting to carry the
commander across the Hudson to Paulus Hook. Washington, with
his officers following, walked down the line of soldiers to
the water. The streets, the balconies, the windows, were
crowded with gazers. All the churches in the city sent forth a
joyous din. Arrived at the ferry, he entered the barge in
silence, stood up, took off his hat and waved farewell. Then,
as the boat moved slowly out into the stream amid the shouts
of the citizens, his companions in arms stood bareheaded on
the shore till the form of their illustrious commander was
lost to view."
J. B. McMaster,
History of the People of the United States,
chapter 2 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 33.
Mrs. M. J. Lamb,
History of the City of New York,
volume 2, chapters 6-7.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1787.
After the war.
Resistance to the stipulations of the Treaty of Peace.
National feebleness and humiliation.
Failure of the Articles of Confederation.
Movements toward a firmer Constitution.
"The revolution was at last accomplished. The evils it had
removed, being no longer felt, were speedily forgotten. The
evils it had brought pressed heavily upon them. They could
devise no remedy. They saw no way of escape. They soon began
to grumble, became sullen, hard to please, dissatisfied with
themselves and with everything done for them. The States,
differing in habits, in customs, in occupations, had been
during a few years united by a common danger. But the danger
was gone; old animosities and jealousies broke forth again
with all their strength, and the union seemed likely to be
dissolved. In this state of public discontent the House met at
Philadelphia early in January, 1784. Some days were spent in
examining credentials of new members, and in waiting for the
delinquents to come in. It was not till the 14th of the month
that the definitive treaty was taken under consideration and
duly ratified. Nothing remained, therefore, but to carry out
the stipulations with as much haste as possible. But there
were some articles which the people had long before made up
their minds never should be carried out. While the treaty was
yet in course of preparation the royal commissioners had
stoutly insisted on the introduction of articles providing for
the return of the refugees and the payment of debts due to
British subjects at the opening of the war. The commissioners
on behalf of the United States, who well knew the tempers of
their countrymen, had at first firmly stood out against any
such articles. But some concessions were afterward made by
each party, and certain stipulations touching the debts and
the refugees inserted. Adams, who wrote in the name of his
fellow-commissioners, … hoped that the middle line adopted
would be approved. The middle line to which Adams referred was
that Congress should recommend the States to make no more
seizures of the goods and property of men lately in arms
against the Confederation, and to put no bar in the way of the
recovery of such as had already been confiscated. It was
distinctly understood by each side that these were
recommendations, and nothing more than recommendations. Yet no
sooner were they made known than a shout of indignation and
abuse went up from all parts of the country. The community in
a moment was divided between three parties. The smallest of
the three was made up of the Tories, who still hoped for place
and power, and still nursed the delusion that the past would
be forgotten. Yet they daily contributed to keep the
remembrance of it alive by a strong and avowed attachment to
Great Britain. Opposed to these was the large and influential
body of violent Whigs, who insisted vehemently that every
loyalist should instantly be driven from the States. A less
numerous and less violent body of Whigs constituted the third
party." The fury of the violent Whigs proved generally
irresistible and great numbers of the obnoxious Tories fled
before it.
See TORIES OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION.
Some "sought a refuge in Florida, then a possession of Spain,
and founded settlements which their descendants have since
raised to prosperous and beautiful villages, renowned for
groves of orange-trees and fields of cane. Others embarked on
the British ships of war, and were carried to Canada or the
island of Bermuda; a few turned pirates, obtained a sloop, and
scoured the waters of Chesapeake bay. Many went to England,
beset the ministry with petitions for relief, wearied the
public with pathetic stories of the harsh ingratitude with
which their sufferings had been requited, and were accused,
with much show of reason, by the Americans of urging the
severe restrictions which England began to lay on American
commerce. Many more … set out for Nova Scotia. … The open
contempt with which, in all parts of the country, the people
treated the recommendation of Congress concerning the refugees
and the payment of the debts, was no more than any man of
ordinary sagacity could have foretold. Indeed, the state into
which Congress had fallen was most wretched. … Each of the
thirteen States the Union bound together retained all the
rights of sovereignty, and asserted them punctiliously against
the central government.
{3290}
Each reserved to itself the right to put up mints, to strike
money, to levy taxes, to raise armies, to say what articles
should come into its ports free and what should be made to pay
duty. Toward the Continental Government they acted precisely
as if they were dealing with a foreign power. In truth, one of
the truest patriots of New England had not been ashamed to
stand up in his place in the Massachusetts House of Deputies
and speak of the Congress of the States as a foreign
government. Every act of that body was scrutinized with the
utmost care. The transfer of the most trivial authority beyond
the borders of the State was made with protestations, with
trembling, and with fear. Under such circumstances, each
delegate felt himself to have much the character, and to be
clothed with very much of the power, of ambassadors. He was
not responsible to men, he was responsible to a State. … From
beginning to end the system of representation was bad. By the
Articles of Confederation each of the thirteen little
republics was annually to send to Congress not more than seven
and not less than two delegates. No thought was taken of
population. … But this absolute equality of the States was
more apparent than real. Congress possessed no revenue. The
burden of supporting the delegates was cast on those who sent
them, and, as the charge was not light, a motive was at once
created for preferring a representation of two to a
representation of seven, or, indeed, for sending none at all.
While the war was still raging and the enemy marching and
counter-marching within the border of every State, a sense of
fear kept up the number of delegates to at least two. Indeed,
some of the wealthier and more populous States often had as
many as four congressmen on the floor of the House. But the
war was now over. The stimulus derived from the presence of a
hostile army was withdrawn, and the representation and
attendance fell off fast. Delaware and Georgia ceased to be
represented. From the ratification of the treaty to the
organization of the Government under the Constitution six
years elapsed, and during those six years Congress, though
entitled to 91 members, was rarely attended by 25. The House
was repeatedly forced to adjourn day after day for want of a
quorum. On more than one occasion these adjournments covered a
period of thirteen consecutive days. … No occasion, however
impressive or important, could call out a large attendance.
Seven States, represented by twenty delegates, witnessed the
resignation of Washington. Twenty-three members, sitting for
eleven States, voted for the ratification of the treaty. … It
is not surprising, therefore, that Congress speedily
degenerated into a debating club, and a debating club of no
very high order. Neglected by its own members, insulted and
threatened by its mutinous troops, reviled by the press, and
forced to wander from city to city in search of an abiding
place, its acts possessed no national importance whatever. It
voted monuments that never were put up, rewarded meritorious
services with sums of money that never were paid, formed wise
schemes for the relief of the finances that never were carried
out, and planned on paper a great city that never was built.
In truth, to the scoffers and malcontents of that day, nothing
was more diverting than the uncertain wanderings of Congress.
… In the coffee-houses and taverns no toasts were drunk with
such uproarious applause as 'A hoop to the barrel' and 'Cement
to the Union'; toasts which not long before had sprung up in
the army and come rapidly into vogue. … The men who, in after
years, came to eminence as the framers of the Constitution,
who became renowned leaders of the Federalists, presidents,
cabinet ministers, and constitutional statesmen, were then in
private life, abroad, or in the State Assemblies. Washington
was busy with his negroes and tobacco; Adams was minister to
Holland; Jefferson still sat in Congress, but was soon to be
sent as minister to France; Madison sat in the Virginia House
of Deputies; Hamilton was wrangling with Livingston and Burr
at the bar of New York; Jay was minister to Spain."
J. B. McMaster,
History of the People of the United States,
volume 1, chapter 2.
Hamilton's description, in one of the papers of the
Federalist, of the state of the country in 1787, is very
graphic: "We may indeed, with propriety," he wrote, "be said
to have reached almost the last stage of National humiliation.
There is scarcely anything that can wound the pride, or
degrade the character of an independent nation, which we do
not experience. Are there engagements, to the performance of
which we are held by every tie respectable among men? These
are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we
owe debts to foreigners, and to our own citizens, contracted
in a time of imminent peril, for the preservation of our
political existence! These remain without any proper or
satisfactory provision for their discharge. Have we valuable
territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign
power, which, by express stipulations, ought long since to
have been surrendered! These are still retained, to the
prejudice of our interests not less than of our rights. Are we
in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have
neither troops, nor treasury, nor Government. Are we even in a
condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on
our own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to
be removed. Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free
participation in the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain
excludes us from it. Is public credit an indispensable
resource in time of public danger? We seem to have abandoned
its cause as desperate and irretrievable. Is commerce of
importance to National wealth? Ours is at the lowest point of
declension. Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a
safeguard against foreign encroachments? The imbecility of our
Government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors
abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty. Is a
violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom
of National distress? The price of improved land in most parts
of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the
quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully
explained by that want of private and public confidence, which
are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have a
direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind. Is
private credit the friend and patron of industry? That most
useful kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced
within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an
opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity of money.
{3291}
To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford
neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be
demanded what indication is there of National disorder,
poverty, and insignificance, that could befall a community so
peculiarly blessed with natural advantages as we are, which
does not form a part of the dark catalogue of our public
misfortunes? … The great and radical vice in the construction
of the existing Confederation is in the principle of
legislation for States or Governments, in their corporate or
collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the
individuals of which they consist. Though this principle does
not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it
pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest
depends. Except as to the rule of apportionment, the United
States have an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for
men and money, but they have no authority to raise either, by
regulations extending to the individual citizens of America.
The consequence of this is, that, though in theory their
resolutions concerning those objects are laws,
constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in
practice they are mere recommendations, which the States
observe or disregard at their option. … There is nothing
absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance
between independent nations, for certain defined purposes
precisely stated in a treaty; regulating all the details of
time, place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to
future discretion; and depending for its execution on the good
faith of the parties. … If the particular States in this
country are disposed to stand in a similar relation to each
other, and to drop the project of a general discretionary
superintendence, the scheme would indeed be pernicious, and
would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have been
enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit
of being, at least, consistent and practicable. Abandoning all
views towards a Confederate Government, this would bring us to
a simple alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us
in a situation to be alternately friends and enemies of each
other, as our mutual jealousies and rivalships, nourished by
the intrigues of foreign nations, should prescribe to us. But
if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation;
if we still will adhere to the design of a National
Government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending
power, under the direction of a common Council, we must
resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which
may be considered as forming the characteristic difference
between a league and a Government; we must extend the
authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens,—the
only proper objects of Government."
Alexander Hamilton,
The Federalist,
number 15.
"Many of the States refused or neglected to pay even their
allotted shares of interest upon the public debt, and there
was no power in Congress to compel payment. Eighteen months
were required to collect only one-fifth of the taxes assigned
to the States in 1783. The national credit became worthless.
Foreign nations refused to make commercial treaties with the
United States, preferring a condition of affairs in which they
could lay any desired burden upon American commerce without
fear of retaliation by an impotent Congress. The national
standing army had dwindled to a corps of 80 men. In 1785
Algiers declared war against the United States. Congress
recommended the building of five 40-gun ships of war. But
Congress had only power to recommend. The ships were not
built, and the Algerines were permitted to prey on American
commerce with impunity. England still refused to carry out the
Treaty of 1783, or to send a Minister to the United States.
The Federal Government, in short, was despised abroad and
disobeyed at home. The apparent remedy was the possession by
Congress of the power of levying and collecting internal taxes
and duties on imports, but, after long urging, it was found
impossible to gain the necessary consent of all the States to
the article of taxation by Congress. In 1786, therefore, this
was abandoned, and, as a last resort, the States were asked to
pass an Amendment intrusting to Congress the collection of a
revenue from imports. This Amendment was agreed to by all the
States but one. New York alone rejected it, after long debate,
and her veto seemed to destroy the last hope of a continuance
of national union in America. Perhaps the dismay caused by the
action of New York was the most powerful argument in the minds
of many for an immediate and complete revision of the
government. The first step to Revision was not so designed. In
1785 the Legislatures of Maryland and Virginia, in pursuance
of their right to regulate commerce, had appointed
Commissioners to decide on some method of doing away with
interruptions to the navigation of Chesapeake Bay. The
Commissioners reported their inability to agree, except in
condemning the Articles of Confederation. The Legislature of
Virginia followed the report by a resolution, inviting the
other States to meet at Annapolis, consider the defects of the
government, and suggest some remedy. In September, 1786,
delegates from five of the Middle States assembled, but
confined themselves to discussion, since a majority of the
States were not represented. The general conclusion was that
the government, as it then stood, was inadequate for the
protection, prosperity or comfort, of the people, and that
some immediate and thorough reform was needed. After drawing
up a report for their States and for Congress, recommending
another Convention to be held at Philadelphia, in May, 1787,
they adjourned. Congress, by resolution, approved their report
and the proposed Convention. The Convention met, as proposed,
May 14th, 1787."
A. Johnston,
History of American Politics,
2d edition, chapter 1.
"Four years only elapsed, between the return of peace and the
downfall of a government which had been framed with the hope
and promise of perpetual duration. … But this brief interval
was full of suffering and peril. There are scarcely any evils
or dangers, of a political nature, and springing from
political and social causes, to which a free people can be
exposed, which the people of the United States did not
experience during that period."
G. T. Curtis,
History of the Constitution,
book 3, chapter 1.
"It is not too much to say that the period of five years
following the peace of 1783 was the most critical moment in
all the history of the American people."
J. Fiske,
Critical Period of American History,
page 55.
ALSO IN:
J. S. Landon,
Constitutional History and Government of the United States,
lecture 3.
{3292}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1783-1789.
Depressed state of Trade and Industry.
Commercial consequences of the want of nationality.
"The effect of the Revolutionary War on the merchant marine of
the colonies, which thereby secured their independence as the
United States, was not so disastrous as might have been
expected. Many ships were lost or captured, and the gains of
maritime commerce were reduced; but to offset these losses an
active fleet of privateers found profitable employment in the
seizure of English merchantmen, and thus kept alive the
maritime spirit of the country, and supplied a revenue to the
shipowners whose legitimate pursuits were suspended by the
war. In 1783, therefore, the American merchant marine was in a
fairly healthy condition. During the next six years the
disadvantages of the new situation made themselves felt.
Before the Revolution the colonies had had open trade with
their fellow-subjects in the British West India Islands. The
commerce thus carried on was a very profitable business. The
island colonies were supplied with lumber, corn, fish, live
stock, and surplus farm produce, which the continent furnished
in abundance, together with rough manufactured articles such
as pipe staves, and in return the ships of New York and New
England brought back great quantities of coffee, sugar,
cotton, rum, and indigo. … As a result of independence, the
West India business was entirely cut off. The merchantmen of
the United States then came in on the footing of foreign
vessels, and all such vessels, under the terms of the
Navigation Act, were rigorously excluded from trade with the
British colonies. It was evident, however, that the sudden
cessation of this trade, whatever loss it might inflict on the
newly created state, would be tenfold more harmful to the
islands, which had so long depended upon their neighbors of
the mainland for the necessaries of life. Pitt, then
Chancellor of the Exchequer, appreciated this difficulty, and
in 1783 brought a bill into Parliament granting open trade as
to articles that were the produce of either country. The
measure failed, owing to Pitt's resignation, and the next
ministry, in consequence of the violent opposition of British
shipowners, passed a merely temporary act, vesting in the
crown the power of regulating trade with America. This power
was occasionally exercised by suspending certain provisions of
the navigation laws, under annual proclamations, but it did
not serve to avert the disaster that Pitt had foreseen.
Terrible sufferings visited the population of the West India
colonies, and between 1780 and 1787 as many as 15,000 slaves
perished from starvation, having been unable to obtain the
necessary supply of food when their own crops had been
destroyed by hurricanes. Apart from the unfavorable condition
of the West India trade, another and more important cause had
operated to check the prosperous development of American
commerce. The only bond of political union at this time was
that formed by the Articles of Confederation, constituting a
mere league of independent States, any one of which could pass
laws calculated to injure the commerce of the others."
J. R. Soley,
Maritime Industries of America
(The United States of America, edition by N. S. Shaler,
volume 1, chapter 10).
"The general commerce of the granulated mass of communities
called the United States, from 1783 to 1780, was probably the
poorest commerce known in the whole history of the country.
England sent America £3,700,000 worth of merchandise in 1784,
and took in return only £750,000. The drain of specie to meet
this difference was very severe, and merchants could not meet
the engagements so rashly made. They had imported luxuries for
customers who were poor, and non-payment through all the
avenues of trade was the consequence. One circumstance and
detail of the internal management of this commerce added to
the distress and to the necessary difficulties of the time.
Immediately after the peace, British merchants, factors, and
clerks came across the seas in streams, to take advantage of
the new opportunities for trade. It seemed to the citizens to
be a worse invasion of their economic rights than the coming
of the troops had been to the political rights of the old
colonists. The whole country was agitated, but action was
initiated in Boston in 1785. The merchants met and discussed
all these difficulties. They pledged themselves to buy no more
goods of British merchants or factors in Boston. In about
three weeks the mechanics and artisans met in the old Green
Dragon Tavern and committed themselves to the same policy. But
the merchants went beyond mere non-intercourse with traders at
home. The root of the difficulty was in the ill-regulation or
want of regulation of our commerce with all foreign countries.
The confederation was giving and not getting. Where it should
have gotten, foreigners were getting, because the parts of the
country had not agreed to unite in acquiring for the common
benefit, lest some part should be injured in the process.
Congress made treaties for the Confederation. But if unable to
treat with any} power which excluded American shipping from
its ports, or laid duties on American produce, Congress did
not control our ports in an equivalent manner. Each individual
state was to decide whether the unfriendly power should trade
at its own ports. This in effect nullified any retaliatory
action. England, being the best market, virtually controlled
any change in commerce, as it was then conducted. Her ports
were closed to American products unless they were brought in
British vessels. France admitted our vessels to her ports, but
her merchants cried out against the competition. It was feared
that the ministers would be obliged to yield to their clamor
and close the ports. Probably the poor economic condition of
the country affected the foreign trade even more than the bad
adjustment of foreign relations. All causes combined to form
two parties, one advocating imposts upon foreign trade or a
Navigation Act, the other opposing this scheme, and insisting
upon absolute freedom of commerce. It was in this direction
that the Boston people moved, after they had instituted
non-intercourse in their own market with British traders. They
petitioned Congress to remedy these embarrassments of trade,
and sent a memorial to their own legislature. This document
urged that body to insist on action by Congress. They formed a
Committee of Correspondence to enforce these plans upon the
whole country."
W. B. Weeden,
Economic and Social History of New England, 1620-1780,
chapter 22 (volume 2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784.
Plans for new States in the Northwest Territory.
See NORTHWEST TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES: A. D. 1784.
{3293}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784.
Revolt in Tennessee against the
territorial cession to Congress.
The State of Franklin.
See TENNESSEE; A. D. 1776-1784; and 1785.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784.
The first daily Newspaper publication.
See PRINTING and PRESS; A. D. 1784-1813.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784.
The financial administration of Robert Morris.
Cost of the war.
From May, 1781, until April, 1785, the burden of the financial
management of the revolutionary struggle rested upon Robert
Morris, of Philadelphia, who held the office which Congress
had created and entitled "the Superintendent of Finances."
Morris's detractors argued that he deserved no great credit
for his management of the finances as compared with his
predecessors, because in his time everything turned in his
favour. It is true that if things had remained as before, he
could not have restored the finances; for the miracle of
carrying on a war without means has never yet been performed
by anybody. The events which gave him an opportunity to
restore the finances, by intelligent and energetic action,
were as follows. The first was the collapse of the paper
currency and its absolute removal from circulation, in May,
1781, just before he took office. As soon as it was out of the
way, specie came in. He was able to throw aside all the
trammels in which the treasury operations had been entangled
by the paper system. It is true that he did not succeed in his
attempt to relieve himself entirely from these anticipations,
which, inasmuch as they were anticipations, would have used up
the revenues of his time; but it was a great gain for him to
be able to conduct his current operations at least in terms of
specie. The second thing in his favour was the great help
granted by France in 1781, and especially the importation of a
part of this in specie. This enabled him to found the bank,
from which he borrowed six times what he put into it. The
chief use of the bank to him, however, was to discount the
notes which he took for bills of exchange. Then also it was
possible for him to reduce the expenses in a way which his
predecessors had not had the courage or the opportunity to
accomplish, because in their time the abuses of the old method
had not gone far enough to force acquiescence in the reforms.
In Morris's time, and chiefly, as it appears, by his exertions
and merit, the expenditures were greatly reduced for an army
of a given size. When the war came to an end, it was possible
for him to reduce the entire establishment to a very low
scale. Next we notice that the efforts to introduce taxation
bore fruit which, although it was trivial in one point of
view, was large enough to be very important to him in his
desperate circumstances. Finally, when his need was the
greatest, and these advantages and opportunities proved
inadequate, the rise of American credit made the loan in
Holland possible, and this carried him through to the result.
… By the Report of 1790 the total amount of expenditures and
advances at the treasury of the United States, during the war,
in specie value, was estimated as follows;
1775 and 1776, $20,064,666.
1777, $24,986,646.
1778, $24,289,438.
1779, $10,794,620.
1780, $ 3,000,000.
1781, $ 1,942,465.
1782, $ 3,632,745.
1783, $ 3,226,583.
1784, $ 548,525 to November 1.
Total $92,485,693.
This table shows how the country lapsed into dependence on
France after the alliance was formed. The round number
opposite 1780 is very eloquent. It means anarchy and
guesswork. … According to the best records we possess, the
cost of the war to the United States, reduced to specie value
year by year at the official scale of depreciation, which,
being always below the truth, makes these figures too high,
was, as above stated, $92,485,693, at the treasury. There were
also certificates of indebtedness out for $16,708,009. There
had been expended in Europe, which never went through the
treasury, $5,000,000. The States were estimated to have
expended $21,000,000. Total, $135,000,000. Jefferson
calculated it at $140,000,000, by adding the debts incurred
and the continental currency. The debt contracted by England
during the war was £115,000,000, for which £91,000,000 were
realized. The Comptroller of the Treasury of France said that
it cost 60,000,000 livres a year to support the army in
America. Vergennes told Lafayette, in November, 1782, that
France had expended 250,000,000 livres in the war. There is an
often-repeated statement that the war cost France
1,200,000,000 livres, or 1,280,000,000, or 1,500,000,000.
Arthur Young put it at £50,000,000, sterling. Probably if
60,000,000 a year for five years, or $60,000,000, was taken as
the amount directly expended for and in America by France, it
would be as fair a computation as could be made of her
contribution to American independence. She had large
expenditures elsewhere in the prosecution of her war against
Great Britain, and her incidental losses of ships, etc., were
great. When England abandoned the effort to subdue the
colonies, she was in a far better position for continuing it
than either of her adversaries. George III. was by no means
stupid in his comments and suggestions about the war. No
Englishman of the period said things which now seem wiser in
the retrospect. As early as September, 1780, he said: 'America
is distressed to the greatest degree. The finances of France,
as well as Spain, are in no good situation: This war, like the
last, will prove one of credit.' This opinion was fully
justified in 1782. French finances were then hastening toward
bankruptcy, so that France could not continue the war expenses
or the loans and subsidies to America. English credit was
high. October 2, 1782, Vergennes wrote to Montmorin, that the
English fleet was stronger than at the beginning of the war,
while the fleets of France and Spain were weaker; that French
finances were greatly weakened, while English credit was high;
that England had recovered influence in Russia, and through
Russia on Prussia and Austria. He wanted peace and
reconciliation with England in order to act with her in
eastern Europe. If England had chosen to persevere in the war,
the matter of credit would have been the most important
element in her chances of success, aside from the natural
difficulties of the enterprise."
W. G. Sumner,
The Financier and the Finances of the American Revolution,
chapter 23 (volume 2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1784-1788.
Disputes with England over the execution of the Treaty of Peace.
Difficulties with Spain.
The question of the Navigation of the Mississippi.
Eastern jealousy and Western excitement.
{3294}
"Serious disputes soon arose, concerning the execution of the
treaty of peace; and each nation complained of infractions by
the other. On the part of the United States, it was alleged
that negroes had been carried away, contrary to the treaty;
and as early as May, 1783, congress instructed their ministers
for negotiating peace to remonstrate to the British court
against this conduct of their commander in America, and to
take measures to obtain reparation. The United States, also,
complained that the western posts had not been sur·rendered,
agreeably to treaty stipulations. Great Britain, on her part,
alleged that legal impediments had been interposed to prevent
the collection of British debts in America; and that the 5th
and 6th articles, relating to the property of the loyalists,
had not been complied with. In June, 1784, the legislature of
Virginia not only declared that there had been an infraction
on the part of Great Britain of the 7th article, in detaining
the slaves and other property of the citizens of the United
States, but instructed their delegates in congress to request
that a remonstrance be presented to the British court against
such infraction and to require reparation. They also directed
them to inform congress that the state of Virginia conceived a
just regard to the national honor and interest obliged her
assembly to withhold their co-operation in the complete
fulfilment of the treaty until the success of such
remonstrance was known, or they should have further directions
from congress. They at the same time declared, that as soon as
reparation for such infraction should be made, or congress
should judge it indispensably necessary, such acts as
inhibited the recovery of British debts should be repealed,
and payment made, in such time and manner as should consist
with the exhausted situation of the state. In consequence of
these difficulties and disputes, congress, early in the year
1785, determined to send a minister plenipotentiary to Great
Britain; and on the 24th of February John Adams was appointed
to represent the United States at the court of London. He was
instructed 'in a respectful but firm manner to insist that the
United States be put, without further delay, into possession
of all the posts and territories within their limits which are
now held by British garrisons.' … Mr. Jefferson was soon after
appointed to represent the United States at the court of
Versailles, in the room of Dr. Franklin, who had leave to
return home, after an absence of nine years. Mr. Livingston
having resigned the office of secretary of foreign affairs,
Mr. Jay, in March, 1784, and before his return from Europe,
was appointed in his place. Mr. Adams repaired to the British
court, and was received as the first minister from the United
States since their independence was acknowledged. … In
December, 1785, Mr. Adams presented a memorial to the British
secretary of state, in which, after stating the detention of
the western posts contrary to the stipulations in the treaty
of peace, he in the name and in behalf of the United States
required 'that all his majesty's armies and garrisons be
forthwith withdrawn from the said United States, from all and
every of the posts and fortresses before enumerated, and from
every port, place and harbor, within the territory of the said
United States, according to the true intention of the
treaties.' To this memorial the British secretary, lord
Carmarthen, returned an answer, on the 28th of February, 1786,
in which he acknowledges the detention of the posts, but
alleges a breach of the 4th article of the treaty of peace on
the part of the United States, by interposing impediments to
the recovery of British debts in America. … This answer was
accompanied with a statement of the various instances in which
the 4th article had been violated by acts of the states. The
complaints of Great Britain also extended to breaches of the
5th and 6th articles of the treaty, relating to the recovery
of certain property and to confiscations. The answer of the
British secretary was submitted to congress; and in order to
remove the difficulties complained of, that body, in March,
1787, unanimously declared that all the acts, or parts of
acts, existing in any of the states, repugnant to the treaty
of peace, ought to be repealed; and they recommended to the
states to make such repeal by a general law. … A circular
letter to the states accompanied these declarations, in which
congress say, 'we have deliberately and dispassionately
examined and considered the several facts and matters urged by
Great Britain, as infractions of the treaty of peace, on the
part of America, and we regret that, in some of the states,
too little attention has been paid to the public faith pledged
by that treaty.' In consequence of this letter, the states of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina, passed acts
complying with the recommendations contained in it. The
operation of the act of Virginia, however, which repealed all
acts preventing the recovery of debts due to British subjects,
was suspended until the governor of that state should issue a
proclamation, giving notice that Great Britain had delivered
up the western posts, and was also taking measures for the
further fulfilment of the treaty of peace by delivering up the
negroes belonging to the citizens of that state, carried away
contrary to the 7th article of the treaty, or by making
compensation for the same. … The British court was not yet
disposed to enter into any commercial treaty with the United
States. The ministers were, no doubt, satisfied that the
advantages they enjoyed under their own regulations were
greater than could be obtained by any treaty they could make
with America. And this was, probably, one of the principal
reasons of their refusal to enter into any such treaty. As the
British court declined sending a minister to the United
States, Mr. Adams, in October, 1787, at his request, had leave
to return home. … The United States had also at this period to
encounter difficulties with Spain as well as Great Britain.
The two Floridas having been ceded to his catholic majesty,
serious disputes soon arose, not only on the old subject of
the navigation of the Mississippi, but with respect to the
boundaries of Louisiana and the ceded territory. The Spanish
court still persisted in its determination to exclude the
Americans from the navigation of the Mississippi. … In
December, 1784, congress declared it necessary to send a
minister to Spain, for the purpose of adjusting the
interfering claims of the two nations respecting the
navigation of the Mississippi, and other matters highly
interesting to the peace and good understanding which ought to
subsist between them. This was prevented by the appointment of
Don Diego Gardoqui, a minister from Spain, who arrived in the
United States and was acknowledged by congress in the summer
of 1785.
{3295}
Soon after his arrival, Mr. Jay, then secretary of foreign
affairs, was appointed to treat with the Spanish minister on
the part of the United States. … As Mr. Jay, by his
instructions, was not to conclude a treaty until the same was
communicated to congress and approved by them, and was also
specially directed to obtain a stipulation acknowledging the
right of the United States to their territorial claims and the
free navigation of the Mississippi, as established in their
treaty with Great Britain, he, on the 3d of August, 1786,
submitted to congress the … plan of a commercial treaty, and
stated the difficulties in obtaining the stipulation required.
… 'Circumstanced as we are [said Mr. Jay] I think it would be
expedient to agree that the treaty should be limited to twenty
five or thirty years, and that one of the articles should

stipulate that the United States would forbear to use the
navigation of that river below their territories to the ocean.
Thus the duration of the treaty and of the forbearance in
question should be limited to the same period.' … Among other
reasons, Mr. Jay stated that the navigation of the Mississippi
was not at that time very important, and would not probably
become so in less than twenty five or thirty years, and that a
forbearance to use it, while it was not wanted, was no great
sacrifice—that Spain then excluded the people of the United
States from that navigation; and that it could only be
acquired by war, for which the United States were not then
prepared; and that in case of war France would no doubt join
Spain. Congress were much divided on this interesting subject.
The seven states at the north, including Pennsylvania, were
disposed, in case a treaty could not otherwise be made, to
forbear the use of the navigation of the Mississippi below the
southern boundary of the United States, for a limited time,
and a resolution was submitted to congress repealing Mr. Jay's
instructions of the 25th of August, 1785, and which was
carried, seven states against five. … This, however, was to be
on the express condition that a stipulation of forbearance
should not be construed to extinguish the right of the United
States, independent of such stipulation, to use and navigate
said river from its source to the ocean; and that such
stipulation was not to be made unless it should be agreed in
the same treaty that the navigation and use of the said river
above such intersection to its source should be common to both
nations—and Mr. Jay was to make no treaty unless the
territorial limits of the United States were acknowledged and
secured according to the terms agreed between the United
States and Great Britain. … As by the confederation the assent
of nine states was necessary in making a treaty the same
number was considered requisite in giving specific
instructions in relation to it; … and it was questioned
whether the previous instructions given to Mr. Jay could be
rescinded without the assent of nine states. These proceedings
in congress, though with closed doors, soon became partly
known, and excited great alarm in Virginia and in the western
settlements. … While these negociations were pending, the
fertile country at the west was settling with a rapidity
beyond the most sanguine calculations; and it is not
surprising that the news of an actual or intended abandonment
of the navigation of the Mississippi, the only outlet for
their productions, should have excited great alarm among its
inhabitants. They were much exasperated by the seizure and
confiscation of American property by the Spaniards, on its way
down the river, which took place about the same time. The
proposition made in congress was magnified into an actual
treaty, and called from the western people most bitter
complaints and reproaches. … To quiet the apprehensions of the
western inhabitants, the delegates from North Carolina, in
September, 1788, submitted to congress a resolution declaring
that 'whereas many citizens of the United States, who possess
lands on the western waters, have expressed much uneasiness
from a report that congress are disposed to treat with Spain
for the surrender of their claim to the navigation of the
river Mississippi; in order therefore to quiet the minds of
our fellow citizens by removing such ill founded
apprehensions, resolved, that the United States have a clear,
absolute, and unalienable claim to the free navigation of the
river Mississippi, which claim is not only supported by the
express stipulations of treaties, but by the great law of
nature.' The secretary of foreign affairs, to whom this
resolution was referred, reported, that as the rumor mentioned
in the resolution was not warranted by the negociations
between the United States and Spain, the members be permitted
to contradict it, in the most explicit terms. Mr. Jay also
stated, there could be no objection to declaring the right of
the United States to the navigation of the river clear and
absolute—that this had always been his opinion; and that the
only question had been whether a modification of that right
for equivalent advantages was advisable; and though he
formerly thought such a modification might be proper, yet that
circumstances and discontents had since interposed to render
it questionable. He also advised that further negociations
with Spain be transferred to the new general government. On
this report, congress, on the 16th of September, 1788, in
order to remove the apprehensions of the western settlers,
declared that the members be permitted to contradict the
report referred to by the delegates from North Carolina; and
at the same time resolved 'that the free navigation of the
river Mississippi is a clear and essential right of the United
States, and that the same ought to be considered and supported
as such.' All further negociations with Spain were also
referred to the new federal government."
T. Pitkin,
Political and Civil History of the United States,
chapter 17 (volume 2).
"It was important for the frontiersmen to take the Lake Posts
from the British; but it was even more important to wrest from
the Spaniards the free navigation of the Mississippi. While
the Lake Posts were held by the garrisons of a foreign power,
the work of settling the northwestern territory was bound to
go forward slowly and painfully; but while the navigation of
the Mississippi was barred, even the settlements already
founded could not attain to their proper prosperity and
importance. … The Westerners were right in regarding as
indispensable the free navigation of the Mississippi. They
were right also in their determination ultimately to acquire
the control of the whole river, from the source to the mouth.
However, the Westerners wished more than the privilege of
sending down stream the products of their woods and pastures
and tilled farms.
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They had already begun to cast longing eyes on the fair
Spanish possessions. … Every bold, lawless, ambitious leader
among the frontier folk dreamed of wresting from the Spaniard
some portion of his rich and ill-guarded domain. It was not
alone the attitude of the frontiersmen towards Spain that was
novel, and based upon a situation for which there was little
precedent. Their relations with one another, with their
brethren of the seaboard, and with the Federal Government,
likewise had to be adjusted without much chance of profiting
by antecedent experience. Many phases of these relations
between the people who stayed at home and those who wandered
off to make homes, between the frontiersmen as they formed
young States, and the Central Government representing the old
States, were entirely new, and were ill-understood by both
parties. … The attitude towards the Westerners of certain
portions of the population in the older States, and especially
in the northeastern States, was one of unreasoning jealousy
and suspicion; and though this mental attitude rarely
crystallized into hostile deeds, its very existence, and the
knowledge that it did exist, embittered the men of the West. …
In the northeastern States, and in New England especially,
this feeling showed itself for two generations after the close
of the Revolutionary War. On the whole the New Englanders have
exerted a more profound and wholesome influence upon the
development of our common country than has ever been exerted
by any other equally numerous body of our people. They have
led the nation in the path of civil liberty and sound
governmental administration. But too often they have viewed
the nation's growth and greatness from a narrow and provincial
standpoint, and have grudgingly acquiesced in, rather than led
the march towards, continental supremacy. In shaping the
nation's policy for the future their sense of historic
perspective seemed imperfect. … The extreme representatives of
this northeastern sectionalism not only objected to the growth
of the West at the time now under consideration, but even
avowed a desire to work it harm, by shutting the Mississippi,
so as to benefit the commerce of the Atlantic States. … These
intolerant extremists not only opposed the admission of the
young western States into the Union, but at a later date
actually announced that the annexation by the United States of
vast territories beyond the Mississippi offered just cause for
the secession of the northeastern States. Even those who did
not take such an advanced ground felt an unreasonable dread
lest the West might grow to overtop the East in power. … A
curious feature of the way many honest men looked at the West
was their inability to see how essentially transient were some
of the characteristics to which they objected. Thus they were
alarmed at the turbulence and the lawless shortcomings of
various kinds which grew out of the conditions of frontier
settlement and sparse population. They looked with anxious
foreboding to the time when the turbulent and lawless people
would be very numerous, and would form a dense and powerful
population; failing to see that in exact proportion as the
population became dense, the conditions which caused the
qualities to which they objected would disappear. Even the men
who had too much good sense to share these fears, even men as
broadly patriotic as Jay, could not realize the extreme
rapidity of western growth. Kentucky and Tennessee grew much
faster than any of the old frontier colonies had ever grown;
and from sheer lack of experience, eastern statesmen could not
realize that this rapidity of growth made the navigation of
the Mississippi a matter of immediate and not of future
interest to the West. … While many of the people on the
eastern seaboard thus took an indefensible position in
reference to the trans-Alleghany settlements, in the period
immediately succeeding the Revolution, there were large bodies
of the population of these same settlements, including very
many of their popular leaders, whose own attitude towards the
Union was, if anything, more blameworthy. They were clamorous
about their rights, and were not unready to use veiled threats
of disunion when they deemed these rights infringed; but they
showed little appreciation of their own duties to the Union. …
They demanded that the United States wrest from the British
the Lake Posts, and from the Spaniards the navigation of the
Mississippi. Yet they seemed incapable of understanding that
if they separated from the Union they would thereby forfeit
all chance of achieving the very purposes they had in view,
because they would then certainly be at the mercy of Britain,
and probably, at least for some time, at the mercy of Spain
also. They opposed giving the United States the necessary
civil and military power, although it was only by the
possession and exercise of such power that it would be
possible to secure for the westerners what they wished. In all
human probability, the whole country round the Great Lakes
would still be British territory, and the mouth of the
Mississippi still in the hands of some European power, had the
folly of the separatists won the day and had the West been
broken up into independent states. … This final triumph of the
Union party in these first-formed frontier States was fraught
with immeasurable good."
T. Roosevelt,
The Winning of the West,
volume 3, chapter 3.
See FLORIDA: A. D. 1783-1787;
and LOUISIANA: A. D. 1785-1800.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1787.
First troubles and dealings with the Barbary pirates.
See BARBARY STATES: A. D. 1785-1801.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1786-1787.
Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts.
See MASSACHUSETTS: A. D. 1786-1787.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787.
The, Ordinance for the Government of the Northwest Territory.
Exclusion of Slavery forever.
See NORTHWEST TERRITORY: A. D. 1787;
also, EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1785-1880.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787.
The framing of the Federal Constitution.
The Union constructed of compromises.
The convention of delegates appointed to revise the Articles
of Confederation, but which took upon itself the task of
framing anew a Federal Constitution for the States, assembled
at Philadelphia on the 25th of May, 1787, eleven days later
than the day appointed for its meeting. "The powers conferred
by the several states were not uniform. Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and New Jersey appointed their delegates 'for
the purpose of revising the Federal Constitution;' North
Carolina, New Hampshire, Delaware, and Georgia 'to decide upon
the most effectual means to remove the defects of the Federal
Union;' New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut 'for the sole
and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation;'
South Carolina and Maryland 'to render the Federal
Constitution entirely adequate to the actual situation.'
{3297}
Rhode Island held aloof. She was governed by a class of men
who wanted to pay their debts in paper money, and she did not
wish to surrender her power to collect duties upon the goods
that came into her port. The trade of Newport at that day
surpassed that of New York. Connecticut came in reluctantly,
and New Hampshire late in July, 1787. … Washington was made
president of the convention. … Many names great in the
revolutionary struggle were absent from the roll of delegates.
John and Samuel Adams, and John Hancock, were not there.
Patrick Henry of Virginia refused to attend. Thomas Jefferson
and John Jay were absent from the country. George Washington
and Benjamin Franklin, however, were there. … Among the
younger men was James Madison of Virginia. … Alexander
Hamilton came from New York. … Charles C. Pinckney was a
delegate from South Carolina. … James Wilson of Pennsylvania
was a Scotchman. He surpassed all others in his exact
knowledge of the civil and common law, and the law of nations.
… Oliver Ellsworth and Roger Sherman came from Connecticut. …
Many of the 55 delegates shared Hamilton's contempt for a
democracy, but the strength they would repose in a government
they preferred to retain in the states. … The first business
of the convention was the adoption of rules. Each state was to
have one vote. Such was the rule in the Confederate Congress.
Seven states made a quorum. The convention was to sit with
closed doors, and everything was to be kept secret: nothing
was to be given to the public except the completed work. This
injunction of secrecy was never removed. Fortunately James
Madison kept a pretty full account of the debates and
proceedings, all in his own hand."
J. S. Landon,
Constitutional History and Government of the United States,
lecture 3.
"Madison tells us in his report of these debates that previous
to the opening of the Convention it had been a subject of
discussion among the members present, as to how the States
should vote in the Convention. Several of the members from
Pennsylvania had urged that the large States unite in refusing
to the small States an equal vote, but Virginia, believing
this to be injudicious if not unjust, ' discountenanced and
stilled the project.' On the 29th the real business of the
Convention was opened by Edmund Randolph, who as Governor of
Virginia was put forward as spokesman by his colleagues. He
began by saying that as the Convention had originated from
Virginia, and the delegation from this State supposed that
some proposition was expected from them, the task had been
imposed on him. After enumerating the defects of the
Confederation, he detailed the remedy proposed. This latter
was set forth in fifteen resolutions and was called afterwards
the Virginia plan of government. Charles Pinckney from South
Carolina had also a draft of a federal government, which was
read and like the former referred to a committee of the whole
House. … The Committee of the Whole … debated from day to day
the resolutions contained in the Virginia plan, and on the
13th of June they reported nineteen resolutions based upon
those of Virginia, forming a system of government in outline.
On the following day Mr. Paterson, of New Jersey, asked for
time to prepare another plan founded on the Articles of
Confederation. This was submitted to the Convention on the
15th. The Virginia and the New Jersey plan were contrasted
briefly by one of the members: Virginia plan proposes two
branches in the legislature, Jersey, a single legislative
body; Virginia, the legislative powers derived from the
people, Jersey, from the States; Virginia, a single executive,
Jersey, more than one; Virginia, a majority of the legislature
can act, Jersey, a small majority can control; Virginia, the
legislature can legislate on all national concerns, Jersey,
only on limited objects; Virginia, legislature to negative all
State laws, Jersey, giving power to the executive to compel
obedience by force; Virginia, to remove the executive by
impeachment, Jersey, on application of a majority of the
States; Virginia, for the establishment of inferior judiciary
tribunals, Jersey, no provision. Neither of these plans
commended themselves to men like Hamilton, who wanted a strong
government, and were afraid of democracy or giving power to
the people. He thought the Virginia plan 'but pork still with
a little change of the sauce.' The Articles of Confederation
amended, as in the New Jersey plan, set forth a government
approved of by the opposite wing of the Convention, consisting
of men like Lansing, who professed an ultra devotion to the
rights and autonomy of the States. … The Convention did not go
again into committee of the whole, but continued to debate the
nineteen resolutions from the 19th of June until the 23d of
July. Some of these were referred to grand committees,
consisting of one member from each State, or they were
referred to select committees consisting of five members."
K. M. Rowland,
Life of George Mason,
volume 2, chapter 4.
"The plan presented by Mr. Patterson, called the New Jersey
plan, was concerted and arranged between the deputations of
that State, of Delaware, of New York, and of Connecticut, with
the individual cooperation of Mr. Luther Martin, one of the
delegates of Maryland. The extreme jealousy … manifested by
the representatives of the two first-named States with regard
to the equal suffrage of the States in the common councils of
the Confederacy, was the principal source of their aversion to
the plan reported by the committee of the whole. The delegates
of Connecticut, and Messrs. Lansing and Yates,—forming a
majority of the delegation of New York,—united with the
deputations of New Jersey and Delaware, not so much from an
exclusive attachment to the principle of the sovereignty and
equality of the States, as from the policy of preserving the
existing framework of the confederation, and of simply vesting
in Congress, as then organized, a few additional powers. It
was under the influence of these mixed political views that
the New Jersey plan was conceived and prepared. It proposed to
vest in the existing Congress,—a single body in which all the
States had an equal suffrage,—in addition to the powers
already given to it by the articles of confederation, that of
raising revenue by imposts and stamp and postage duties, and
also that of passing acts for the regulation of commerce with
foreign nations and between the States; leaving the
enforcement of all such acts, in the first instance, to the
State courts, with an ultimate appeal to the tribunals of the
United States.
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Whenever requisitions on the States for contributions should
be made, and any State should fail to comply with such
requisitions within a specified time, Congress was to be
authorized to direct their collection in the non-complying
States, and to pass the requisite acts for that purpose. None
of the foregoing powers, however, were to be exercised by
Congress without the concurrence of a certain number of the
States, exceeding a bare majority of the whole. The plan also
proposed the organization of a Federal executive and a Federal
judiciary. … It was, finally, provided that if any State, or
any body of men in any State, shall oppose or prevent the
carrying into execution any act of Congress passed in virtue
of the powers granted to that body, or any treaty made and
ratified under the authority of the United States, the Federal
executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the
confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary,
to enforce and compel an obedience to the acts, or an
observance of the treaties, whose execution shall have been so
opposed or prevented. Such were the salient features of the
plan now brought forward as a substitute for the Virginia
propositions, as reported by the committee of the whole. … In
the progress of the discussion upon the two plans, Colonel
Hamilton, of New York, made an elaborate speech, declaring
himself to be opposed to both, and suggesting a third and more
absolute plan, which he thought was alone adequate to the
exigencies of the country. He frankly avowed his distrust of
both republican and federal government, under any
modification. He entered into a minute analysis of the various
sources and elements of political power, in order to show that
all these would be on the side of the State governments, so
long as a separate political organization of the States was
maintained, and would render them an over-match for any
general government that could be established, unless a
'complete sovereignty' was vested in the latter. He thought it
essential, therefore, to the ends of a good and efficient
government of the whole country, that the State governments,
with their vast and extensive apparatus, should be
extinguished; though 'he did not mean,' he said, 'to shock
public opinion by proposing such a measure.' He also expressed
his despair of the practicability of establishing a republican
government over so extensive a country as the United States.
He was sensible, at the same time, that it would be unwise to
propose one of any other form. Yet 'he had no scruple,' he
said, 'in declaring that, in his private opinion, the British
government was the best in the world, and that he doubted much
whether any thing short of it would do in America.' He
descanted upon the securities against injustice, violence, and
innovation, afforded, in the English system, by the permanent
constitution of the House of Lords, and by the elevated and
independent position of the monarch. He thence deduced the
necessity of as permanent a tenure as public opinion in this
country would bear, of the leading branches of the new
government. 'Let one branch of the legislature,' he said,
'hold their places for life, or at least during good behavior.
Let the executive also be for life.' In concluding, he
expressed his conviction that 'a great progress was going on
in the public mind; that the people will, in time, be
unshackled from their prejudices; and, whenever that happens,
they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the
plan brought forward by Mr. Randolph [the Virginia plan] would
place them, but would be ready to go as far, at least, as he
proposed.' He then read a plan of government he had prepared,
which, he said, he did not submit as a proposition to the
convention, but as giving a correct sketch of his ideas, and
to suggest the amendment which he should probably offer to the
Virginia plan in the future stages of its consideration. … The
convention now had presented for their consideration three
distinct schemes of government: one purely Federal, founded
upon the idea of preserving undiminished the sovereignty and
equality of the States, and of constituting a special
political agency in Congress for certain purposes, but still
under the dependence and control of the States; another of a
consolidated character, bottomed on the principle of a virtual
annihilation of the State sovereignties and the creation of a
central government, with a supreme and indefinite control over
both individuals and communities; the third a mixed and
balanced system, resting upon an agreed partition of the
powers of sovereignty between the States and the Union,—one
portion to be vested in the Union for certain objects of
common and national concern, the residue retained by the
States for the regulation of the general mass of their
interior and domestic interests. … On the 19th of June … Mr.
King, of Massachusetts, moved that 'the committee do now rise,
and report that they do not agree to the propositions offered
by the Honorable Mr. Patterson; and that they report to the
House the resolutions offered by the Honorable Mr. Randolph,
heretofore reported from a committee of the whole.' The motion
was carried by the votes of Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia, in the affirmative,—New York, New Jersey, and
Delaware voting in the negative; and Maryland, divided."
W. C. Rives,
Life and Times of James Madison,
chapter 29.
"It appeared," wrote Madison, in a letter to Jefferson,
October 24th "to be the sincere and unanimous wish of the
Convention to cherish and preserve the Union of the States. No
proposition was made, no suggestion was thrown out, in favor
of a partition of the Empire into two or more Confederacies.
It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could
not be secured by any system founded on the principle of a
confederation of Sovereign States. A voluntary observance of
the federal law by all the members could never be hoped for. A
compulsive one could evidently never be reduced to practice,
and if it could, involved equal calamities to the innocent and
the guilty, the necessity of a military force, both obnoxious
and dangerous, and, in general, a scene resembling much more a
civil war than the administration of a regular Government.
Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government which,
instead of operating on the States, should operate without
their intervention on the individuals composing them; and
hence the change in the principle and proportion of
representation.
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This ground-work being laid, the great objects
which presented themselves were:
1. To unite a proper energy in the Executive, and a proper
stability in the Legislative departments, with the essential
characters of Republican Government:
2. To draw a line of demarkation which would give to the
General Government every power requisite for general purposes,
and leave to the States every power which might be most
beneficially administered by them.
3. To provide for the different interests of different parts
of the Union.
4. To adjust the clashing pretensions of the large and small
States.
Each of these objects was pregnant with difficulties. The
whole of them together formed a task more difficult than can
well be conceived by those who were not concerned in the
execution of it. Adding to these considerations the natural
diversity of human opinions on all new and complicated
subjects, it is impossible to consider the degree of concord
which ultimately prevailed as less than a miracle. The first
of these objects, as respects the Executive, was peculiarly
embarrassing. On the question whether it should consist of a
single person or a plurality of co-ordinate members, on the
mode of appointment, on the duration in office, on the degree
of power, on the re-eligibility, tedious and reiterated
discussions took place. The plurality of co-ordinate members
had finally but few advocates. Governor Randolph was at the
head of them. The modes of appointment proposed were various;
as by the people at large, by electors chosen by the people,
by the Executives of the States, by the Congress; some
preferring a joint ballot of the two Houses; some, a separate
concurrent ballot, allowing to each a negative on the other
house; some, a nomination of several candidates by one House,
out of whom a choice should be made by the other. Several
other modifications were started. The expedient at length
adopted seemed to give pretty general satisfaction to the
members. As to the duration in office, a few would have
preferred a tenure during good behaviour; a considerable
number would have done so in case an easy and effectual
removal by impeachment could be settled. It was much agitated
whether a long term, seven years for example, with a
subsequent and perpetual ineligibility, or a short term, with
a capacity to be re-elected, should be fixed. In favor of the
first opinion were urged the danger of a gradual degeneracy of
re-elections from time to time, into first a life and then a
hereditary tenure, and the favorable effect of an incapacity
to be reappointed on the independent exercise of the Executive
authority. On the other side it was contended that the
prospect of necessary degradation would discourage the most
dignified characters from aspiring to the office; would take
away the principal motive to the faithful discharge of its
duties—the hope of being rewarded with a reappointment; would
stimulate ambition to violent efforts for holding over the
constitutional term; and instead of producing an independent
administration and a firmer defence of the constitutional
rights of the department, would render the officer more
indifferent to the importance of a place which he would soon
be obliged to quit forever, and more ready to yield to the
encroachments of the Legislature, of which he might again be a
member. The questions concerning the degree of power turned
chiefly on the appointment to offices, and the controul on the
Legislature. An absolute appointment to all offices, to some
offices, to no offices, formed the scale of opinions on the
first point. On the second, some contended for an absolute
negative, as the only possible means of reducing to practice
the theory of a free Government, which forbids a mixture of
the Legislative and Executive powers. Others would be content
with a revisionary power, to be overruled by three-fourths of
both Houses. It was warmly urged that the judiciary department
should be associated in the revision. The idea of some was,
that a separate revision should be given to the two
departments; that if either objected, two-thirds, if both,
three-fourths, should be necessary to overrule. In forming the
Senate, the great anchor of the government, the questions, as
they come within the first object, turned mostly on the mode
of appointment, and the duration of it. The different modes
proposed were:
1. By the House of Representatives.
2. By the Executive.
3. By electors chosen by the people for the purpose.
4. By the State Legislatures.
On the point of duration, the propositions descended from good
behaviour to four years, through the intermediate terms of
nine, seven, six, and five years. The election of the other
branch was first determined to be triennial, and afterwards
reduced to biennial. The second object, the due partition of
power between the General and local Governments, was perhaps,
of all, the most nice and difficult. A few contended for an
entire abolition of the States; some, for indefinite power of
Legislation in the Congress, with a negative on the laws of
the States; some, for such a power without a negative; some,
for a limited power of legislation, with such a negative; the
majority, finally, for a limited power without the negative.
The question with regard to the negative underwent repeated
discussions, and was finally rejected by a bare majority. … I
return to the third object above mentioned, the adjustments of
the different interests of different parts of the continent.
Some contended for an unlimited power over trade, including
exports as well as imports, and over slaves as well as other
imports; some, for such a power, provided the concurrence of
two-thirds of both Houses were required; some, for such a
qualification of the power, with an exemption of exports and
slaves; others, for an exemption of exports only. The result
is seen in the Constitution. South Carolina and Georgia were
inflexible on the point of the slaves. The remaining object
created more embarrassment, and a greater alarm for the issue
of the Convention, than all the rest put together. The little
States insisted on retaining their equality in both branches,
unless a compleat abolition of the State Governments should
take place; and made an equality in the Senate a sine qua non.
The large States, on the other hand, urged that as the new
Government was to be drawn principally from the people
immediately, and was to operate directly on them, not on the
States; and, consequently, as the States would lose that
importance which is now proportioned to the importance of
their voluntary compliance with the requisitions of Congress,
it was necessary that the representation in both Houses should
be in proportion to their size. It ended in the compromise
which you will see, but very much to the dissatisfaction of
several members from the large States."
J. Madison,
Letters and other Writings,
volume 1, pages 344-354.
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"Those who proposed only to amend the old Articles of
Confederation and opposed a new Constitution, objected that a
government formed under such a Constitution would be not a
federal, but a national, government. Luther Martin said, when
he returned to Maryland, that the delegates 'appeared totally
to have forgot the business for which we were sent. … We had
not been sent to form a government over the inhabitants of
America considered as individuals. … That the system of
government we were intrusted to prepare was a government over
these thirteen States; but that in our proceedings we adapted
principles which would be right and proper only on the
supposition that there were no state governments at all, but
that all the inhabitants of this extensive continent were in
their individual capacity, without government, and in a state
of nature.' He added that, 'in the whale system there was but
one federal feature, the appointment of the senators by the
States in their sovereign capacity, that is by their
legislatures, and the equality of suffrage in that branch; but
it was said that this feature was only federal in appearance.'
The Senate, the second house as it was called in the
convention, was in part created, it is needless to say, to
meet, or rather in obedience to, reasoning like this. … The
Luther Martin protestants were too radical to remain in the
convention to the end, when they saw that such a confederacy
as they wanted was impossible. But there were not many who
went the length they did in believing that a strong central
government was necessarily the destruction of the state
governments. Still fewer were those who would have brought
this about if they could. … The real difficulty, as Madison
said in the debate on that question, and as he repeated again
and again after that question was settled, was not between the
larger and smaller States, but between the North and South;
between those States that held slaves and those that had none.
Slavery in the Constitution, which has given so much trouble
to the Abolitionists of this century, and, indeed, to
everybody else, gave quite as much in the last century to
those who put it there. Many of the wisest and best men of the
time, Southerners as well as Northerners, and among them
Madison, were opposed to slavery. … Everywhere north of South
Carolina, slavery was looked upon as a misfortune which it was
exceedingly desirable to be free from at the earliest possible
moment; everywhere north of Mason and Dixon's Line, measures
had already been taken, or were certain soon to be taken, to
put an end to it; and by the Ordinance for the government of
all the territory north of the Ohio River, it was absolutely
prohibited by Congress, in the same year in which the
Constitutional Congress met. But it was, nevertheless, a thing
to the continued existence of which the anti-slavery people of
that time could consent without any violation of conscience.
Bad as it was, unwise, wasteful, cruel, a mockery of every
pretense of respect for the rights of man, they did not
believe it to be absolutely wicked. … The question with the
North was, how far could it yield; with the South, how far
could it encroach. It turned mainly an representation. … There
were some who maintained at first that the slave population
should not be represented at all. Hamilton proposed in the
first days of the convention 'that the rights of suffrage in
the national legislature ought to be proportioned to the
number of free inhabitants.'"
S. H. Gay,
James Madison,
chapters 7-8.
"When the great document was at last drafted by Gouverneur
Morris, and was all ready far the signatures [September 17,
1787], the aged Franklin produced a paper, which was read for
him, as his voice was weak. Same parts of this Constitution,
he said, he did not approve, but he was astonished to find it
so nearly perfect. Whatever opinion he had of its errors he
would sacrifice to the public good, and he hoped that every
member of the convention who still had objections would on
this occasion doubt a little of his own infallibility, and for
the sake of unanimity put his name to this instrument.
Hamilton added his plea. A few members, he said, by refusing
to sign, might do infinite mischief. … From these appeals, as
well as from Washington's solemn warning at the outset, we see
how distinctly it was realized that the country was on the
verge of civil war. Most of the members felt so, but to some
the new government seemed far too strong, and there were three
who dreaded despotism even more than anarchy. Mason, Randolph,
and Gerry refused to sign. … In the signatures the twelve
states which had taken part in the work were all represented,
Hamilton signing alone for New York."
J. Fiske,
The Critical Period of American History,
page 303.
A "popular delusion with regard to the Constitution is that it
was created out of nothing; or, as Mr. Gladstone puts it, that
·It is the greatest work ever struck off at any one time by
the mind and purpose of man.' The radical view on the other
side is expressed by Sir Henry Maine, who informs us that the
'Constitution of the United States is a modified version of
the British Constitution … which was in existence between 1760
and 1787.' The real source of the Constitution is the
experience of Americans. They had established and developed
admirable little commonwealths in the colonies; since the
beginning of the Revolution they had had experience of State
governments organized on a different basis from the colonial;
and, finally, they had carried on two successive national
governments, with which they had been profoundly discontented.
The general outline of the new Constitution seems to be
English; it was really colonial. The President's powers of
military command, of appointment, and of veto were similar to
those of the colonial governor. National courts were created
on the model of colonial courts. A legislature of two houses
was accepted because such legislatures had been common in
colonial times. In the English Parliamentary system as it
existed before 1760 the Americans had had no share; the later
English system of Parliamentary responsibility was not yet
developed, and had never been established in colonial
governments; and they expressly excluded it from their new
Constitution. They were little more affected by the experience
of other European nations. … The chief source of the details
of the Constitution was the State constitutions and laws then
in force. Thus the clause conferring a suspensive veto on the
President is an almost literal transcript from the
Massachusetts constitution. In fact, the principal experiment
in the Constitution was the establishment of an electoral
college; and of all parts of the system this has worked least
as the framers expected. The Constitution represents,
therefore, the accumulated experience of the time. … The real
boldness of the Constitution is the novelty of the federal
system which it set up."
A. B. Hart,
Formation of the Union
(Epochs of American History),
section 62.
{3301}
"That a constitution should be framed in detail by a body of
uninstructed delegates, expressly chosen for that purpose, was
familiar in the States of the Union; but was perhaps
unexampled elsewhere in the world, and was certainly
unexampled in the history of federations. That the instrument
of federal government should provide for proportional
representation in one house, and for a federal court, was a
step in federal organization which marks a new federal
principle. For many purposes the Union then created was
stronger than the Prussian monarchy at that moment. In many
respects the States were left stronger than the little
nominally independent German principalities. The great merit
of the members of the convention is their understanding of the
temper of their own countrymen. They selected out Of English,
or colonial, or State usages such practices and forms as
experience had shown to be acceptable to the people. … The
Convention had further the wisdom to express their work in
general though carefully stated principles. All previous
federal governments had been fettered either by an imperfect
and inadequate statement, as in the constitution of the United
Netherlands, or by an unwritten constitution with an
accumulation of special precedents, as in the Holy Roman
Empire. The phrases of the Constitution of 1787 were broad
enough to cover cases unforeseen. A third distinction of the
federal Convention is the skill with which it framed
acceptable compromises upon the three most difficult questions
before it. The two Houses of Congress satisfied both large and
small States; the three-fifths representation of slaves
postponed an inevitable conflict; the allowance of the slave
trade for a term of years made it possible for Congress to
perfect commercial legislation. The Convention had profited by
the experience of the Confederation: on every page of the
Constitution may be found clauses which would not have stood
there had it been framed in 1781. An adequate revenue was
provided; foreign and interstate commerce was put under the
control of Congress; the charge of foreign affairs was given
entirely to the central authority; the powers of government
were distributed among three departments."
A. B. Hart,
Introduction to the Study of Federal Government,
chapter 4.
ALSO IN:
I. Eliot,
Debates in the Convention at Philadelphia, 1787.
J. Madison,
Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution.
W. C. Rives,
Life and Times of James Madison,
chapters 27-33 (volume 2).
G. Bancroft,
History of the Formation of the Constitution of
the United States.
G. T. Curtis,
History of the Constitution of the United States.
C. E. Stevens,
Sources of the Constitution of the United States.
J. H. Robinson,
The Original and Derived Features of the Constitution.
(Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, volume l).
For the text of the Constitution.
See CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1787-1789.
The struggle for the Federal Constitution in the States.
Its ratification.
The end of the Confederation.
The fate of the proposed Constitution remained doubtful for
many months after the adjournment of the convention. Hamilton
said it would be arrogance to conjecture the result. …
Delaware was the first state to accept it, [December 7, 1787].
Gratified by the concession of equality in the federal Senate,
the ratification was prompt, enthusiastic, and unanimous.
Pennsylvania was the second [December 12]. The opposition was
sharp, but Franklin was president of the state, and Wilson a
delegate to the state convention. Their influence was great. …
The ratification was effected by a vote of 46 to 23. Then New
Jersey [December 18] and Georgia [January 2, 1788] followed
unanimously. Next came Connecticut [January 9] by a vote of
128 to 40. The result in these five states was the more easily
obtained because the friends of the Constitution were prompt
to act. With delay in the other states came a bitterness of
contention which made the result doubtful. The first close
struggle was in Massachusetts. The public creditor favored the
proposed Constitution. He saw in it some hope of his long
deferred pay. But the debtor class opposed it; for it would
put an end to cheap paper money, with which they hoped to pay
their debts, when it became still cheaper. … Hancock and Adams
scarcely favored the Constitution. They feared it infringed
upon the rights of the people, and especially upon the rights
of the states. … Hancock finally came forward as a mediator.
He proposed that the Constitution be ratified, with an
accompanying recommendation that it be amended in the
particulars in which it was thought to be defective. His
proposition was adopted, and the Constitution was ratified
[February 6] by a vote of 187 to 168. Maryland next ratified
the Constitution with much unanimity [April 28],
notwithstanding the strenuous opposition of Luther Martin. …
South Carolina followed next [May 23], and ratified the
Constitution by a majority of 76, but recommended amendments
substantially like those of Massachusetts. South Carolina was
the eighth state; and, if one more could be obtained, the
Constitution would take effect between the nine ratifying
states. There remained the five states of Virginia, New York,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Rhode Island. The state
convention of Virginia was called for the 2d of June 1788, of
New York for the 17th, and of New Hampshire for the 18th of
the same month. The result was expected to be adverse in
everyone of these states. In Virginia the opposition was led
by Patrick Henry. … Henry was ably seconded by Richard Henry
Lee, William Grayson, and George Mason. … James Monroe
followed their lead. James Madison and Governor Randolph were
the leading champions of the new Constitution. … John
Marshall, afterwards chief justice, came to their assistance.
… The debate lasted a month. It may be read with instruction,
as it is reported in the volumes of Elliot. The ratification
prevailed [June 25] by a majority of ten in a vote of 186.
After all, the influence of Washington procured the result. …
Meanwhile, the state of New Hampshire had ratified the
Constitution [June 21], but the fact was not known in
Virginia. The opposition to the Constitution was great and
bitter in the State of New York. Fortunately the convention
was held so late that New Hampshire, the ninth state, had
ratified while the New York convention was engaged in its
heated discussions. Two thirds of the delegates were elected
to oppose it. … The friends of the Constitution felt, long
before the convention assembled, that public discussion might
be useful in overcoming the hostile attitude of the state.
{3302}
Accordingly, a series of essays in exposition of the
Constitution was written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay, over
the common signature of 'Publius.' These essays were published
in a newspaper, between October, 1787, and June, 1788. … They
were subsequently collected and published in a volume styled
'The Federalist.' From that day to this, 'The Federalist' has
held unequalled rank as an authority upon the construction of
the Constitution." On the 24th of June a fleet courier,
employed by Hamilton, brought from Concord to Poughkeepsie,
where the New York convention sat, news of the ratification of
the Constitution by New Hampshire, the ninth state. "Now,
indeed, the situation was changed. There was no longer a
confederacy; the Union was already formed. … The state must
either join the new system or stay out of it. New York was not
favorably situated for a separate nation. New England on the
east, and New Jersey and Pennsylvania on the south, belonged
to the new Union. Canada was on the north. … Delay, with its
altered circumstances, finally brought to Hamilton and his
party the victory that had been denied to argument and
eloquence. But the Anti-Federalists were reluctant to yield,
and the debate was prolonged," until the 26th of July, when
the ratification was carried by 30 votes against 27. "North
Carolina remained out of the Union until November, 1789, and
Rhode Island until June, 1790. … The ratification by nine
states having been certified to the Congress of the
Confederacy, that body adopted a resolution fixing the first
Wednesday of March, 1789, as the day when the new government
should go into operation. As the day fell on the 4th of March,
that day became fixed for the beginning and the end of
congressional and presidential terms."
J. S. Landon,
Constitutional History and Government of the United States,
lecture 4.
ALSO IN:
J. Fiske,
The Critical Period of American History,
chapter 7.
G. T. Curtis, History of the Constitution of
the United States,
book 5 (volume 2).
G. Bancroft,
History of the Formation of the Constitution,
book 4 (volume 2).
J. Elliot, editor,
Debates in the State Convention on the Adoption
of the Federal Constitution.
The Federalist.
A. Hamilton,
Works,
volume 2.
W. C. Rives,
Life and Times of Madison,
chapters 34-36 (volume 2).
K. M. Rowland,
Life of George Mason.
volume 2, chapters 6-8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789.
The First Presidential Election.
Washington called to the head of the new Government.
"The adoption of the Federal constitution was another epoch in
the life of Washington. Before the official forms of an
election could be carried into operation a unanimous sentiment
throughout the Union pronounced him the nation's choice to
fill the presidential chair. He looked forward to the
possibility of his election with characteristic modesty and
unfeigned reluctance; as his letters to his confidential
friends bear witness. … The election took place at the
appointed time [the first Wednesday in January, 1789], and it
was soon ascertained that Washington was chosen President for
the term of four years from the 4th of March. By this time the
arguments and entreaties of his friends, and his own
convictions of public expediency, had determined him to
accept. … From a delay in forming a quorum of Congress the
votes of the electoral college were not counted until early in
April, when they were found to be unanimous in favor of
Washington 'The delay,' said he in a letter to General Knox,
'may be compared to a reprieve; for in confidence I tell you
(with the world it would obtain little credit), that my
movements to the chair of government will be accompanied by
feelings not unlike those of a culprit, who is going to the
place of his execution; so unwilling am I, in the evening of a
life nearly consumed in public cares, to quit a peaceful abode
for an ocean of difficulties, without that competency of
political skill, abilities and inclination, which are
necessary to manage the helm.' … At length on the 14th of
April he received a letter from the president of Congress,
duly notifying him of his election; and he prepared to set out
immediately for New York, the seat of government."
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 4, chapter 37.
The secondary electoral votes, by which the Vice President
was, at that time, chosen, were scattered among eleven
candidates. John Adams received the greater number (34) though
not quite a majority of the 69, and was elected.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789.
Passage of the Act of Congress organizing the
Supreme Court of the United States.
See SUPREME COURT.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789-1792.
Hamilton's report on Manufactures.
See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1789-1791.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789-1792;
Organization of the Federal government
and first administration of Washington.
The dividing of Parties.
Federalists and Democratic Republicans.
"March 4th, 1789, had been appointed for the formal
inauguration of the new Government, but the members elect had
not yet unlearned the Confederacy's slovenly habits. It was
not until April 6th that a sufficient number of members of
Congress arrived in New York to form a quorum and count the
electoral votes. At that time, and until 1805, no electoral
votes were cast distinctively for President and
Vice-President. Each elector voted by ballot for two persons.
If a majority of all the votes were cast for any person, he
who received the greatest number of votes became President,
and he who received the next greatest number became
Vice-President. When the votes were counted in 1789 they were
found to be, for George Washington, of Virginia, 69 (each of
the electors having given him one vote), for John Adams, of
Massachusetts, 34, and 35 for various other candidates.
Washington received notice of his election, and, after a
triumphal progress northward from his home at Mount Vernon,
was sworn into office April 30th [at Federal Hall, corner Wall
and Nassau Streets, New York]. The Vice-President had taken
his place as presiding officer of the Senate a few days
before. Frederick A. Muhlenberg, of Pennsylvania, was chosen
Speaker of the House, but the vote had no party divisions, for
Parties were still in a state of utter confusion. Between the
extreme Anti-federalists, who considered the Constitution a
long step toward a despotism, and the extreme Federalists, who
desired a monarchy modeled on that of England, there were all
varieties of political opinion. … The extreme importance of
Washington lay in his ability, through the universal
confidence in his integrity and good judgment, to hold
together this alliance of moderate men for a time, and to
prevent party contests upon the interpretation of federal
powers until the Constitution should show its merit and be
assured of existence.
{3303}
The President selected his Cabinet with a careful regard to
the opposite opinions of his supporters. The Treasury
Department was given to Alexander Hamilton, of New York, a
Federalist. … The War Department was given to General Henry
Knox, of Massachusetts, also a Federalist. The State
Department was given to Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, an
Anti-federalist. … Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, also an
Anti-federalist, was appointed Attorney-General, and John Jay,
of New York, a Federalist, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Twelve Amendments were adopted by this Session of Congress, in
order to meet the conscientious objections of many moderate
Anti-federalists, and to take the place of a 'Bill of Rights.'

Ten of these, having received the assent of the necessary
number of States, became a part of the Constitution, and now
stand the first ten of the Amendments. They were intended to
guarantee freedom of religion, speech, person, and property. …
January 9th [1790] Hamilton offered his famous Report on the
Settlement of the Public Debt. It consisted of three
recommendations, first, that the foreign debt of the
Confederacy should be assumed land paid in full; second, that
the domestic debt of the Confederacy, which had fallen far
below par and had become a synonym for worthlessness, should
also be paid at its par value; and third, that the debts
incurred by the States during the Revolution, and still
unpaid, should be assumed and paid in full by the Federal
Government. Hamilton's First recommendation was adopted
unanimously. The Second was opposed, even by Madison and many
moderate Anti-federalists, on the ground that the domestic
debt was held by speculators, who had bought it at a heavy
discount, and would thus gain usurious interest on their
investment. Hamilton's supporters argued that, if only for
that reason, they should be paid in full, that holders of
United States securities might learn not to sell them at a
discount, and that the national credit might thus be
strengthened for all time to come. After long debate the
second recommendation was also adopted. Hamilton's Third
recommendation involved a question of the powers of the
Federal Government. It therefore for the first time united all
the Anti-federalists in opposition to it. They feared that the
rope of sand of the Confederacy was being carried to the
opposite extreme; that the 'money power' would, by this
measure, be permanently attached to the Federal Government;
and that the States would be made of no importance. But even
this recommendation was adopted, though only by a vote of 31
to 26 in the House. A few days later, however, the
Anti-federalists received a reinforcement of seven newly
arrived North Carolina members. The third resolution was at
once reconsidered, and voted down by a majority of two.
Hamilton secured the final adoption of the third resolution by
a bargain which excited the deep indignation of the
Anti-federalists. A National Capital was to be selected. The
Federalists agreed to vote that it should be fixed upon the
Potomac River [see WASHINGTON (CITY): A. D. 1791], after
remaining ten years in Philadelphia, and two Anti-federalist
members from the Potomac agreed in return to vote for the
third resolution, which was then finally adopted. Hamilton's
entire report was thus successful. Its immediate effects were
to appreciate the credit of the United States, and to enrich
the holders of the Continental debt. Its further effect was to
make Hamilton so much disliked by Anti-federalists that,
despite his acknowledged talents, his party never ventured to
nominate him for any elective office. … Party Organization may
be considered as fairly begun about the close [of the first
Session of the Second Congress, in 1792]. … The various
Anti-federalist factions, by union in resisting the
Federalists, had learned to forget minor differences and had
been welded into one party which only lacked a name. That of
Anti-federalist was no longer applicable, for its opposition
to the Federal Union had entirely ceased. A name was supplied
by Jefferson, the recognized leader of the party, after the
French Revolution had fairly begun its course. That political
convulsion had, for some time after 1789, the sympathy of both
Federalists and Anti-federalists, for it seemed the direct
outgrowth of the American Revolution. But, as its leveling
objects became more apparent, the Federalists grew cooler and
the Anti-federalists warmer towards it. The latter took great
pains, even by dress and manners, to show the keenness of
their sympathy for the Republicans of France, and about this
time adopted the name Democratic-Republican, which seemed
sufficiently comprehensive for a full indication of their
principles. This has always been the official party title. It
is now abbreviated to Democratic, though the name Democrat was
at first used by Federalists as one of contempt, and the party
called itself Republican, a title which it could hardly claim
with propriety, for its tendency has always been toward a
democracy, as that of its opponents has been toward a strong
republic. The name Republican, therefore, belongs most
properly to its present possessors (1879). But it must be
remembered that the party which will be called Republican
until about 1828 was the party which is now called
Democratic."
A. Johnston,
History of American Politics,
chapter 2.
Jefferson's bitterness of hostility to the Federalists was due
to the belief that they aimed at the overthrow of the
Republic. His conviction as to these really treasonable
purposes in the leaders of the party was often expressed, but
never more distinctly than in a letter written in 1813 to an
English traveller, Mr. Melish. At the same time, he set forth
the principles and aims of his own party: "Among that section
of our citizens called federalists," he wrote, "there are
three shades of opinion. Distinguishing between the leaders
and people who compose it, the leaders consider the English
constitution as a model of perfection, some, with a correction
of its vices, others, with all its corruptions and abuses.
This last was Alexander Hamilton's opinion, which others, as
well as myself, have often heard him declare, and that a
correction of what are called its vices would render the
English an impracticable government. This government they
wished to have established here, and only accepted and held
fast, at first, to the present constitution, as a
stepping-stone to the final establishment of their favorite
model. This party has therefore always clung to England as
their prototype and great auxiliary in promoting and effecting
this change. A weighty minority, however, of these leaders,
considering the voluntary conversion of our government into a
monarchy as too distant, if not desperate, wish to break off
from our Union its eastern fragment, as being, in truth, the
hot-bed of American monarchism, with a view to a commencement
of their favorite government, from whence the other States may
gangrene by degrees, and the whole be thus brought finally to
the desired point.
{3304}
For Massachusetts, the prime mover in this enterprise, is the
last State in the Union to mean a final separation, as being
of all the most dependent on the others. Not raising bread for
the sustenance of her own inhabitants, not having a stick of
timber for the construction of vessels, her principal
occupation, nor an article to export in them, where would she
be, excluded from the ports of the other States, and thrown
into dependence on England, her direct, and natural, but now
insidious rival? At the head of this minority is what is
called the Essex Junto of Massachusetts. But the majority of
these leaders do not aim at separation. In this, they adhere
to the known principle of General Hamilton, never, under any
views, to break the Union. Anglomany, monarchy, and
separation, then, are the principles of the Essex federalists.
Anglomany and monarchy, those of the Hamiltonians, and
Anglomany alone, that of the portion among the people who call
themselves federalists. These last are as good republicans as
the brethren whom they oppose, and differ from them only in
their devotion to England and hatred of France which they have
imbibed from their leaders. The moment that these leaders
should avowedly propose a separation of the Union, or the
establishment of regal government, their popular adherents
would quit them to a man, and join the republican standard;
and the partisans of this change, even in Massachusetts, would
thus find themselves an army of officers without a soldier.
The party called republican is steadily for the support of the
present constitution. They obtained at its commencement all
the amendments to it they desired. These reconciled them to it
perfectly, and if they have any ulterior view, it is only,
perhaps, to popularize it further, by shortening the
Senatorial term, and devising a process for the responsibility
of judges, more practicable than that of impeachment. They
esteem the people of England and France equally, and equally
detest the governing powers of both. This I verily believe,
after an intimacy of forty years with the public councils and
characters, is a true statement of the grounds on which they
are at present divided, and that it is not merely an ambition
for power. An honest man can feel no pleasure in the exercise
of power over his fellow citizens. And considering as the only
offices of power those conferred by the people directly, that
is to say, the executive and legislative functions of the
General and State governments, the common refusal of these,
and multiplied resignations, are proofs sufficient that power
is not alluring to pure minds, and is not, with them, the
primary principle of contest. This is my belief of it; it is
that on which I have acted; and had it been a mere contest who
should be permitted to administer the government according to
its genuine republican principles, there has never been a
moment of my life in which I should have relinquished for it
the enjoyments of my family, my farm, my friends and books.
You expected to discover the difference of our party
principles in General Washington's valedictory, and my
inaugural address. Not at all. General Washington did not
harbor one principle of federalism. He was neither an
Angloman, a monarchist, nor a separatist. He sincerely wished
the people to have as much self-government as they were
competent to exercise themselves. The only point on which he
and I ever differed in opinion, was, that I had more
confidence than he had in the natural integrity and discretion
of the people, and in the safety and extent to which they
might trust themselves with a control over their government.
He has asseverated to me a thousand times his determination
that the existing government should have a fair trial, and
that in support of it he would spend the last drop of his
blood. He did this the more repeatedly, because he knew
General Hamilton's political bias, and my apprehensions from
it."
T. Jefferson,
Letter to Mr. Melish, January 13, 1813
(Writings, edited by Washington, volume 6).
The view taken at the present day of the Federalism and the
Federalists of the first three decades of the Union, among
those who see more danger in the centrifugal than in the
centripetal forces in government, are effectively stated in
the following: "The popular notion in regard to Federalism is
that to which the name naturally gives rise. By Federalists
are commonly understood those men who advocated a union of the
States and an efficient Federal government. This conception is
true, but is at the same time so limited that it may fairly be
called superficial. The name arose from its first object which
the friends of the Constitution strove to achieve; but this
object, the more perfect union, and even the Constitution
itself, were but means to ends of vastly more importance. The
ends which the Federalists sought formed the great principles
on which the party was founded, and it can be justly said that
no nobler or better ends were ever striven for by any
political party or by any statesmen. The first and paramount
object of the Federalists was to build up a nation and to
create a national sentiment. For this they sought a more
perfect union. Their next object was to give the nation they
had called into existence not only a government, but a strong
government. To do this, they had not only to devise a model,
to draw a constitution, to organize a legislature, executive,
and judiciary, but they had to equip the government thus
formed with all those adjuncts without which no government can
long exist under the conditions of modern civilization. The
Federalists had to provide for the debt, devise a financial
and foreign policy, organize an army, fortify the ports, found
a navy, impose and collect taxes, and put in operation an
extensive revenue system. We of the English race—whose creed
is that governments and great political systems grow and
develop slowly, are the results of climate, soil, race,
tradition, and the exigencies of time and place, who wholly
disavow the theory that perfect governments spring in a night
from the heated brains of Frenchmen or Spaniards—can best
appreciate the task with which our ancestors grappled. … Upon
a people lately convulsed by civil war, upon a people who had
lost their old political habits and traditions without finding
new ones in their stead, it was necessary to impose a
government, and to create a national sentiment. This the
Federalists did, and they need no other eulogy.
{3305}
With no undue national pride, we can justly say that the
adoption and support of the Constitution offer an example of
the political genius of the Anglo-Saxon race to which history
cannot furnish a parallel. The political party to whose
exertions these great results were due was the Federal party.
They were the party of order, of good government, and of
conservatism. Against them was ranged a majority of their
fellow-citizens. But this majority was wild, anarchical,
disunited. The only common ground on which they could meet was
that of simple opposition. The only name they had was
anti-Federalists. They had neither leaders, discipline,
objects, nor even a party cry. Before the definite aims and
concentrated ability of the Federalists, they fled in helpless
disorder, like an unarmed mob before advancing soldiers. But,
though dispersed, the anti-Federalists were still in a
numerical majority. They needed a leader, organization, and
opportunity, and they soon found all three. Thomas Jefferson
arrived in New York, not only to enter into Washington's
cabinet, and lend the aid of his great talents to the success
of the new scheme, but soon also to put himself at the head of
the large though demoralized opposition to the administration
he had sworn to support. Filled with the wild democratic
theories which his susceptible nature had readily imbibed in
France, Jefferson soon infused them into the minds of most of
his followers. Instead of a vague dislike to any and all
government, he substituted a sharp and factious opposition to
each and every measure proposed by the friends of the
Constitution."
H. C. Lodge,
Life and Letters of George Cabot,
chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
W. C. Rives,
Life and Times of Madison,
chapters 37-46 (volume 3).
J. Parton,
Life of Jefferson,
chapters 42-47.
M. Van Buren,
Political Parties in the United States,
chapters 2-4.
J. D. Hammond,
History of Political Parties in New York,
volume 1, chapters 1-2.
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 5, chapters 1-16.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1789-1810.
Founding of the Roman Episcopate.
See PAPACY: A. D. 1789-1810.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1790.
The First Census.
Total population, 3,929,827,
classed and distributed as follows:
North.
White. Free black. Slave.
Connecticut. 232,581 2,801 2,759
Maine. 96,002 538 0
Massachusetts. 373,254 5,463 0
New Hampshire. 141,111 630 158
New Jersey. 169,954 2,762 11,423
New York. 314,142 4,654 21,324
Pennsylvania. 424,099 6,537 3,737
Rhode Island. 64,689 3,469 952
Vermont. 85,144 255 17
--- --- ---
Total 1,900,976 27,109 40,370
South.
White. Free black. Slave.
Delaware. 46,310 3,899 8,887
Georgia. 52,886 398 29,264
Kentucky. 61,133 114 11,830
Maryland. 208,649 8,043 103,036
North Carolina. 288,204 4,975 100,572
South Carolina. 140,178 1,801 107,094
Tennessee. 32,013 361 3,417
Virginia. 442,115 12,766 293,427
--- --- ---
Total 1,271,488 32,357 657,527
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1790-1795.
War with the Indian tribes of the Northwest.
Disastrous expeditions of Harmar and St. Clair,
and Wayne's decisive victory.
See NORTHWESTERN TERRITORY: A. D. 1790-1795.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1791.
Admission of Vermont to the Union.
See VERMONT: A. D. 1790-1791.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1791.
Incorporation of the first Bank of the United States.
See MONEY AND BANKING: A. D. 1791-1816.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1791.
The founding of the Federal Capital.
See WASHINGTON (CITY): A. D. 1791.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1791.
Adoption of the first ten Amendments
to the Federal Constitution.
The first ten amendments to the Constitution (see CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA), embodying a declaration of
rights which was thought to be necessary by many who had
consented to the adoption of the Constitution, but only with
the understanding that such amendments should be added, were
proposed to the legislatures of the several States by the
First Congress, on the 25th of September, 1789. At different
dates between November 20, 1789 and December 15, 1791, they
were ratified by eleven of the then fourteen States. "There is
no evidence on the journals of Congress that the legislatures
of Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts ratified them."
Constitution,
Rules and Manual of the UNITED STATES SENATE (1885)
page 61.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1792.
Admission of Kentucky to the Union.
Slavery in the Constitution of the new State.
See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1789-1792.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1792.
Second Presidential Election.
George Washington re-elected with unanimity, receiving 132
votes of the Electoral College, John Adams, Vice President,
receiving 77 votes, with 50 cast for George Clinton, 4 for
Jefferson and 1 for Burr.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1793.
The First Fugitive Slave Law.
For some time after the adoption of the Federal Constitution,
its provision relating to the rendition of persons "held to
service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof,
escaping into another" remained without legislation to execute
it; "and it is a striking fact that the call for legislation
came not from the South, but from a free State; and that it
was provoked, not by fugitive slaves, but by kidnappers. … A
free negro named John was seized at Washington, Pennsylvania,
in 1791, and taken to Virginia. The Governor of Pennsylvania,
at the instigation of the Society for the Abolition of
Slavery, asked the return of the three kidnappers; but the
Governor of Virginia replied that, since there was no national
law touching such a case, he could not carry out the request.
On the matter being brought to the notice of Congress by the
Governor of Pennsylvania," a bill was passed which "became law
by the signature of the President, February 12, 1793. … The
act provided at the same time for the recovery of fugitives
from justice and from labor; but the alleged criminal was to
have a protection through the requirement of a requisition, a
protection denied to the man on trial for his liberty only.
The act was applicable to fugitive apprentices as well as to
slaves, a provision of some importance at the time. In the
Northwest Territory there were so-called negro apprentices,
who were virtually slaves, and to whom the law applied, since
it was in terms extended to all the Territories. Proceedings
began with the forcible seizure of the alleged fugitive. The
act, it will be observed, does not admit a trial by jury.
{3306}
It allowed the owner of the slave, his agent or attorney, to
seize the fugitive and take him before any judge of a United
States Circuit or District Court, or any local magistrate. The
only requirement for the conviction of the slave was the
testimony of his master, or the affidavit of some magistrate
in the State from which he came, certifying that such a person
had escaped. Hindering arrest or harboring a slave was
punishable by a fine of five hundred dollars. The law thus
established a system allowing the greatest harshness to the
slave and every favor to the master. Even at that time, when
persons might still be born slaves in New York and New Jersey,
and gradual emancipation had not yet taken full effect in
Rhode Island and Connecticut, it was repellent to the popular
sense of justice; there were two cases of resistance 'to the
principle of the act before the close of 1793. Until 1850 no
further law upon this subject was passed, but as the
provisions of 1793 were found ineffectual, many attempts at
amendment were made."
M. G. McDougall,
Fugitive Slaves, 1619-1865
(Fay House Monographs, number 3), pages 17-19.
"The fugitive-slave clause in the Constitution is of course
obligatory, but there is a wide distinction between the
fugitive-slave clause and the fugitive-slave law. The
Constitution gives no power to Congress to legislate on the
subject, but imposes on the States the obligation of
rendition. Chief-Justice Hornblower, of New York, and
Chancellor Walworth, of New York, long since pronounced the
fugitive law of '93 unconstitutional on this very ground."
William Jay,
Letter to Josiah Quincy
(quoted in B. Tuckerman's "William Jay and the
Constitutional Movement for the Abolition of Slavery").
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1793.
Popular sympathy with the French Revolution.
Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality.
Insolent conduct of the French minister, Genet.
"The French Revolution, as was natural from the all-important
services rendered by France to the United States in their own
revolutionary struggle, enlisted the warm sympathy of the
American people. … As the United States were first introduced
to the family of nations by the alliance with France of 1778,
the very important question arose, on the breaking out of the
war between France and England, how far they were bound to
take part in the contest. The second article of the treaty of
alliance seemed to limit its operation to the then existing
war between the United States and Great Britain; but by the
eleventh article the two contracting powers agreed to
'guarantee mutually from the present time and forever, against
all other powers,' the territories of which the allies might
be in possession respectively at the moment the war between
France and Great Britain should break out, which was
anticipated as the necessary consequence of the alliance. Not
only were the general sympathies of America strongly with
France, but the course pursued by Great Britain toward the
United States, since the peace of 1783, was productive of
extreme irritation, especially her refusal to give up the
western posts, which … had the effect of involving the
northwestern frontier in a prolonged and disastrous Indian
war. These causes, together with the recent recollections of
the revolutionary struggle, disposed the popular mind to make
common cause with France, in what was regarded as the war of a
people struggling for freedom against the combined despots of
Europe. Washington, however, from the first, determined to
maintain the neutrality of the country;" and, with the
unanimous advice of his cabinet, he issued (April 22, 1793) a
proclamation of neutrality. "This proclamation, though
draughted by Mr. Jefferson and unanimously adopted by the
Cabinet, was violently assailed by the organs of the party
which followed his lead. … The growing excitement of the
popular mind was fanned to a flame by the arrival at
Charleston, South Carolina [April 9], of 'Citizen' Genet, who
was sent as the minister of the French Republic to the United
States. Without repairing to the seat of government, or being
accredited in any way, in his official capacity, he began to
fit out privateers in Charleston, to cruise against the
commerce of England. Although the utmost gentleness and
patience were observed by the executive of the United States
in checking this violation of their neutrality, Genet assumed
from the first a tone of defiance, and threatened before long
to appeal from the government to the people. These insolent
demonstrations were of course lost upon Washington's firmness
and moral courage. They distressed, but did not in the
slightest degree intimidate him; and their effect on the
popular mind was to some extent neutralized by the facts, that
the chief measures to maintain the neutrality of the country
had been unanimously advised by the Cabinet, and that the duty
of rebuking his intemperate course had devolved upon the
secretary of state [Jefferson], the recognized head of the
party to which Genet looked for sympathy."
E. Everett,
Life of Washington,
chapter 8.
A demand for "Genet's recall was determined on during the
first days of August. There was some discussion over the
manner of requesting the recall, but the terms were made
gentle by Jefferson, to the disgust of the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Secretary of War [Hamilton and Knox], who
desired direct methods and stronger language. As finally toned
up and agreed upon by the President and cabinet, the document
was sufficiently vigorous to annoy Genet, and led to bitter
reproaches addressed to his friend in the State Department. …
The letter asking Genet's recall, as desired by Washington,
went in due time, and in the following February came a
successor. Genet, however, did not go back to his native land,
for he preferred to remain here and save his head, valueless
as that article would seem to have been. He spent the rest of
his days in America, married, harmless, and quite obscure. His
noise and fireworks were soon over, and one wonders now how he
could ever have made as much flare and explosion as he did."
H. C. Lodge,
George Washington,
volume 2, pages 155-156.
ALSO IN:
H. S. Randall,
Life of Jefferson,
volume 2, chapter 4.
J. T. Morse,
Life of Hamilton,
volume 2, chapter 3.
American State Papers,
volume 1, pages 140-188, 243-246, and 311-314.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1793.
Whitney's Cotton-gin and the series of inventions
which it made complete.
Their political effect.
The strengthening of the Slave Power, and the
strengthening of Unionism.
"Some English artisans, who, about the middle of the last
century, were obtaining a scanty living by spinning, weaving
and other such occupations, turned their inventive talent to
the improvement of their art.
{3307}
Paul and Wyatt introduced the operation of spinning by
rollers; Highs, or Hargreaves, invented the jenny, by which a
great many threads could be spun as easily as one. Paul
devised the rotating carding-engine; Crompton the mule;
Arkwright the water-frame, which produced any number of
threads of any degree of fineness and hardness. These
ingenious machines constituted a very great improvement on the
spindle and distaff of ancient times, and on the
spinning-wheel, originally brought from Asia, or perhaps
reinvented in Europe. At length one spinner was able to
accomplish as much work as one hundred could have formerly
done. While the art of producing threads was undergoing this
singular improvement, Cartwright, a clergyman, invented, in
1785, the power-loom, intended to supersede the operation of
weaving by hand, and to make the production of textile fabrics
altogether the result of machinery. After some modifications,
that loom successfully accomplished the object for which it
was devised. As these inventions succeeded, they necessarily
led to a demand for motive power. In the first little cotton
factory, the germ of that embodiment of modern industry, the
cotton-mill, a water-wheel was employed to give movement to
the machinery. The establishment was, therefore, necessarily
placed near a stream, where a sufficient fall could be
obtained. The invention of the steam-engine by Watt, which was
the consequence of the new and correct views of the nature of
vapors that had been established by Dr. Black, supplied, in
due time, the required motive power, and by degrees the
water-wheel went almost out of use. Textile manufacture needed
now but one thing more to become of signal importance—it
needed a more abundant supply of raw material. … Cotton, the
fibre chiefly concerned in these improvements, was obtained in
limited quantities from various countries; but, at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution, not a single pound was
exported from the United States. What was grown here was for
domestic consumption. Every good housewife had her
spinning-wheel, every plantation its hand-loom. The difficulty
of supplying cotton fibre in quantity sufficient to meet the
demands of the new machinery was due to the imperfect means in
use for separating the cotton from its seeds—a tedious
operation, for the picking was done by hand. Eli Whitney, a
native of Massachusetts, by his invention of the cotton-gin in
1793, removed that difficulty. The fibre could be separated
from the seeds with rapidity and at a trifling cost. There was
nothing now to prevent an extraordinary development in the
English manufactures. A very few years showed what the result
would be. In 1790 no cotton was exported from the United
States. Whitney's gin was introduced in 1793. The next year
about 1½ million of pounds were exported; in 1795, about 5¼
millions; in 1860, the quantity had reached 2,000 millions of
pounds. The political effect of this mechanical invention,
which thus proved to be the completion of all the previous
English inventions, being absolutely necessary to give them
efficacy, was at once seen in its accomplishing a great
increase and a redistribution of population in England. … In
the United States the effects were still more important.
Cotton could be grown through all the Southern Atlantic and
the Gulf States. It was more profitable than any other
crop—but it was raised by slaves. Whatever might have been the
general expectation respecting the impending extinction of
slavery, it was evident that at the commencement of this
century the conditions had altogether changed. A powerful
interest had come into unforeseen existence both in Europe and
America which depended on perpetuating that mode of labor.
Moreover, before long it was apparent that, partly because of
the adaptation of their climate to the growth of the plant,
partly because of the excellence of the product, and partly
owing to the increasing facilities for interior
transportation, the cotton-growing states of America would
have a monopoly in the supply of this staple. But, though
mechanical invention had reinvigorated the slave power by
bestowing on it the cotton-gin, it had likewise strengthened
unionism by another inestimable gift—the steam-boat. At the
very time that the African slave-trade was prohibited, Fulton
was making his successful experiment of the navigation of the
Hudson River by steam. This improvement in inland navigation
rendered available, in a manner never before contemplated, the
river and lake system of the continent; it gave an
instantaneous value to the policy of Jefferson, by bringing
into effectual use the Mississippi and its tributaries; it
crowded with population the shores of the lakes; it threw the
whole continent open to commerce, it strengthened the central
power at Washington by diminishing space, and while it
extended geographically the domain of the republic, it
condensed it politically. It bound all parts of the Union more
firmly together. … In the Constitution it had been agreed that
three fifths of the slaves should be accounted as federal
numbers in the apportionment of federal representation. A
political advantage was thus given to slave labor. This closed
the eyes of the South to all other means of solving its
industrial difficulties. … To the cotton-planter two courses
were open. He might increase his manual force, or he might
resort to machinery. … It required no deep political
penetration for him to perceive that the introduction of
machinery must in the end result in the emancipation of the
slave. Machinery and slavery are incompatible—the slave is
displaced by the machine. In the Southern States political
reasons thus discouraged the introduction of machinery. Under
the Constitution an increased negro force had a political
value, machinery had none. The cotton interest was therefore
persuaded by those who were in a position to guide its
movements, that its prosperity could be secured only through
increased manual labor."
Dr. J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
section 3, chapter 16 (volume 1).
See, also, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1818-1821.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1794.
Resistance to the Excise.
The Whisky Insurrection in Pennsylvania.
See PENNSYLVANIA: A. D. 1794.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1794-1795.
Threatening relations with Great Britain.
The Jay Treaty.
"The daily increasing 'love-frenzy for France,' and the
intemperate language of the Democratic press, naturally
emphasized in England that reaction against America which set
in with the treaty of peace. On the other hand, the retention
of the frontier posts in violation of that treaty was a thorn
in the side of the young Republic. In the course of the war
England had adopted, by successive Orders in Council, a policy
ruinous to the commerce of neutral nations, especially of the
United States.
{3308}
In the admiralty courts of the various British West India
islands hundreds of ships from New England were seized and
condemned, for carrying French produce or bearing cargoes of
provisions chartered to French ports. The New England
fishermen and shipowners were vociferous for war, and the
Democratic clubs denounced every British insult and celebrated
every French victory. On March 26, 1794, an embargo against
British ships was proclaimed for thirty days, and then
extended for thirty days longer. The day after the embargo was
laid, Dayton, of New Jersey, moved in Congress to sequester
all moneys due to British creditors, and apply it towards
indemnifying shipowners for losses incurred through the Orders
in Council; and on April 21st the Republicans moved a
resolution to suspend, all commercial intercourse with Great
Britain till the western posts should be given up, and
indemnity be paid for injuries to American commerce in
violation of the rights of neutrals. The passage of such an
act meant war; and for war the United States was never more
unprepared. … Peace could be secured only by immediate
negotiation and at least a temporary settlement of the causes
of neutral irritation, and for such a task the ministers at
London and Washington were incompetent or unsuited. … In this
crisis Washington decided to send to England a special envoy.
Hamilton was his first choice, but Hamilton had excited bitter
enmities." On Hamilton's recommendation, John Jay, the Chief
Justice, was chosen for the difficult mission, and he sailed
for England in May, 1794, landing at Falmouth on the 8th of
June. Within the succeeding five months he accomplished the
negotiation of a treaty, which was signed on the 19th of
November. "The main points that Jay had been instructed to
gain were compensation for negroes [carried away by the
British armies on the evacuation of the country in 1783],
surrender of the posts, and compensation for spoliations; in
addition, a commercial treaty was desired. When Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, Jay had argued that the negroes, some 3,000
in number, who, at the time of the evacuation, were within the
British lines, relying on proclamations that offered freedom,
and who followed the troops to England, came within that
clause of the treaty of peace which provided that the army
should be withdrawn without 'carrying away any negroes or
other property.' Lord Grenville, however, insisted upon
refusing any compensation. Once within the British lines, he
said, slaves were free for good and all. … From any point of
view the matter was too insignificant to wreck the treaty upon
it, and Jay waived the claim. As to the western posts [Oswego,
Niagara, Detroit, Mackinaw, etc.], it was agreed that they
should be surrendered by June 12, 1796. But compensation for
the detention was denied on the ground that it was due to the
breach of the treaty by the United States in permitting the
States to prevent the recovery of British debts." For the
determination and payment of such debts, it was now provided
that a board of five commissioners should sit at Philadelphia;
while another similar board at London should award
compensation for irregular and illegal captures or
condemnations made during the war between Great Britain and
France. "Under this clause American merchants received
$10,345,000. … The disputed questions of boundaries, arising
from the construction of the treaty of peace, were referred to
joint commissioners: properly enough, as the confusion was due
to ignorance of the geography of the Northwest. British and
American citizens holding lands at the time respectively in
the United States and in any of the possessions of Great
Britain were secured in their rights; a clause much objected
to in America, but which was obviously just. A still more
important provision followed, a novelty in international
diplomacy, and a distinct advance in civilization: that war
between the two countries should never be made the pretext for
confiscation of debts or annulment of contracts between
individuals. In the War of 1812 the United States happened for
the moment to be the creditor nation, and the millions which
this provision saved to her citizens it would be difficult to
estimate. … It was the commercial articles which excited the
most intense hostility in America. … To unprejudiced eyes,
after the lapse of a hundred years, considering the mutual
exasperation of the two peoples, the pride of England in her
successes in the war with France, the weakness and division of
the United States, the treaty seems a very fair one. Certainly
one far less favorable to America would have been infinitely
preferable to a war, and would probably in the course of time
have been accepted as being so. The commercial advantages were
not very considerable, but they at least served as 'an
entering wedge,' to quote Jay's expression, and they were 'pro
tanto' a clear gain to America. … The treaty was not published
till July 2d. … Even before its contents were known, letters,
signed 'Franklin,' appeared abusing the treaty; and in
Philadelphia an effigy of Jay was placed in the pillory, and
finally taken down, guillotined, the clothes fired, and the
body blown up. It was clear, then, that it was not this
particular treaty, but any treaty at all with Great Britain,
that excited the wrath of the Republicans. On July 4th toasts
insulting Jay or making odious puns on his name, were the
fashion. … On June 24th the treaty was ratified by the Senate,
with the exception of the article about the West India trade.
On August 15th it was signed, with the same exception by
Washington."
G. Pellew,
John Jay,
chapter 11.
"The reception given to the treaty cannot be fully explained
by the existing relations between the United States and
England. It was only in consequence of its Francomania that
the opposition assumed the character of blind rage."
H. von Holst,
Constitutional and Political History of the United States,
volume 1, page 124.
ALSO IN:
H. S. Randall,
Life of Jefferson,
volume 2, chapters 4-6.
W. Jay,
Life of John Jay,
volume 1, chapters 8-10
and volume 2, pages 216-264.
American State Papers,
volume 1, pages 464-525.
J. B. McMaster,
History of the People of the United States,
volume 2, chapter 9.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1796.
Admission of Tennessee to the Union.
See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1785-1796.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1796.
Washington's Farewell Address.
"The period for the presidential election was drawing near,
and great anxiety began to be felt that Washington would
consent to stand for a third term. No one, it was agreed, had
greater claim to the enjoyment of retirement, in consideration
of public services rendered; but it was thought the affairs of
the country would be in a very precarious condition should he
retire before the wars of Europe were brought to a close.
{3309}
Washington, however, had made up his mind irrevocably on the
subject, and resolved to announce, in a farewell address, his
intention of retiring. Such an instrument, it will be
recollected, had been prepared for him from his own notes, by
Mr. Madison, when he had thought of retiring at the end of his
first term. As he was no longer in confidential intimacy with
Mr. Madison, he turned to Mr. Hamilton as his adviser and
coadjutor, and appears to have consulted him on the subject
early in the present year [1796], for, in a letter dated New
York, May 10th, Hamilton writes: 'When last in Philadelphia,
you mentioned to me your wish that I should "re-dress" a
certain paper which you had prepared. As it is important that
a thing of this kind should be done with great care and much
at leisure, touched and retouched, I submit a wish that, as
soon as you have given it the body you mean it to have, it may
be sent to me.' The paper was accordingly sent, on the 15th of
May, in its rough state, altered in one part since Hamilton
had seen it. 'If you should think it best to throw the whole
into a different form,' writes Washington, 'let me request,
notwithstanding, that my draft may be returned to me (along
with yours) with such amendments and corrections as to render
it as perfect as the formation is susceptible of; curtailed if
too verbose, and relieved of all tautology not necessary to
enforce the ideas in the original or quoted part. My wish is,
that the whole may appear in a plain style; and be handed to
the public in an honest, unaffected, simple garb.' We forbear
to go into the vexed question concerning this address; how
much of it is founded on Washington's original 'notes and
heads of topics'; how much was elaborated by Madison, and how
much is due to Hamilton's recasting and revision. The whole
came under the supervision of Washington; and the instrument,
as submitted to the press, was in his handwriting, with many
ultimate corrections and alterations. Washington had no pride
of authorship; his object always was to effect the purpose in
hand, and for that he occasionally invoked assistance, to
ensure a plain and clear exposition of his thoughts and
intentions. The address certainly breathes his spirit
throughout, is in perfect accordance with all his words and
actions, and 'in an honest, unaffected, simple garb,' embodies
the system of policy on which he had acted throughout his
administration. It was published in September [17], in a
Philadelphia paper called the Daily Advertiser. The
publication of the Address produced a great sensation. Several
of the State legislatures ordered it to be put on their
journals."
W. Irving,
Life of Washington,
volume 5, chapter 30.
The following is the text of the Address.
"To the people of the United States.
Friends and Fellow-Citizens:
The period for a new election of a citizen, to administer the
executive government of the United States, being not far
distant, and the time actually arrived, when your thoughts
must be employed in designating the person, who is to be
clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper,
especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of
the public voice, that I should now apprize you of the
resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among
the number of those, out of whom a choice is to be made. I beg
you, at the same time, to do me the justice to be assured,
that this resolution has not been taken without a strict
regard to an the considerations appertaining to the relation,
which binds a dutiful citizen to his country; and that, in
withdrawing the tender of service, which silence in my
situation might imply, I am influenced by no diminution of
zeal for your future interest; no deficiency of grateful
respect for your past kindness; but am supported by a full
conviction that the step is compatible with both. The
acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to
which your suffrages have twice called me, have been a uniform
sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty, and to a
deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly
hoped, that it would have been much earlier in my power,
consistently with motives, which I was not at liberty to
disregard, to return to that retirement, from which I had been
reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this,
previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation
of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on
the then perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with
foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled
to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea. I rejoice,
that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal,
no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible with
the sentiment of duty, or propriety; and am persuaded,
whatever partiality may be retained for my services, that, in
the present circumstances of our country, you will not
disapprove my determination to retire. The impressions, with
which I first undertook the arduous trust, were explained on
the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust, I will
only say, that I have, with good intentions, contributed
towards the organization and administration of the government
the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment was
capable. Not unconscious, in the outset, of the inferiority of
my qualifications, experience in my own eyes, perhaps still
more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to
diffidence of myself; and every day the increasing weight of
years admonishes me more and more, that the shade of
retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome.
Satisfied, that, if any circumstances have given peculiar
value to my services, they were temporary, I have the
consolation to believe, that, while choice and prudence invite
me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not forbid it.
In looking forward to the moment, which is intended to
terminate the career of my public life, my feelings do not
permit me to suspend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of
gratitude, which I owe to my beloved country for the many
honors it has conferred upon me; still more for the steadfast
confidence with which it has supported me; and for the
opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my
inviolable attachment, by services faithful and persevering,
though in usefulness unequal to my zeal. If benefits have
resulted to our country from these services, let it always be
remembered to your praise, and as an instructive example in
our annals, that under circumstances in which the passions,
agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead, amidst
appearances sometimes dubious, vicissitudes of fortune often
discouraging, in situations in which not unfrequently want of
success has countenanced the spirit of criticism, the
constancy of your support was the essential prop of the
efforts, and a guarantee of the plans by which they were
effected.
{3310}
Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I shall carry it with me
to my grave, as a strong incitement to unceasing vows that
Heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its
beneficence; that your union and brotherly affection may be
perpetual; that the free constitution, which is the work of
your hands, may be sacredly maintained; that its
administration in every department may be stamped with wisdom
and virtue; that, in fine, the happiness of the people of
these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made
complete, by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of
this blessing, as will acquire to them the glory of
recommending it to the applause, the affection, and adoption
of every nation, which is yet a stranger to it. Here, perhaps,
I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which
cannot end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger,
natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the
present, to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to
recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments, which are
the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable
observation, and which appear to me all-important to the
permanency of your felicity as a People. These will be offered
to you with the more freedom, as you can only see in them the
disinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly
have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget,
as an encouragement to it, your indulgent reception of my
sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion. Interwoven
as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts,
no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm
the attachment. The unity of Government, which constitutes you
one people, is also now dear to you. It is justly so: for it
is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the
support of your tranquillity at home, your peace abroad; of
your safety; of your prosperity; of that very Liberty, which
you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee, that, from
different causes and from different quarters, much pains will
be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the
conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your
political fortress against which the batteries of internal and
external enemies will be most constantly and actively (though
often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite
moment, that you should properly estimate the immense value of
your national Union to your collective and individual
happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and
immovable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think
and speak of it as of the Palladium of your political safety
and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous
anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a
suspicion, that it can in any event be abandoned; and
indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt
to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to
enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various
parts. For this you have every inducement of sympathy and
interest. Citizens, by birth or choice, of a common country,
that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The
name of American, which belongs to you, in your national
capacity, must always exalt the just pride of Patriotism, more
than any appellation derived from local discriminations. With
slight shades of difference, you have the same religion,
manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a
common cause fought and triumphed together; the Independence
and Liberty you possess are the work of joint counsels, and
joint efforts, of common dangers, sufferings, and successes.
But these considerations, however powerfully they address
themselves to your sensibility, are greatly outweighed by
those, which apply more immediately to your interest. Here
every portion of our country finds the most commanding motives
for carefully guarding and preserving the Union of the whole.
The North, in an unrestrained intercourse with the South,
protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds, in
the productions of the latter, great additional resources of
maritime and commercial enterprise and precious materials of
manufacturing industry. The South, in the same intercourse,
benefiting by the agency of the North, sees its agriculture
grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into its own
channels the seamen of the North, it finds its particular
navigation invigorated; and, while it contributes, in
different ways, to nourish and increase the general mass of
the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of
a maritime strength, to which itself is unequally adapted. The
East, in a like intercourse with the West, already finds, and
in the progressive improvement of interior communications by
land and water, will more and more find, a valuable vent for
the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures
at home. The West derives from the East supplies requisite to
its growth and comfort, and, what is perhaps of still greater
consequence, it must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of
indispensable outlets for its own productions to the weight,
influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic
side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of
interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the West can
hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own
separate strength, or from an apostate and unnatural connexion
with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.
While, then, every part of our country thus feels an immediate
and particular interest in Union, all the parts combined
cannot fail to find in the united mass of means and efforts
greater strength, greater resource, proportionably greater
security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of
their peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable
value, they must derive from Union an exemption from those
broils and wars between themselves, which so frequently
afflict neighbouring countries not tied together by the same
governments, which their own rivalships alone would be
sufficient to produce, but which opposite foreign alliances,
attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and embitter.
Hence, likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those
overgrown military establishments, which, under any form of
government, are inauspicious to liberty and which are to be
regarded as particularly hostile to Republican Liberty. In
this sense it is, that your Union ought to be considered as a
main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought
to endear to you the preservation of the other.
{3311}
These considerations speak a persuasive language to every
reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of
the Union as a primary object of Patriotic desire. Is there a
doubt, whether a common government can embrace so large a
sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation
in such a case were criminal. We are authorized to hope, that
a proper organization of the whole, with the auxiliary agency

of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a
happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and
full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to
Union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience
shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will
always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those, who in
any quarter may endeavour to weaken its bands. In
contemplating the causes, which may disturb our Union, it
occurs as matter of serious concern, that any ground should
have been furnished for characterizing parties by Geographical
discriminations, Northern and Southern, Atlantic and Western;
whence designing men may endeavour to excite a belief, that
there is a real difference of local interests and views. One
of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within
particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims
of other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much
against the jealousies and heart-burnings, which spring from
these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each
other those, who ought to be bound together by fraternal
affection. The inhabitants of our western country have lately
had a useful lesson on this head; they have seen, in the
negotiation by the Executive, and in the unanimous
ratification by the Senate, of the treaty with Spain, and in
the universal satisfaction at that event, throughout the
United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the
suspicious propagated among them of a policy in the General
Government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their
interests in regard to the Mississippi; they have been
witnesses to the formation of two treaties, that with Great
Britain, and that with Spain, which secure to them every thing
they could desire, in respect to our foreign relations,
towards confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their
wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the
Union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be
deaf to those advisers, if such there are, who would sever
them from their brethren, and connect them with aliens? To the
efficacy and permanency of your Union, a Government for the
whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between
the parts can be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably
experience the infractions and interruptions, which all
alliances in all times have experienced. Sensible of this
momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay, by
the adoption of a Constitution of Government better calculated
than your former for an intimate Union, and for the
efficacious management of your common concerns. This
Government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and
unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature
deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the
distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and
containing within itself a provision for its own amendment,
has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect
for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in
its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of
true Liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right
of the people to make and to alter their Constitutions of
Government. But the Constitution which at any time exists,
till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole
people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the
power and the right of the people to establish Government
presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the
established Government. All obstructions to the execution of
the Laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever
plausible character, with the real design to direct, control,
counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and action of the
constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental
principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize
faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force; to
put, in the place of the delegated will of the nation, the
will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising
minority of the community; and, according to the alternate
triumphs of different parties, to make the public
administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous
projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and
wholesome plans digested by common counsels, and modified by
mutual interests. However combinations or associations of the
above descriptions may now and then answer popular ends, they
are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent
engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men
will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to
usurp for themselves the reins of government; destroying
afterwards the very engines, which have lifted them to unjust
dominion. Towards the preservation of your government, and the
permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite, not
only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to
its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care
the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious
the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect, in the
forms of the constitution, alterations, which will impair the
energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be
directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be
invited, remember that time and habit are at least as
necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of
other human institutions; that experience is the surest
standard, by which to test the real tendency of the existing
constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the
credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual
change, from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion;
and remember, especially, that, for the efficient management
of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a
government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect
security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find
in such a government, with powers properly distributed and
adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little else than
a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the
enterprise of faction, to confine each member of the society
within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all
in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person
and property.
{3312}
I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the
state, with particular reference to the founding of them on
geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more
comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner
against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally.
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature,
having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind.
It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or
less stilled, controlled, or repressed; but, in those of the
popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is
truly their worst enemy. The alternate domination of one
faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge,
natural to party dissension, which in different ages and
countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is
itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a
more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and
miseries, which result, gradually incline the minds of men to
seek security and repose in the absolute power of an
individual; and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing
faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors,
turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation,
on the ruins of Public Liberty. Without looking forward to an
extremity of this kind, (which nevertheless ought not to be
entirely out of sight,) the common and continual mischiefs of
the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and
duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it. It serves
always to distract the Public Councils, and enfeeble the
Public Administration. It agitates the Community with
ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity
of one part against another, foments occasionally riot and
insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and
corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government
itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy
and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and
will of another. There is an opinion, that parties in free
countries are useful checks upon the administration of the
Government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of Liberty.
This within certain limits is probably true; and in
Governments of a Monarchical cast, Patriotism may look with
indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But
in those of the popular character, in Governments purely
elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their
natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of
that spirit for every salutary purpose. And, there being
constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of
public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be
quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its
bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should
consume. It is important, likewise, that the habits of
thinking in a free country should inspire caution, in those
intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves
within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in
the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon
another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the
powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create,
whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just
estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it,
which predominates in the human heart, is sufficient to
satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of
reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by
dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and
constituting each the Guardian of the Public Weal against
invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments
ancient and modern; some of them in our country and under our
own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to
institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the
distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be
in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment
in the way, which the constitution designates. But let there
be no change by usurpation; for, though this, in one instance,
may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by
which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must
always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or
transient benefit, which the use can at any time yield. Of all
the dispositions and habits, which lead to political
prosperity, Religion and Morality are indispensable supports.
In vain would that man claim the tribute of Patriotism, who
should labor to subvert these great pillars of human
happiness, these firmest props of the duties of Men and
Citizens. The mere Politician, equally with the pious man,
ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace
all their connexions with private and public felicity. Let it
simply be asked, Where is the security for property, for
reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation
desert the oaths, which are the instruments of investigation
in Courts of Justice? And let us with caution indulge the
supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion.
Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education
on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both
forbid us to expect, that national morality can prevail in
exclusion of religious principle. It is substantially true,
that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular
government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force
to every species of free government. Who, that is a sincere
friend to it, can look with indifference upon attempts to
shake the foundation of the fabric? Promote, then, as an
object of primary importance, institutions for the general
diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a
government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that
public opinion should be enlightened. As a very important
source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One
method of preserving it is, to use it as sparingly as
possible; avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace,
but remembering also that timely disbursements to prepare for
danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel
it; avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by
shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertions in
time of peace to discharge the debts, which unavoidable wars
may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity
the burthen, which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution
of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is
necessary that public opinion should cooperate.
{3313}
To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is
essential that you should practically bear in mind, that
towards the payment of debts there must be Revenue; that to
have Revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be
devised, which are not more or less inconvenient and
unpleasant, that the intrinsic embarrassment, inseparable from
the selection of the proper objects (which is always a choice
of difficulties), ought to be a decisive motive for a candid
construction of the conduct of the government in making it,
and for a spirit of acquiescence in the measures for obtaining
revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.
Observe good faith and justice towards all Nations; cultivate
peace and harmony with all. Religion and Morality enjoin this
conduct; and can it be, that good policy does not equally
enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at
no distant period, a great Nation, to give to mankind the
magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by
an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt, that, in
the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would
richly repay any temporary advantages, which might be lost by
a steady adherence to it? Can it be, that Providence has not
connected the permanent felicity of a Nation with its Virtue?
The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment
which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible
by its vices? In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more
essential, than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against
particular Nations, and passionate attachments for others,
should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and
amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The
Nation, which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or
an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave
to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is
sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest.
Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more
readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight
causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable, when
accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence
frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody
contests. The Nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment,
sometimes impels to war the Government, contrary to the best
calculations of policy. The Government sometimes participates
in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what
reason would reject; at other times, it makes the animosity of
the nation subservient to projects of hostility instigated by
pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives.
The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty, of Nations has
been the victim. So likewise, a passionate attachment of one
Nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for
the favorite Nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary
common interest, in cases where no real common interest
exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other
betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and
wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or
justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite
Nation of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to
injure the Nation making the concessions; by unnecessarily
parting with what ought to have been retained; and by exciting
jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the
parties from whom equal privileges are withheld. And it gives
to ambitious, corrupted, or deluded citizens, (who devote
themselves to the favorite nation,) facility to betray or
sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium,
sometimes even with popularity; gilding, with the appearances
of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for
public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base
of foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or
infatuation. As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable
ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly
enlightened and independent Patriot. How many opportunities do
they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practise the
arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or
awe the Public Councils! Such an attachment of a small or
weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to
be the satellite of the latter. Against the insidious wiles of
foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me,
fellow-citizens,) the jealousy of a free people ought to be
constantly awake; since history and experience prove, that
foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of
Republican Government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must
be impartial; else it becomes the instrument of the very
influence to be avoided, instead of a defence against it.
Excessive partiality for one foreign nation, and excessive
dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see
danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the
arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may resist
the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become suspected
and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and
confidence of the people, to surrender their interests. The
great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations,
is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them
as little political connexion as possible. So far as we have
already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect
good faith. Here let us stop. Europe has a set of primary
interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation.
Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the
causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns.
Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate
ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of
her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of
her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant
situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course.
If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the
period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from
external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will
cause the neutrality, we may at any time resolve upon, to be
scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the
impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly
hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or
war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel. Why
forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our
own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our
destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace
and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship,
interest, humor, or caprice? It is our true policy to steer
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign
world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for
let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity
to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable
to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the
best policy.
{3314}
I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in
their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary and
would be unwise to extend them. Taking care always to keep
ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable
defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances
for extraordinary emergencies. Harmony, liberal intercourse
with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and
interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal
and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive
favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of
things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams
of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing, with powers so
disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define
the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to
support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that
present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but
temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or
varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate;
constantly keeping in view, that it is folly in one nation to
look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay
with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept
under that character; that, by such acceptance, it may place
itself in the condition of having given equivalents for
nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude
for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to
expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It
is an illusion, which experience must cure, which a just pride
ought to discard. In offering to you, my countrymen, these
counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope
they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish;
that they will control the usual current of the passions, or
prevent our nation from running the course, which has hitherto
marked the destiny of nations. But, if I may even flatter
myself, that they may be productive of some partial benefit,
some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to
moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the
mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures
of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense
for the solicitude for your welfare, by which they have been
dictated. How far in the discharge of my official duties, I
have been guided by the principles which have been delineated,
the public records and other evidences of my conduct must
witness to you and to the world. To myself, the assurance of
my own conscience is, that I have at least believed myself to
be guided by them. In relating to the still subsisting war in
Europe, my Proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793, is the
index to my Plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice, and by
that of your Representatives in both Houses of Congress, the
spirit of that measure has continually governed me,
uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.
After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights
I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under
all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and
was bound in duty and interest to take, a neutral position.
Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend upon
me, to maintain it, with moderation, perseverance, and
firmness. The considerations, which respect the right to hold
this conduct, it is not necessary on this occasion to detail.
I will only observe, that, according to my understanding of
the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the
Belligerent Powers, has been virtually admitted by all. The
duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without
anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity
impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act,
to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards
other nations. The inducements of interest for observing that
conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and
experience. With me, a predominant motive has been to
endeavour to gain time to our country to settle and mature its
yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption
to that degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary
to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.
Though, in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am
unconscious of intentional error, I am nevertheless too
sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may
have committed many errors. Whatever they may be, I fervently
beseech the Almighty to avert or mitigate the evils to which
they may tend. I shall also carry with me the hope, that my
Country will never cease to view them with indulgence; and
that, after forty-five years of my life dedicated to its
service with an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent
abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon
be to the mansions of rest. Relying on its kindness in this as
in other things, and actuated by that fervent love towards it,
which is so natural to a man, who views in it the native soil
of himself and his progenitors for several generations; I
anticipate with pleasing expectation that retreat, in which I
promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment
of partaking, in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign
influence of good laws under a free government, the ever
favorite object of my heart, and the happy reward, as I trust,
of our mutual cares, labors, and dangers.
GEORGE WASHINGTON."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1796.
Third Presidential Election.
Washington succeeded by John Adams.
After the appearance of Washington's Farewell Address, the
result of the Presidential election became exceedingly
doubtful. "There was no second man to whom the whole of the
nation could be won over. The Federalists … could not bring
forward a single candidate who could calculate on the
unanimous and cheerful support of the entire party. There
still prevailed at the time a feeling among the people that
the vice-president had a sort of claim to the succession to
the presidency. But even apart from this, Adams would have
been one of the most prominent candidates of the Federalists.
The great majority of them soon gave him a decided preference
over all other possible candidates. On the other hand, some of
the most distinguished and influential of the Federalists
feared serious consequences to the party and the country from
the vanity and violence as well as from the egotism and
irresolution with which he was charged. But to put him aside
entirely was not possible, nor was it their wish. They
thought, however, to secure a greater number of electoral
votes for Thomas Pinckney, the Federal candidate for the
vice-presidency, which, as the constitution then stood, would
have made him president and Adams vice-president.
{3315}
Although this plan was anxiously concealed from the people, it
caused the campaign to be conducted by the party with less
energy than if the leaders had been entirely unanimous. France
was naturally desirous of Jefferson's success. … Wolcott
asserted that Adet had publicly declared that France's future
policy towards the United States would depend on the result of
the election. Some did not hesitate to say that, on this
account, Jefferson should have the preference, but on the more
thoughtful Federalists it exerted the very opposite influence.
There is no reason for the assumption that the issue of the
election would have been different, had Adet behaved more
discreetly. But his indiscretion certainly contributed to make
the small majority expected for Adams completely certain,
while Hamilton's flank movement in favor of Pinckney helped
Jefferson to the vice-presidency. … The result of the
election, however, left the country in a very serious
condition. Washington's withdrawal removed the last restraint
from party passion."
H. von Holst,
The Constitutional and Political History of the United States,
volume 1, chapter 3.
Adams received 71 votes in the Electoral College and Jefferson
68. As the constitution then provided, the majority of votes
elected the President and the next greatest number of votes
elected the Vice President.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1797-1799.
Troubles with the French Republic.
The X, Y, Z correspondence.
On the brink of war.
"Mr. Adams took his cabinet from his predecessor; it was not a
strong one, and it was devoted to Hamilton, between whom and
the new President there was soon a divergence, Hamilton being
fond of power, and Adams having a laudable purpose to command
his own ship. The figure of speech is appropriate, for he
plunged into a sea of troubles, mainly created by the
unreasonable demands of the French government. The French
'Directory,' enraged especially by Jay's treaty with England,
got rid of one American minister by remonstrance, and drove
out another [Pinckney] with contempt. When Mr. Adams sent
three special envoys [Gerry, Marshall, and Pinckney], they
were expected to undertake the most delicate negotiations with
certain semi-official persons designated in their
correspondence only by the letters X, Y, Z. The plan of this
covert intercourse came through the private secretary of M. de
Talleyrand, then French Minister for Foreign Affairs; and the
impudence of these three letters of the alphabet went so far
as to propose a bribe of 1,200,000 francs (some $220,000) to
be paid over to this minister. 'You must pay money, a great
deal of money,' remarked Monsieur Y ('Il faut de l'argent,
beaucoup de l'argent'). The secret of these names was kept,
but the diplomatic correspondence was made public, and created
much wrath in Europe as well as in America. Moreover, American
vessels were constantly attacked by France, and yet Congress
refused to arm its own ships. At last the insults passed
beyond bearing, and it was at this time that 'Millions for
defence, not one cent for tribute,' first became a proverbial
phrase, having been originally used by Charles C. Pinckney. …
Then, with tardy decision, the Republicans yielded to the
necessity of action, and the Federal party took the lead. War
was not formally proclaimed, but treaties with France were
declared to be no longer binding. An army was ordered to be
created, with Washington as Lieutenant-general and Hamilton as
second in command; and the President was authorized to appoint
a Secretary of the Navy and to build twelve new ships-of-war.
Before these were ready, naval hostilities had actually begun;
and Commodore Truxtun, in the United States frigate
Constellation, captured a French frigate in West Indian waters
(February 9. 1799), and afterwards silenced another, which
however escaped. Great was the excitement over these early
naval successes of the young nation. Merchant-ships were
authorized to arm themselves, and some 300 acted upon this
authority. … The result of it all was that France yielded.
Talleyrand, the very minister who had dictated the insults,
now disavowed them, and pledged his government to receive any
minister the United States might send. The President, in the
most eminently courageous act of his life, took the
responsibility of again sending ambassadors; and did this
without even consulting his cabinet, which would, as he well
knew, oppose it. They were at once received, and all danger of
war with France was at an end. This bold stroke separated the
President permanently from at least half of his own party,
since the Federalists did not wish for peace with France. His
course would have given him a corresponding increase of favor
from the other side, but for the great mistake the Federalists
had made in passing certain laws, called the 'Alien' law and
the 'Sedition' law."
T. W. Higginson,
Larger History of the United States,
chapter 14.
ALSO IN:
J. T. Austin,
Life of Elbridge Gerry,
volume 2, chapters 5-8.
John Quincy and Charles Francis Adams,
Life of John Adams,
chapter 10 (volume 2).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1797-1800.
Early attitude of the Slavocracy in Congress.
Treatment of Free Blacks.
"Many people will not allow the least blame to be cast on this
period [the later years of the 18th century], because it does
not harmonize with their admiration of the 'fathers,' and
because they have adopted, without any proof, the common view
that the deeper shadows of slavery and slavocracy first
appeared comparatively late. … In reading through the debates
[in Congress], single striking instances of injustice do not
make the deepest impression. It is the omnipresent
unwillingness to practice justice towards colored
persons,—yes, even to recognize them as actual beings. When
the defense of their rights is demanded, then congress has
always a deaf ear. … Swanwick of Pennsylvania laid before the
house of representatives, January 30, 1797, a petition from
four North Carolina negroes who had been freed by their
masters. Since a state law condemned them to be sold again,
they had fled to Philadelphia. There they had been seized
under the fugitive slave law … and now prayed congress for its
intervention. Blount of North Carolina declared that only when
it was 'proved' that these men were free, could congress
consider the petition. Sitgreaves of Pennsylvania asked, in
reply to this, what sort of proof was offered that the four
negroes were not free. This question received no answer. Smith
of South Carolina and Christie of Maryland simply expressed
their amazement that any member whatever could have presented
a petition of 'such an unheard-of nature.'
{3316}
Swanwick and some other representatives affirmed that the
petition must be submitted to a committee for investigation
and consideration, because the petitioners complained of
violation of their rights under a law of the Union. No reply
could be made to this and no reply was attempted. This
decisive point was simply set aside, and it was voted by fifty
ayes to thirty-three noes not to receive the petition. … In
order to reach this result, Smith had produced the customary
impression by the declaration that the refusal of the demand
made by the representatives from the southern states would
drive a 'wedge' into the Union. When, three years later, the
same question was brought before congress again by a petition
of the free negroes of Philadelphia, Rutledge of South
Carolina declared in even plainer terms that the south would
be forced to the sad necessity of going its own way. … The
whites who troubled themselves about slaves or free colored
persons had no better reception. Year after year the Quakers
came indefatigably with new petitions, and each time had to
undergo the same scornful treatment. … In all the cases
mentioned, the tactics of the representatives of the
slaveholding interest were the same and they maintained them
unchanged up to the last. If congress was urged to act in any
way which did not please them, then slavery was always a
'purely municipal affair.'"
H. von Holst,
Constitutional and Political History of the United States,
volume 1, chapter 8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1798.
The Alien and Sedition Laws and
the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions.
"The outrages which we suffered from the injustice of England
and France gave additional bitterness to the strife between
parties at home. The anti-federal press was immoderate in its
assaults upon the administration. It so happened that several
of the anti-federal papers were conducted by foreigners.
Indeed, there were many foreigners in the country whose
sympathies were with the French, and their hostility to the
administration was open and passionate. The federal leaders
determined to crush out by the strong arm of the law these
publishers of slanders and fomenters of discontent. Hence the
famous 'alien and sedition laws' were passed. The remedy
devised was far worse than the disease. It hastened the
federal party to its tomb, and was the occasion of the
formulation of that unfortunate creed of constitutional
construction and of state sovereignty known as the 'Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions' of 1798-99."
J. S. Landon,
Constitutional History and Government of the United States,
lecture 6.
The series of strong measures carried by the Federalists
comprised the Naturalization Act of June 18, the Alien Act of
June 25, the second Alien Act, of July 6, and the Sedition Act
of July 14, 1798.
The text of the Naturalization Act is as follows:
June 18, 1798. Acts of the Fifth Congress,
Statute II., Chapter liv.:
"An Act supplementary to, and to amend the act, intituled 'An
act to establish an uniform rule of naturalization; and to
repeal the act heretofore passed on that subject.'
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That no alien shall be admitted to become a citizen
of the United States, or of any state, unless in the manner
prescribed by the act, intituled 'An act to establish an
uniform rule of naturalization; and to repeal the act
heretofore passed on that subject,' he shall have declared his
intention to become a citizen of the United States, five
years, at least, before his admission, and shall, at the time
of his application to be admitted, declare and prove, to the
satisfaction of the court having jurisdiction in the case,
that he has resided within the United States fourteen years,
at least, and within the state or territory where, or for
which such court is at the time held, five years, at least,
besides conforming to the other declarations, renunciations
and proofs, by the said act required, anything therein to the
contrary hereof notwithstanding: Provided, that any alien, who
was residing within the limits, and under the jurisdiction of
the United States, before the twenty-ninth day of January, one
thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, may, within one year
after the passing of this act—and any alien who shall have
made the declaration of his intention to become a citizen of
the United States, in conformity to the provisions of the act,
intituled 'An act to establish an uniform rule of
naturalization; and to repeal the act heretofore passed on
that subject,' may, within four years after having made the
declaration aforesaid, be admitted to become a citizen, in the
manner prescribed by the said act, upon his making proof that
he has resided five years, at least, within the limits, and
under the jurisdiction of the United States: And provided
also, that no alien, who shall be a native, citizen, denizen
or subject of any nation or state with whom the United States
shall be at war, at the time of his application, shall be then
admitted to become a citizen of the United States."
Statutes at Large of the United States, edition 1850.
volume 1, pages 566-567.
The following is the text of the two Alien Acts:
June 25, 1798. Statute II., Chapter lviii.
"An Act Concerning Aliens.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That it shall be lawful for the President of the
United States at any time during the continuance of this act,
to order all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the
peace and safety of the United States, or shall have
reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable
or secret machinations against the government thereof, to
depart out of the territory of the United States, within such
time as shall be expressed in such order, which order shall be
served on such alien by de·livering him a copy thereof, or
leaving the same at his usual abode, and returned to the
office of the Secretary of State, by the marshal or other
person to whom the same shall be directed. And in case any
alien, so ordered to depart, shall be found at large within
the United States after the time limited in such order for his
departure, and not having obtained a license from the
President to reside therein, or having obtained such license
shall not have conformed thereto, every such alien shall, on
conviction thereof, be imprisoned for a term not exceeding
three years, and shall never after be admitted to become a
citizen of the United States.
{3317}
Provided always and be it further enacted, that if any alien
so ordered to depart shall prove to the satisfaction of the
President, by evidence to be taken before such person or
persons as the President shall direct, who are for that
purpose hereby authorized to administer oaths, that no injury
or danger to the United States will arise from suffering such
alien to reside therein, the President may grant a license to
such alien to remain within the United States for such time as
he shall judge proper, and at such place as he may designate.
And the President may also require of such alien to enter into
a bond to the United States, in such penal sum as he may
direct, with one or more sufficient sureties to the
satisfaction of the person authorized by the President to take
the same, conditioned for the good behavior of such alien
during his residence in the United States, and not violating
his license, which license the President may revoke whenever
he shall think proper.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful
for the President of the United States, whenever he may deem
it necessary for the public safety, to order to be removed out
of the territory thereof, any alien who may or shall be in
prison in pursuance of this act; and to cause to be arrested
and sent out of the United States such of those aliens as
shall have been ordered to depart therefrom and shall not have
obtained a license as aforesaid, in all cases where, in the
opinion of the President, the public safety requires a speedy
removal. And if any alien so removed or sent out of the United
States by the President shall voluntarily return thereto,
unless by permission of the President of the United States,
such alien on conviction thereof, shall be imprisoned so long
as, in the opinion of the President, the public safety may
require.
Section 3. And be it further enacted, That every master or
commander of any ship or vessel which shall come into any port
of the United States after the first day of July next, shall
immediately on his arrival make report in writing to the
collector, or other chief officer of the customs of such port,
of all aliens, if any, on board his vessel, specifying their
names, age, the place of nativity, the country from which they
shall have come, the nation to which they belong and owe
allegiance, their occupation and a description of their
persons, as far as he shall be informed thereof, and on
failure, every such master and commander shall forfeit and pay
three hundred dollars, for the payment whereof on default of
such master or commander, such vessel shall also be holden,
and may by such collector or other officer of the customs be
detained. And it shall be the duty of such collector, or other
officer of the customs, forthwith to transmit to the officer
of the department of state true copies of all such returns.
Section 4. And be it further enacted, That the circuit and
district courts of the United States, shall respectively have
cognizance of all crimes and offences against this act. And
all marshals and other officers of the United States are
required to execute all precepts and orders of the President
of the United States issued in pursuance or by virtue of this
act.
Section 5. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful
for any alien who may be ordered to be removed from the United
States, by virtue of this act, to take with him such part of
his goods, chattels, or other property, as he may find
convenient; and all property left in the United States by any
alien, who may be removed, as aforesaid, shall be, and remain
subject to his order and disposal, in the same manner as if
this act had not been passed.
Section 6. And be it further enacted, That this act shall
continue and be in force for and during the term of two years
from the passing thereof.
Approved, June 25, 1798."
Statutes at Large of the United States, edition 1850,
Volume I., pages 570-572.
July 6, 1798. Statute II., Chapter lxvi.
"An Act respecting Alien Enemies.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That whenever there shall be a declared war between
the United States and any foreign nation or government, or any
invasion or predatory incursion shall be perpetrated,
attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United
States, by any foreign nation or government, and the President
of the United States shall make public proclamation of the
event, all natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects of the
hostile nation or government, being males of the age of
fourteen years and upwards, who shall be within the United
States, and not actually naturalized, shall be liable to be
apprehended, restrained, secured and removed, as alien
enemies. And the President of the United States shall be, and
he is hereby authorized, in any event, as aforesaid, by his
proclamation thereof or other public act, to direct the
conduct to be observed, on the part of the United States,
towards the aliens who shall become liable as aforesaid; the
manner and degree of the restraint to which they shall be
subject, and in what cases, and upon what security their
residence shall be permitted, and to provide for the removal
of those, who, not being permitted to reside within the United
States, shall refuse or neglect to depart therefrom; and to
establish any other regulations which shall be found necessary
in the premises and for the public safety; Provided, that
aliens resident within the United States, who shall become
liable as enemies, in the manner aforesaid, and who shall not
be chargeable with actual hostility, or other crime against
the public safety, shall be allowed for the recovery,
disposal, and removal of their goods and effects, and for
their departure, the full time which is, or shall be
stipulated by any treaty, where any shall have been between
the United States and the hostile nation or government, of
which they shall be natives, citizens, denizens, or subjects:
and when no such treaty shall have existed, the President of
the United States may ascertain and declare such reasonable
time as may be consistent with the public safety, and
according to the dictates of humanity and national
hospitality.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That after any
proclamation shall be made as aforesaid, it shall be the duty
of the several courts of the United States, and of each state,
having criminal jurisdiction, and of the several judges and
justices of the courts of the United States, and they shall
be, and are hereby respectively, authorized upon complaint,
against any alien or alien enemies, as aforesaid, who shall be
resident and at large within such jurisdiction or district, to
the danger of the public peace or safety, and contrary to the
tenor or intent of such proclamation, or other regulations
which the President of the United States shall and may
establish in the premises, to cause such alien or aliens to be
duly apprehended and convened before such court, judge or
Justice; and after a full examination and hearing on such
complaint, and sufficient cause therefor appearing, shall and
may order such alien or aliens to be removed out of the
territory of the United States, or to give such sureties for
their good behaviour, or to be otherwise restrained,
conformably to the proclamation or regulations which shall or
may be established as aforesaid, and may imprison, or
otherwise secure such alien or aliens, until the order which
shall and may be made, as aforesaid, shall be performed.
{3318}
Section 3. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the
duty of the marshal of the district in which any alien enemy
shall be apprehended, who by the President of the United
States, or by the order of any court, judge or justice, as
aforesaid, shall be required to depart, and to be removed, as
aforesaid, to provide therefor, and to execute such order, by
himself or his deputy, or other discreet person or persons to
be employed by him, by causing a removal of such alien out of
the territory of the United States; and for such removal the
marshal shall have the warrant of the President of the United
States, or of the court, judge or justice ordering the same,
as the case may be.
Approved, July 6, 1798."
Statutes at Large of the United States, edition of 1850,
Volume I, page 577.
The text of the Sedition Act is as follows:
JULY 14, 1798. Chapter lxxiv.
"An Act in addition to the act, entitled 'An Act for the
punishment of certain crimes against the United States.'
Section 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress
assembled, That if any persons shall unlawfully combine or
conspire together, with intent to oppose any measure or
measures of the government of the United States, which are or
shall be directed by proper authority, or to impede the
operation of any law of the United States, or to intimidate or
prevent any person holding a place or office in or under the
government of the United States, from undertaking, performing
or executing, his trust or duty; and if any person or persons,
with intent as aforesaid, shall counsel, advise or attempt to
procure any insurrection, riot, unlawful assembly, or
combination, whether such conspiracy, threatening, counsel,
advice, or attempt shall have the proposed effect or not, he
or they shall be deemed guilty of a high misdemeanor, and on
conviction before any court of the United States having
jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding five thousand dollars and by imprisonment during a
term not less than six months nor exceeding five years; and
further at the discretion of the court may be holden to find
sureties for his good behavior in such sum, and for such time,
as the said court may direct.
Section 2. And be it further enacted, That if any person shall
write, print, utter, or publish, or shall cause or procure to
be written, printed, uttered or published or shall knowingly
and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or
publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or
writings against the government of the United States, or
either house of the Congress of the United States, or the
President of the United States, with intent to defame the said
government, or either house of the said Congress, or the said
President, or to bring them or either of them, into contempt
or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either, or any of
them, the hatred of the good people of the United States, or
to stir up sedition within the United States, or to excite any
unlawful combinations therein, for opposing or resisting any
law of the United States, or any act of the President of the
United States, and one in pursuance of any such law, or of the
powers in him vested by the constitution of the United States,
or to resist, oppose or defeat any such law or act, or to aid,
encourage or abet any hostile designs of any foreign nation
against the United States, their people or government, then
such person, being thereof convicted before any court of the
United States having jurisdiction thereof, shall be punished
by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars, and by
imprisonment not exceeding two years.
Section 3. And be it further enacted and declared, That if any
person shall be prosecuted under this act, for the writing or
publishing any libel aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the
defendant, upon the trial of the cause, to give in evidence in
his defence, the truth of the matter contained in the
publication charged as a libel. And the jury who shall try the
cause, shall have a right to determine the law and the fact,
under the direction of the court, as in other cases.
Section 4. And be it further enacted, That this act shall
continue and be in force until the third day of March, one
thousand eight hundred and one, and no longer: Provided that
the expiration of the act shall not prevent or defeat a
prosecution and punishment of any offence against the law,
during the time it shall be in force. Approved July 14, 1798."
"There has been a general effort on the part of biographers to
clear their respective heroes from all responsibility for
these ill-fated measures. The truth is, that they had the full
support of the congressmen and senators who passed, them, of
the President who signed them, and of all the leaders in the
States, who almost all believed in them; and they also met
with very general acceptance by the party in the North.
Hamilton went as far in the direction of sustaining the
principle of these laws as any one. He had too acute a mind to
believe with many of the staunch Federalist divines of New
England, that Jefferson and Madison were Marats and
Robespierres, and that their followers were Jacobins who, when
they came to power, were ready for the overthrow of religion
and society, and were prepared to set up a guillotine and pour
out blood in the waste places of the federal city. But he did
believe, and so wrote to Washington, after the appearance of
the X. Y. Z. letters that there was a party in the country
ready to 'new model' the constitution on French principles, to
form an offensive and defensive alliance with France, and make
the United States a French province. He felt, in short, that
there was a party in America ready for confiscation and social
confusion. A year later, in 1799, he wrote to Dayton, the
speaker of the national House of Representatives, a long
letter in which he set forth very clearly the policy which he
felt ought to be pursued.
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He wished to give strength to the government, and increase
centralization by every means, by an extension of the national
judiciary, a liberal system of internal improvements, an
increased and abundant revenue, an enlargement of the army and
navy, permanence in the laws for the volunteer army, extension
of the powers of the general government, subdivision of the
States as soon as practicable, and finally a strong sedition
law, and the power to banish aliens. This was what was termed
at that day a 'strong and spirited' policy; it would now be
called repressive, but by whatever name it is designated, it
was the policy of Hamilton, and is characteristic of both his
talents and temperament. Except as to the subdivision of
States, it was carried out pretty thoroughly in all its main
features by the Federalists. The alien and sedition laws,
although resisted in Congress, did not much affect public
opinion at the elections which immediately ensued, and the
Federalists came into the next Congress with a large
majority."
Henry Cabot Lodge,
Alexander Hamilton,
chapter 9.
"The different portions of the country were affected according
to the dominant political opinion. Where the Federalists were

strong political feeling bore them headlong into prosecutions
under the new powers. In the Republican States a sense of
injury and danger went hand in hand, and the question of the
hour was how to repel the threatening destruction. Mr.
Jefferson did not fail to see that the great opportunity for
his party had come. His keen political sagacity detected in an
instant the fatal mistake the administration had made, and he
began at once to look about him for the best means to turn his
opponents' mistake to his own advantage. Naturally he felt
some delicacy in appearing too forward in assailing a
government of which he himself was the second in office.
Nevertheless he lent himself willingly to the task of
organizing, in a quiet way, a systematic assault upon these
laws of Congress, and at once opened a correspondence
calculated to elicit the best judgment of his coadjutors and
gradually drew out a programme of action. Virginia was by no
means unanimous in reprobating these laws. She had a large and
influential body of Federalists. … But the influence of
Jefferson was paramount and the result of Jeffersonian
principles soon appeared on every hand. Meetings were held in
many of the counties upon their county court days at which
were adopted addresses or series of resolutions condemning or
praying for the repeal of these laws. … New York, New Jersey,
and Pennsylvania sent petitions of appeal to Congress. … But
it was in Kentucky that the greatest resistance was evoked.
The feeling in that State was, indeed, little short of frenzy,
and a singular unanimity was displayed even in the most
extreme acts and sentiments. This grew out of no passing
passion. It was based upon the most vigorous elements in her
character as a people. Kentucky was at this time somewhat
apart from the rest of the Union. … Her complaints, just and
unjust, had been many, but hitherto she had not gained the
nation's ear. But the time was now ripe for her to assert
herself."
E. D. Warfield,
The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798,
chapter 1.
The famous Kentucky Resolutions, substantially drafted by
Jefferson, as he acknowledged fifteen years afterwards, but
introduced in the Legislature of Kentucky by John
Breckenridge, on the 8th of November, 1798, were adopted by
that body, in the lower branch on the 10th and in the upper on
the 13th. Approved by the Governor on the 16th, they were
immediately printed and copies officially sent to every other
state and to members of Congress. They were as follows:
"I. Resolved, that the several states composing the United
States of America, are not united on the principle of
unlimited submission to their General Government; but that by
compact under the style and title of a Constitution for the
United States and of amendments thereto, they constituted a
General Government for special purposes, delegated to that
Government certain definite powers, reserving each state to
itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self
Government; and that whensoever the General Government assumes
undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and
are of no force: That to this compact each state acceded as a
state, and is an integral party, its co-states forming as to
itself, the other party: That the Government created by this
compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the
extent of the powers delegated to itself; since that would
have made its discretion, and not the constitution, the
measure of its powers; but that as in all other cases of
compact among parties having no common judge, each party has
an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as
of the mode and measure of redress.
II. Resolved, that the Constitution of the United States
having delegated to Congress a power to punish treason,
counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United
States, piracies and felonies committed on the High Seas, and
offences against the laws of nations, and no other crimes
whatever, and it being true as a general principle, and one of
the amendments to the Constitution having also declared, 'that
the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved
to the states respectively, or to the people,' therefore also
the same act of Congress passed on the 14th day of July, 1798,
and entitled 'An act in addition to the act entitled an act
for the punishment of certain crimes against the United
States;' as also the act passed by them on the 27th of June,
1798, entitled 'An act to punish frauds committed on the Bank
of the United States' (and all other their acts which assume
to create, define, or punish crimes other than those
enumerated in the constitution) are altogether void and of no
force, and that the power to create, define, and punish such
other crimes is reserved, and of right appertains solely and
exclusively to the respective states, each within its own
Territory.
{3320}
III. Resolved, that it is true as a general principle, and is
also expressly declared by one of the amendments to the
Constitution that 'the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
states, are reserved to the states respectively or to the
people;' and that no power over the freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, or freedom of the press being delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the states, all lawful powers respecting the same did of right
remain, and were reserved to the states, or to the people:
That thus was manifested their determination to retain to
themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of
speech and of the press may be abridged without lessening
their useful freedom, and how far those abuses which cannot be
separated from their use, should be tolerated, rather than the
use be destroyed; and thus also they guarded against all
abridgment by the United States of the freedom of religious
opinions and exercises, and retained to themselves the right
of protecting the same, as this state by a Law passed on the
general demand of its Citizens, had already protected them
from all human restraint or interference; and that in addition
to this general principle and express declaration, another and
more special provision has been made by one of the amendments
to the Constitution which expressly declares that 'Congress
shall make no law respecting an Establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press,' thereby guarding in the
same sentence, and under the same words, the freedom of
religion, of speech, and of the press, insomuch, that whatever
violates either, throws down the sanctuary which covers the
others, and that libels, falsehoods, and defamation, equally
with heresy and false religion, are withheld from the
cognizance of federal tribunals. That therefore the act of the
Congress of the United States passed on the 14th day of July,
1798, entitled 'An act in addition to the act for the
punishment of certain crimes against the United States,' which
does abridge the freedom of the press, is not law, but is
altogether void and of no effect.
IV. Resolved, that alien friends are under the jurisdiction
and protection of the laws of the state wherein they are; that
no power over them has been delegated to the United States,
nor prohibited to the individual states distinct from their
power over citizens; and it being true as a general principle,
and one of the amendments to the Constitution having also
declared, that 'the powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are
reserved to the states respectively or to the people,' the act
of the Congress of the United States passed on the 22d day of
June, 1798, entitled 'An act concerning aliens,' which assumes
power over alien friends not delegated by the Constitution, is
not law, but is altogether void and of no force.
V. Resolved, that in addition to the general principle as well
as the express declaration, that powers not delegated are
reserved, another and more special provision inserted in the
Constitution from abundant caution has declared, 'that the
migration or importation of such persons as any of the states
now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808.' That this
Commonwealth does admit the migration of alien friends
described as the subject of the said act concerning aliens;
that a provision against prohibiting their migration, is a
provision against all acts equivalent thereto, or it would be
nugatory; that to remove them when migrated is equivalent to a
prohibition of their migration, and is therefore contrary to
the said provision of the Constitution, and void.
VI. Resolved, that the imprisonment of a person under the
protection of the Laws of this Commonwealth on his failure to
obey the simple order of the President to depart out of the
United States, as is undertaken by the said act entitled 'An
act concerning aliens,' is contrary to the Constitution, one
amendment to which has provided, that 'no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law,' and that
another having provided 'that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to a public trial by an
impartial jury, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him,
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his
defence,' the same act undertaking to authorize the President
to remove a person out of the United States who is under the
protection of the Law, on his own suspicion, without
accusation, without jury, without public trial, without
confrontation of the witnesses against him, without having
witnesses in his favour, without defence, without counsel, is
contrary to these provisions also of the Constitution, is
therefore not law but utterly void and of no force. That
transferring the power of judging any person who is under the
protection of the laws, from the Courts to the President of
the United States, as is undertaken by the same act concerning
Aliens, is against the article of the Constitution which
provides, that 'the judicial power of the United States shall
be vested in Courts, the Judges of which shall hold their
offices during good behaviour,' and that the said act is void
for that reason also; and it is further to be noted, that this
transfer of Judiciary powers is to that magistrate of the
General Government who already possesses all the Executive,
and a qualified negative in all the Legislative power.
VII. Resolved, that the construction applied by the General
Government (as is evinced by sundry of their proceedings) to
those parts of the Constitution of the United States which
delegate to Congress a power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the
common defence, and general welfare of the United States, and
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or any department
thereof, goes to the destruction of all the limits prescribed
to their power by the Constitution—That words meant by that
instrument to be subsidiary only to the execution of the
limited powers, ought not to be so construed as themselves to
give unlimited powers, nor a part so to be taken, as to
destroy the whole residue of the instrument: That the
proceedings of the General Government under colour of these
articles, will be a fit and necessary subject for revisal and
correction at a time of greater tranquility, while those
specified in the preceding resolutions call for immediate
redress.
VIII. Resolved, that the preceding Resolutions be transmitted
to the Senators and Representatives in Congress from this
Commonwealth, who are hereby enjoined to present the same to
their respective Houses, and to use the best endeavours to
procure at the next session of Congress, a repeal of the
aforesaid unconstitutional and obnoxious acts.
{3321}
IX. Resolved lastly, that the Governor of this Commonwealth
be, and is hereby authorised and requested to communicate the
preceding Resolutions to the Legislatures of the several
States, to assure them that this Commonwealth considers Union
for specified National purposes, and particularly for those
specified in their late Federal compact, to be friendly to the
peace, happiness, and prosperity of all the states: that
faithful to that compact, according to the plain intent and
meaning in which it was understood and acceded to by the
several parties, it is sincerely anxious for its preservation:
that it does also believe, that to take from the states all
the powers of self government, and transfer them to a general
and consolidated Government, without regard to the special
delegations and reservations solemnly agreed to in that
compact, is not for the peace, happiness, or prosperity of
these states: And that therefore, this Commonwealth is
determined, as it doubts not its Co-states are, tamely to
submit to undelegated and consequently unlimited powers in no
man or body of men on earth: that if the acts before specified
should stand, these conclusions would flow from them; that the
General Government may place any act they think proper on the
list of crimes and punish it themselves, whether enumerated or
not enumerated by the Constitution as cognizable by them: that
they may transfer its cognizance to the President or any other
person, who may himself be the accuser, counsel, judge, and
jury, whose suspicions may be the evidence, his order the
sentence, his officer the executioner, and his breast the sole
record of the transaction: that a very numerous and valuable
description of the inhabitants of these states, being by this
precedent reduced as outlaws to the absolute dominion of one
man and the barrier of the Constitution thus swept away from
us all, no rampart now remains against the passions and the
power of a majority of Congress, to protect from a like
exportation or other more grievous punishment the minority of
the same body, the Legislatures, Judges, Governors, and
Counsellors of the states, nor their other peaceable
inhabitants who may venture to reclaim the constitutional
rights and liberties of the states and people, or who for
other causes, good or bad, may be obnoxious to the views or
marked by the suspicions of the President, or be thought
dangerous to his or their elections or other interests public
or personal: that the friendless alien has indeed been
selected as the safest subject of a first experiment: but the
citizen will soon follow, or rather has already followed; for
already has a Sedition Act marked him as its prey: that these
and successive acts of the same character, unless arrested on
the threshold, may tend to drive these states into revolution
and blood, and will furnish new calumnies against Republican
Governments, and new pretexts for those who wish it to be
believed that man cannot be governed but by a rod of iron:
that it would be a dangerous delusion were a confidence in the
men of our choice to silence our fears for the safety of our
rights: that confidence is everywhere the parent of despotism:
free government is founded in jealousy and not in confidence;
it is jealousy and not confidence which prescribes limited
Constitutions to bind down those whom we are obliged to trust
with power: that our Constitution has accordingly fixed the
limits to which and no further our confidence may go; and let
the honest advocate of confidence read the Alien and Sedition
Acts, and say if the Constitution has not been wise in fixing
limits to the Government it created, and whether we should be
wise in destroying those limits? Let him say what the
Government is if it be not a tyranny, which the men of our
choice have conferred on the President, and the President of
our choice has assented to and accepted over the friendly
strangers, to whom the mild spirit of our Country and its laws
had pledged hospitality and protection: that the men of our
choice have more respected the bare suspicions of the
President than the solid rights of innocence, the claims of
justification, the sacred force of truth, and the forms and
subsistence of law and justice. In questions of power then let
no more be heard of confidence in man, but bind him down from
mischief by the chains of the Constitution. That this
Commonwealth does therefore call on its Co-states for an
expression of their sentiments on the acts concerning Aliens,
and for the punishment of certain crimes hereinbefore
specified, plainly declaring whether these acts are or are not
authorized by the Federal Compact? And it doubts not that
their sense will be so announced as to prove their attachment
unaltered to limited Government, whether general or
particular, and that the rights and liberties of their
Co-states will be exposed to no dangers by remaining embarked
on a common bottom with their own: That they will concur with
this Commonwealth, in considering the said acts so palpably
against the Constitution as to amount to an undisguised
declaration, that the compact is not meant to be the measure
of the powers of the General Government, but that it will
proceed in the exercise over these states of all powers
whatsoever: That they will view this as seizing the rights of
the states and consolidating them in the hands of the General
Government with a power assumed to bind the states (not merely
in cases made federal) but in all cases whatsoever, by laws
made, not with their consent, but by others against their
consent: That this would be to surrender the form of
Government we have chosen, and to live under one deriving its
powers from its own will, and not from our authority; and that
the Co-states recurring to their natural right in cases not
made federal, will concur in declaring these acts void and of
no force, and will each unite with this Commonwealth in
requesting their repeal at the next session of Congress."
In the month following this declaration from Kentucky, on the
21st of December, Virginia affirmed substantially the same
threatening doctrine, more temperately and cautiously set
forth in resolutions drawn by Madison as follows:
"Resolved, that the General Assembly of Virginia doth
unequivocally express a firm resolution to maintain and defend
the constitution of the United States, and the constitution of
this state against every aggression, either foreign or
domestic, and that they will support the government of the
United States in all measures warranted by the former.
That this Assembly most solemnly declares a warm attachment to
the union of the states, to maintain which, it pledges all its
powers; and that for this end it is their duty to watch over
and oppose every infraction of those principles which
constitute the only basis of that union, because a faithful
observance of them can alone secure its existence, and the
public happiness.
{3322}
That this Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare
that it views the powers of the Federal Government, as
resulting from the compact, to which the states are parties;
as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument
constituting that compact; as no farther valid than they are
authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact, and that
in case of a deliberate, palpable and dangerous exercise of
other powers not granted by the said compact, the states who
are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound to
interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for
maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities,
rights and liberties appertaining to them.
That the General Assembly doth also express its deep regret
that a spirit has in sundry instances, been manifested by the
Federal Government, to enlarge its powers by forced
constructions of the constitutional charter which defines
them; and that indications have appeared of a design to
expound certain general phrases (which having been copied from
the very limited grant of powers in the former articles of
confederation were the less liable to be misconstrued), so as
to destroy the meaning and effect of the particular
enumeration, which necessarily explains and limits the general
phrases; and so as to consolidate the states by degrees into
one sovereignty, the obvious tendency and inevitable
consequence of which would be to transform the present
republican system of the United States into an absolute, or at
best a mixed monarchy. That the General Assembly doth
particularly protest against the palpable and alarming
infractions of the Constitution, in the two late cases of the
'Alien and Sedition Acts,' passed at the last session of
Congress, the first of which exercises a power nowhere
delegated to the Federal Government; and which by uniting
legislative and judicial powers to those of executive,
subverts the general principles of free government, as well as
the particular organization and positive provisions of the
federal constitution: and the other of which acts, exercises
in like manner a power not delegated by the constitution, but
on the contrary expressly and positively forbidden by one of
the amendments thereto; a power which more than any other
ought to produce universal alarm, because it is levelled
against the right of freely examining public characters and
measures, and of free communication among the people thereon,
which has ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian
of every other right.
That this state having by its convention which ratified the
federal constitution, expressly declared, 'that among other
essential rights, the liberty of conscience and of the press
cannot be cancelled, abridged, restrained or modified by any
authority of the United States,' and from its extreme anxiety
to guard these rights from every possible attack of sophistry
or ambition, having with other states recommended an amendment
for that purpose, which amendment was in due time annexed to
the constitution, it would mark a reproachful inconsistency
and criminal degeneracy, if an indifference were now shown to
the most palpable violation of one of the rights thus declared
and secured, and to the establishment of a precedent which may
be fatal to the other.
That the good people of this commonwealth having ever felt and
continuing to feel the most sincere affection to their
brethren of the other states, the truest anxiety for
establishing and perpetuating the union of all, and the most
scrupulous fidelity to that constitution which is the pledge
of mutual friendship, and the instrument of mutual happiness:
The General Assembly doth solemnly appeal to the like
dispositions of the other states, in confidence that they will
concur with this commonwealth in declaring, as it does hereby
declare, that the acts aforesaid are unconstitutional, and
that the necessary and proper measures will be taken by each
for cooperating with this state, in maintaining unimpaired the
authorities, rights, and liberties, reserved to the states
respectively, or to the people. That the Governor be desired
to transmit a copy of the foregoing resolutions to the
executive authority of each of the other states, with a
request, that the same may be communicated to the legislature
thereof.
And that a copy be furnished to each of the Senators and
Representatives, representing this state in the Congress of
the United States."
In later years, after Calhoun and his school had pushed these
doctrines to their logical conclusion, Madison shrank from the
result, and endeavored to disown the apparent meaning of what
Jefferson had written and he had seemed to endorse in 1798. He
denounced Nullification and Secession as "twin heresies," and
denied that they were contained or implied in the resolutions
of 1798—either those adopted in Kentucky or the responsive
ones written by himself for the legislature of Virginia. The
Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 were followed in 1799 by another
series, in which the right of a sovereign State to nullify
obnoxious laws of the Federal Government was no longer
asserted by implication, but was put into plain terms—as
follows: "That the principle and construction, contended for
by sundry of the state legislatures, that the general
government is the exclusive judge of the extent of the powers
delegated to it, stop not short of despotism,—since the
discretion of those who administer the government, and not the
Constitution, would be the measure of their powers: That the
several states who formed that instrument, being sovereign and
independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of the
infraction; and, That a nullification, by those sovereignties,
of all unauthorized acts done under color of that instrument,
is the rightful remedy." It was Mr. Madison's desire to cast
on these resolutions of 1799, with which Jefferson had nothing
to do, the odium of the nullification doctrine, and to remove
the stigma from the resolutions of 1798, in which the word
"nullification" makes no appearance; "neither that," pleaded
Madison, "nor any equivalent term." But, when Madison made
this plea, in 1830, "it was not then generally known, whether
Mr. Madison knew it or not, that one of the resolutions and
part of another which Jefferson wrote to be offered in the
Kentucky legislature in 1798 were omitted by Mr. Nicholas [to
whom Mr. Jefferson had entrusted them], and that therein was
the assertion … 'where powers are assumed which have not been
delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy.'
{3323}
The next year, when additional resolutions were offered by Mr.
Breckenridge, this idea in similar, though not in precisely the
same language, was presented [as quoted above]. … In 1832,
this fact, on the authority of Jefferson's grandson and
executor, was made public; and further, that another
declaration of Mr. Jefferson's in the resolution not used was
an exhortation to the co-States, 'that each will take measures
of its own for providing that neither these acts nor any
others of the general government, not plainly and
intentionally authorized by the Constitution, shall be
exercised within their respective territories.'"
S. H. Gay,
James Madison,
chapter 15.
"The publication of the Kentucky resolutions … was instantly
followed by a new crop of remonstrances and petitions from the
people. … Memorials by scores came in from each State, and the
signatures appended to some were as many as sixteen hundred.
Those from Pennsylvania alone bore over eighteen thousand
names. … Such memorials as reached the House were sent to a
committee, who, late in February, reported. … The report
closed with three resolutions, and these were: that it was not
in the interest of the public good to repeal either the Alien
Law, or the Sedition Law, or any of the laws respecting the
army, the navy, or the revenue of the United States. On the
twenty-fifth of February, the House being in Committee of the
Whole, the three resolutions were taken up one by one.
Gallatin spoke long and well against the first; but it was
carried. Mr. Nicholas spoke at greater length against
agree·ing to the second. But the Federalists had made up their
minds to accept the report, and, as Nicholas went on, treated
him with great disrespect. They assembled in groups about the
House, laughed, coughed, and talked at the top of their
voices; nor would the Speaker command order in the room. When
Nicholas finished, shouts of 'Question! Question!' rose from
all sides. A member from North Carolina hoped the question
would not be taken. The hour was late. Other members had
something to say. An hour or two on the morrow might well be
spent in discussion. He moved the committee should rise. … The
motion to rise was lost, the question on the second resolution
was carried, the question on the third resolution was carried,
then the committee rose. The House then agreed to the action
of the committee on each of the three resolutions. The Federal
party was now at the height of its prosperity and power. It
controlled the Senate. It controlled the House. Outwardly it
was great and powerful, but within that dispute had begun
which, in a few short months, drove Pickering and M'Henry from
the Cabinet, split the party in twain, and gave to the country
the strange spectacle of staunch and earnest Federalists
wrangling and contending and overwhelming each other with
abuse."
J. B. McMaster,
A History of the United States,
chapter 11 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
H. S. Randall,
Life of Jefferson,
volume 2, chapter 8.
J. Madison,
Works,
volume 4, pages 95-110, and 506-555.
T. Jefferson,
Works,
volume 7, page 229;
and volume 9, pages 464-471.
H. von Holst,
Constitutional and Political History of the United States,
volume 1, page 148.
J. T. Morse,
Life of Hamilton,
volume 2, chapter 6.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1800.
The convention with France and the French Spoliation Claims
incident to it.
"In the instructions to the American envoys in France they had
been directed to secure a claims commission, the abrogation of
the former treaties, and the abolition of the guarantee of
1778, as it was called, contained in Article XI. of the Treaty
of Alliance of that year, and covering 'the present
possessions of the Crown of France in America, as well as
those which it may acquire by the future treaty of peace.'
Upon none of these points were the envoys able to carry out
their instructions. In reference to claims, a distinction,
which was finally embodied in the treaty, was drawn by the
French government between two classes of claims: first, debts
due from the French government to American citizens for
supplies furnished, or prizes whose restoration had been
decreed by the courts; and secondly, indemnities for prizes
alleged to have been wrongfully condemned. The treaty provided
that the first class, known as debts, should be paid, but
excluded the second, or indemnity class. In reference to the
indemnity claims, and to the questions involved in the old
treaties, including, of course, the guarantee of 1778, as the
envoys were not able to come to an agreement, the treaty
declared that the negotiation was postponed. The Senate of the
United States expunged this latter article, inserting in its
place a clause providing for the duration of the present
convention; and this amendment was accepted by the French
government, with the proviso that both governments should
renounce the pretensions which were the object of the original
article. To this the Senate also agreed, and upon this basis
the convention was finally ratified. It thus appears that the
United States surrendered the claims of its citizens against
France for wrongful seizures, in return for the surrender by
France of whatever claim it might have had against the United
States for the latter's failure to fulfil the obligations
assumed in the earlier treaties [especially the guaranty of
the possessions of France in America, which was undertaken in
the treaty of 1778]. The United States, therefore, having
received a consideration for its refusal to prosecute the
claims of its citizens, thereby took the place, with respect
to the claimants, of the French government, and virtually
assumed the obligations of the latter. … The claims for
indemnity thus devolving upon the United States, known as the
French Spoliation Claims, have been from that day to this the
subject of frequent report and discussion in Congress, but
with no result until the passage of the act of January 20,
1885, referring them to the Court of Claims. At the present
time (1888) they are undergoing judicial examination before
that tribunal."
J. R. Soley,
The Wars of the United States, 1789-1850
(Narrative and Critical History of America,
volume 7, chapter 6; and editor's foot-note).
ALSO IN:
F. Wharton,
Digest of the International Law of the United States,
section 248 (volume 2, pages 714-728).
D. Webster,
Works,
volume 4, pages 152-178.
T. H. Benton,
Thirty Years' View,
volume 1, chapters 117-120.
W. H. Seward,
Works,
volume 1, pages 132-155.
Report of Secretary of State
(United States Senate, Ex. Doc. no. 74 and 102,
49th Congress 1st session).
Spoliations committed by the French in the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic wars subsequently to the year 1800, were
indemnified under the provisions of the treaty for the
Louisiana purchase (see LOUISIANA: A. D. 1798-1803); under the
treaty with Spain in 1819, and under a later treaty with
France which was negotiated in Andrew Jackson's most
imperative manner in 1831. These do not enter into what have
become historically specialized as the French Spoliation
Claims.
{3324}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1800.
The Second Census.
Total population, 5,305,937, (an increase of slightly more
than 35 per cent. since 1790), classed and distributed as
follows:
North.
White. Free black. Slave.
Connecticut. 244,721 5,330 951
Indiana. 4,577 163 135
Maine. 150,901 818 0
Massachusetts. 416,793 6,452 0
New Hampshire. 182,898 856 8
New Jersey. 195,125 4,402 12,422
New York. 556,039 10,374 20,343
Ohio. 45,028 337 0
Pennsylvania. 586,094 14,561 1,706
Rhode Island. 65,437 3,304 381
Vermont. 153,908 557 0
--- --- ---
Total 2,601,521 47,154 35,946
South.
White. Free black. Slave.
Delaware. 49,852 8,268 6,153
District of Columbia. 10,066 783 3,244
Georgia. 101,678 1,019 59,404
Kentucky. 179,871 741 40,343
Maryland. 216,326 19,587 105,635
Mississippi. 5,179 182 3,489
North Carolina. 337,764 7,043 133,296
South Carolina. 196,255 3,185 146,151
Tennessee. 91,709 309 13,584
Virginia. 514,280 20,124 345,796
--- --- ---
Total 1,702,980 61,241 857,095

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1800-1801.
The Fourth Presidential Election
Inauguration of Jefferson.
"Adams, whom Dr. Franklin aptly described as 'always an honest
man, often a wise one, but sometimes and in some things
absolutely out of his senses,' was approaching the end of his
term as President, and public attention was absorbed in the
task of choosing a successor. … At the time of Adams's
election, a sectional feeling, destined in the future to work
so much evil, had already been developed; and he in
consequence received from States south of the Potomac but two
electoral votes. New York had given him her twelve, yet the
entire majority over his competitor was but three in all the
colleges. The national parties were not unequally matched in
the State; and it was evident that, could its vote be diverted
to Jefferson in the next contest, his victory would be
assured. Hence, strenuous efforts were made to accomplish this
end, and for months society was like a seething caldron. The
trouble with France had, for the moment, swelled the numbers
of the Federalists, and closed up their ranks; but the
capricious course of the President, and the violent disruption
of the cabinet, rent them asunder, never to be re-united. …
During the French excitement, it seemed almost certain that,
after the local election, they would have a majority in the
new Legislature, and thus retain for their candidate the
electoral vote of New York. This pleasing prospect was soon
obscured. When its people found Mr. Adams sternly enforcing
the Sedition Law, and exercising the power it conferred in an
unfeeling manner upon one of their most esteemed citizens
[Judge Peck], they turned with disgust from a party which they
held responsible for its enactment, as well as for this
violent procedure. The permanent ascendency which the
Republicans seemed to have acquired in the metropolis had been
wrested from them, in the spring of 1799, by the unpopularity
of a scheme of Burr's, already conspicuous in the State as an
unscrupulous political tactician. He had been a member of the
assembly the preceding year, and, under the pretence of
supplying pure and wholesome water, obtained a charter which
enabled the corporators to engage in banking. In consequence
of the feeling this aroused, he did not dare present himself
again as a candidate, but, with great tact and unwearied
efforts, succeeded in healing divisions in his party, and
nominating a delegation for the assembly, which embraced the
Republicans most eminent for wealth, station, or family
influence. Governor Clinton headed the list. … The result
followed which Burr had anticipated. The Federal majority of
the last year was overcome, and New York City secured by the
Republicans, giving them control of the State. Adams
subsequently received but four electoral votes south of
Maryland, and Jefferson became his successor. Burr, to whose
untiring exertions this great victory was due, was thereby
inducted into the office of Vice-President. At that time, the
Legislature appointed the electors for the State; and the
Republicans, then anticipating a defeat, had at a previous
session advocated that, for the future, these should be chosen
directly by the people in separate districts, hoping thus to
secure a sufficient number to elect their Presidential
candidate. The Federalists, thinking their supremacy in the
assembly assured, refused to support the plan. Now, however,
when it became known that their adversaries had gained a
majority in the Legislature on which would devolve the duty of
choosing the electors, Hamilton addressed a letter to Governor
Jay, suggesting that the present body, whose term would not
expire before July, should be again convened, in order to pass
a measure which, when before proposed by the Republicans, had
been denounced as unconstitutional. Jay had too much regard
for principle to entertain the idea. After his death, the
letter was found among his papers, endorsed, 'Proposing a
measure for party purposes which I think it would not become
me to adopt.' It is related that a noted French duellist, when
required to forgive his enemies before receiving absolution,
exclaimed, My enemies? I have none. I have killed them all!
Mr. Jefferson might have responded in the same manner, the
morrow after the Presidential election. To the one party, the
result seemed like the breaking up of an ice gorge—the
harbinger of spring. To the other it appeared as an avalanche
of French principles, destructive alike of religion and
established government. Both were at fault. President
Jefferson was quite as unable to destroy the work of his
predecessors as he was to depart from their policy of
neutrality. The Sedition and Alien Laws soon expired by
limitation; but the great measures of the former
administrations were too wise, and had struck their roots too
deep into the national sentiment, to be suddenly overturned."
W. Whitelock,
Life and Times of John Jay,
chapter 22.
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In the Electoral College, Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr,
both Democratic Republicans, received an equal number of votes
(73), and the election was carried into the House of
Representatives, where Jefferson was chosen President and Burr
Vice President. "Adams, stung to the heart by the election of
Jefferson, refused to witness the hateful spectacle of his
successor's inauguration. He spent his last hours in filling
up vacancies to place patronage out of Jefferson's reach; then
he departed, the old order in his person giving place with a
frown and a shudder to the new. Adams did not hate monarchy,
he thought that for England it was good. In the eyes of
Jefferson monarchy was the incarnate spirit of evil and to rid
mankind of it by example was the mission of the American
Republic. Every vestige of the half monarchical state which
Washington had retained was now banished from the President's
mansion and life. No more coaches-and-six, no more court
dress, no more levees. Although Jefferson did not, as legend
says, ride to his inauguration and tie his horse to the fence,
he was inaugurated with as little ceremony as possible. He
received an ambassador in slippers down at the heel, and in
the arrangement of his dinner parties was so defiant of the
rules of etiquette as to breed trouble in the diplomatic
circle. Yet with all his outward simplicity the Virginian
magnate and man of letters, though he might be a Republican,
could not in himself be a true embodiment of democracy. He was
the friend of the people, but not one of them. … The desired
day had come when the philosopher was to govern. The words of
the address which Jefferson, unlike the demagogic sons of
thunder in the present day, read in a very low voice, are the
expression by its great master and archetype of the republican
idea which has hitherto reigned supreme in the mind of the
American people. These words are monumental, 'Equal and exact
justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious
or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all
nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the
State governments in all their rights, as the most competent
administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest
bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies, the preservation
of the general government in its whole constitutional vigour,
as the sheet-anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a
jealous care of the right of election by the People; a mild
and safe correction of abuses which are lopped by the sword of
revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute
acquiescence in the decisions of the majority, the vital
principle of republics, from which there is no appeal but to
force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism;
a well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for
the first movements in war, till regulars may relieve them;
the supremacy of the civil over the military authority;
economy in the public expense, that labour may be lightly
burdened; the honest payment of our debts, and sacred
preservation of the public faith; encouragement of
agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid, the diffusion of
information, and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of
public reason; freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and
freedom of person under the protection of the "habeas corpus,"
and trial by jurors impartially selected;—these principles
form the bright constellation which has gone before us and
guided our steps through an age of revolution and
reformation.' Jefferson's wand was the pen. Yet he is
strangely apt to fall into mixed metaphors and even into
platitudes. This address has not escaped criticism."
Goldwin Smith,
The United States,
chapter 3.
"Jefferson had reached the presidential chair at a most
fortunate moment. … The prospect of a speedy peace in Europe
promised effectual and permanent relief from those serious
embarrassments to which, during war on the ocean, American
commerce was ever exposed from the aggressions of one or of
all the belligerents. The treasury was fuller, the revenue
more abundant than at any previous period. Commerce was
flourishing, and the pecuniary prosperity of the country very
great. All the responsibility of framing institutions, laying
taxes, find providing for debts, had fallen on the ousted
administration. Succeeding to the powers and the means of the
Federal government without sharing any of the unpopularity at
the expense of which they had been attained, and ambitious not
so much of a splendid as of a quiet and popular
administration, the new president seemed to have before him a
very plain and easy path. … To the offices of Secretary of
State, Secretary of the Treasury, and Attorney General, left
vacant by the resignation of the late incumbents, Jefferson
nominated James Madison, Henry Dearborn, and Levi Lincoln, the
latter an early leader of the opposition in Massachusetts. …
As the Senate stood at present, still containing, as it did,
of the members present a majority of Federalists, Jefferson
did not think proper to make any further nominations; but,
soon after the adjournment, he appointed as Secretary of the
Treasury Albert Gallatin, all along the financial member of
the opposition. … The Navy Department, after being refused by
Chancellor Livingston, was given to Robert Smith, brother of
the Baltimore member of Congress. Livingston, however, having
reached the age of sixty, and being obliged, under a
Constitutional provision, to vacate the chancellorship of New
York, consented to accept the embassy to France. … Habersham
was continued as post-master-general for some six months, …
but he presently gave way to Gideon Granger, a leader of the
Connecticut Republicans."
R. Hildreth,
History of the United States, 2d series,
chapter 16 (volume 2, or volume 5 of whole work).
"The first act of the new Cabinet was to reach a general
understanding in regard to the objects of the Administration.
These appear to have been two only in number: reduction of
debt and reduction of taxes, and the relation to be preserved
between them."
H. Adams,
Life of Albert Gallatin,
page 276.
"Under President Jefferson, the heads of the great departments
of the government were changed, nor was there any just reason
to complain of this measure; as they formed a part of his
political council; and, as the chief executive officer of
government, he had a perfect right to select his confidential
friends and advisers. But when afterwards, and within a few
months, he removed able and upright men from offices of a
subordinate grade, his conduct was considered improper and
arbitrary, and as partaking somewhat of the 'right of
prerogative,' usually claimed and exercised by royal princes.
… In his inaugural address, Mr. Jefferson said, 'We have
gained little, if we encourage a political intolerance as
wicked as impolitic. We are all brethren of the same
principles; we are all republicans, and all federalists.'
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Yet in less than fifty days he removed fourteen federal
officers; without any allegation of unfaithfulness or
inefficiency: on the plea, indeed, that his predecessor had
removed two public officers on account of their political
opinions; and had appointed none to office in the government
but such as were of the same sentiments and views as the
administration. 'Few died, and none resigned,' he said; and
therefore, to equalize public offices between the two great
political parties, it was necessary, in his opinion, to remove
a part of those then employed, and to appoint others more
friendly to the new administration. For a very few of the
removals there might have been sufficient or justifiable
reasons offered; but in most instances the changes were made
merely for political opinions."
A. Bradford,
History of the Federal Government, 1789-1839,
chapter 6.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1801.
Appointment of John Marshall to be
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
His Constitutional decisions.
On the 31st of January, 1801, near the close of the term of
President Adams, the latter appointed John Marshall, who had
been Secretary of State in his cabinet since the previous May,
to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It was a memorable
appointment,—the most memorable, perhaps, that has ever been
made by official and not popular selection, in America, since
Washington was appointed to the command of the continental
army. Its result was to place the new, uninterpreted, plastic
Constitution of the Federal Republic under the hands of a
master, during thirty-four years of the period in which it
hardened into practical, determined law. It decided the
character of the Constitution, and by that decision the great
instrument was made a bond of nationality, firm, strenuous and
enduring. "The abilities of the new Chief Justice were
recognized by the profession and the public at the time of his
appointment, but the attractive qualities of his heart and his
kindly manners soon caused respect and reverence to ripen into
affection. Perhaps no American citizen except Washington ever
conciliated so large a measure of popularity and public
esteem. … In surveying the results of the labors of
thirty-four years recorded in thirty-two volumes of reports,
it is obvious that it was in the decision of cases involving
international and constitutional law that the force and
clearness of the Chief Justice's intellect shone most
conspicuous. Such was the ready assent of his colleagues on
the bench to his supremacy in the exposition of constitutional
law, that in such causes a dissenting opinion was almost
unknown. Having had occasion to discuss and thoroughly study
the Constitution, both in the Virginia convention which
adopted it and afterward in the legislature, he had
preconceived opinions concerning it, as well as perfect
familiarity with it. But in the hot contest waging between the
friends of a strict and those of a liberal construction of its
language, he wished to take no part. He stated that there
should be neither a liberal nor a strict construction, but
that the simple, natural, and usual meaning of its words and
phrases should govern their interpretation. In the case of
Gibbons v. Ogden, in which he is called upon to define the
true rule of construction of the United States Constitution
regarding the rights of the States and the rights and powers
of the general government, he studiously avoids each extreme,
steering safely in the middle course. He lays down his own
rule thus clearly and definitely:—'This instrument contains
an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to
their government. It has been said that these powers ought to
be construed strictly; but why ought they to be so construed?
Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives
countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated
powers, that which grants expressly the means for carrying all
others into execution, Congress is authorized to make all laws
that shall be necessary and proper for the purpose. But this
limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to
the powers which are conferred, nor is there one sentence in
the Constitution which has been pointed out by the gentlemen
of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that
prescribes this rule. We do not therefore think ourselves
justified in adopting it. If they contend only against that
enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their
natural and obvious import, we might question the application
of the term but should not controvert the principle. If they
contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some
theory not to be found in the Constitution, would deny to the
government those powers which the words of the grant, as
usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the
general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow
construction which would cripple the government, and render it
unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be
instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly
understood, render it competent; then we cannot perceive the
propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as a rule
by which the Constitution is to be expounded.' … Marshall's
dictum that there must be neither a strict nor a liberal
construction of the Constitution, but that the natural meaning
of the words must govern, was undoubtedly sound and wise. The
broad proposition was above criticism; it meant only that the
language of the instrument should not be stretched or wrenched
in any direction; and however politicians or even statesmen
might feel, there was no other possible ground for a judge to
take. Jefferson might regard it as a duty to make the
Constitution as narrow and restricted as possible; Hamilton
might feel that there was an actual obligation upon him to
make it as broad and comprehensive as its words would admit.
But Jefferson and Hamilton, in a different department of
public life from Marshall, had duties and obligations
correspondingly different from his. They might properly try to
make the Constitution mean what it seemed to them for the
public welfare that it should mean. Marshall could not
consider any such matter; he had only to find and declare what
it did mean, what its words actually and properly declared,
not what they might possibly or desirably be supposed or
construed to declare. This was the real force and the only
real force of his foregoing assertion. As an abstract
statement of his function it was impregnable. But, as with
most broad principles, the difficulty lay in the application
of it to particular cases. The constitutional questions which
came before Marshall chiefly took the form of whether or not
the Constitution conferred some power or authority upon
Congress, or upon the Executive. Then the Federalist lawyers
tried to show how much the language could mean, and the
anti-Federalist counsel sought to show how little it could
mean, and each urged that public policy was upon his side.
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The decision must be yes or no; the authority did or did not
rest in the government. It was easy to talk about the natural
and proper meaning of the words; but after all it was the
question at issue; did they (not could they) say yes, or did
they (not could they) say no, to the special authority sought
to be exercised. Now it is one thing to be impartial and
another to be colorless in mind. Judge Marshall was impartial
and strongly possessed of the judicial instinct or faculty.
But he was by no means colorless. He could no more eliminate
from his mind an interest in public affairs, and opinions as
to the preferable forms of government and methods of
administration, than he could cut out and cast away his mind
itself. Believing that the Constitution intended to create and
did create a national government, and having decided notions
as to what such a government must be able to do, he was
subject to a powerful though insensible influence to find the
existence of the required abilities in the government. … The
great majority of his decisions were in accordance with
Federalist principles of construction and of policy. The
Republicans all denounced him as a Federalist, even of an
extreme type."
A. B. Magruder,
John Marshall,
chapter 10.
ALSO IN:
H. Flanders,
Lives and Times of the Chief Justices of the Supreme Court,
volume 2.
J. Story,
John Marshall
(North American Review, volume 26).