History for ready reference, Volume 5, Tunnage to Zyp and Supplement

by J. N. Larned

never mentioned without calling him gallant or courageous,
spirited or noble. … A committee was appointed by the House
which took a large amount of evidence, and the majority
reported a resolution in favor of the expulsion of Brooks. On
this resolution, the vote was 121 to 95; but as it required
two thirds, it was not carried. Only three Southern
representatives publicly condemned the assault; only one voted
to expel Brooks. After the decision by the House, Brooks made
a speech, which he ended by resigning his place as
representative. His district re-elected him almost
unanimously: there were only six votes against him."
J. F. Rhodes,
History of the United States from 1850,
chapter 7 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
C. Sumner,
Works,
volume 4, pages 125-342.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1856.
Eighteenth Presidential Election.
Buchanan made President.
"The presidential campaign of … 1856, showed a striking
disintegration and re-formation of political groups. Nominally
there were four parties in the field: Democrats, Whigs, Native
Americans or Know-Nothings, and Republicans. The Know-Nothings
had lately won some State elections, but were of little
account as a national organization, for they stood upon an
issue hopelessly insignificant in comparison with slavery.
Already many had gone over to the Republican camp; those who
remained nominated as their candidates Millard Fillmore and
Andrew J. Donelson. The Whigs were the feeble remnant of a
really dead party, held together by affection for the old
name; too few to do anything by themselves, they took by
adoption the Know-Nothing candidates. The Republican party had
been born only in 1854. Its members, differing on other
matters, united upon the one doctrine, which they accepted as
a test: opposition to the extension of slavery. They nominated
John C. Fremont and William L. Dayton, and made a platform
whereby they declared it to be 'both the right and the duty of
Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of
barbarism, polygamy and slavery.' … In this Convention 110
votes were cast for Lincoln for the second place on the
ticket. … In the Democratic party there were two factions. The
favorite candidate of the South was Franklin Pierce, for
reelection, with Stephen A. Douglas as a substitute or second
choice; the North more generally preferred James Buchanan, who
was understood to be displeased with the repeal of the
Missouri Compromise. The struggle was sharp, but was won by
the friends of Buchanan, with whom John C. Breckenridge was
coupled. The campaign was eager, for the Republicans soon
developed a strength beyond what had been expected and which
put the Democrats to their best exertions. The result was:
popular vote, Democrats [Buchanan] 1,838,169, Republicans
[Fremont] 1,341,264, Know-Nothings and Whigs [Fillmore]
874,534; electoral vote, Democrats 174, Republicans 114,
Know-Nothings and Whigs, 8. Thus James Buchanan became
President of the United States, March 4, 1857. … Yet, while
the Democrats triumphed, the Republicans enjoyed the presage
of the future; they had polled a total number of votes which
surprised everyone; on the other hand, the Democrats had lost
ten States which they had carried in 1852 and had gained only
two others, showing a net loss of eight States; and their
electoral votes had dwindled from 254 to 174."
J. T, Morse, Jr.,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 1, chapter 4.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1856-1859.
The continued struggle in Kansas.
The Topeka vs. the Lecompton Constitution.
See KANSAS: A. D. 1854-1859.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1857.
The Dred Scott decision.
"Dred Scott was a negro slave, the property of Dr. Emerson, a
surgeon in the army. In 1834, Dred was carried by his master
from the slave state of Missouri, first, to the military post
at Rock Island in the free state of Illinois, where he
remained till April or May, 1836; and, thence, to Fort
Snelling, in the territory known as Upper Louisiana, and lying
north of the line of the Missouri Compromise, in both of which
places he was held as a slave. At Fort Snelling, in the year
1836, he was married to Harriet, a negro slave, who had also
been brought to Fort Snelling by her master, Major Taliaferro,
and there sold to Dr. Emerson. In 1838, Dred, with his wife
and a child which had been born to him, was carried back by
his master to the state of Missouri. Subsequently, Dred, with
his wife, his daughter Eliza, and another daughter, Lizzie,
who was born after the return of her family to Missouri, was
sold to John F. A. Sandford—the defendant in the present case.
Dred commenced his efforts for the establishment of the
freedom of himself and family in the state courts of Missouri.
The suit was brought in the Circuit Court of St. Louis county.
Before this court, the judgment was in his favor, but, on
appeal by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the state,
this judgment was reversed, and the case remanded to the court
below,—where it remained, awaiting the decision of the suit
which, in the meanwhile, Dred had brought in the United States
courts. This second suit was brought before the Circuit Court
of the United States for the district of Missouri, and thence
carried, by writ of error, to the Supreme Court at Washington.
It may be added that the first suit was brought against Dr.
Emerson, but the second against Mr. Sandford, to whom Dred had
been sold. The action, though brought to assert the title of
Dred Scott and his family to freedom, was, in form, an action
of trespass 'vi et armis,' which is the usual form employed in
that state to try questions of this kind. The plaintiff,
Scott, in his writ both makes a declaration of the acts of
trespass—which of course are the acts of restraint necessarily
implied in holding himself and family as slaves—and avers,
what was necessary to give the court jurisdiction, that he and
the defendant are citizens of different states; that is, that
he is a citizen of Missouri, and the defendant a citizen of
New York. At the April term of the court, in 1854, the
defendant Sandford pleads, that the court has not
jurisdiction, because the plaintiff is not a citizen of
Missouri, but a negro of African descent, whose ancestors, of
pure African blood, were brought into this country and sold as
slaves.
{3400}
To this plea the plaintiff demurs as insufficient; the
demurrer is argued at the same term, and is sustained by the
court, that is, the court asserts its jurisdiction over the
case." It was on this plea that the case went finally to the
Supreme Court of the United States and was decided in 1857.
"The question of negro citizenship came up in the
consideration of the question of jurisdiction. For the
question of jurisdiction was the question, whether the
plaintiff was a citizen of Missouri, as he had averred in his
declaration; and the only fact pleaded to disprove his
citizenship was the fact that Scott was a negro of African
descent, whose ancestors had been sold as slaves in the United
States. The court, however, decided that this fact did not
exclude the possibility of his being a citizen; in other
words, it decided that a negro of this description can be a
citizen of the United States. The first question before the
Supreme Court was, whether it could rejudge this determination
of the circuit court."
W. A. Larned,
Negro Citizenship
(New Englander, August, 1857).
The decision of the Supreme Court, delivered by Chief Justice
Taney, March 6, 1857, not only closed the door of freedom to
Dred Scott, but shut the doors of the United States courts
against him and all those of his race who were or had been
slaves, or who sprang from an ancestry in the servile state.
The opinion of Chief Justice Taney was concurred in by all the
justices except Curtis and McLean-Justice Nelson dissenting on
one point only. The arguments and the sentiments in the
opinion which gave most offence to the conscience and the
reason of the country were the following: "It becomes … our
duty to decide whether the facts stated in the plea are or are
not sufficient to show that the plaintiff is not entitled to
sue as a citizen in a court of the United States. This is
certainly a very serious question, and one that now for the
first time has been brought for decision before this court.
But it is brought here by those who have a right to bring it,
and it is our duty to meet it and decide it. The question is
simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into
this country, and sold as slaves, become a member of the
political community formed and brought into existence by the
Constitution of the United States, and as such become entitled
to all the rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied
by that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the
privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the
cases specified in the Constitution. It will be observed, that
the plea applies to that class of persons only whose ancestors
were negroes of the African race, and imported into this
country, and sold and held as slaves. The only matter in issue
before the court, therefore, is whether the descendants of
such slaves, when they shall be emancipated, or who are born
of parents who had become free before their birth, are
citizens of a State, in the sense in which the word citizen is
used in the Constitution of the United States. And this being
the only matter in dispute on the pleadings, the court must be
understood as speaking in this opinion of that class only,
that is, of those persons who are the descendants of Africans
who were imported into this country, and sold as slaves. … The
words 'people of the United States' and 'citizens' are
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe
the political body who, according to our republican
institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the power and
conduct the Government through their representatives. They are
what we familiarly call the 'sovereign people,' and every,
citizen is one of this people, and a constituent member of
this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the class
of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a
portion of this people, and are constituent members 'of this
sovereignty? We think they are not, and that they are not
included, and were not intended to be included, under the word
'citizens' in the Constitution, and can therefore claim none
of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides
for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the
contrary, they were at that time considered as a subordinate
and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained
subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges
but such as those who held the power and the Government might
choose to grant them. It is not the province of the court to
decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy,
of these laws. The decision of that question belonged to the
political or law-making power. … In discussing this question,
we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State
may confer within its own limits, and the rights of
citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means
follow, because he has all the rights and privileges of a
citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of the United
States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the
citizen of a State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and
privileges of a citizen in any other State. … The question
then arises, whether the provisions of the Constitution, in
relation to the personal rights and privileges to which the
citizen of a State should be entitled, embraced the negro
African race, at that time in this country, or who might
afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be
made free in any State; and to put it in the power of a single
State to make him a citizen of the United States, and endue
him with the full rights of citizenship in every other State
without their consent? … The court think the affirmative of
these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot, the
plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of
Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in its
courts. It is true, every person, and every class and
description of persons, who were at the time of the adoption
of the Constitution recognised as citizens in the several
States, became also citizens of this new political body; but
none other. … It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine
who were citizens of the several States when the Constitution
was adopted. And in order to do this, we must recur to the
Governments and institutions of the thirteen colonies, when
they separated from Great Britain and formed new
sovereignties, and took their places in the family of
independent nations. We must inquire who, at that time, were
recognised as the people or citizens of a State, whose rights
and liberties had been outraged by the English Government; and
who declared their independence, and assumed the powers of
Government to defend their rights by force of arms.
{3401}
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and histories of
the times, and the language used in the Declaration of
Independence, show that neither the class of persons who had
been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they
had become free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of
the people, nor intended to be included in the general words
used in that memorable instrument. It is difficult at this day
to realize the state of public opinion in relation to that
unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and
enlightened portions of the world at the time of the
Declaration of Independence, and when the Constitution was
framed and adopted. But the public history of every European
nation displays it in a manner too plain to be mistaken. They
had for more than a century before been regarded as beings of
an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race, either in social or political relations; and so
far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was
bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully
be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and sold,
and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic,
whenever a profit could be made by it. This opinion was at
that time fixed and universal in the civilized portion of the
white race." Finally, having, with great elaboration, decided
the question of citizenship adversely to Dred Scott and all
his kind, the Court proceeded to obliterate the antislavery
provision of the Missouri Compromise, which constituted one of
the grounds on which Dred Scott claimed his freedom. "It is
the opinion of the court," wrote Chief Justice Taney, "that
the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding
and owning property of this kind in the territory of the
United States north of the line therein mentioned, is not
warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore void; and that
neither Dred Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made
free by being carried into this territory; even if they had
been carried there by the owner, with the intention of
becoming a permanent resident. We have so far examined the
case, as it stands under the Constitution of the United
States, and the powers thereby delegated to the Federal
Government. But there is another point in the case which
depends on State power and State law. And it is contended, on
the part of the plaintiff, that he is made free by being taken
to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois, independently of his
residence in the territory of the United States; and being so
made free, he was not again reduced to a state of slavery by
being brought back to Missouri. Our notice of this part of the
case will be very brief; for the principle on which it depends
was decided in this court, upon much consideration, in the
case of Strader et al. v. Graham, reported in 10th Howard, 82.
In that case, the slaves had been taken from Kentucky to Ohio,
with the consent of the owner, and afterwards brought back to
Kentucky. And this court held that their status or condition,
as free or slave, depended upon the laws of Kentucky, when
they were brought back into that State, and not of Ohio; and
that this court had no jurisdiction to revise the judgment of
a State court upon its own laws. This was the point directly
before the court, and the decision that this court had not
jurisdiction turned upon it, as will be seen by the report of
the case. So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken
into the State of Illinois by his owner, and was there held as
such, and brought back in that character, his status, as free
or slave, depended on the laws of Missouri, and not of
Illinois. … Upon the whole, therefore, it is the judgment of
this court, that it appears by the record before us that the
plaintiff in error is not a citizen of Missouri, in the sense
in which that word is used in the Constitution; and that the
Circuit Court of the United States, for that reason, had no
jurisdiction in the case, and could give no judgment in it.
Its judgment for the defendant must, consequently, be
reversed, and a mandate issued, directing the suit to be
dismissed for want of jurisdiction."
Report of the Decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of
Dred Scott vs. John F. A. Sandford
(Howard's Reports, volume 19).
"By this presentation of the iniquity, naked and in its most
repulsive form, Taney did no small harm to the party which he
intended to aid. It has been said that slavery plucked ruin on
its own head by its aggressive violence. It could not help
showing its native temper, nor could it help feeding its
hunger of land, insisting on the restoration of its runaways,
or demanding a foreign policy such as would fend off the
approach of emancipation. But Taney's judgment was a
gratuitous aggression and an insult to humanity at the same
time, for which, supposing that the Southern leaders inspired
it, they paid dear. If the slave was mere property, his owner
might be entitled to take him anywhere, and thus slavery might
be made national. The boast of a daring partisan of slavery
might be fulfilled, that the day would come when men might be
bought and sold in Boston as freely as any other goods. The
issue, which all the politicians had striven to keep out of
sight, was presented in its most startling and shocking form."
Goldwin Smith,
The United States,
page 235.
ALSO IN:
H. Wilson,
Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America,
volume 2, chapter 39.
S. Tyler,
Memoirs of Roger B. Taney,
chapters 4-5.
A. Johnston,
The United States: Its History and Constitution,
section 249.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1857.
Tariff reduction.
The financial collapse.
See TARIFF LEGISLATION (UNITED STATES): A. D. 1846-1861.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1857-1859.
The Mormon rebellion in Utah.
See UTAH: A. D. 1857-1859.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1858.
Treaty with China.
See CHINA: A. D. 1857-1868.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1858.
The Lincoln and Douglas debate in Illinois.
The senatorial term of Mr. Stephen A. Douglas being about to
expire, the choice of his successor became an issue which
controlled the election of members of the Illinois
Legislature, in the fall of 1858. Mr. Douglas received an
endorsement at the hands of the Democratic State Convention,
in April, which virtually nominated him for re-election.
Abraham Lincoln, who had come markedly to the front in his
state during the Kansas discussions, "was the man already
chosen in the hearts of the Republicans of Illinois for the
same office, and therefore with singular appropriateness they
passed, with great unanimity, at their convention in
Springfield on the 16th of June, the characteristic
resolution: 'That Hon. Abraham Lincoln is our first and only
choice for United States Senator to fill the vacancy about to
be created by the expiration of Mr. Douglas' term of office.'
{3402}
There was of course no surprise in this for Mr. Lincoln. He
had been all along led to expect it, and with that in view had
been earnestly and quietly at work preparing a speech in
acknowledgment of the honor about to be conferred on him. This
speech he wrote on stray envelopes and scraps of paper, as
ideas suggested themselves, putting them into that
miscellaneous and convenient receptacle, his hat. As the
convention drew near he copied the whole on connected sheets,
carefully revising every line and sentence, and fastened them
together, for reference during the delivery of the speech, and
for publication. The former precaution, however, was
unnecessary, for he had studied and read over what he had
written so long and carefully that he was able to deliver it
without the least hesitation or difficulty. … Before
delivering his speech he invited a dozen or so of his friends
over to the library of the State House, where he read and
submitted it to them. After the reading he asked each man for
his opinion. Some condemned and not one endorsed it. One man,
more forcible than elegant, characterized it as a 'd-d fool
utterance;' another said the doctrine was 'ahead of its time;'
and still another contended that it would drive away a good
many voters fresh from the Democratic ranks. Each man attacked
it in his criticism. I was the last to respond. Although the
doctrine announced was rather rank, yet it suited my views,
and I said, 'Lincoln, deliver that speech as read and it will
make you President.' At the time I hardly realized the force
of my prophecy. Having patiently listened to these various
criticisms from his friends—all of which with a single
exception were adverse—he rose from his chair, and after
alluding to the careful study and intense thought he had given
the question, he answered all their objections substantially
as follows: 'Friends, this thing has been retarded long
enough. The time has come when these sentiments should be
uttered; and if it is decreed that I should go down because of
this speech, then let me go down linked to the truth—let me
die in the advocacy of what is just and right.' The next day,
the 17th, the speech was delivered just as we had heard it
read. [The part of this famous speech which made the
profoundest impression and gave rise to the most discussion
was the opening part, contained in the following sentences:
'If we could first know where we are, and whither we are
tending, we could better judge what to do, and how to do it.
We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was
initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of
putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of
that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has
constantly augmented. In my opinion, it will not cease until a
crisis shall have been reached and passed. "A house divided
against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot
endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect
the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to
fall—but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will
become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents
of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it
where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in
the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push
it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the
States, old as well as new, North as well as South. Have we no
tendency to the latter condition? Let anyone who doubts
carefully contemplate that now almost complete legal
combination—piece of machinery, so to speak—compounded of the
Nebraska doctrine and the Dred Scott decision. Let him
consider not only what work the machinery is adapted to do,
and how well adapted; but also let him study the history of
its construction, and trace, if he can, or rather fail, if he
can, to trace the evidences of design and concert of action
among its chief architects, from the beginning.'] … Lincoln
had now created in reality a more profound impression than he
or his friends anticipated. Many Republicans deprecated the
advanced ground he had taken, the more so as the Democrats
rejoiced that it afforded them an issue clear and
well-defined. Numbers of his friends distant from Springfield,
on reading his speech, wrote him censorious letters; and one
well-informed co-worker predicted his defeat, charging it to
the first ten lines of the speech. These complaints, coming
apparently from every quarter, Lincoln bore with great
patience. To one complainant who followed him into his office
he said proudly, 'If I had to draw a pen across my record, and
erase my whole life from sight, and I had one poor gift or
choice left as to what I should save from the wreck, I should
choose that speech and leave it to the world unerased.'
Meanwhile Douglas had returned from Washington to his home in
Chicago. Here he rested for a few days until his friends and
co-workers had arranged the details of a public reception on
the 9th of July, when he delivered from the balcony of the
Tremont House a speech intended as an answer to the one made
by Lincoln in Springfield. Lincoln was present at this
reception, but took no part in it. The next day, however, he
replied. Both speeches were delivered at the same place.
Leaving Chicago, Douglas passed on down to Bloomington and
Springfield, where he spoke on the 16th and 17th of July
respectively. On the evening of the latter day Lincoln
responded again in a most effective and convincing effort. The
contest now took on a different phase. Lincoln's Republican
friends urged him to draw Douglas into a joint debate, and he
accordingly sent him a challenge on the 24th of July. … On the
30th Douglas finally accepted the proposition to 'divide time,
and address the same audiences,' naming seven different
places, one in each Congressional district, outside of Chicago
and Springfield, for joint meetings. The places and dates
were, Ottawa, August 21; Freeport, August 27; Jonesboro,
September 15; Charleston, September 18; Galesburg, October 7;
Quincy, October 13; and Alton, October 15. … During the
canvass Mr. Lincoln, in addition to the seven meetings with
Douglas, filled thirty-one appointments made by the State
Central Committee, besides speaking at many other times and
places not previously advertised. … The election took place on
the second of November, and while Lincoln received of the
popular vote a majority of over 4,000, yet the returns from
the legislative districts foreshadowed his defeat. In fact,
when the Senatorial election took place in the Legislature,
Douglas received 54 and Lincoln 46 votes—one of the results of
the lamentable apportionment law then in operation."
W. H. Herndon and J. W. Weik,
Lincoln, the True Story of a Great Life,
chapter 13 (volume 2).
{3403}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1859.
Admission of Oregon into the Union, with a constitution
excluding free colored People.
See OREGON: A. D. 1859.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1859.
John Brown's attack on Slavery in Virginia.
The tragedy at Harper's Ferry.
"On the 17th of October, 1859, this country was bewildered and
astounded while the fifteen Slave States were convulsed with
fear, rage, and hate, by telegraphic dispatches from Baltimore
and Washington, announcing the outbreak, at Harper's Ferry, of
a conspiracy of Abolitionists and negroes, having for its
object the devastation and ruin of the South, and the massacre
of her white inhabitants. … As time wore on, further advices,
with particulars and circumstances, left no room to doubt the
substantial truth of the original report. An attempt had
actually been made to excite a slave insurrection in Northern
Virginia, and the one man in America to whom such an
enterprise would not seem utter insanity and suicide, was at
the head of it." This was John Brown, of Osawatomie, who had
been fighting slavery and the border ruffians in Kansas (see
KANSAS: A. D. 1854-1859) for five years, and had now changed
his field. "A secret convention, called by Brown, and attended
only by such whites and blacks as he believed in thorough
sympathy with his views, had assembled in a negro church at
Chatham, Canada West, May 8, 1858; at which Convention a
'Provisional Constitution and Ordinances for the People of the
United States' had been adopted. It was, of course, drafted by
Brown, and was essentially an embodiment of his political
views. … John Brown was chosen Commander-in-Chief; J. H. Kagi,
Secretary of War; Owen Brown (son of John), Treasurer; Richard
Realf, Secretary of State. Brown returned to the States soon
after his triumphal entry into Canada as a liberator. … He was
in Hagerstown, Maryland, on the 30th [of June, 1859], where he
registered his name as 'Smith, and two sons, from Western New
York.' He told his landlord that they had been farming in
Western New York, but had been discouraged by losing two or
three years' crops by frost, and they were now looking for a
milder climate, in a location adapted to wool-growing, etc.
After looking about Harper's Ferry for several days, they
found, five or six miles from that village, a large farm, with
three unoccupied houses, the owner, Dr. Booth Kennedy, having
died the last Spring. These houses they rented for a trifle
until the next March, paying the rent in advance. … After they
had lived there a few weeks, attracting no observation, others
joined them from time to time, including two of Brown's young
daughters; and one would go and another come, without exciting
any particular remark. … Meantime, the greater number of the
men kept out of sight during the day, so as not to attract
attention, while their arms, munitions, etc., were being
gradually brought from Chambersburg, in well-secured boxes. No
meal was eaten on the farm, while old Brown was there, until a
blessing had been asked upon it; and his Bible was in daily
requisition. The night of the 24th of October was originally
fixed upon by Brown for the first blow against Slavery in
Virginia, by the capture of the Federal Arsenal at Harper's
Ferry; and his biographer, Redpath, alleges that many were on
their way to be with him on that occasion, when they were
paralyzed by the intelligence that the blow had already been
struck, and had failed. The reason given for this, by one who
was in his confidence, is, that Brown, who had been absent on
a secret journey to the North, suspected that one of his party
was a traitor, and that he must strike prematurely, or not at
all. But the women who had been with them at the Kennedy
farm—the wives or daughters of one or another of the party—had
already been quietly sent away; and the singular complexion of
their household had undoubtedly begun to excite curiosity, if
not alarm, among their neighbors. … Harper's Ferry was then a
village of some 5,000 inhabitants, lying on the Virginia side
of the Potomac, and on either side of its principal tributary,
the Shenandoah, which here enters it from the South. Its site
is a mere nest or cup among high, steep mountains. … Here the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad crosses the Potomac. … Washington
is 57 miles distant by turnpike; Baltimore 80 miles by
railroad. … One of its very few streets was entirely occupied
by the work-shops and offices of the National Armory, and had
an iron railing across its entrance. In the old Arsenal
building, there were usually stored from 100,000 to 200,000
stand of arms. The knowledge of this had doubtless determined
the point at which the first blow of the liberators was to be
struck. The forces with which Brown made his attack consisted
of seventeen white and five colored men, though it is said
that others who escaped assisted outside, by cutting the
telegraph wires and tearing up the railroad track. The
entrance of this petty army into Harper's Ferry on Sunday
evening … seems to have been effected without creating alarm.
They first rapidly extinguished the lights of the town; then
took possession of the Armory buildings, which were only
guarded by three watchmen, whom, without meeting resistance or
exciting alarm, they seized and locked up in the guardhouse.
It is probable that they were aided, or, at least, guided, by
friendly negroes belonging in the village. … At a quarter-past
one, the western train arrived, and its conductor found the
bridge guarded by armed men. … A little after midnight, the
house of Colonel Washington was visited by six of Brown's men
under Captain Stevens, who captured the Colonel, seized his
arms, horses, etc., and liberated his slaves. On their return,
Stevens and party visited the house of Mr. Alstadtt and his
son, whom they captured, and freed their slaves. These, with
each male citizen as he appeared in the street, were confined
in the Armory until they numbered between forty and fifty.
Brown informed his prisoners that they could be liberated on
condition of writing to their friends to send a negro apiece
as ransom. At daylight, the train proceeded, Brown walking
over the bridge with the conductor. Whenever anyone asked the
object of their captors, the uniform answer was, 'To free the
slaves;' and when one of the workmen, seeing an armed guard at
the Arsenal gate, asked by what authority they had taken
possession of the public property, he was answered, 'By the
authority of God Almighty!' The passenger train that sped
eastward from Harper's Ferry, by Brown's permission, in the
early morning of Monday, October 17th, left that place completely
in the military possession of the insurrectionists. …
{3404}
But it was no longer entirely one-sided. The white Virginians,
who had arms, and who remained unmolested in their houses,
prepared to use them. … Several Virginians soon obtained
possession of a room overlooking the Armory gates, and fired
thence at the sentinels who guarded them, one of whom was
mortally wounded. Still, throughout the forenoon, the
liberators remained masters of the town. … Had Brown chosen to
fly to the mountains with his few followers, he might still
have done so, though with a much slenderer chance of impunity
than if he had, according to his original plan, decamped at
midnight, with such arms and ammunition as he could bear away.
Why he lingered, to brave inevitable destruction, is not
certain; but it may fairly be presumed that he had private
assurances that the negroes of the surrounding country would
rise. … At all events, if his doom was already sealed, his
delay at least hastened it. Half an hour after noon, a militia
force, 100 strong, arrived from Charlestown, the county seat,
and were rapidly disposed so as to command every available
exit from the place. … Militia continued to pour in; the
telegraph and railroad having been completely repaired, so
that the Government at Washington, Governor Wise at Richmond,
and the authorities at Baltimore, were in immediate
communication with Harper's Ferry, and hurrying forward troops
from all quarters. … Night found Brown's forces reduced to
three unwounded whites beside himself, with perhaps half a
dozen negroes from the vicinity. Eight of the insurgents were
already dead; another lay dying beside the survivors; two were
captives mortally wounded, and one other unhurt. Around the
few survivors were 1,500 armed, infuriated foes. … During that
night, Colonel Lee, with 90 United States marines and two
pieces of artillery, arrived, and took possession of the
Armory guard, very close to the engine-house. … At seven in
the morning, after a parley which resulted in nothing, the
marines advanced to the assault, broke in the door of the
engine-house by using a ladder as a battering-ram, and rushed
into the building. One of the defenders was shot and two
marines wounded; but the odds were too great; in an instant,
all resistance was over. Brown was struck in the face with a
saber and knocked down, after which the blow was several times
repeated, while a soldier ran a bayonet twice into the old
man's body."
H. Greeley, The American Conflict,
volume 1, chapter 20.
"The Virginians demonstrated amply during the Civil War that
they were not cowards. What made them shake in their shoes was
not John Brown and his handful of men, but the shadows which
their excited imagination saw standing behind them. … The best
evidence of the frightful genuineness of the panic is the
brazen impudence with which it was brought forward as the
justifying motive for the many atrocities which marked the
trial. The brutalizing influences of slavery came to light
with terrible vividness. Kapp's statement that Brown 'enjoyed
very careful treatment' is not mistaken, but it is true only
of the later period of his imprisonment. Watson Brown, whose
life was prolonged until the early morning of the 19th of
October, complained of the hard bench he was forced to lie on,
His fellow-prisoner, Coppoc, begged for a mattress, or at
least a blanket, for the dying man, but could obtain neither.
Both Brown himself and Stevens, who was even more seriously
wounded, had nothing furnished them but wretched straw.
Redpath (page 373) assures us that 'from October 19 till
November 7 no clean clothing was given to Brown, but that he
lay in his soiled and blood-stained garments just as he had
fallen at Harper's Ferry.' On the 25th of October he was
brought before the court; he was not at first carried there on
a camp-bed, as was the case afterward, but compelled to walk,
leaning on two men. Virginia could not wait till he could
stand. … There was no such haste to carry out the sentence as
there had been to bring the trial to a close. On the 2d of
November, Brown was sentenced to suffer death by hanging on
the 2d of December."
H. von Holst,
John Brown,
pages 139-155.
"Brown actually expected that the raid on Harper's Ferry would
be the stroke with which Moses called forth water from the
rock. The spring was to turn southward, and in its swift
course to swell to a mighty river. He declared expressly to
Governor Wise, and later still in his letters, that he had not
intended simply to break the chains of a few dozen or a few
hundred slaves, and to take them again to Canada. Emancipation
was to be spread farther and farther, and the freedmen were to
remain in the Southern States. Heaven itself could not have
brought this about, unless it had sent the angel of judgment
to cast down into the dust the whole white population from
Florida to Maine." At the last, when John Brown, wounded and a
prisoner, lay waiting his death, "he did not perceive that his
undertaking could not have succeeded under any circumstances;
but he did see that his failure and its consequences achieved
much greater results than its most complete success could have
done. … 'I can leave to God,' he writes, 'the time and manner
of my death, for I believe now that the sealing of my
testimony before God and man with my blood will do far more to
further the cause to which I have earnestly devoted myself,
than anything else I have done in my life.' And a few days
later, 'My health improves slowly, and I am quite cheerful
concerning my approaching end, since I am convinced that I am
worth infinitely more on the gallows than I could be anywhere
else.' … One year after the execution of Brown, on the 20th of
December, 1860, South Carolina declared its secession from the
Union, and on May 11, 1861, the Second Massachusetts Regiment
of infantry was raised, which was first to sing on its march
South:
'John Brown's body lies mouldering in the grave,
His soul goes marching on.'"
H. von Holst,
John Brown,
pages 139-155, 125-126, 167-175.
"Editors persevered for a good while in saying that Brown was
crazy; but at last they said only that it was 'a crazy
scheme,' and the only evidence brought to prove it was that it
cost him his life. I have no doubt that if he had gone with
5,000 men, liberated 1,000 slaves, killed a hundred or two
slaveholders, and had as many more killed on his own side, but
not lost his own life, these same editors would have called it
by a more respectable name. Yet he has been far more
successful than that."
H. D. Thoreau,
The Last Days of John Brown
(Anti-Slavery and Reform Papers).
ALSO IN:
H. Wilson,
Rise and Fall of the Slave Power,
volume 2, chapter 45.
F. B. Sanborn,
Life and Letters of John Brown,
chapters 15-17.
J. Redpath,
Public Life of Captain John Brown.
{3405}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860.
The Eighth Census.
Total population, 31,443,322, being an increase exceeding 35½
per cent. over the population of 1850; classified and
distributed as follows:
North.
White. Free black. Slave.
California. 361,353 4,086 0
Colorado. 34,231 46 0
Connecticut. 451,520 8,627 0
Dakota. 2,576 0 0
Illinois. 1,704,323 7,628 0
Indiana. 1,339,000 11,428 0
Iowa. 673,844 1,069 0
Kansas. 106,579 625 2
Maine. 626,952 1,327 0
Massachusetts. 1,221,464 9,602 0
Michigan. 742,314 6,799 0
Minnesota. 171,864 259 0
Nebraska. 28,759 67 15
Nevada. 6,812 45 0
New Hampshire. 325,579 494 0
New Jersey. 646,699 25,318 18
New York. 3,831,730 49,005 0
Ohio. 2,302,838 36,673 0
Oregon. 52,337 128 0
Pennsylvania. 2,849,266 56,849 0
Rhode Island. 170,668 3,952 0
Utah. 40,214 30 29
Vermont. 314,389 709 0
Washington. 11,138 30 0
Wisconsin. 774,710 1,171 0
--- --- ---
Total 18,791,159 225,967 64
South.
White. Free black. Slave.
Alabama. 526,431 2,690 435,080
Arkansas. 324,191 144 111,115
Delaware. 90,589 19,829 1,798
District of Columbia. 60,764 11,131 3,185
Florida. 77,748 932 61,745
Georgia. 591,588 3,500 462,198
Kentucky. 919,517 10,684 225,483
Louisiana. 357,629 18,647 331,726
Maryland. 515,918 83,942 87,189
Mississippi. 353,901 773 436,631
Missouri. 1,063,509 3,572 114,931
New Mexico 82,924 85 0
North Carolina. 631,100 30,463 881,059
South Carolina. 291,388 9,914 402,406
Tennessee. 826,782 7,300 275,719
Texas. 421,294 855 182,566
Virginia. 1,047,411 58,042 490,865
---- --- ---
Total 8,182,684 262,008 8,958,696
Immigration in the preceding decade added 2,598,214 to the
population, being 1,388,098 from the British Islands, and
1,114,564 from other parts of Europe.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860.
The Southern view of Slavery.
The state of opinion and feeling on the subject of slavery to
which the people of the southern states had arrived in 1860 is
set forth with brevity and distinctness in Claiborne's Life of
General Quitman, which was published that year: "In the early
stages of African slavery in the South," says the writer, "it
was by many considered an evil, that had been inflicted upon
the country by British and New England cupidity. The Africans
were regarded as barbarians, and were governed by the lash.
The very hatred of the 'evil' forced upon us was, in a
measure, transferred to the unhappy victims. They were treated
with severity, and no social relations subsisted between them
and the whites. By degrees slavery began to be considered 'a
necessary evil,' to be got rid of by gradual emancipation, or
perhaps not at all, and the condition of the slave sensibly
improved. The natural sense of justice in the human heart
suggested that they had been brought here by compulsion, and
that they should be regarded not as savages, but as captives,
who were to be kindly treated while laboring for their
ultimate redemption. The progress of anti-slavery sentiment in
the Northern States (once regarded by the South as a harmless
fanaticism), the excesses it has occasioned, and the
unconstitutional power it claims, at length prompted a general
and searching inquiry into the true status of the negro. The
moment that the Southern mind became convinced, that slavery,
as it exists among us, instead of being a moral, social, and
political evil, is a moral, social, and political good, and is
the natural condition of the negro, as ordained by Providence,
and the only condition in which he can be civilized and
instructed, the condition of the Southern slave underwent a
thorough change. As a permanent fixture, as a hereditary
heirloom, as a human being with an immortal soul, intrusted to
us by God for his own wise purposes, his value increased, and
his relation to his owner approximated to the relation of
guardian and ward. Interest taught us that it would be wise to
cherish what was to be the permanent means of production and
profit, and religion exacted the humane and judicious
employment of the 'talent' committed to our care. Thus the
most powerful influences that sway the heart and the judgment
are in operation for the benefit of the slave, and hence his
present comfortable and constantly ameliorating condition. It
is due, almost solely, to the moral convictions of the
slaveholder. Our laws protect the slave in life and limb, and
against cruel and inordinate punishment. Those laws are
rigorously applied, though rarely necessary, for public
opinion, more formidable than law, would condemn to execration
and infamy the unjust and cruel master. Since these
convictions in regard to slavery have been adopted almost
unanimously in the South, the value of negroes has quadrupled.
This, however, is in some measure an evil, because the
tendency is to concentrate the slaves in the hands of the few,
who are able to pay the extraordinary rates now demanded. It
would be better for the commonwealth, and give additional
solidity to our system of domestic servitude, if every family
had an interest in it, secured, to a limited extent, against
liability for debt. It should constitute in the South, if
practicable, a part of every homestead, and then interest, and
household tradition, and the friendly, confidential, and even
affectionate relations that in the present state of public
feeling prevail between master and slave, would unite all men
in its defense. Neither land, nor slaves, which are here more
valuable than land, should, by either direct or indirect
legislation, be concentrated in few hands. Every citizen
should have, if possible, that immediate interest in them
which would make him feel that, in defending the commonwealth
and its institutions, he is defending his own inheritance."
J. F. H. Claiborne,
Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman,
volume 1, chapter 4.
{3406}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860 (April-November).
Nineteenth Presidential Election.
Division of the Democratic Party.
Four candidates in the field.
A victory for freedom in the choice of Abraham Lincoln.
"Mr. J. W. Fell, a politician of Pennsylvania, says that after
the debates of 1858 [with Douglas] he urged Lincoln to seek
the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1860. Lincoln,
however, replied curtly that men like Seward and Chase were
entitled to take precedence, and that no such 'good luck' was
in store for him. … In the winter of 1859-60 sundry 'intimate
friends,' active politicians of Illinois, pressed him to
consent to be mentioned as a candidate. He considered the
matter over night and then gave them the desired permission,
at the same time saying that he would not accept the
vice-presidency. … With the opening of the spring of 1860 the
several parties began the campaign in earnest. The Democratic
Convention met first, at Charleston, April 23; and immediately
the line of disruption opened. Upon the one side stood
Douglas, with the moderate men and nearly all the Northern
delegates, while against him were the advocates of extreme
Southern doctrines, supported by the administration and by
most of the delegates from the 'Cotton States.' The majority
of the committee appointed to draft the platform were
anti-Douglas men; but their report was rejected, and that
offered by the pro-Douglas minority was substituted, 165 yeas
to 138 nays. Thereupon the delegations of Alabama,
Mississippi, Florida, and Texas, and sundry delegates from
other States, withdrew from the Convention, taking away 45
votes out of a total of 303. Those who remained declared the
vote of two thirds of a full Convention, i. e., 202 votes, to
be necessary for a choice. Then during three days 57 ballots
were cast, Douglas being always far in the lead, but never
polling more than 152½ votes. At last, on May 3, an
adjournment was had until June 18, at Baltimore. At this
second meeting contesting delegations appeared, and the
decisions were uniformly in favor of the Douglas men, which
provoked another secession of the extremist Southern men. A
ballot showed 173½ votes for Douglas out of a total of 191½;
the total was less than two thirds of the full number of the
original Convention, and therefore it was decided that any
person receiving two thirds of the votes cast by the delegates
present should be deemed the nominee. The next ballot gave
Douglas 181½. Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia was nominated for
vice-president. On June 28, also at Baltimore [after a meeting
and adjournment from Richmond, June 11], there came together a
collection composed of original seceders at Charleston, and of
some who had been rejected and others who had seceded at
Baltimore. Very few Northern men were present, and the body in
fact represented the Southern wing of the Democracy. Having,
like its competitor, the merit of knowing its own mind, it
promptly nominated John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky and Joseph
Lane of Oregon, and adopted the radical platform which had
been reported at Charleston. These doings opened, so that it
could never be closed, that seam of which the thread had long
been visible athwart the surface of the old Democratic party.
… In May the Convention of the Constitutional Union party met,
also at Baltimore. This organization was a sudden outgrowth
designed only to meet the present emergency. … The party died,
of necessity, upon the day when Lincoln was elected, and its
members were then distributed between the Republicans, the
Secessionists, and the Copperheads. John Bell, of Tennessee,
the candidate for the presidency, joined the Confederacy;
Edward Everett, of Massachusetts, the candidate for the
vice-presidency, became a Republican. The party never had a
hope of electing its men; but its existence increased the
chance of throwing the election into Congress; and this hope
inspired exertions far beyond what its own prospects
warranted. On May 16 the Republican Convention came together
at Chicago, where the great 'Wigwam' had been built to hold
10,000 persons. … Many candidates were named, chiefly Seward,
Lincoln, Chase, Cameron, Edward Bates of Missouri, and William
L. Dayton of New Jersey. Thurlow Weed was Seward's lieutenant.
Horace Greeley, chiefly bent upon the defeat of Seward, would
have liked to achieve it by the success of Bates. David Davis,
aided by Judge Logan and a band of personal friends from
Illinois, was manager for Lincoln. Primarily the contest lay
between Seward and Lincoln. … Upon the third ballot … those
who were keeping the tally saw that it stood:—Seward, 180;
Lincoln, 231½; Chase, 24½; Bates, 22; Dayton, 1; McLean, 5;
Scattering, 1. … Before the count could be announced, a
delegate from Ohio transferred four votes to Lincoln. This
settled the matter; and then other delegations followed, till
Lincoln's score rose to 354. … Later in the day the convention
nominated Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, on tho second ballot, by
367 votes, for the vice-presidency. … Almost from the
beginning it was highly probable that the Republicans would
win, and it was substantially certain that none of their
competitors could do so. The only contrary chance was that no
election might be made by the people, and that it might be
thrown into Congress."
J. T. Morse, Jr.,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 1, chapter 6.
At the popular election, the votes were:
Lincoln, 1,866,452
(Free-States vote, 1,840,022, Slave States vote, 26,430);
Douglas, 1,375,157
(Free States vote, 1,211,632, Slave States vote, 163,525);
Breckenridge, 847,953
(Free States vote, 277,082, Slave States vote, 570,871);
Bell, 590,631
(Free States vote, 74,658, Slave States vote, 515,973).
In the Electoral College, the four candidates were voted
for as follows:
Lincoln, 180;
Breckenridge, 72;
Bell, 39;
Douglas, 12.
E. Stanwood,
History of Presidential Elections,
chapter 20.
ALSO IN:
H. W. Raymond,
Life of Lincoln,
chapter 4.
E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States during the
Great Rebellion,
page 1.
J. G. Holland,
Life of Lincoln,
chapters 15-16.
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 2, chapters 13-16.
J. F. Rhodes,
History of the United States from 1850,
chapter 11 (volume 2).
{3407}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860 (November-December).
The plotting of the rebellion.
Secession of South Carolina.
"The long-hoped-for opportunity of trying the experiment of
secession was now at last presented. Abraham Lincoln had been
elevated to the presidency by a strictly sectional vote; and
though the fact could not be denied that he had been elected
in a perfectly constitutional manner, … yet, no sooner was it
ascertained that it was almost certain that he would receive a
majority of the electoral votes of the whole Union, than steps
began to be taken for carrying into effect a revolutionary
project which had engrossed the thoughts and sensibilities of
a small class of extreme Southern politicians, mainly confined
to the State of South Carolina, for some thirty years
preceding. … So thoroughly matured was the project of
secession in the minds of Southern extremists in South

Carolina, that they are known actually to have commenced
movements looking to this desired end before even the
presidential election had taken place, and when the result
which soon ensued was yet but a strong probability.
Accordingly we find Governor Gist, as early as the 5th of
November, 1860, addressing a message to the South Carolina
Legislature, embodying the following bold and explicit
declarations. … 'That an exposition of the will of the people
may be obtained on a question involving such momentous
consequences, I would earnestly recommend that, in the event
of Abraham Lincoln's election to the presidency, a Convention
of the people of this state be immediately called, to consider
and determine for themselves the mode and measure of redress.
My own opinions of what the Convention should do are of little
moment; but, believing that the time has arrived when
everyone, however humble he may be, should express his
opinions in unmistakable language, I am constrained to say
that the only alternative left, in my judgment, is the
secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union. The
indications from many of the Southern States justify the
conclusion that the secession of South Carolina will be
immediately followed, if not adopted simultaneously by them,
and ultimately by the entire South. … I would also
respectfully recommend a thorough reorganization of the
militia, so as to place the whole military force of the state
in a position to be used at the shortest notice and with the
greatest efficiency. … In addition to this general
preparation, I would recommend that the services of 10,000
volunteers be immediately accepted.' … I desire not to
particularize on this painful subject to an extent which might
now prove annoying, and therefore proceed briefly to state
that the Legislature of South Carolina provided for the
assemblage of a state Convention, the members of which were to
be elected on the 6th of December, while the conventional body
itself was to come together on the 19th of the same month;
that the Convention did assemble on the last-mentioned day,
and, after an excited debate of several days' continuance,
adopted an Ordinance of Secession on the 20th of December.
Commissioners were sent with a copy of the ordinance to each
of the slave states, in order to quicken co-operative action,
and notification was duly made as to these events to the
Federal government in Washington City. The next secession
movement it was expected would come off in the State of
Georgia. A Convention for this purpose had been already
called. It was known that Alexander H. Stephens, Herschel V.
Johnson, and other public men, of elevated standing and of
extended influence, would be members of the Convention, and it
was expected that they would exert themselves to the utmost to
prevent the imitation by the State of Georgia of the rash
example which had just been set by South Carolina; and it was
likewise known that eminent personages from the State of South
Carolina would attend the Convention of Georgia, in order to
urge immediate co-operation. Under these circumstances, I took
it upon myself to persuade the public men of most influence in
the city of Nashville, where I was then residing, to send ten
or fifteen delegates forthwith to Milledgeville, respectfully
and earnestly to protest against extreme action on the part of
Georgia. … I urged these views for several days most
zealously, but, I regret to say, without success; some
supposing that there was no serious danger of the Convention
of Georgia adopting an Ordinance of Secession, and others that
there was reason to fear, if we should send delegates to
Milledgeville, it might result in fatally compromising our own
attitude. The manly opposition made by Mr. Stephens to the
attempt to draw Georgia into the Secession maelstrom is well
known. This want of success is a circumstance which I shall
ever deplore as the most unfortunate event of a public nature
which has occurred within my recollection. Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were now soon enrolled among
the seceded States. Tennessee, North Carolina, Virginia,
Arkansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, and Delaware still
stood firm, despite all the efforts essayed to shake their
constancy. It is indeed true, as Mr. Greeley has deliberately
recorded, that after the secession 'conspiracy had held
complete possession of the Southern mind for three months,
with the Southern members of the cabinet, nearly all the
Federal officers, most of the governors and other state
functionaries, and seven eighths of the prominent and active
politicians pushing it on, and no force exerted against nor in
any manner threatening to resist it, a majority of the slave
states, with two thirds of the free population of the entire
slaveholding region, was openly and positively adverse to it,
either because they regarded the alleged grievances of the
South as exaggerated if not unreal, or because they believed
that those wrongs would rather be aggravated than cured by
disunion.'"
H. S. Foote,
War of the Rebellion,
chapter 15.
ALSO IN:
J. G. Nicolay,
The Outbreak of Rebellion,
chapter 1.
S. W. Crawford,
The Genesis of the Civil War,
chapters 2-5.
F. Moore, editor,
Rebellion Record,
volume 1.
The following is the South Carolina Ordinance of Secession,
adopted December 20, together with the Declaration of Causes
which was promulgated by the Convention four days later:
"An Ordinance to dissolve the Union between the State of South
Carolina and other States united with her under the compact
entitled 'The Constitution of the United States of America.'
We, the People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention
assembled, do declare and ordain, and it is hereby declared
and ordained. That the Ordinance adopted by us in Convention,
on the twenty-third day of May, in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight, whereby the
Constitution of the United States of America was ratified, and
also, all Acts and parts of Acts of the General Assembly of this
State, ratifying amendments of the said Constitution, are
hereby repealed; and that the union now subsisting between
South Carolina and other States, under the name of 'The United
States of America,' is hereby dissolved."
{3408}
"Declaration of the immediate causes which induce and justify
the secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union:
The People of the State of South Carolina, in Convention
assembled, on the 26th day of April, A. D., 1852, declared
that the frequent violations of the Constitution of the United
States, by the Federal Government, and its encroachments upon
the reserved rights of the States, fully justified this State
in then withdrawing from the Federal Union; but in deference
to the opinions and wishes of the other slaveholding States,
she forbore at that time to exercise this right. Since that
time, these encroachments have continued to increase, and
further forbearance ceases to be a virtue. And now the State
of South Carolina having resumed her separate and equal place
among nations, deems it due to herself, to the remaining
United States of America, and to the nations of the world,
that she should declare the immediate causes which have led to
this act. In the year 1765, that portion of the British Empire
embracing Great Britain, undertook to make laws for the
government of that portion composed of the thirteen American
Colonies. A struggle for the right of self-government ensued,
which resulted, on the 4th July, 1776, in a Declaration, by
the Colonies, 'that they are, and of right ought to be, free
and independent States; and that, as free and independent
States, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace,
contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other
acts and things which independent States may of right do.'
They further solemnly declared that whenever any 'form of
government becomes destructive of the ends for which it was
established, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish
it, and to institute a new government.' Deeming the Government
of Great Britain to have become destructive of these ends,
they declared that the Colonies 'are absolved from all
allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political
connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and
ought to be, totally dissolved.' In pursuance of this
Declaration of Independence, each of the thirteen States
proceeded to exercise its separate sovereignty; adopted for
itself a Constitution, and appointed officers for the
administration of government in all its
departments—Legislative, Executive and Judicial. For purposes
of defence, they united their arms and their counsels; and, in
1778, they entered into a League known as the Articles of
Confederation, whereby they agreed to entrust the
administration of their external relations to a common agent,
known as the Congress of the United States, expressly
declaring, in the first article, 'that each State retains its
sovereignty, freedom and independence, and every power,
jurisdiction and right which is not, by this Confederation,
expressly delegated to the United States in Congress
assembled. Under this Confederation the War of the Revolution
was carried on, and on the 3d September, 1783, the contest
ended, and a definitive Treaty was signed by Great Britain, in
which she acknowledged the Independence of the Colonies in the
following terms:
'Article 1.—His Britannic Majesty acknowledges the said United
States, viz: New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, Rhode Island
and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Georgia, to be free, sovereign and
independent States; that he treats with them as such; and for
himself, his heirs and successors, relinquishes all claims to
the government, propriety and territorial rights of the same
and every part thereof.' Thus were established the two great
principles asserted by the Colonies, namely: the right of a
State to govern itself; and the right of a people to abolish a
Government when it becomes destructive of the ends for which
it was instituted. And concurrent with the establishment of
these principles, was the fact, that each Colony became and
was recognized by the mother Country as a free, sovereign and
independent State. In 1787, Deputies were appointed by the
States to revise the Articles of Confederation, and on 17th
September, 1787, these Deputies recommended, for the adoption
of the States, the Articles of Union, known as the
Constitution of the United States. The parties to whom this
Constitution was submitted, were the several sovereign States;
they were to agree or disagree, and when nine of them agreed,
the compact was to take effect among those concurring; and the
General Government, as the common agent, was then to be
invested with their authority. If only nine of the thirteen
States had concurred, the other four would have remained as
they were—separate sovereign States, independent of any of the
provisions of the Constitution. In fact, two of the States did
not accede to the Constitution until long after it had gone
into operation among the other eleven; and during that
interval, they each exercised the functions of an independent
nation. By this Constitution, certain duties were imposed upon
the several States, and the exercise of certain of their
powers was restrained, which necessarily implied their
continued existence as sovereign States. But, to remove all
doubt, an amendment was added, which declared that the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people. On 23d May, 1788, South
Carolina, by a Convention of her people, passed an Ordinance
assenting to this Constitution, and afterwards altered her own
Constitution, to conform herself to the obligations she had
undertaken. Thus was established, by compact between the
States, a Government, with defined objects and powers, limited
to the express words of the grant. This limitation left the
whole remaining mass of power subject to the clause reserving
it to the States or to the people, and rendered unnecessary
any specification of reserved rights. We hold that the
Government thus established is subject to the two great
principles asserted in the Declaration of Independence; and we
hold further, that the mode of its formation subjects it to a
third fundamental principle, namely: the law of compact. We
maintain that in every compact between two or more parties,
the obligation is mutual; that the failure of one of the
contracting parties to perform a material part of the
agreement, entirely releases the obligation of the other; and
that where no arbiter is provided, each party is remitted to
his own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all
its consequences.
{3409}
In the present case, that fact is established with certainty.
We assert, that fourteen of the States have deliberately
refused for years past to fulfil their constitutional
obligations, and we refer to their own Statutes for the proof.
The Constitution of the United States, in its 4th Article,
provides as follows: 'No person held to service or labor in
one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be
discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered
up, on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be
due.' This stipulation was so material to the compact, that
without it that compact would not have been made. The greater
number of the contracting parties held slaves, and they had
previously evinced their estimate of the value of such a
stipulation by making it a condition in the Ordinance for the
government of the territory ceded by Virginia, which now
composes the States north of the Ohio river. The same article
of the Constitution stipulates also for rendition by the
several States of fugitives from justice from the other
States. The General Government, as the common agent, passed
laws to carry into effect these stipulations of the States.
For many years these laws were executed. But an increasing
hostility on the part of the non-slaveholding States to the
Institution of Slavery has led to a disregard of their
obligations, and the laws of the General Government have
ceased to effect the objects of the Constitution. The States
of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Rhode Island, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa, have enacted laws which either
nullify the Acts of Congress or render useless any attempt to
execute them. In many of these States the fugitive is
discharged from the service or labor claimed, and in none of
them has the State Government complied with the stipulation
made in the Constitution. The State of New Jersey, at an early
day, passed a law in conformity with her constitutional
obligation; but the current of anti-slavery feeling has led
her more recently to enact laws which render inoperative the
remedies provided by her own law and by the laws of Congress.
In the State of New York even the right of transit for a slave
has been denied by her tribunals; and the States of Ohio and
Iowa have refused to surrender to justice fugitives charged
with murder, and with inciting servile insurrection in the
State of Virginia. Thus the constitutional compact has been
deliberately broken and disregarded by the non-slaveholding
States, and the consequence follows that South Carolina is
released from her obligation. The ends for which this
Constitution was framed are declared by itself to be 'to form
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity.' These ends it endeavored to
accomplish by a Federal Government, in which each State was
recognized as an equal, and had separate control over its own
institutions. The right of property in slaves was recognized
by giving to free persons distinct political rights, by giving
them the right to represent, and burthening them with direct
taxes for three-fifths of their slaves; by authorizing the
importation of slaves for twenty years; and by stipulating for
the rendition of fugitives from labor. We affirm that these
ends for which this Government was instituted have been
defeated, and the Government itself has been made destructive
of them by the action of the non-slaveholding States. Those
States have assumed the right of deciding upon the propriety
of our domestic institutions; and have denied the rights of
property established in fifteen other States and recognized by
the Constitution; they have denounced as sinful the
institution of Slavery; they have permitted the open
establishment among them of societies, whose avowed object is
to disturb the peace and to claim the property of the citizens
of other States. They have encouraged and assisted thousands
of our slaves to leave their homes; and those who remain, have
been incited by emissaries, books and pictures to servile
insurrection. For twenty-five years this agitation has been
steadily increasing, until it has now secured to its aid the
power of the Common Government. Observing the forms of the
Constitution, a sectional party has found within that article
establishing the Executive Department, the means of subverting
the Constitution itself. A geographical line has been drawn
across the Union, and all the States north of that line have
united in the election of a man to the high office of
President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are
hostile to slavery. He is to be entrusted with the
administration of the Common Government, because he has
declared that that 'Government cannot endure permanently half
slave, half free,' and that the public mind must rest in the
belief that Slavery is in the course of ultimate extinction.
This sectional combination for the subversion of the
Constitution, has been aided in some of the States by
elevating to citizenship, persons, who, by the Supreme Law of
the land, are incapable of becoming citizens; and their votes
have been used to inaugurate a new policy, hostile to the
South, and destructive of its peace and safety. On the 4th
March next, this party will take possession of the Government.
It has announced, that the South shall be excluded from the
common Territory; that the Judicial Tribunals shall be made
sectional, and that a war must be waged against slavery until
it shall cease throughout the United States. The Guaranties of
the Constitution will then no longer exist; the equal rights
of the States will be lost. The slaveholding States will no
longer have the power of self-government, or self-protection,
and the Federal Government will have become their enemy.
Sectional interest and animosity will deepen the irritation,
and all hope of remedy is rendered vain, by the fact that
public opinion at the North has invested a great political
error with the sanctions of a more erroneous religious belief.
We, therefore, the people of South Carolina, by our delegates,
in Convention assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the
world for the rectitude of our intentions, have solemnly
declared that the Union heretofore existing between this State
and the other States of North America, is dissolved, and that
the State of South Carolina has resumed her position among the
nations of the world, as a separate and independent State;
with full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract
alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and
things which independent States may of right do."
{3410}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860 (December).
President Buchanan's surrender.
His disunion message and its evil effects.
Congress met on the first Monday of December and received from
President Buchanan "his mischievous and deplorable message …
—a message whose evil effect can never be estimated, and whose
evil character can hardly be exaggerated. The President
informed Congress that 'the long-continued and intemperate
interference of the Northern people with the question of
slavery in the Southern States has at last produced its
natural effect.' … The President found that the chief
grievance of the South was in the enactments of the Free
States known as 'personal liberty laws' [designed to protect
free citizens, black or white, in their right to trial by
jury, which the fugitive slave law denied to a black man
claimed as a slave]. … Very likely these enactments, inspired
by an earnest spirit of liberty, went in many cases too far,
and tended to produce conflicts between National and State
authority. That was a question to be determined finally and
exclusively by the Federal Judiciary. Unfortunately Mr.
Buchanan carried his argument beyond that point. … After
reciting the statutes which he regarded as objectionable and
hostile to the constitutional rights of the South, and after
urging their unconditional repeal upon the North, the
President said: 'The Southern States, standing on the basis of
the Constitution, have a right to demand this act of justice
from the States of the North. Should it be refused, then the
Constitution, to which all the States are parties, will have
been willfully violated. … In that event, the injured States,
after having used all peaceful and constitutional means to
obtain redress, would be justified in revolutionary resistance
to the government of the Union.' By this declaration the
President justified, and in effect advised, an appeal from the
constitutional tribunals of the country to a popular judgment
in the aggrieved States, and recognized the right of those
States, upon such popular judgment, to destroy the
Constitution and the Union. … Mr. Buchanan proceeded to argue
ably and earnestly against the assumption by any State of an
inherent right to secede from the government at its own will
and pleasure. But he utterly destroyed the force of his
reasoning by declaring that, 'after much serious reflection'
he had arrived at 'the conclusion that no power has been
delegated to Congress, or to any other department of the
Federal Government, to coerce a State into submission which is
attempting to withdraw, or has actually withdrawn,' from the
Union. … Under these doctrines the Government of the United
States was shorn of all power to preserve its own existence,
and the Union might crumble and fall while its constituted
authorities stood paralyzed and impotent. This construction
was all that the extremists of the South desired. With so much
conceded, they had every thing in their own hands. … Men who,
under the wholesome restraint of executive power, would have
refrained from taking aggressive steps against the National
Government, were by Mr. Buchanan's action forced into a
position of hostility. Men in the South, who were disposed to
avoid extreme measures, were by taunt and reproach driven into
the ranks of Secession. … The evil effects of Mr. Buchanan's
message were not confined to the slave States. It did
incalculable harm in the free States. It fixed in the minds of
tens of thousands of Northern men who were opposed to the
Republican party, the belief that the South was justified in
taking steps to break up the government, if what they termed a
war on Southern institutions should be continued. This feeling
had in turn a most injurious influence in the South."
J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years in Congress,
volume 1, chapter 10.
https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/21128
ALSO IN:
G. T. Curtis,
Life of James Buchanan,
volume 2, chapters 16-17.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860 (December).
Vain concessions and humiliations of the North proposed.
The Crittenden compromise.
"When, in the House of Representatives, Mr. Boteler, of
Virginia, proposed to refer so much of the President's Message
as related to the perilous condition of the country to a
committee of thirty-three—one from each state—not less than
52 members from the Slave States refused to vote. 'I pay no
attention to any action taken in this body,' said one. 'I am
not sent here to patch up difficulties,' said another. The
Democratic members from the Free States did their utmost to
compose the dissension—some of them who subsequently became
conspicuous in the war—suggesting concessions which doubtless
they looked back upon with regret. It was proposed that
persons of African blood should never be considered as
citizens of the United States; that there should never be any
interference with slavery in the Territories, nor with the
interstate slave-trade; that the doctrine of state-rights
should be admitted, and power of coercion denied to the
government. Among the dissatisfied members, one would allow
any state at pleasure to secede, and allot it a fair share of
the public property and territory. Another would divide the
Union into four republics; another would abolish the office of
President, and have in its stead a council of three, each of
whom should have a veto on every public act. Propositions such
as these show to what length the allies of the slave power
would have gone to preserve it and give it perpetuity. At this
stage, Mr. Crittenden [Senator John J. Crittenden of
Kentucky], proposed in the Senate certain amendments of the
Constitution, and resolutions known subsequently as the
Crittenden Compromise. The essential features of his plan were
the re-establishing of the Missouri Compromise: that in all
territory of the United States north of 36° 30' slavery should
be prohibited; in all south of that line, not only permitted,
but protected; that from such territory north or south states
might be admitted with or without slavery, as the Constitution
of each might determine; that Congress should have no power to
abolish slavery in places under its jurisdiction in a slave
state, nor in the District of Columbia, without the consent of
the adjoining states, nor without compensation to the
slaveholders, nor to prevent persons connected with the
government bringing their slaves into the District; that
Congress should have no power to hinder the interstate or
territorial transport of slaves; that the national government
should pay a full value to the owner of a fugitive slave who
might have been rescued from the officers; that no amendments
of the Constitution should ever be made which might affect
these amendments, or other slave compromises already existing
in the Constitution.
{3411}
He also recommended to the states that had enacted laws in
conflict with the existing fugitive slave acts, their repeal;
and in four resolutions made provision for the more perfect
execution of those acts. But the dissension was too deep to be
closed by such a measure as Mr. Crittenden's, which contained
nothing that could satisfy the North. The South was resolved
not to be satisfied with any thing. It had taken what was
plainly an irreversible step. According]y, Mr. Crittenden's
proposition was eventually lost."
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 31 (section 6, volume 1).
ALSO IN:
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 1, chapter 24.
E. McPherson, Political History of the United States
during the Great Rebellion,
pages 48-90.
J. A. Logan,
The Great Conspiracy,
chapter 8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860 (December).
Major Anderson at Fort Sumter.
Floyd's treachery in the War Department.
Cabinet rupture.
Loyalty reinstated in the national government.
"In November, 1860, the fortifications of Charleston Harbor
consisted of three works—Castle Pinckney, an old-fashioned,
circular brick fort, on Shute's Folly Island, and about one
mile east of the city; Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island,
still farther to the east, and famous as being on the site of
the old fort of palmetto logs, where, during the long
bombardment by the British fleet in Revolutionary days, the
gallant William Jasper leaped from the low rampart upon the
beach below, and seizing the flag that had been shot down,
rehoisted it above the fort; and lastly, Fort Sumter, an
unfinished fortification, named after General Thomas Sumter,
the famous partisan leader of the Revolution, and who was
familiarly known as the 'gamecock of the Carolinas.' The
armament of Castle Pinckney consisted of 22 cannon, 2 mortars,
and 4 light pieces; that of Moultrie of 45 cannon and 7 light
pieces; while Sumter mounted 78 heavy guns of various calibre.
The entire force of United States troops in these
fortifications was composed of two weak companies of artillery
under command of Major Robert Anderson, and a few engineer
employees under Captain John G. Foster. Of these a sergeant
and squad of men were stationed at Castle Pinckney for the
care of the quarters and the guns; a similar handful were at
Sumter; while most of the little force were at Moultrie, where
Anderson had his headquarters. Such was the military situation
when South Carolina began to proclaim, without disguise, her
purpose to secede and to possess herself of the fortifications
on her coast. … Our Government paid no apparent heed, and yet
the authorities at Washington were fully and betimes
forewarned. … On the files of the Engineer Department I found
a letter, which still remains there, dated as early as
November 24, 1860, from Captain Foster to Colonel De Russy,
then the chief of the engineer corps, in which the captain
states that, at the request of Major Anderson, he has, in
company with that officer, made a thorough inspection of the
forts in the harbor; that, in the opinion of Anderson, one
additional company of artillery should at once be sent to
garrison Castle Pinckney, which in the terse language of the
letter, 'commands the city of Charleston.' Upon the back of
the letter is the simple but significant indorsement, in his
own hand-writing, 'Return to Governor Floyd.' You may recall
him as Mr. Buchanan's Secretary of War. On November 30,
Captain Foster again writes to Colonel De Russy, saying: 'I
think that more troops should have been sent here to guard the
forts, and I believe that no serious demonstration on the part
of the populace would have met such a course.' On this is
indorsed: 'Colonel Cooper says this has been shown to the
Secretary of War. H. G. W.' The initials, placed there by
himself, are those of the gallant Horatio G. Wright, who
succeeded to the command of the Sixth Army Corps after the
loved Sedgwick fell. On December 2, application was made by
Captain Foster for the small supply of four boxes of muskets
and sixty rounds of cartridge per man, to arm the few
civilians or hired laborers who constituted the engineer
corps. These arms and ammunition were in the United States
arsenal at Charleston, a building which still had a Federal
keeper, and over which still floated the Federal flag. On this
application is the following indorsement, also in General
Wright's handwriting: 'Handed to adjutant-general, and by him
laid before the Secretary of War on the sixth of December.
Returned by adjutant-general on the seventh. Action deferred
for the present. See Captain Foster's letter of December 4.' …
On December 17, Captain Foster, acting on his own patriotic
judgment, but without orders, went to Charleston and took from
the Federal arsenal forty muskets, with which to arm his
laborers. Early on the morning of the 19th, he received a
telegram from Secretary Floyd, directing him instantly to
return the arms to the arsenal. On the next day, the 20th, the
South Carolinians decided, in State convention, to secede, and
proclaimed their State an independent sovereignty. … All alike
were delirious with the epidemic madness of the hour, were
hopeful, resolute, enthusiastic. Bells pealed and cannon
boomed. … But few ventured to breast the storm. There was one,
whose name should live honored in in a nation's memory, a
wise, true man, the greatest lawyer of his State, James L.
Pettigrew, who, when his minister first dropped from the
service the prayer for the President of the United States,
rose in his pew in the middle aisle of Charleston's most
fashionable church, and slowly and with distinct voice
repeated: 'Most humbly and heartily we beseech Thee with Thy
favor to behold and bless Thy servant, the President of these
United States.' Then, placing his prayer-book in the rack, and
drawing his wife's arm within his own, he left the church, nor
entered it again until his body was borne there for burial. To
their honor be it said, that even the Carolinians respected
his sincerity and candor, and never molested him. … On the
night of December 26, Major Anderson evacuated Fort Moultrie,
which was untenable by his small force, spiked his guns,
burned the gun-carriages, and transferred his small command in
two schooners to Fort Sumter. This act was without orders and
against the do-nothing and helpless policy which had thus far
controlled the Government. But it showed the wisdom and prompt
decision of the trained soldier and the spirit of the loyal
citizen. … Let us recall the appearance of Sumter when
Anderson transferred his feeble garrison to its protection.
The fort was built on an artificial island, which had been
constructed by dumping stone upon a shoal that lay on the
south side of the principal ship channel to Charleston Harbor.
Sumter was pentagonal in form, and its five sides of brick,
made solid by concrete, rose 60 feet above the water. It was
pierced for an armament of 135 guns, which were to be placed
in three tiers.
{3412}
Two tiers were to be in casemates, and one 'en barbette,' or
on the top of the wall. The embrasures of the upper tier of
casemates were never completed. They were filled up with brick
during Major Anderson's occupation of the fort, and so
remained during all the succeeding operations and siege.
Seventy-eight guns of various calibre composed its then
armament, the most efficient of which were placed 'en
barbette.' On the east and west sides of the parade were
barracks for the privates, and on the south side were the
officers' quarters. These were all wooden structures. The
wharf by which access was had to the fort was on the southern
side against the gorge wall. Looking from the sea front,
Sumter lay nearly midway between Sullivan's Island on the
north and the low, sandy ridges of Morris on the south, and
about 1,400 yards from either. The main ship channel was
between Sumter and Sullivan's Island. The water between the
fort and Morris Island was for the most part comparatively
shallow. James Island lay to the west and southwest, while to
the northwest, and at a distance of three and one-third miles,
rose the steeples of Charleston. The city could have been
barely reached by the heaviest guns of the barbette battery.
Castle Pinckney lay in the direction of the city, and was
distant about two and one-third miles. Sullivan's, Morris, and
James Islands thus formed a segment of three-fourths of a
circle around Sumter. They were so close under the guns of the
fort that, with the then limited experience in the
construction of earthworks, no batteries could have been
erected under fire from Sumter sufficiently strong to prevent
the re-enforcement and supplying of the fort, had Anderson
been allowed to open fire at the first upon the rebel working
parties. … At noon of December 27, the flag of the nation was
raised over the defenders of the fort. Major Anderson knelt,
holding the halliards, while Reverend Matthew Harris, an army
chaplain, offered fervent prayer for that dear flag and for
the loyal few who stood beneath its folds. … And then all
wearily the days and weeks dragged on. New fortifications rose
day by day on each sandhill about the harbor; vessels of war,
bearing the Confederate flag, steamed insultingly near, and
the islands were white as harvest fields, with the tents of
the fast-gathering rebel soldiery; and still, by positive
orders, Anderson was bidden to stand in idle helplessness
beside his silent indignant cannon."
General Stewart L. Woodford,
The Story of Fort Sumter
(Personal Recollections of the War of the Rebellion,
pages 259-266).
On the 29th of December, three days after Anderson had
transferred his command to Fort Sumter, Floyd gave up his work
of treachery in the War Department, and resigned. Howell Cobb
had resigned the Treasury Department previously, on the 10th.
A few days later, January 8, Jacob Thompson withdrew from the
Interior Department. Loyal men now replaced these
secessionists in the Cabinet. Joseph Holt of Kentucky took the
place of Floyd in the War Department; John A. Dix of New York
succeeded Cobb in the Treasury, and the place of Thompson was
not filled. Edwin M. Stanton entered the Cabinet as
Attorney-General, taking the place of Jeremiah S. Black who
became Secretary of State. General Cass had held the State
Department until December 12, when he, too, resigned, but for
reasons opposite to those of Floyd and Cobb. He left the
Government because it would not reinforce the Charleston
forts.
E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States during the
Great Rebellion,
page 28.
ALSO IN:
S. W. Crawford,
Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter,
chapters 1, and 6-10.
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 2, chapters 18-29,
and volume 3, chapter 1-6.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860-1861 (December-February).
Seizure of arms, arsenals, forts, and other
public property by the Southern insurgents.
Base surrender of an army by Twiggs.
"Directly after Major Anderson's removal to Fort Sumter, the
Federal arsenal in Charleston, containing many thousand stand
of arms and a considerable quantity of military stores, was
seized by the volunteers, now flocking to that city by
direction of the State authorities; Castle Pinckney, Fort
Moultrie, and Sullivan's Island were likewise occupied by
them, and their defenses vigorously enlarged and improved. The
Custom-House, Post-Office, etc., were likewise appropriated,
without resistance or commotion. … Georgia having given
[January 2, 1861] a large popular majority for Secession, her
authorities immediately took military possession of the
Federal arsenal at Augusta, as also of Forts Pulaski and
Jackson, commanding the approaches by sea to Savannah. North
Carolina had not voted to secede, yet Governor Ellis
simultaneously seized the United States Arsenal at
Fayetteville, with Fort Macon, and other fortifications
commanding the approaches to Beaufort and Wilmington. Having
done so, Governor Ellis coolly wrote to the War Department
that he had taken the step to preserve the forts from seizure
by mobs! In Alabama, the Federal arsenal at Mobile was seized
on the 4th, by order of Governor Moore. It contained large
quantities of arms and munitions. Fort Morgan, commanding the
approaches to Mobile, was likewise seized, and garrisoned by
State troops. … In Louisiana, the Federal arsenal at Baton
Rouge was seized by order of Governor Moore on the 11th. Forts
Jackson and St. Philip, commanding the passage up the
Mississippi to New Orleans, and Fort Pike, at the entrance of
Lake Pontchartrain, were likewise seized and garrisoned by
State troops. The Federal Mint and Custom-House at New Orleans
were left untouched until February 1st, when they, too, were
taken possession of by the State authorities. … In Florida,
Fort Barrancas and the Navy Yard at Pensacola were seized by
Florida and Alabama forces on the 13th; Commander Armstrong
surrendering them without a struggle. He ordered Lieutenant
Slemmer, likewise, to surrender Forts Pickens and McRae; but
the intrepid subordinate defied the order, and, withdrawing
his small force from Fort McRae to the stronger and less
accessible Fort Pickens, announced his determination to hold
out to the last. He was soon after besieged therein by a
formidable volunteer force; and a dispatch from Pensacola
announced that 'Fort McRae is being occupied and the guns
manned by the allied forces of Florida, Alabama, and
Mississippi.' … The revenue cutter Cass, stationed at Mobile,
was turned over by Captain J. J. Morrison to the authorities
of Alabama at the end of January.
{3413}
The McClellan, Captain Breshwood, stationed on the Mississippi
below New Orleans, was, in like manner, handed over to those
of Louisiana. General Dix had sent down a special agent to
secure them, but he was too late. The telegraph dispatch
whereby General Dix directed him, 'If any person' attempts to
haul down the American flag, shoot him on the spot,' sent an
electric thrill through the loyal heart of the country.
Finally, tidings reached Washington, about the end of
February, that Brigadier-General Twiggs, commanding the
department of Texas, had disgracefully betrayed his trust, and
turned over his entire army, with all the posts and
fortifications, arms, munitions, horses, equipments, etc., to
General Ben. M'Culloch, representing the authorities of Texas,
now fully launched upon the rushing tide of treason. The Union
lost by that single act at least half its military force, with
the State of Texas, and the control of our Mexican frontier. …
The defensive fortifications located within the seceding
States were some 30 in number, mounting over 3,000 guns, and
having cost at least $20,000,000. Nearly all these had been
seized and appropriated by the Confederates before Mr.
Lincoln's inauguration, with the exception of Fortress Monroe
(Virginia), Fort Sumter (South Carolina), Fort Pickens
(Florida), and the fortresses on Key West and the Tortugas,
off the Florida coast."
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 1, chapter 26.
ALSO IN:
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion,
series 1, volume 1.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (January-February).
Secession of Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, Louisiana,
Alabama, and Texas.
Opposition of Alexander H. Stephens, in Georgia.
"On the 9th day of January, 1861, the State of Mississippi
seceded from the Union. Alabama and Florida followed on the
11th day of the same month; Georgia on the 20th; Louisiana on
the 26th; and Texas on the 1st of February. Thus, in less than
three mouths after the announcement of Lincoln's election, all
the Cotton States … had seceded from the Union, and had,
besides, secured every Federal fort within their limits,
except the forts in Charleston harbor, and Fort Pickens, below
Pensacola, which were retained by United States troops."
E. A. Pollard,
The First Year of the War,
chapter 1.
The secession of Georgia was powerfully but vainly opposed by
the foremost citizen of that state, Alexander H. Stephens,
whose speech before the Legislature of Georgia, in protest
against the disruption of the Union, had been one of the
notable utterances of the time. "Shall the people of the
South," asked Mr. Stephens, "secede from the Union in
consequence of the election of Mr. Lincoln to the Presidency
of the United States? My countrymen, I tell you frankly,
candidly, and earnestly, that I do not think that they ought.
In my judgment, the election of no man, constitutionally
chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any State
to separate from the Union. It ought to stand by and aid still
in maintaining the constitution of the country. To make a
point of resistance to the government, to withdraw from it
because a man has been constitutionally elected, puts us in
the wrong. We are pledged to maintain the constitution. Many
of us have sworn to support it. Can we, therefore, for the
mere election of a man to the presidency, and that, too, in
accordance with the prescribed forms of the constitution, make
a point of resistance to the government, without becoming the
breakers of that sacred instrument ourselves, by withdrawing
ourselves from it? Would we not be in the wrong? Whatever fate
is to befall this country, let it never be laid to the charge
of the people of the South, and especially to the people of
Georgia, that we were untrue to our national engagements. Let
the fault and the wrong rest upon others. … Let the fanatics
of the North break the constitution, if such is their fell
purpose. Let the responsibility be upon them. … We went into
the election with this people. The result was different from
what we wished; but the election has been constitutionally
held. Were we to make a point of resistance to the government
and go out of the Union on that account, the record would be
made up hereafter against us. But it is said Mr. Lincoln's
policy and principles are against the constitution, and that,
if he carries them out, it will be destructive of our rights.
Let us not anticipate a threatened evil. If he violates the
constitution, then will come our time to act. Do not let us
break it because, forsooth, he may. If he does, that is the
time for us to strike. I think it would be injudicious and
unwise to do this sooner. I do not anticipate that Mr. Lincoln
will do anything to jeopard our safety or security, whatever
may be his spirit to do it; for he is bound by the
constitutional checks which are thrown around him, which at
this time render him powerless to do any great mischief. This
shows the wisdom of our system. The President of the United
States is no emperor, no dictator—he is clothed with no
absolute power. He can do nothing unless he is backed by power
in Congress. The House of Representatives is largely in a
majority against him. In the very face and teeth of the heavy
majority which he has obtained in the northern States, there
have been large gains in the House of Representatives to the
conservative constitutional party of the country, which here I
will call the national democratic party, because that is the
cognomen it has at the North. … Is this the time, then, to
apprehend that Mr. Lincoln, with this large majority in the
House of Representatives against him, can carry out any of his
unconstitutional principles in that body? In the Senate he
will also be powerless. There will be a majority of four
against him. … Mr. Lincoln cannot appoint an officer without
the consent of the Senate—he cannot form a cabinet without the
same consent. He will be in the condition of George the Third
(the embodiment of toryism), who had to ask the whigs to
appoint his ministers, and was compelled to receive a cabinet
utterly opposed to his views; and so Mr. Lincoln will be
compelled to ask of the Senate to choose for him a cabinet, if
the democracy of that party chose to put him on such terms. He
will be compelled to do this, or let the government stop, if
the national democratic men (for that is their name at the
North), the conservative men in the Senate, should so
determine. Then how can Mr. Lincoln obtain a cabinet which
would aid him, or allow him to violate the constitution? Why
then, I say, should we disrupt the ties of this Union when his
hands are tied—when he can do nothing against us?"
A. H. Stephens,
Speech against Secession, November 14, 1860
(in "Alexander H. Stephens in Public and Private;
by H. Cleveland").
{3414}
But when Georgia, despite his exertions, was drawn into the
movement of rebellion, Mr. Stephens surrendered to it, and
lent his voice to the undertaking which he had proved to be
without excuse.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (MARCH).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (February).
The Peace Convention.
"The General Assembly of Virginia, on the 19th of January,
adopted resolutions inviting representatives of the several
States to assemble in a Peace Convention at Washington, which
met on the 4th of February. It was composed of 133
Commissioners, many from the border States, and the object of
these was to prevail upon their associates from the North to
unite with them in such recommendations to Congress as would
prevent their own States from seceding and enable them to
bring back six of the cotton States which had already
seceded." On the 15th of February a committee of the
Convention reported certain proposed amendments to the
Constitution which "were substantially the same with the
Crittenden Compromise;
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1860 (DECEMBER)
VAIN CONCESSIONS;
but on motion of Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, the general terms
of the first and by far the most important section were
restricted to the present Territories of the United States. On
motion of Mr. Franklin, of Pennsylvania, this section was
further amended, but not materially changed, by the adoption
of the substitute offered by him. Nearly in this form it was
afterwards adopted by the Convention. The following is a copy:
'In all the present territory of the United States north of
the parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north
latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of
crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of
that line, the status of persons held to involuntary service
or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed; nor shall
any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature
to prevent the taking of such persons from any of the States
of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights
arising from said relation; but the same shall be subject to
judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the
course of the common law. When any Territory north or south of
said line, within such boundary as Congress may prescribe,
shall contain a population equal to that required for a member
of Congress, it shall, if its form of government be
republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing
with the original States, with or without involuntary
servitude, as the Constitution of such State may provide.'…
More than ten days were consumed in discussion and in voting
upon various propositions offered by individual commissioners.
The final vote was not reached until Tuesday, the 26th
February, when it was taken on the first vitally important
section, as amended. This section, on which all the rest
depended, was negatived by a vote of eight States to eleven.
Those which voted in its favor were Delaware, Kentucky,
Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Tennessee. And those in the negative were Connecticut,
Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York,
North Carolina, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia." A
reconsideration of the vote was moved, however, and on the day
following (February 27), "the first section was adopted, but
only by a majority of nine to eight States, nine being less
than a majority of the States represented. … From the nature
of this vote, it was manifestly impossible that two-thirds of
both Houses of Congress should act favorably on the amendment,
even if the delay had not already rendered such action
impracticable before the close of the session. The remaining
sections of the amendment were carried by small majorities,"
and the proposed amendment of the Constitution was reported to
Congress, with a request that it be submitted to the
Legislatures of the States, but no action upon it was taken.
T. V. Cooper,
American Politics,
pages 106-108.
"Most of the Southerners thought these propositions worse than
nothing. Hunter preferred the present position under the
constitution, with the Dred Scott decision as its exposition.
Mason, the other Senator from the state that had issued the
call for the Peace Convention, said that he would consider
himself a traitor if he should recommend such propositions.
Wigfall of Texas, however, bore off the palm by saying: 'If
those resolutions were adopted, and ratified by three-fourths
of the states of this Union, and no other cause ever existed,
I make the assertion that the seven states now out of the
Union would go out upon that.' Many of the Republicans were
equally strong in their opposition to them. Chandler of
Michigan spoke the substance of the opinions of several on his
side of the Senate when he expressed himself in the language
of the 'stump' by saying: 'No concession, no compromise,—ay,
give us strife, even to blood,—before a yielding to the
demands of traitorous insolence.' … John Tyler, the president
of the convention that passed them, and Seddon returned to
their state and denounced the recommendations of the Peace
Convention as a delusion, a sham and an insult to the South. …
Hawkins of Florida told the House, when the question was first
touched upon, that the day of compromise was past and that he
and his state were opposed to all and every compromise. Pugh
and Clopton of Alabama both spoke boldly for secession and
against any temporizing policy. Congress had been in session
but ten days, and neither of the committees on compromise had
had time to report, when a large number of the members of
Congress from the extreme Southern States issued a manifesto
declaring that 'argument was exhausted' and that 'the sole and
primary aim of each slaveholding state ought to be its speedy
and absolute separation from an unnatural and hostile Union.'
… The boldness of these facts is startling, even when viewed
at this distance. They make it perfectly evident that it was
not the constitution which the South was desirous of saving,
but the institution of slavery which she was determined to
preserve. Likewise on the Northern side we find that those who
were courageous, logical, and intellectually vigorous in
political speculation considered the constitution of less
importance than the development of their ideas of freedom.
These people were called Abolitionists. Although their
political strength was not great, some one of their many ideas
found sympathy in the mind of almost every Northerner of
education or of clear moral intentions. This explains how John
A. Andrew could be elected governor of Massachusetts, although
known to have presided over a John Brown meeting.
{3415}
The purpose of the Abolitionists was 'the utter extermination
of slavery wheresoever it may exist.' Wendell Phillips
surprised very few Abolitionists when, knowing that the
Confederacy was forming, he rejoiced that 'the covenant with
death' was annulled and 'the agreement with hell' was broken
in pieces, and exclaimed: 'Union or no Union, constitution or
no constitution, freedom for every man between the oceans, and
from the hot Gulf to the frozen pole! You may as well dam up
Niagara with bulrushes as bind our anti-slavery purpose with
Congressional compromise.' Congress had to consider such facts
as these, as well as the compromises which were proposed.
Stephen A. Douglas felt compelled to say, as early as January,
1861, that there were Democrats in the Senate who did not want
a settlement. And it was plain to all that most of the
Republicans discouraged further concessions. Nor would a
constitutional amendment have been possible unless the
Northern members had first recognized the seven states as
being out of the Union, for it would otherwise have required
the support of all but one of the states that were still
active. That the 'personal liberty' laws were a violation of
the constitution, and that the execution of the fugitive slave

law of 1850 had been unconstitutionally obstructed, were
unquestioned facts, directly or indirectly recognized by many
of the Republican leaders. Nevertheless, the North was much
more inclined to continue in this unconstitutional position
than to yield to the demands of the South."
F. Bancroft,
The Final Efforts at Compromise
(Political Science Quarterly, September, 1891).
ALSO IN:
H. A. Wise,
Seven Decades of the Union,
chapter 15.
L. G. Tyler,
Letters and Times of the Tylers,
volume 2, chapter 20.
L. E. Chittenden,
Report of Debates and Proceedings in Secret Session
of the Conference Convention, Washington, 1861.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (February).
Adoption of a Constitution for
"The Confederate States of America."
Election of a President and Vice President.
"Early in February, 1861, a convention of six seceding states,
South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana,
Florida, was held at Montgomery, Alabama. They were
represented by 42 persons. Measures were taken for the
formation of a provisional government. After the vote on the
provisional Constitution was taken, Jefferson Davis was
elected President, and Alexander H. Stephens Vice-President of
the Confederacy for the current year. The inauguration of Mr.
Davis took place on February 18th. Both were shortly after
re-elected permanently for six years. … The permanent
Constitution adopted for 'The Confederate States of America,'
the title now assumed, was modeled substantially on that of
the United States. It was remarked that, after all, the old
Constitution was the most suitable basis for the new
Confederacy. Among points of difference must be noticed that
the new instrument broadly recognized, even in its preamble,
the contested doctrine of state-rights. … Inducements and
threats were applied to draw Virginia and the other Border
States into the Confederacy. … With an ominous monition, the
second article reads, 'Congress shall … have power to prohibit
the introduction of slaves from any state not a member of this
Confederacy.' At this time Virginia was receiving an annual
income of $12,000,000 from the sale of slaves. In 1860 12,000
slaves were sent over her railroads to the South and
Southwest. One thousand dollars for each was considered a low
estimate. Notwithstanding this, the Ordinance of Secession did
not pass the Virginia Convention until some weeks subsequently
(April 17)."
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 32 (volume 1).
The preamble of the Constitution declared that "the people of
the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and
independent character, invoking the favor and guidance of
Almighty God, ordained a Constitution to form a permanent
Federal Government and for other purposes. The change in
phraseology was obviously to assert the derivative character
of the Federal Government and to exclude the conclusion which
Webster and others had sought to draw from the phrase, 'We,
the people of the United States.' In the Executive department,
the Constitution provided, in accordance with the early
agreement of the Convention of 1787, that the President should
be elected for six years and be ineligible. A seat upon the
floor of either House of Congress might be granted to the
principal officer in each of the Executive departments with
the privilege of discussing any measures appertaining to his
department. The President was empowered to remove at pleasure
the principal officer in each of the Executive departments and
all persons connected with the diplomatic service. To give
entire control of Cabinet officers and of foreign ministers
was considered to be necessary for the proper discharge of the
President's duties and for the independence of his department.
All other civil officers could be removed when their services
were unnecessary, or for dishonesty, inefficiency, misconduct,
or neglect of duty, but the removals in such cases, with the
reasons therefor, were to be reported to the Senate, and no
person rejected by the Senate could be reappointed to the same
office during the recess of the Senate. The President was
empowered, while approving portions of an appropriation bill,
to disapprove particular items, as in other like cases of
veto, the object being to defeat log-rolling combinations
against the Treasury. Admitting members of the Cabinet to
seats upon the floor of Congress with right of discussion
(which worked well during the brief life of the Confederacy),
was intended to secure greater facility of communication
betwixt the Executive and the Legislative departments and
enforce upon the heads of the departments more direct personal
responsibility. By ineligibility of the President and
restriction of the power of removal, the Congress, acting as a
convention, sought to secure greater devotion to public
interests, freedom from the corrupting influences of Executive
patronage, and to break up the iniquitous spoils system which
is such a peril to the purity and perpetuity of our
Government. The Judicial department was permitted to remain
substantially as it was in the old Government. The only
changes were to authorize a tribunal for the investigation of
claims against the Government, the withholding from the
Federal Courts jurisdiction of suits between citizens of
different States, and the enactment of a wise provision that
any judicial or other Federal officer, resident and acting
solely within the limits of any State, might be impeached by a
vote of two thirds of both branches of the Legislature
thereof.
{3416}
The provisions in reference to the election of Senators and
Representatives and the powers and duties of each House were
unaltered except that the electors of each State were required
to be citizens, and the Senators were to be chosen by the
Legislatures of the State at the session next immediately
preceding the beginning of the term of service. In reference
to the general powers of Congress, some of the changes were
more vital. The general welfare clause was omitted from the
taxing grant. Bounties from the Treasury and extra
compensation to contractors, officers, and agents were
prohibited. 'A Protective Tariff' was so far forbidden that no
duties or taxes on importations could be laid to promote or
foster any branch of industry. Export duties were allowed with
the concurrence of two thirds of both Houses. Congress was
forbidden to make internal improvements except to furnish
lights, beacons, buoys, to improve harbors, and to remove
obstructions in river navigation, and the cost of these was to
be paid by duties levied on the navigation facilitated. That
the objects might be better attained, States, with the consent
of Congress and under certain other restrictions, were allowed
to lay a duty on the sea-going tonnage participating in the
trades of the river or harbor improved. States, divided by
rivers, or through which rivers flowed, could enter into
compacts for improving their navigation. Uniform laws of
naturalization and bankruptcy were authorized, but bankruptcy
could not affect debts contracted prior to the passage of the
law. A two-thirds vote was made requisite to appropriate money
unless asked and estimated for by some one of the heads of the
departments. Every law must relate but to one subject, and
that was to be expressed in the title. To admit new States
required a vote of two thirds of each House, the Senate voting
by States. Upon the demand of any three States, legally
assembled in their several conventions, Congress could summon
a convention to consider amendments to the Constitution, but
the convention was confined in its action to propositions
suggested by the States making the call. … 'The importation of
negroes of the African race was forbidden, and Congress was
required to pass laws effectually to prevent it.' The right of
transit or sojourn with slaves in any State was secured and
fugitive slaves—called 'slaves' without the euphemism of the
old instrument—were to be delivered up on the claim of the
party to whom they belonged. Congress could prohibit the
introduction of slaves from States and Territories not
included in the Confederacy, and laws impairing the right of
property in negro slaves were prohibited. Slaves could be
carried into any Territory of the Confederacy by citizens of
the Confederate States and be protected as property. This
clause was intended to forbid 'squatter sovereignty,' and to
prevent adverse action against property in slaves, until the
Territory should emerge from a condition of pupilage and
dependence into the dignity, equality, and sovereignty of a
State, when its right to define 'property' would be beyond the
interference or control of Congress."
J. L. M. Curry,
The Southern States of the American Union,
chapter 13.
Alexander H. Stephens, in his "Constitutional view of the late
War between the States," expresses the opinion that the
selection of Jefferson Davis for the Presidency of the
Confederacy was due to a misunderstanding. He says that a
majority of the states were looking to Georgia for the
President, and the Georgia delegation had unanimously agreed
to present Mr. Toombs, who would have been acceptable. But a
rumor got currency that Georgia would put forward Howell Cobb,
whereupon the other states took up Davis, and united upon him.
It was generally understood, says Mr. Stephens, that Davis
"did not desire the office of President. He preferred a
military position, and the one he desired above all others was
the chief command of the army."
A. H. Stephens,
Constitutional View of the War between the States,
volume 2, page 328-333.
ALSO IN:
R. B. Rhett,
The Confederate Government at Montgomery
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
volume 1, pages 99-111).
Jefferson Davis,
Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government,
part 3, chapter. 5, and appendix K (volume 1).
The text of both the Provisional and the Permanent
Constitution of the Confederate States is given in the
appendix referred to.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (February).
Urgency of South Carolina for the reduction of Fort Sumter
before the inauguration of President Lincoln.
"I am perfectly satisfied," wrote Governor Pickens of South
Carolina to Howell Cobb, "President of the Provisional
Congress" of the Confederacy, in a letter dated February 13,
1861,—"I am perfectly satisfied that the welfare of the new
confederation and the necessities of the State require that
Fort Sumter should be reduced before the close of the present
administration at Washington. If an attack is delayed until
after the inauguration of the incoming President of the United
States, the troops now gathered in the capital may then be
employed in attempting that which, previous to that time, they
could not be spared to do. They dare not leave Washington now
and do that which then will be a measure too inviting to be
resisted. Mr. Lincoln cannot do more for this State than Mr.
Buchanan has done. Mr. Lincoln will not concede what Mr.
Buchanan has refused. Mr. Buchanan has placed his refusal upon
grounds which determine his reply to six States, as completely
as to the same demand if made by a single State. If peace can
be secured, it will be by the prompt use of the occasion, when
the forces of the United States are withheld from our harbor.
If war can be averted, it will be by making the capture of
Fort Sumter a fact accomplished during the continuance of the
present administration, and leaving to the incoming
administration the question of an open declaration of war.
Such a declaration, separated, as it will be, from any present
act of hostilities during Mr. Lincoln's administration, may
become to him a matter requiring consideration. That
consideration will not be expected of him, if the attack on
the fort is made during his administration, and becomes,
therefore, as to him, an act of present hostility. Mr.
Buchanan cannot resist, because he has not the power. Mr.
Lincoln may not attack, because the cause of the quarrel will
have been, or may be, considered by him as past. Upon this
line of policy I have acted, and upon the adherence to it may
be found, I think, the most rational expectation of seeing
that fort, which is even now a source of danger to the State,
restored to the possession of the State without those
consequences which I should most deeply deplore."
Official Records,
volume 1, page 256.
{3417}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (February-March).
The inauguration and the
inaugural address of President Lincoln.
"On the 11th of February, with his family and some personal
friends, Lincoln left his home at Springfield for Washington.
… On his way to Washington, he passed through the great states
of Indiana, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, and
was everywhere received with demonstrations of loyalty, as the
representative of the national government. He addressed the
people at the capitals of these states, and at many of their
chief towns and cities. The city of Washington was surrounded
by slave territory, and was really within the lines of the
insurgents. Baltimore was not only a slaveholding city, but
nowhere was the spirit of rebellion more hot and ferocious
than among a large class of its people. The lower classes, the
material of which mobs are made, were reckless, and ready for
any outrage. From the date of his election to the time of his
start for Washington, there had often appeared in the press
and elsewhere, vulgar threats and menaces that he should never
be inaugurated, nor reach the capital alive. Little attention
was paid to these threats, yet some of the President's
personal friends, without his knowledge, employed a detective,
who sent agents to Baltimore and Washington to investigate. …
The detectives ascertained the existence of a plot to
assassinate the President elect, as he passed through
Baltimore. The first intelligence of this conspiracy was
communicated to Lincoln at Philadelphia. On the facts being
laid before him, he was urged to take the train that night
(the 21st of February), by which he would reach Washington the
next morning, passing through Baltimore earlier than the
conspirators expected, and thus avoid the danger. Having
already made appointments to meet the citizens of Philadelphia
at, and raise the United States flag over, Independence Hall,
on Washington's birthday, the 22nd, and also to meet the
Legislature of Pennsylvania at Harrisburgh, he declined
starting for Washington that night. Finally his friends
persuaded him to allow the detectives and the officers of the
railways to arrange for him to return from Harrisburgh, and,
by special train, to go to Washington the night following the
ceremonies at Harrisburgh. … He went to Harrisburgh according
to arrangement, met the Legislature, and retired to his room.
In the meanwhile, General Scott and Mr. Seward had learned,
through other sources, of the existence of the plot to
assassinate him, and had despatched Mr. F. W. Seward, a son of
Senator Seward, to apprise him of the danger. Information
coming to him from both of these sources, each independent of
the other, induced him to yield to the wishes of his friends,
and anticipate his journey to Washington. Besides, there had
reached him from Baltimore no committee, either of the
municipal authorities or of citizens, to tender him the
hospitalities, and to extend to him the courtesies of that
city, as had been done by every other city through which he
had passed. He was persuaded to permit the detective to
arrange for his going to Washington that night. The telegraph
wires to Baltimore were cut, Harrisburgh was isolated, and,
taking a special train, he reached Philadelphia, and driving
to the Baltimore depot, found the Washington train waiting his
arrival, stepped on board, and passed on without interruption
through Baltimore to the national capital. … He afterwards
declared: 'I did not then, nor do I now believe I should have
been assassinated, had I gone through Baltimore as first
contemplated, but I thought it wise to run no risk where no
risk was necessary.' … On the 4th of March, 1861, he was
inaugurated President of the United States. … In the open air,
and with a voice so clear and distinct that he could be heard
by thrice ten thousand men, he read his inaugural address, and
on the very verge of civil war, he made a most earnest appeal
for peace."
I. N. Arnold,
Life of Abraham Lincoln,
chapters 11-12.
ALSO IN:
J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, chapter 13.
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 3, chapters 19-21.
H. J. Raymond,
Life of Abraham Lincoln,
chapters 5-6.
The following is the full text of the inaugural address, from
Lincoln's "Complete Works."
"Fellow-Citizens of the United States: In compliance with a
custom as old as the government itself, I appear before you to
address you briefly, and to take, in your presence, the oath
prescribed by the Constitution of the United States to be
taken by the President 'before he enters on the execution of
his office.' I do not consider it necessary, at present, for
me to discuss those matters of administration about which
there is no special anxiety or excitement. Apprehension seems
to exist among the people of the southern states, that, by the
accession of a republican administration, their property and
their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There
has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension.
Indeed, the most ample evidence to the contrary has all the
while existed and been open to their inspection. It is found
in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses
you. I do but quote from one of those speeches, when I declare
that 'I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere
with the institution of slavery in the states where it exists.
I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no
inclination to do so.' Those who nominated and elected me did
so with full knowledge that I had made this and many similar
declarations, and had never recanted them. And, more than
this, they placed in the platform, for my acceptance, and as a
law to themselves and to me, the clear and emphatic resolution
which I now read: 'Resolved, That the maintenance inviolate of
the rights of the states, and especially the right of each
state to order and control its own domestic institutions
according to its own judgment exclusively, is essential to
that balance of power on which the perfection and endurance of
our political fabric depend, and we denounce the lawless
invasion by armed force of the soil of any state or territory,
no matter under what pretext, as among the gravest of crimes.'
I now reiterate these sentiments; and in doing so I only press
upon the public attention the most conclusive evidence of
which the case is susceptible, that the property, peace, and
security of no section are to be in any wise endangered by the
now incoming administration. I add, too, that all the
protection which, consistently with the Constitution and the
laws, can be given, will be cheerfully given to all the states
when lawfully demanded, for whatever cause—as cheerfully to
one section as to another.
{3418}
There is much controversy about the delivering up of fugitives
from service or labor. The clause I now read is as plainly
written in the Constitution as any other of its provisions:
'No person held to service or labor in one state under the
laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of
any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service
or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to
whom such service or labor may be due.' It is scarcely
questioned that this provision was intended by those who made
it for the reclaiming of what we call fugitive slaves; and the
intention of the law-giver is the law. All members of Congress
swear their support to the whole Constitution—to this
provision as much as to any other. To the proposition, then,
that slaves whose cases come within the terms of this clause
'shall be delivered up,' their oaths are unanimous. Now, if
they would make the effort in good temper, could they not,
with nearly equal unanimity, frame and pass a law by means of
which to keep good that unanimous oath? There is some
difference of opinion whether this clause should be enforced
by national or by state authority; but surely that difference
is not a very material one. If the slave is to be surrendered,
it can be of but little consequence to him or to others by
which authority it is done. And should anyone, in any case, be
content that this oath shall go unkept on a merely
unsubstantial controversy as to how it shall be kept? Again,
in any law upon this subject, ought not all the safeguards of
liberty known in civilized and humane jurisprudence to be
introduced, so that a free man be not, in any case,
surrendered as a slave? And might it not be well at the same
time to provide by law for the enforcement of that clause in
the Constitution which guarantees that 'the citizens of each
state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states'? I take the official oath
today with no mental reservations, and with no purpose to
construe the Constitution or laws by any hypercritical rules.
And while I do not choose now to specify particular acts of
Congress as proper to be enforced, I do suggest that it will
be much safer for all, both in official and private stations,
to conform to and abide by all those acts which stand
unrepealed, than to violate any of them, trusting to find
impunity in having them held to be unconstitutional. It is
seventy-two years since the first inauguration of a President
under our National Constitution. During that period, fifteen
different and greatly distinguished citizens have in
succession administered the executive branch of the
Government. They have conducted it through many perils, and
generally with great success. Yet, with all this scope of
precedent, I now enter upon the same task, for the brief
constitutional term of four years, under great and peculiar
difficulty. A disruption of the Federal Union, heretofore only
menaced, is now formidably attempted. I hold that in the
contemplation of universal law and of the Constitution, the
union of these states is perpetual. Perpetuity is implied, if
not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national
governments. It is safe to assert that no government proper
ever had a provision in its organic law for its own
termination. Continue to execute all the express provisions of
our National Constitution, and the Union will endure forever,
it being impossible to destroy it except by some action not
provided for in the instrument itself. Again, if the United
States be not a government proper, but an association of
states in the nature of a contract merely, can it, as a
contract, be peaceably unmade by less than all the parties who
made it? One party to a contract may violate it—break it, so
to speak; but does it not require all to lawfully rescind it?
Descending from these genera] principles, we find the
proposition that in legal contemplation the Union is
perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union itself. The
Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in
fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured
and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776. It
was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen
states expressly plighted and engaged that it should be
perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation, in 1778. And
finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining
and establishing the Constitution was 'to form a more perfect
Union.' But if the destruction of the Union by one or by a
part only of the states be lawfully possible, the Union is
less perfect than before the Constitution, having lost the
vital element of perpetuity. It follows from these views that
no state, upon its own mere motion, can lawfully get out of
the Union; that resolves and ordinances to that effect are
legally void; and that acts of violence within any state or
states against the authority of the United States are
insurrectionary or revolutionary, according to circumstances.
I therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the
laws, the Union is unbroken; and, to the extent of my ability,
I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly
enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully
executed in all the states. Doing this I deem to be only a
simple duty on my part; and I shall perform it so far as
practicable, unless my rightful masters, the American people,
shall withhold the requisite means, or in some authoritative
manner direct the contrary. I trust this will not be regarded
as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union
that it will constitutionally defend and maintain itself. In
doing this there needs to be no bloodshed or violence, and
there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national
authority. The power confided to me will be used to hold,
occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the
Government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but beyond
what may be necessary for these objects there will be no
invasion, no using of force against or among the people
anywhere. Where hostility to the United States in any interior
locality shall be so great and universal as to prevent
competent resident citizens from holding the federal offices,
there will be no attempt to force obnoxious strangers among
the people for that object. While the strict legal right may
exist in the Government to enforce the exercise of these
offices, the attempt to do so would be so irritating, and so
nearly impracticable withal, that I deem it better to forego,
for the time, the uses of such offices. The mails, unless
repelled, will continue to be furnished in all parts of the
Union. So far as possible, the people everywhere shall have
that sense of perfect security which is most favorable to calm
thought and reflection.
{3419}
The course here indicated will be followed, unless current
events and experience shall show a modification or change to
be proper; and in every case and exigency my best discretion
will be exercised according to circumstances actually
existing, and with a view and a hope of a peaceful solution of
the national troubles, and the restoration of fraternal
sympathies and affections. That there are persons, in one
section or another, who seek to destroy the Union at all
events, and are glad of any pretext to do it, I will neither
affirm nor deny; but if there be such, I need address no word
to them. To those, however, who really love the Union, may I
not speak? Before entering upon so grave a matter as the
destruction of our national fabric, with all its benefits, its
memories, and its hopes, would it not be wise to ascertain
precisely why we do it? Will you hazard so desperate a step,
while there is any possibility that any portion of the ills
you fly from have no real existence? Will you, while the
certain ills you fly to are greater than all the real ones you
fly from—will you risk the commission of so fearful a mistake?
All profess to be content in the Union if all constitutional
rights can be maintained. Is it true, then, that any right,
plainly written in the Constitution, has been denied? I think
not. Happily the human mind is so constituted that no party
can reach to the audacity of doing this. Think, if you can, of
a single instance in which a plainly written provision of the
Constitution has ever been denied. If, by the mere force of
numbers, a majority should deprive a minority of any clearly
written constitutional right, it might, in a moral point of
view, justify revolution—certainly would if such a right were
a vital one. But such is not our case. All the vital rights of
minorities and of individuals are so plainly assured to them
by affirmations and negations, guarantees and prohibitions in
the Constitution, that controversies never arise concerning
them. But no organic law can ever be framed with a provision
specifically applicable to every question which may occur in
practical administration. No foresight can anticipate, nor any
document of reasonable length contain, express provisions for
all possible questions. Shall fugitives from labor be
surrendered by national or by state authority? The
Constitution does not expressly say. May Congress prohibit
slavery in the Territories? The Constitution does not
expressly say. Must Congress protect slavery in the
Territories? The Constitution does not expressly say. From
questions of this class spring all our constitutional
controversies, and we divide upon them into majorities and
minorities. If the minority will not acquiesce, the majority
must, or the Government must cease. There is no other
alternative; for continuing the Government is acquiescence on
one side or the other. If a minority in such case will secede
rather than acquiesce, they make a precedent which, in turn,
will divide and ruin them; for a minority of their own will
secede from them whenever a majority refuses to be controlled
by such minority. For instance, why may not any portion of a
new Confederacy, a year or two hence, arbitrarily secede
again, precisely as portions of the present Union now claim to
secede from it? All who cherish disunion sentiments are now
being educated to the exact temper of doing this. Is there
such perfect identity of interests among the states to compose
a new Union as to produce harmony only, and prevent renewed
secession? Plainly, the central idea of secession is the
essence of anarchy. A majority held in restraint by
constitutional checks and limitations, and always changing
easily with deliberate changes of popular opinions and
sentiments, is the only true sovereign of a free people.
Whoever rejects it, does, of necessity, fly to anarchy or to
despotism. Unanimity is impossible; the rule of a minority, as
a permanent arrangement, is wholly inadmissible; so that,
rejecting the majority principle, anarchy or despotism, in
some form, is all that is left. I do not forget the position
assumed by some that constitutional questions are to be decide
by the Supreme Court; nor do I deny that such decisions must
he binding in any case upon the parties to a suit, as to the
object of that suit, while they are also entitled to very high
respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other
departments of the Government; and while it is obviously
possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given
case, still the evil effect following it, being limited to
that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled
and never become a precedent for other cases, can better be
borne than could the evils of a different practice. At the
same time the candid citizen must confess that if the policy
of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole
people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court, the instant they are made, in ordinary litigation
between parties in personal actions, the people will have
ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent
practically resigned their Government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal. Nor is there in this view any assault upon
the Court or the Judges. It is a duty from which they may not
shrink, to decide cases properly brought before them, and it
is no fault of theirs if others seek to turn their decisions
to political purposes. One section of our country believes
slavery is right and ought to be extended, while the other
believes it is wrong and ought not to be extended. This is the
only substantial dispute. The fugitive-slave clause of the
Constitution, and the law for the suppression of the foreign
slave-trade, are each as well enforced, perhaps, as any law
can ever be in a community where the moral sense of the people
imperfectly supports the law itself. The great body of the
people abide by the dry legal obligation in both cases, and a
few break over in each. This, I think, cannot be perfectly
cured; and it would be worse in both cases after the
separation of the sections than before. The foreign
slave-trade, now imperfectly suppressed, would be ultimately
revived, without restriction, in one section; while fugitive
slaves, now only partially surrendered, would not be
surrendered at all by the other. Physically speaking, we
cannot separate; we cannot remove our respective sections from
each other, nor build an impassable wall between them. A
husband and wife may be divorced, and go out of the presence
and beyond the reach of each other; but the different parts of
our country cannot do this. They cannot but remain face to
face; and intercourse, either amicable or hostile, must
continue between them. Is it possible, then, to make that
intercourse more advantageous or more satisfactory after
separation than before? Can aliens make treaties easier than
friends can make laws?
{3420}
Can treaties be more faithfully enforced between aliens than
laws can among friends? Suppose you go to war, you cannot
fight always; and when, after much loss on both sides and no
gain on either, you cease fighting, the identical old
questions as to terms of intercourse are again upon you. This
country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who
inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing
government, they can exercise their constitutional right of
amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or
overthrow it. I cannot be ignorant of the fact that many
worthy and patriotic citizens are desirous of having the
National Constitution amended. While I make no recommendation
of amendments, I fully recognize the rightful authority of the
people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either of
the modes prescribed in the instrument itself; and I should,
under existing circumstances, favor, rather than oppose, a
fair opportunity being afforded the people to act upon it. I
will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems
preferable, in that it allows amendments to originate with the
people themselves, instead of only permitting them to take or
reject propositions originated by others not especially chosen
for the purpose, and which might not be precisely such as they
would wish to either accept or refuse. I understand a proposed
amendment to the Constitution—which amendment, however, I have
not seen—has passed Congress, to the effect that the Federal
Government shall never interfere with the domestic
institutions of the states, including that of persons held to
service. To avoid misconstruction of what I have said, I
depart from my purpose not to speak of particular amendments,
so far as to say that, holding such a provision to now be
implied constitutional law, I have no objection to its being
made express and irrevocable. The Chief Magistrate derives all
his authority from the people, and they have conferred none
upon him to fix terms for the separation of the states. The
people themselves can do this also if they choose, but the
Executive, as such, has nothing to do with it. His duty is to
administer the present government as it came to his hands, and
to transmit it unimpaired by him to his successor. Why should
there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of
the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world? In
our present differences is either party without faith of being
in the right? If the Almighty Ruler of Nations, with his
eternal truth and justice, be on your side of the North, or on
yours of the South, that truth and that justice will surely
prevail by the judgment of this great tribunal, the American
people. By the frame of the Government under which we live,
this same people have wisely given their public servants but
little power for mischief; and have with equal wisdom provided
for the return of that little to their own hands at very short
intervals. While the people retain their virtue and vigilance,
no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can
very seriously injure the Government in the short space of
four years. My countrymen, one and all, think calmly and well
upon this whole subject. Nothing valuable can be lost by
taking time. If there be an object to hurry any of you, in hot
haste, to a step which you would never take deliberately, that
object will be frustrated by taking time; but no good object
can be frustrated by it. Such of you as are now dissatisfied
still have the old Constitution unimpaired, and on the
sensitive point, the laws of your own framing under it; while
the new administration will have no immediate power, if it
would, to change either. If it were admitted that you who are
dissatisfied hold the right side in the dispute, there still
is no single good reason for precipitate action. Intelligence,
patriotism, Christianity, and a firm reliance on Him who has
never yet forsaken this favored land, are still competent to
adjust, in the best way, all our present difficulty. In your
hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is
the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not
assail you. You can have no conflict without being yourselves
the aggressors. You have no oath registered in heaven to
destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one
to 'preserve, protect, and defend it.' I am loth to close. W
are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though
passion may have strained, it must not break, our bonds of
affection. The mystic cords of memory, stretching from every
battle-field and patriot grave to every living heart and
hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the
chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will
be, by the better angels of our nature."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (March).
President Lincoln and his Cabinet.
Secretary Seward.
President Lincoln, "in selecting his cabinet, which he did
substantially before he left Springfield for Washington, …
thought it wise to call to his assistance the strong men of
his party, especially those who had given evidence of the
support they commanded as his competitors in the Chicago
convention. … This was sound policy under the circumstances.
It might indeed have been foreseen that among the members of a
cabinet so composed, troublesome disagreements and rivalries
would break out. But it was better for the President to have
these strong and ambitious men near him as his coöperators
than to have them as his critics in Congress, where their
differences might have been composed in a common opposition to
him. As members of his cabinet he could hope to control them,
and to keep them busily employed in the service of a common
purpose, if he had the strength to do so. Whether he did
possess this strength was soon tested by a singularly rude
trial. There can be no doubt that the foremost members of his
cabinet, Seward and Chase, the most eminent Republican
statesmen, had felt themselves wronged by their party when in
its national convention it preferred to them for the
presidency a man whom, not unnaturally, they thought greatly
their inferior in ability and experience as well as in
service. … Seward, who, as Secretary of State, considered
himself next to the Chief Executive, and who quickly
accustomed himself to giving orders and making arrangements
upon his own motion, thought it necessary that he should
rescue the direction of public affairs from hands so
unskilled, and take full charge of them himself. At the end of
the first month of the administration he submitted a
'memorandum' to President Lincoln, which has been first
brought to light by Nicolay and Hay, and is one of their most
valuable contributions to the history of those days.
{3421}
In that paper Seward actually told the President that, at the
end of a month's administration, the government was still
without a policy, either domestic or foreign; that the slavery
question should be eliminated from the struggle about the
Union; that the matter of the maintenance of the forts and
other possessions in the South should be decided with that
view; that explanations should be demanded categorically from
the governments of Spain and France, which were then
preparing, one for the annexation of San Domingo, and both for
the invasion of Mexico; that if no satisfactory explanations
were received war should be declared against Spain and France
by the United States; that explanations should also be sought
from Russia and Great Britain, and a vigorous continental
spirit of independence against European intervention be
aroused all over the American continent; that this policy
should be incessantly pursued and directed by somebody; that
either the President should devote himself entirely to it, or
devolve the direction on some member of his cabinet, whereupon
all debate on this policy must end. This could be understood
only as a formal demand that the President should acknowledge
his own incompetency to perform his duties, content himself
with the amusement of distributing post offices, and resign
his power as to all important affairs into the hands of his
Secretary of State. … Had Lincoln, as most Presidents would
have done, instantly dismissed Seward, and published the true
reason for that dismissal, it would inevitably have been the
end of Seward's career. But Lincoln did what not many of the
noblest and greatest men in history would have been noble and
great enough to do. He considered that Seward was still
capable of rendering great service to his country in the place
in which he was, if rightly controlled. He ignored the insult,
but firmly established his superiority. In his reply, which he
forthwith dispatched, he told Seward that the administration
had a domestic policy as laid down in the inaugural address
with Seward's approval; that it had a foreign policy as traced
in Seward's dispatches with the President's approval; that if
any policy was to be maintained or changed, he, the President,
was to direct that on his responsibility; and that in
performing that duty the President had a right to the advice
of his secretaries. Seward's fantastic schemes of foreign war
and continental policies Lincoln brushed aside by passing them
over in silence. Nothing more was said. Seward must have felt
that he was at the mercy of a superior man."
Carl Schurz,
Abraham Lincoln,
pages 67-73.
ALSO IN:
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln: a History,
volume 3, chapters 22 and 26.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (March).
Surrender of Alexander H. Stephens to Secession.
His "Corner-stone" speech at Savannah.
The following is from a speech made by Alexander H. Stephens
at Savannah, on the evening after the secession of Georgia,
which he had opposed, but to which he now yielded himself
without reserve. It is a speech that became famous on account
of its bold declaration that Slavery formed the "corner-stone"
of the New Confederacy. "The new constitution," said Mr.
Stephens, "has put at rest, forever, all the agitating
questions relating to our peculiar institution—African slavery
as it exists amongst us—the proper status of the negro in our
form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late
rupture and present revolution. Jefferson, in his forecast,
had anticipated this, as the 'rock upon which the old Union
would split.' He was right. What was conjecture with him, is
now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the
great truth upon which that rock stood and stands may be
doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him and most of
the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old
constitution, were that the enslavement of the African was in
violation of the laws of nature; that it was wrong in
principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil
they knew not well how to deal with, but the general opinion
of the men of that day was that, somehow or other in the order
of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and pass
away. This idea, though not incorporated in the constitution,
was the prevailing idea at that time. The constitution, it is
true, secured every essential guarantee to the institution
while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly
urged against the constitutional guarantees thus secured,
because of the common sentiment of the day. Those ideas,
however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the
assumption of the equality of races. This was an error. It was
a sandy foundation, and the government built upon it fell when
the 'storm came and the wind blew.' Our new government is
founded upon exactly the opposite idea; its foundations are
laid, its corner-stone rests upon the great truth, that the
negro is not equal to the white man; that slavery
—subordination to the superior race—is his natural and normal
condition. This, our new government, is the first, in the
history of the world, based upon this great physical,
philosophical, and moral truth. This truth has been slow in
the process of its development, like all other truths in the
various departments of science. It has been so even amongst
us."
A. H. Stephens,
Speech in Savannah, March 21, 1861
(in "Alexander H. Stephens in Public and Private;
by H. Cleveland").
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (March-April).
The breaking of rebellion into open war
by the attack on Fort Sumter.
President Lincoln's statement of the circumstances.
His first difficulties.
Attitude of the Border States.
The circumstances under which the first blow of the civil war
was struck by the rebels at Charleston were recited by
President Lincoln, in his Message to Congress, at the special
session convened July 4, 1861; "On the 5th of March (the
present incumbent's first full day in office), a letter of
Major Anderson, commanding at Fort Sumter, written on the 28th
of February and received at the War Department on the 4th of
March, was by that department placed in his hands. This letter
expressed the professional opinion of the writer that
reinforcements could not be thrown into that fort within the
time for his relief, rendered necessary by the limited supply
of provisions, and with a view of holding possession of the
same, with a force of less than 20,000 good and
well-disciplined men. This opinion was concurred in by all the
officers of his command, and their memoranda on the subject
were made inclosures of Major Anderson's letter.
{3422}
The whole was immediately laid before Lieutenant-General
Scott, who at once concurred with Major Anderson in opinion.
On reflection, however, he took full time, consulting with
other officers, both of the army and the navy, and at the end
of four days came reluctantly but decidedly to the same
conclusion as before. He also stated at the same time that no
such sufficient force was then at the control of the
government, or could be raised and brought to the ground
within the time when the provisions in the fort would be
exhausted. In a purely military point of view, this reduced
the duty of the administration in the case to the mere matter
of getting the garrison safely out of the fort. It was
believed, however, that to so abandon that position, under the
circumstances, would be utterly ruinous; that the necessity
under which it was to be done would not be fully understood;
that by many it would be construed as a part of a voluntary
policy; that at home it would discourage the friends of the
Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the
latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our
national destruction consummated. This could not be allowed.
Starvation was not yet upon the garrison, and ere it would be
reached Fort Pickens might be reinforced. This last would be a
clear indication of policy, and would better enable the
country to accept the evacuation of Fort Sumter as a military
necessity. An order was at once directed to be sent for the
landing of the troops from the steamship 'Brooklyn' into Fort
Pickens. This order could not go by land, but must take the
longer and slower route by sea. The first return news from the
order was received just one week before the fall of Fort
Sumter. The news itself was that the officer commanding the
'Sabine,' to which vessel the troops had been transferred from
the 'Brooklyn,' acting upon some quasi armistice of the late
administration (and of the existence of which the present
administration, up to the time the order was despatched, had
only too vague and uncertain rumors to fix attention), had
refused to land the troops. To now reinforce Fort Pickens
before a crisis would be reached at Fort Sumter was
impossible—rendered so by the near exhaustion of provisions in
the latter-named fort. In precaution against such a
conjuncture, the government had, a few days before, commenced
preparing an expedition as well adapted as might be to relieve
Fort Sumter, which expedition was intended to be ultimately
used, or not, according to circumstances. The strongest
anticipated case for using it was now presented, and it was
resolved to send it forward. As had been intended in this
contingency, it was also resolved to notify the governor of
South Carolina that he might expect an attempt would be made
to provision the fort; and that, if the attempt should not be
resisted, there would be no effort to throw in men, arms, or
ammunition, without further notice, or in case of an attack
upon the fort. This notice was accordingly given; whereupon
the fort was attacked and bombarded to its fall, without even
awaiting the arrival of the provisioning expedition. It is
thus seen that the assault upon and reduction of Fort Sumter
was in no sense a matter of self-defense on the part of the
assailants."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 56-57.
The President's delay of action in the case of Fort Sumter was
mainly due, on the political side of the question, to the
state of things in the border states—especially in Virginia.
"There were fifteen slave states, which those engaged in the
rebellion hoped to lead or to force into secession. At the
time of the inauguration, only seven of these fifteen—less
than a majority—had revolted. The cotton states alone had
followed the lead of South Carolina out of the Union. Several
weeks had passed since a state had seceded; and unless other
states could be dragooned into the movement, the rebellion
would be practically a failure from the start. Such a
confederacy could not hope to live a year, and would be
obliged to find its way back into the Union upon some terms.
In the meantime, two or three conventions in the border states
[Virginia, April 4, and Missouri, March], delegated freshly
from the people, had voted distinctly and decidedly not to
secede. [Kentucky and Tennessee had refused even the call of
conventions; while North Carolina, February 28, and Arkansas,
March 18, of the states farther south, had voted secession
down.] The affairs of the confederacy were really in a very
precarious condition when Mr. Lincoln came into power. The
rebel government was making very much more bluster than
progress. It became Mr. Lincoln's policy so to conduct affairs
as to strengthen the Union feeling in the border states, and
to give utterance to no sentiment and to do no deed which
should drive these states toward the confederacy. … The
confederacy found that it must make progress or die. The rebel
Congress passed a measure for the organization of an army, on
the 9th of March, and on the 12th two confederate
commissioners—Mr. Forsyth of Alabama and Mr. Crawford of
Georgia—presented themselves at the State Department at
Washington for the purpose of making a treaty with the United
States. They knew, of course, that they could not be received
officially, and that they ought to be arrested for treason.
The President would not recognize them, but sent to them a
copy of his inaugural, as the embodiment of the views of the
government. … In the meantime, Lieutenant Talbot, on behalf of
Mr. Lincoln, was having interviews with Governor Pickens of
South Carolina and with General Beauregard, in command of the
confederate forces there, in which he informed them that
provisions would be sent to Fort Sumter, peaceably if
possible,—otherwise by force. This was communicated to L. P.
Walker, then rebel Secretary of War. Before Talbot had made
his communication, Beauregard had informed Major Anderson, in
command of Fort Sumter, that he must have no further
intercourse with Charleston; and Talbot himself was refused
permission to visit that gallant and faithful officer. … The
wisdom of Mr. Lincoln's waiting became evident at a day not
too long delayed. Fort Pickens, which the rebels had not
taken, was quietly reinforced [April 12], and when the vessels
which carried the relief [to Sumter] were dispatched, Mr.
Lincoln gave official information to General Beauregard that
provisions were to be sent to Major Anderson in Fort Sumter,
by an unarmed vessel. He was determined that no hostile act on
the part of the government should commence the war, for which
both sides were preparing; although an act of open war had
already transpired in Charleston harbor"—the rebel batteries
having fired upon and driven off the unarmed steamer Star of
the West, which had been sent to convey troops and provisions
to Fort Sumter on the 9th of January, two months before
Lincoln's inauguration.
{3423}
"Beauregard laid this last intelligence before his Secretary
of War, and, under special instructions, on the 12th of April,
he demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter. He was ready to make
the demand, and to back it by force. The city of Charleston
was full of troops, and, for months, batteries had been in
course of construction, with the special purpose of compelling
the surrender of the fort. Major Anderson had seen these
batteries going up, day after day, without the liberty to fire
a gun. He declined to surrender. He was called upon to state
when he would evacuate the fort. He replied that on the 15th
he would do so, should he not meantime receive controlling
instructions from the government, or additional supplies. The
response which he received was that the confederate batteries
would open on Fort Sumter in one hour from the date of the
message. The date of the message was 'April 12, 1861, 3:30 A.
M.' Beauregard was true to his word. At half past four the
batteries opened upon the Fort, which, after a long and
terrible bombardment, and a gallant though comparatively
feeble defense by a small and half-starved garrison, was
surrendered the following day. … The fall of Sumter was the
resurrection of patriotism. The North needed just this. Such a
universal burst of patriotic indignation as ran over the North
under the influence of this insult to the national flag has
never been witnessed. It swept away all party lines as if it
had been flame and they had been flax."
J. G. Holland,
Life of Lincoln,
chapter 18.
ALSO IN:
F. W. Seward,
Seward at Washington,
chapter 56.
S. W. Crawford,
Genesis of the Civil War: The Story of Sumter,
chapters 24-32.

A. Doubleday,
Reminiscences of Forts Sumter and Moultrie,
chapters 8-11.
A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
volume 1, chapters 2-4.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
The Century Company,
volume 1, pages 40-83.
S. L. Woodford,
The Story of Fort Sumter
(Personal Recollections of the War:
N. Y. Com. L. L. of the United States).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April).
President Lincoln's call to arms.
The mighty uprising of the North.
The response of disloyal Governors.
"By the next morning (Sunday April 14) the news of the close
of the bombardment and capitulation of Sumter was in
Washington. In the forenoon, at the time Anderson and his
garrison were evacuating the fort, Lincoln and his Cabinet,
together with sundry military officers, were at the Executive
Mansion, giving final shape to the details of the action the
Government had decided to take. A proclamation, drafted by
himself, copied on the spot by his secretary, was concurred in
by his Cabinet, signed, and sent to the State Department to be
sealed, filed, and copied for publication in the next
morning's newspapers. The document bears date April 15
(Monday), but was made and signed on Sunday." It was as
follows:
"Whereas the laws of the United States have been for some time
past and now are opposed, and the execution thereof
obstructed, in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama,
Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations
too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals
by law: Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the
United States, in virtue of the power in me vested by the
Constitution and the laws, have thought fit to call forth, and
hereby do call forth, the militia of the several States of the
Union, to the aggregate number of seventy-five thousand, in
order to suppress said combinations, and to cause the laws to
be duly executed. The details for this object will be
immediately communicated to the State authorities through the
War Department. I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor,
facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the
integrity, and the existence of our National Union, and the
perpetuity of popular government; and to redress wrongs
already long enough endured. I deem it proper to say that the
first service assigned to the forces hereby called forth will
probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which
have been seized from the Union; and in every event the utmost
care will be observed, consistently with the objects
aforesaid, to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or
interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful
citizens in any part of the country. And I hereby command the
persons composing the combination aforesaid to disperse and
retire peacefully to their respective abodes within twenty
days from date. Deeming that the present condition of public
affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, I do hereby, in
virtue of the power in me vested by the Constitution, convene
both Houses of Congress. Senators and Representatives are
therefore summoned to assemble at their respective chambers,
at twelve o'clock noon, on Thursday the fourth day of July
next, then and there to consider and determine such measures
as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem
to demand. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand,
and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done
at the city of Washington, this 15th day of April, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one, and of
the Independence of the United States the eighty-fifth.
Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward,
Secretary of State."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, page 34.
"In view of the subsequent gigantic expansion of the civil
war, eleventh-hour critics continue to insist that a larger
force should have been called at once. They forget that this
was nearly five times the then existing regular army; that
only very limited quantities of arms, equipments, and supplies
were in the Northern arsenals; that the treasury was bankrupt;
and that an insignificant eight million loan had not two weeks
before been discounted nearly six per cent. by the New York
bankers, some bids ranging as low as eighty-five. They forget
that the shameful events of the past four months had elicited
scarcely a spark of war feeling; that the loyal States had
suffered the siege of Sumter and firing on the 'Star of the
West' with a dangerous indifference. They forget the doubt and
dismay, the panic of commerce, the division of counsels, the
attacks from within, the sneers from without—that faith seemed
gone and patriotism dead. Twenty-four hours later all this was
measurably changed, … The guns of the Sumter bombardment woke
the country from the political nightmare which had so long
tormented and paralyzed it.
{3424}
The lion of the North was fully roused. Betrayed, insulted,
outraged, the free States arose as with a cry of pain and
vengeance. War sermons from pulpits; war speeches in every
assemblage; tenders of troops; offers of money; military
proclamations and orders in every newspaper; every city
radiant with bunting; every village-green a mustering ground;
war appropriations in every legislature and in every city or
town council; war preparations in every public or private
workshop; gun-casting in the great foundries; cartridge-making
in the principal towns; camps and drills in the fields;
parades, drums, flags, and bayonets in the streets; knitting,
bandage-rolling, and lint-scraping in nearly every household.
Before the lapse of forty-eight hours a Massachusetts
regiment, armed and equipped, was on its way to Washington;
within the space of a month the energy and intelligence of the
country were almost completely turned from the industries of
peace to the activities of war."
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 4, chapters 4-5.
"In intelligence no army, except perhaps the Athenian, can
have ever equalled or approached that of the North. Most of
the soldiers carried books and writing materials in their
knapsacks, and mail bags heavily weighted with letters were
sent from every cantonment. Such privates would sometimes
reason instead of obeying, and they would see errors of their
commanders to which they had better have been blind. But on
the whole, in a war in which much was thrown upon the
individual soldier, intelligence was likely to prevail. In
wealth, in the means of providing the weapons and ammunitions
of war, the North had an immense advantage, which, combined
with that of numbers, could not fail, if, to use Lincoln's
homely phrase, it 'pegged away,' to tell in the end. It was
also vastly superior in mechanical invention; which was
destined to play a great part, and in mechanical skill; almost
every Yankee regiment was full of mechanics, some of whom
could devise as well as execute. In artillery and engineering
the North took the lead from the first, having many civil
engineers, whose conversion into military civil engineers was
easy. The South, to begin with, had the contents of Federal
arsenals and armouries, which had been well stocked by the
provident treason of Buchanan's Minister of War. … But when
these resources were exhausted, replacement was difficult, the
blockade having been established, though extraordinary efforts
in the way of military manufacture were made. To the wealthy
North, besides its own factories, were opened the markets of
England and the world. Of the small regular army the
Confederacy had carried off a share, with nearly half the
regular officers. The South had the advantage of the
defensive, which, with long-range muskets and in a difficult
country, was reckoned in battle as five to two. The South had
the superiority of the unity, force, and secrecy which
autocracy lends to the operations of war. On the side of the
North these were comparatively wanting."
Goldwin Smith,
The United States,
chapter 5.
In six of the eight Slave-labor States included in the call,
the President's Proclamation and the requisition of the
Secretary of War "were treated by the authorities with words
of scorn and defiance. The exceptions were Maryland and
Delaware. In the other States, disloyal Governors held the
reins of power. 'I have only to say,' replied Governor Letcher
of Virginia, 'that the militia of this State will not be
furnished to the powers at Washington for any such purpose as
they have in view. Your object is to subjugate the Southern
States, and a requisition made upon me for such an object—an
object, in my judgment, not within the province of the
Constitution or the Act of 1795—will not be complied with. You
have chosen to inaugurate civil war, and, having done so, we
will meet it in a spirit as determined as the Administration
has exhibited toward the South.' Governor Ellis, of North
Carolina, answered:—'Your dispatch is received, and if
genuine, which its extraordinary character leads me to doubt,
I have to say in reply, that I regard the levy of troops, made
by the Administration for the purpose of subjugating the
States of the South, as in violation of the Constitution, and
a usurpation of power. I can be no party to this wicked
violation of the laws of the country, and to this war upon the
liberties of a free people. You can get no troops from North
Carolina.' Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, replied:—'Your
dispatch is received. I say emphatically that Kentucky will
furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her
sister Southern States.' Governor Harris, of Tennessee,
said:—'Tennessee will not furnish a single man for coercion,
but 50,000, if necessary, for the defense of our rights, or
those of our Southern brethren.' Governor Rector, of Arkansas,
replied:—'In answer to your requisition for troops from
Arkansas to subjugate the Southern States, I have to say that
none will be furnished. The demand is only adding insult to
injury.' … Governor Jackson, of Missouri, responded:—'There
can be, I apprehend, no doubt that these men are intended to
make war upon the seceded States. Your requisition, in my
judgment, is illegal, unconstitutional, and revolutionary in
its objects, inhuman and diabolical, and cannot be complied
with. Not one man will the State of Missouri furnish to carry
on such an unholy crusade.' … Governor Hicks, of Maryland,
appalled by the presence of great dangers, and sorely pressed
by the secessionists on every side, hastened, in a
proclamation, to assure the people of his State that no troops
would be sent from Maryland unless it might be for the defense
of the National Capital, and that they (the people) would, in
a short time, 'have the opportunity afforded them, in a
special election for members of the Congress of the United
States, to express their devotion to the Union, or their
desire to see it broken up.' Governor Burton, of Delaware,
made no response until the 26th, when he informed the
President that he had no authority to comply with his
requisition. At the same time he recommended the formation of
volunteer companies for the protection of the citizens and
property of Delaware, and not for the preservation of the
Union. … In the seven excepted Slave-labor States in which
insurrection prevailed, the proclamation and the requisition
produced hot indignation, and were assailed with the bitterest
scorn. … Even in the Free-labor States, there were vehement
opposers of the war policy of the Government from its
inception." But, speaking generally, "the uprising of the
people of the Free-labor States in defense of Nationality was
a sublime spectacle. Nothing like it had been seen on the
earth since the preaching of Peter the Hermit and of Pope
Urban the Second filled all Christian Europe with religious
zeal, and sent armed hosts, with the cry of 'God wills it! God
wills it!' to rescue the sepulcher of Jesus from the hands of
the infidel."
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 1, chapter 14.
ALSO IN:
F. Moore, editor,
Rebellion Record,
volume 1.
W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
chapters 4-6.
{3425}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April).
The Morrill Tariff Act.
See TARIFF LEGISLATION: A. D. 1861-1864 (UNITED STATES).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April).
Secession of Virginia.
See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-JUNE).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April).
Activity of Rebellion in Virginia and Maryland.
Peril of the national capital.
Attack on Massachusetts volunteers in Baltimore.
"Massachusetts, always the most zealous, was the first in the
field [with troops in response to the President's call], and
on the 17th [April] she forwarded a regiment of volunteers
from Boston to Washington. Pennsylvania, although nearly
one-half of her votes had been given for Mr. Breckinridge,
followed this example; and, owing to her geographical
position, her volunteers reached the shores of the Potomac in
advance of all the others. After passing through the great
city of Baltimore in the midst of an incipient insurrection,
they encamped around the Capitol, on the 18th of April. The
seceders, on their side, had not lost a moment in Virginia.
They were in possession of Richmond, where the convention was
in session. … The workshops and arsenal of Harper's Ferry,
situated at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah,
on a spot which was destined to play an important part during
the war, were only guarded by a detachment of 64 dismounted
dragoons; and the Virginia volunteers, assembled in the
valleys of the Blue Ridge, were ready to take possession of
them as soon as the ordinance for the secession of Virginia
should furnish them a pretext. They were then to cross the
Potomac and join the insurgents of Maryland, for the purpose
of attempting the capture of Washington, where their
accomplices were expecting them. On the morning of the 18th
[April], a portion of them were on their march, in the hope of
seizing the prey which was to be of so much value to the
future armies of the Confederacy. But Lieutenant Jones, who
was in command at Harper's Ferry, had been informed of the
approach of the Confederate troops under the lead of Ashby—a
chief well known since; notwithstanding their despatch, they
only arrived in sight of Harper's Ferry in time to see from a
distance a large conflagration that was consuming the
workshops, store-houses, and the enormous piles of muskets
heaped in the yards, while the Federal soldiers who had just
kindled it were crossing the Potomac on their way to
Washington. The Confederates found nothing but smoking ruins,
and some machinery, which they sent to Richmond; their allies
from Maryland had not made their appearance, and they did not
feel strong enough to venture alone to the other side of the
Potomac. During the last few days the authorities of Virginia
had been making preparations for capturing the Norfolk [or
Gosport] arsenal (navy-yard). That establishment possessed a
magnificent granite basin, construction docks, and a depot of
artillery with more than 2,000 guns; a two-decked vessel was
on the stocks, two others, with a three-decker, three
frigates, a steam sloop, and a brig, lay dismantled in the
port; the steam frigate Merrimac was there undergoing repairs;
the steam sloop Germantown was in the harbor ready to go to
sea, while the sailing sloop Cumberland was lying to at the
entrance of the port. … Commodore McCauley, the Federal
commandant, was surrounded by traitors," and, being deficient
in energy and capability, he allowed himself to be put in a
position where he thought it necessary to sink all the vessels
in the harbor except the Cumberland. As they were sinking,
reinforcements arrived from Washington, under Captain
Paulding, who superseded McCauley in command. But they came
too late. Captain Paulding could do nothing except hastily
destroy as far as possible the sinking ships and the arsenal
buildings, and then retreat. "The Confederates found abundant
resources in artillery and 'materiel' of every description in
Norfolk; the fire was soon extinguished, the docks repaired,
and they succeeded in raising the Merrimac, which we shall see
at work the following year. Fort Monroe had just been occupied
by a small Federal garrison. Its loss would have been even
more disastrous to the Federal cause than that of the Norfolk
navy-yard and arsenal, because the Confederates, instead of
having to cover Richmond, would have been able to blockade
Washington by sea and besiege it by land. … The example of
Virginia fired the enthusiasm of the secessionists everywhere,
and they applied themselves to the task of drawing into the
conflict those slave States which were still hesitating. … The
sight of the Pennsylvania volunteers had caused a great
irritation in Baltimore. That city, the largest in the slave
States, … warmly sympathized with the South. Her location on
the railway line which connects Washington with the great
cities of the North imparted to her a peculiar importance.
Consequently, the accomplices of the South, who were numerous
in Baltimore, determined to seize the first opportunity that
might offer to drag that city into the rebellion. … The
looked-for opportunity occurred … April 19. When the Sixth
Massachusetts Regiment, with a few battalions of Pennsylvania
volunteers, arrived at the northern station, an immense crowd
bore down upon them. A line of rails, laid in the centre of
the streets, connected this with the southern station, and
enabled the cars, drawn by horses, to pass through the city.
The crowd surround the soldiers of the Sixth Massachusetts,
who occupy these cars. The last cars are stopped, and the
occupants, being obliged to get out, endeavor to make their
way through the crowd. But, being hemmed in on all sides, they
are soon attacked by a shower of stones, which wound many of
them, and injure a few mortally. The soldiers have to defend
themselves, and the first discharge of musketry, which has
considerable effect, opens them a passage. But the aggressors,
being armed, rally, and a regular battle ensues. … The ground
is strewn with the wounded of both parties. At last, the
Massachusetts soldiers rejoin their comrades at the southern
station," and are conveyed to Washington. "Baltimore was
thenceforth in possession of the secessionists, who were fully
determined to take advantage of the situation of that city to
intercept all communications between Washington and the North.
{3426}
Accordingly, they hastened to burn the railroad bridges which
had been constructed over large estuaries north of Baltimore,
and to cut the telegraph wires. Deprived of all sources of
information from the North, the capital of the Union was soon
wrapped in mournful silence. For some days the occupant of the
White House was unable to forward any instructions to the
people who had remained faithful to the Union; but their zeal
did not abate on that account. Patriotism extinguished all
party animosities in the hearts of most of the Democrats who
had opposed the election of Mr. Lincoln. In the presence of
the national peril they loyally tendered their assistance to
the President; and breaking loose from their former
accomplices of the South, they assumed the name of War
Democrats in opposition to that of Peace Democrats."
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 1, book 2, chapter 4.
ALSO IN:
J. W. Hanson,
History of the Sixth Massachusetts Volunteers,
pages 21-57.
G. W. Brown,
Baltimore and the 29th of April, 1861
(Johns Hopkins University Studies, extra volume 3).
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion,
series 1, volume 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April: South Carolina).
Monarchical cravings.
Intensity of the Carolinian hatred of New England and the North.
Mr. Russell, who was famous in his day as a correspondent of
"The Times" (London), spent some time in South Carolina at the
beginning of the war, and described the state of feeling there
in a letter from Charleston, written at the end of April:
"Nothing I could say," he wrote, "can be worth one fact which
has forced itself upon my mind in reference to the sentiments
which prevail among the gentlemen of this State. I have been
among them for several days. I have visited their plantations,
I have conversed with them freely and fully, and I have
enjoyed that frank, courteous and graceful intercourse which
constitutes an irresistible charm of their society. From all
quarters have come to my ears the echoes of the same voice. …
That voice says, 'If we could only get one of the royal race
of England to rule over us, we should be content.' Let there
be no misconception on this point. That sentiment, varied in a
hundred ways, has been repeated to me over and over again.
There is a general admission that the means to such an end are
wanting, and that the desire cannot be gratified. But the
admiration for monarchical institutions on the English model,
for privileged classes, and for a landed aristocracy and
gentry, is undisguised and apparently genuine. With the pride
of having achieved their independence is mingled in the South
Carolinians' hearts a strange regret at the result and
consequences, and many are they who 'would go back tomorrow if
we could.' An intense affection for the British connection, a
love of British habits and customs, a respect for British
sentiment, law, authority, order, civilization, and
literature, preeminently distinguish the inhabitants of this
State, who, glorying in their descent from ancient families on
the three islands, whose fortunes they still follow, and with
whose members they maintain not unfrequently familiar
relations, regard with an aversion of which it is impossible
to give an idea to one who has not seen its manifestations,
the people of New England and the populations of the Northern
States, whom they regard as tainted beyond cure by the venom
of 'Puritanism.' Whatever may be the cause, this is the fact
and the effect. 'The State of South Carolina was,' I am told,
'founded by gentlemen.' It was not established by
witch-burning Puritans, by cruel persecuting fanatics, who
implanted in the North the standard of Torquemada, and
breathed into the nostrils of their newly-born colonies all
the ferocity, blood-thirstiness, and rabid intolerance of the
Inquisition. … We could have got on with these fanatics if
they had been either Christians or gentlemen,' says [one],
'for in the first case they would have acted with common
charity, and in the second they would have fought when they
insulted us; but there are neither Christians nor gentlemen
among them!' 'Any thing on earth!' exclaims [another], 'any
form of government, any tyranny or despotism you will; but
'—and here is an appeal more terrible than the adjuration of
all the Gods—'nothing on earth shall ever induce us to submit
to any union with the brutal, bigoted blackguards of the New
England States, who neither comprehend nor regard the feelings
of gentlemen! Man, woman and child, we'll die first.' … The
hatred of the Italian for the Tedesco, of the Greek for the
Turk, of the Turk for the Russ, is warm and fierce enough to
satisfy the prince of darkness, not to speak of a few little
pet aversions among allied powers and the atoms of composite
empires; but they are all mere indifference and neutrality of
feeling compared to the animosity evinced by the 'gentry' of
South Carolina for the 'rabble of the North.' The contests of
Cavalier and Roundhead, of Vendean and Republican, even of
Orangeman and Croppy, have been elegant joustings, regulated
by the finest rules of chivalry, compared with those which
North and South will carry on if their deeds support their
words. 'Immortal hate, the study of revenge' will actuate
every blow, and never in the history of the world, perhaps,
will go forth such a 'væ victis' as that which may be heard
before the fight has begun. There is nothing in all the dark
caves of human passion so cruel and deadly as the hatred the
South Carolinians profess for the Yankees. That hatred has
been swelling for years, till it is the very life-blood of the
state. … Believe a southern man as he believes himself, and
you must regard New England and the kindred States as the
birthplace of impurity of mind among men and of unchastity in
women—the home of free love, of Fourrierism, of infidelity, of
abolitionism, of false teachings in political economy and in
social life; a land saturated with the drippings of rotten
philosophy, with the poisonous infections of a fanatic press;
without honor or modesty; whose wisdom is paltry cunning,
whose valor and manhood have been swallowed up in a corrupt,
howling demagogy, and in the marts of a dishonest commerce."
W. H. Russell,
Letter to the Times (London), April 30, 1861.
{3427}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April-May).
Proclamation by the Confederate President.
President Lincoln's proclamation of a Blockade of Southern ports.
The Queen's proclamation of British neutrality.
On the 17th of April, two days after President Lincoln's call
for troops, Jefferson Davis, the chief of the rebellious
Confederacy, published a counter-proclamation, giving notice
of the intention of the government at Montgomery to issue
letters of marque to privateers, for the destruction of
American commerce. It was as follows:
"Whereas, Abraham Lincoln, the President of the United States
has, by proclamation announced the intention of invading this
Confederacy with an armed force, for the purpose of capturing
its fortresses, and thereby subverting its independence, and
subjecting the free people thereof to the dominion of a
foreign power; and whereas it has thus become the duty of this
Government to repel the threatened invasion, and to defend the
rights and liberties of the people by all the means which the
laws of nations and the usages of civilized warfare place at
its disposal; Now, therefore, I, Jefferson Davis, President of
the Confederate States of America, do issue this my
Proclamation, inviting all those who may desire, by service in
private armed vessels on the high seas, to aid this Government
in resisting so wanton and wicked an aggression, to make
application for commissions or Letters of Marque and Reprisal,
to be issued under the Seal of these Confederate States. And I
do further notify all persons applying for Letters of Marque,
to make a statement in writing, giving the name and a suitable
description of the character, tonnage, and force of the
vessel, and the name and place of residence of each owner
concerned therein, and the intended number of the crew, and to
sign said statement and deliver the same to the Secretary of
State, or to the Collector of any port of entry of these
Confederate States, to be by him transmitted to the Secretary
of State. And I do further notify all applicants aforesaid
that before any commission or Letter of Marque is issued to
any vessel, the owner or owners thereof, and the commander for
the time being, will be required to give bond to the
Confederate States, with at least two responsible sureties,
not interested in such vessel, in the penal sum of five
thousand dollars; or if such vessel be provided with more than
one hundred and fifty men, then in the penal sum of ten
thousand dollars, with condition that the owners, officers,
and crew who shall be employed on board such commissioned
vessel, shall observe the laws of these Confederate States and
the instructions given to them for the regulation of their
conduct. That they shall satisfy all damages done contrary to
the tenor thereof by such vessel during her commission, and
deliver up the same when revoked by the President of the
Confederate States. And I do further specially enjoin on all
persons holding offices, civil and military, under the
authority of the Confederate States, that they be vigilant and
zealous in discharging the duties incident thereto; and I do,
moreover, solemnly exhort the good people of these Confederate
States as they love their country, as they prize the blessings
of free government, as they feel the wrongs of the past and
these now threatened in aggravated form by those whose enmity
is more implacable because unprovoked, that they exert
themselves in preserving order, in promoting concord, in
maintaining the authority and efficacy of the laws, and in
supporting and invigorating all the measures which may be
adopted for the common defence, and by which, under the
blessing of Divine Providence, we may hope for a speedy, just,
and honorable peace.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and
caused the Seal of the Confederate States to be affixed,
this seventeenth day of April 1861.
By the President,
(Signed) Jefferson Davis. R. Toombs, Secretary of State."
The response to this menace was a second proclamation by
President Lincoln, announcing a blockade of the ports of the
Confederacy, and warning all persons who should accept and act
under the proposed letters of marque that they would be held
amenable to the laws against piracy. This proclamation was in
the following language:
"Whereas an insurrection against the government of the United
States has broken out in the States of South Carolina,
Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas,
and the laws of the United States for the collection of the
revenue cannot be effectually executed therein conformably to
that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be
uniform throughout the United States: And whereas a
combination of persons engaged in such insurrection have
threatened to grant pretended letters of marque to authorize
the bearers thereof to commit assaults on the lives, vessels,
and property of good citizens of the country lawfully engaged
in commerce on the high seas, and in waters of the United
States: And whereas an executive proclamation has been already
issued requiring the persons engaged in these disorderly
proceedings to desist therefrom, calling out a militia force
for the purpose of repressing the same, and convening Congress
in extraordinary session to deliberate and determine thereon:
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United
States, with a view to the same purposes before mentioned, and
to the protection of the public peace, and the lives and
property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their lawful
occupations, until Congress shall have assembled and
deliberated on the said unlawful proceedings, or until the
same shall have ceased, have further deemed it advisable to
set on foot a blockade of the ports within the States
aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and
of the law of nations in such case provided. For this purpose
a competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and
exit of vessels from the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with
a view to violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or
shall attempt to leave either of the said ports, she will be
duly warned by the commander of one of the blockading vessels,
who will indorse on her register the fact and date of such
warning, and if the same vessel shall again attempt to enter
or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured and sent to
the nearest convenient port, for such proceedings against her
and her cargo, as prize, as may be deemed advisable. And I
hereby proclaim and declare that if any person, under the
pretended authority of the said States, or under any other
pretense, shall molest a vessel of the United States, or the
persons or cargo on board of her, such person will be held
amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention
and punishment of piracy. In witness whereof, I have hereunto
set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be
affixed. Done at the city of Washington, this nineteenth day
of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and sixty-one, and of the independence of the United States
the eighty-fifth. Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William
H. Seward, Secretary of State."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 35-36.
{3428}
Apparently on unofficial information of these announcements,
indicating a state of civil war in the United States, the
Government of Great Britain made haste—unfriendly haste, as
the United States complained—to declare neutrality between the
belligerents, thus placing the insurgent Confederacy on an
exactly equal footing with the United States so far as a
foreign recognition might do so. The Queen's Proclamation was
as follows:
"Whereas, We are happily at peace with all Sovereigns, Powers,
and States; And whereas hostilities have unhappily commenced
between the Government of the United States of America and
certain States styling themselves 'the Confederate States of
America'; And whereas we, being at peace with the Government
of the United States, have declared our Royal determination to
maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest
between the said contending parties; We, therefore, have
thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to
issue this our Royal Proclamation: And we do hereby strictly
charge and command all our loving subjects to observe a strict
neutrality in and during the aforesaid hostilities, and to
abstain from violating or contravening either the laws and
statutes of the realm in this behalf, or the law of nations in
relation thereto, as they will answer to the contrary at their
peril." After reciting the language of certain statutes which
forbid the subjects of Her Majesty to engage, without leave
and license from the Crown, in any foreign military or naval
service, or to furnish or equip any ship or vessel for service
against any state with which Her Majesty is not at war, the
Proclamation proceeds as follows: "Now, in order that none of
our subjects may unwarily render themselves liable to the
penalties imposed by said statute, we do hereby strictly
command, that no person or persons whatsoever do commit any
act, matter or thing whatsoever, contrary to the provisions of
the said statute, upon pain of the several penalties by the
said statute imposed, and of our high displeasure. And we do
hereby further warn all our loving subjects, and all persons
whatsoever entitled to our protection, that if any of them
shall presume, in contempt of this Royal Proclamation, and of
our high displeasure, to do any acts in derogation of their
duty as subjects of a neutral sovereign, in the said contest,
or in violation or contravention of the law of nations in that
behalf—as, for example and more especially, by entering into
the military service of either of the said contending parties
as commissioned or non-commissioned officers or soldiers; or
by serving as officers, sailors, or marines on board any ship
or vessel of war or transport of or in the service of either
of the said contending parties; or by serving as officers,
sailors, or marines on board any privateer bearing letters of
marque of or from either of the said contending parties; or by
engaging to go or going to any place beyond the seas with
intent to enlist or engage in any such service, or by
procuring or attempting to procure, within Her Majesty's
dominions, at home or abroad, others to do so; or by fitting
out, arming, or equipping, any ship or vessel to be employed
as a ship-of-war, or privateer, or transport, by either of the
said contending parties; or by breaking, or endeavoring to
break, any blockade lawfully and actually established by or on
behalf of either of the said contending parties; or by
carrying officers, soldiers, despatches, arms, military stores
or materials, or any article or articles considered and deemed
to be contraband of war according to the law of modern usage
of nations, for the use or service of either of the said
contending parties, all persons so offending will incur and be
liable to the several penalties and penal consequences by the
said statute, or by the law of nations, in that behalf imposed
or denounced. And we do hereby declare that all our subjects
and persons entitled to our protection who may misconduct
themselves in the premises will do so at their peril and of
their own wrong, and that they will in no wise obtain any
protection from us against any liability or penal
consequences, but will, on the contrary, incur our high
displeasure by such misconduct.
Given at our Court at the White Lodge, Richmond Park, this
13th day of May, in the year of our Lord 1861, and in the
24th year of our reign. God save the Queen."
In the complaint of the United States subsequently submitted
to the Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, the facts attending
this remarkably hastened Proclamation of Neutrality were set
forth as follows: "Before any armed collision had taken place,
there existed an understanding between Her Majesty's
Government and the Government of the Emperor of the French,
with a view to securing a simultaneous and identical course of
action of the two Governments on American questions. … The
fact that it had been agreed to by the two Governments was
communicated to Mr. Dallas, by Lord John Russell, on the first
day of May, 1861. There was nothing in the previous relations
between Great Britain and the United States which made it
necessary for Her Majesty's Government to seek the advice or
to invite the support of the Emperor of the French in the
crisis which was threatened. … When the news of the bloodless
attack upon Fort Sumter became known in Europe, Her Majesty's
Government apparently assumed that the time had come for the
joint action which had been previously agreed upon; and,
without waiting to learn the purposes of the United States, it
announced its intention to take the first step by recognizing
the insurgents as belligerents. The President's Proclamation,
which has since been made the ostensible reason for this
determination, was issued on the 19th of April, and was made
public in the Washington newspapers of the morning of the
20th. An imperfect copy of it was also telegraphed to New
York, and from thence to Boston, in each of which cities it
appeared in the newspapers of the morning of the 20th. The New
York papers of the 20th gave the substance of the
Proclamation, without the official commencement and close, and
with several errors of more or less importance. The Boston
papers of the same date, in addition to the errors in the New
York copy, omitted the very important statement in regard to
the collection of the revenue, which appears in the
Proclamation as the main cause of its issue.
{3429}
During the morning of the 19th of April, a riot took place in
Baltimore, which ended in severing direct communication, by
rail or telegraph, between Washington and New York.
Telegraphic communication was not restored until the 30th of
the month. The regular passage of the mails and trains was
resumed about the same time. … It is absolutely certain that
no full copy of the text of the Proclamation could have left
Washington by the mails of the 19th, and equally certain that
no copy could have reached New York from Washington after the
19th for several days. On the 20th the steamer Canadian sailed
from Portland, taking the Boston papers of that day, with the
imperfect copy of the Proclamation, in which the clause in
regard to the collection of the revenue was suppressed. This
steamer arrived at Londonderry on the 1st of May, and the
'Daily News' of London, of the 2d of May, published the
following telegraphic items of news: 'President Lincoln has
issued a Proclamation, declaring a blockade of all the ports
in the seceded States. The Federal Government will condemn as
pirates all privateer-vessels which may be seized by Federal
ships.' The Canadian arrived at Liverpool on the 2d of May,
and the 'Daily News,' of the 3d, and the 'Times,' of the 4th
of May, published the imperfect Boston copy of the
Proclamation. … No other than the Boston copy of the
Proclamation appears to have been published in the London
newspapers. It is not likely that a copy was received in
London before the 10th, by the Fulton from New York. It was on
this meager and incorrect information that the advice of the
British Law Officers was based, upon which that Government
acted. … On the 5th of May the steamship Persia arrived at
Liverpool with advices from New York to the 25th of April.
Lord John Russell stated on Monday, the 6th of May, in a
communication to Lord Cowley, 'that Her Majesty's Government
received no dispatches from Lord Lyons by the mail which has
just arrived, [the Persia,] the communication between
Washington and New York being interrupted.' In the same
dispatch Lord Cowley is informed 'that Her Majesty's
Government cannot hesitate to admit that such Confederacy is
entitled to be considered as a belligerent, and as such
invested with all the rights and prerogatives of a
belligerent,' and he is instructed to invite the French
Government to a joint action, and a line of joint policy with
the British Government, toward the United States."
The Case of the United States before the Tribunal
of Arbitration at Geneva
[42d congress, 2d session, Senate ex. doc. 31],
pages 24-27.
"The British government is accustomed to preserve an attitude
of neutrality towards contending nations; but it would seem
that neutrality does not so far interfere with the sympathies
and freedom of its subjects as to compel it to issue
proclamations against Irishmen enlisting with Francis Joseph,
or Englishmen fighting for Victor Emanuel and Garibaldi. … In
the case of the United States, the laws of England and its
treaty stipulations with our Government already forbade its
subjects from engaging in a conspiracy to overthrow our
institutions. The proclamation, therefore, in forbidding
English subjects to fight in the service of the rebels against
the United States, simply declared the law as it was already
understood; while in forbidding Englishmen to fight for the
United States against the rebels, it intervened to change the
existing practice, to revive the almost obsolete act of Geo.
III. forbidding English subjects from engaging in foreign
service without the royal consent, which had slumbered in
regard to Austria and Italy, for the purpose of forbidding
Englishmen from assisting to maintain in the United States
constitutional order against conspiracy and rebellion, and the
cause of freedom against chattel slavery. The first effect of
the proclamation, therefore, was to change the position in
which England and Englishmen stood to the United States, to
the disadvantage of the latter. Before the proclamation, for
an Englishman to serve the United States Government in
maintaining its integrity was regarded honorable; after the
proclamation such service became a crime. The proclamation
makes it an offence now for an Englishman to fight for the
Government at Washington as great as it was for Englishmen
before the proclamation to fight for the rebels of Montgomery.
It thus, in a moral view, lowered the American Government to
the level of the rebel confederacy, and in the next place, it
proceeded, in an international view, to place the rebel
confederacy on a par with the American Government. … No
ingenuity can blind us to these facts:—Before the
proclamation, to support our Government was an honorable
office for the subjects of Great Britain, and the rebels were
insurgents, with no rights save under the American
Constitution. After the proclamation, for an Englishman to
serve the United States is a crime, and the rebels are
elevated into a belligerent power—and this intervention of
England, depriving us of a support which her practice
permitted, and giving the rebels a status and right they did
not possess, we are coolly told is neutrality. … What would
England have said to such a proclamation of neutrality from us
in her domestic troubles in Canada, in Ireland, or in India?
What would the English people have thought of a state paper
from Washington, declaring it the sovereign will of the people
of the United States to remain perfectly neutral in the
contest being waged in Hindostan between the British
government on the one side and the Mogul dynasty on the other,
and forbidding American citizens to enter the services of
either of the said belligerents? What would they have thought
of the American President intimating with cold etiquette that
it was a matter of profound indifference to this Government
which of the belligerents should be victorious, the King of
Oude and Nana Sahib, or Lord Canning and the immortal
Havelock?"
John Jay,
The Great Conspiracy:
Address at Mount Kisco, July 4, 1861.
ALSO IN:
J. H. Soley,
The Blockade and the Cruisers,
chapter 2.
W. H. Seward,
Works,
volume 5
(Diplomatic History of the War).
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 4, chapter 15.
M. Bernard,
Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain
during the American Civil War,
chapters 4-10.
See, also, ALABAMA CLAIMS.
{3430}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (April-May: Maryland).
The ending of rebellious trouble in Baltimore and the state.
General Butler in the field.
The Eighth Massachusetts Regiment, Colonel Monroe, arrived at
Philadelphia on the 20th of April, the day following the
passage of the Sixth Massachusetts Regiment through Baltimore,
and its battle with the rebel mob of that city. The Eighth was
accompanied by General Benjamin F. Butler, who had been
appointed by the Governor of Massachusetts to command the
first brigade from that state. At Philadelphia General Butler
"first heard of the attack on the Sixth, in Baltimore. His
orders commanded him to march through that city. It was now
impossible to do so with less than 10,000 armed men. He
counselled with Major-General Robert Patterson, who had just
been appointed commander of the 'Department of Washington,'
which embraced the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and
Maryland, and the District of Columbia, and whose
head-quarters were at Philadelphia. Commodore Dupont,
commandant of the Navy Yard there, was also consulted, and it
was agreed that the troops should go by water from Perryville,
at the mouth of the Susquehanna River, to Annapolis, and
thence across Maryland to Washington." This route was
accordingly taken by General Butler. Colonel Lefferts, who had
reached Philadelphia with the New York Seventh Regiment,
preferred to attempt going directly to Washington by a steamer
which he secured for the purpose; but a report of rebel
batteries on the Potomac turned him back, and his regiment,
likewise, proceeded to Annapolis, arriving there some hours
after the Eighth Massachusetts. Despite the protests and
remonstrances of the Governor of Maryland-who was striving
hard to put his state in an attitude of "neutrality," and to
persuade the national government to respect it by passing no
armed troops across Maryland soil—both regiments were landed,
and took possession of the town, where the secessionists were
making ready to capture the Naval Academy and the training
ship Constitution. The track of the railroad from Annapolis
had been torn up and the locomotives disabled. The mechanics
of the Massachusetts Eighth proceeded quickly to repair both,
and the two regiments moved forward. "The troops reached
Annapolis Junction on the morning of the 25th, when the
co-operation of the two regiments ceased, the Seventh New York
going on to Washington, and the Eighth Massachusetts remaining
to hold the road they had just opened. Before their departure
from Annapolis, the Baltic, a large steamship transport, had
arrived there with troops, and officers speedily followed.
General Scott ordered General Butler to remain there, hold the
town and the road, and superintend the forwarding of troops to
the Capital. The 'Department of Annapolis,' which embraced the
country twenty miles on each side of the railway, as far as
Bladensburg, was created, and General Butler was placed in
command of it, with ample discretionary powers to make him a
sort of military dictator. … At the close of April, General
Butler had full 10,000 men under his command at Annapolis, and
an equal number were guarding the seat of Government
[Washington]." Meantime, Baltimore had been given up to the
control of the Secessionists, though the Maryland Unionists
were numerous and strong and were gathering courage to assert
themselves. But the rebellious and riotous city was now
brought to its senses. On the 5th of May General Butler sent
two regiments to occupy the Relay House, within nine miles of
Baltimore. On the 9th, a force of 1,200 Pennsylvania troops
and regulars, ordered forward by General Patterson from
Philadelphia, were landed near Fort McHenry, under the guns of
a United States vessel, and marched through the city. On the
night of the 13th, General Butler, in person, with about 1,000
men, including the Massachusetts Sixth, entered the place and
took a commanding position on Federal Hill, which was
afterwards permanently fortified. From that day the disloyalty
in Baltimore gave no trouble to the Government.
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 1, chapter 18.
ALSO IN:
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion,
series 1, volume 2.
J. Parton,
General Butler in New Orleans,
chapters 4-5.
T. Winthrop,
New York Seventh Regiment: Our March to Washington
(Life in the Open Air).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May).
Call for additional volunteers.
On the 3d of May the President issued a call for forty
additional regiments of volunteers; directed an increase of
the regular army by ten regiments, and ordered the enlistment
of 18,000 seamen—acts subsequently legalized by Congress.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May).
Exportation of cotton from the Confederacy,
excepting through its seaports, prohibited.
On the 21st of May, 1861, the Congress of the Confederate
States passed an act declaring that "from and after the 1st
day of June next, and during the existence of the blockade of
any of the ports of the Confederate States of America by the
Government of the United States, it shall not be lawful for
any person to export any raw cotton or cotton yarn from the
Confederate States of America except through the seaports of
the said Confederate States."
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May).
Secession of North Carolina.
See NORTH CAROLINA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-MAY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May).
General Butler at Fortress Monroe and his "Contrabands."
The first military thrust at Slavery.
General Butler was commissioned as Major-General of Volunteers
on the 16th of May, and on the 20th he was ordered to the
command at Fortress Monroe. He arrived at the Fortress on the
22d and assumed the command. "On the evening of the second day
after his arrival at the post, the event occurred which will
for ever connect the name of General Butler with the history
of the abolition of slavery in America. Colonel Phelps's visit
to Hampton [the previous day] had thrown the white inhabitants
into such alarm that most of them prepared for flight, and
many left their homes that night, never to see them again. In
the confusion three negroes escaped, and, making their way
across the bridges, gave themselves up to a Union picket,
saying that their master, Colonel Mallory, was about to remove
them to North Carolina to work upon rebel fortifications
there, far away from their wives and children, who were to be
left in Hampton. They were brought to the fortress, and the
circumstance was reported to the general in the morning. … He
needed laborers. He was aware that the rebel batteries that
were rising around him were the work chiefly of slaves,
without whose assistance they could not have been erected in
time to give him trouble. He wished to keep these men. The
garrison wished them kept. The country would have deplored or
resented the sending of them away. If they had been Colonel
Mallory's horses, or Colonel Mallory's spades, or Colonel
Mallory's percussion caps, he would have seized them and used
them without hesitation.
{3431}
Why not property more valuable for the purposes of the
rebellion than any other? He pronounced the electric words,
'These men are Contraband of War; set them at work.' 'An
epigram,' as Winthrop remarks, 'abolished slavery in the
United States.' The word took; for it gave the country an
excuse for doing what it was longing to do. … By the time the
three negroes were comfortably at work upon the new
bake-house, General Butler received the following brief
epistle, signed 'J. B. Carey, major-acting, Virginia
volunteers': 'Be pleased to designate some time and place when
it will be agreeable to you to accord to me a personal
interview.' The general complied with the request." The
interview occurred that afternoon, and was not between
strangers; for General Butler and Major Carey were old
political allies—hard-shell democrats both. The essential part
of the conversation which ensued was as follows: "Major Carey:
'I am informed that three negroes, belonging to Colonel
Mallory, have escaped within your lines. I am Colonel
Mallory's agent and have charge of his property. What do you
intend to do with regard to those negroes?' General Butler: 'I
propose to retain them.' Major Carey: 'Do you mean, then, to
set aside your constitutional obligations?' General Butler: 'I
mean to abide by the decision of Virginia, as expressed in her
ordinance of secession, passed the day before yesterday. I am
under no constitutional obligations to a foreign country,
which Virginia now claims to be.' Major Carey: 'But you say,
we can't secede, and so you cannot consistently detain the
negroes.' General Butler: 'But you say, you have seceded, and
so you cannot consistently claim them. I shall detain the
negroes as contraband of war. You are using them upon your
batteries. It is merely a question whether they shall be used
for or against the government. Nevertheless, though I greatly
need the labor which has providentially fallen into my hands,
if Colonel Mallory will come into the fort, and take the oath
of allegiance to the United States, he shall have his negroes,
and I will endeavor to hire them from him.' Major Carey:
'Colonel Mallory is absent.' The interview here terminated,
and each party, with polite farewell, went its way. This was
on Friday, May 24. On Sunday morning, eight more negroes came
in. … They continued to come in daily, in tens, twenties,
thirties, till the number of contrabands in the various camps
numbered more than 900. A commissioner of negro affairs was

appointed, who taught, fed and governed them." General Butler
reported his action to the Government, and on the 30th of May
the Secretary of War wrote to him: "Your action in respect to
the negroes who came within your lines, from the service of
the rebels, is approved. … While … you will permit no
interference, by persons under your command, with the
relations of persons held to service under the laws of any
state, you will, on the other hand, so long as any state
within which your military operations are conducted remain
under the control of … armed combinations, refrain from
surrendering to alleged masters any persons who come within
your lines." "So the matter rested for two months, at the
expiration of which events revived the question."
J. Parton,
General Butler in New Orleans,
chapter 6.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May: Virginia).
First Advance of Union Troops across the Potomac.
Death of Ellsworth at Alexandria.
"Already 'Confederate' pickets were occupying Arlington
Heights and the Virginia shore of the Long Bridge, which spans
the Potomac at Washington City; and engineers had been seen on
those heights selecting eligible positions for batteries. A
crisis was evidently at hand, and the General-in-chief was now
persuaded to allow an immediate invasion of Virginia. Orders
were at once issued [May 23] for the occupation of the shores
of the Potomac opposite, and also the city of Alexandria, nine
miles below, by National troops. General Mansfield was in
command of about 13,000 men at the Capital. Toward midnight,
these forces in and around Washington were put in motion for
the passage of the river, at three different points. One
column was to cross at the Aqueduct Bridge, at Georgetown;
another at the Long Bridge, at Washington; and a third was to
proceed in vessels, and seize the city of Alexandria. The
three invading columns moved almost simultaneously. … The
troops moving by land and water reached Alexandria at about
the same time. The National frigate Pawnee was lying off the
town, and her commander had already been in negotiation for
the evacuation of Alexandria by the insurgents. A detachment
of her crew, bearing a flag of truce, now hastened to the
shore in boats, and leaped eagerly upon the wharf just before
the zouaves [the New York Fire Zouave Regiment, under Colonel
Ellsworth] reached it. They were fired upon by some Virginia
sentries, who instantly fled from the town. Ellsworth,
ignorant of any negotiations, advanced to the center of the
city, and took possession of it in the name of his Government,
while the column under Wilcox marched through different
streets to the Station of the Orange and Alexandria Railway,
and seized it, with much rolling stock. They there captured a
small company (thirty-five men) of Virginia cavalry, under
Captain Ball. Other Virginians, who had heard the firing of
the insurgent pickets, escaped by way of the railroad.
Alexandria was now in quiet possession of the National troops,
but there were many violent secessionists there who would not
submit. Among them was a man named Jackson, the proprietor of
an inn called the Marshall House. The Confederate flag had
been flying over his premises for many days, and had been
plainly seen from the President's house in Washington. It was
still there, and Ellsworth went in person to take it down.
When descending an upper staircase with it, he was shot by
Jackson, who was waiting for him in a dark passage, with a
double-barreled gun, loaded with buckshot. Ellsworth fell
dead, and his murderer met the same fate an instant afterward,
at the hands of Francis E. Brownell, of Troy, who, with six
others, had accompanied his commander to the roof of the
house. He shot Jackson through the head with a bullet, and
pierced his body several times with his saber-bayonet. …
Ellsworth was a very young and extremely handsome man, and was
greatly beloved for his generosity, and admired for his
bravery and patriotism. His death produced great excitement
throughout the country. It was the first of note that had
occurred in consequence of the National troubles, and the very
first since the campaign had actually begun, a few hours
before.
{3432}
It intensified the hatred of rebellion and its abettors; and a
regiment was raised in his native State (New York) called the
Ellsworth Avengers. Intrenching tools were sent over the
Potomac early on the morning of the 24th, and the troops
immediately commenced casting up intrenchments and redoubts,
extending from Roach's Spring, on the Washington and
Alexandria Road, across Arlington Heights, almost to the Chain
Bridge."
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 1, chapter 20.
ALSO IN:
F. Moore,
Anecdotes, Poetry and Incidents of the War,
page 391.
J. T. Headley,
The Great Rebellion,
chapter 5.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May-June).
Tennessee dragged into the rebel Confederacy.
Loyal resistance of East Tennessee.
See TENNESSEE: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-MAY) and (JUNE).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May-July: Missouri).
The baffling of the 'Secessionists in Missouri.
Lyon's capture of Camp Jackson.
The Battle of Boonville.
See MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY-JULY).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (May-September: Kentucky).
The struggle for the state.
Secession and Neutrality overcome.
See KENTUCKY: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-SEPTEMBER).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (June: Virginia).
The fight at Big Bethel.
"Major-General Butler and staff arrived at Fortress Monroe
Wednesday afternoon, May 22d. … Colonel Magruder—late Colonel
in the United States service, and an officer of much
distinction as an obstinate combatant—was placed in command
(rebel) of the Peninsula. … Troops rapidly poured into
Butler's department, and he soon found himself in a condition
to act on the offensive. Magruder's scouts and cavalry greatly
annoyed the two camps mentioned. They had, also, seized
several Union men. These raids became so frequent and annoying
that a night attack was concerted upon their positions at
Little Bethel and Big Bethel—the latter, near the north branch
of Back River, where it was understood Magruder's outposts
were throwing up strong works. Brigadier-General Pierce, of
the Massachusetts troops, was detailed to command the
expedition. … Approaching the enemy's position at Big Bethel,
it was found that their guns commanded all points of approach.
The road leading up to the bridge over the creek was swept by
their artillery. A thick woods to the left of the road
afforded some protection to the Federal left. An open field on
the right of the approach only offered a house and
out-buildings as a cover. The enemy occupied a hill, beyond
the creek, which almost completely secured their front. At
their rear was a dense wood. This gave them the advantage of
ground, greatly. A reconnaissance would have demonstrated the
futility of a front attack except by artillery. The only hope
for the Federals was in a flank movement, higher up the creek,
by which, the stream being passed, the enemy could be
assaulted in their works, at the point of the bayonet, if
necessary. This movement was only attempted partially at a
late hour in the day. The rebels were well prepared, and only
awaited the appearance of the head of the Federal advance to
open a sharp fire. … The fight was, from the first, extremely
unequal. A front attack was sheer folly. But, the flank
movement was not ordered. … The fortunes of the day needed but
a master-hand to direct them, to have turned in favor of the
Union troops. … Lieutenant-Colonel Washburne had … arranged
for a flank movement which, with a combined attack from the
front, must have ended the struggle; but the order for retreat
was given before the movement could be executed. … The Federal
loss was 14 killed, 49 wounded and five missing. Among the
killed were two of the most gallant and noble men in the
service—Major Theodore Winthrop, Secretary and Aid to General
Butler, and first-Lieutenant John T. Greble, of the United
States regular artillery, Second regiment. The rebels
pronounced their loss to have been but one killed and four
wounded. The retreat was accomplished in good order—the enemy
not pursuing."
O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
volume 2, division 4, chapter 18.
ALSO IN:
W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 4, chapter 17.
Life and Poems of Theodore Winthrop,
chapter 9.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (June-July: West Virginia).
General McClellan's campaign in the mountains.
Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford.
"Although some thousands of West Virginians had volunteered to
fight for the Union, none of them were encamped on the soil of
their State until after the election held [May 23] to ratify
or reject the Ordinance of Secession. …
See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JANUARY-JUNE)]
The Virginians who volunteered were mustered in and organized
at Camp Carlile, in Ohio, opposite Wheeling, under the command
of Colonel Kelly, himself a Virginian. George B. McClellan,
who had been appointed a Major-General and assigned to the
command of the Department of the Ohio, remained at Cincinnati,
his home. Three days after the election aforesaid, he issued
from that city a spirited address 'To the Union men of Western
Virginia.' … A brief and stirring address to his soldiers was
issued simultaneously with the above; and, both being read to
those in Camp Carlile that evening, the 1st Virginia, 1,100
strong, Colonel Kelly, crossed to Wheeling early next morning,
closely followed by the 16th Ohio, Colonel Irvine. The 14th
Ohio, Colonel Steedman, crossed simultaneously, and quietly
occupied Parkersburg, the terminus of the Northwestern branch
of the Baltimore and Ohio road. A Rebel force, then holding
Grafton, which connected the branch aforesaid with the main or
Wheeling division of the railroad, had meditated a descent on
Wheeling; but, finding themselves anticipated and outnumbered,
they obstructed and destroyed the railroad west of them," and
fell back to Philippi, some fifteen miles southward. "General
McClellan having ordered that Philippi be captured by
surprise, the attempt was made on the night of June 2d. Two
brigades of two regiments each approached the Rebel camp by
different roads" and dispersed it completely, with some loss
on both sides, capturing the tents, provisions and munitions.
The Rebel commander, Colonel Porterfield, "gathering up such
portion of his forces as he could find, retreated hastily to
Beverly, and thence to Huttonsville; where the Rebel array was
rapidly increased by conscription, and Governor Wise placed in
command. General McClellan arrived at Grafton on the 23d. …
His forces were rapidly augmented, till they amounted, by the
4th of July, to over 30,000 men; while the Rebels in his front
could hardly muster 10,000 in all.
{3433}
He therefore resolved to advance. The Rebel main force,
several thousand strong, under General Robert S. Garnett, was
strongly intrenched on Laurel Hill, a few miles north of
Beverly, … while a smaller detachment, under Colonel John
Pegram was intrenched upon the summit and at either base of
Rich Mountain … three or four miles distant from the Rebel
main body." General Rosecrans, sent by a detour of eight miles
through the mountains to Pegram's rear, drove the rebels (July
11) from their position, at the point of the bayonet; and the
following day their commander, with about 600 men, was forced
to surrender. "General McClellan pushed on to Beverly, which
he entered early next morning, flanking General Garnett's
position at Laurel Hill and compelling him to a precipitate
flight northward. Six cannon, 200 tents, 60 wagons and over
100 prisoners, were the trophies of this success. The Rebel
loss in killed and wounded was about 150; the Union about 50.
General Garnett, completely flanked, thoroughly worsted, and
fearfully outnumbered, abandoned his camp at Laurel Hill
without a struggle, crossing the Laurel Mountains eastward, by
a by-road, into the narrow valley of Cheat river. … At length,
having crossed the Cheat at a point known as Carrick's Ford,
which proffered an admirable position for defense. Garnett
turned [July 14] to fight." But the Union force which pursued
him was overpowering; Garnett himself was killed in the battle
at the Ford and his command fled in confusion. General
McClellan telegraphed to Washington, next day, from
Huttonsville: "We have completely annihilated the enemy in
Western Virginia. Our loss is about 13 killed and not more
than 40 wounded; while the enemy's loss is not far from 200
killed; and the number of prisoners we have taken will amount
to at least 1,000. We have captured seven of the enemy's guns
in all. A portion of Garnett's forces retreated; but I look
for their capture by General Hill, who is in hot pursuit."
"This expectation was not realized. The pursuit was only
continued two miles beyond the ford; when our weary soldiers
halted, and the residue of the Rebels, under Colonel Ramsey,
turning sharply to the right, made their way across the
mountains, and joined General Jackson at Monterey." Meantime,
simultaneously with General McClellan's advance on Beverly,
another strong Union force, under General Cox, had moved from
Guyandotte to the Kanawha, and up that river to Charleston,
which it reached on the 25th of July. Governor Wise, who
commanded the rebels in the Kanawha Valley, retreated, General
Cox pursuing, until the pursuit was checked on the 29th by
Wise's destruction of Gauley bridge. The rebels then made good
their flight to Lewisburg, in Greenbrier county, where Wise
was reinforced and superseded by General John B. Floyd.
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 1, chapter 32.
"The war in Western Virginia seemed to have ended with the
dispersion of Garnett's forces, and there was much rejoicing
over the result. It was premature. The 'Confederates' were not
disposed to surrender to their enemy the granaries that would
be needed to supply the troops in Eastern Virginia, without a
severer struggle. General Robert E. Lee succeeded Garnett, and
more important men than Wise and Floyd took the places of
these incompetents. Rosecrans succeeded McClellan, who was
called to the command of the Army of the Potomac, and the war
in the mountain region of Virginia was soon renewed."
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 1, chapter 22.
ALSO IN:
Official Records of the War of the Rebellion,
series 1, volume 2, page 193-293.
V. A. Lewis,
History of West Virginia,
chapter 28.
J. D. Cox,
McClellan in West Virginia
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July).
First depredations of the Confederate cruiser Sumter.
See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1861-1862.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July: Virginia).
The seat of the rebel government transferred to Richmond.
See VIRGINIA: A. D. 1861 (JULY).

The Principal Theatre of War in Virginia.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July: Virginia).
On to Richmond.
The First Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas.
"The Southern Government having inclined to the defensive
policy as that upon which they should act, their first object
was to prevent an advance of any Federal force into Virginia.
Early in the month of May troops were assembled in Richmond,
and pushed forward toward the northeastern boundary of the
State, to a position known as Manassas Junction. … It is here
that a railroad from Alexandria, another from Staunton up the
valley and through Manassas Gap, and another from Gordonsville
unite. At Gordonsville the railroad from Richmond and the line
from East Tennessee unite. As a point for concentration none
more eligible exists in northeastern Virginia. The advantages
for fortification are naturally such that the place can be
rendered impregnable. Here the centre of the northern force of
the Southern army was posted, with the left wing pushed
forward to Winchester [under the command of General Joseph E.
Johnston, with the Union General Patterson opposed to him] and
the right extended to the Potomac, and sustained by heavy
batteries which served to blockade the river. The Federal
force, the advance of which was assembled at Washington for
the defence of that city against any attack by the Southern
troops, was posted on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on
Arlington Heights, which were strongly fortified. Their right
was pushed some distance up the Potomac, and chiefly on the
Maryland side, while their left occupied Alexandria. The
armies of both sides consisted of raw militia hastily brought
together, and of volunteers who for the first time had put on
the uniform, and taken up the weapons of the soldier. On both
sides the forces were constantly accumulating. On the morning
of June 27th, the consolidated report of General Mansfield,
commanding the Department of Washington, gives the number of
troops in that city and vicinity. The privates, including
regulars and volunteers present for duty, numbered 22,846 men.
The grand aggregate of the force, including officers, etc.,
present and absent, was 34,160 men. The force of General
Patterson, commanding in Maryland above Washington, and also
on the Virginia side of the Potomac, on the 28th of June, was
returned, embracing officers and men enlisted and present for
duty, 15,923. Of these about 550 were reported as sick."
W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
page 67.
{3434}
"The return of Johnston's [Confederate] army for June 30th
showed his total force present for duty to have been 10,654;
but this includes some troops which, though assigned to his
army, did not join him till after July 3d. … A prime object of
Johnston in taking post at Winchester was, that he might be
enabled to join the army at Manassas in case of need. On June
2d, only a week after Johnston's arrival at Harper's Ferry,
Beauregard had reached Manassas and assumed command. He and
Johnston at once communicated with each other, and agreed in
their views of the importance of mutual support. … As soon as
Johnston ascertained … that McClellan [from West Virginia] was
not moving on Romney and Winchester, the feasibility of this
movement to Manassas at the right time became greater. The
only problem then remaining was to so time it as to arrive
just long enough before the impending battle to take part in
it, and not so long as to cause, by the news of his arrival, a
corresponding transfer of Patterson. … It was for the purpose
of gaining as much start as possible on Patterson that
Johnston had retired to Winchester, instead of remaining
opposite the Northern force at Martinsburg. He kept his
cavalry well out, in order to be informed as promptly as
possible of the slightest change in Patterson's position.
Meanwhile the grand Federal advance upon Manassas had
commenced."
R. M. Hughes,
General Johnston,
pages 47-51.
The advance from Washington, which began on the 16th of July,
and which resulted in the grievous defeat of the Union forces
at Bull Run, or Manassas, on Sunday, the 21st, was undertaken
to appease the impatient, ignorant clamor of Northern
newspapers, and in opposition to the judgment and the plans of
General Scott, who was then at the head of the National army.
The cry "On to Richmond" was taken up by Congressmen and
Senators, and the pressure on the government became too strong
to be resisted. Instead of keeping the raw troops, hurriedly
gathered at Washington, in camps of instruction, until they
were properly drilled and until their officers had acquired
some experience in handling them, they were hurriedly pushed
into a serious campaign movement, against an enemy likewise
untrained, to be sure, but who was far better prepared to
receive an attack than the assailants were to make one.
General Irwin McDowell had been recently placed in command of
the army intended for the field, with General Mansfield
commanding the troops in Washington. The former had "entered
on his new and responsible duties with great alacrity, working
night and day to prepare his command for the approaching
conflict. … McDowell was laboring at a great
disadvantage—drilling and preparing his troops as best he
could—under the heavy pressure from the North to deliver
battle to the enemy in his front. Secretary Chase was the
champion, in the Cabinet, of the intense feeling in the North
that the war should be pushed at once, with a vigor that would
end it soon. … There is no doubt that General Scott was
weakened with the administration, for the reason that he did
not believe in the prevailing opinion that a few days would
crush the rebellion; and the more the old hero insisted, or
faithfully stood by his views, the more it antagonized the
opinion of those who hoped and said it would end speedily. At
the Cabinet meeting a week before, General Hamilton says:
'General Montgomery Blair said he would march to Richmond with
10,000 men, armed with lathes.' 'Yes,' said General Scott, 'as
prisoners of war.' Continuing General Hamilton's statement of
the events which occurred prior to the battle and during its
progress, he says: 'On the Sunday preceding the battle of Bull
Run, Scott directed me, his military secretary, to say to
McDowell that he wished him to dine with him without fail. At
the dinner, at which General McDowell appeared, General Scott
used every possible argument to dissuade General McDowell from
fighting the first battle of Bull Run under the then existing
condition of public affairs. … He then begged General McDowell
to go to Secretary Chase, his kinsman, and aid him (General
Scott) in preventing a forward movement at that moment; one of
the arguments used by General Scott being that the Union
sentiment of the South had been surprised by the suddenness
and promptitude of the movement in favor of secession; that he
(General Scott) was well advised that the Union sentiment was
recovering itself, and gaining head in the South; that from
the moment blood was shed the South would be made a unit.
General McDowell regretted that he could not agree with
General Scott in his views, and arose and retired. … In the
course of the succeeding week General McDowell reported to
General Scott his proposed plan of battle. It was hung upon
the wall, and I followed with a pointer the positions
indicated by General McDowell as those he intended the forces
under his command should occupy. After General McDowell had
gone through a detailed statement of his plan, and had
finished, General Scott remarked, "General McDowell, that is
as good a plan of battle as I ever saw upon paper." General
McDowell said in rep]y: "General Scott, the success of this
whole plan depends upon General Patterson holding General
Johnston in check at Winchester." General Scott remarked that
General Johnston was a very able soldier, that he had a
railroad at his command with which to move his troops, and if
General McDowell's plan of battle, which had just been
presented to him, depended upon General Patterson holding
General Johnston in check, his plan was not worth the paper it
was drawn upon.' That ended that interview."
J. H. Stine,
History of the Army of the Potomac,
pages 7-10.
Says General McDowell, in his subsequent report of the
movement and the disastrous battle:
"When I submitted to the General-in-Chief, in compliance with
his verbal instructions, the plan of operations and estimate
of force required, the time I was to proceed to carry it into
effect was fixed for the 8th of July (Monday). Every facility
possible was given me by the General-in-Chief and heads of the
administrative departments in making the necessary
preparations. But the regiments, owing, I was told, to want of
transportation, came over slowly. Many of them did not come
across until eight or nine days after the time fixed upon, and
went forward without my ever seeing them and without having
been together before in a brigade. The sending re-enforcements
to General Patterson by drawing off the wagons was a further
and unavoidable cause of delay. Notwithstanding the herculean
efforts of the Quartermaster-General, and his favoring me in
every possible way, the wagons for ammunition, subsistence,
&c., and the horses for the trains and for the artillery, did
not all arrive for more than a week after the time appointed
to move.
{3435}
I was not even prepared as late as the 15th ultimo, and the
desire I should move became great, and it was wished I should
not, if possible, delay longer than Tuesday, the 10th ultimo.
When I did set out on the 10th I was still deficient in wagons
for subsistence, but I went forward, trusting to their being
procured in time to follow me. The trains thus hurriedly
gotten together, with horses, wagons, drivers, and
wagon-masters all new and unused to each other, moved with
difficulty and disorder, and was the cause of a day's delay in
getting the provisions forward, making it necessary to make on
Sunday the attack we should have made on Saturday. I could
not, with every exertion, get forward with the troops earlier
than we did. I wished them to go to Centreville the second
day, which would have taken us there on the 17th, and enabled
us, so far as they were concerned, to go in to action on the
19th instead of the 21st; but when I went forward from Fairfax
Court-House beyond Germantown to urge them forward, I was told
it was impossible for the men to march farther. They had only
come from Vienna, about 6 miles, and it was not more than 6½
miles farther to Centreville, in all a march of 12½ miles; but
the men were foot-weary, not so much, I was told, by the
distance marched, as by the time they had been on foot, caused
by the obstructions in the road and the slow pace we had to
move to avoid ambuscades. The men were, moreover, unaccustomed
to marching, their bodies not in condition for that kind of
work, and not used to carrying even the load of 'light
marching order.'"
Brig. General I. McDowell,
Report
(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, pages 323-324).
The advance of the Union Army was made "in five divisions,
commanded by Generals Tyler, Hunter, Heintzelman, Runyon, and
Miles. Among the brigade commanders that afterward rose to
eminence were William T. Sherman, Ambrose E. Burnside, Erastus
D. Keyes, and Oliver O. Howard. The total force was somewhat
over 34,000 men; but Runyon's division was left to guard the
line of communication with Washington, and the number that
actually moved against the enemy was about 28,000 with 49 guns
and a battalion of cavalry. So little did strict military
discipline as yet enter into the policy of the Government that
a large number of civilians, including several members of
Congress, obtained passes enabling them to ride out in
carriages, close in the rear of the army, to witness the
expected battle. … The troops marched by the Warrenton
turnpike, and found themselves in the presence of the enemy on
the banks of Bull Run on the 18th. … The enemy's outposts had
fallen back as the army advanced, and the first serious
opposition was met at Blackburn's Ford," where some sharp
fighting occurred between Tyler's division and the Confederate
troops under Longstreet. "McDowell, finding that Beauregard
was very strongly intrenched on his right, and that the roads
in that direction were not good, changed his plan and
determined to attack on the north or left wing. Another reason
for doing this lay in the fact that McDowell had distrusted
Patterson from the first, having no faith that he would hold
Johnston. … The action at Blackburn's Ford had been fought on
Thursday. Friday and Saturday were consumed in reconnoissances
and searching for a suitable ford on the upper part of the
stream, where a column could cross and, marching down on the
right bank, uncover the fords held by the enemy and enable the
remainder of the army to cross. Such a ford was found at
length, and on Sunday morning, the 21st, the army was put in
motion. McDowell did not know that Johnston had easily eluded
Patterson and with two fifths of his forces joined Beauregard
on Saturday. … The Confederate commanders had actually ordered
a forward movement of their own right wing; but as they saw
the development of McDowell's plan they recalled that, and
gradually strengthened their left to meet the onset. … The
battleground was a plateau, wooded and broken."
R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Rebellion,
chapter 4.
In the Report of the Confederate General Beauregard, the
plateau which now became the principal battle ground of the
conflict is described as follows: "It is inclosed on three
sides by small water-courses, which empty into Bull Run within
a few yards of each other a half a mile to the south of the
stone bridge. Rising to an elevation of quite 100 feet above
the level of Bull Run at the bridge, it falls off on three
sides to the level of the enclosing streams in gentle slopes,
but which are furrowed by ravines of irregular direction and
length, and studded with clumps and patches of young pines and
oaks. The general direction of the crest of the plateau is
oblique to the course of Bull Run in that quarter and to the
Brentsville and turnpike roads, which intersect each other at
right angles. Immediately surrounding the two houses …
[mentioned below] are small open fields of irregular outline,
not exceeding 150 acres in extent. The houses, occupied at the
time, the one by the Widow Henry and the other by the free
negro Robinson, are small wooden buildings, the latter densely
embowered in trees and environed by a double row of fences on
two sides. Around the eastern and southern brow of the plateau
an almost unbroken fringe of second-growth pines gave
excellent shelter for our marksmen, who availed themselves of
it with the most satisfactory skill. To the west, adjoining
the fields, a broad belt of oaks extends directly across the
crest on both sides of the Sudley road, in which during the
battle regiments of both armies met and contended for the
mastery. From the open ground of this plateau the view
embraces a wide expanse of woods and gently undulating open
country of broad grass and grain fields in all directions."
General G. T. Beauregard,
Report
(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, pages 493-494).
At an early hour in the afternoon, the Union forces had driven
the enemy from this plateau and seemed to be in a position
which promised victory to them. Says General McDowell in his
official report: "The enemy was evidently disheartened and
broken. But we had then been fighting since 10.30 o'clock in
the morning, and it was after 3 o'clock in the afternoon. The
men had been up since 2 o'clock in the morning, and had made
what to those unused to such things seemed a long march before
coming into action, though the longest distance gone over was
not more that 9½ miles; and though they had three days'
provisions served out to them the day before, many, no doubt,
either did not get them, or threw them away on the march or
during the battle, and were therefore without food. They had
done much severe fighting.
{3436}
Some of the regiments which had been driven from the hill in
the first two attempts of the enemy to keep possession of it
had become shaken, were unsteady, and had many men out of the
ranks. It was at this time that the enemy's re-enforcements
came to his aid from the railroad train (understood to have
just arrived from the valley with the residue of Johnston's
army). They threw themselves in the woods on our right, and
opened a fire of musketry on our men, which caused them to
break and retire down the hillside. This soon degenerated into
disorder, for which there was no remedy. Every effort was made
to rally them, even beyond the reach of the enemy's fire, but
in vain. The battalion of regular infantry alone moved up the
hill opposite to the one with the house, and there maintained
itself until our men could get down to and across the
Warrenton turnpike on the way back to the position we occupied
in the morning. The plain was covered with the retreating
groups, and they seemed to infect those with whom they came in
contact. The retreat soon became a rout, and this soon
degenerated still further into a panic. Finding this state of
affairs was beyond the efforts of all those who had assisted
so faithfully during the long and hard day's work in gaining
almost the object of our wishes, and that nothing remained on
that field but to recognize what we could no longer prevent, I
gave the necessary orders to protect their withdrawal, begging
the men to form a line, and offer the appearance, at least, of
organization and force. They returned by the fords to the
Warrenton road, protected, by my order, by Colonel Porter's
force of regulars. Once on the road, and the different corps
coming together in small parties, many without officers, they
became intermingled, and all organization was lost."
Brigadier General I. McDowell,
Report
(Official Records, series 1, volume 2, page 320).
"The battle of Bull Run was a misfortune, and not a disgrace,
to the Federal arms; but the reports of losses on both sides
prove that it was bravely disputed. … The rout—or, in other
words, the panic— … was one of those accidents to which even
victorious armies are sometimes liable, and against which old
troops are not always able to guard. The importance of the
battle of Bull Run cannot be measured by the amount of losses
sustained by the two contending parties. … Its immediate
effect upon military operations was to produce a sudden change
in the attitude of the belligerents. The possession of
Virginia, with the exception of that portion which had been
recaptured by McClellan, was secured to the Confederates.
Richmond was beyond danger of any attack, and Washington was
threatened anew. … But it was chiefly through its moral effect
that this first encounter was to exercise a powerful influence
upon the war of which it was only the prelude. The South saw
in this victory a kind of ratification of her claims. It was
not only the Federal soldiers who were vanquished on that day,
but with them all who had remained more or less openly loyal
to the Union in the Southern States. … This disaster, which
might have discouraged the North, proved, on the contrary, a
salutary lesson."
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 1, book 3, chapter 2.
"Those only can realize the condition of our Army, at that
time, who can recall the incidents of this memorable campaign
and the battle with which it closed. The crowds of curious and
impertinent spectators who accompanied and often rode through
our ranks; the long and fatal delay of Hunter's column, on the
morning of the battle—a delay occasioned by a few
baggage-waggons, which should have been miles in rear—the many
ludicrous, yet sad, scenes on the field; the heroic, but
fruitless, gallantry of separate regiments, each attempting,
in detail, the accomplishment of a work which required the
combined effort of all; the dread, on the part of our men, of
those terrible 'masked batteries' and 'the fierce Black-horse
Cavalry,' neither of which ever had an existence except in the
imaginative brains of our newspaper reporters, all help to
fill up the picture. … I believe the plan of this battle to
have been well-conceived, notwithstanding its disastrous
result. We were compelled to take the offensive against troops
in position, and upon a field, the topography of which was
unknown to nearly all our officers. Notwithstanding these
facts, successes would have been achieved but for the
impatient spirit which hurried us on, without the slightest
preparation. Of the march, the battle, the rout, and the
disorderly retreat to Washington, the description given by
William H. Russell was not greatly exaggerated. It was far
more truthful than many of the descriptions given by the
reporters of our own papers. Who has forgotten the newspaper
accounts of the conduct of the celebrated Fire Zouaves—of the
prodigies of valor performed by them—of their bayonet
charges—of their heroic assaults—of the fearful destruction
inflicted by them upon the enemy—and, finally, when the order
to retreat came, of the great difficulty experienced by the
officers in forcing 'these gallant, but bloodthirsty lambs,'
as they were called, to cease fighting and commence
retreating? We all remember these accounts, and many others of
a similar character; and yet, every intelligent officer who
was on the field knows that this regiment dispersed at the
first fire, and so thoroughly was it dispersed that it was
from that day never again known as a military organization.
This campaign, and every subsequent one, of the War, taught us
that the rough element of our cities—the prize-fighter, the
veteran of a score of street-fights—does not necessarily make
the most valuable soldier. On the contrary, many a pale-faced
boy, who, from a sense of duty, has left school or
counting-room to join our Army, has exhibited a degree of
endurance on the march and of bravery on the field, seldom
equalled by the rough element of our cities."
General H. W. Slocum,
Military Lessons taught by the War
(Historical Magazine, February 1871).
"The failure of the Confederate army to pursue after the
battle of Manassas has been much criticised, and has caused
much acrimonious discussion. General Johnston, however, never
hesitated to assume his share of the responsibility for the
action taken, though insisting that the course pursued was
proper, and the only practicable one under the circumstances.
… The troops who had been actually engaged all day, in the hot
summer season, were in no condition to follow up the enemy.
But the great obstacle to any effective pursuit was the
weakness of the cavalry arm in the Southern army. Its entire
strength was considerably under 2,000 men, and a large
proportion of these were not in call.
{3437}
Many of those within reach had been fighting for hours, and
were in little better condition than the infantry. All who
were available were sent off in immediate pursuit, with the
result of greatly swelling the number of prisoners and
captured guns. But by the time the captors turned their prizes
over to proper guards, the Northern army had covered a
sufficient distance to be out of danger, being protected in
their retreat by large bodies of troops that had not been
engaged. This was all that could be accomplished. … The fact
that the condition of the Confederate troops put any active
pursuit out of the question is established by the official
reports. General Johnston's report says: 'Our victory was as
complete as one gained by infantry and artillery can be.' …
The same reasons apply with equal force to any attempted
advance during the few days succeeding the battle. The army
was not in a condition to make the movement, being itself much
demoralized by the engagement. Many thought the war over and
went home; many accompanied wounded comrades to their homes;
for the ties of discipline were not as strong then as in a
veteran army. But a yet stronger obstacle to an advance was
the lack of necessary transportation. … Even if the
Confederates had advanced and captured the intrenchments
opposite Washington, they could have accomplished nothing.
They could not have crossed the river on the bridge under the
fire of the Federal vessels of war. They had no artillery of
sufficient range to bombard Washington from the southern side,
even if they had been disposed to wage war in that manner.
They had no sufficient supply of ammunition."
R. M. Hughes,
General Johnston,
chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 8.
J. G. Nicolay,
Outbreak of the Rebellion,
chapters 13-16.
J. B. Fry and others,
Campaign of the First Bull Run
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1).
J. E. Cook,
Stonewall Jackson,
part 1, chapter 12.
A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
volume 1, chapter 9.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (JULY).
Enlistment of volunteers authorized by Congress.
The enlistment of 500,000 volunteers was authorized by Acts of
Congress passed July 22 and 25.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July-September: Missouri).
Sigel's well-conducted retreat from Carthage.
Death of Lyon at Wilson's Creek.
Siege of Lexington.
Fremont in command.
The flight of Governor Jackson and his followers from
Booneville was westward, to Warsaw, on the Osage, first, and
thence into Vernon County, where they were joined, July 3, by
General Sterling Price.
See MISSOURI: A. D. 1861 (FEBRUARY-JULY).
"Their united force is stated by Pollard, at 3,600. Being
pursued by Lyon, they continued their retreat next day,
halting at 9 P. M., in Jasper County, 23 miles distant. Ten
miles hence, at 10 A. M. next morning, they were confronted by
a Union force 1,500 strong, under Colonel Franz Sigel, who had
been dispatched from St. Louis by the 'Southwestern Pacific
road, to Rolla, had marched thence to Springfield, and had
pushed on to Mount Vernon, Lawrence County, hoping to prevent
a junction between Jackson and some forces which his
Brigadiers were hurrying to his support. Each army appears to
have started that morning with intent to find and fight the
other; and such mutual intentions are seldom frustrated. Sigel
found the Rebels, halted after their morning march, well
posted, vastly superior in numbers and in cavalry, but
inferior in artillery, which he accordingly resolved should
play a principal part in the battle. In the cannonade which
ensued, he inflicted great damage on the Rebels and received
very little, until, after a desultory combat of three or four
hours, the enemy resolved to profit by their vast superiority
in cavalry by outflanking him, both right and left. This
compelled Sigel to fall back. … The retreat was made in
perfect order … to Carthage, and through that town to
Sarcoxie, some fifteen miles eastward. It was well, indeed,
that he did so; for Jackson's force was augmented, during that
night and next morning, by the arrival of Price from the
southward, bringing to his aid several thousand Arkansas and
Texas troops, under Generals Ben McCulloch and Pearce. Our
loss in the affair of Carthage was 13 killed and 31
wounded—not one of them abandoned to the enemy; while the
Rebels reported their loss at 40 to 50 killed and 125 to 150
wounded. Sigel, now outnumbered three or four to one, was
constrained to continue his retreat, by Mount Vernon, to
Springfield; where General Lyon, who had been delayed by lack
of transportation, joined and outranked him on the 10th."
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 1, chapter 35.
"The month of August came, and found General Lyon at
Springfield, hoping to receive reenforcements; but the battle
of Bull Run had occurred, and rendered it impossible to send
him aid. Major General Fremont had been appointed [July 9] to
the command of the Western Department, and had reached St.
Louis (July 25). Meantime Confederate troops were pouring over
the southern frontier of Missouri, and Lyon, finding that they
were advancing upon him in two columns, determined to strike
before he should be overwhelmed by the combined Louisiana,
Missouri, Arkansas, and Texas troops. His force did not exceed
5,500, his antagonist had more than 12,000. A skirmish
occurred at Dug Spring (August 1st), in which he had the
advantage; but he could not prevent the junction of the two
columns. Hereupon he fell back to Springfield. His position
had now become one of great difficulty. Political as well as
military considerations rendered it almost impossible for him
to retreat farther. He therefore determined to resume the
offensive, and compensate for his weakness by audacity. Moving
out of Springfield on a very dark night (August 9-10), and
having ordered Sigel, with 1,200 men and six guns, to gain the
enemy's rear by their right, he was ready, as soon as day
broke, to make an attack on their front [on Wilson's Creek].
But the disparity of force was too great. Sigel was
overwhelmed. He lost five out of his six guns, and more than
half his men. The attack in front was conducted by Lyon in
person with very great energy. His horse was shot under him;
he was twice wounded, the second time in the head. In a final
charge he called to the Second Kansas Regiment, whose colonel
was at that moment severely wounded, 'Come on, I will lead
you,' and in so doing was shot through the heart. After the
death of Lyon the battle was still continued, their artillery
preserving the national troops from total defeat. News then
coming of Sigel's disaster, a retreat to Springfield, distant
about nine miles, was resolved on. It was executed without
difficulty.
{3438}
In this battle of Wilson's Creek there were 223 killed, 721
wounded, 292 missing, on the national side; and, as may be
inferred from the determined character of the assault, the
loss of the Confederates was very great. They had been so
severely handled that they made no attempt at pursuit, and the
retreat was continued by the national troops, who, on the
19th, had fallen back to Rolla. After this action, the
Confederate commanders, McCulloch and Price, quarreling with
each other, and unable to agree upon a plan for their
campaign, the former returned to Arkansas, the latter advanced
from Springfield toward Lexington. Here he found a national
force of about three thousand (2,780) under Colonel Mulligan.
Attempts were made by General Fremont to re-enforce Mulligan,
but they did not succeed. Meantime the assailing forces were
steadily increasing in number, until they eventually reached
28,000, with 13 pieces of artillery. They surrounded the
position and cut off the beleaguered troops from water. They
made repeated assaults without success until [September] 20th,
when they contrived a movable breastwork of hemp-bales, which
they rolled before them as they advanced, and compelled
Mulligan, who had been twice wounded, to surrender
unconditionally. On receiving news of this disaster, Fremont
at once left St. Louis with the intention of attacking Price,
but that general instantly retreated, making his way back to
the southwest corner of the state, where he rejoined McCulloch
and his Confederate troops."
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 47 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
T. L. Snead,
The Fight for Missouri,
chapters 11-14.
J. Peckham,
General Lyon and Missouri in 1861,
book 4.
J. C. Fremont, F. Sigel and others,
Wilson's Creek, Lexington and Pea Ridge
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War', volume 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (July-November).
McClellan's rise to the chief command.
Creation of the Army of the Potomac.
Reorganization of the western armies.
"Immediately after the battle of Bull Run, Major General
McClellan was assigned to the command of the Military
Department of Washington and Northeastern Virginia. Lieutenant
General Scott retained his command as general in chief of the
American army, until the end of October. 'I found,' says
General McClellan in his report, 'no army to command—a mere
collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the Potomac,
some perfectly raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat.
Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the
southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive
works; nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the
avenues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. The
number of troops in and around the city was about 50,000
infantry, less than 1,000 cavalry, 650 artillerymen, with nine
imperfect field batteries of 30 pieces.' … General McClellan
at once commenced the organization of the great army
authorized by Congress. His views of the military position and
appropriate military conduct were, for the most part,
accepted, and such was the patriotism of the people, the
resolution of Congress, the energy of the executive, that the
Army of the Potomac had reached, on October 27th, a strength
of … 168,318. It was the general's opinion that the advance
upon the enemy at Manassas should not be postponed beyond the
25th of November. It was his desire that all the other armies
should be stripped of their superfluous strength, and, as far
as possible, every thing concentrated in the force under his
command. On the 31st of October, General Scott, having found
his bodily infirmities increasing, addressed a letter to the
Secretary of War requesting to be placed on the retired list.
… His desire was granted. An order was simultaneously issued
appointing General McClellan commander-in-chief under the
President. This change in his position at once produced a
change in General McClellan's views. Hitherto he had
undervalued the importance of what was to be done in the West.
He had desired the Western armies to act on the defensive. Now
he wished to institute an advance on East Tennessee, and
capture Nashville contemporaneously with Richmond. … In
preparation for this, the Department of the West was
reorganized. On the day following that of McClellan's
promotion, Fremont was removed from his command. His
department was subdivided into three: (1.) New Mexico, which
was assigned to Colonel Canby; (2.) Kansas, to General Hunter;
(3.) Missouri, to General Halleck. To General Buell was
assigned the Department of the Ohio, and to General Rosecrans
that of West Virginia. The end of November approached, and
still the Army of the Potomac had not moved. The weather was
magnificent, the roads excellent. … Winter at last came, and
nothing had been done. … Considering the military condition of
the nation when General McClellan undertook the formation and
organization of the great Army of the Potomac, the time
consumed in bringing that force into a satisfactory condition
was far from being too long. … From the resources furnished
without stint by Congress McClellan created that army. Events
showed that his mental constitution was such that he could not
use it on the battlefield. … There probably never was an army
in the world so lavishly supplied as that of the Potomac
before the Peninsular expedition. General McDowell, who knew
the state of things well, declared, in his testimony before
the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 'There
never was an army in the world supplied as well as ours. I
believe a French army of half the size could be supplied with
what we waste.'"
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapters 44 and 49 (volume 2).
"Some persons, who ought to have known better, have supposed
that in organizing the Army of the Potomac I set too high a
model before me and consumed unnecessary time in striving to
form an army of regulars. This was an unjustifiable error on
their part. I should, of course, have been glad to bring that
army to the condition of regulars, but no one knew better than
myself that, with the means at my command, that would have
been impossible within any reasonable or permissible time.
What I strove for and accomplished was to bring about such a
condition of discipline and instruction that the army could be
handled on the march and on the field of battle, and that
orders could be reasonably well carried out. … In spite of all
the clamor to the contrary, the time spent in the camps of
instruction in front of Washington was well bestowed, and
produced the most important and valuable results. Not a day of
it was wasted.
{3439}
The fortifications then erected, both directly and indirectly,
saved the capital more than once in the course of the war, and
enabled the army to manœuvre freely and independently. … No
other army we possessed could have met and defeated the
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. And, with all the
courage, energy, and intelligence of the Army of the Potomac,
it probably would not have been equal to that most difficult
task without the advantage it enjoyed during its sojourn in
the camps around Washington."
G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
G. B. McClellan,
Report on the Organization and Campaigns
of the Army of the Potomac.
Prince de Joinville,
The Army of the Potomac.
Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,
37th Congress, 3d session, H. R., part. 1.
W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August).
Act of Congress freeing Slaves employed
in the service of the Rebellion.
In August, Congress passed an "Act to confiscate property used
for insurrectionary purposes." As originally framed, it only
confiscated "any property used or employed in aiding, abetting
or promoting insurrection, or resistance to the laws," which
would not include slaves. A new section was added, declaring
that "whenever hereafter during the present insurrection
against the Government of the United States, any person held
to labor or service under the law of any State shall be
required or permitted by the person to whom such labor or
service is due to take up arms against the United States, or
to work in or upon any fort, dock, navy-yard, armory,
intrenchment or in any military or naval service whatever
against the Government of the United States, the person to
whom such service or labor is due shall forfeit his claim
thereto." The law further provided that, "whenever any person
shall seek to enforce his claim to a slave, it shall be a
sufficient answer to such claim, that the slave had been
employed in the military or naval service against the United
States contrary to the provisions of this Act."
J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, page 342.
ALSO IN:
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 1, pages 568-570.
E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States during the Rebellion,
page 195.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August: North Carolina).
The Hatteras expedition.
"General Wool relieved General Butler August 16th, 1861, of
the command at Fortress Monroe. Butler was detailed to active
duty. The War and Navy Departments having arranged the first
of a series of expeditions against the Southern coast, the
command of the land forces was conferred upon Butler—Commodore
S. H. Stringham directing the naval arm. Materials for the
adventure were rapidly gathered at Fortress Monroe from the
date of August 16th to the 26th, on which day the fleet took
its departure. … Not until the vessels were at sea were any
but the directors of the enterprize aware of the point of
attack. Forts Hatteras and Clark commanded the entrance to the
Sounds of Pamlico and Albemarle, whose waters were a great
rendezvous for traders running the blockade. … Fort Hatteras
was an exceedingly formidable battery. It was nearly
surrounded by water, and was only approached by a circuitous
and narrow neck of land. … The secrecy and rapidity of
preparation by the Federals caught the rebels somewhat
unprepared for the attack. … The bombardment opened Wednesday
morning, at ten o'clock, preparatory to the landing of the
land forces on the beach above Fort Hatteras. … A heavy surf
rolled in upon the treacherous sands. After infinite labor,
and the beaching of three small boats, the landing was
suspended for the day. Those already on shore—315 in
number—were safe under the guns of the fleet. … The
bombardment continued during the entire first day. No land
assault was attempted. Fort Hatteras replied with great vigor,
but with little avail. … On the morning of the 29th, the
cannonade opened early. A cloudless sky and a clear sea
blessed the cause of the assailants. During the night a
transport heavily laden with troops reenforced the fort,
running down the Sound which was yet open. Fort Clark was
occupied by the Federal forces, and refused its aid to assist
its late confederate. The conflict soon raged with extreme
vigor on both sides. At eleven o'clock the Confederate flag
fluttered uneasily a moment—then ran down the halyards and a
white flag was slowly run to the peak. … Articles of
capitulation were signed on board the flag-ship Minnesota.
Butler then landed and took formal possession of the largest
fortification. The number of prisoners surrendered was 615,
who were all placed on the Minnesota. In four days time they
were in New York harbor. … The first design, it would appear,
was to destroy the forts, stop up the channel with old hulks,
and to return, temporarily at least, to Fortress Monroe with
the entire force; but the place proved to be so strong that
Butler left Weber and Hawkins' commands in possession."
O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
volume 2, division 5, chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
D. Ammen,
The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,
chapter 8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (August-October: Missouri).
Fremont's premature proclamation of freedom to slaves of
rebels and Lincoln's modification of it.
The change of command.
"On the 31st of August, General Fremont [commanding in the
West] issued a proclamation declaring martial law, defining
the lines of the army of occupation, and threatening with
death by the bullet all who should be found within those lines
with arms in their hands. Furthermore, the real and personal
property of all persons in the state [Missouri] who should
take up arms against the United States was declared
confiscated to the public use, and their slaves, if they had
any, were declared free men. This proclamation produced a
strong effect upon the public mind. The proclaiming of freedom
to the slaves of rebels struck the popular chord, particularly
among thoroughly loyal men in the free states. Of course, it
maddened all the sympathizers with the rebellion, infuriated
the rebels themselves, and perplexed those loyal men who had
upon their hands the task of so conducting affairs as to hold
to their allegiance the border slave states which had not
seceded. Mr. Lincoln did not approve some features of General
Fremont's proclamation. As soon as he read it, he wrote, under
date of September 2d, to the General, that there were two
points in it which gave him anxiety. The first was, that, if
he should shoot a man according to his proclamation, 'the
confederates would certainly shoot our best men in their hands
in retaliation, and so, man for man, indefinitely.'
{3440}
He therefore ordered him to allow no man to be shot under the
proclamation without first having his (the President's)
approbation or consent. The second cause of anxiety was that
the paragraph relating to the confiscation of property and the
liberation of slaves of traitorous owners would alarm
Unionists at the South, and perhaps ruin the fair prospect of
saving Kentucky to the Union. He, therefore, wished General
Fremont, as of his own motion, so to modify his proclamation
as to make it conformable to the confiscation act just passed
by the extra session of Congress, which only freed such slaves
as were engaged in the rebel service. … General Fremont
received the President's letter respectfully, and replied to
it September 8th, stating the difficulties under which he
labored, with communication with the government so difficult,
and the development of perplexing events so rapid in the
department under his command. As to the part of his
proclamation concerning the slaves, he wished the President
openly to order the change desired, as, if he should do it of
his own motion, it would imply that he thought himself wrong,
and that he had acted without the reflection which the gravity
of the point demanded. This the President did, in a dispatch
under date of September 11th, in the words: 'It is therefore
ordered that the said clause of said proclamation be so
modified, held, and constructed, as to conform to, and not to
transcend, the provisions on the same subject contained in the
act of Congress entitled, An act to confiscate property used
for insurrectionary purposes, approved August 6, 1861; and
that such act be published at length with this order.' Before
this order had been received, or on the day following its
date, General Fremont, though acquainted with the President's
wishes, manumitted two slaves of Thomas L. Snead of St. Louis,
in accordance with the terms of his proclamation. Although Mr.
Lincoln desired General Fremont so to modify his proclamation
as to make it accordant with the act of Congress approved
August 6th, it is hardly to be supposed that he did it solely
out of respect to that act. … If he had believed that the time
had come for the measure of liberating the slaves of rebels by
proclamation, the act of Congress would not have stood in his
way. This act was an embodiment of his policy at that time,
and he used it for his immediate purpose. … Complications in
the personal relations of General Fremont and Colonel F. P.
Blair, under whose personal and family influence General
Fremont had received his position, occurred at an early day.
Colonel Blair doubtless thought that he had not sufficient
weight in the General's counsels, and the General, doubtless,
exercised his right in choosing his own counselors. … It was a
very unhappy quarrel, and it is quite likely that there was
blame upon both sides, though it occurred between men equally
devoted to the sacred cause of saving the country to freedom
and justice. … Mr. Lincoln always gave to each the credit due
to his motives, and so far refused to mingle in the general
quarrel that grew out of the difficulty, that he kept the
good-will of both sides, and compelled them to settle their
own differences. … General Fremont at length took the field in
person. On the 8th of October he left Jefferson City for
Sedalia. As he advanced with his forces, Price retreated,
until it was widely reported that he would give battle to the
national forces at Springfield. Just as Fremont was making
ready to engage the enemy, he was overtaken by an order
relieving him of his command. He was succeeded by General
Hunter; but Hunter's command was brief, and was transferred at
an early day to General Halleck. General Fremont was relieved
of his command by the President not because of his
proclamation, not because he hated slavery, and not because he
believed him corrupt or vindictive or disloyal. He relieved
him simply because he believed that the interests of the
country, all things considered, would be subserved by
relieving him and putting another man in his place. The matter
was the cause of great excitement in Missouri, and of much
complaint among the radical anti-slavery men of the country:
but the imputations sought to be cast upon the President were
not fastened to him; and did not, four years later, when
Fremont himself became a candidate for the presidency, prevent
the warmest anti-slavery men from giving Mr. Lincoln their
support. The federal army under General Hunter retreated
without a battle; and thus the campaign, inaugurated with
great show and immense expense, was a flat failure."
J. G. Holland,
Life of Abraham Lincoln,
chapter 20.
ALSO IN:
J. C. Fremont,
In Command in Missouri
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1),
pages 278-288.
W. Dorsheimer,
Fremont's Hundred Days in Missouri
(Atlantic Monthly, volume 9, 1862).
Official Record,
series 1, volume 3, pages 466-564.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861
(August-December: West Virginia).
Rosecrans against Lee.
Battles of Carnifex Ferry and Cheat Summit.
"When General McClellan was called [July 22] to take General
McDowell's place at the head of the Army of the Potomac,
Brigadier-General William S. Rosecrans was left in command of
the troops in West Virginia. General Robert E. Lee, the
Confederate commander, who had gathered together the forces
which had been defeated under Garnett and Pegram, and some
others, found himself in August at the head of about 16,000
men. Lee made his headquarters at Huntersville, while General
John B. Floyd … took up a position on the Gauley River for the
purpose of cutting off General Cox of Ohio, who, with a
brigade of Rosecrans's army, had just driven a Confederate
force under ex-Governor Henry A. Wise of Virginia out of the
Kanawha Valley. Floyd surprised and routed the Seventh Ohio
under Colonel Tyler, and then moved to a place on the Gauley
River called Carnifex Ferry, hoping to cut off Cox from
Rosecrans. But early in September Rosecrans, leaving part of
his army under General Joseph J. Reynolds to watch Lee,
marched southward with about 10,000 men and [September 10]
attacked Floyd, who had strongly fortified himself with about
2,000 men on the banks of the river. After a severe fight of
three or four hours, in which the Union troops lost heavily,
Rosecrans, finding the position much stronger than he
expected, gave orders at twilight to stop the assault until
morning; but when morning came no enemy was to be seen; Floyd,
finding his enemy much superior in numbers, had crossed the
river in the night over a bridge hastily built of logs, and
retreated to the mountains 30 miles away. Rosecrans followed,
but finally fell back again to the Gauley. When Rosecrans
marched against Floyd, Reynolds took up a strong position on
Cheat Mountain."
J. D. Champlin,
Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,
chapter 10.
{3441}
"General Lee proposed first to win a victory, if possible,
over Reynolds. He was combative, anxious to strike, but many
difficulties confronted him. He fully realized he had been
sent to West Virginia to retrieve Confederate disasters, and
that he had a most difficult task to perform. The Federal
commander [his main force at Elk Water] held the center summit
of Cheat Mountain pass, the mountain having three well-defined
summits. … It was necessary first to carry this well-selected
position of the Federal troops. A citizen surveyor, in
sympathy with the South and familiar with the mountain paths,
had made a trip to an elevated point where he could clearly
see the Federal position, and reported his observations to
General Lee. Afterward he made a second reconnoissance,
accompanied by Colonel Albert Rust, of the Third Arkansas
Regiment, who was anxious to see the nature of the ground and
the strength of the position for himself. They reported to
General Lee that in their opinion the enemy's position could
be assailed with success with troops which could be guided to
the point they had reached. General Lee decided to make the
attack, and gave to Rust a column of 1,200 infantry. … The
movement was to begin at night, which happened to be a very
rainy one. All the troops, however, got in the positions
assigned to them without the knowledge of the enemy, where
they waited, every moment expecting to hear the rattle of
Rust's muskets, who had been charged with the capture of the
pass on Cheat Mountain; but hour after hour passed, and no
sounds were heard. After a delay of many hours, and the enemy
had divined the nature of the attack, the troops were ordered
back to their former position. There had been only a small
conflict between cavalry, in which Colonel John A. Washington,
General Lee's aid-de-camp, who had been sent with Major W. H.
F. Lee to reconnoiter the enemy, was killed from an ambuscade.
… Rust claims in his reports that spies had communicated the
movements of the Confederate troops to the enemy. This officer
evidently did not attack, because he found, on getting close
to the Federal position, that it was much stronger than he had
thought it was from the preliminary reconnoissances he had
made. As the attack of the whole depended on the assault of
this force, the failure to attack caused a corresponding
failure of the whole movement. … This movement having failed,
and knowing that the enemy would be prepared for any second
attempt which, from the nature of the country, would have to
be similar to the one already tried, General Lee decided to
turn his attention to the commands of Wise and Floyd in front
of Rosecrans, leaving General H. R. Jackson in Reynolds's
front. He proceeded at once to Floyd's command, which he
reached on September 20th, and then to Wise's camp, closely
inspecting both. He at once perceived that Wise's position was
the strongest and offered the best means for successful
defense, and promptly concentrated his forces at that point. …
Rosecrans had advanced to the top of Big Sewell Mountain and
had placed his army in a strong position. General Lee, with te
troops of Wise, Floyd, and Loring—about 8,000 men—occupied a
position on a parallel range. The two armies were now in close
proximity to each other, both occupying strong defensive
positions. Lee and Rosecrans, having been officers of the
engineers, were fully aware of the great disadvantage an
attacking army would have, and each waited, hoping the other
would attack. After occupying these positions for twelve days,
Rosecrans, on the night of October 6th, retreated. The
condition of the roads, the mud, the swollen streams, the
large numbers of men with typhoid fever and measles, the
condition of the horses, of the artillery, and transportation,
were such that Lee decided not to pursue. … The rapid approach
of winter and the rainy season terminated the campaign in this
section. … At the termination of this campaign of General
Lee's the Confederate Government did not bestow much attention
upon this section. The majority of the people seemed inclined
to support the Federal side. … It must be admitted that
General Lee retired from West Virginia with diminished

military reputation. Great results had been expected from his
presence there. Garnett's defeat and death were to be avenged,
and the whole of that portion of Virginia speedily wrested
from the Federal arms. The public did not understand the
difficulties of the situation, or comprehend why he did not
defeat Reynolds, or the failure to attack Rosecrans."
F. Lee,
General Lee,
chapter 6.
After Lee left General H. R. Jackson in front of Reynolds'
position, the former established himself in a fortified camp
on Buffalo Hill, and was unsuccessfully attacked there by
Reynolds, October 3. Two months later, on the 13th of
December, the attack was repeated by Reynolds' successor in
command, General Milroy, and again without success. Meantime,
Floyd had been driven into the mountains, with little
fighting, by Rosecrans, and military operations, for the time,
were at an end.
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 1, book 4, chapter 2.
ALSO IN:
V. A. Lewis,
History of West Virginia,
chapter 28.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861
(September-November: On the Mississippi).
General Grant's first battle, at Belmont.
In August, General Ulysses S. Grant, who had been serving for
a few weeks in Missouri, first as Colonel of the 21st Illinois
Regiment, and later as a brigadier-general, was assigned by
General Fremont to "the command of the district of south-east
Missouri, embracing all the territory south of St. Louis, in
Missouri, as well as all southern Illinois." On the 4th of
September he established his headquarters at Cairo, Illinois,
and the next day, having learned from a scout that the rebels
were preparing to seize Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee
River, he placed a couple of regiments of troops and a light
battery on board of steamers: and occupied the place on the
6th,—telegraphing meanwhile for orders, but not waiting for
them. His movement anticipated the enemy by a few hours, only,
and secured a command of the Tennessee, the importance of
which was afterward demonstrated by Grant, himself, when he
moved on Forts Henry and Donelson. In his "Memoirs" General
Grant says: "From the occupation of Paducah up to the early
part of November, nothing important occurred with the troops
under my command.
{3442}
I was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled
and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to
come. By the 1st of November I had not fewer than 20,000 men.
… About the 1st of November I was directed from department
headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the
Mississippi River with the view of detaining the rebels within
their lines. Before my troops could be got off, I was notified
from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy
on the St. Francis River about 50 miles west, or south-west,
from Cairo, and was ordered to send another force against
them. I dispatched Colonel Oglesby at once with troops
sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy.
On the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were
about to detach a large force from Columbus to be moved by
boats down the Mississippi and up the White River, in
Arkansas, in order to reinforce Price, and I was directed to
prevent this movement if possible." To carry out these orders,
General Grant directed a demonstration to be made from Paducah
towards Columbus, while, at the same time, he conveyed some
3,000 troops down the river, in steamers, and attacked a camp
of rebels at Belmont, immediately opposite Columbus. The
battle was a severe one. "The officers and men engaged at
Belmont were then under fire for the first time. Veterans,"
says General Grant, "could not have behaved better than they
did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. At this point
they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap
its full reward. … The moment the camp was reached our men
laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick
up trophies. Some of the higher officers were little better
than the privates. They galloped about from one cluster of men
to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the
Union cause and the achievements of the command." The result
was a rallying of the defeated rebels and a reinforcement from
Columbus which forced the Unionists to retire with haste. "Our
loss at Belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. About
125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. We
returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four
other pieces. The loss of the enemy, as officially reported,
was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. We had engaged about
2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports.
The enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops
brought over from Columbus who were not engaged in the first
defence of Belmont. The two objects for which the battle of
Belmont was fought were fully accomplished. The enemy gave up
all idea of detaching troops from Columbus. … If it had not
been fought, Colonel Oglesby would probably have been captured
or destroyed with his 3,000 men. Then I should have been
culpable indeed."
U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 19-20 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
A. Badeau,
Military History of U. S. Grant,
chapter 1.
W. P. Johnston,
Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,
chapter 24.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia).
Confederate project for the invasion of the North
vetoed by Jefferson Davis.
"Between the 4th of August and the 15th of October more than
110 regiments and thirty batteries, comprising at least
100,000 men, were added to the forces in Washington and its
neighborhood, and there appeared to be no limit to the
resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Northern
troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the
immense resources at the disposal of the United States
Government, that there was every reason to expect in the
spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and
vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities, on
the part of the soldiers. The army at Manassas, on the other
hand, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate
Government, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of
clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward
with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter. … It was
easy for any one instructed in military matters to see that if
the Federal authorities would only be content to defer active
operations until the patriotic levies of the North should have
learned 'the trade of the soldier,'—should have acquired
familiarity with the use of arms, habits of obedience, trust
in their officers and superiors, discipline,—the Federal
general would enter on the next campaign with all those
chances of success which attend largely superior numbers,
better arms and equipment, and a sound and thorough
organization of his army. Such in fact was the view of the
situation taken by the sagacious officer who commanded the
lately victorious army at Manassas Junction, Joseph E.
Johnston. In his opinion his two corps commanders, Beauregard
… and G. W. Smith, … entirely concurred. They saw that
something must be done to break up this constantly increasing
Federal army while it was yet in the process of formation. The
Confederate generals determined to urge their views upon the
President of the Southern Confederacy. Mr. Davis responded at
once to their expressed wish for a conference upon the
military situation, and he reached Manassas on September 30,
1861. The conference was held the next day. The generals
strongly advised Mr. Davis to reinforce the army at Manassas
so that they might cross the Potomac, cut the communications
of Washington with the North, and carry the war into the
enemy's country. Johnston and Beauregard fixed the strength of
an army adequate to these tasks at 60,000 men. Smith was
content with a force of 50,000. Additional transportation and
supplies of ammunition were also demanded. The army then at
Manassas numbered about 40,000 men. With the quality of the
soldiers the generals seemed to be perfectly content. They
only asked that the additional troops sent should be of an
equal degree of efficiency,—'seasoned soldiers' as
distinguished from 'fresh volunteers.' But President Davis
decided that he could not furnish the required reinforcement
without 'a total disregard of the safety of other threatened
positions.' The project was therefore dropped, and no further
attempt was made during the ensuing autumn and winter to
interfere with the uninterrupted development of the Federal
army at and near Washington in organization and efficiency. …
It is altogether probable that the Confederate army was at
that time decidedly the superior of its antagonist in many
important respects. It had the prestige of victory. … We may
fairly say therefore, that an invasion of the North,
undertaken in October, 1861, held out a very fair promise of a
successful result for the Confederate arms."
J. C. Ropes,
The Story of the Civil War,
chapter 10.
{3443}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (October: Virginia).
The affair at Ball's Bluff, or Leesburg.
"The true story of the affair of Ball's Bluff, is, in brief,
as follows: One of General Stone's officers, Captain
Philbrick, of the 15th Massachusetts, thought that he had
discovered a camp of the enemy about one mile beyond
Harrison's island in the direction of Leesburg. Having
completed the feint of crossing made in the course of the
20th, General Stone at 10.30 P. M. of the same day issued his
orders for the surprise of the supposed camp at daybreak of
the 21st. Colonel Devens, of the 15th Massachusetts, was
entrusted with the duty, with four companies of his regiment.
Colonel Lee, of the 20th Massachusetts, was directed to
replace Colonel Devens in Harrison's island with four
companies of his own regiment, one of which was to pass over
to the Virginia shore and hold the heights there to cover
Colonel Devens's return. Colonel Devens was directed to
'attack the camp at daybreak, and, having routed, to pursue
them as far as he deems prudent, and to destroy the camp, if
practicable, before returning.' … Having accomplished this
duty, Colonel Devens will return to his present position,
unless he shall see one on the Virginia side near the river
which he can undoubtedly hold until reinforced, and one which
can be successfully held against largely superior numbers. In
which case he will hold on and report.' In obedience to these
orders Colonel Devens crossed about midnight with five
companies (instead of four), numbering about 300 men, and
halted until daybreak in an open field near the bluffs
bordering the shore. While there he was joined by Colonel Lee
with 100 men of the 20th Massachusetts, who halted here to
cover his return. At daybreak he advanced about a mile towards
Leesburg, and then discovered that the supposed camp did not
exist. After examining the vicinity and discovering no traces
of the enemy, he determined not to return at once, but at
about half-past six A. M. sent a non-commissioned officer to
report to General Stone that he thought he could remain where
he was until reinforced. At about seven o'clock a company of
hostile riflemen were observed on the right, and a slight
skirmish ensued. A company of cavalry being soon observed on
the left, the skirmishers were drawn back to the woods, and,
after waiting half an hour for attack, the command was
withdrawn to the position held by Colonel Lee; but, after
again scouting the woods, Colonel Devens returned to his
advanced position. About eight o'clock the messenger returned
from General Stone with orders for Colonel Devens to remain
where he was, and that he would be reinforced. The messenger
was again sent back to report the skirmish that had taken
place. Colonel Devens then threw out skirmishers and awaited
reinforcements. At about ten o'clock the messenger again
returned with the information that Colonel Baker [Senator
Edward D. Baker, of California] would soon arrive with his
brigade and take command. Between nine and eleven Colonel
Devens was joined by Lieutenant-Colonel Learned with the
remainder of the 15th. bringing up his command to 28 officers
and 625 men. About midday Colonel Devens learned that the
enemy were gathering on his left, and about half-past twelve
or one he was strongly attacked; and as he was in great danger
of being outflanked, and no reinforcements had arrived, at
about a quarter-past two he fell back to the bluff, where he
found Colonel Baker, who directed him to take the right of the
position he proposed to occupy. … At about three o'clock the
enemy attacked in force, the weight of his attack being on our
centre and left. At about four our artillery was silenced, and
Colonel Devens was ordered to send two of his companies to
support the left of our line; shortly after he learned that
Colonel Baker had been killed. Colonel Coggswell then assumed
command, and, after a vain attempt to cut his way through to
Edward's Ferry, was obliged to give the order to retreat to
the river-bank and direct the men to save themselves as best
they could. I have gone thus much into detail because at the
time I was much criticised and blamed for this unfortunate
affair, while I was in no sense responsible for it."
G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
chapter 11.
In connection with the disaster at Ball's Bluff (called the
battle of Leesburg by the Confederates) a great wrong seems to
have been done to General Stone. Accused of disloyalty, he was
arrested, but on no specific charge, imprisoned for six
months, denied a trial, and set free without explanation. He
went abroad and for many years was Chief of the General Staff
to the Khedive of Egypt.
J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, chapter 17.
ALSO IN:
R. B. Irwin,
Ball's Bluff and the arrest of General Stone
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
volume 2, pages 123-134).
Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,
37th Congress, 3d session, H. R., part 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861
(October-December: South Carolina-Georgia).
The Port Royal Expedition.
Capture of Hilton Head.
Extensive occupation of the coast.
Savannah threatened.
"On the 29th of October, another and far stronger naval and
military expedition [than that against the Hatteras forts] set
forth from Hampton Roads, and, clearing the capes of Virginia,
moved majestically southward. Genera] T. W. Sherman [not to be
confused with General William T. Shennan of the Western
armies] commanded the land forces, consisting of 13 volunteer
regiments, forming three brigades, and numbering not less than
10,000 men; while the fleet—commanded by Commodore Samuel F.
Du Pont—embraced the steam-frigate Wabash, 14 gun-boats, 22
first-class and 12 smaller steamers, with 26 sailing vessels.
After a stormy passage, in which several transports were
disabled and four absolutely lost, Commodore Du Pont, in his
flag-ship, came to off Port Royal, South Carolina, during the
night of November 3d and 4th; and, after proper soundings and
reconnoissances, which developed the existence of a new fort
on either side of the entrance, the commodore brought his most
effective vessels into action at 9 A. M., on Thursday,
November 7th, taking the lead in his flagship, the Wabash—the
gunboats to follow at intervals in due order. Thus the
fighting portion of the fleet steamed slowly up the bay by the
forts, receiving and returning the fire of the batteries on
Bay Point as they passed up, and exchanging like compliments
with the stronger fort on Hilton Head as they came down. Thus
no vessel remained stationary under fire; so that the enemy
were at no time enabled to gain, by experiment and
observation, a perfect aim. The day was lovely; the spectacle
magnificent; the fight spirited, but most unequal.
{3444}
Despite the general presumption that batteries, well manned
and served, are superior to ships when not ironclad, the
terrible rain of shot and shell upon the gunners in the Rebel
forts soon proved beyond human endurance. … The battle … raged
nearly five hours, with fearful carnage and devastation on the
part of the Rebels, and very little on ours, when the
overmatched Confederates, finding themselves slaughtered to no
purpose, suddenly and unanimously took to flight. … The Rebel
forts were fully manned by 1,700 South Carolinians, with a
field battery of 500 more stationed not far distant. The
negroes, save those who had been driven off by their masters,
or shot while attempting to evade them, had stubbornly
remained on the isles."
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
chapter 36.
"The effect of the battle of Port Royal was as largely felt in
the North, where it revived the hopes of her people, as in the
South, to whose people it revealed the presence of a new and
pressing danger. The Federals had conquered a strong base of
operations on the enemy's coast; they had carried the war into
South Carolina. … Sherman might, perhaps, at the first moment
of his adversary's disorder, have been able to push his
success farther, and to lead his army upon Charleston, or
Savannah. But he was afraid of risking such a venture. … The
occupation of most of the islands in the vicinity of the St.
Helena group was the natural consequence of the victory of
Hilton Head. It was effected gradually before the end of the
year. Among all the points of the coast which the Federals had
thus seized without striking a blow, thanks to the prestige of
their success, the most important was Tybee Island, at the
entrance of the Savannah River. Situated on the right bank of
the mouth of that river, and being the spot where the
lighthouse stands, Tybee Island enabled the Federals, as soon
as they became masters of it, to obstruct the passage of the
blockade-runners on their way to the great mart of Savannah.
At a distance of about 600 feet from its borders, on an islet
in the middle of the river, stood Fort Pulaski. … A few days
after, the navy extended its conquests still farther south,"
occupying the channel between the Tybee Island group and the
Warsaw Islands, "and thus opening a passage for future
operations, which would enable them to reach Savannah by
turning Fort Pulaski. … At the end of the year, Dupont's
fleet, supported by detachments from Sherman's army, was in
possession of the five large bays of North Edisto, St. Helena,
Port Royal, Tybee, Warsaw, and the whole chain of islands
which forms the coast of Carolina and Georgia between those
bays."
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
book 4, chapter 3 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
volume 1, chapter 26.
D. Ammen,
The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,
chapter 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861 (November).
The Trent affair.
Arrest of Mason and Slidell.
"On the 8th of November, 1861, Captain Charles Wilkes, of the
United States Steamer San Jacinto, intercepted on the ocean H.
B. M. [His Britannic Majesty] mail packet boat Trent, having
on board four rebel emissaries bound for England. Having
boarded the Trent, an officer of the San Jacinto, with an
armed guard, arrested the rebels Mason, Slidell, McFarland and
Eustis, and transferred them to the San Jacinto. The Trent
then proceeded on her voyage. Captain Wilkes conveyed his
captives to Boston, where they were consigned to Fort Warren,
then a receptacle for political prisoners. When this
transaction became known to the British government, immediate
preparations were made for war. In the United States, the act
was hailed as a victory. The Secretary of the Navy publicly
applauded Captain Wilkes, and the House of Representatives did
the same. The Secretary of State, upon whom the chief
responsibility in the matter rested, saw, more clearly than
others, that a breach of international law had been committed
by the commander of the San Jacinto. The President coincided
with Mr. Seward, and it was at once resolved to restore the
rebel captives to the protection of the British flag."
G. E. Baker,
Biographical Memoir of William H. Seward
(volume 5 of Seward's Works, pages 10-11).
In his diplomatic correspondence as quoted in the volume cited
above, under the caption "Diary or Notes on the War,"
Secretary Seward wrote:
"November 30, 1861.—Captain Wilkes, in the Steamer San
Jacinto, has boarded a British colonial steamer, and taken
from her deck two insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on
an errand of treason against their own country. Lord Lyons has
prudently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I
presume, waiting instructions from home. We have done nothing
on the subject to anticipate the discussion, and we have not
furnished you with any explanations. We adhere to that course
now, because we think it more prudent that the ground taken by
the British government should be first made to us here, and
that the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here.
In the capture of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board a British
vessel, Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions
from the government, the subject is therefore free from the
embarrassment which might have resulted if the act had been
specially directed by us. …
January 20, 1862.—We have reason to be satisfied with our
course in the Trent affair. The American people could not have
been united in a war which, being waged to maintain Captain
Wilkes's act of force, would have practically been a voluntary
war against Great Britain. At the same time it would have been
a war in 1861 against Great Britain for a cause directly the
opposite of the cause for which we waged war against the same
power in 1812." In a despatch to Lord Lyons, British Minister,
Mr. Seward had written: "If I decide this case in favor of my
own government, I must disavow its most cherished principles,
and reverse and forever abandon its essential policy. The
country cannot afford the sacrifice. If I maintain those
principles, and adhere to that policy, I must surrender the
case itself. It will be seen, therefore, that this government
could not deny the justice of the claim presented to us in
this respect upon its merits. We are asked to do to the
British nation just what we have always insisted all nations
ought to do to us. … By the adjustment of the present case
upon principles confessedly American, and yet, as I trust,
mutually satisfactory to both of the nations concerned, a
question is finally and rightly settled between them, which,
heretofore exhausting not only all forms of peaceful
discussion, but also the arbitrament of war itself, for more
than half a century alienated the two countries from each
other."
W. H. Seward,
To Lord Lyons, December 26, 1861
(Works, volume 5, Diplomatic History of the War,
pages 308-309).
ALSO IN:
M. Bernard,
Historical Account of the Neutrality of Great Britain,
chapter 9.
D. M. Fairfax,
Captain Wilkes's Seizure of Mason and Slidell
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 135-142).
{3445}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862
(December-March: Virginia).
Protracted inaction of McClellan.
His Plan of Campaign and its frustration by
the rebel evacuation of Centreville.
"When Congress assembled … in the beginning of December, 1861,
so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and
so zealously had the people responded to their country's call,
that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your
committee by the adjutant general of the army, showed that,
exclusive of the command of General Dix, at Baltimore, the
army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men. During the
time this large army had been collecting and organizing,
nothing of importance had transpired in connexion with it,
except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the
rebels, which your committee treat of more at length in
another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of
Ball's Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate report.
The weather during the fall season, and for some weeks after
the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for
active military operations. As month after month passed
without anything being done by the army of the Potomac, the
people became more and more anxious for the announcement that
the work of preparation had been completed and active
operations would soon be commenced. From the testimony before
your committee it appeared that the army of the Potomac was
well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of
discipline by the last of September or the first of October.
The men were ready and eager to commence active operations.
The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed
to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared
they had no expectation of doing so. … Your committee
endeavored to obtain as accurate information, as possible in
relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of
Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here
upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in
December an order had been issued from headquarters
prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any
persons who should come into our lines from the direction of
the enemy; but all such persons were to be sent, without
examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions
were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was,
that the generals examined appeared to be almost entirely
ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having
only such information as they were allowed to obtain at
headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously
estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the
highest estimate based their opinion upon information received
at headquarters. … Subsequent events have proved that the
force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these
estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very
greatly overestimated. Your committee also sought to ascertain
what number of men could be spared from this army for
offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the
enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be
advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the
force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act
entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure
against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses
examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men,
leaving 100,000 or upwards that could be used for expeditions
at other points. … The subject of the obstruction of the
navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration
of your committee. … As was well urged by the Navy Department,
the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army
co-operate with the navy in securing the unobstructed
navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation
at that time, permit so important a channel of communication
to be closed. After repeated efforts, General McClellan
promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to
proceed down the river. … The troops did not arrive, and the
Navy Department was informed of the fact by Captain Craven.
Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of General McClellan
why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was
informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so
large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he
had concluded not to send them. Captain Fox replied that the
landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy
Department had charge. … It was then agreed that the troops
should be sent the next night. Captain Craven was again
notified, and again had his flotilla in readiness for the
arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that
time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose. Captain
Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the committee as to what
reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to
the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as
he could ascertain, was, that General McClellan feared it
might bring on a general engagement. … Upon the failure of
this plan of the Navy Department, the effective vessels of the
Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The
navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter
closed, and remained closed until the rebels voluntarily
evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps
having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening
communication by that route. On the 19th of January, 1862, the
President of the United States, as commander-in-chief of the
army and navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the
armies of the United States, one result of which was the
series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which
so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every
loyal man in the land. After this long period of inaction of
the army of the Potomac, the President of the United States,
on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order: …
'Ordered, That all the disposable force of the army of the
Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington,
be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of
seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward
of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in
the discretion of the general-in-chief, and the expedition to
move before or on the 22d day of February next. Abraham
Lincoln.'
{3446}
To this order General McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of
the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as
involving 'the error of dividing our army by a very difficult
obstacle, (the Occoquan,) and by a distance too great to
enable the two portions to support each other, should either
be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is
held in check.' He then proceeded to argue in favor of a
movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving
the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30
days would be required to provide the necessary means of
transportation. He stated that he regarded 'success as
certain, by all the chances of war,' by the route he proposed,
while it was 'by no means certain that we can beat them (the
enemy) at Manassas.' … Your committee have no evidence, either
oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the
arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the
President that led him to relinquish his own line of
operations and consent to the one proposed by Genera]
McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in
February, 1862. That council, the first, so far as your
committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by General
McClellan, and then by direction of the President, was
composed of twelve generals. … To them was submitted the
question whether they would indorse the line of operations
which General McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the
deliberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the
movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake
bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urbana, and across the
country to Richmond. The four generals who voted against the
proposed movement were Generals McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman,
and Barnard. General Keyes voted for it with the qualification
that no change should be made until the enemy were driven from
their batteries on the Potomac. … Before the movement by way
of Annapolis could be executed, the enemy abandoned their
batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at
Centreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the
Rappahannock. When General McClellan, then in the city of
Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he
proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of
the whole army in the direction of the position lately
occupied by the enemy. The enemy moved on the morning of the
10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further
than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded
to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock,
ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and
destroyed the railroad bridge across it. … On the 13th of
March General McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a
council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of
army corps, (General Banks being absent,) and informed them
that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the
Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement
by way of the York and James rivers."
Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War,
37th Congress, 3d session, H. R. Rep.,
part 1, pages 6-12.
The Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, consisting of
Senators Wade, Chandler, and Andrew Johnson, and of
Representatives Gooch, Covode, Julian, and Odell, was
appointed in December, 1861. This Committee "was for four
years one of the most important agencies in the country. It
assumed, and was sustained by Congress in assuming, a great
range of prerogative. It became a stern and zealous censor of
both the army and the Government; it called soldiers and
statesmen before it, and questioned them like refractory
schoolboys. … It was often hasty and unjust in its judgments,
but always, earnest, patriotic, and honest. … General
McClellan and his immediate following treated the committee
with something like contempt. But the President, with his
larger comprehension of popular forces, knew that he must take
into account an agency of such importance; and though he
steadily defended General McClellan and his deliberateness of
preparation before the committee, he constantly assured him in
private that not a moment ought to be lost in getting himself
in readiness for a forward movement. … December was the fifth
month that General McClellan had been in command of the
greatest army ever brought together on this continent. It was
impossible to convince the country that a longer period of
preparation was necessary before this army could be led
against one inferior in numbers, and not superior in
discipline or equipment. … McClellan reported to the Secretary
of War, that Johnston's army, at the end of October, numbered
150,000, and that he would therefore require, to make an
advance movement with the Army of the Potomac, a force of
240,000. Johnston's report of that date shows an effective
total of 41,000 men. … Aware that his army was less than
one-third as strong as the Union forces, Johnston contented
himself with neutralizing the army at Washington, passing the
time in drilling and disciplining his troops, who, according
to his own account, were seriously in need of it. He could not
account for the inactivity of the Union army. Military
operations, he says, were practicable until the end of
December; but he was never molested."
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 5, chapter 9.
McClellan says, "It certainly was not till late in November,
1861, that the Army of the Potomac was in any condition to
move, nor even then were they capable of assaulting entrenched
positions. By that time the roads had ceased to be practicable
for the movement of armies, and the experience of subsequent
years proved that no large operations could be advantageously
conducted in that region during the winter season. Any success
gained at that time in front of Washington could not have been
followed up and a victory would have given us the barren
possession of the field of battle, with a longer and more
difficult line of supply during the rest of the winter. If the
Army of the Potomac had been in condition to move before
winter, such an operation would not have accorded with the
general plan I had determined upon after succeeding General
Scott as general in command of the armies"
G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
pages 199-200.
ALSO IN:
J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapters 3-4.
A. S. Webb,
The Peninsula
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 3) chapter 2.
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
book 5, chapter 4 (volume 1).
G. B. McClellan,
The Peninsular Campaign
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
volume 2, pages 160-187).
G. B. McClellan,
Complete Report.
J. G. Barnard,
The Peninsular Campaign and its Antecedents.
J. C. Ropes,
Gen. McClellan's Plans
(Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 1).
{3447}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862
(December-April: Virginia).
Jackson's first campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.
Battle of Kernstown.
"Soon after the battle of Bull Run Stonewall Jackson was
promoted to major-general, and the Confederate Government
having on the 21st of October, 1861, organized the Department
of Northern Virginia, under command of General Joseph E.
Johnston, it was divided into the Valley District, the Potomac
District, and Aquia District, to be commanded respectively by
Major-Generals Jackson, Beauregard, and Holmes," In November,
Jackson's force was about 10,000 men. "His only movement of
note in the winter of 1861-62 was an expedition at the end of
December to Bath and Romney, to destroy the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad and a dam or two near Hancock, on the Chesapeake and
Ohio canal. … In March Johnston withdrew from Manassas, and
General McClellan collected his army of more than 100,000 men
on the Peninsula. … Jackson's little army in the Valley had
been greatly reduced during the winter from various causes, so
that at the beginning of March he did not have over 5,000 men
of all arms available for the defense of his district, which
began to swarm with enemies all around its borders,
aggregating more than ten times his own strength. Having
retired up the Valley, he learned that the enemy had begun to
withdraw and send troops to the east of the mountains to
cooperate with McClellan. This he resolved to stop by an
aggressive demonstration against Winchester, occupied by
General Shields, of the Federal army, with a division of 8,000
to 10,000 men. A little after the middle of March, Jack·son
concentrated what troops he could, and on the 23d he occupied
a ridge at the hamlet of Kernstown, four miles south of
Winchester. Shields promptly attacked him, and a severe
engagement of several hours ensued, ending in Jackson's
repulse about dark, followed by an orderly retreat up the
Valley to near Swift Run Gap in Rockingham county. The pursuit
was not vigorous nor persistent. Although Jackson retired
before superior numbers, he had given a taste of his fighting
qualities that stopped the withdrawal of the enemy's troops
from the Valley. The result was so pleasing to the Richmond
government and General Johnston that it was decided to
reënforce Jackson by sending General Ewell's division to him
at Swift Run Gap, which reached him about the 1st of May."
J. D. Imboden,
Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 282-285).
"The losses at Kernstown were:
Union, 118 killed, 450 wounded, 22 missing=590;
Confederate, 80 killed, 375 wounded, 263 missing=718."
N. Kimball,
Fighting Jackson at Kernstown
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, page 307, footnote).
ALSO IN:
G. H. Gordon,
Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,
chapter 3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1863.
President Lincoln's suspension of the writ of Habeas Corpus.
On the 27th of April, 1861, President Lincoln issued the
following order "To the Commanding General, Army of the United
States"—at that time, General Scott: "You are engaged in
suppressing an insurrection against the laws of the United
States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of any military
line which is now or which shall be used between the city of
Philadelphia and the city of Washington you find resistance
which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus for the public safety, you personally, or through the
officer in command at the point at which resistance occurs,
are authorized to suspend that writ." On the 2d of July,
another order was issued in exactly the same language, except
that it gave authority to suspend the writ at "any point on or
in the vicinity of any military line … between the city of New
York and the city of Washington." On the 14th of October, a
third order to General Scott declared: "The military line of
the United States for the suppression of the insurrection may
be extended so far as Bangor, Maine. You and any officer
acting under your authority are hereby authorized to suspend
the writ of habeas corpus in any place between that place and
the city of Washington." On the 2d of December a specific
order to General Halleck, commanding in the Department of
Missouri, authorized the suspension of the writ within the
limits of his command; and a similar order, long previously,
had specially empowered the commander of the forces of the
United States on the coast of Florida to do the same. On the
24th of September, 1862, a general proclamation by the
President subjected to martial law "all rebels and insurgents,
their aiders and abettors within the United States, and all
persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia
drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and
comfort to rebels against the authority of the United States";
and suspending the writ of habeas corpus "in respect to all
persons arrested, or who are now, or hereafter during the
rebellion shall be, imprisoned in any fort, camp, arsenal,
military prison, or other place of confinement, by any
military authority, or by the sentence of any court martial or
military commission." On the 3d of March, 1863, the authority
of the President to suspend habeas corpus (which some thought
questionable) was confirmed by act of Congress; and on the
15th of September in that year another general proclamation
was issued, referring to the act and declaring a suspension of
the writ "throughout the United States, in the cases where, by
the authority of the President of the United States, military,
naval, and civil officers of the United States, or any of
them, hold persons under their command, or in their custody,
either as prisoners of war, spies, or aiders or abettors of
the enemy, or officers, soldiers, or seamen enrolled or
drafted or mustered or enlisted in, or belonging to, the land
or naval forces of the United States, or as deserters
therefrom, or otherwise amenable to military law, or the rules
and articles of war, or the rules or regulations prescribed
for the military or naval service by authority of the
President of the United States; or for resisting a draft, or
for any other offense against the military or naval service."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 38, 45, 54, 85, 93, 239, 406.
{3448}
"Whether it is the President or Congress that has power under
the constitution to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus was a burning question during the civil war. …
The case of John Merryman … was the first to come up for
judicial interpretation. Merryman lived near Baltimore, and
appears to have been suspected of being captain of a secession
troop, of having assisted in destroying railroads and bridges
for the purpose of preventing troops from reaching Washington,
and of obstructing the United States mail. By order of General
Keim of Pennsylvania he was arrested at night in his own
house, and taken to Fort McHenry at that time in command of
General George Cadwallader. Taney, who was then chief justice
of the United States, granted a habeas corpus, but Cadwallader
refused to obey it, saying that the privilege had been
suspended by the President. On the return of the writ, the
Chief Justice filed an opinion denying that the President had
any power to suspend habeas corpus and affirming that such
power rested with Congress alone. Lincoln continued to arrest
and imprison without any regard to this opinion, and indeed
was advised by his Attorney-General that he was not bound to
notice it. … The writ of habeas corpus was … not suspended by
Congress until the rebellion was half over. In other words,
Lincoln suspended it for two years of his own accord and
without authority from anyone; for two years he made arrests
without warrants and held men in prison as long as he pleased.
… There are few things in American history more worthy of
discussion than the power exercised by Lincoln in those two
years. It was absolute and arbitrary and, if unauthorized, its
exercise was a tremendous violation of the constitution.
Whether it was justifiable and necessary is another matter. If
it was unconstitutional and yet necessary in order to save the
Union, it shows that the constitution is defective in not
allowing the government the proper means of protecting itself.
That Lincoln used this power with discretion and forbearance
there is no doubt. He was the most humane man that ever
wielded such authority. He had no taste for tyranny, and he
knew the temper of the American people. But, nevertheless,
injustice was sometimes done. His subordinates had not always
their master's nature."
S. G. Fisher,
The Suspension of Habeas Corpus
during the War of the Rebellion
(Political Science Quarterly,
September, 1888).
The view which President Lincoln himself entertained, and
under which he assumed and exercised authority to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus, was submitted to Congress in his first
Message, when it convened in special session, July 4, 1861. He
said: "Soon after the first call for militia, it was
considered a duty to authorize the commanding general in
proper cases, according to his discretion, to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or, in other words, to
arrest and detain, without resort to the ordinary processes
and forms of law, such individuals as he might deem dangerous
to the public safety. This authority has purposely been
exercised but very sparingly. Nevertheless, the legality and
propriety of what has been done under it are questioned, and
the attention of the country has been called to the
proposition that one who has sworn to 'take care that the laws
be faithfully executed' should not himself violate them. Of
course some consideration was given to the questions of power
and propriety before this matter was acted upon. The whole of
the laws which were required to be faithfully executed were
being resisted and failing of execution in nearly one third of
the States. Must they be allowed to finally fail of execution,
even had it been perfectly clear that by the use of the means
necessary to their execution some single law, made in such
extreme tenderness of the citizen's liberty that, practically,
it relieves more of the guilty than of the innocent, should to
a very limited ex·tent be violated? To state the question more
directly, are all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the
government itself go to pieces lest that one be violated? Even
in such a case, would not the official oath be broken if the
government should be overthrown, when it was believed that
disregarding the single law would tend to preserve it? But it
was not believed that this question was presented. It was not
believed that any law was violated. The provision of the
Constitution that 'the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or
invasion, the public safety may require it,' is equivalent to
a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be
suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of
rebellion, and that the public safety does require the
qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was
authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and
not the executive, is vested with this power. But the
Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to
exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for
a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of
the instrument intended that in every case the danger should
run its course until Congress could be called together, the
very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended
in this case, by the rebellion. … Whether there shall be any
legislation upon the subject, and if any, what, is submitted
entirely to the better judgment of Congress."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 59-60.
Congress gave tacit approval to this view of the President's
powers by passing no act on the subject until nearly two years
afterwards, as shown above.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(January-February: Kentucky—Tennessee).
The first breaking of the Confederate line.
Grant's capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson.
"At the beginning of the new year the Union armies were over
660,000 strong, backed by a fleet of 212 vessels. McClellan
lay quiet upon the Potomac all winter, drilling, organizing,
disciplining the Army of the Potomac. In his front was Joe
Johnston, with a much smaller force, pushing forward with
equal energy the schooling of his soldiers. The Western
generals were more active. Albert Sidney Johnston, perhaps the
most promising Southern officer, was in command in the West,
with headquarters at Bowling Green. Buell lay in Johnston's
front, having superseded Sherman, whose 'crazy' suggestion
that 250,000 men would be required for operations on the
Western field had lost him the confidence of his superiors.
There was abundant method in his madness, as time all too
fully showed. In [Eastern] Kentucky the Confederate Humphrey
Marshall had been creating more or less political trouble, and
General Garfield was sent against him with some 2,000 men.
Marshall somewhat outnumbered Garfield; but in a vigorous
January campaign [beginning at Paintsville, January 7, and]
culminating at Prestonburg [January 10], Garfield quite
dispersed his forces, and drove him into the mountains.
{3449}
About the same time, Zollicoffer, with some 12,000 men, had
retreated from his post in advance of Cumberland Gap, where he
held the extreme right of the Southern line, to Mill Spring,
in Central Kentucky. General George H. Thomas was charged with
the duty of disposing of him. With about an equal force Thomas
promptly moved upon his enemy, and in a sharp action at Mill
Spring [January 19] utterly broke up his army. He thus early
showed the rare vigor he afterwards so fully developed.
Zollicoffer was killed. This first of our substantial western
victories (called 'Fishing Creek' by the enemy) [and also
called the battle of Logan Cross Roads by some Union writers]
was a great encouragement to our arms. Crittenden, who
succeeded to the command, withdrew his troops across the
Cumberland, abandoning his artillery and trains. Eastern
Kentucky was thus freed from the Confederates. Halleck's first
task as commander of the Western armies was to penetrate the
Confederate line of defense. This could be done by breaking
its centre or by turning one of its flanks. The former
appeared most feasible to Grant, and Commodore Foote, who
commanded the naval forces. Under instructions from Halleck,
seven of the gun-boat flotilla, with Grant's 17,000 men in
reserve, moved up the Tennessee river to attack Fort Henry and
essay the value of gun-boats in amphibious warfare. Grant
landed below the fort, and Foote then opened fire upon it.
Tilghman, in command, foreseeing its capture, was shrewd
enough to send off the bulk of his force to Fort Donelson. He
himself made a mock defense with a handful of men,
surrendering the fort after the garrison was well on its way.
Without the twin citadel of Donelson [distant about eleven
miles, southeastwardly, on the Cumberland River], however,
Fort Henry was but a barren triumph, for no column could
advance up the Tennessee river while this garrison threatened
its flank. It was here that Grant earned his first laurels as
a stanch soldier, by compelling, after a stubborn fight, the
surrender of this second fortress with its entire garrison.
Every effort had been made by Johnston to hold the place. He
must here fight for the possession of Nashville. Fort Donelson
was strongly fortified and garrisoned. Grant moved against it
from Fort Henry with 15,000 men; 5,000 less than the enemy.
The ground is difficult; the troops are green. But
reinforcements and the fleet come to Grant's assistance. The
fort is fully invested, under great difficulties from severity
of weather and the inexperience of the men. Happily there is
not much ability in the defense. Floyd, the senior officer,
determines to cut his way out. He falls heavily upon Grant's
right, held by McClernand and backed by Wallace, thinking to
thrust them aside from the river and to escape over the road
so won. A stubborn resistance defeats this sortie, though but
narrowly. A general assault is ordered, which effects a
lodgment in the works. Divided responsibilities between Floyd,
Buckner, and Pillow weaken the defense so as to operate a
surrender. Our loss was 2,300. The Confederates captured were
over 15,000 men. These successes broke through the centre of
the Confederate line, established with so much pains, and
compromised its flanks. Johnston found that he must retire to
a new line. This lay naturally along the Memphis and
Charleston Railroad. He had retreated from Bowling Green on
receipt of the news of the fall of Fort Henry, and was forced
thereby to cede to Buell possession of Nashville, and
practically of Kentucky. The advanced flank on the Mississippi
at Columbus was likewise compromised, and with the bulk of the
armament was withdrawn to Island No. 10, some forty miles
below Cairo. We could congratulate ourselves upon a very
substantial gain."
T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War,
chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 21-23.
J. M. Hoppin,
Life of Rear Admiral Foote,
chapters 16-18.

W. P. Johnston,
Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,
chapters 26-28.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 7.
Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
volume 1.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(January-March: Missouri-Arkansas).
Expulsion of the Confederates from Missouri.
Battle of Pea Ridge.
"Late in December General Samuel R. Curtis took command of
12,000 National troops at Rolla, and advanced against Price,
who retreated before him to the northwestern corner of
Arkansas, where his force was joined by that of General
McCulloch, and together they took up a position in the Boston
Mountains. Curtis crossed the line into Arkansas, chose a
strong place on Pea Ridge, in the Ozark Mountains, intrenched,
and awaited attack. Because of serious disagreements between
Price and McCulloch, General Earl Van Dorn, who ranked them
both, was sent to take command of the Confederate force,
arriving late in January. There is no authentic statement as
to the size of his army. He himself declared that he had but
14,000 men, while no other estimate gave fewer than twice that
number. Among them was a large body of Cherokee Indians,
recruited for the Confederate service by Albert Pike, who
thirty years before had won reputation as a poet. On March 5,
1862, Van Dorn moved to attack Curtis, who knew of his coming
and formed his line on the bluffs along Sugar Creek, facing
southward. His divisions were commanded by Generals Franz
Sigel and Alexander S. Asboth and Colonels Jefferson C. Davis
and Eugene A. Carr, and he had somewhat more than 10,000 men
in line, with 48 guns. The Confederates, finding the position
too strong in front, made a night march to the west, with the
intention of striking the Nationals on the right flank. But
Curtis discovered their movement at dawn, promptly faced his
line to the right about, and executed a grand left wheel. His
army was looking westward toward the approaching foe, Carr's
division being on the right, then Davis, then Asboth, and
Sigel on the left. But they were not fairly in position when
the blow fell. Carr was struck most heavily, and, though
reenforced from time to time, was driven back a mile in the
course of the day. Davis, opposed to the corps of McCulloch,
was more successful; that General was killed and his troops
were driven from the field. In the night Curtis reformed and
strengthened his lines, and in the morning the battle was
renewed. This day Sigel executed some brilliant and
characteristic manœvres. To bring his division into its place
on the left wing, he pushed a battery forward, and while it
was firing rapidly its infantry supports were brought up to it
by a right wheel; this movement was repeated with another
battery and its supports to the left of the first, and again,
till the whole division had come into line, pressing back the
enemy's right.
{3450}
Sigel was now so far advanced that Curtis's whole line made a
curve, enclosing the enemy, and by a heavy concentrated
artillery fire the Confederates were soon driven to the
shelter of the ravines, and finally put to rout. The National
loss in this action [called the battle of Elk Horn by the
Confederates]—killed, wounded, and missing—was over 1,300,
Carr and Asboth being among the wounded. The Confederate loss
is unknown. Generals McCulloch and McIntosh were killed, and
Generals Price and Slack wounded. Owing to the nature of the
ground, any effective pursuit of Van Dorn's broken forces was
impracticable."
R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Secession,
chapter 6.
ALSO IN:
W. Baxter,
Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove.
O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
volume 3, pages 56-71.
Official Records, series 1,
volume 8, pages 189-330.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(January-April: North Carolina).
Burnside's expedition to Roanoke and
capture of Newbern and Beaufort.
"Roanoke Island, lying behind Bodie's Island, the sand-bar
that shuts off Upper North Carolina from the Atlantic Ocean,
offers some of the most interesting souvenirs of early
American history. … As stated by General Wise, to whom its
defense was intrusted by the Confederate government, it was
the key to all the rear defenses of Norfolk. It unlocked two
sounds, eight rivers, four canals, two railroads. It guarded
more than four fifths of the supplies of Norfolk. The seizure
of it endangered the subsistence of the Confederate army
there, threatened the navy yard, interrupted the communication
between Norfolk and Richmond, and intervened between both and
the South. … After the capture of Hatteras Inlet in August,
1861, light-draught steamers, armed with a rifle gun, often
stealthily came out of these waters to prey upon commerce. …
An expedition for operating on this part of the North Carolina
coast was placed under command of General Burnside, who was
ordered (January 7th, 1862) to unite with Flag-officer
Goldsborough, in command of the fleet, at Fortress Monroe,
capture Newbern, seize the Weldon Railroad, and reduce Fort
Macon. The force consisted of 31 steam gun-boats, some of them
carrying heavy guns; 11,500 troops, conveyed in 47 transports;
a fleet of small vessels for the transportation of sixty days'
supplies. It left Hampton Roads on the night of January 11th,
and arrived off Hatteras in two days, as a storm was coming
on. The commander found with dismay that the draught of
several of his ships was too great to permit them to enter. …
Some dishonest ship-sellers in New York had, by
misrepresentation, palmed off on the government unsuitable
transport vessels, of which several were lost in that
tempestuous sea. … It was only by the greatest exertion and
perseverance, and not until a whole fortnight had elapsed,
that the entrance to Pamlico Sound was completed. The villainy
that led to this delay gave the Confederates ample time for
preparation. Not until the end of another week (February 7th)
had the reorganized expedition gained the entrance to Croatan
Sound, and worked through its shallow, marshy passes. The
weather was beautiful by day; there was a bright moonshine at
night. The gun-boats found a Confederate fleet drawn up behind
the obstructions, across the channel, near Pork Point. They
opened fire on the fort at that point. It was returned both
from the works and the shipping. Meantime troops were being
landed at Ashby's, a small force, which was attempting to
resist them, being driven off by the fire of the ships. The
debarkation went on, though it was raining heavily and night
had set in. It was continued until 10,000 men had been landed
on the marsh. Before dark, however, the work at Pork Point had
been silenced, and the Confederate fleet had retired to Weir's
Point. … When day broke, Burnside commenced forcing his way up
the island. He moved in three columns, the central one,
preceded by a howitzer battery, upon the only road, the right
and left through the woods. The battery that obstructed this
road was soon carried, though not without resistance. The men
had to wade waist-deep in the water of the pond that protected
it. … Toward Nag's Head the Confederate force, expelled from
the captured work, attempted to retreat. They were, however,
overtaken, and the rest of the command on the north of the
island, 2,500 strong, was compelled to surrender. The
Confederate fleet was pursued to Elizabeth City, whither it
had fled, and there destroyed. A large part of the town was
burned. A portion of the national fleet went into the harbor
of Edenton and captured that town. Winton, on the Chowan
River, shared the same fate. Burnside next made an attack
(March 14th) on Newbern, one of the most important sea-ports
of North Carolina. As the troops advanced from the place of
landing, the gun-boats shelled the woods in front of them, and
thereby cleared the way. A march of 18 miles in a rain-storm,
and over execrable roads, did not damp the energy of the
soldiers. … Newbern was captured, and with it 46 heavy guns, 3
batteries of light artillery, and a large amount of stores.
Burnside's losses were 90 killed and 466 wounded. Preparations
were next made for the reduction of Fort Macon, which commands
the entrance of Beaufort Harbor. On April 25th it was
bombarded by three steamers and three shore batteries; the
former, however, in the course of an hour and a half, were
compelled to withdraw. But the shore batteries, continuing
their attack, silenced the guns of the garrison, and, in the
course of the afternoon, compelled the surrender of the fort.
In connection with this expedition some operations of minor
importance occurred. … The chief result, however, was the
closure of the ports and suppression of commerce. General
Burnside's forces were eventually, for the most part,
withdrawn. They were taken to Alexandria, and joined the army
of General Pope."
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 59 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
D. Ammen,
The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast,
chapters 8-9.
A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th Army Corps,
part 1, chapters 3-5.
B. P. Poore,
Life of Burnside,
chapters 12-14.
{3451}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(February-April: Georgia-Florida).
Siege and capture of Fort Pulaski.
Temporary occupation of Florida.
Discouragement of Unionists.
The blockade of Fort Pulaski may be dated from the 22d of
February. Preparations were then made on Tybee Island to
bombard it. The most of the work had to be done in the night.
The work was carried on under the supervision of General
Gillmore, who was in chief command, and on the 9th of April
eleven batteries, containing an aggregate of 36 guns, were in
readiness to open fire. General David Hunter, who had just
succeeded General Sherman in command of the Department,
arrived at Tybee on the evening of the 8th. At sunrise, on the
morning of the 10th, Hunter sent Lieutenant J. H. Wilson to
the fort, with a summons to the commander of the garrison to
surrender. The latter refused, saying: "I am here to defend
this fort, not to surrender it." At a few minutes after eight
o'clock the batteries opened fire, and at the end of thirty
hours the garrison surrendered. In reporting the capture,
General Hunter wrote: "At the end of eighteen hours' firing
the fort was breached in the southeast angle, and at the
moment of surrender, 2 p. m. on the 11th instant, we had
commenced preparations for storming. The whole armament of the
fort—47 guns, a great supply of fixed ammunition, 40,000
pounds of powder, and large quantities of commissary stores,
have fallen into our hands; also 360 prisoners, of whom the
officers will be sent North by the first opportunity that
offers. The result of this bombardment must cause, I am
convinced, a change in the construction of fortifications as
radical as that foreshadowed in naval architecture by the
conflict between the Monitor and Merrimac. No works of stone
or brick can resist the impact of rifled artillery of heavy
caliber." General Benham, immediately commanding the
operations, remarked in his report: "This siege is … the first
trial, at least on our side of the Atlantic, of the modern
heavy and rifled projectiles against forts erected and
supposed to be sufficiently strong prior to these inventions,
almost equaling, as it would appear, the revolution
accomplished in naval warfare by the iron-clad vessels
recently constructed." Captain (acting Brigadier-General) Q.
A. Gillmore, the officer immediately in charge of the works on
Tybee Island, has given, in a report made in 1865 to the
Adjutant-General of the United States of America, an account
of the difficulties under which the batteries which performed
the chief part in the siege were erected: "Tybee Island is
mostly a mud marsh, like other marsh islands on this coast.
Several ridges and hummocks of firm ground, however, exist
upon it, and the shore of Tybee Roads, where the batteries
were located, is partially skirted by low sand banks, formed
by the gradual and protracted action of the wind and tides.
The distance along this shore from the landing place to the
advanced batteries is about 2½ miles. The last mile of this
route, on which the seven most advanced batteries were placed,
is low and marshy, lies in full view of Fort Pulaski, and is
within effective range of its guns. The construction of a
causeway resting on fascines and brush-wood over this swampy
portion of the line; the erection of the several batteries,
with the magazines, gun platforms, and splinter-proof
shelters; the transportation of the heaviest ordnance in our
service by the labor of men alone; the hauling of ordnance
stores and engineer supplies, and the mounting of the guns and
mortars on their carriages and beds had to be done almost
exclusively at night, alike regardless of the inclemency of
the weather and of the miasma from the swamps. No one except
an eye-witness can form any but a faint conception of the
herculean labor by which mortars of 8½ tons' weight and
columbiads but a trifle lighter were moved in the dead of
night over a narrow causeway, bordered by swamps on either
side, and liable at any moment to be overturned and buried in
the mud beyond reach. The stratum of mud is about 12 feet
deep, and on several occasions the heaviest pieces,
particularly the mortars, became detached from the
sling-carts, and were with great difficulty, by the use of
planks and skids, kept from sinking to the bottom. Two hundred
and fifty men were barely sufficient to move a single piece on
sling-carts. The men were not allowed to speak above a
whisper, and were guided by the notes of a whistle. The
positions selected for the five most advanced batteries were
artificially screened from view from the fort by a gradual and
almost imperceptible change, made little by little every
night, in the condition and appearance of the brush-wood and
bushes in front of them. No sudden alteration of the outline
of the landscape was permitted. After the concealment was once
perfected to such a degree as to afford a good and safe
parapet behind it less care was taken, and some of the work in
the batteries requiring mechanical skill was done in the
daytime, the fatigue parties going to their labor before break
of day and returning in the evening after dark. … The three
breaching batteries—Sigel, Scott, and McClellan—were
established at a mean distance of 1,700 yards from the scarp
walls of Fort Pulaski. The circumstance, altogether new in the
annals of sieges, that a practicable breach, which compelled
the surrender of the work, was made at that distance in a wall
7½ feet thick, standing obliquely to the line of fire and
backed by heavy casemate piers and arches, cannot be ignored
by a simple reference to the time-honored military maxims that
'Forts cannot sustain a vigorous land attack,' and that 'All
masonry should be covered from land batteries.'"
Official Records,
series 1, volume 6, pages 134-135, 155, 161.
"By this victory, won on the first anniversary of the fall of
Fort Sumter [April 12], the port of Savannah was sealed
against blockade-runners. The capture of Fort Jackson above,
and of the city, would have been of little advantage to the
Nationals then, for the forces necessary to hold them were
needed in more important work farther down the coast. While
Gillmore and Viele were besieging Fort Pulaski, Commodore
Dupont and General Wright were making easy conquests on the
coast of Florida." Fort Clinch, on Amelia Island, Fernandina,
Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and other places, were abandoned
by the Rebels on the approach of the National forces. But
these conquests proved rather unfortunate than otherwise. "At
first, the hopes they inspired in the breasts of the Union
people developed quite a widespread loyalty. A Union
convention was called to assemble at Jacksonville on the 10th
of April, to organize a loyal State Government, when, to the
dismay of those engaged in the matter, General Wright prepared
to withdraw his forces, two days before the time when the
convention was to meet. … In consequence, … very little Union
feeling was manifested in Florida during the remainder of the
war."
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 2, chapter 12.
{3452}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (February-April: Tennessee).
The advance up River.
Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing.
"By the end of February, 1862, Major-General Halleck commanded
all the armies in the valley of the Mississippi, from his
headquarters in St. Louis. These were, the Army of the Ohio,
Major-General Buell, in Kentucky; the Army of the Tennessee,
Major-General Grant, at Forts Henry and Donelson; the Army of
the Mississippi, Major-General Pope; and that of General S. R.
Curtis, in Southwest Missouri. He posted his chief of staff,
General Cullum, at Cairo, and me [General Sherman] at Paducah,
chiefly to expedite and facilitate the important operations
then in progress up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. …
General Buell had also followed up the rebel army, which had
retreated hastily from Bowling Green to and through Nashville,
a city of so much importance to the South that it was at one
time proposed as its capital. Both Generals Grant and Buell
looked to its capture as an event of great importance. On the
21st General Grant sent General Smith with his division to
Clarksville, 50 miles above Donelson, toward Nashville, and on
the 27th went himself to Nashville to meet and confer with
General Buell, but returned to Donelson the next day." Orders
sent by General Halleck to Grant did not reach the latter, and
a supposed disobedience occurred which caused him to be
hastily relieved from his command, which was transferred to
General C. F. Smith, on the 4th of March. Halleck's purpose
"was evidently to operate up the Tennessee River, to break up
Bear Creek Bridge and the railroad communications between the
Mississippi and Tennessee Rivers, and no doubt he was provoked
that Generals Grant and Smith had turned aside to Nashville.
In the mean time several of the gunboats, under Captain
Phelps, United States Navy, had gone up the Tennessee as far
as Florence, and on their return had reported a strong Union
feeling among the people along the river. On the 10th of
March, having received the necessary orders from General
Halleck, I embarked my division at Paducah. … I … steamed up
the Tennessee River, following the two gunboats, and, in
passing Pittsburg Landing, was told by Captain Gwin that, on
his former trip up the river, he had found a rebel regiment of
cavalry posted there, and that it was the usual landing-place
for the people about Corinth, distant 30 miles. I sent word
back to General Smith that, if we were detained up the river,
he ought to post some troops at Pittsburg Landing. We went on
up the river cautiously, till we saw Eastport and Chickasaw,
both of which were occupied by rebel batteries and a small
rebel force of infantry. We then dropped back quietly to the
mouth of Yellow River, a few miles below," where the troops
were landed and an attempt made to push out and destroy the
Memphis and Charleston railroad; but heavy rains had so
swollen all the streams that the expedition was foiled and
returned. "Once more embarked, I concluded to drop down to
Pittsburg Landing, and to make the attempt from there. During
the night of the 14th, we dropped down to Pittsburg Landing,
where I found Hurlbut's division in boats. Leaving my command
there, I steamed down to Savannah, and reported to General
Smith in person, who saw in the flooded Tennessee the full
truth of my report; and he then instructed me to disembark my
own division, and that of General Hurlbut, at Pittsburg
Landing; to take positions well back, and to leave room for
his whole army; telling me that he would soon come up in
person, and move out in force to make the lodgment on the
railroad, contemplated by General Halleck's orders. … Within a
few days, Prentiss's division arrived and camped on my left,
and afterward McClernand's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions,
which formed a line to our rear. Lew Wallace's division
remained on the north side of Snake Creek, on a road leading
from Savannah or Crump's Landing to Purdy. General C. F. Smith
remained back at Savannah, in chief command, and I was only
responsible for my own division. I kept pickets well out on
the roads, and made myself familiar with all the ground inside
and outside my lines. … We were all conscious that the enemy
was collecting at Corinth, but in what force we could not
know, nor did we know what was going on behind us. On the 17th
of March, General U. S. Grant was restored to the command of
all the troops up the Tennessee River, by reason of General
Smith's extreme illness, and because he had explained to
General Halleck satisfactorily his conduct after Donelson; and
he too made his headquarters at Savannah, but frequently
visited our camps. … From about the 1st of April we were
conscious that the rebel cavalry in our front was getting
bolder and more saucy. … On Sunday morning, the 6th, early,
there was a good deal of picket-firing, and I got breakfast,
rode out along my lines, … and saw the rebel lines of battle
in front coming down on us as far as the eye could reach. All
my troops were in line of battle, ready, and the ground was
favorable to us. … In a few minutes the battle of 'Shiloh'
began with extreme fury, and lasted two days. … Probably no
single battle of the war gave rise to such wild and damaging
reports. It was publicly asserted at the North that our army
was taken completely by surprise; that the rebels caught us in
our tents; bayoneted the men in their beds; that General Grant
was drunk; that Buell's opportune arrival saved the Army of
the Tennessee from utter annihilation, etc. These reports were
in a measure sustained by the published opinions of Generals
Buell, Nelson, and others, who had reached the
steamboat-landing from the east, just before nightfall of the
6th, when there was a large crowd of frightened, stampeded
men, who clamored and declared that our army was all destroyed
and beaten. Personally I saw General Grant, who with his staff
visited me about 10 A. M. of the 6th, when we were desperately
engaged. But we had checked the headlong assault of our enemy,
and then held our ground. This gave him great satisfaction,
and he told me that things did not look as well over on the
left. … He came again just before dark, and described the last
assault made by the rebels at the ravine, near the
steamboat-landing, which he had repelled by a heavy battery
collected under Colonel J. D. Webster and other officers, and
he was convinced that the battle was over for that day. He
ordered me to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning,
saying that, as he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis
of the battle, both sides seemed defeated, and whoever assumed
the offensive was sure to win.
{3453}
General Grant also explained to me that General Buell had
reached the bank of the Tennessee River opposite Pittsburg
Landing, and was in the act of ferrying his troops across at
the time he was speaking to me. About half an hour afterward
General Buell himself rode up to where I was. … Buell said
that Nelson's, McCook's, and Crittenden's divisions of his
army, containing 18,000 men, had arrived and could cross over
in the night, and be ready for the next day's battle. I argued
that with these reënforcements we could sweep the field. Buell
seemed to mistrust us, and repeatedly said that he did not
like the looks of things, especially about the boat-landing,
and I really feared he would not cross over his army that
night, lest he should become involved in our general disaster.
… Buell did cross over that night, and the next day we assumed
the offensive and swept the field, thus gaining the battle
decisively. Nevertheless, the controversy was started and kept
up, mostly to the personal prejudice of General Grant, who as
usual maintained an imperturbable silence. … Beauregard [who
took the rebel command after General Albert Sidney Johnston
fell in the first day's battle afterward reported his entire
loss as 10,699. Our aggregate loss, made up from official
statements, shows 1,700 killed, 7,495 wounded, 3,022
prisoners; aggregate, 12,217, of which 2,167 were in Buell's
army, leaving for that of Grant 10,050. This result is a fair
measure of the amount of fighting done by each army. … The
battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, was one of the most
fiercely contested of the war. On the morning of April 6,
1862, the five divisions of McClernand, Prentiss, Hurlbut, W.
H. L. Wallace, and Sherman, aggregated about 32,000 men. We
had no intrenchments of any sort, on the theory that as soon
as Buell arrived we would march to Corinth to attack the
enemy. The rebel army, commanded by General Albert Sidney
Johnston, was, according to their own reports and admissions,
45,000 strong."
W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs, 4th edition,
chapter 10 (volume 1);
or 1st edition, chapter 9 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 23-25.
W. P. Johnston,
Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston,
chapters 30-35.
U. S. Grant, D. C. Buell, and others,
Shiloh
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, volume 1).
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 10.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March).
President Lincoln's proposal of Compensated Emancipation
approved by Congress.
On the 6th of March President Lincoln addressed to Congress
the following Special Message: "Fellow-citizens of the Senate
and House of Representatives: I recommend the adoption of a
joint resolution by your honorable bodies, which shall be
substantially as follows: Resolved, That the United States
ought to cooperate with any State which may adopt gradual
abolishment of slavery, giving to such State pecuniary aid, to
be used by such State, in its discretion, to compensate for
the inconveniences, public and private, produced by such
change of system. If the proposition contained in the
resolution does not meet the approval of Congress and the
country, there is the end; but if it does command such
approval, I deem it of importance that the States and people
immediately interested should be at once distinctly notified
of the fact, so that they may begin to consider whether to
accept or reject it. The Federal Government would find its
highest interest in such a measure, as one of the most
efficient means of self-preservation. The leaders of the
existing insurrection entertain the hope that this government
will ultimately be forced to acknowledge the independence of
some part of the disaffected region, and that all the slave
States north of such part will then say, 'The Union for which
we have struggled being already gone, we now choose to go with
the Southern section.' To deprive them of this hope
substantially ends the rebellion; and the initiation of
emancipation completely deprives them of it as to all the
States initiating it. The point is not that all the States
tolerating slavery would very soon, if at all, initiate
emancipation; but that while the offer is equally made to all,
the more Northern shall, by such initiation, make it certain
to the more Southern that in no event will the former ever
join the latter in their proposed confederacy. I say
'initiation' because, in my judgment, gradual and not sudden
emancipation is better for all. In the mere financial or
pecuniary view, any member of Congress, with the census tables
and treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself
how very soon the current expenditures of this war would
purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named
State. Such a proposition on the part of the General
Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to
interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it
does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the
State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as
a matter of perfectly free choice with them. In the annual
message, last December, I thought fit to say, 'The Union must
be preserved, and hence all indispensable means must be
employed.' I said this not hastily, but deliberate]y. War has
been made, and continues to be, an indispensable means to this
end. A practical reacknowledgment of the national authority
would render the war unnecessary, and it would at once cease.
If, however, resistance continues, the war must also continue;
and it is impossible to foresee all the incidents which may
attend and all the ruin which may follow it. Such as may seem
indispensable, or may obviously promise great efficiency,
toward ending the struggle, must and will come. The
proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be
esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration
tendered would not be of more value to the States and private
persons concerned than are the institution and property in it,
in the present aspect of affairs? While it is true that the
adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely
initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is
recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important
practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to
my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of
Congress and the people to the subject. Abraham Lincoln,
Washington, March 6, 1862."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 129-130.
{3454}
"Mr. Stevens, of Pennsylvania, having moved and carried a
reference of this Message by the House to a Committee of the
Whole on the State of the Union, and Mr. R. Conkling, of New
York, having moved the resolve above recommended, a debate
sprung up thereon; which is notable only as developing the
repugnance of the Unionists of the Border Slave States, with
that of the Democrats of all the States, to compensated or any
other Emancipation. … It passed the House by 89 Yeas
(Republicans, West Virginians, and a few others not strictly
partisans) to 31 Nays." On the 2d of April, the resolution
passed the Senate, by 32 Yeas to 10 Nays. "The President of
course approved the measure; but no single Slave State ever
claimed its benefits; and its only use inhered in its
demonstration of the willingness of the Unionists to increase
their already heavy burdens to pay for the slaves of the
Border States—a willingness which the infatuation of the
ruling class in those States rendered abortive."
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 12.
ALSO IN:
H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America,
volume 3, chapter 23.
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 5, chapter 12.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March).
The Battle of the Monitor and the Merrimac.
"In August 1861 the Northern States had determined to obtain
ironclad steam vessels, and at the end of that month Ericsson
offered to construct in a few months a vessel which would
destroy the rebel squadron. A board of officers was appointed
to consider plans proposed, and in September it recommended
that a vessel on Ericsson's design should be built. She was
commenced in October, launched on January 30th, 1862, and
completed on February 15th, 1862. The design provided for a
hull not more than 2 ft. above the water, and with a flat
bottom, that the draught might not exceed 10 ft. The sides, to
a short distance below the water line, were protected with
4-in. plates. In the centre of the deck was built a circular
turret, revolving on a central spindle, and protected with 8
in. of iron. Inside the turret were mounted two 11-in. smooth
bore guns, pointing through port holes. They could thus fire
in any direction without turning the vessel, an obvious
advantage not only on the open sea but especially in narrow
waters, for which she was more intended. Such was the famous
'Monitor,' a name given by Ericsson to his creation to
admonish the leaders of the Southern Rebellion, and to be also
a monitor to the Lords of the Admiralty in England, suggesting
to them doubts as to the propriety of their building four
broadside ironclads at three and a half million dollars each."
S. Eardley-Wilmot,
The Development of Navies,
chapter 4.
"While the Secretary of the Navy was urging forward the
construction of the first iron-clads, it was known that the
rebel government was making great exertions in the same
direction. Iron-clad vessels were under way at New Orleans,
Charleston, and at some other points, while at Norfolk the
Merrimack [the old frigate of that name, roofed slopingly with
railroad iron, was very near completion in the winter of
1861-62.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1861 (APRIL)
ACTIVITY OF REBELLION.
The formidable character of this mailed frigate constrained
the Government to make every effort to complete the Monitor
[the first of the turreted iron-clads, invented by John C.
Ericsson] in season to meet her whenever she should come out;
and it is stated that information obtained by a rebel spy of
the state of forwardness in which the Monitor was, induced the
rebels to put a double force upon their frigate, so that she
might be able to attack our fleet in Hampton Roads before the
Monitor's arrival, and, if possible, also to make a raid upon
Washington or the Northern cities. This extra labor, it is
said, gained the one day in which the Merrimack destroyed the
Cumberland and Congress. … The Monitor, commanded by
Lieutenant John L. Worden, reached the scene of late disaster
to our cause, and of her coming triumph, on the 8th of March,
at 9 o'clock P. M., and Lieutenant Worden reported for orders
to Captain Marston, the commander of the Roanoke. The
Minnesota, one of our noblest frigates, the Roanoke of the
same class, but partially disabled, the frigate Congress, and
the sloop Cumberland, had been stationed at the mouth of the
James River to watch for, to engage, and, if possible,
destroy, capture, or stop the expected rebel iron-clad frigate
then ready for sea at Norfolk. These vessels carried very
heavy batteries, and it was hoped that they would be able to
cope with the Merrimack. How vain such an expectation was, her
first day's operations fully and sadly demonstrated. It is
probably no exaggeration to say that she would have destroyed
easily, and without any material damage to herself, every
wooden ship then in our Navy, had they been within her reach,
and with none but themselves to oppose her."
C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
chapter 21.
"Such was the state of affairs when the Monitor arrived at
Hampton Roads, that the sturdy commanders trembled in face of
the coming day, and all was silence and gloom. The
sloop-of-war Cumberland, having a crew of 300 men, and
mounting 24 guns, now lay on the bottom with only her
top-gallant masts and pennant above the water, marking the
spot where 117 mangled bodies lay buried beneath the waves.
The Congress, a 50-gun frigate, had also met her destruction,
and now lay on shore with the flames kindled by hot shot of
the Merrimac sweeping out her hull. The Roanoke and Minnesota,
steam frigates of 40 guns each, the pride of the navy and the
most perfect of any men-of-war of the period, laid hard and
fast on shore, with broken machinery and as powerless as if
they had been unarmed. The capture or entire destruction of
the Federal fleet at Hampton Roads and the escape of the
Merrimac and the rebel cruisers seemed inevitable." Arriving
in the evening of the 8th, the Monitor anchored near the
frigate Minnesota at Newport News. "At half-past five in the
morning all hands were called, and the ship was immediately
cleared of her sea-rig and got ready for battle. … At
half-past seven o'clock a long line of black smoke was seen,
preceded by the steamers Jamestown, Patrick Henry and Teazer.
It was the signal for battle. The crews of the different
vessels stood by their guns, fuzes in hands. The Monitor
steamed slowly from beneath the bows of the Minnesota, where
she had been partly concealed, to meet the challenger in an
open field. It was alike an astonishment to the rebels and our
own people; neither had seen her when she arrived, and many
were the conjectures of what it could be. Some said a huge
water tank; others an infernal machine; none that she had
guns, and not till they saw steam rise from her deck did they
think she had power to move herself. … The Merrimac stopped
her engines, as if to survey and wonder at the audacity of the
nondescript. The Monitor was approaching on her starboard bow.
{3455}
Then, as if seized with impulsive rage, and as if a huge
breath would waft her enemy away, the Merrimac poured a
broadside of solid shot at her. For an instant she was
enveloped in smoke, and people who were looking on held their
breath in doubt of seeing the Monitor again. It was a moment
of great suspense. Then as a gentle breeze swept over the
scene the Monitor appeared. At this instant the flash of her
own guns was seen, and then their report, louder than any
cannon that had ever been heard, thundered across the sea. It
seemed to jar the very earth, and the iron scales of the
invincible crumbled and cracked from their fastenings. One on
board the Merrimac at this time has told me that, though at
first entirely confident of victory, consternation took hold
of them all. 'D-n it!' said one, 'the thing is full of guns!'
The enthusiasm at this moment among the thousand of civilians
and soldiers, who lined the shore to witness the fight, was
beyond description and their own control. Such a spontaneous
burst of cheers was never before heard. Men were frantic with
joy. The Monitor continued her approach, reserving fire that
every shot might take effect, until she came parallel with the
Merrimac, but heading in the opposite direction. In this way
they passed slowly within a few yards of each other, both
delivering and receiving the other's fire. … Captain Worden
headed again towards the Merrimac with renewed confidence and
engaged her at close quarters. Again they joined in close
combat, the Monitor lying bow on, at times touching, both
delivering their fire as rapidly as possible. At the same time
the marines on the Merrimac poured an incessant fire of
musketry at the peek-holes about the pilot-house and turret.
The speed of the two vessels was about equal, but the light
draught of the Monitor gave her an advantage. The rebels
finding that they could make nothing of the invulnerable
cheese-box, as they called her, and foiled and maddened at the
loss of their coveted prize, turned towards the Minnesota,
determined, if possible, to destroy her. The Merrimac went
head on and received a full broadside of the Minnesota. Fifty
solid nine-inch shot struck square. Any wooden vessel that
ever floated would have gone to pieces under such a fire. The
Merrimac was unharmed. She returned the fire with her forward
rifle guns. One shell passed through four rooms, tearing away
partitions and setting the ship on tire. Another passed
through the boiler of the steamer Dragon which lay alongside,
blowing her up and killing and wounding 17 men. Before a third
was fired the Monitor interposed, compelling the Merrimac to
change her position. The two combatants then made a complete
circle in their endeavors to get a favorable position, each
seeking to discharge a broadside into some vital part. The
Merrimac then turned sharp and made a plunge towards the
Minnesota, but Worden was vigilant, and crossed the stern of
the Merrimac, sending two solid shot into her. To get back
again between her and the Minnesota, the Monitor had almost to
cross her bow. The Merrimac steamed up quickly, and finding
that the Monitor would be struck with her prow Worden sheered
towards the enemy's stern, avoiding a direct blow, and, as
they came into collision, each vessel delivered a broadside
into the other. At this point a shell from the Merrimac struck
the pilot-house exactly over the peek-hole through which
Captain Worden was looking. The shell exploding, filled his
face and eyes with powder and fragments of iron, utterly
blinding and for a time rendering him unconscious. Lieutenant
Greene, who had been in charge of the turret division,
immediately left the guns and spent full thirty minutes
nursing the wounded commander, during which time the gunners
shotted the guns, and, as the Merrimac was turning away,
discharged them at close range into her stern, a blow that
made her whole frame shudder and seemed at once to be fatal.
There was no officer to direct the movements of the vessel
except the pilot Howard. As the two combatants parted from the
struggle they were headed in opposite directions, both away
from their goal. Presuming that the fight would be continued,
Pilot Howard ran the vessel a short distance down the channel
and turning brought her again close to the protection of the
Minnesota, when Lieutenant Greene stepped into the pilot-house
and assumed command. It was then observed that the Merrimac
had taken the channel and was heading towards Norfolk. She was
soon joined by her consorts, and taken up to their refuge
under the batteries of Craney Island, the Merrimac apparently
sagging down astern. Thus ended the greatest naval battle of
the world. … The only perceptible danger to those on board the
Monitor, after the first round from the Merrimac, was to those
in the turret, who were in great danger from the flying of
bolt heads driven with great force across the turret, and from
the concussion, which would for a time paralyze a man if he
should in any way be in contact with the turret when struck by
a shot."
F. B. Butts,
The Monitor and the Merrimac
(Soldiers' and Sailors' Historical Society of Rhode Island,
Fourth series, Number 6).
"The engagement in Hampton Roads on the 8th of March, 1862,
between the Confederate iron-clad Virginia, or the Merrimac,
as she is known at the North, and the United States wooden
fleet, and that on the 9th, between the Virginia and the
Monitor, was, in its results, in some respects the most
momentous naval conflict ever witnessed. No battle was ever
more widely discussed or produced a greater sensation. It
revolutionized the navies of the world. … Rams and iron-clads
were in future to decide all naval warfare. In this battle old
things passed away, and the experience of a thousand years of
battle and breeze was forgotten. The naval supremacy of
England vanished in the smoke of this fight, only to reappear
some years later more commanding than ever. The effect of the
news was best described by the London 'Times,' which said:
'Whereas we had available for immediate purposes 149
first-class war-ships: we have now two, these two being the
Warrior and her sister Ironside. There is not now a ship in
the English navy apart from these two that it would not be
madness to trust to an engagement with that little Monitor.'
The Admiralty at once proceeded to reconstruct the navy. … The
same results were produced in France, which had but one
sea-going iron-clad, La Gloire, and this one, like the
Warrior, was only protected amidships. … And so with all the
maritime powers. In this race the United States took the lead,
and at the close of the war led all the others in the numbers
and efficiency of its iron-clad fleet. … Our loss [that is,
the Confederate loss on the Virginia, or Merrimac, in the
first day's battle, with the wooden ships] in killed and
wounded was 21.
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The armor was hardly damaged, though at one time our ship was
the focus on which were directed at least 100 heavy guns
afloat and ashore. But nothing outside escaped. … We slept at
our guns, dreaming of other victories in the morning. But at
daybreak we discovered, lying between us and the Minnesota, a
strange-looking craft, which we knew at once to be Ericsson's
Monitor, which had long been expected in Hampton Roads, and of
which, from different sources, we had a good idea. She could
not possibly have made her appearance at a more inopportune
time for us, changing our plans, which were to destroy the
Minnesota, and then the remainder of the fleet below Fortress
Monroe. She appeared but a pigmy compared with the lofty
frigate which she guarded. But in her size was one great
element of her success. … After an early breakfast, we got
under way and steamed out toward the enemy, opening fire from
our bow pivot, and closing in to deliver our starboard
broadside at short range, which was returned promptly from her
11-inch guns. Both vessels then turned and passed again still
closer. The Monitor was firing every seven or eight minutes,
and nearly every shot struck. Our ship was working worse and
worse, and after the loss of the smoke-stack, Mr. Ramsay,
chief engineer, reported that the draught was so poor that it
was with great difficulty he could keep up steam. Once or
twice the ship was on the bottom. Drawing 22 feet of water, we
were confined to a narrow channel, while the Monitor, with
only 12 feet immersion, could take any position, and always
have us in range of her guns. … Several times the Monitor
ceased firing, and we were in hopes she was disabled, but the
revolution again of her turret and the heavy blows of her
11-inch shot on our sides soon undeceived us. … Lieutenant
Jones now determined to run her down or board her. For nearly
an hour we manœuvred for a position. … The ship was as
unwieldy as Noah's Ark. … And so, for six or more hours, the
struggle was kept up. At length, the Monitor withdrew over the
middle ground where we could not follow. … The battle was a
drawn one, so far as the two vessels engaged were concerned.
But in its general results the advantage was with the
Monitor."
J. T. Wood,
The First Fight of Iron Clads
(Battles and Leaders of the Civil War,
volume 1, pages 692-711).
ALSO IN:
J. Ericsson,
The Building of the Monitor
(Battles and Leaders. volume 1, pages 730-744).
W. C. Church,
Life of John Ericsson,
chapters 15-18 (volume 1).
Gideon Welles,
The First Iron-Clad Monitor
(Annals of the War by leading Participants),
page 17.
C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
chapter 21.
On the evacuation of Norfolk by the Confederates, in May,
1862, the Merrimac was destroyed. The following December the
Monitor went down in a storm at sea, while on her way to
Charleston, and only a few of her crew were saved.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March).
Amendment of the Military Code.
Officers forbidden to surrender fugitive Slaves.
"As the formal orders of the government regarding the
treatment of slaves who sought refuge near the armies were not
always executed, Congress determined to give them a legal
sanction; and on the 25th of February and the 13th of March
both the Senate and the House of Representatives introduced a
new article in the military code, prohibiting officers, at the
risk of dismissal, from interfering to restore fugitive slaves
to their masters. Notwithstanding the powers with which the
government was thus armed, great difficulty was experienced in
applying this law in those regiments whose commanders openly
professed their sympathies in favor of slavery."
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, page 733.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(March-April: On the Mississippi).
New Madrid and Island No. 10.
On the surrender of Fort Donelson to General Grant, Columbus,
on the Mississippi, was hastily abandoned by the rebels, who
fell back to Island Number Ten, thirty miles below, where
strong works had been erected. These it was hoped would
command the passage of the river. "Following the course of the
Mississippi, this island is about ten miles above New Madrid,
Missouri, which is 79 miles below Cairo; but on account of a
long bend in the river … the island is really further south
than New Madrid. New Madrid is at the most northerly part of
the bend, and its guns were so placed as to be able to fire at
vessels coming either way. Besides Fort Thompson, named after
Jeff Thompson, it was defended by several batteries and by six
gunboats, mounting heavy guns, which had come up the river
from New Orleans and were under the command of Commodore
Hollins. … As the land around New Madrid is very flat, these
gunboats could fire upon troops approaching the place by land.
On the same day when the flag of the Union was hoisted over
the deserted works of the Confederates at Columbus [March 4],
a Union army under General John Pope, who had been commanding
in eastern Missouri, appeared before New Madrid. Seeing that
he could do but little with his field artillery, he sent to
Cairo for heavy guns; and while waiting for these he built a
battery at Point Pleasant, about ten miles below New Madrid,
so as to blockade the river at that place and prevent supplies
from being sent up to the town. Meanwhile the Confederates
strengthened their works and reinforced the garrison with men
from Island Number Ten, while their fleet of gunboats was
increased to nine. Four heavy guns were sent from Bird's Point
to General Pope by the Cairo and Fulton Railway, which brought
them within 20 miles of where they were wanted. … On the night
of March 12 a thousand spades were at work within half a mile
of Fort Thompson, and at daylight the guns were in position
ready for action. Pope opened a cannonade at once on the
gunboats and on Fort Thompson, both of which replied
vigorously. The fight raged all day long; several of the gun
boats were disabled and the Union army was gradually shutting
in the Confederates on the land side, when their commander,
General McCown, seeing the danger of capture, left the place
in the night, during a heavy thunder-storm, and removed all
his troops to Island Number Ten. … General Pope lost 51 men in
killed and wounded during the day's bombardment; the loss of
the Confederates is not known, but is thought to have been
more than a hundred. About the time of the capture of New
Madrid, Commodore Foote sailed from Cairo with a fleet of
seven iron-clad gunboats, one wooden gunboat, and ten
mortar-boats, for the purpose of aiding General Pope in the
attack on Island Number Ten. He came in sight of the island on
Saturday, March 15, and on the next morning opened the
bombardment with the rifled guns of the Benton, his flag-ship.
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The mortar-boats, moored at convenient places along the shore,
soon took part in the firing, and rained bombs into the
Confederate works. … Commodore Foote kept up the bombardment
for many days, without doing much damage to the Confederate
works. But while he kept the enemy busy, General Pope had been
engaged in digging a canal across the swampy peninsula formed
by the bend of the river, so that vessels could go through to
New Madrid without having to pass Island Number Ten. … A large
number of men were employed, and after nineteen days of hard
labor a channel deep enough for light-draught vessels was cut
through. In the night of April 1 a few men from the gunboats,
aided by some of Pope's soldiers, landed on the Kentucky
shore, opposite Island Number Ten, took one of the batteries
by surprise and spiked its six guns. … A few nights afterward
the Carondelet [gunboat] ran safely by all the batteries at
midnight, during a heavy thunderstorm. … Two nights afterward
the Pittsburgh, another gunboat, performed the same feat, with
the same good fortune; and a few days later the Confederates
were astonished to see a fleet of transports laden with troops
and several floating batteries join the gunboats at New
Madrid. … The gunboats soon silenced the one-gun batteries on
the opposite side of the river below New Madrid," and the
Confederates, attempting to escape, were intercepted and
captured (April 7), both those on the mainland and those on
the Island.
J. D. Champlin, Jr.,
Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,
chapter 16.
Said General Pope in his report: "It is almost impossible to
give a correct account of the immense quantity of artillery,
ammunition, and supplies of every description which fell into
our hands. Three generals, 273 field and company officers,
6,700 privates, 123 pieces of heavy artillery, 35 pieces of
field artillery (all of the very best character and latest
patterns), 7,000 stand of small-arms, tents for 12,000 men,
several wharf-boat loads of provisions, an immense quantity of
ammunition of all kinds, many hundred horses and mules, with
wagons and harness, &c., are among the spoils. Very few, if
any, of the enemy escaped, and only by wading and swimming
through the swamps. The conduct of the troops was splendid
throughout, as the results of this operation and its whole
progress very plainly indicate. We have crossed this great
river, the banks of which were lined with batteries and
defended by 7,000 men. We have pursued and captured the whole
force of the enemy and all his supplies and material of war,
and have again recrossed and reoccupied the camps at New
Madrid, without losing a man or meeting with any accident.
Such results bespeak efficiency, good conduct, high
discipline, and soldierly deportment of the best character far
more conclusively than they can be exhibited in pitched battle
or the storming of fortified places."
Official Records,
series 1, volume 8.
"In the years since 1862, Island No. 10 … has disappeared. The
river, constantly wearing at its upper end, has little by
little swept away the whole. … On the other shore a new No. 10
has risen."
A. T. Mahan,
The Navy in the Civil War: The Gulf and Inland Waters,
chapter 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March-May: Virginia).
The Peninsular Campaign.
McClellan before Yorktown.
"When Manassas had been abandoned by the enemy [see UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1861-1862 (December-March: Virginia)]
and he had withdrawn behind the Rapidan, the Urbana movement
lost much of its promise, as the enemy was now in position to
reach Richmond before we could do so. The alternative remained
of making Fort Monroe and its vicinity the base of operations.
The plan first adopted was to commence the movement with the
First Corps as a unit, to land north of Gloucester and move
thence on West Point; or, should circumstances render it
advisable, to land a little below Yorktown to turn the
defenses between that place and Fort Monroe. The Navy
Department were confident that we could rely upon their
vessels to neutralize the Merrimac and aid materially in
reducing the batteries on the York River. … As transports
arrived very slowly, especially those for horses, and the