History for ready reference, Volume 5, Tunnage to Zyp and Supplement

by J. N. Larned

great impatience of the Government grew apace, it became
necessary to embark divisions as fast as vessels arrived, and
I decided to land them at Fort Monroe, holding the First Corps
to the last, still intending to move it in mass to turn
Gloucester. On the 17th of March the leading division embarked
at Alexandria. The campaign was undertaken with the intention
of taking some 145,000 troops, to be increased by a division
of 10,000 drawn from the troops in the vicinity of Fort
Monroe. … On the 12th of March I learned that there had
appeared in the daily papers the order relieving me from the
general command of all the armies and confining my authority
to the Department of the Potomac. I had received no previous
intimation of the intention of the Government in this respect.
… On my arrival at Fort Monroe on the 2d of April, I found
five divisions of infantry, Sykes's brigade of regulars, two
regiments of cavalry, and a portion of the reserve artillery
disembarked. Another cavalry regiment and a part of a fourth
had arrived, but were still on shipboard; comparatively few
wagons had come. … The best information obtainable represented
the Confederate troops around Yorktown as numbering at least
15,000, with about an equal force at Norfolk; and it was clear
that the army lately at Manassas, now mostly near
Gordonsville, was in position to be thrown promptly to the
Peninsula. … On my arrival at Fort Monroe I learned, in an
interview with Flag-Officer Goldsborough, that he could not
protect the James as a line of supply, and that he could
furnish no vessels to take an active part in the reduction of
the batteries at York and Gloucester or to run by and gain
their rear. He could only aid in the final attack after our
land batteries had essentially silenced their fire. I thus
found myself with 53,000 men in condition to move, faced by
the conditions of the problem just stated. Information was
received that Yorktown was already being reenforced from
Norfolk, and it was apprehended that the main Confederate army
would promptly follow the same course. I therefore determined
to move at once with the force in hand, and endeavor to seize
a point—near the Halfway House—between Yorktown and
Williamsburg, where the Peninsula is reduced to a narrow neck,
and thus cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison and
prevent the arrival of reenforcements.
{3458}
The advance commenced on the morning of the 4th of April, and
was arranged to turn successively the intrenchments on the two
roads; the result being that, on the afternoon of the 5th, the
Third Corps was engaged with the enemy's outposts in front of
Yorktown and under the artillery fire of the place. The Fourth
Corps came upon Lee's Mills and found it covered by the
unfordable line of the Warwick, and reported the position so
strong as to render it impossible to execute its orders to
assault. Thus all things were brought to a stand-still, and
the intended movement on the Halfway House could not be
carried out. Just at this moment came a telegram, dated the
4th, informing me that the First Corps [McDowell's] was
withdrawn from my command. Thus, when too deeply committed to
recede, I found that another reduction of about 43,000 …
diminished my paper force to 92,000, instead of the 155,000 on
which the plans of the campaign had been founded, … which
reduced the numbers actually available for battle to some
67,000 or 68,000. The order withdrawing the First Corps also
broke up the Department of the Potomac, forming out of it the
Department of the Shenandoah, under General Banks, and the
Department of the Rappahannock, under General McDowell, the
latter including Washington. … In our front was an intrenched
line, apparently too strong for assault, and which I had now
no means of turning, either by land or water. … Whatever may
have been said afterward, no one at the time—so far as my
knowledge extended—thought an assault practicable without
certain preliminary siege operations. … We were thus obliged
to resort to siege operations in order to silence the enemy's
artillery fire, and open the way to an assault. All the
batteries would have been ready to open fire on the 5th, or,
at latest, on the morning of the 6th of May; … but during the
night of the 3d and 4th of May the enemy evacuated his
positions. … Meanwhile, on the 22d of April, Franklin's
division of McDowell's corps had joined me by water, in
consequence of my urgent calls for reënforcements … [and, May
7th] disembarked near West Point and took up a suitable
position to hold its own and cover the landing of
reënforcements."
G. B. McClellan,
The Peninsular Campaign
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 160-187).
General Joseph E. Johnston, who assumed command of the
Confederate forces on the Peninsula, April 17, says in his
"Narrative": "I went to the Peninsula as soon as possible,
reaching General Magruder's headquarters early in the morning.
… That officer had estimated the importance of at least
delaying the invaders until an army capable of coping with
them could be formed; and opposed them with about a tenth of
their number, on a line of which Yorktown, intrenched, made
the left flank. This boldness imposed upon the Federal
general, and made him halt to besiege instead of assailing the
Confederate position. This resolute and judicious course on
the part of General Magruder was of incalculable value. It
saved Richmond, and gave the Confederate Government time to
swell that officer's handful to an army. … The arrival of
Smith's and Longstreet's divisions increased the army on the
Peninsula to about 53,000 men, including 3,000 sick. … I could
see no other object in holding the position than that of
delaying the enemy's progress, to gain time."
J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapters 4-5.
ALSO IN:
J. C. Palfrey,
The Siege of Yorktown
(Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers,
volume 1, pages 31-92).
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 1, chapter 1.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (March-June).
Appointment of Military Governors in Tennessee,
North Carolina, and Louisiana.
"By the Union victories in the spring of 1862 very
considerable areas of territory in States in rebellion came
under the control and occupation of the Union armies. … The
sudden change from Confederate to Federal authority involved
everywhere either a serious derangement or total cessation of
the ordinary administration of local civil law, and the
displacement from the occupied territory of State governments
and State officials who claimed to be exercising functions
under ordinances of secession, and yielding obedience to the
self-styled Confederate States. A similar displacement had
occurred in Virginia and in Missouri during the year 1861, but
in those States prompt remedies were available," by means of
popular movements, through delegated conventions, which
abrogated the rebellious and reinstated loyal State
governments in operation. The courses pursued in Virginia and
Missouri were not practicable, however, in other cases, and "a
substitute was found in the appointment of military governors
to represent and exert such State and local authority as the
anomalous conditions made practicable, and as the supreme
military necessities might allow. The first of these
appointments occurred in Tennessee. Nashville, the capital,
having been evacuated about February 23, 1862, President
Lincoln nominated, and the Senate confirmed, Andrew Johnson
(March 4, 1862) as military governor with the rank of
brigadier-general. … Conforming to this precedent, Mr.
Lincoln, through the Secretary of War, appointed Edward
Stanley military governor of North Carolina, 'with authority
to exercise and perform, within the limits of that State, all
and singular the powers, duties, and functions pertaining to
the office of military governor (including the power to
establish all necessary offices and tribunals, and suspend the
writ of habeas corpus) during the pleasure of the President,
or until the loyal inhabitants of that State shall organize a
civil government in conformity with the Constitution of the
United States.' … In like manner, soon after news was received
of the successes in the Gulf, Colonel G. F. Shepley (of the
12th Maine Infantry) of Butler's army was appointed military
governor of Louisiana, this selection being made because
General Butler had already designated him to act as mayor of
the city of New Orleans, and it was thought best to combine
both functions in the same individual."
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 6, chapter 16.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (April: On the Mississippi).
Farragut's passage of the lower forts
and capture of New Orleans.
"About the close of the gloomy and disastrous year 1861, the
Government of the United States determined to regain control
of the Mississippi. … After long consideration, Farragut was
chosen as the naval officer to command in the Gulf. The story
of his southern birth, and of his steadfast loyalty to his
flag, is too well known to be here repeated. His formal orders
put him in command of the 'Western Gulf Blockading Squadron,'
and these were issued in January, 1862.
{3459}
But confidential instructions were also given him, by which he
was especially charged with the 'reduction of the defences
guarding the approaches to New Orleans, and the taking
possession of that city.' He was to be assisted by a
mortar-fleet of schooners, under commander D. D. Porter. … On
February 2d, 1862, Farragut sailed for the Gulf, in the
sloop-of-war Hartford, which was so long to bear his flag,
successfully, through manifold dangers. The Hartford was a
wooden screw-steamer, full ship-rigged, and of 1,900 tons
burthen. She was of comparatively light draught, and,
therefore, well suited to the service she was called upon to
perform. … The Hartford arrived at her rendezvous, Ship
Island, 100 miles north-northeast of the mouths _ of the
Mississippi, on February 20th. A military force, to co-operate
with Farragut's fleet, was sent out, under General B. F.
Butler, and arrived at Ship Island on March 25th."
E. Shippen,
Naval Battles,
chapter 41.
"At a point about 30 miles above the head of the passes, where
the river makes its last great bend—the lowest favorable
locality for defense before reaching the Gulf—the United
States Government had erected two forts, St. Philip on the
left or north bank, and Jackson a little farther down stream
on the right. … The Confederate Government had early taken
possession of these forts, and put them in complete order.
When Farragut's fleet appeared before them, Fort Jackson, with
its water battery, mounted 75 guns, and St. Philip about 40. …
Just above the forts lay a rebel fleet of 15 vessels, under
Commodore J. K. Mitchell, including the iron-clad ram Manassas
and an immense floating battery covered with railroad iron,
called the Louisiana. Just below Fort Jackson the Confederates
had obstructed the river with a heavy chain, brought from
Pensacola. … The task that lay before Farragut was, to break
through the obstructions, pass between the forts, conquer the
rebel fleet, and then steam up to New Orleans, lay the city
under his guns, and demand its surrender. For its
accomplishment he had 6 sloops-of-war, 16 gunboats, 21
schooners, each carrying a 13-inch mortar, and 5 other
vessels. The fleet carried over 200 guns. … The schooners
sailed up partly, or were towed by steamers, and on the
morning of the 18th of April they had all reached their
positions, ready to open fire. … For six days and nights the
mortars kept up an unremitting fire, mainly on Fort Jackson,
throwing nearly 6,000 shells. The Confederates acknowledged a
loss of 14 killed and 39 wounded by the bombardment. …
Farragut's patience was sorely tried by this delay. He had
never had much faith in the mortars, and now it was evident,
as he had anticipated, that almost the only practical effect
of the bombardment was, to give the enemy long warning of the
attack by the ships. … Having decided to run by the forts, he
confided to his trusted Fleet Captain, Bell, the dangerous
mission of proceeding with the gunboats Pinola and Itasca to
make a passage for his fleet through the chain obstructions. …
A sufficient opening was made for the fleet to pass through,
in spite of the heavy fire to which the party were subjected.
… Farragut had made up his mind to run by the forts at the
close of the fifth day's bombardment; but the necessity of
repairing damages to two of his vessels delayed him
twenty-four hours longer. He had intended to lead the column
in his flag-ship Hartford; but in the final disposition he
gave that post to Captain Theodorus Bailey, at his own earnest
request, who hoisted his red flag on the gunboat Cayuga. … The
attempt to pass was to be made in the night, April 23-24;
and, as the moon would rise about half past 3 o'clock in the
morning, the fleet were warned to expect the signal for
sailing at about 2 o'clock. … Lieutenant Commanding Caldwell
sent up in the Itasca to examine the obstructions and find
whether the passage was still open. At 11 o'clock he gave the
signal that it was, and about the same time the enemy opened
fire on him, sent down burning rafts, and lighted the immense
piles of wood which they had prepared on the shore near the
ends of the chain. … It was half past 3, the hour of moonrise,
before all was ready. In the light of the blazing rafts and
bonfires, moon or no moon made little difference now. …
Captain Bailey led off with his division of 8 vessels, whose
objective was Fort St. Philip, and all of them passed through
the opening in the cable. Both forts opened fire upon his
flag-ship, the Cayuga, soon after she had passed the hulks.
Five minutes later she was pouring grape and canister into St.
Philip, and in ten minutes more she had passed beyond range of
that work, to find herself surrounded by 11 rebel gun-boats.
Three of them attempted to board her at once. An 11-inch shot
was sent through one of them at the close range of 30 yards,
and she immediately ran aground and burned up. The Parrott gun
on the forecastle drove off another; and Bailey was preparing
to close with the third, when the Oneida and Varuna, which had
run in close to St. Philip, thus avoiding the elevated guns of
the fort, while they swept its bastions with grape and
scrapnel, came up to the assistance of the Cayuga. The Oneida
ran under full steam into one of the rebel ships, cut her
nearly in two, and left her to float down stream a helpless
wreck. She fired right and left into the others, and then went
to the assistance of the Varuna, which was ashore on the left
bank, hard pressed by the Governor Moore and another, said to
be the Manassas. The Varuna was rammed by them both, and sank
at the end of 15 minutes; but in that time it is claimed that
she put three 8-inch shells into the Governor Moore, and so
crippled her with solid shot that she surrendered to the
Oneida, and drove five 8-inch shells into another, which sent
her ashore. Still another of her shells exploded the boiler of
a rebel steamer. The Pensacola steamed steadily but slowly by,
firing with great deliberation and regularity. … The
Mississippi was fought regularly in line, like the Pensacola,
but escaped with light losses. She encountered the ram
Manassas, which gave her a severe cut on the port quarter
below the water-line, and disabled her machinery. But she
riddled the ram with shot, boarded her, and set her on fire,
so that she drifted below the forts and blew up. The Katahdin
ran close to the forts, steamed by rapidly, and got near the
head of the line, where she put a few good shots into the
iron-clad Louisiana. The Kineo ran by close under St. Philip,
and then assisted the Mississippi in handling the ram
Manassas; but she was afterward attacked by three rebel gun
boats at once, and, her pivot-gun carriage becoming injured,
she withdrew and continued on up stream.
{3460}
The Wissahickon ran ashore before she reached the forts, got
off, passed them, and above ran ashore again. Most of these
operations were carried on in the darkness occasioned by the
thick smoke, lighted, however, by the lurid flashes of more
than 200 guns. The Hartford, bearing Flag-Officer Farragut,
led the second division of the fleet. … In attempting to avoid
a fire-raft, she grounded on a shoal near St. Philip. At the
same time the ram Manassas pushed a raft upon her port
quarter, and in an instant she was on fire. A part of the crew
went to 'fire quarters' and soon subdued the flames, while the
working of her guns was steadily continued, and she was then
backed off into deep water. This movement turned the ship's
head down stream, and it was with some difficulty that she was
turned around against the current; but this was finally
accomplished, and she continued to steam up the river, firing
into several of the enemy's vessels as she passed. Among these
was a steamer full of men, apparently a boarding-party. She
was making straight for the Hartford when Captain Broome's
gun, manned by marines, planted a shell in her, which
exploded, and she disappeared. … The Brooklyn got out of her
course, ran over one of the hulks, and became entangled in the
raft, where she suffered a raking fire from Fort Jackson, and
a pretty severe one from St. Philip. Scarcely was she
disentangled and on her way up stream when she was butted by
the Manassas, which, however, had not headway enough to damage
her much, and slid off in the darkness. Then she was attacked
by a large rebel steamer, but gave her the port broadside at
fifty yards and set her on fire. Groping along through a black
cloud of smoke from a fire-raft, she came close abreast of St.
Philip, into which she poured such tremendous broadsides that
by the flashes the gunners were seen running to shelter, and
for the time the fort was silenced. The Brooklyn then passed
on, and engaged several of the enemy's gunboats at short
range. One of these, the Warrior, came under the port
broadside, when eleven 5-second shells were instantly planted
in her, all of which exploded, setting her on fire, and she
was run ashore. The Brooklyn was under fire an hour and a
half, and her losses were almost as severe as those of the
Pensacola. The Richmond, a slow ship, brought up the rear of
the second division, steaming steadily and working her guns
with great regularity. … The Sciota, carrying Fleet-Captain
Bell, led the third division. She steamed by the forts, firing
as she passed, and above them burned two steamboats. … The
Iroquois passed within 50 yards of Fort Jackson without
injury, but was subjected to a terrible raking cross-fire from
St. Philip, and was also raked by the McCrea. … Her losses
were heavy. The Pinola passed up in line, firing her 11-inch
pivot-gun and Parrott rifles at the flashes of Fort Jackson's
guns, which at first were all that could be seen; then she
emerged from the cloud of smoke, stood over toward St. Philip,
and in the light of the blazing rafts received the discharges
of its 40 guns. She was the last vessel that passed the forts,
and got up in time to put one or two shells into the gunboats
of the enemy. The Kennebec got out of her course, became
entangled in the rafts, and did not get free till it was broad
daylight and too late to attempt a passage. The Itasca,
arriving in front of Fort Jackson, received a shot in her
boiler, which made it impossible for her to proceed, and was
turned down stream. The Winona got astray among the hulks, and
lost so much time that when she came within range of Fort
Jackson it was daylight, and the fleet had passed on. The
first three or four shots from the fort swept away the entire
crew of her rifled gun, save one man. Still she kept on, until
the lower battery of St. Philip opened on her at less than
point-blank range; this was too much for her, and she
prudently headed down stream and ran out of the fire. Thus was
accomplished a feat in naval warfare which had no precedent,
and which is still without a parallel except the one furnished
by Farragut himself, two years later, at Mobile. Starting with
17 wooden vessels, he had passed with all but 3 of them,
against the swift current of a river but half a mile wide,
between two powerful earthworks which had long been prepared
for him, his course impeded by blazing rafts, and immediately
thereafter had met the enemy's fleet of 15 vessels, two of
them iron-clad, and either captured or destroyed every one of
them. And all this with a loss of but one ship from his own
squadron."
L. Farragut,
Life of Farragut,
chapters 18-19.
Commander Porter, who kept up the mortar fire while Farragut
was forcing his way, says of the battle: "No grander or more
beautiful sight could have been realized than the scenes of
that night. From silence, disturbed now and then only by the
slow fire of the mortars,—the phantom-like movements of the
vessels giving no sound—an increased roar of heavy guns began,
while the mortars burst forth into rapid bombardment, as the
fleet drew near the enemy's works. Vessel after vessel added
her guns to those already at work, until the very earth seemed
to shake from their reverberations. A burning raft added its
lurid glare to the scene, and the fiery tracks of the
mortar-shells, as they passed through the darkness aloft, and
sometimes burst in mid-air, gave the impression that heaven
itself had joined in the general strife. The succeeding
silence was almost as sudden. From the weighing of the
anchors, one hour and ten minutes saw the vessels by the
forts, and Farragut on his way to New Orleans, the prize
staked upon the fierce game of war just ended."
D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the Civil War,
page 185.
"General Lovell, who was in command at New Orleans, had come
down the river in a steamboat to observe the operations and
was very nearly captured; he hastened back to the city to
withdraw his forces. When the news spread through the streets
that the Federal fleet had passed the forts and had destroyed
the Confederate flotilla, a strange scene followed; a scene
impossible, perhaps, in any other American city under parallel
circumstances. The brave, active, fighting men of New Orleans
were far away in the armies of the South; but they had left
behind a slinking swarm of human vermin. … These, when they
saw a hopeless panic seize the good people of the city, poured
forth from their dens and began an indiscriminate pillaging of
houses, shops, and storage-sheds. Thus while the better class
of citizens were frantically setting fire to the cotton (some
12,000 bales) the cut-throats and ruffians, the hardened women
and even the lawless children, were raging from place to
place, back and forth, here and there, wildly plundering and
aimlessly destroying. … All the public materials, consisting
of army supplies, were heaped up in the middle of the streets
and burned.
{3461}
General Lovell withdrew his soldiers on the evening of the
24th, leaving the city at the mercy of the Federal fleet,
which at 1 o'clock on the following day steamed up the river
and anchored in the middle of the stream not far from the foot
of Canal Street. … The mob which lately had been committing
such foul deeds, now swayed back and forth in the streets,
hooting, yelling and cursing, urging the people to resist the
landing of the Federals. Commodore Farragut demanded the
formal surrender of the city, but the mayor was powerless. He
could not surrender the city while the people were controlled
by an unreasoning mob. Consequently, on the 20th, a detachment
under command of Fleet Captain H. H. Bell was sent ashore to
take possession of the public buildings."
M. Thompson,
The Story of Louisiana,
chapter 11.
"The success was almost beyond price to the Union Government
from its moral importance on both sides of the Atlantic. As to
the material advantage won, it may be best judged of by the
statement of the well-known Confederate writer, Mr. Pollard: …
'It was a heavy blow to the Confederacy. It annihilated us in
Louisiana; separated us from Texas and Arkansas; diminished
our resources and supplies by the loss of one of the greatest
grain and cattle countries within the limits of the
Confederacy; gave to the enemy the Mississippi River, with all
its means of navigation, for a base of operations.' … In
calling the capture of New Orleans 'one of the most remarkable
triumphs in the whole history of naval operations' he [Mr.
Welles, Secretary of the Navy] is fully justified."
C. C. Chesney,
Essays in Military Biog.,
page 167-168.
ALSO IN:
D. D. Porter, J. R. Bartlett and others,
The Capture of New Orleans
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2).
A. T. Mahan,
Admiral Farragut,
chapter 7.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 6.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (April-May: Alabama).
General Mitchell's expedition.
The division of Buell's army commanded by General Ormsby M.
Mitchell left Nashville with the other divisions of that army,
late in March, but took the road to Murfreesboro, while the
latter marched toward Pittsburg Landing. On the 4th of April
General Mitchell marched from Murfreesboro to Shelbyville, 26
miles distant. "On the 7th he advanced to Fayetteville, 27
miles farther, and the next forenoon, the 8th, 15 miles
beyond, he crossed the State line of Alabama. Continuing his
march six miles farther, and being within ten miles of
Huntsville, Alabama, he halted for the artillery and infantry
to come up." At an early hour the next morning he entered the
town, taking it completely by surprise. "Before the close of
the day 100 miles of the Memphis and Charleston railroad were
in his possession, stretching in one direction as far as
Stevenson, and in the other as far as Decatur. … From Decatur
he pushed on at once to Tuscumbia. Thus, without the loss of a
single life, General Mitchell placed his army midway between
Corinth and Chattanooga, prevented the destruction of a fine
bridge at Decatur, opened communication with General Buell,
and also the navigation of the Tennessee. The occupation of
Huntsville also cut off all communication between the east and
west by the Memphis and Charleston railroad. … This extension
of General Mitchell's lines to hold the railroad rendered his
situation precarious. Soon the enemy began to gather in force
and threaten him. … He was raised to the rank of a
major-general, and ordered to report directly to the [war]
department, and his force was constituted an independent
corps. But he got no reënforcements, he was left in such a
condition that he at first hardly had anything to report but
that he had been gradually driven from those positions, the
gaining of which had made him a major-general." Subsequently
he advanced upon Chattanooga; but that important position was
not secured. A little later General Mitchell was transferred
to Port Royal, South Carolina.
W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
chapter 15.
It was in connection with General Mitchell's expedition that
the thrilling episode of the railroad raid in Georgia
occurred, narratives of which have been published by one of
the participants, Reverend William Pittenger, first under the
title of "Capturing a Locomotive," and afterwards with the
title "Daring and Suffering," and also as "The Great
Locomotive Chase." Volume Two of "Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War" also contains the story, entitled "The Locomotive
Chase in Georgia," preceded by General Buell's critical
account of Mitchell's entire operations.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(April-May: Tennessee-Mississippi).
The bloodless and bootless conquest of Corinth.
"General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg landing on the 11th of
April and immediately assumed command in the field. On the
21st General Pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh
from the capture of Island Number Ten in the Mississippi
River. He went into camp at Hamburg landing five miles above
Pittsburg. Halleck had now three armies: the Army of the Ohio,
Buell commanding; the Army of the Mississippi, Pope
commanding; and the Army of the Tennessee. His orders divided
the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre, and
left wing. … I [General Grant] was named second in command of
the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right
wing and reserve. … Preparations were at once made upon the
arrival of the new commander for an advance on Corinth. …
Corinth, Mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from
Pittsburg landing and about 19 miles away as the bird would
fly, but probably 22 by the nearest wagon-road. It is about
four miles south of the line dividing the States of Tennessee
and Mississippi, and at the junction of the Mississippi and
Chattanooga Railroad with the Mobile and Ohio road which runs
from Columbus to Mobile. … Corinth was a valuable strategic
point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one
for us to possess ourselves of. We ought to have seized it
immediately after the fall of Donelson and Nashville, when it
could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it
should have been taken, without delay, on the concentration of
troops at Pittsburg landing after the battle of Shiloh. In
fact, the arrival of Pope should not have been awaited. There
was no time from the battle of Shiloh up to the evacuation of
Corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed. … On the
30th of April the grand army commenced its advance from Shiloh
upon Corinth. The movement was a siege from the start to the
close.
{3462}
The National troops were always behind intrenchments, except
of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to
clear the way for an advance. Even the commanders of these
parties were cautioned, 'not to bring on an engagement.' … For
myself, I was little more than an observer. Orders were sent
direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances
were made from one line of intrenchments to another without
notifying me. My position was so embarrassing in fact that I
made several applications during the siege to be relieved. …
On the 28th of May, General Logan, whose command was then on
the Mobile and Ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had
been evacuating for several days, and that if allowed he could
go into Corinth with his brigade. … Beauregard published his
orders for the evacuation of Corinth on the 26th of May and
fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the
30th of May General Halleck had his whole army drawn up
prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was
every indication that our left was to be attacked that
morning. Corinth had already been evacuated and the National
troops marched on and took possession without opposition.
Everything had been destroyed or carried away. The Confederate
commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival
of every train, to create the impression among the Yankees
that reinforcements were arriving. There was not a sick or
wounded man left by the Confederates, nor stores of any kind.
Some ammunition had been blown up—not removed—but the trophies
of war were a few Quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of
ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in
the most threatening manner towards us. The possession of
Corinth by the National troops was of strategic importance,
but the victory was barren in every other particular. …
General Halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications
around Corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must
be held if it took the whole National army to do it. … They
were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men
to fully man them. … These fortifications were never used. …
After the capture of Corinth a movable force of 80,000 men,
besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have
been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great
campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. In addition to
this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective
force. But the work of depletion commenced."
U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapter 26 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
M. F. Force,
From Fort Henry to Corinth
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 2),
chapter 8.
A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
chapter 24 (volume 1).
Official Records,
series 1, volume 10.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (April-June).
Abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia
and in the Territories.
On the 16th of December, 1861, Mr Wilson, of Massachusetts,
introduced in the Senate of the United States a bill for the
immediate emancipation of the slaves in the District of
Columbia; "for the payment to their loyal owners of an average
sum of $300; for the appointment of a commission to assess the
sum to be paid; and the appropriation of $1,000,000. This bill
was reported back on the 13th of February, 1862, with
amendments. On the 24th he introduced a bill which, he said,
was supplementary to that already before the Senate, to repeal
the act extending the laws of Maryland over the District, and
to annul all those statutes which gave the cities of
Washington and Georgetown authority to pass ordinances
discriminating against persons on account of color. On the
12th of March it came up for debate in committee of the whole.
The debate on these resolutions, the bill, and other cognate
measures exhibit elements of interest hardly found in any
other session of the American Congress on record. It was
emphatically a new departure. … No important change was made,
and on the 3d of April, 1862, the bill introduced by Mr.
Wilson more than three months before was passed by a vote of
29 to 14. The bill was taken up in the House the next week,
and gave rise to a brief but brilliant debate. … The bill …
passed the House by a vote of 92 to 38, and received the
approval of the President on the 16th day of April, 1862. The
President, in his message accompanying his approval of the
bill, had stated some objections to it. These objections were
that certain classes, such as married women, minors, and
persons absent from the District, were not sufficiently
protected and provided for; and he suggested that these
defects should be remedied by additional legislation"—which
was done. "On the 24th of March, 1862, Mr. Arnold, of
Illinois, introduced a bill into the House of Representatives
to render freedom national and slavery sectional. It was
referred to the Committee on Territories, was reported on the
1st of May, with an amendment, and made the order of the day
for the 8th. It provided that freedom should be the
fundamental law of the land, and that slavery should no longer
exist in all places under the direct and exclusive control of
the Federal government. It prohibited slavery in all
Territories, then or thereafter existing; in all places
purchased by the government, with the consent of the
legislatures of the several States, for forts, magazines,
arsenals, doek-yards, and other needful buildings; in all
vessels on the high seas, and on all national highways, beyond
the territory and jurisdiction of the several States. … The
difficulties, … real or seeming, constitutional or other, were
too great to secure the united action of the friends of the
underlying principle of the bill as reported by the committee.
Mr. Lovejoy, therefore, moved a substitute restricting its
action entirely to the Territories. The substitute was
accepted, and the bill as thus amended was carried by a vote
of 85 to 50. The preamble was so amended as to read, 'An act
to secure freedom to all persons within the Territories of
the United States.' In the Senate, on the 15th of May, Mr.
Browning, reported the bill from the Committee on Territories
with an amendment that, from and after the passage of the act,
there should be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in
any existing Territory, or in any Territory thereafter formed
or acquired. It was, substantially, the application of the
principle of the ordinance of 1787 to all the territory then
possessed or thereafter to be acquired. On the 9th of June the
Senate proceeded to its consideration, adopted the amendment,
and passed the bill by a vote of 28 to 10. The House agreed to
the Senate amendment, and the bill thus amended was passed on
the 17th, and approved by the President on the 19th of June."
H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America,
volume 3, chapters 21 and 24.
ALSO IN:
M. Tremain,
Slavery in the District of Columbia
(University of Nebraska: Seminary Papers Number 2).
{3463}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May).
Passage of the Homestead Act.
"The homestead bill, or the granting of free homes from and on
the public domain, became a national question in 1852. The
Free Soil Democracy, at Pittsburg, Pa., August 11, 1852, in
National Convention, nominated John P. Hale, of New Hampshire,
and George W. Julian, of Indiana, for President and
Vice-President, and adopted the following as the 12th plank or
resolution in their platform: 'That the public lands of the
United States belong to the people, and should not be sold to
individuals, nor granted to corporations, but should be held
as a sacred trust for the benefit of the people, and should be
granted in limited quantities, free of cost, to landless
settlers.' Thereafter it became a national question until its
passage in 1862, and was in the platforms of political
parties. It was petitioned for and against. Public sentiment
was aroused. It was a serious innovation and would cause an
almost entire change in the settlement laws. Instead of the
public lands being sold for cash, for profit, or being taken,
first, under the pre-emption system, which eventuated in cash
purchases, they were to be given to actual settlers who would
occupy, improve, and cultivate them for a term of years, and
then receive a patent free of acreage charges, with fees paid
by the homesteader sufficient to cover cost of survey and
transfer of title. … The rich and fertile lands of the
Mississippi Valley were fast filling up with settlers.
Agricultural lands in the Middle States, which, after the year
1824, were bought for $1.25 per acre, now sold at from $50 to
$80 per acre. Former purchasers of these Government lands in
the Middle, Western, and Southern States, were selling their
early purchases for this great advance, and moving west, to
Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Missouri, and there again
taking cheap Government lands under the pre-emption laws. The
western emigration caused a rush—a migration of neighborhoods
in many localities of the older Western States. Following the
sun, their pillar of fire, these State founders moved
westward, a resistless army of agents of American
civilization, and there was a demand for homes on the public
lands, and a strong pressure for the enactment of a law which
should confine locators to small tracts, and require actual
occupation, improvement, and cultivation. A fierce political
battle now ensued, beginning in 1854, and continuing until
1862, the year of the passage of the law. The demand of the
settlers was incessant and constant." Mr. Galusha A. Grow, of
Pennsylvania, made himself the special champion of the measure
in Congress. On the 1st of February, 1859, a bill embodying
its principles was carried in the House, but was not permitted
to reach a vote in the Senate. The slaveholding interest was
almost solidly against it. In March, 1860, a similar bill was
again passed by the House. The Senate substituted a bill
granting homesteads to actual settlers at twenty-five cents
per acre, instead of free of cost. After protracted
conferences, the House was forced to accept the Senate bill,
with slight amendments. But if the enemies of the measure had
so nearly lost their control of Congress, they still owned the
President—Buchanan—and he killed it by a veto. Then came the
rebellion and civil war, absorbing all minor questions, and
nearly two years went by before the law which opened the
public lands freely to all actual settlers was adopted. It
became a law by the signature of President Lincoln on the 20th
of May, 1862. The following are the essential provisions of
the Act: "That any person who is the head of a family, or who
has arrived at the age of twenty-one years, and is a citizen
of the United States, or who shall have filed his declaration
of intention to become such, as required by the naturalization
laws of the United States, and who has never borne arms
against the United States Government or given aid and comfort
to its enemies, shall, from and after the first January,
eighteen hundred and sixty-three, be entitled to enter one
quarter-section or a less quantity of unappropriated public
lands, upon which said person may have filed a pre-emption
claim, or which may, at the time the application is made, be
subject to pre-emption at one dollar and twenty-five cents, or
less, per acre; or eighty acres or less of such unappropriated
lands, at two dollars and fifty cents per acre, to be located
in a body, in conformity to the legal subdivisions of the
public lands, and after the same shall have been surveyed:
Provided, That any person owning or residing on land may,
under the provisions of this act, enter other land lying
contiguous to his or her said land, which shall not, with the
land so already owned and occupied, exceed in the aggregate
one hundred and sixty acres. … That the person applying for
the benefit of this act shall, upon application to the
register of the land office in which he or she is about to
make such entry, make affidavit before the said register or
receiver that he or she is the head of a family, or is
twenty-one or more years of age, or shall have performed
service in the Army or Navy of the United States, and that he
has never borne arms against the Government of the United
States or given aid and comfort to its enemies, and that such
application is made for his or her exclusive use and benefit,
and that said entry is made for the purpose of actual
settlement and cultivation, and not, either directly or
indirectly, for the use or benefit of any other person or
persons whomsoever; and upon filing the said affidavit with
the said register or receiver, and on payment of ten dollars,
he or she shall thereupon be permitted to enter the quantity
of land specified: Provided, however, That no certificate
shall be given or patent issued therefor until the expiration
of five years from the date of such entry; and if, at the
expiration of such time, or at any time within two years
thereafter, the person making such entry—or if he be dead,
his widow; or in case of her death, his heirs or devisee; or
in case of a widow making such entry, her heirs or devisee, in
case of her death—shall prove by two credible witnesses that
he, or she, or they have resided upon or cultivated the same
for the term of five years immediately succeeding the time of
filing the affidavit aforesaid, and shall make affidavit that
no part of said land has been alienated, and that he has borne
true allegiance to the Government of the United States; then,
in such case, he, she, or they, if at that time a citizen of
the United States, shall be entitled to a patent, as in other
cases provided for by law:
{3464}
And provided, further, That in case of the death of both
father and mother, leaving an infant child or children under
twenty-one years of age, the right and fee shall inure to the
benefit of said infant child or children; and the executor,
administrator, or guardian may, at any time within two years
after the death of the surviving parent, and in accordance
with the laws of the State in which such children for the time
being have their domicil, sell said land for the benefit of
said infants, but for no other purpose; and the purchaser
shall acquire the absolute title by the purchase, and be
entitled to a patent from the United States, on payment of the
office fees and sum of money herein specified. … That if, at
any time after the filing of the affidavit, … and before the
expiration of the five years aforesaid, it shall be proven,
after due notice to the settler, to the satisfaction of the
register of the land office, that the person having filed such
affidavit shall have actually changed his or her residence, or
abandoned the said land for more than six months at any time,
then and in that event the land so entered shall revert to the
Government.' … This original homestead act has been amended
several times. … The principal amendments were in the nature
of extension of its privileges, and the limit of 80 acres of
land of the double minimum class, $2.50 per acre, within
certain road limits, has since been done away with by acts of
March 3, 1879, July 1, 1879, and June 15, 1880; there now
being but one class of agricultural lands, so for as regards
the minimum quantity in homestead entries. The act of June 8,
1872, was known as the soldiers' and sailors' homestead act.
It gave honorably discharged soldiers and sailors from the
Army and Navy of the United States lands under the homestead
act in any locality, and deducted from the five years'
residence which was required to make title their term of
service in the Army and Navy during the war of the Rebellion.
One year's residence and cultivation, however, were necessary.
… The soldiers' additional homestead provision was to give
those soldiers who had had the benefit of the homestead act,
to the extent of a quantity under 160 acres, an additional
amount, so as to make their allowance 160 acres."
T. Donaldson,
The Public Domain,
chapter 27.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May).
General Hunter's Emancipation Order,
rescinded by President Lincoln.
Major General David Hunter, having lately succeeded to the
command at Hilton Head, South Carolina, issued, on the 9th of
May, 1862, a General Order (No. 11), declaring martial law in
Georgia, Florida and South Carolina, and adding: "Slavery and
martial law in a free country are altogether incompatible; the
persons in these States … heretofore held as slaves are
therefore declared forever free." This order was rescinded by
President Lincoln in a Proclamation, dated May 19, in which he
used the following language: "Whether it be competent for me,
as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, to declare the
slaves of any State or States free; and whether at any time,
or in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable
to the maintenance of the Government, to exercise such
supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility,
I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in
leaving to the decision of commanders in the field."
E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States during
the Great Rebellion,
pages 250—251.
ALSO IN:
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 6, ch. 5.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May: South Carolina).
Employment of the freed Negroes as armed soldiers.
The negroes within the Union lines in South Carolina, at
Hilton Head and elsewhere, were placed under the charge, at
first, of agents appointed by the Treasury Department; but
disagreements arose between these agents and the military
authorities, and the former were recalled. "These several
agents had been replaced by a superior officer of the staff,
General Saxton, who was himself placed under the orders Of
General Hunter with the rank of a military commander. By this
action the government at Washington sustained Hunter in his
conflict with the agents Of the Treasury Department—a
conflict originating in very serious causes, for it affected
the question of slavery in its most vital points. … Mr.
Cameron [Secretary of the Treasury] had authorized General
Sherman to organize the negroes into squads and companies. The
latter had at first only been employed in manual labor, such
as the construction of forts, roads and wharves; but Hunter,
on taking Sherman's place, saw that he could give a much wider
interpretation to the Secretary's instructions. He substituted
muskets for the pick-axes used by the detachments of negro
laborers organized by his predecessor; and, instead of making
them dig the earth, he had them taught military exercises. Nor
did he stop here; but wishing to increase the number of these
new soldiers, he gathered all the adult negroes residing on
the adjoining islands at Hilton Head on the 12th of May, in
order to induce them to enter the military service. … The
civil agents complained bitterly of the trouble this measure
had created among the people entrusted to their charge, and
thence sprung the quarrel which Mr. Lincoln cut short by
deciding in favor of Hunter. The protection granted to
fugitive slaves was the first logical consequence of the war,
their enrolment in the Federal armies was the second. As
untimely and impolitic as was the proclamation by which Hunter
had taken upon himself to free the slaves outside of his
jurisdiction, the creation Of the first negro regiment was an
act skilfully conceived. It was essentially a military act; it
raised and ennobled the freedman by entrusting him with arms;
its legality was unquestionable from the moment that the
President approved of it, for there was no law to prevent him
from enlisting colored volunteers. In short, it showed to the
Confederates that the Washington government was determined not
to allow itself to be any longer paralyzed by the vain hope Of
reconciliation. … But notwithstanding the success of this
first experiment, considerable time elapsed before the Federal
government concluded to follow Hunter in this direction."
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 7, chapter 3.
ALSO IN:
G. W. Williams,
History of Negro troops in the War of the Rebellion,
chapter 5.
{3465}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May: Virginia).
The Peninsular Campaign: The Battle of Williamsburg
and the slow advance to the Chickahominy.
On the evacuation Of the rebel works at Yorktown, "our columns
followed on in pursuit, McClellan remaining in Yorktown, busy
with questions of transportation. The enemy under Longstreet
had awaited our approach at Williamsburg. Hooker first
attacked, having been brought to a stand by a work known as
Fort Magruder, and kept up a heavy pounding all the forenoon
[May 5). Kearny came to his rescue when Hooker's men were all
but spent. Hancock moved around the enemy's left, seized some
abandoned redoubts, and made a brilliant diversion. But there
was no cooperation in our attack; no one on the field was in
supreme command, and the day was fruitlessly spent in partial
blows. The enemy retreated at night. Our loss was 2,200;
theirs in all probability less."
T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-eye View of our Civil War,
chapter 11.
"General Johnston says [' Narrative,' p. 124]:
'We fought for no other purpose than to hold the ground long
enough to enable our baggage-trains to get out of the way of
the troops. This object was accomplished without difficulty.
There was no time during the day when the slightest
uncertainty appeared.' He also says that Longstreet's and
Hill's divisions slept on the field; that what deserves to be
called fighting ceased two hours before dark, yet the
Confederates held the field until the next morning, when they
resumed their march. … There may be a little rose-color about
these statements, but the substantial facts seem to be
accurately stated. … General McClellan made no pursuit after
Williamsburg, for reasons which he who will may find stated in
his Report; and we may pass on with the single additional
remark that the battle of Williamsburg was unnecessary, for
the position might have been turned by a movement by our
right. This was actually accomplished by Hancock, after Hooker
had met with all his heavy loss; and it might as well have
been done before as after. … The three weeks which followed
the battle of Williamsburg were so devoid of incident that it
seems to be sufficient to say that the Confederates moved up
the Peninsula in two columns. The right column, composed of
the divisions of Smith and Magruder, followed the road by New
Kent Court House, and in three marches reached the Baltimore
Cross Roads, 19 miles from Barhamsville. The left column,
composed of the divisions of Longstreet and D. H. Hill,
reached in the same number of marches the Long Bridges. The
army remained five days in this position, facing to the east.
… The iron-clad Virginia [better known as the Merrimac] was
destroyed on, or just before, the 14th of May. This event
opened the James River to our navy; and, to be ready to meet
an advance up that river as well as from the direction of West
Point, the Confederate forces were ordered to cross the
Chickahominy on the 15th May. On the 17th their army encamped
about three miles from Richmond, in front of the line of
redoubts constructed in 1861. … During this period the weather
was generally fine, cool and breezy, but gradually tending
towards heat. … McClellan sent out cavalry reconnoissances
from Williamsburg on the 5th and 7th May. … The advance of the
main body began on the 8th; and on the 10th headquarters were
at Roper's Church, 19 miles from Williamsburg, with all the
troops which had arrived by land, except Hooker's, in the
vicinity of that place. … By the 15th, headquarters, and the
divisions of Franklin, Porter, Sykes, and Smith, reached
Cumberland on the Pamunkey. … On the 19th of May, headquarters
and the corps of Porter and Franklin moved to Tunstall's
Station on the railroad, five miles from White House. On the
20th, Casey's division forded the Chickahominy, where Bottom's
Bridge had been, and occupied the opposite heights. Bottom's
Bridge was immediately rebuilt. … On the 22d, headquarters
moved to Cold Harbor. On the 24th, we carried the village of
Mechanicsville, but the enemy destroyed the bridge on which
the Mechanicsville Turnpike crossed the river. On the same day
our left advance secured a position at Seven Pines, the point
of junction of the Nine-Mile Road with the Williamsburg road,
which last road crosses the Chickahominy at Bottom's Bridge. …
It is difficult to account for, or justify, the slowness of
McClellan's march. The distance from Williamsburg to the
middle of a line drawn from Bottom's Bridge to Cold Harbor,
measuring by the road, is about 40 miles. That from West Point
to the same point, measuring in the same way, is considerably
less. One might almost say that, in the three weeks which
McClellan took to accomplish this distance, he might have
marched his army all the way in order of battle, bridging
streams, felling trees, making roads, and supplying his army
as he advanced. 'I had hoped,' he says, 'by rapid movements to
drive before me, or capture, the enemy on the Peninsula, open
the James River, and press on to Richmond, before he should be

materially re-enforced.' What was there to hinder his making
the attempt? Instead of that he followed him at the average
rate of rather less than two miles a day."
F. W. Palfrey,
After the fall of Yorktown
(Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers,
volume 1, pages 95-114).
ALSO IN:
J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapter 5.
Report of Joint Commission on the Conduct of the War,
38th Congress 2d session, volume 1.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 11, part 1.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May: Virginia).
Evacuation of Norfolk by the Rebels.
Destruction of the Merrimac.
"The movement of our grand army up the Peninsula, in
connection with Burnside's successes and captures in North
Carolina, had rendered the possession of Norfolk by the Rebels
no longer tenable. … General Wool, commanding at Fortress
Monroe, having organized an expedition designed to reduce that
important city, led it thither on the 10th; finding the bridge
over Tanner's Creek on fire, but no enemy to dispute
possession of Norfolk, which was quietly surrendered by its
Mayor. The Navy Yard and Portsmouth were in like manner
repossessed; the Rebels, ere they left, destroying every thing
that would burn, partially blowing up the Dry Dock, and
completely destroying their famous iron-clad known to us as
the Merrimac. They left about 200 cannon. … Two unfinished
iron-clads were among the vessels fired by the Rebels ere they
left."
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, page 127.
{3466}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May: Virginia).
The Peninsular Campaign: Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines.
"On the 25th of May General McClellan issued a general order,
which was read throughout the camps, directing the troops, as
they advanced beyond the Chickahominy, to be prepared for
battle at a moment's notice, and to be entirely unencumbered,
with the exception of ambulances; to carry three days rations
in their haversacks, leaving their knapsacks with their
wagons, which were on the eastern side of the river, carefully
parked. … The divisions from the corps of Generals Heintzelman
and Keyes were among the first to cross the Chickahominy. They
took a position on the right bank somewhat advanced therefrom.
The right wing rested near New Bridge, the centre at Seven
Pines, and the left flank on the White Oak Swamp. General
Sumner's corps remained on the east side of the river. On the
30th the Confederate General Johnston made arrangements for an
attack upon the Federal army, for the purpose of cutting off,
if possible, the corps of Generals Heintzelman and Keyes
before they could be joined by General Sumner. He selected the
divisions of Generals Longstreet, Huger, G. W. Smith, D. H.
Hill, and Whiting. His plan was that Generals Hill and
Longstreet should advance by the road to Williamsburg and make
the attack in front, and that General Huger should move on the
road to Charles City and attack in flank the troops assailed
by Generals Hill and Longstreet. General Smith was ordered to
the junction of the New Bridge Road and the Nine Mile Road,
and to be in readiness to fall on the right flank of General
Keyes and to cover the left of General Longstreet. The forces
of Generals Hill, Longstreet, and Smith were in position early
on the morning of Saturday, May 31, and waited until afternoon
for General Huger to get into position. Prince de Joinville,
who was a competent spectator, thus describes ['Campagne de l'
Armèe du Potomac, Mars-Juillet, 1862'] the scenes which
followed this attack: 'At the moment it was thus attacked the
Federal army occupied a position having the form of a V. The
base of the V is at Bottom's Bridge, where the railroad
crosses the Chickahominy. The left arm stretches toward
Richmond, with this railroad and the road from that city to
Williamsburg. There stood the left wing, composed of four
divisions echeloned, one behind the other, between Fair Oaks
and Savage stations, and encamped in the woods on both sides
of the road. The other arm of the V, the right, follows the
left bank of the river; that is the right wing. There are
these five divisions and the reserve. Should one desire to
communicate from one extremity to the other of those two
wings, going by Bottom's Bridge, the way is very long, not
less than 12 or 15 miles. In an air line the distance, on the
contrary, is very trifling, but between the two arms of the V
flows the Chickahominy. It was to connect both arms, in the
space between them, that the construction of 3 or 4 bridges
had been undertaken, only one of which was serviceable on the
31st of May. It had been built by General Sumner, nearly half
way between Bottom's Bridge and the most advanced point of the
Federal lines. It saved the army that day from a disaster.'
The other bridges were not ready. They were structures of
logs, and time was required to build them. The approaches were
always bad, and the tedious labor of corduroying long
distances was necessary. 'It was against the left wing of the
army that every effort of the enemy was directed. That wing
had its outposts at Fair Oaks station, on the York river
railroad, and at a place called Seven Pines, on the
Williamsburg road. There the Federals had thrown up a redoubt
in a clearing, where a few houses were to be seen, and
constructed abatis, to increase the field for sharpshooting of
the troops posted there. The rest of the country was
completely covered with woods. The previous day there had been
a frightful storm, with torrents of rain, and the roads were
frightful. All at once, about one o'clock in the afternoon,
the weather being dark and gloomy, a very spirited fusilade is
heard. The pickets and sentries are violently driven in; the
woods which surround Fair Oaks and Seven Pines are filled with
clouds of the enemy's sharpshooters. The troops rush to arms
and fight in desperation; but their adversaries' forces
constantly increase, and their losses do not stop them. The
redoubt of the Seven Pines is surrounded, and its defenders
die bravely. … Meanwhile Heintzelman rushes to the rescue with
his two divisions. As at Williamsburg, Kearney arrives in good
time to reëstablish the fight. Berry's brigade, of this
division, composed of Michigan regiments and an Irish
battalion, advances firm as a wall into the midst of the
disordered mass which wanders over the battle field, and does
more by its example than the most powerful reënforcements.
About a mile of ground has been lost, 15 pieces of cannon, the
camp of the division of the advance guard, that of General
Casey; but now we hold our own. A sort of line of battle is
formed across the woods, perpendicularly to the road and the
railroad, and there the repeated assaults of the enemy's
masses are resisted. The left cannot be turned, where is the
White Oak Swamp, an impassable morass; but the right may be
surrounded. At this very moment, in fact, a strong column of
Confederates has been directed against that side. If it
succeeds in interposing between Bottom's Bridge and the
Federal troops, which hold beyond Savage's Station, the entire
left wing is lost. It will have no retreat, and is doomed to
yield to numbers; but precisely at this moment—that is to say,
at 6 o'clock in the evening—new actors appear on the scene.
General Sumner, who has succeeded in passing the Chickahominy,
with Sedgwick's division, over the bridge constructed by his
troops, and who, like a brave soldier, has marched straight
through the woods to the sound of the cannon, arrived suddenly
on the left flank of the column with which the enemy is
endeavoring to cut off Heintzelman and Keyes. He plants in the
clearing a battery which he has succeeded in bringing with
him. … In vain Johnston sends against this battery his best
troops, those of South Carolina—the Hampton Legion among
others. In vain he rushes on it himself; nothing can shake the
Federals, who, at nightfall, valiantly led by General Sumner
in person, throw themselves upon the enemy at the point of the
bayonet, and drive him furiously, with frightful slaughter and
fear, back as far as Fair Oaks Station. Night put an end to
the combat. On both sides nothing was known of the result of
the battle but what each one had seen with his own eyes. …
Evidently Johnston had flattered himself, in throwing all his
forces on the four divisions of the left wing, that he could
annihilate them before any aid could come to them from the
main body of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy.
For the moment he had recoiled before the energetic resistance
of those four divisions, and also before the furious and
unforeseen attack of Sumner's troops.
{3467}
No doubt he had counted on the terrible storm of the previous
day to have swelled the Chickahominy so as to render the
establishment of a bridge impossible, or to sweep away in its
overflowing waters those already established; but the
capricious river baffled his plans, as it did some hours later
those of his adversaries. The effect of the deluge was not
immediate; the rise in the water delayed its appearance 24
hours. Was this unhoped-for delay turned to account with all
desirable activity on the part of the Federals? That is a
question which will remain always in dispute. … It was not
until 7 o'clock in the evening that the idea of securing all
the bridges without delay, and causing the whole army to cross
at daybreak to the right bank of the Chickahominy, was
entertained. It was now too late. Four hours had been lost,
and the opportunity—that moment so fleeting, in war as in
other circumstances—had gone. The rise, on which Johnston had
vainly counted, and which had not hindered Sumner from
crossing, came on during the night. The river rose suddenly
from two feet, and continued to swell with rapidity, carrying
away the new bridges, tearing up and sweeping off the trees
which formed the planking of Sumner's bridges, and covering
the entire valley with its overflowing waters. Nothing could
cross. At the earliest dawn of day the combat was resumed with
great fury on the left bank. The enemy came on in a body, but
without order or method, and rushed upon the Federals, who,
knowing that they were inferior in numbers and without hope of
being supported, did not attempt to do more than resist and
hold their ground. They fought with fierce determination on
both sides, without any noise, without any cries, and whenever
they were too hardly pressed they made a charge with the
bayonet. … Toward midday the fire gradually diminished, then
ceased. The enemy retreated; but the Federals were not in a
position to pursue them. No one then knew what a loss the
Southerners had just suffered in the person of their
commander, General Johnston, who was severely wounded. It was
to his absence that was owing, in a great measure, the
unskilful attacks against the Federal army in the morning. …
Who can say what would have been the result if at this moment
the 35,000 fresh troops left on the other side of the
Chickahominy had appeared on the flank of this disordered mass
after having successfully crossed the bridges?'"
W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
chapter 19 (quoting and translating from
Prince de Joinville's "Campagne de l'Armée du Potomac").
"After this battle of Seven Pines—or Fair Oaks, as the
Northern people prefer to call it—General McClellan made no
step forward, but employed his troops industriously in
intrenching themselves."
J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
page 142.
ALSO IN:
G. W. Smith,
Two days of Battle at Seven Pines
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 220-263).
Official Records,
series 1, volume 11, part 1.
W. Allan,
The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862,
chapter 7-8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May-June: Virginia).
Stonewall Jackson's second campaign in the Shenandoah Valley.
Winchester.
Cross Keys.
Port Republic.
"At the time the Army of the Potomac was toiling painfully up
the Peninsula towards Richmond, the remaining forces in
Northern Virginia presented the extraordinary spectacle of
three distinct armies, planted on three separate lines of
operations, under three independent commanders. The highland
region of West Virginia had been formed into the 'Mountain
Department' under command of General Fremont; the Valley of
the Shenandoah constituted the 'Department of the Shenandoah'
under General Banks; and the region covered by the direct
lines of approach to Washington had been erected into the
'Department of the Rappahannock,' and assigned to General
McDowell. … The Administration, growing more easy touching the
safety of the capital, determined, in response to General
McClellan's oft-repeated appeals for re-enforcements, to send
forward McDowell's corps,—not, indeed, as he desired, to
re-enforce him by water, but to advance overland to attack
Richmond in co-operation with the Army of the Potomac. … After
numerous delays, the time of advance of this column was at
length fixed for the 26th of May, a date closely coincident
with the arrival of the Army of the Potomac on the
Chickahominy. The head of McDowell's column had already been
pushed eight miles south of Fredericksburg; and McClellan, to
clear all opposition from his path, sent forward Porter's
corps to Hanover Junction, where he had a sharp encounter with
a force of the enemy under General Branch, whom he repulsed
with a loss of 200 killed and 700 prisoners, and established
the right of the Army of the Potomac within fifteen miles, or
one march, of McDowell's van. McDowell was eager to advance,
and McClellan was equally anxious for his arrival, when there
happened an event which frustrated this plan and all the hopes
that had been based thereon. This event was the irruption of
Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. The keen-eyed
soldier at the head of the main Confederate army, discerning
the intended junction between McDowell and McClellan, quickly
seized his opportunity, and intrusted the execution of a bold
'coup' to that vigorous lieutenant who had already made the
Valley ring with his exploits." Jackson, who had been resting
for a time in a position between the south fork of the
Shenandoah and Swift Run Gap, was joined, on the 30th of
April, by Ewell's division from Gordonsville, and by other
re-enforcements, which "raised his force to about 15,000 men.
Banks' force, reduced by the detachment of Shields' division,
sent to General McDowell, to about 5,000 men, was posted at
Harrisonburg. Fremont was at Franklin, across the mountains;
but one of his brigades, under Milroy, had burst beyond the
limits of the Mountain Department, and seemed to be moving to
make a junction with Banks, with the design, as Jackson
thought, of advancing on Staunton. Jackson determined to
attack these forces in detail. Accordingly, he posted Ewell so
as to hold Banks in check, whilst he himself moved to
Staunton. From here he threw forward five brigades, under
General Edward Johnson (May 7), to attack Milroy. The latter
retreated to his mountain fastness, and took position at a
point named McDowell, where, re-enforced by the brigade of
Schenck, he engaged Johnson, but was forced to retire on
Fremont's main body at Franklin. Having thus thrown off Milroy
eccentrically from communication with Banks, Jackson returned
(May 14) to destroy the force under that officer." Banks
retreated down the Valley, followed by Jackson, who diverged a
little to capture a garrison of 700 men at Front Royal.
{3468}
On the 24th, Banks made a stand on the heights of Winchester
and gave fight, "till, being assailed on both flanks, he
retired hastily to the north bank of the Potomac (May 25),
making a march of 53 miles in 48 hours. Jackson continued the
pursuit as far as Halltown, within two miles of Harper's
Ferry, where he remained till the 30th, when, finding heavy
forces converging on his rear, he began a retrograde movement
up the Valley. The tidings of Jackson's apparition at
Winchester on the 24th, and his subsequent advance to Harper's
Ferry, fell like a thunderbolt on the war-council at
Washington. The order for McDowell's advance from
Fredericksburg, to unite with McClellan, was instantly
countermanded; and he was directed to put 20,000 men in motion
at once for the Shenandoah Valley, by the line of the Manassas
Gap Railroad. … In vain he pointed out that it was impossible
for him either to succor Banks or co-operate with Fremont; …
that it would take him a week or ten days to reach the Valley,
and that by this time the occasion for his services would have
passed by. In vain General McClellan urged the real motive of
the raid—to prevent re-enforcements from reaching him."
McDowell moved from the east and Fremont from the west,
converging on Strasburg. "The two columns moved rapidly; they
had almost effected a junction on the 31st; but that very day
Jackson, falling back from Harper's Ferry, slipped between the
two, and made good his retreat up the Valley. … The pursuers
did their best: they pushed on, Fremont following in the path
of Jackson up the Valley of the Shenandoah; while McDowell
sent forward Shields' division by the lateral Luray Valley,
with a view to head him off when he should attempt to break
through the gaps of the Blue Ridge." On the 8th of June
Ewell's division of Jackson's army "repulsed Fremont, while
Jackson held Shields in check. Early next morning, drawing in
Ewell and concentrating his forces, Jackson threw himself
across the river, burned the bridge to prevent Fremont from
following; fell upon Shields' advance, consisting of two
brigades under General Tyler, and repulsed him, capturing his
artillery. The former of these affairs figures in history as
the battle of Cross Keys, and the latter as the battle of Port
Republic. In this exciting month's campaign, Jackson made
great captures of stores and prisoners; but this was not its
chief result. Without gaining a single tactical victory he had
yet achieved a great strategic victory; for by skilfully
manœuvring 15,000 men he succeeded in neutralizing a force of
60,000. It is perhaps not too much to say that he saved
Richmond."
W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
pages 122-128.
ALSO IN:
J. D. Imboden,
Stonewall Jackson in the Shenandoah
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, page 282-301).
J. E. Cooke,
Stonewall Jackson: a Military Biography,
part 2, chapters 8-17.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May-July: On the Mississippi).
The first undertakings against Vicksburg.
"New Orleans once secured and handed over to General Butler,
Farragut pushed up the Mississippi, and in the course of the
next two months the Union flag was hoisted at Baton Rouge,
Natchez, and every town of importance as high as Vicksburg.
This city, strong by its natural position on high bluffs
sloping gently landward, and already partly converted into a
fortress by intrenchments heavily armed, was now (since the
surrender of Memphis on the 6th of June) the only point of
importance held by the Confederates on the banks of the great
river. It at once, therefore, assumed an importance well
warranted by its later history. Summoned on the 18th of May to
evacuate the place, General M. L. Smith, who held it, gave a
decided refusal; and Farragut found it necessary to await once
more the arrival of Porter's flotilla, which was not brought
up and reported ready until the 27th of June. On the 28th a
general attack took place, Farragut succeeding in taking two
of his three frigates and six gun-boats above the batteries,
but producing no effect on the defences. 'The enemy leave
their guns for the moment,' says his hasty report, 'but return
to them as soon as we have passed, and rake us.' About 50 men
were killed and wounded on board, and the Brooklyn frigate,
with two gun-boats, forced to retreat below the place. The
bombardment continued at intervals, pending an application to
General Halleck at Corinth for a corps of his army to aid the
fleet, and the result of an experiment (the first of three)
made to cut a ship canal through the isthmus opposite
Vicksburg, and leave the Federal ships an independent passage.
On the 15th of July their possession of the river was suddenly
challenged by a large ram, the Arkansas, which the
Confederates had been fitting on the Yazoo, a considerable
stream entering the Mississippi just above Vicksburg. … Her
plating, however, proved to be weak, and her machinery very
defective." The career of the Arkansas was brief and harmless.
In August she was knocked to pieces by the shells of the
Essex, "whose commander had taken charge of the Lower
Mississippi on the departure of Farragut. The latter officer,
in compliance with orders from Mr. Welles, had abandoned his
contest with the Vicksburg works on the 20th of July, and made
down stream for New Orleans, whence he proceeded with his
squadron to carry on operations along the coast of Texas,
where the chief posts were (for the time) recovered to the
Union by his detachments in the course of a few weeks. 'All we
want,' he wrote on the 15th of October, 'is a few soldiers to
hold the places, and we will soon have the whole coast. It is
a more effectual blockade to have the vessels inside instead
of outside.'"
C. C. Chesney,
Essays in Military Biography,
pages 169-171.
ALSO IN:
L. Farragut,
Life of David G. Farragut,
chapter. 20.
D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the Civil War,
chapter 21.
R. B. Irwin,
History of the 19th Army Corps.
chapters 2-3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (May-December: Louisiana).
New Orleans under General Butler.
The army which accompanied Farragut's naval expedition against
New Orleans, to assist its operations and to occupy the city
and the lower Mississippi region when taken, was placed under
the command of General Benjamin F. Butler. It consisted
nominally of 18,000 men, but is said to have actually mustered
less than 14,000. It was composed of regiments which had been
raised by Butler in New England especially for the enterprise,
his preparations having commenced as early as September, 1861.
These troops were partly gathered at Ship Island, in the Gulf,
some time before Farragut made ready his fleet; the remainder
were at the rendezvous in good time, and the whole were in
waiting, on board transports, at the passes, when Farragut
carried his fleet past Forts Jackson and St. Philip.
{3469}
"General Butler … now proceeded to execute his part of the
duty. He brought his forces into the rear of St. Philip,
Porter keeping up a bombardment. On the 27th of April the
garrison had become so demoralized as to refuse to fight any
longer. The forts were therefore surrendered on the next day.
… On the 1st of May New Orleans 'was formally occupied by
United States troops. The loss on the national side in
achieving this great victory was 40 killed and 177 wounded. …
General Butler now entered on the difficult task of governing
New Orleans. Its population, though greatly diminished to
strengthen the Confederate armies in the Border States—a cause
of bitter complaint to the inhabitants—still numbered about
140,000. Almost one half of it was of foreign birth. Perhaps
no city in the world had in its lower classes a more dangerous
and desperate population. There was a wide-spread hope that a
French force would soon come to their help. By firmness,
strict yet considerate, he controlled the municipal
authorities; by severity he put down the mob. He was a terror
to tricky tradesmen, a benefactor to the starving poor. He
cleaned the streets, enforced sanitary regulations, and kept
out yellow fever. He put an effectual stop to the operations
of Confederate agents, who were illicitly obtaining supplies
for their cause. … He arrested Mumford, the person who had
hauled down the national flag at the Mint [where it had been
raised by one of Farragut's officers before the arrival of the
troops], brought him before a military commission, convicted
and executed him." This execution of Mumford (by hanging) drew
from the Confederate President, Davis, a proclamation
denouncing Butler as "an outlaw and common enemy of mankind";
directing that, if captured, he should be immediately hung;
declaring the commissioned officers of his command "not
entitled to be considered as soldiers engaged in honorable
warfare, but as robbers and criminals"; and ordering that "no
commissioned officer of the United States taken captive shall
be released on parole before exchange until the said Butler
shall have met with due punishment for his crimes." "Some
women of New Orleans, relying on the immunity of their sex,
gratified their animosity by insulting national officers in
public places. One of them ventured so far as to spit in the
face of an officer who was quietly walking in the street.
Hereupon was issued 'General Order No. 28' [known as 'the
Woman Order,' which gave notice that] … 'hereafter, when any
female shall, by word, gesture, or movement, insult or show
contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, she
shall be regarded and held liable to be treated as a woman of
the town plying her vocation.' … The feeling of personal
hatred to Butler grew daily more and more intense. He was
accused of improper tampering with the banks, speculating in
sequestrated property, and, through the agency of his brother,
carrying on illegal but profitable transactions in sugar and
cotton. In South Carolina a reward of $10,000 had been offered
for his assassination. Throughout the Confederacy he received
an ignominious surname, and was known as 'Butler the Beast.'
The government felt constrained to send a commission to New
Orleans to investigate his transactions. Its conclusion was
that he had evidently acted 'under a misapprehension, to be
referred to the patriotic zeal which governs him.'" In
December General Butler was recalled and General Banks was
sent to take his place.
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 52 (volume 2).
ALSO IN:
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 2, chapter 13.
J. Parton,
General Butler in New Orleans,
chapters 11-32.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (June: On the Mississippi).
The capture of Memphis.
The naval fight before the city.
After the evacuation of Corinth by Beauregard, "Fort Pillow,
40 miles above Memphis, was no longer of any account, for the
Union army could take it from the rear. The Confederates,
therefore, spiked the guns, burned their barracks and what
supplies they could not take away; and the Confederate
gunboats went down the river to Memphis, where several of the
boats had been built. Commodore Montgomery commanded the
fleet. He had eight vessels. … Fort Pillow evacuated! It was
astounding news to the people of Memphis. They learned it at
noon, June 5th. The merchants closed their stores. Some of
them began to pack their goods. Some of the citizens jumped on
board the cars and fled from the city. The Confederate fleet
made its appearance. 'I shall retreat no farther,' said
Commodore Montgomery; 'I shall fight a battle in front of the
city, and to-morrow morning you will see Lincoln's gunboats
sent to the bottom.' The dawn is breaking when I step from the
Benton, the flag-ship of Commodore Davis [commanding the Union
river fleet], to the tugboat Jessie Benton. … The Union fleet
is at anchor three miles above the city. 'Drop down below the
city and see if you can discover the Confederate fleet,' is
the order to the captain of the Jessie Benton. We sweep around
the majestic bend of the river and behold the city. The first
rays of the sun are gilding the spires of the churches. A
crowd of people is upon the levee—men, women, and children—who
have come out to see the Union fleet sent to the bottom. …
Suddenly a vessel with a black cloud of smoke rolling from the
chimneys shoots into the stream. It is the Little Rebel,
Commodore Montgomery's flag-ship. One by one the other vessels
follow, forming in two lines of battle. In the front line,
nearest the city, is the Beauregard, next the Little Rebel,
then the Price and Sumter. In the second line, behind the
Beauregard, is the Lovell, then the Thompson, Bragg, and Van
Dorn. … There are five gunboats in the Union fleet. The Benton
is nearest the Tennessee shore, then the Carondelet,
Louisville, St. Louis, and Cairo. There are also two rams—the
Queen City and Monarch. The rams are river steamers, with
thick oak sides; they carry no cannon, but on each boat are
100 riflemen. 'Round to; head down stream; keep in line with
the flag-ship,' was the order which we on board the Jessie
Benton carried to each boat of the line." In the fight which
followed, and which is graphically described by the
eye-witness here quoted, the Price and the Beauregard were run
down by the rams; the Little Rebel, the Lovell, the Thompson
and the Bragg were destroyed by shot and shell; the Sumter
driven ashore, and the Van Dorn alone escaped. On the Union
side, only the ram Queen City was disabled.
{3470}
"In an hour's time the Confederate fleet was annihilated. … It
is not known how many men were lost on the Confederate side,
but probably from 80 to 100. Colonel Ellet was the only one
injured on board the Union fleet. … The victory opens the
Upper Mississippi from Cairo to Vicksburg."
C. C. Coffin,
Drumbeat of the Nation,
chapter 10.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (June: Virginia).
The Peninsular Campaign: McClellan fortifying and Lee
preparing for a bold attack.
"When McClellan crossed the Chickahominy it was thought he
would advance immediately upon Richmond. This expectation was
disappointed, however, for instead of advancing he began to
fortify his position. The right wing rested on the
Chickahominy a little below New Bridge, and the left extended
to the White Oak Swamp, embracing a front of about four miles,
nearly parallel with that of the Confederates. The opposing
lines were separated by an interval but little exceeding a
mile, but each was obscured from the other's view by the
intervening forest. The picket-lines were often within close
musket-range of each other. … The strength of the Confederate
force was always greatly overestimated by McClellan, and his
frequent and urgent calls for reinforcements exposed his want
of confidence in his own strength. General Lee [who took
command of the Confederate army June 1, General Johnston being
disabled], knowing this uneasy, insecure feeling of his
antagonist, and McDowell's force, which had always been a
thorn in his side, being about this time withdrawn from
Fredericksburg for the support of Banks and Shields in the
Valley, prepared … to assume the offensive. He conceived the
bold plan of crossing the Chickahominy, and, attacking the
Federal right wing, to force it back and seize McClellan's
line of communication with his base of operations. This plan
being successfully executed, the Federal general would be
compelled to save his army as best he could by retreat.
Preparatory to the execution of this plan General J. E. B.
Stuart was ordered to make a reconnoissance in the rear of the
Federal position. This officer, with a force of about 1,000
cavalry, executed his instructions with great boldness and
success. He made the entire circuit of the Federal army and
gained much important information, … captured many prisoners
and destroyed Federal stores to the value of $7,000,000. … His
design being confirmed by Stuart's successful reconnoissance,
Lee proceeded to organize a force requisite for the
accomplishment of his proposed enterprise. The troops that
could be conveniently spared from North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia were ordered to Richmond. … At the same
time General Jackson was ordered to withdraw secretly from the
Valley and proceed with such expedition as would enable him to
reach Hanover Junction by the afternoon of the 25th of June.
In order to mask his designs from the Federals, Lee directed
Whiting's division and Lawton's brigade to proceed to
Staunton, apparently with the view of reinforcing Jackson, but
really under orders to return immediately and join that
general on the 25th at Hanover Junction. This movement further
strengthened McClellan in his opinion of Lee's vastly superior
force, and completely blinded him in regard to the real
intentions of that general. General Lee determined to attack
the Federal right wing on the morning of the 26th of June."
A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
page 169.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (June-July: Virginia).
The Peninsular Campaign: The Seven Days Battle and Retreat.
Mechanicsville.
Gaines' Mill.
Savage Station.
Glendale.'
Malvern Hill.
"Since the battle of Fair Oaks the Second Corps (Sumner) had
remained on the right bank of the Chickahominy, where it had
been followed in the month of June by the Sixth Corps
(Franklin). So that only the Fifth Corps (Porter) remained on
the left bank, recently reënforced by McCall's division. All
the efforts of the enemy were made there, and there the great
seven days' contest commenced. On the 26th of June, A. P.
Hill, preceding Jackson by twenty-four hours, endeavored to
force the passage of Beaver Dam Creek, defended by the
Pennsylvanians under McCall. He was repulsed with considerable
loss on the Mechanicsville road. But, during the night, Porter
was compelled to fall back to a position more tenable against
a force become much superior to his own, Jackson and
Longstreet having united against his lines. On the 27th, then,
the Fifth Corps, with about 25,000 men, was assailed by 70,000
Confederates on Gaines' Mill Heights, and defended itself
there obstinately, until our own cavalry came fatally to the
enemy's aid. Unskilfully handled and roughly repulsed, it fell
back in disorder on our lines, where it put everything into
confusion, artillery and infantry. The Confederates, coming on
at the charge, finished the overthrow, and the Fifth Corps
would have been destroyed if the coming of the night had not
enabled our decimated troops to cross to the right bank of the
Chickahominy, destroying the bridges behind them. [This
battle, called Gaines' Mill by the Federals, was named Cold
Harbor, or Chickahominy, by the Rebels.] … As soon as Porter
had crossed safely on the 28th, the general retreat commenced.
Keyes crossed White Oak swamp first, and took position to
protect the passage of the immense army trains and the great
herds of cattle. Then, on the 29th, after having repulsed a
cavalry attack, he continued his way towards the James, where
he arrived on the 30th, at the same time that Porter reached
Haxall's Landing. Much less favored, the three other corps
suspended their march only to fight and ceased to fight only
to march. But all this was done without any general system, in
the absence of superior supervision, and of orders in
accordance with circumstances. On the 29th the enemy crossed
the Chickahominy to unite all his force on the right bank;
Franklin advised Sumner, and the two, acting together, fell
back on Savage Station, where they took up position, with the
intention, aided by Heintzelman, of repelling the dangerous
attack which menaced them. But Heintzelman, adhering to his
general instructions, after destroying the material of the
railroad, the provisions, munitions of war, arms and baggage
that there was neither time nor means of carrying away,
hastened to cross White Oak swamp, uncovering Sumner's left.
The latter learned of the retreat of the Third Corps only from
a furious attack by the enemy on the very side which he
believed protected by Heintzelman. He did not the less sustain
the shock with an unshakable solidity, and fought all the
afternoon with four divisions without being broken at any
point.
{3471}
The enemy, worn out by the useless attacks, retired at
nightfall. Then only did he receive any news from McClellan;
under the form of an order to Sumner to fall back, along with
Franklin, to the other side of White Oak swamp, abandoning our
general hospitals at Savage Station, and the 2,500 sick and
wounded in them. On the Morning of the 30th, Jackson presented
himself, to cross the swamp after us. He found the bridge
destroyed, and endeavored to force a passage at several
points. He was everywhere repulsed and kept in check the whole
day by the obstinate resistance of Franklin, while farther on,
towards the James, Longstreet was held by Heintzelman and
McCall, who prevented him from cutting our army in two at
Glendale. This was not done without hard fighting. The
Confederates, arriving by the New Market road at a right angle
to the Quaker road, which was our line of march, struck, in
the first place, the Pennsylvania reserves, broke their line,
outflanking it on the right and on the left, captured a
battery of artillery, and pushed resolutely on through that
dangerous breach. They then struck Hooker's division, which
threw them obliquely on Sumner's Corps. Soon afterward,
Kearney occupied the vacant space, and, as on the evening
before, the sun set with the rebels unsuccessful. [This day's
battle is variously named after Glendale, New Market,
Frazier's Farm, and Nelson's Farm.] But, the same evening,
Franklin, left without orders, and seeing his position was
becoming more and more dangerous, abandoned White Oak swamp
and fell back towards the James. At that news, which was
promptly sent to him from several directions, Heintzelman sent
in vain to headquarters to ask for instructions. Left to his
own devices, he concluded that the wisest course was to follow
the retrograde movement, and retreated with his corps. Sumner
still remained, and, seeing himself left alone and without
support, he decided, in his turn, to do as the others had
done. On the morning of the 31st, he arrived on the Malvern
Heights, where the three corps, the Second, Third, and Sixth,
found themselves united, not, as has been benevolently said,
by the wise combinations of General McClellan, but by the
fortunate inspiration of the commanders, who had received no
orders to that effect. 'At daylight,' said General Sumner, in
his testimony before the Congressional committee, 'I called on
General McClellan, on the banks of the James. He told me that
he had intended that the army should hold the position it had
the night before, and that no order for retreat had been sent;
but that, since the rest of the army had fallen back, he was
glad that I had done the same.' It was found that the plateau
of Malvern Hill was admirably formed for a defensive position.
General Humphreys, of the corps of topographical engineers,
was ordered to examine the position, and he traced a
formidable line with the left resting at Haxall's Landing on
the James, where it was protected by the gun-boats, while the
right was thrown back on some fields covered with thick woods,
and cut up by marshy streams. The summits and slopes of the
plateau were bristling with cannon, sweeping the plain over
the heads of our infantry deployed in front of them. In that
position, the army awaited a last attack. The enemy played
there his last card, and lost the game. … He tried his fortune
and gave battle July 1. On every point his columns were thrown
back in disorder, crushed in every attack by the double fire
of artillery and infantry. Dash was not enough now. On this
occasion, the enemy was compelled to acknowledge himself
beaten and incapable of pursuing us any further. But our men
were slow to believe in success. On receiving the order, a few
hours later, after night had put an end to the contest, to
retire to Harrison's Landing, they naturally concluded that we
were not strong enough to hold out long against the enemy. …
Worn out by fatigue and fighting, exhausted by privations and
by vigils, discouraged, and suspecting that it was not fortune
alone that had betrayed them, they dragged themselves along
without order … during that last night march, which had all
the character of a rout."
R. de Trobriand,
Four Years with the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 13.
"If McClellan deserves sharp criticism for not having sooner
made up his mind, and still more for his failure to discover
and use the absence of the Confederates in his front, where
his advance in mass, according to General Magruder's
officially expressed opinion, 'would have insured his success,
and the occupation of the works about Richmond, and
consequently the city,' his character as a commander never
shone so brightly as in the hour of disaster and danger, when
Porter's wing was driven in upon his centre. The ill-success
of his campaign as a whole has caused his conduct at this
crisis to be done scant justice to. But there is no military
reputation in the world which would not be increased by the
manner in which that retreat to the James was conducted from
the moment it began."
C. C. Chesney,
Essays in Military Biog.,
page 114.
ALSO IN:
W. Allan,
The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862,
chapters 12-17.
A. S. Webb,
Campaigns of the Civil War,
volume 3: The Peninsula, chapter 9.
F. J. Porter, W. B. Franklin, D. H. Hill, and others,
The Seven Days' Fighting
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2).
G. B. McClellan,
Complete Report,
part 2.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 11, parts. 1-2.
Report of Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War
(Senate Reports, 37th Congress,
3d session, volume 2, part 1).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(June-October: Tennessee-Kentucky).
Ineffective dispersion of Western armies.
Failure to secure Chattanooga and Vicksburg.
Bragg's invasion of Kentucky.
The race for Louisville.
Battle of Perryville.
End of Buell's campaign.
"We left the Federals in possession of Corinth and Memphis,
the army of Beauregard disappearing in the depths of
semi-tropical forests where the Tombigbee takes its source,
and Montgomery's ships lying at the bottom of the Mississippi.
See, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(APRIL-MAY: TENNESSEE-MISSISSIPPI)
and (JUNE: ON THE MISSISSIPPI).
The part to be played by the Federal fleets was fully laid
out; Farragut, by ascending the river, and Davis, by
descending it, were to endeavor to join hands and destroy all
the obstacles which still obstructed its course. What, in the
mean time, was the large army encamped at Corinth going to do?
It had allowed Beauregard to escape at the very moment when it
felt sure of crushing him; but it could yet strike some
decisive blows either to eastward or westward, the
Confederates being nowhere sufficiently numerous to make any
strong opposition.
{3472}
Eastward, Mitchell had forced open the way to Chattanooga and
approached the gap which opens south-east of that town, before
which, at a subsequent period, so much blood was shed at the
battles of Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge. He was master of
the passes of the Tennessee, and the Federals, stationed at
Corinth, could reach Chattanooga much more speedily than their
adversary encamped at Tupelo. They might probably conquer by
the same stroke the whole upper course of the river which
waters this town. Westward, the Federals could sweep both
sides of the Mississippi, cause all the Confederate works
which defended them to fall, and perhaps prevent the enemy
from erecting the formidable citadels of Vicksburg and Port
Hudson, the capture of which, at a later period, cost so dear.
… Everything … was in favor of prompt and vigorous action. But
Halleck divided his army, and, notwithstanding the resources
he had at his disposal, allowed his adversaries to forestall
him everywhere. … The army of the Ohio left Corinth on the
10th of June, and Buell was ordered to proceed with it in the
direction of Chattanooga, where Mitchell was beginning to be
sorely pressed; but this movement was slowly executed.
Sherman, at the head of his own division and that of Hurlbut,
proceeded toward Memphis, dropping detachments of troops as
far as Holly Springs to cover his left flank. The rebuilding
of the Mobile Railway, which had been completely destroyed by
the enemy, was a considerable undertaking. Begun on the 9th of
June, it was only finished on the 26th. The Confederates had
profited by this delay. The new general-in-chief, Braxton
Bragg [who had superseded Beauregard], had boldly divided his
army and abandoned the position of Tupelo, which Halleck still
believed him to occupy. He had determined to cover at once the
two points we have already indicated as being of the greatest
importance for the future of the war, Chattanooga and
Vicksburg. He proceeded toward the first with all the old army
of Johnston, consisting of the corps of Hardee and Polk, as
rapidly as the difficulties of communication in that portion
of the Southern States allowed. He had the merit and good
fortune to reach Chattanooga before Buell. It was not too
soon, for a few days previous, the 7th of June, the Federal
General Negley, with his single brigade and some cannon, had
nearly taken possession of this city by surprise. Bragg found
it of great advantage to transfer the war to the vicinity of
Chattanooga. Master of this position, indeed, he could menace
either Tennessee or Kentucky, Nashville or Louisville and
wrest from the Federals all the conquests they had achieved
during the last few months by taking them in rear. He was also
drawing near Virginia."
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 2, chapter 3.
"Halleck soon leaves for Washington to assume supreme control
of the Union forces from the War Department. Grant is left in
command of the Army of the Tennessee, Buell of the Army of the
Ohio, Pope of the Army of the Mississippi. Everyone is without
definite instructions; there is no one head; and the Western
armies are practically put upon the defensive. Rosecrans
succeeds Pope, who is transferred to Virginia, and to Grant's
lot now fall the armies of the Mississippi and Tennessee,
42,000 effectives, with which to keep open his communications
with Buell and guard the railroad from Memphis to Decatur.
While Grant and Sherman devote their energies to the line of
the Mississippi, Buell is ordered to regain East Tennessee,
where the loyal population is in extreme suffering. Mitchell's
[General O. M. Mitchell] capture of Huntsville [in Alabama,
which he surprised, by a remarkable forced march, from
Nashville, in April], and some hundred miles of the Memphis
and Charleston Railroad, which he had held, together with all
territory north of the Tennessee river, had been full of
possibilities. Had he but received the authority, he might
readily have anticipated Bragg in taking possession of
Chattanooga, and have saved much subsequent blood and
treasure. For this town is the key to that entire strategic
field. … Buell supposed that Bragg would attempt to turn his
right in order to obtain possession of Nashville. He therefore
concentrated the bulk of his force at Murfreesboro. Thomas,
then commanding a wing of the Army of the Ohio, whose military
intuitions were as keen as his judgment was reliable, … was
shrewd enough to recognize Bragg's crossing of the Tennessee
river as a threat to invade Kentucky. Not so Buell, to his
sorrow. By a sudden movement, Bragg steals a march around
Buell's left, through the Sequatchie Valley [August 28], and
marches straight toward Louisville, while Kirby Smith turns
Cumberland Gap, defeats Nelson at Richmond, and makes for
Cincinnati. … Thoroughly alarmed, as is also the country,
Buell at once swings his left in pursuit of Bragg, while he
endeavors to retain his grasp on Nashville with his right.
Bragg has the shorter line and the start. But he is delayed a
day or two [September 16-17] by the capture of Mumfordsville,
and by scattering his forces instead of pushing home. This is
a serious fault on Bragg's part. He fairly holds success in
his hand, but forfeits it by this delay. After some rapid
marching and manœuvring, Buell enters Louisville just ahead of
his opponent. The authorities in Washington have lost all
confidence in Buell. He is summarily relieved from command and
Thomas appointed to succeed him. But this magnanimous soldier,
though far from always agreeing with the methods of his chief,
declines the proffered honor, and, at his earnest
solicitation, Buell is reinstated. The Army of the Ohio
marches out to meet Bragg, with Thomas second in command.
Bragg expects to defend the line of the Kentucky and Duck
rivers, but divides his forces, leaving Kirby Smith near
Frankfort. Buell makes a demonstration upon Bragg's
communications. After some cautious feeling, Buell comes upon
Hardee with only 15,000 men, at Perryville, where, had he at
once attacked, he could have punished Bragg severely for this
division. But, owing to lack of water, one-half of Buell's
army is distant from the field, and he in turn pays the
penalty of lack of concentration. Polk joins Hardee, and the
latter [October 8] falls heavily upon McCook, who holds
Buell's left, and bears him back. But he cannot break the
Union centre; and after a stubborn conflict Bragg retires,
leaving to our forces the field. Our left has not been
engaged. The loss is nearly 5,000 men on either side, a
quarter of the numbers actually engaged. On being followed up,
Bragg retreats through Cumberland Gap, and leaves Kentucky and
Tennessee once more in our possession. His retreat ends only
at Chattanooga.
{3473}
What Bragg expected to obtain in Kentucky was a vast accession
of recruits and horses, as did Lee in Maryland. Both fell
short of their calculations, though Bragg carried off a goodly
train of supplies. Forgetful of what he had really done, the
South was bitter in its criticism of Bragg's failure to hold
Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. … Halleck now insists that
Buell shall undertake a campaign in East Tennessee, still
occupied by the enemy. But Buell alleges the utter
impossibility of subsisting his troops so far from the
railroad; and again concentrates at Nashville. Here he is
relieved [October 30] and General Rosecrans is appointed to
the command."
T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War,
chapter 15.
ALSO IN:
D. C. Buell, J. Wheeler, and others,
The Perryville Campaign
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3).
T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapters 12-15 (volume 1).
J. B. Fry,
Operations of the Army under Buell.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 16.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July).
Three hundred thousand more.
On the 2d of July, 1862, the President issued his proclamation
calling for 300,000 volunteers.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July).
Land-grant for agricultural and mechanical Colleges.
See EDUCATION, MODERN: AMERICA: A. D. 1862.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July).
Prescription of the Ironclad Oath.
See IRONCLAD OATH.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July).
The fitting out of the Rebel cruiser, Alabama, at Liverpool.
See ALABAMA CLAIMS: A. D. 1862-1864.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July).
Confiscation of the property of rebels,
giving freedom to their slaves.
Immediately on the assembling of Congress at its regular
session in December, 1861, "Mr. Trumbull of Illinois
introduced a bill, providing that the slaves of all who had
taken up arms against the United States should 'become forever
thereafter free, any law to the contrary notwithstanding.' …
On the 25th of February it came up for general debate, which
was very extended. … Divergences of views, even among those
who had been most prominent and pronounced in their
antislavery action, and the general drift of the discussion,
seemed to preclude any reasonable hope of agreement upon any
motion or measure then before the Senate. It was therefore
moved by Mr. Clark of New Hampshire to refer the whole matter,
the original bill, and all motions, amendments, and
substitutes, to a select committee. This, too, gave rise to a
sharp debate. … The motion was carried by a vote of 24 to 14;
and the committee, consisting of Clark, Collamer, Trumbull,
Cowan, Wilson, Harris, Sherman, Henderson, and Willey, was
appointed. Mr. Trumbull declining, Mr. Harlan was appointed in
his place. The committee reported 'a bill to suppress
insurrection, and punish treason and rebellion'; and on the
16th of May it came up for consideration. Its main provision
was that at any time after the passage of the act, the
President might issue his proclamation that the slaves of
persons found, 30 days after the issuing of the proclamation,
in arms against the government, will be free, any law or
custom to the contrary; that no slave escaping from his master
shall be given up, unless the claimant proves he has not given
aid or comfort to the Rebellion; and that the President shall
be authorized to employ persons of African descent for the
suppression of the Rebellion. … The bill was further debated,
but did not reach a vote. In the House a substantially similar
course was pursued. On the first day of the regular session
Mr. Eliot of Massachusetts introduced a resolution
confiscating the property and freeing the slaves of those
engaged in the Rebellion. It did not, however, come up for
consideration till the close of the following week. … A motion
was finally made and carried to refer the whole subject to a
select committee of seven, consisting of Olin, Eliot, Noell,
Hutchins, Mallory, Beaman, and Cobb. Mr. Olin was excused, and
Mr. Sedgwick of New York was appointed in his place. On the
14th of May Mr. Eliot from the committee reported two
bills,—the one confiscating Rebel property, and the other
freeing the slaves of Rebels,—and opened the debate on 'the
twin measures of confiscation and emancipation.' … On the 26th
of May Mr. Eliot closed the debate, and the two bills he had
reported from the special committee were brought to a vote.
The first, or that providing for the confiscation of Rebel
property, was passed by a strong majority. The second, or that
freeing the slaves of Rebels, coming up for action, the first
business was the disposal of the several amendments that had
been offered. The amendments having all been voted down, the
original bill was lost by a vote of 74 to 78. That vote was,
however, reconsidered and the bill was recommitted. On the

18th of June Mr. Eliot moved a substitute for the bill
reported by the committee, which was accepted by the House,
and the bill, as thus amended, was passed by a vote of 82 to
54. The gist of this bill consisted in the provision, that all
slaves of persons found in rebellion 60 days after the
President shall issue his proclamation should be free; and the
President should appoint commissioners to carry its provisions
into effect. The House confiscation bill was taken up in the
Senate on the 23d of June. An amendment was moved by Mr. Clark
combining confiscation and emancipation. The amendment was
sharply debated, but was adopted on the 28th. The bill as
amended was adopted by a vote of 28 to 13. The bill as thus
amended was taken up in the House on the 3d of July, and the
House non-concurred in the Senate's amendment. … A committee
of conference was appointed, which reported, on the 11th, in
substance the Senate amendment. The report was accepted by
both bodies, … and the President gave it his approval on the
17th. It provided that all slaves of Rebels coming into the
possession or under the protection of the government should be
deemed captives of war, and made free; that fugitive slaves
should not be surrendered; that no person engaged in the
military or naval service should render fugitives on pain of
being dismissed from the service; and that the President might
employ persons of the African race for the suppression of the
Rebellion in such manner as he might deem best."
H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America,
volume 3, chapter 25.
ALSO IN:
J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, pages 373-377.
E. McPherson,
Political History of the United States during the Rebellion,
pages 196-203.
{3474}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-August: Virginia).
The end of the Peninsular Campaign.
The army at Harrison's Landing.
Results of the Seven Days fighting.
Withdrawal from the Peninsula.
"On reaching Harrison's Landing there were scarcely 50,000 men
in the ranks, but on the 4th of July, when the corps
commanders made their reports, it was found that the net
losses of the army since the 20th of June amounted to 15,249
men, of whom 1,582 had been killed, 7,700 wounded, and 5,958
missing. This last figure comprised, besides prisoners, all
the soldiers who had been left on the field of battle, whose
fate, whether killed or wounded, could not be ascertained; to
this number may be added, without exaggeration, 6,000 sick or
lame who had gone to the hospital in consequence of the
excessive fatigues of the preceding days. McClellan therefore
found himself with about 84,000 men under arms, not counting
those who had just joined him. The losses of Lee's army during
the seven days amounted to 20,000 men, to which number must
also be added at least 5,000 rendered unfit for active service
by the same causes which had operated with his adversaries;
this army, therefore, had undergone a diminution of 25,000
men. This was more than one-fourth of its effective force on
the 26th of June. An interlude was to follow this great
struggle. While McClellan was fortifying himself at Harrison's
Landing, Lee, hampered like himself by the difficulty of
subsisting his army, was obliged to fall back as far as the
environs of Richmond. … In the estimation of those who did not
allow themselves to be troubled by foolish alarms and were not
blinded by party prejudices, McClellan's situation was far
from bad. … Planted on the James, McClellan could, either by
ascending this river or by seizing upon Petersburg, strike
much deadlier blows at Richmond than when his army lay across
the Chickahominy, far from any water communication. Such was
the position of the two armies about the 7th of July. On this
day the steamer coming from Fortress Monroe landed a passenger
at Harrison's Landing, whose dress, as simple as his manners,
did not at first attract any attention, but in whom people
soon recognized President Lincoln. He had come to consult with
the commander of the army of the Potomac about the measures to
be adopted under those grave circumstances. … On the occasion
of his interview with McClellan at Harrison's Landing, the
latter had so thoroughly demonstrated the importance of that
position that [the President] went back fully determined to
allow the chief of the army of the Potomac full freedom of
action. But General Halleck … claimed for himself, as
commander-in-chief [lately so appointed], the exclusive
direction of all the armies in the field, and Mr. Lincoln,
conscious of his own incompetency, submitted to this new
authority." Measures taken during July for placing the army of
the Potomac again upon the offensive were altered on the 3d of
August, when Halleck gave orders to McClellan to transfer his
army with all possible expedition to Aquia Creek, on the
Potomac, for the support of General Pope and the Army of
Virginia.
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 1, chapter 4
and book 3, chapter 1.
ALSO IN:
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 5, chapter 24.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (July-August: Virginia).
The beginning of Pope's campaign: Cedar Mountain, or Cedar Run.
"While Lee and McClellan were resting, important events were
taking place at Washington and in Northern Virginia. The
Federal administration, satisfied of the impolicy of the
separate departments and independent commands which they had
organized in that region, had determined to unite under one
leader the three armies of Banks, Fremont, and McDowell, which
Jackson had beaten or baffled in succession. … Their united
armies were henceforth to be styled the Army of Virginia,
while McClellan's forces continued to be known as the Army of
the Potomac. General John Pope, whose deeds and still more his
dispatches in the West, had given him some reputation, was
called to Washington and placed at the head of the new army.
General Pope was assigned to command on the 26th of June. …
The unification of these commands under Pope was followed by
another and still more important change of the same kind. The
dissatisfaction of the Federal administration with General
McClellan had been steadily growing for many months. This
officer's caution often exposed him, and sometimes not
unjustly, to the charge of timidity. … No doubt other causes,
such as his moderation and his conservative political views,
rendered him distasteful to the progressive radicals who at
this time predominated in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet; but it must
be confessed that McClellan's military conduct was not such as
to inspire confidence or diminish antagonisms, and it, alone,
is sufficient to account for the manner in which he was
treated by his government. … After the Seven Days' Battles,
the Federal government called General Halleck from the West …
and placed him in chief command of the armies of the United
States, the position from which McClellan had been deposed in
March. The order assigning General Halleck was dated July 11,
but the latter did not arrive in Washington and enter upon his
duties until Ju]y 23. By this appointment it was designed to
give a common head to the two armies in Virginia, and insure
the cooperation of McClellan and Pope. The first great
question that presented itself to Halleck was, what to do with
McClellan's forces, and on the day after assuming command he
left Washington to visit this army. The visit seems to have
satisfied him of the propriety of withdrawing the Army of the
Potomac at once from the Peninsula, and of placing it on the
line of the Rappahannock. … During the month of Ju]y, while
McClellan was resting at Westover, General Pope, though in
Washington, was not idle. Having devoted some days to the
reorganization and equipment of his command, he directed the
concentration of the mass of his forces at the eastern base of
the Blue Ridge Mountains in Rappahannock County, from which
position he could cover the approach to Washington, or
threaten the flank of any columns going toward the Shenandoah
Valley, while he prepared for an aggressive campaign. …
General Lee on July 13 ordered Jackson with the veteran troops
of his own and Ewell's division to Gordonsville to oppose
Pope's advance. The force thus sent numbered about 11,000 men.
Robertson's brigade of cavalry, which was already in Pope's
front, added 1,000 or 1,200 more. General Lee remained with
some 65,000 men between McClellan and Richmond. General
Jackson reached the vicinity of Gordonsville on July 19. His
arrival was opportune. The Federal reconnoitring parties had
already advanced through Culpeper to the Rapidan, and on July
14 Banks had been ordered to send forward all his cavalry
under Hatch to seize Gordonsville."
William Allan,
The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862,
chapter 20.
{3475}
"After ascertaining that the enemy were in large force under
General Pope … Jackson applied to General Lee for
reinforcements. The division of A. P. Hill was immediately
sent to him, and, with this accession to his small army,
Jackson had no intention of remaining idle or of awaiting an
attack from so powerful a foe, but determined to strike a blow
himself before the enemy had time to concentrate all their
forces. He therefore advanced towards them on the 7th of
August. Before taking this step, it was observed that he was
much in prayer, but this was his custom previous to every
battle. … Pope's army was gathering in all its strength at
Culpepper Court-House, and on the 9th of August Jackson's
little army came in contact with his advance-guard about six
miles from the Court-House, on the borders of a little stream
called Cedar Run. Here hostilities began by a furious
cannonade on both sides, lasting two hours, when, about five
o'clock in the afternoon, the infantry of both armies became
hotly engaged. The conflict was fierce and stubborn, but the
overwhelming numbers of the enemy swept down with such
impetuosity that the weaker party were forced to yield, and it
looked as if it were doomed to destruction. Ewell, Early, A.
P. Hill, Winder, and other commanders all fought their bravest
and best—the gallant Winder receiving a mortal wound—and
still they were pressed back. 'It was at this fearful moment,'
says his late chief-of-staff, Dr. Dabney, 'that the genius of
the storm reared his head, and in an instant the tide was
turned, Jackson appeared in the mid-torrent of the highway, …
he drew his own sword (the first time in the war), and shouted
to the broken troops with a voice which pealed higher than the
roar of battle: "Rally, brave men, and press forward! Your
general will lead you! Jackson will lead you† Follow me!" This
appeal was not in vain, and the Federals, startled by this
unexpected rally, were driven from the field. They afterwards
made an attempt to retrieve the fortunes of the day, which
they had so nearly won, by an assault from a magnificent body
of cavalry, but even this was repelled, and the troopers
driven in full retreat.' … This battle of Cedar Run [called
Cedar Mountain by the Unionists] Jackson himself pronounced
the most successful of his exploits. … In this battle the
Confederates had between eighteen and twenty thousand men
engaged, while the Federals, according to their own returns,
had thirty-two thousand. Jackson, however, had one
incalculable advantage over the enemy, which he gained by his
promptitude in seizing and holding Slaughter's Mountain—an
elevation which commanded all the surrounding plains, and
enabled him to overlook the whole scene of action. … It was to
the advantage of this position as well as the bravery of his
troops that he was indebted for his complete success. By this
victory Pope received such a blow that he was deterred from
making another advance until he could gather reinforcements.
Burnside's corps was withdrawn from North Carolina and sent on
to Culpepper Court-House, and it was believed that McClellan's
remaining forces would be recalled from James River and sent
also to swell the ranks of the grand 'Army of Virginia,' as
the command of Pope was called. At all events, General Lee was
convinced that McClellan was incapable of further aggression,
and that the most effective way to dislodge him from the
Peninsula was to threaten Washington! He therefore determined
to move his army from Richmond to Gordonsville. He began his
march on the 13th, and four days after, on the 17th, McClellan
evacuated the Peninsula and removed his troops to the
Potomac." Pope's army was withdrawn behind the Rappahannock.
"General Lee now ordered Jackson to cross the Rappahannock
high up, and by a forced march go to Manassas and get in
Pope's rear. Other divisions were sent to Pope's front, and
the two hostile armies marched along on either side of the
stream, opening fire upon each other whenever the opportunity
offered. Jackson continued his march up stream until he
reached Warrenton Springs, on the 22d, where he found the
bridge destroyed, but he passed Early's brigade over on a
mill-dam, and took possession of the Springs. Before other
troops could be crossed to his support, a sudden and heavy
rainfall swelled the river so as to render it impassable, and
Early was thus cut off from his friends and surrounded by the
enemy. His situation was one of extreme peril, but he managed
to conceal his troops in the woods, and hold his foes at bay
with artillery, until Jackson had constructed a temporary
bridge, and by the dawn of the morning of the 24th the gallant
Early, with his command, had recrossed the river without the
loss of a man. While a fierce artillery duel was going on
across the river between A. P. Hill and the enemy, Jackson
left the river-bank a few miles, and marched to the village of
Jeffersonton. He was thus lost sight of by the Federals, and
to Longstreet was given the task of amusing Pope by the
appearance of a crossing at Warrenton Springs. Jackson was now
preparing to obey Lee's order to separate himself from the
rest of the army, pass around Pope to the westward, and place
his corps between him and Washington at Manassas Junction.
Mrs. M. A. Jackson,
Life and letters of General Thomas J. Jackson,
chapter 17.
ALSO IN:
G. H. Gordon.
History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia,
chapters 1-3.
W. C. Bryant and S. H. Gay,
Popular History of the United States,
volume 4, chapter 19.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(July-September: Missouri-Arkansas).
Warfare with the Rebel Guerrillas.
"Since the autumn of 1861, General J. M. Schofield, Lyon's
second at the battle of Wilson's Creek, had been in command of
the militia of Missouri, and in June, 1862, that State was
erected into a separate military district, with Schofield at
its head. He was vigilant and active; but when Curtis withdrew
to the Mississippi, and left Arkansas and Southern Missouri
open to the operations of guerrilla bands, then numerous in
the western part of the former State, he found his forces
inadequate to keep down the secessionists in his district.
When Price crossed the Mississippi, early in May, he sent back
large numbers of Missourians to recruit guerrilla bands for
active service during, the summer, and these, at the middle of
July, were very numerous in the interior, and were preparing
to seize important points in the State. To meet the danger,
Schofield obtained authority from the Governor to organize all
the militia of the State.
{3476}
This drew a sharp dividing line between the loyal and disloyal
inhabitants. He soon had 50,000 names on his rolls, of whom
nearly 20,000 were ready for effective service at the close of
July, when the failure of the campaign against Richmond so
encouraged the secessionists in Missouri that it was very
difficult to keep them in check. Schofield's army of
volunteers and militia was scattered over Missouri in six
divisions, and for two months a desperate and sanguinary
guerrilla warfare was carried on in the bosom of that
Commonwealth, the chief theater being northward of the
Missouri River, in McNeill's division, where insurgent bands
under leaders like Poindexter, Porter, Cobb, and others, about
5,000 strong, were very active." They were also aided by
incursions from Arkansas, under Hughes, Coffey and other
leaders. The encounters were many and fierce. At Kirksville,
August 6, and Chariton River, four days later, the loyal
forces achieved considerable victories; at Independence (which
was captured) August 11, and at Lone Jack, about the same
time, they suffered defeat. These were the principal
engagements of the month. With the cooperation of General
Blunt, commanding in Kansas, the Arkansas invasion was driven
back. Missouri was now somewhat relieved, but the Confederates
were gathering in force in Arkansas, where they were joined by
conscripts from Southern Missouri and a large number of troops
from Texas. Their entire number was estimated to be 50,000 at
the middle of September, with General T. C. Hindman in chief
command. … So threatening was this gathering that Schofield
took the field in person, and General Curtis succeeded him in
command of the District of Missouri." Schofield's vanguard,
under General Salomon, encountered the enemy at Newtonia,
September 30, and was defeated; but the Confederates retreated
before the united forces of Schofield and Blunt and "were
chased about 30 miles into Arkansas."
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 2, chapter 20.
ALSO IN:
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 4, chapter 3.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August).
Draft of Militia for nine months.
By proclamation, August 4, the President ordered a draft of
300,000 militia, for nine months service unless sooner
discharged.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August).
President Lincoln's "policy" explained to Horace Greeley.
"Executive Mansion, Washington, August 22, 1862.
Hon. Horace Greeley.
Dear Sir:
I have just read yours of the 19th, addressed to myself
through the New York 'Tribune.' If there be in it any
statements or assumptions of fact which I may know to be
erroneous, I do not, now and here, controvert them. If there
be in it any inferences which I may believe to be falsely
drawn, I do not, now and here, argue against them. If there be
perceptible in it an impatient and dictatorial tone, I waive
it in deference to an old friend whose heart I have always
supposed to be right. As to the policy I 'seem to be
pursuing,' as you say, I have not meant to leave anyone in
doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest
way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority
can be restored, the nearer the Union will be the Union as it
was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless
they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with
them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless
they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree
with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the
Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I
could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it;
and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do
it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others
alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the
colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the
Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe
it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I
shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do
more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause.
I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I
shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true
views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of
official duty; and I intend no modification of my
oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be
free.
Yours, A. Lincoln."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, page 227-228.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August: Virginia.)
General Pope's campaign: Stonewall Jackson's movement
into the rear of the Federal Army.
"By the capture of Pope's papers [effected in a raid of
Stuart's cavalry to the Federal rear] Lee gained an accurate
knowledge of the situation of the Federal army. Acting on it,
he ordered Jackson to advance his corps to Jeffersonton and
secure the bridge over the Rappahannock at Warrenton Springs.
… Jackson, on arriving at Jeffersonton in the afternoon of the
22d, found that the bridge on the Warrenton turnpike had been
destroyed by the Federals. … On the 23d Lee ordered
Longstreet's corps to follow Jackson and mass in the vicinity
of Jeffersonton. The headquarters of the army was also moved
to that place. … General Longstreet made a feint on the
position of Warrenton on the morning of the 24th, under cover
of which Jackson's corps was withdrawn from the front to the
vicinity of the road from Jeffersonton to the upper fords of
the Rappahannock. Jackson was then directed to make
preparations to turn the Federal position and seize their
communications about Manassas Junction. Longstreet continued
his cannonade at intervals throughout the day, to which the
Federals replied with increasing vigor, showing that Pope was
massing his army in Lee's front. It was the object of Lee to
hold Pope in his present position by deluding him with the
belief that it was his intention to force a passage of the
river at that point, until Jackson by a flank movement could
gain his rear. Longstreet, on the morning of the 25th, resumed
his cannonade with increased energy, and at the same time made
a display of infantry above and below the bridge. Jackson
then, moved up the river to a ford eight miles above; crossing
at that point and turning eastward, by a rapid march he
reached the vicinity of Salem. Having made a march of 25
miles, he bivouacked for the night. Stuart's cavalry covered
his right flank, the movement being masked by the natural
features of the country. The next morning at dawn the march
was resumed by the route through Thoroughfare Gap. The
cavalry, moving well to the right, passed around the west end
of Bull Run Mountain and joined the infantry at the village of
Gainesville, a few miles from the Orange and Alexandria Railroad.
{3477}
Pressing forward, still keeping the cavalry well to the right,
Jackson struck the railroad at Bristoe Station late in the
afternoon, where he captured two empty trains going east.
After dark he sent a detachment under Stuart to secure
Manassas Junction, the main depot of supplies of the Federal
army. The cavalry moved upon the flanks of this position,
while the infantry, commanded by Trimble, assaulted the works
in front and carried them with insignificant loss, capturing
two batteries of light artillery with their horses and a
detachment of 300 men, besides an immense amount of army
supplies. The next morning, after effectually destroying the
railroad at Bristoe, Jackson … moved his main body to
Manassas, where he allowed his troops a few hours to refresh
themselves upon the abundant stores that had been captured.
About 12 o'clock the sound of artillery in the direction of
Bristoe announced the Federal advance. Not having
transportation to remove the captured supplies, Jackson
directed his men to take what they could carry off, and
ordered the rest to be destroyed. General Ewell, having
repulsed the advance of two Federal columns [at Bristoe
Station], rejoined Jackson at Manassas. The destruction of the
captured stores having been completed, Jackson retired with
his whole force to Bull Run, and took a position for the
night, a part of his troops resting on the battle-field of the
previous year. Pope, … upon learning that Jackson was in his
rear, … immediately abandoned his position on the Rappahannock
and proceeded with al despatch to intercept him before he
could be reinforced by Lee. His advance having been arrested
on the 27th by Ewell, he did not proceed beyond Bristoe that
day. Lee on the 26th withdrew Longstreet's corps from its
position in front of Warrenton Springs, covering the
withdrawal by a small rear-guard and artillery, and directed
it to follow Jackson by the route he had taken the day before.
… The corps bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of Salem.
On the morning of the succeeding day, the 27th, a messenger
appeared bringing the important and cheering news of the
success of Jackson at Bristoe and Manassas. … Thoroughfare Gap
was reached about noon of the 28th. It was quickly found to be
occupied by a Federal force. Some slight attempt was made to
dislodge the enemy, but without success, as their position
proved too strong, and it seemed as if the movement of the
Confederate army in that direction was destined to be
seriously interfered with. Meanwhile, nothing further had been
heard from Jackson, and there was a natural anxiety in regard
to his position and possible peril. … Under these critical
circumstances General Lee made every effort to find some
available route over the mountains," and had already succeeded
in doing so when his adversary saved him further trouble.
"Pope … had ordered McDowell to retire from the Gap and join
him to aid in the anticipated crushing of Jackson. McDowell
did so, leaving Rickett's division to hold the Gap. In evident
ignorance of the vicinity of Longstreet's corps, this force
was also withdrawn during the night, and on the morning of the
29th Lee found the Gap unoccupied, and at once marched through
at the head of Longstreet's column. … Pope had unknowingly
favored the advance of the Confederate commander. His removal
of McDowell from his position had been a tactical error of
such magnitude that it could not well be retrieved. … The
cannonade at the Gap on the 28th had informed Jackson of Lee's
proximity. He at once took a position north of the Warrenton
turnpike, his left resting on Bull Run. … About three o'clock
the Federals bore down in heavy force upon Ewell and
Taliaferro, who maintained their positions with admirable
firmness, repelling attack after attack until night. The loss
on both sides was considerable. … Jackson, with barely 20,000
men, now found himself confronted by the greater part of the
Federal army. Any commander with less firmness would have
sought safety in retreat. But having heard the Confederate
guns at Thoroughfare Gap, he knew that Lee would join him the
next day. Therefore he determined to hold his position at all
hazards. By the morning of the 29th … Hood's division had
reached the south side of the mountain, and early in the day
was joined by the remainder of Longstreet's corps, by way of
the open Gap. While these important movements were in
progress, Pope had resumed his attack upon Jackson. … On the
arrival of Lee, Pope discontinued his attack, and retired to
the position which the year before had been the scene of the
famous battle of Bull Run, or Manassas."
A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 11.
ALSO IN:
R. L. Dabney,
Life and Campaigns of General Thomas J. Jackson.
G. H. Gordon,
History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia,
chapters 4-10.
W. B. Taliaferro,
Jackson's Raid around Pope
(Battles and Leader, volume 2, pages 501-511).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (August-September: Virginia).
The end of General Pope's campaign: Groveton.
Second Bull Run.
Chantilly.
"By contradictory orders and the useless marches and
counter-marches they involved, Pope's opportunity was thrown
away, and instead of fighting Jackson's corps alone, it was
the entire army of Lee with which he had to deal,—this, too,
with his forces very much out of position, and he himself
ignorant both of his own situation and that of the enemy.
When, towards noon [August 29], Pope, coming from Centreville,
reached the field near Groveton, he found the situation as
follows: Heintzelman's two divisions, under Hooker and
Kearney, on the right, in front and west of the Sudley Springs
road; Reno and Sigel holding the centre,—Sigel's line being
extended a short distance south of the Warrenton turnpike;
Reynolds with his division on the left. But the commander was
ignorant of the whereabouts of both Porter and McDowell, and
he knew not that Longstreet had joined Jackson! The troops had
been considerably cut up by the brisk skirmishing that had
been going on all morning. An artillery contest had also been
waged all forenoon between the opposing lines; but it was at
long range and of no effect. The position of the troops in
front of Jackson's intrenched line was one that promised very
little success for a direct attack, and especially for a
partial attack. Nevertheless, at three o'clock, Pope ordered
Hooker to assault. The attempt was so unpromising that that
officer remonstrated against it; but the order being
imperative, he made a very determined attack with his
division," and was driven back.
{3478}
"Too late for united action, Kearney was sent to Hooker's
assistance, and he also suffered repulse. Meanwhile, Pope had
learnt the position of Porter's command, and, at half-past
four in the afternoon, sent orders to that officer to assail
the enemy's right flank and rear,—Pope erroneously believing
the right flank of Jackson, near Groveton, to be the right of
the Confederate line. Towards six, when he thought Porter
should be coming into action, he directed Heintzelman and Reno
to assault the enemy's left. The attack was made with vigor,
especially by Kearney," but the enemy brought up heavy
reserves and repelled the assault. "Turning now to the left,
where Porter was to have assailed the Confederate left
[right], it appears that the order which Pope sent at
half-past four did not reach Porter till about dusk. He then
made dispositions for attack, but it was too late. It is,
however, more than doubtful that, even had the order been
received in time, any thing but repulse would have resulted
from its execution. … Contrary to Pope's opinion, he [Porter]
had then, and had had since noon, Longstreet's entire corps
before him. So, as firing now died away in the darkling woods
on the right, a pause was put for the day to the chaos and
confusion of this mismanaged battle [known as the battle of
Groveton], in which many thousand men had fallen on the Union
side. It would have been judicious for General Pope, in the
then condition of his army, to have that night withdrawn
across Bull Run and taken position at Centreville, or even
within the fortifications of Washington. By doing so he would
have united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, then
between Washington and Centreville. … With untimely obstinacy,
Pope determined to remain and again try the issue of battle.
To utilize Porter's corps, he drew it over from the isolated
position it had held the previous day to the Warrenton road. …
Now, by one of those curious conjunctures which sometimes
occur in battle, it so was that the opposing commanders had
that day formed each the same resolution: Pope had determined
to attack Lee's left flank, and Lee had determined to attack
Pope's left flank. And thus it came about that when
Heintzelman pushed forward to feel the enemy's left, the
refusal of that flank by Lee, and his withdrawal of troops to
his right for the purpose of making his contemplated attack on
Pope's left, gave the impression that the Confederates were
retreating up the Warrenton turnpike towards Gainesville. …
Pope … telegraphed to Washington that the enemy was
'retreating to the mountains,'—a dispatch which, flashed
throughout the land, gave the people a few hours, at least, of
unmixed pleasure. To take advantage of the supposed 'retreat'
of Lee, Pope ordered McDowell with three corps—Porter's in the
advance—to follow up rapidly on the Warrenton turnpike, and
'press the enemy vigorously during the whole day.' But no
sooner were the troops put in motion to make this pursuit of a
supposed flying foe, than the Confederates, hitherto concealed
in the forest in front of Porter, uncovered themselves." The
result of this misdirected movement was a fatal check,
Porter's troops being fearfully cut up and driven back.
"Jackson immediately took up the pursuit, and was joined by a
general advance of the whole Confederate line—Longstreet
extending his right so as, if possible, to cut off the retreat
of the Union forces." In this attempt, however, he was foiled,
and "under cover of the darkness the wearied troops retired
across Bull Run, by the stone bridge, and took position on the
heights of Centreville. Owing to the obscurity of the night,
and the uncertainty of the fords of Bull Run, Lee attempted no
pursuit." The engagement of this day is called the Second
Battle of Bull Run, or the Second Battle of Manassas, as it
was named by the Confederate victors. "At Centreville, Pope
united with the corps of Franklin and Sumner, and he remained
there during the whole of the 31st. But Lee had now yet given
up the pursuit. Leaving Longstreet on the battle-field, he
sent Jackson by a detour on Pope's right, to strike the Little
River turnpike, and by that route to Fairfax Courthouse; to
intercept, if possible, Pope's retreat to Washington.
Jackson's march was much retarded by a heavy storm that
commenced the day before and still continued. Pope, meantime,
fell back to positions covering Fairfax Courthouse and
Germantown; and on the evening of the 1st of September,
Jackson struck his right, posted at Ox Hill." The short but
severe action which then occurred (called the battle of
Chantilly) was indecisive. Jackson's attack was repelled, but
the repulse cost the lives of two excellent officers of high
rank and reputation, Generals Kearney and Stevens, besides
many men. "On the following day, September 2d, the army was,
by order of General Halleck, drawn back within the lines of
Washington."
W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
pages 184-193.
"The Second Battle of Bull Hun … was a severe defeat for
General Pope; but it was nothing else. It was not a rout, nor
anything like a rout. … Lee claims to have captured in these
engagements 30 pieces of artillery and 7,000 unwounded
prisoners."
J. C. Ropes,
The Army under Pope
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 4),
chapters 8-11.
ALSO IN:
G. H. Gordon,
History of the Campaign of the Army of Virginia,
chapters 11-13.
The Virginia Campaign of General Pope
(Massachusetts Military Historical Society Papers, volume 2).
J. Pope,
The Second Battle of Bull Run
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2, pages 449-494).
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 12, part 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland).
Lee's first invasion: His cold reception and disappointment.
"The defeat of General Pope opened the way for movements not
contemplated, probably, by General Lee, when he marched from
Richmond. … He accordingly determined to advance into
Maryland—the fortifications in front of Washington, and the
interposition of the Potomac, a broad stream easily defended,
rendering a movement in that direction unpromising. On the 3d
of September, therefore, and without waiting to rest his army,
which was greatly fatigued with the nearly continuous marching
and fighting since it had left the Rapidan, General Lee moved
toward Leesburg, crossed his forces near that place, and to
the music of the bands playing the popular air, 'Maryland, my
Maryland,' advanced to Frederick City, which he occupied on
the 7th of September. Lee's object in invading Maryland has
been the subject of much discussion. … It can only be said
that General Lee, doubtless, left the future to decide his
ultimate movements; meanwhile he had a distinct and
clearly-defined aim, which he states in plain words.
{3479}
His object was to draw the Federal forces out of Virginia. …
The condition of affairs in Maryland, General Lee says,
'encouraged the belief that the presence of our army, however
inferior to that of the enemy, would induce the Washington
Government to retain all its available force to provide for
contingencies which its course toward the people of that State
gave it reason to apprehend,' and to cross the Potomac 'might
afford us an opportunity to aid the citizens of Maryland in
any efforts they might be disposed to make to recover their
liberty.' It may be said, in summing up on this point, that
Lee expected volunteers to enroll themselves under his
standard, tempted to do so by the hope of throwing off the
yoke of the Federal Government, and the army certainly shared
this expectation. The identity of sentiment generally between
the people of the States of Maryland and Virginia, and their
strong social ties in the past, rendered this anticipation
reasonable, and the feeling of the country at the result
afterward was extremely bitter. Such were the first designs of
Lee; his ultimate aim seems as clear. By advancing into
Maryland and threatening Baltimore and Washington, he knew
that he would force the enemy to withdraw all their troops
from the south bank of the Potomac, where they menaced the
Confederate communications with Richmond; when this was
accomplished, as it clearly would be, his design was, to cross
the Maryland extension of the Blue Ridge, called there the
South Mountain, advance by way of Hagerstown into the
Cumberland Valley, and, by thus forcing the enemy to follow
him, draw them to a distance from their base of supplies,
while his own communications would remain open by way of the
Shenandoah Valley. … The Southern army was concentrated in the
neighborhood of Frederick City by the 7th of September, and on
the next day General Lee Issued an address to the people of
Maryland. … This address, couched in terms of such dignity,
had little effect upon the people. Either their sentiment in
favor of the Union was too strong, or they found nothing in
the condition Of affairs to encourage their Southern feelings.
A large Federal force was known to be advancing; Lee's army,
in tatters, and almost without supplies, presented a very
uninviting appearance to recruits, and few joined his
standard, the population in general remaining hostile or
neutral. … Lee soon discovered that he must look solely to his
own men for success in his future movements. He faced that
conviction courageously; and, without uttering a word of
comment, or indulging in any species of crimination against
the people of Maryland, resolutely commenced his movements
looking to the capture of Harper's Ferry and the invasion of
Pennsylvania."
J. E. Cooke,
Life of Robert E. Lee,
part 5, chapters 1-2.
ALSO IN:
A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 12.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September: Maryland).
Lee's first invasion: Harper's Ferry.
South Mountain.
Antietam.
"On the 2d of September the President went to General
McClellan's house in Washington, asked him to take command
again of the Army of the Potomac, in which Pope's army had now
been merged, and verbally authorized him to do so at once. The
first thing that McClellan wanted was the withdrawal of
Miles's force, 11,000 men, from Harper's Ferry—where, he said,
it was useless and helpless—and its addition to his own force.
All authorities agree that in this he was obviously and
unquestionably right; but the marplot hand of Halleck
intervened, and Miles was ordered to hold the place. Halleck's
principal reason appeared to be a reluctance to abandon a
place where so much expense had been laid out. Miles, a worthy
subordinate for such a chief, interpreted Halleck's orders
with absolute literalness, and remained in the town, instead
of holding it by placing his force on the heights that command
it. As soon as it was known that Lee was in Maryland,
McClellan set his army in motion northward, to cover
Washington and Baltimore and find an opportunity for a
decisive battle. He arrived with his advance in Frederick on
the 12th, and met with a reception in striking contrast to
that accorded to the army that had left the town two days
before. … But this flattering reception was not the best
fortune that befell the Union army in Frederick. On his
arrival in the town General McClellan came into possession of
a copy of General Lee's order, dated three days before, in
which the whole campaign was laid out. … General Lee had taken
it for granted that Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry would be
evacuated at his approach (as they should have been); and when
he found they were not, he had so far changed or suspended the
plan with which he set out as to send back a large part of his
army to capture those places and not leave a hostile force in
his rear." This was easily accomplished by Jackson and McLaws,
the latter of whom took possession of the heights commanding
the town, where Miles waited to be trapped. "A bombardment the
next day compelled a surrender when Jackson was about to
attack. General Miles was mortally wounded by one of the last
shots. About 11,000 men were included in the capitulation,
with 73 guns. … Jackson, leaving the arrangements for the
sur·render to A. P. Hill, hurried with the greater part of his
force to rejoin Lee, and reached Sharpsburg on the morning of
the 16th. The range known as the South Mountain, which is a
continuation of the Blue Ridge north of the Potomac, is about
1,000 feet high. The two principal gaps are Turner's and
Crampton's, each about 400 feet high, with the hills towering
600 feet above it. When McClellan learned the plans of the
Confederate commander, he set his army in motion to thwart
them. He ordered Franklin's corps to pass through Crampton's
Gap and press on to relieve Harper's Ferry; the corps of Reno
and Hooker, under command of Burnside, he moved to Turner's
Gap. The movement was quick for McClellan, but not quite quick
enough for the emergency. He might have passed through the
Gaps on the 13th with little or no opposition, and would then
have had his whole army between Lee's divided forces, and
could hardly have failed to defeat them disastrously and
perhaps conclusively. But he did not arrive at the passes till
the morning of the 14th; and by that time Lee had learned of
his movement and recalled Hill and Longstreet, from Boonsboro
and beyond, to defend Turner's Gap, while he ordered McLaws to
look out for Crampton's. … There was stubborn and bloody
fighting all day, with the Union forces slowly but constantly
gaining ground, and at dark the field was won," at both the
passes. The two engagements were called the battle of South
Mountain by the Federals, the Battle of Boonsboro by the
Confederates.
{3480}
At Turner's Gap there was a loss of about 1,500 on each side,
and 1,500 Confederates were made prisoners; at Crampton's Gap,
the loss in killed and wounded was some 500 on each side, with
400 Confederate prisoners taken. The Union army had forced the
passage of the mountains, but Lee had gained time to unite his
scattered forces. "He withdrew across the Antietam, and took
up a position on high ground between that stream and the
village of Sharpsburg. … Lee now had his army together and
strongly posted. But it had been so reduced by losses in
battle and straggling that it numbered but little over 40,000
combatants. … McClellan had somewhat over 70,000 men. … The
ground occupied by the Confederate army, with both flanks
resting on the Potomac, and the Antietam flowing in front, was
advantageous. The creek was crossed by four stone bridges and
a ford, and all except the northernmost bridge were strongly
guarded. The land was occupied by meadows, cornfields, and
patches of forest, and was much broken by outcropping ledges.
McClellan only reconnoitered the position on the 15th. On the
16th he developed his plan of attack, which was simply to
throw his right wing across the Antietam by the upper and
unguarded bridge, assail the Confederate left, and when this
had sufficiently engaged the enemy's attention and drawn his
strength to that flank, to force the bridges and cross with
his left and centre. … All day long an artillery duel was kept
up. … It was late in the afternoon when Hooker's corps crossed
by the upper bridge, advanced through the woods, and struck
the left flank, which was held by two brigades of Hood's men.
Scarcely more than a skirmish ensued, when darkness came on,
and the lines rested for the night where they were." At
sunrise, next morning, Hooker assaulted Jackson and was
seriously wounded in the fighting which followed. Sumner's
corps finally joined in the attack, and all the forenoon the
battle was desperate in that part of the field. "But while
this great struggle was in progress on McClellan's right, his
centre and left, under Porter und Burnside, did not make any
movement to assist. At noon Franklin arrived from Crampton's
Gap, and was sent over to help Hooker and Sumner, being just
in time to check a new advance by more troops brought over
from the Confederate right. At eight o'clock in the morning
Burnside had been ordered to carry the bridge in his front,
cross the stream, and attack the Confederate right. But,
though commanded and urged repeatedly, it was one o'clock
before he succeeded in doing this, and two more precious hours
passed away before he had carried the ridge commanding
Sharpsburg and captured the Confederate battery there. Then
came up the last division of Lee's forces (A. P. Hill's) from
Harper's Ferry, 2,000 strong, united with the other forces on
his left, and drove Burnside from the crest and re-took the
battery. Here ended the battle; not because the day was
closed, or any apparent victory had been achieved, but because
both sides had been so severely punished that neither was
inclined to resume the fight. Every man of Lee's force had
been actively engaged, but not more than two thirds of
McClellan's. The reason why the Confederate army was not
annihilated or captured must be plain to any intelligent
reader. … General McClellan reported his entire loss at
12,469, of whom 2,010 were killed. General Lee reported his
total loss in the Maryland battles as 1,567 killed and 8,724
wounded, saying nothing of the missing; but the figures given
by his division commanders foot up 1,842 killed, 9,399
wounded, and 2,292 missing—total 13,533. … Nothing was done on
the 18th, and when McClellan determined to renew the attack on
the 19th, he found that his enemy had withdrawn from the field
and crossed to Virginia by the ford at Shepherdstown. The
National commander reported the capture of more than 6,000
prisoners, 13 guns, and 39 battle-flags, and that he had not
lost a gun or a color. As he was also in possession of the
field … and had rendered Lee's invasion fruitless of anything
but the prisoners carried off from Harper's Ferry, the victory
was his."
R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Secession,
chapter 12.
ALSO IN:
F. W. Palfrey,
The Antietam and Fredericksburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5).
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 2, book 3, chapter 4.
F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 4.
A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th. Army Corps,
part 2, chapters 2-3.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 19.
G. B. McClellan,
McClellan's Own Story,
chapters 33-38.
D. H. Hill, J. D. Cox, J. Longstreet, and others,
Lee's Invasion of Maryland
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2).
W. Allan,
The Army of Northern Virginia in 1862,
chapters 37-48.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (September).
President Lincoln's Preliminary Proclamation of Emancipation,
and the attitude of Northern parties on the Slavery question.
Abraham Lincoln "believed that without the Union permanent
liberty for either race on this continent would be impossible.
And because of this belief, he was reluctant, perhaps more
reluctant than most of his associates, to strike slavery with
the sword. For many months, the passionate appeals of millions
of his associates seemed not to move him. He listened to all
the phases of the discussion, and stated in language clearer
and stronger than any opponent had used, the dangers, the
difficulties, and the possible futility of the act. In
reference to its practical wisdom, Congress, the Cabinet, and
the country were divided. Several of his generals had
proclaimed the freedom of slaves within the limits of their
commands. The President revoked their proclamations. His first
Secretary of War had inserted a paragraph in his annual report
advocating a similar policy. The President suppressed it. On
the 19th of August, 1862, Horace Greeley published a letter
addressed to the President, entitled 'The Prayer of Twenty
Millions,' in which he said, 'On the face of this wide earth,
Mr. President, there is not one disinterested, determined,
intelligent champion of the Union cause who does not feel that
all attempts to put down the rebellion and at the same time
uphold its inciting cause are preposterous and futile.' To
this the President responded in that ever memorable reply of
August 22, in which he said:—'If there be those who would not
save the Union unless they could at the same time save
slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would
not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy
slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object is to
save the Union, and not either to save or to destroy slavery.
{3481}
If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would
do it. If I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would
do it,—and if I could do it by freeing some and leaving
others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery
and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save
the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not
believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less
whenever I shall believe that what I am doing hurts the cause,
and I shall do more whenever I believe doing more will help
the cause.' Thus, against all importunities on the one hand
and remonstrances on the other, he took the mighty question to
his own heart, and, during the long months of that terrible
battle-summer, wrestled with it alone. But at length he
realized the saving truth, that great unsettled questions have
no pity for the repose of nations. On the 22d of September, he
summoned his Cabinet to announce his conclusion. It was my
good fortune, on that same day, and a few hours after the
meeting, to hear, from the lips of one who participated, the
story of the scene. As the chiefs of the Executive Departments
came in, one by one, they found the President reading a
favorite chapter from a popular humorist. He was lightening
the weight of the great burden which rested upon his spirit.
He finished the chapter, reading it aloud. And here I quote,
from the published Journal of the late Chief Justice, an
entry, written immediately after the meeting, and bearing
unmistakable evidence that it is almost a literal transcript
of Lincoln's words: 'The President then took a graver tone and
said: "Gentlemen I have, as you are aware, thought a great
deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all
remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had
prepared upon the subject, which, on account of objections
made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind
has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought
all along that the time for acting on it might probably come.
I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I
wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the
army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have
best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and
Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the
rebel army was at Frederick, I determined as soon as it should
be driven out of Maryland to issue a proclamation of
emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I
said nothing to any one, but I made a promise to myself and
(hesitating a little) to my Maker. The rebel army is now
driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got
you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish
your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined
for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect
for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on
this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have
considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I
have written is that which my reflections have determined me
to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in
any minor matter which any of you thinks had best be changed,
I shall be glad to receive your suggestions. One other
observation I will make, I know very well that many others
might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and
if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully
possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any
constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he
should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But though I
believe I have not so much of the confidence of the people as
I had some time since, I do not know that, all things
considered, any other person has more; and, however this may
be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put
where I am. I am here. I must do the best I can and bear the
responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to
take." The President then proceeded to read his Emancipation
Proclamation, making remarks on the several parts as he went
on, and showing that he had fully considered the subject in
all the lights under which it had been presented to him.' The
Proclamation was amended in a few matters of detail. It was
signed and published that day."
J. A. Garfield,
Works,
volume 2, pages 538-540.
"I was alone with Mr. Lincoln more than two hours of the
Sunday next after Pope's defeat in August, 1802. That was the
darkest day of the sad years of the war. … When the business
to which I had been summoned by the President was over—strange
business for the time: the appointment of assessors and
collectors of internal revenue—he was kind enough to ask my
opinion as to the command of the army. The way was thus opened
for conversation, and for me to say at the end that I thought
our success depended upon the emancipation of the slaves. To
this he said: 'You would not have it done now, would you? Must
we not wait for something like a victory?' This was the second
and most explicit intimation to me of his purpose in regard to
slavery. In the preceding July or early in August, at an
interview upon business connected with my official duties, he
said, 'Let me read two letters,' and taking them from a

pigeon-hole over his table he proceeded at once to do what he
had proposed. I have not seen the letters in print. His
correspondent was a gentleman in Louisiana, who claimed to be
a Union man. He tendered his advice to the President in regard
to the reorganization of that State, and he labored zealous]y
to impress upon him the dangers and evils of emancipation. The
reply of the President is only important from the fact that
when he came to that part of his correspondent's letter he
used this expression: 'You must not expect me to give up this
government without playing my last card.' Emancipation was his
last card. He waited for the time when two facts or events
should coincide. Mr. Lincoln was as devoted to the
Constitution as was ever Mr. Webster. In his view, a military
necessity was the only ground on which the overthrow of
slavery in the States could be justified. Next, he waited for
a public sentiment in the loyal States not only demanding
emancipation but giving full assurance that the act would be
sustained to the end. As for himself, I cannot doubt that he
had contemplated the policy of emancipation for many months,
and anticipated the time when he should adopt it."
G. S. Boutwell,
Reminiscences of Abraham Lincoln by
Distinguished Men of his Time,
pages 123-125.
{3482}
"It was after all efforts for voluntary emancipation by the
states interested, with pecuniary aid from the national
treasury, had failed [that the President determined to decree
emancipation in the rebellious states by a military order]. To
Mr. Seward and myself the President communicated his purpose,
and asked our views, on the 13th of July 1862. It was the day
succeeding his last unsuccessful and hopeless conference with
the representatives in Congress from the border slave states,
at a gloomy period of our affairs, just after the reverses of
our armies under McClellan before Richmond. The time, be said,
had arrived when we must determine whether the slave element
should be for or against us. Mr. Seward … was appalled and not
prepared for this decisive step, when Mr. Lincoln made known
to us that he contemplated, by an executive order, to
emancipate the slaves. Startled with so broad and radical a
proposition, he informed the President that the consequences
of such an act were so momentous that he was not prepared to
advise on the subject without further reflection. … While Mr.
Seward hesitated and had the subject under consideration, the
President deliberately prepared his preliminary proclamation,
which met the approval, or at least the acquiescence, of the
whole Cabinet, though there were phases of opinion not
entirely in accord with the proceedings. Mr. Blair, an
original emancipationist, and committed to the principle,
thought the time to issue the order inopportune, and Mr. Bates
desired that the deportation of the colored race should be
coincident with emancipation. Aware that there were shades of
difference among his counsellors, and hesitation and doubt
with some, in view of the vast responsibility and its
consequences, the President devised his own scheme, held
himself alone accountable for the act, and, unaided and
unassisted, prepared each of the proclamations of freedom."
G. Welles,
Lincoln and Seward,
pages 210-212.
The preliminary or monitory Proclamation of Emancipation,
issued on the 22d of September, 1862, was as follows:
"'I. Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States of
America, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof,
do hereby proclaim and declare that hereafter, as heretofore,
the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically
restoring the constitutional relations between the United
States and each of the States and the people thereof, in which
States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed. That
it is my purpose, upon the next meeting of Congress, to again
recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering
pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the
slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in
rebellion against the United States, and which States may then
have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt,
the immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their
respective limits; and that the effort to colonize persons of
African descent, with their consent, upon this continent or
elsewhere, with the previously obtained consent of the
governments existing there, will be continued. That on the
first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves
within any State, or designated part of a State, the people
whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States,
shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and the
Executive Government of the United States, including the
military and naval authorities thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or
acts to repress such persons, or any of them, in any efforts
they may make for their actual freedom. That the Executive
will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation,
designate the States, or parts of States if any, in which the
people thereof, respectively, shall then be in rebellion
against the United States; and the fact that any State, or the
people thereof, shall, on that day, be in good faith
represented in the Congress of the United States by members
chosen thereto at elections, wherein a majority of the
qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall,
in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed
conclusive evidence that such State, and the people thereof,
are not then in rebellion against the United States.' Then,
after reciting the language of 'An act to make an additional
article of war,' approved March 13, 1862, and also sections 9
and 10 of the Confiscation Act, approved July 17, 1862, and
enjoining their enforcement upon all persons in the military
and naval service, the proclamation concludes: 'And I do
hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the
military and naval service of the United States to observe,
obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service,
the acts and sections above recited. And the Executive will,
in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States,
who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the
rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional
relations between the United States and the people, if that
relation shall have been suspended or disturbed, be
compensated for all losses by acts of the United States,
including the loss of slaves.'"
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 6, chapters 6 and 8.
ALSO IN:
J. G. Blaine,
Twenty Years of Congress,
volume 1, chapter 20.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(September-October: Mississippi).
Union successes under Grant.
Iuka and Corinth.
"In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 17th of
that month Halleck was assigned to the command of all the
armies, superseding McClellan. He repaired at once to
Washington, and Grant was directed to establish his
headquarters at Corinth. Grant's jurisdiction was not,
however, enlarged by the promotion of Halleck: on the
contrary, the new general-in-chief first offered the command
of the Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Robert Allen, a
quarter-master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to
remain under Grant. He was, however, left somewhat more
independent than while Halleck had heen immediately present in
the field. Four divisions of his army (including Thomas's
command), were within the next two months ordered to Buell,
who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, unwieldy snake,
from Eastport to Decatur, and from Decatur towards
Chattanooga. This subtraction put Grant entirely on the
defensive. He had possession of Corinth, the strategic point,
but was obliged to hold the railroads from that place and
Bolivar, north to Columbus, which last, on account of the low
water in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. … He
remained himself eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the
enemy, who, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, harassed and
threatened him continually.
{3483}
During this time, he directed the strengthening and
remodelling of the fortifications of Corinth. … New works,
closer to the town, were … erected. … Van Dorn at last
determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of
Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee and
reënforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified
Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of his
intention to prevent it. … On the 13th [of September], Price
advanced from the south and seized Iuka, 21 miles east of
Corinth. … Grant had called in his forces some days before to
the vicinity of Corinth, had repeatedly cautioned all his
commanders to hold their troops in readiness, and when the
enemy's cavalry moved towards Iuka, and cut the railroad and
telegraph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven miles
to the westward, Grant began his operations. Price was at
Iuka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the southwest,
threatening Corinth. Grant's object was to destroy Price,
before the two could concentrate, and then to get back to
Corinth and protect it against Van Dorn. He accordingly
ordered Brigadier-General Rosecrans, whose troops were posted
south of Corinth, to move by way of Renzi, along the south
side of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and attack Iuka
from that direction; while Major-General Ord, with a force
brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jackson, was to push
towards Burnsville, and from there take roads on the north
side of the railroad, attacking Iuka from that quarter. Ord
had 8,000 men, and Rosecrans reported 9,000, a greater force
combined than Price had, according to Grant's estimate."
Rosecrans's movement was delayed, and he was attacked
(September 19) in heavy force as he neared Iuka, Ord's advance
having been held back waiting for him. He kept his ground, but
lost in the action a battery of artillery, besides 736 men,
killed and wounded. That night the enemy retreated from Iuka,
over a road which Rosecrans was expected to occupy, but did
not. "By the battle of Iuka, the enemy was simply checked in
his plans, not seriously crippled in his force. Price moved
around by a circuitous route and joined Van Dorn, and the same
state of affairs continued which had annoyed Grant for so many
weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, and Ord at
Bolivar, and on the 23d of September removed his own
headquarters to Jackson, from which point he could communicate
more readily with all points of his district, including
Memphis and Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and
Ripley. … At last it was rendered certain … that Corinth was
to be the place of attack. Grant thereupon directed Rosecrans
to call in his forces, and sent Brigadier-General McPherson to
his support from Jackson, with a brigade of troops." He also
"hurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Pocahontas from Bolivar, 44
miles away, to be ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear,
as he advanced, and at least to create a diversion, if they
could not get into the town. On the 2d of October the rebel
array, under Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villepigue, and Rust,
appeared in front of Corinth. … On the 3d the fighting began
in earnest. Rosecrans had about 19,000 men, and the enemy had
collected 38,000 for this important movement, which was to
determine the possession of northern Mississippi and West
Tennessee. Rosecrans pushed out about five miles, towards
Chewalla, Grant having ordered him to attack, if opportunity
offered; but the enemy began the fight, and, on the afternoon
of the 3d, the battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rosecrans
was driven back to his defences on the north side of Corinth,
and it was now found how important was the labor bestowed on
these fortifications, by Grant's order, a month previous. The
enemy was checked until morning; but, early on the 4th, the
whole rebel army, flushed with the success of the day before,
assaulted the works. The fighting was fierce; the rebels
charging almost into the town, when an unexpected fire from
the forts drove them back in confusion. Again and again, they
advanced to the works, but each time were received with a
determination equal to their own. Once, the national troops
came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied them in
person, and the rebels were finally repulsed before noon, with
a loss admitted by themselves to be double that of Rosecrans.
The national loss was 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232
prisoners and missing. Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at
1,423, and took 2,225 prisoners. … The repulse was complete,
by 11 o'clock in the morning, but unfortunately was not
followed up by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels,
however, started off in haste and disorder immediately after
the fight; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were struck
in flank, as Grant had planned, by Hurlbut and Ord, and the
disaster was rendered final. This occurred early on the
morning of the 5th, at the crossing of the Hatchie river,
about ten miles from Corinth. … A battery of artillery and
several hundred men were captured, and the advance was
dispersed or drowned. … Had Rosecrans moved promptly the day
before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either
as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this
defile [six miles up the stream, where Van Dorn finally made
his crossing]. In either event, the destruction of the rebels
must have been complete. … These two fights relieved the
command of West Tennessee from all immediate danger."
A. Badeau,
Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,
volume 1, chapter 4.
"Satisfied that the enemy was retreating [on the 4th], I
ordered Sullivan's command to push him with a heavy skirmish
line, and to keep constantly feeling them. I rode along the
lines of the commands, told them that, having been moving and
fighting for three days and two nights, I knew they required
rest, but that they could not rest longer than was absolutely
necessary. I directed them to proceed to their camps, provide
five days' rations, take some needed rest, and be ready early
next morning for the pursuit."
W. S. Rosecrans,
The Battle of Corinth
(Battles and Leaders, volume 2), page 753.
{3484}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862
(September-December: Missouri-Arkansas).
Social demoralizations of the Civil War.
Battle of Prairie Grove.
"The dispersion and suppression of the guerrilla bands [in
Missouri] did not serve wholly to terminate local disturbances
and offenses. The restraints of a common public opinion no longer
existed. Neighborhood good-will had become changed to
neighborhood hatred and feud. Men took advantage of the
license of war to settle personal grudges by all the
violations of law, varying from petty theft to assassination;
and parallel with this thirst for private revenge was the
cupidity which turned crime into a source of private gain. … A
rearrangement of military command appears in an order of the
President under date of September 19, 1862, directing that
Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, and the bordering Indian Territory
should constitute a new department to be called the Department
of the Missouri, to be commanded by Major-General Samuel R.
Curtis. … This new arrangement served to change the relative
positions of Schofield and Curtis. The former, gathering what
troops he could, took the field in a campaign towards
Southwest Missouri to meet the expected invasion from
Arkansas, while the latter, recalled from a short leave of
absence, came to St. Louis (September 24, 1862) to take up his
headquarters and assume the general administration of the new
Department of the Missouri. … The difficulties in the military
situation had grown primarily out of the error of Halleck … in
postponing the opening of the Mississippi River. When, in the
spring and summer of 1862, Halleck abandoned all thought of
pursuing that prime and comprehensive object, and left
Vicksburg to grow up into an almost impregnable Confederate
citadel, he blighted the possibility of successful Union
campaigns on both sides of the great river. … From the
midsummer of 1862, therefore, until the fall of Vicksburg in
midsummer of 1863, military campaigning in the
trans-Mississippi country ceases to have any general
significance. … The only action of importance which marks the
military administration of Curtis was the battle of Prairie
Grove in the northwest corner of Arkansas, where on the 7th of
December the detachments respectively commanded by the Union
generals James G. Blunt (who had been hovering all summer
along the border of Kansas) and Francis J. Herron, who,
finding Blunt pressed by the enemy coming northward with a
view of entering Missouri, advanced by forced marches from
near Springfield and formed a junction with Blunt just in the
nick of time to defeat the Confederates under General Hindman.
The losses on each side were about equal, and on the day
following the engagement the Confederates retreated southward
across the protecting barrier of the Boston Mountains. It was
in a diminished degree a repetition of the battle of Pea
Ridge, fought in the preceding March within 20 or 30 miles of
the same place. … So effectually did this engagement serve to
scatter the rebel forces that Schofield reported January 31,
1863, 'There is no considerable force of the enemy north of
the Arkansas River; indeed I believe they have all gone or are
going, as rapidly as possible, to Vicksburg. Ten thousand
infantry and artillery can be spared from Southern Missouri
and Northern Arkansas.'"
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 6, chapter 18.
ALSO IN:
W. Baxter,
Pea Ridge and Prairie Grove.
O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
division 10, chapter 4 (volume 3).
W. Britton,
Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border,
chapter 1.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (October-December: Virginia).
The final removal of McClellan.
Burnside at Fredericksburg.
"Both armies … felt the need of some repose; and, glad to be
freed from each other's presence, they rested on their
arms—the Confederates in the Shenandoah Valley, in the
vicinity of Winchester, and the army of the Potomac near the
scene of its late exploits, amid the picturesque hills and
vales of Southwestern Maryland. The movement from Washington
into Maryland to meet Lee's invasion was defensive in its
purpose, though it assumed the character of a
defensive-offensive campaign. Now that this had been
accomplished and Lee driven across the frontier, it remained
to organize on an adequate scale the means of a renewal of
grand offensive operations directed at the Confederate army
and towards Richmond. The completion of this work, including
the furnishing of transportation, clothing, supplies, etc.,
required upwards of a month, and during this period no
military movement occurred, with the exception of a raid into
Pennsylvania by Stuart. About the middle of October, that
enterprising officer, with twelve or fifteen hundred troopers,
crossed the Potomac above Williamsport, passed through
Maryland, penetrated Pennsylvania, occupied Chambersburg,
where he burnt considerable government stores, and after
making the entire circuit of the Union army, recrossed the
Potomac below the mouth of the Monocacy. He was all the way
closely pursued by Pleasonton with 800 cavalry. … On the
recrossing of the Potomac by Lee after Antietam, McClellan
hastened to seize the débouehé of the Shenandoah Valley, by
the possession of Harper's Ferry. … At first McClellan
contemplated pushing his advance against Lee directly down the
Shenandoah Valley, as he found that, by the adoption of the
line east of the Blue Ridge, his antagonist, finding the door
open, would again cross to Maryland. But this danger being
removed by the oncoming of the season of high-water in the
Potomac, McClellan determined to operate by the east side of
the Blue Ridge, and on the 26th his advance crossed the
Potomac by a ponton-bridge at Berlin, five miles below
Harper's Ferry. By the 2d November the entire army had crossed
at that point. Advancing due southward towards Warrenton, he
masked the movement by guarding the passes of the Blue Ridge,
and by threatening to issue through these, he compelled Lee to
retain Jackson in the Valley. With such success was this
movement managed, that on reaching Warrenton on the 9th, while
Lee had sent half of his army forward to Culpepper to oppose
McClellan's advance in that direction, the other half was
still west of the Blue Ridge, scattered up and down the
Valley, and separated from the other moiety by at least two
days' march. McClellan's next projected move was to strike
across obliquely westward and interpose between the severed
divisions of the Confederate force; but this step he was
prevented from taking by his sudden removal from the command
of the Army of the Potomac, while on the march to Warrenton.
Late on the night of November 7th, amidst a heavy snow-storm,
General Buckingham, arriving post-haste from Washington,
reached the tent of General McClellan at Rectortown. He was
the bearer of the following dispatch, which he handed to
General McClellan: … 'By direction of the President of the
United States, it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be
relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that
Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.' … It
chanced that General Burnside was at the moment with him in
his tent.
{3485}
Opening the dispatch and reading it, without a change of
countenance or of voice, McClellan passed over the paper to
his successor, saying, as he did so: 'Well, Burnside, you are
to command the army.' Thus ended the career of McClellan as
head of the Army of the Potomac. … The moment chosen was an
inopportune and an ungracious one; for never had McClellan
acted with such vigor and rapidity-never had he shown so much
confidence in himself or the army in him. And it is a notable
fact that not only was the whole body of the army—rank and
file as well his officers—enthusiastic in their affection for
his person, but that the very general appointed as his
successor was the strongest opponent of his removal."
W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 6, sections 2-3.
"It is dangerous to shift commanders on the eve of battle, and
our cavalry had already engaged the Confederates'; it is more
dangerous to change the plans of troops moving in the vicinity
of the enemy. But as if impelled to do some new thing … the
new commander of the Army of the Potomac determined upon a
flank movement by his left on the north of the river towards
Fredericksburg. … Only by movements equally wary and rapid, as
well as by sure means of crossing the river, could Burnside's
manœuvre possibly succeed. In this last element he counted on
Halleck, and, of course, failed. The promised pontoons did
not, and could scarcely have been expected to come. Arrived at
Fredericksburg Burnside still might have crossed by the fords,
for the water was low. And once in possession of the heights
beyond the city he could afford to wait. But, slower than even
his predecessor, Burnside sat down at Falmouth, on the north
side of the river, while Lee, having learned of his movement,
by forced marches concentrated his army on the opposite bank,
and prepared to erect impregnable defences in his front. …
Before Burnside got ready to take any active steps, Marye's
Heights, back of Fredericksburg, had been crowned by a triple
line of works, and Lee had brought together nearly 90,000
troops to man them. Two canals and a stone wall in front of
the left, as well as open, sloping ground on both flanks,
served to retain an attacking party for a long period under
fire. To assault these works in front was simple madness. To
turn them below necessitated the crossing of a wide and now
swollen river, in the face of a powerful enemy in his
immediate front. … To turn them above was practicable, but it
was a confessed return to McClellan's plan. Burnside chose the
first. Preparations foe crossing were begun. The better part
of three days [December 11-13] was consumed in throwing the
bridges and putting over the two Grand Divisions of Franklin
and Sumner, all of which was accomplished under fire. But Lee
was by no means unwilling to meet the Army of the Potomac
after this fashion. Such another happy prospect for him was
not apt soon again to occur. He did not dispute the crossing
in force. Burnside's one chance in a hundred lay in a
concentrated assault sharply pushed home before the enemy
could oppose an equal force. But in lieu of one well-sustained
attack, or of two quite simultaneous, Burnside frittered away
this single chance by putting in Franklin on the left and
Sumner on the right, without concerted action." Both assaults
were bloodily repulsed. "Hooker is ordered across. Under
protest, and yet Hooker lacked not stomach for a fight, he
obeys the useless order, and leads his men into the slaughter
pen. … All is in vain. Even the Army of the Potomac cannot do
the impossible. The defeated troops are huddled into
Fredericksburg, and gradually withdrawn across the river.
Burnside was insane enough to wish to repeat the assault next
day. But the counsels of his officers prevailed on him to
desist. No such useless slaughter, with the exception,
perhaps, of Cold Harbor, occurred during our war, and 13,000
men paid the penalty. The enemy's loss was but one in three of
ours."
T. A. Dodge,
Bird's-Eye View of Our Civil War,
chapter 21.
ALSO IN:
A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps,
part 2, chapters 4-8.
F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapters 5-6.
B. P. Poore,
Life of Burnside,
chapters 18-19.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 21.
J. Longstreet,
D. N. Couch, and others,
Burnside at Fredericksburg,
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3).
F. W. Palfrey,
The Antietam and Fredericksburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 5), pages 129-135.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862 (December: On the Mississippi).
The second attempt against Vicksburg.
General Sherman and Admiral Porter.
Miscarriage of Grant's plans.
"Rear-Admiral Porter took command of the Mississippi squadron
in October, 1862. … Up to this time the gun-boats had,
strictly speaking, been under the control of the Army, but now
all this was changed, and the Mississippi Squadron, like all
the other naval forces, was brought directly under the
supervision of the Secretary of the Navy. … The new
arrangement left the commander of the squadron at liberty to
undertake any expedition he thought proper, and he was not in
the least hampered by any instructions from the Navy
Department. … Before Admiral Porter left Washington he was
informed by the President that General McClernand had been
ordered to raise an Army at Springfield, Illinois, to
prosecute the siege of Vicksburg. The President expressed the
hope that the rear-admiral would co-operate heartily with
General McClernand in the operations to be carried on. But as
Vicksburg never would have been taken if it had depended on
General McClernand's raising an Army sufficient for the
purpose, the Admiral, immediately on his arrival at Cairo,
sent a message to General Grant, at Holly Springs,
Mississippi, informing him of McClernand's intention; that he,
Porter, had assumed command of the Mississippi Squadron, and
was ready to cooperate with the Army on every occasion where
the services of the Navy could be useful. A few days
afterwards General Grant arrived at Cairo and proposed an
expedition against Vicksburg, and asking the rear-admiral, if
he could furnish a sufficient force of gun-boats, to accompany
it. Grant's plan was to embark Sherman from Memphis, where he
then was, with 30,000 soldiers, to be joined at Helena,
Arkansas, by 10,000 more. Grant himself would march from Holly
Springs with some 60,000 men upon Granada. General Pemberton
would naturally march from Vicksburg to stop Grant at Granada,
until reinforcements could be thrown into Vicksburg from the
south, and while Pemberton was thus absent with the greater
part of his Army, Sherman and Porter could get possession of
the defences of Vicksburg.
{3486}
General Grant having been informed that the gun-boats would be
ready to move at short notice, and having sent orders to
Sherman to put his troops aboard the transports as soon as the
gun-boats arrived in Memphis, returned immediately to Holly
Springs to carry out his part of the programme. … The
expedition from Memphis got away early in December, 1862.
Commander Walke, in the 'Carondelet,' being sent ahead with
[three iron-clads and two so-called 'tin-clads'] … to clear
the Yazoo River of torpedoes and cover the landing of
Sherman's Army when it should arrive. This arduous and
perilous service was well performed," but one of the
iron-clads engaged in it, the Cairo, was sunk by a torpedo.
"General Sherman moved his transports to a point on the river
called Chickasaw Bayou without the loss of a man from
torpedoes or sharpshooters, his landing [December 27] being
covered in every direction by the gunboats. Sherman first made
a feint on Haines' Bluff, as if to attack the works, and then
landed at Chickasaw Bayou. Owing to the late heavy rains he
found the roads to Vicksburg heights almost impassable, and
when he attempted to advance with his Army he was headed off
by innumerable bayous, which had to be bridged, or corduroy
roads built around them. It was killing work. Even at this
time Vicksburg had been fortified at every point, and its only
approaches by land led through dense swamps or over boggy open
ground, where heavy guns were placed, so as to mow down an
advancing Army. A general has seldom had so difficult a task
assigned him, and there was little chance of Sherman's
succeeding unless Pemberton had drawn off nearly all his
forces to oppose Grant's advance on Granada. … Sherman and his
Army overcame everything and at last reached terra firma. In
the meanwhile the Navy was doing what it could to help the
Army. … Grant had left Holly Springs with a large Army at the
time he had appointed, merely with the design of drawing
Pemberton from Vicksburg and thus helping Sherman in his
attack on that place. … Grant moved towards Granada, and
everything looked well; but the Confederate General, Earl Van
Dorn, dashed into Holly Springs, 28 miles in the rear of the
Union Army, capturing the garrison and all their stores. At
the same time General Forrest pushed his cavalry into West
Tennessee, cutting the railroad to Columbus at several points
between that place and Jackson. … Due precautions had been
taken to prevent this mishap by leaving a strong force behind
at Holly Springs, but the commanding officer was not on the
alert and his capture was a complete surprise. In this raid of
the Confederates a million dollars' worth of stores were
destroyed. Under the circumstances it was impossible for Grant
to continue his march on Granada, which Pemberton perceiving,
the latter returned to Vicksburg in time to assist in
Sherman's repulse. … Sherman made all his arrangements to
attack the enemy's works on the 20th of December, 1862, and
the assault took place early on that day. One division
succeeded in occupying the batteries on the heights, and hoped
shortly to reach those commanding the city of Vicksburg, but
the division that was to follow the advance was behind time
and the opportunity was lost. A portion of Pemberton's Army
had returned from Granada just in time to overwhelm and drive
back the small force that had gained the hills. … The enemy
did not follow, being satisfied with driving our troops from
the heights, and there was nothing left for Sherman to do but
to get his Army safely back to the transports."
D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the Civil War,
chapter 24.
ALSO IN:
S. M. Bowman and R. B. Irwin,
Sherman and his Campaigns,
chapter 7.
W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 11.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1862-1863
(December-January: Tennessee).
Bragg and Rosecrans.
The Battle of Stone River, or Murfreesborough.
"The Confederate government was greatly disappointed with the
issue of Bragg's campaign. Scarcely had he reached Chattanooga
when he was ordered to move northward again. Rosecrans, on
assuming command of Buell's army, … concentrated his forces at
Nashville, and there accumulated large supplies. … Bragg had
already reached Murfreesborough on his second northward march
from Chattanooga. Rosecrans had given out that it was his
intention to take up his winter quarters at Nashville, and
Bragg, supposing that this would be the case, sent out strong
detachments of cavalry under Morgan and Forrest, the former
being ordered to break Rosecrans's communications. As it was
about the season of Christmas, Murfreesborough was the scene
of much gayety … and the giddy Confederates danced on floors
carpeted with the American flag. Suddenly, on the 26th of
December, Rosecrans moved. His march commenced in a heavy min.
The Confederate outposts retired before his advance, the
pressure upon them being so vigorous that they had not time to
destroy the bridges on the Jefferson and Murfreesborough
turnpikes. On the 30th, Bragg, finding he was about to be
assailed, had concentrated his army a couple of miles in front
of Murfreesborough. The position of the national army, which
was 43,000 strong on the evening of that day, was on the west
side of Stone River, a sluggish stream fringed with cedar
brakes, and here flowing in a north-northwesterly course. The
line ranged nearly north and south, and was three or four
miles in length. Crittenden was on its left, with three
divisions. Wood, Vancleve, Palmer; Thomas in the centre, with
two divisions, Negley and Rousseau, the latter in reserve;
McCook on the right with three, Sheridan, Davis, Johnson. The
left wing touched the river. … Bragg's army, 62,000, stood
between Rosecrans and Murfreesborough. … Breckinridge's
division formed his right, in his centre, under Polk, were two
divisions, those of Withers and Cheatham; on his left, under
Hardee, two divisions, Cleburne and McCown. The river
separated Breckinridge from the rest of the Confederate army.
Rosecrans had concentrated two thirds of his force on his
left. His intention was that his right wing, standing on the
defensive, should simply hold its ground; but his extreme
left, the divisions of Wood and Vancleve, crossing Stone
River, should assail Breckinridge's division, exposed there,
and seize the heights. … On his part, also, Bragg had
determined to take the offensive. … Both intended to strike
with the left, and therefore both massed their force on that
wing. … In the dawn of the last day of the year (1862), while
Rosecrans's left was rapidly crossing Stone River to make its
expected attack, Bragg, with his left, had already anticipated
him. Coming out of a fog which had settled on the
battle-field, he fell furiously upon Johnson's division, and
so unexpectedly that two of its batteries were taken before a
gun could be fired.
{3487}
The Confederate success was decisive. Johnson's division,
which was on the extreme national right, was instantly swept
away. Davis, who stood next, was assailed in front and on his
uncovered flank. He made a stout resistance, but the shock was
too great; he was compelled to give way, with the loss of many
guns. And now the triumphant Confederate left, the centre also
coming into play, rushed upon the next division—but that was
commanded by Sheridan. Rosecrans's aggressive movement was
already paralyzed; nay, more, it had to be abandoned. He had
to withdraw his left for the purpose of saving his right and
defending his communications. He must establish a new line.
The possibility of doing this—the fate of the battle—rested on
Sheridan." He held his ground for an hour, until "the
cartridge-boxes of his men were empty. The time had come when
even Sheridan must fall back. But, if he had not powder, he
had steel. The fixed bayonets of his reserve brigade covered
him, and he retired, unconquered and unshaken, out of the
cedar thicket toward the Nashville road. In this memorable and
most glorious resistance he had lost 1,630 men. 'Here's all
that are left,' he said to Rosecrans, whom he had saved and
now met. After Sheridan had been pushed back, there was
nothing for Negley but to follow. … Meantime, on a knoll in
the plain to which these divisions had receded, Rosecrans had
massed his artillery. He was forming a new line, in which the
army would face southwestwardly, with the Nashville turnpike
on its rear." Against this new line the Confederates dashed
themselves, desperately but vainly, four times that day, and
were repelled with horrible slaughter. "Bragg, unwilling to be
foiled, now brought Breckinridge, who had hitherto been
untouched, across the river to make a final attempt on
Rosecrans's left flank with 7,000 fresh men. His first attack
was repulsed; he made a second; it shared the same fate. So
stood affairs when night came, … the closing night of 1862. On
New Year's Day nothing was done; the two armies, breathless
with their death-struggle, stood looking at each other. On
January 2d Rosecrans was found, not retreating, but busily
engaged in trying to carry out his original plan. He had made
his position impregnable; he had thrown a force across Stone
River, and, as he at first intended, was getting ready to
crown with artillery the heights beyond the east bank.
Hereupon Bragg brought Breckinridge back to his old position,
ordering him to drive the enemy across the river—a task which
that officer bravely tried, but only imperfectly accomplished,
for the artillery on the opposite bank tore his division to
pieces. In twenty minutes he lost 2,000 men. A violent storm
prevented the renewal of the battle on the 3d. On that night
Bragg, despairing of success, withdrew from Murfreesborough,
retreating to Tullahoma. … In these dreadful battles the
Confederates lost 14,700 men. On the national side there were
killed 1,553, wounded more than 7,000, prisoners more than
3,000; more than one third of its artillery and a large
portion of its train were taken. The losses were about one
fourth of each army. Henceforth the Confederates abandoned all
thought of crossing the Ohio River."
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 53 (volume 2).
"The enemy in retiring did not fall back very far—only behind
Duck River to Shelbyville and Tullahoma—and but little
endeavor was made to follow him. Indeed, we were not in
condition to pursue, even if it had been the intention at the
outset of the campaign. … The victory quieted the fears of the
West and Northwest, destroyed the hopes of the secession
element in Kentucky, renewed the drooping spirits of the East
Tennesseans, and demoralized the disunionists in Middle
Tennessee; yet it was a negative victory so far as concerned
the result on the battle-field. Rosecrans seems to have
planned the battle with the idea that the enemy would continue
passive, remain entirely on the defensive, and that it was
necessary only to push forward our left in order to force the
evacuation of Murfreesboro'. … Had Bragg followed up with the
spirit which characterized its beginning the successful attack
by Hardee on our right wing—and there seems no reason why he
should not have done so—the army of Rosecrans still might have
got back to Nashville, but it would have been depleted and
demoralized."
P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 12-14.
ALSO IN:
A. F. Stevenson,
Battle of Stone's River.
T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapters 16-17 (volume 1).
Official Records,
series 1, volume 20.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January).
The final Proclamation of Emancipation.
The immediate practical effect of the warning Proclamation of
Emancipation issued by President Lincoln on the 22d of
September, 1862, "did, perhaps, more nearly answer the
apprehensions of the President than the expectations of those
most clamorous for it. It did, as charged, very much 'unite
the South and divide the North.' The cry of 'the perversion of
the war for the Union into a war for the negro' became the
Democratic watchword, and was sounded everywhere with only too
disastrous effect, as was plainly revealed by the fall
elections with their large Democratic gains and Republican
losses. Indeed, it was the opinion of Mr. Greeley that, could
there have been a vote taken at that time on the naked issue,
a large majority would have pronounced against emancipation.
But Mr. Lincoln did not falter. Notwithstanding these
discouraging votes at the North, and the refusal of any
Southern State to avail itself of the proffered immunity and
aid of his Proclamation of September, he proceeded, at the
close of the hundred days of grace allowed by it, to issue his
second and absolute Proclamation, making all the slaves of the
Rebel States and parts of States forever and irreversibly
free." It was in the following words:
"Whereas, on the twenty-second day of September, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-two, a
proclamation was issued by the President of the United States,
containing, among other things, the following, to wit: 'That
on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one
thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as
slaves within any state, or designated part of a state, the
people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United
States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and
the Executive Government of the United States, including the
military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and
maintain the freedom of such persons, and will do no act or
acts to repress such persons or any of them, in any efforts
they may make for their actual freedom.
{3488}
That the Executive will, on the first day of January
aforesaid, by proclamation, designate the states and parts of
states, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall
then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact
that any state, or the people thereof, shall on that day be in
good faith represented in the Congress of the United States,
by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of
the qualified voters of such state shall have participated,
shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be
deemed conclusive evidence that such state, and the people
thereof, are not then in rebellion against the United States.'
Now, therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power in me vested as
Commander-in-Chief of the army and navy of the United States,
in time of actual armed rebellion against the authority and
government of the United States, and as a fit and necessary
war measure for suppressing said rebellion, do, on this first
day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-three, and in accordance with my purpose so
to do, publicly proclaimed for the full period of one hundred
days from the day first above mentioned, order and designate,
as the states and parts of states wherein the people thereof
respectively are this day in rebellion against the United
States, the following, to wit: Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana
(except the parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, Jefferson,
St. John, St. Charles, St. James, Ascension, Assumption, Terre
Bonne, Lafourche, St. Mary, St. Martin, and Orleans, including
the city of New Orleans), Mississippi, Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Virginia (except
the forty-eight counties designated as West Virginia, and also
the counties of Berkeley, Accomac, Northampton, Elizabeth
City, York, Princess Ann, and Norfolk, including the cities of
Norfolk and Portsmouth), and which excepted parts are for the
present left precisely as if this proclamation were not
issued. And, by virtue of the power and for the purpose
aforesaid, I do order and declare that all persons held as
slaves within said designated states and parts of states are
and henceforward shall be free; and that the Executive
Government of the United States, including the military and
naval authorities thereof, will recognize and maintain the
freedom of said persons. And I hereby enjoin upon the people
so declared to be free, to abstain from all violence, unless
in necessary self-defense; and I recommend to them that, in
all cases when allowed, they labor faithfully for reasonable
wages. And I further declare and make known that such persons
of suitable condition will be received into the armed service
of the United States, to garrison forts, positions, stations,
and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said
service. And upon this act, sincerely believed to be an act of
justice, warranted by the Constitution, upon military
necessity, I invoke the considerate judgment of mankind and
the gracious favor of Almighty God.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed.
Done at the city of Washington, this first day of January,
in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and
sixty-three, and of the Independence of the United States
of America the eighty-seventh.
Abraham Lincoln.
By the President: William H. Seward, Secretary of State."
"Though the immediate effects of the Proclamation might not
have answered all that was expected of it, it was not many
months before its happy influences became manifest. Its
tendency from the first was to unify and consolidate the
antislavery and Christian sentiment of the land, to give
dignity and consistency to the conflict. … It strengthened,
too, the cause immensely with other nations, secured the
sympathy and moral support of Christendom, and diminished, if
it did not entirely remove, the danger of foreign
intervention."
H. Wilson,
History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power,
volume 3, chapter 28.
"Fame is due Mr. Lincoln, not alone because he decreed
emancipation, but because events so shaped themselves under
his guidance as to render the conception practical and the
decree successful. Among the agencies he employed none proved
more admirable or more powerful than this two-edged sword of
the final proclamation, blending sentiment with force,
leaguing liberty with Union, filling the voting armies at home
and the fighting armies in the field. In the light of history
we can see that by this edict Mr. Lincoln gave slavery its
vital thrust, its mortal wound. It was the word of decision,
the judgment without appeal, the sentence of doom."
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln.
volume 6, chapter 19.
ALSO IN:
O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
division 10, chapter 9 (volume 3).
W. P. and F. J. Garrison,
William Lloyd Garrison,
volume 4. chapters 3-4.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January: Arkansas).
The capture of Arkansas Post, or Fort Hindman.
Sherman withdrew his troops from the attempt against Vicksburg
on the 2d of January, and on the 4th he relinquished the
command to General McClernand, who had come down the river
with orders to assume it. On that same day "the expedition
sailed on the same transports that had brought them from
Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to
attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old
French settlement situated on the left or north bank of the
Arkansas River, 50 miles from its mouth and 117 below Little
Rock. … The expedition moved up the White River through the
cut-off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up
the latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort
Hindman. … By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and
the troops were on the march to invest the post. … The
gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the
afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops
were in position." Next morning a combined attack began, which
the garrison endured until 4 o'clock P. M. when the white flag
was raised. "Our entire loss in killed was 129; in wounded,
831; and in missing, 17; total, 977. … By the surrender there
fell into our hands 5,000 men. … After sending the prisoners
to St. Louis, having destroyed the defences and all buildings
used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops
re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon,
Arkansas, whence on the 17th … they returned to Milliken's
Bend."
S. M. Bowman and R B. Irwin,
Sherman and his Campaigns,
chapters 7-8.
{3489}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (January-April: Virginia).
Command given to Hooker.
President Lincoln's Letter to him.
Demoralized state of the Army of the Potomac,
and its improvement.
"General Burnside retired from a position he had never sought,
to the satisfaction, and, be it said to his credit, with the
warm personal regard of all. Sumner, whom the weight of years
had robbed of strength, but not of gallantry, was relieved at
his own request; Franklin was shelved. Hooker thus became
senior general officer, and succeeded to the command. No man
enjoyed a more enviable reputation in the Army of the Potomac.
… His commands so far had been limited; and he had a frank,
manly way of winning the hearts of his soldiers. He was in
constant motion about the army while it lay in camp; his
appearance always attracted attention; and he was as well
known to almost every regiment as its own commander. He was a
representative man. … Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot
in Hooker's character than the odd pride he took in Mr.
Lincoln's somewhat equivocal letter to him at the time of his
appointment: … 'I have placed you [wrote the President] at the
head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course, I have done this
upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I
think it best for you to know that there are some things in
regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe
you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like.
I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession,
in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself; which
is a valuable, if not an indispensable quality. You are
ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather
than harm; but I think that, during General Burnside's command
of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition and
thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great
wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable
brother-officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it,
of your recently saying that both the army and the Government
needed a dictator. Of course, it was not for this, but in
spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those
generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask
of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.
The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability,
which is neither more nor less than it has done or will do for
all commanders. I much fear that the spirit you have aided to
infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and
withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I
shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you
nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out
of an army while such a spirit prevails in it. And now, beware
of rashness! Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless
vigilance go forward, and give us victories!' … Hooker was
appointed Jan. 26, 1863; and Burnside, with a few earnest
words, took leave of the army. The troops received their new
chief with a heartiness and confidence which, since
McClellan's re-instatement, had not been equalled. Hooker was
to all the soul and embodiment of the growth and history of
this weather-beaten Army of the Potomac. And the salutary
changes he at once began to make,—for Hooker never lacked the
power of organization—were accepted with alacrity; and a
spirit of cheerful willingness succeeded speedily to what had
been almost a defiant obedience. The army was in a lamentably
low state of efficiency. Politics mingled with camp duties;
and the disaffection of officers and men, coupled with an
entire lack of confidence in the ability of the Army of the
Potomac to accomplish anything, were pronounced. Desertions
occurred at the rate of 200 a day. … Hooker states that he
found 2,922 officers, and 81,964 enlisted men, entered as
absent on the rolls of the army, a large proportion from
causes unknown. Sharp and efficient measures were at once
adopted, which speedily checked this alarming depletion of the
ranks. … The testimony of all general officers of the Army of
the Potomac concurs in awarding the highest praise to Hooker
for the manner in which he improved the condition of the
troops during the three months he was in command prior to
Chancellorsville. … On the 30th of April the Army of the
Potomac, exclusive of provost-guard, consisted of about
130,000 men under the colors,—'for duty equipped,' according
to the morning report. … While the Army of the Potomac lay
about Falmouth [opposite Fredericksburg], awaiting orders to
move, Lee occupied the heights south of the Rappahannock, from
Banks's Ford above to Port Royal (or Skenker's Neck), below
Fredericksburg, a line some 15 miles in length as the crow
flies. … Lee's forces numbered about 60,000 men, for duty."
T. A. Dodge,
The Campaign of Chancellorsville,
chapters 3-4.
ALSO IN:
F. A. Walker,
History of the 2nd Army Corps,
chapter 7.
R. De Trobriand,
Four Years with the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 20.
{3490}

Map of Vicksburg and Vicinity.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(January-April: On the Mississippi).
Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg.
Futile operations of the first four months.
"General Grant took personal command of the movement against
Vicksburg on the 30th of January, 1863. … The first plan made
was to dig a canal across the neck of land, or peninsula in
front of Vicksburg,—below the city,—at a point where the
isthmus was only a mile and a fifth in width. This had been
begun before General Grant's arrival. If a canal could have
been made large enough for large steamboats, then no matter
how strong were the fortifications of Vicksburg, the boats
would pass through, far away from their fire. So a canal ten
feet wide and six deep was made here, in the hope that the
freshets of the river would widen it, and so make it large
enough for large steamers. But very little came of the canal.
When the river did rise, it would not flow where it was meant
to do. It flooded the camps of the workmen. Meanwhile the
Rebels had made new batteries below it. Thus ended plan number
one. Another similar plan, to open a route by Lake Providence
and Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Washita and Red River,
did not succeed better. The canals attempted here were both on
the west of the river. A very bold attempt was made on the
east side, by what was known as the Yazoo Pass, into the
Tallahatchee and Yazoo River. The expeditions sent out by this
route would come out above Vicksburg; but it was hoped that
thus the Rebel gunboats on the Yazoo River might be destroyed.
If a practicable route were made here, the whole army could be
moved to Haine's Bluff,—above Vicksburg,—an upland region very
desirable for occupation.
{3491}
But nothing came of this movement, though some hard work and
some hard fighting were done in it. What resulted of
importance was, that the troops found their way into the
granary from which Vicksburg had been fed; and in the
resistance, many of the Rebels were destroyed. In such
attempts February and March passed away. Meanwhile Admiral
Farragut, of the navy, ran by the Rebel batteries at Port
Hudson, so that he communicated with Grant below
Vicksburg,—and Grant could communicate with General Banks, who
was trying to do at Port Hudson what Grant was trying to do
above. The distance from Vicksburg to Port Hudson is about 120
miles in a straight line, and more than twice that by the
crooked river. Grant now determined to pass the city of
Vicksburg on the west side of the river by marching his army
by land—with the help of boats on some bayous if possible—from
Milliken's Bend, which is twenty miles above Vicksburg, to New
Carthage, which is about as far below. At his request Admiral
Porter sent seven of his iron-clads, with three steamers and
ten barges, down the river, past the Rebel batteries. They
were well laden with forage and supplies. The crews of all but
one refused to go. But volunteers from the army offered,
enough to man a hundred vessels had they been needed. On a
dark night of the 16th of April, led by Admiral Porter, they
steamed down, with the barges in tow. They turned the bend
without being noticed. Then the first batteries opened on
them. The Rebels set fire to houses so as to light up the
scene; and from the ships the crews could see the men at the
batteries and in the streets of Vicksburg. Though every vessel
was hit, all got by, except the Henry Clay steamer. Finding
she was sinking, her commander cut off the barge he was
towing, which drifted safely down, and, soon after, the vessel
herself took fire. The crew escaped in their boats,—the vessel
blazed up and lighted up all around. At last, however, after
the boats had been under fire two hours and forty minutes, the
whole fleet except the Henry Clay arrived safely below the
batteries. Grant had thus secured, not only forage and stores,
but the means of transportation. On the 26th of April five
more vessels passed successfully, one being lost as before.
Grant was now strong enough to cross the Mississippi River.
His army had to march seventy miles on the west side by muddy
roads, scarcely above the river line. He feared he might have
to go as far down as a little town called Rodney for a good
landing-place on the east side. But a friendly negro man, who
knew the country, brought in information that there was a good
road inland from Bruinsburg,—and so it proved. Grand Gulf, on
the river, where the Rebels had a post, was still between
Grant and Bruinsburg. Porter attacked it with his gunboats,
and Grant was ready to land 10,000 troops to storm the place
if the batteries were silenced. But Porter did not succeed.
Grant therefore marched his troops down on the west side of
the river. Porter ran by Grand Gulf with transports in the
night, and, on the morning of the 30th of April, Grant crossed
the river with 10,000 men. They did not carry a tent nor a
wagon. General Grant and his staff went without their horses.
It was said afterwards that his whole baggage was a
toothbrush! Other divisions followed, and on the 3d of May he
left the river, and marched, not directly on Vicksburg, but
more inland, to cut off all communication with that city. His
army took three days' rations with them, and relied
principally for provisions on the stores in the rich country
through which they marched."
E. E. Hale,
Stories of War told by Soldiers,
chapter 7.
ALSO IN:
F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 4.
U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 31-32.
G. W. Brown,
The Mississippi Squadron and the Siege of Vicksburg
(Personal Recollections of the War:
New York Com. L. L. of the United States).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D.1863(February-April: Tennessee).
Engagements at Dover and Franklin.
"In February [on the 3d], General Wheeler, Bragg's chief of
Cavalry, tried to capture Fort Donaldson, so as to stop the
navigation of the Cumberland River, by which some of
Rosecrans's supplies came in steamboats to Nashville. The fort
had not been repaired after its capture by Grant, but the
Village of Dover near it had been fortified, and it was then
held by Colonel A. C. Harding with about 600 men. The Union
men fought bravely, and in the evening the gunboat Fair Play
came up and opened a fire on the Confederates which drove them
away in confusion, with a loss of more than 500 men. Harding's
loss was 126. Early in March, General Van Dorn appeared near
Franklin mounted men. Colonel Colburn, of the 33d Indiana, moved
Southward from Franklin with 2,700 men. Van Dorn and Forrest
met him, and after a fight of several hours [March 5] Colburn
had to surrender with 1,300 of his men."
J. D. Champlin, Jr.,
Young Folks' History of the War for the Union,
chapter 31.
"Sheridan, with his division, and about 1,800 cavalry, under
Colonel Minty, first swept down toward Shelbyville, and then
around toward Franklin, skirmishing in several places with
detachments of Van Dorn's and Forrest's men. In a sharp fight
at Thompson's Station, he captured some of the force which
encountered Colburn. He finally drove Van Dorn beyond the Duck
River, and then returned to Murfreesboro', with a loss during
his ten days' ride and skirmishing of only five men killed and
five wounded. His gain was nearly 100 prisoners. On the 18th
of March, Colonel A. S. Hall, with a little over 1,400 men,
moved eastward from Murfreesboro' to surprise a Confederate
camp at Gainesville. He was unexpectedly met by some of
Morgan's cavalry, when he fell back to Milton, twelve miles
northeast of Murfreesboro' and took a strong position on
Vaught's Hill. There he was attacked by 2,000 men, led by
Morgan in person. With the aid of Harris's Battery skilfully
worked, Hall repulsed the foe after a struggle of about three
hours. Morgan lost between 300 and 400 men killed and wounded.
Among the latter was himself. Hall's loss was 55 men, of whom
only 6 were killed. Early in April, General Granger, then in
command at Franklin, with nearly 5,000 troops, was satisfied
that a heavy force under Van Dorn was about to attack him. He
was then constructing a fort (which afterwards bore his name),
but only two siege-guns and two rifled cannon, belonging to an
Ohio battery, were mounted upon it.
{3492}
The fort … completely commanded the approaches to Franklin. …
On the 10th, Van Dorn, with an estimated force of 9,000
mounted men and two regiments of foot, pressed rapidly forward
along the Columbia and Lewisburg turnpikes, and fell upon
Granger's front. The guns from the fort opened destructively
upon the assailants, and their attack was manfully met by
Granger's troops. Van Dorn soon found himself in a perilous
situation, for Stanley [commanding cavalry] came up and struck
him a heavy blow on the flank. Smith [with cavalry] was
ordered forward to support Stanley, and Baird's troops
were_thrown across the river to engage in the fight. The
Confederates were routed at all points on Granger's front,
with a heavy Joss in killed and wounded, and about 500
prisoners. Van Dorn then turned his whole force upon Stanley
before Smith reached him, and with his overwhelming numbers
pushed him back and recovered most of the captured men. By
this means Van Dorn extricated himself from his perilous
position, and, abandoning his attempt to capture Franklin, he
retired to Spring Hill, with a loss of about three hundred men
in killed, wounded and prisoners. The Union loss was about 37
killed, wounded and missing."
B. J. Lossing,
Field Book of the Civil War,
volume 3, chapter 4.
ALSO IN:
T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapter 18, (volume 1).
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 23.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (March).
The Conscription Act.
"The Rebel Congress having long since passed [April 16, 1862]
a conscription act whereby all the "White males in the
Confederacy between the ages of 18 and 35 were placed at the
disposal of their Executive, while all those already in the
service, though they had enlisted and been accepted for
specific terms of one or two years, were held to serve through
the war, our Congress was constrained to follow afar off in
the footsteps of the enemy; since our ranks, [after] our heavy
losses in the bloody struggles of 1862, were filled by
volunteers too slowly for the exigencies of the service. The
act providing 'for the enrollment of the National forces' was
among the last passed [March 3, 1863] by the XXXVIIth Congress
prior to its dissolution. It provided for the enrollment, by
Federal provost-marshals and enrolling officers, of all
able-bodied male citizens (not Whites only), including aliens
who had declared their intention to become naturalized,
between the ages of 18 and 45—those between 20 and 35 to
constitute the first class; all others the second class—from
which the President was authorized, from and after July 1, to
make drafts at his discretion of persons to serve in the
National armies for not more than three years; anyone drafted
and not reporting for service to be considered and treated as
a deserter. A commutation of $300 was to be received in lieu
of such service: and there were exemptions provided of certain
heads of Executive Departments; Federal judges; Governors of
States; the only son of a widow, or of an aged and infirm
father, dependent on that son's labor for support; the father
of dependent motherless children under 12 years of age, or the
only adult brother of such children, being orphans; or the
residue of a family which has already two members in the
service, &c., &c. The passage and execution of this act
inevitably intensified and made active the spirit of
opposition to the War. Those who detested every form of
'coercion' save the coercion of the Republic by the Rebels,
with those who especially detested the National effort under
its present aspects as 'a war not for the Union, but for the
Negro,' were aroused by it to a more determined and active
opposition. The bill passed the House by Yeas 115, Nays 49—the
division being so nearly as might be, a party one—while in the
Senate a motion by Mr. Bayard that it be indefinitely
postponed was supported by 11 Yeas (all Democrats) to 35 Nays:
consisting of every Republican present, with Messrs.
McDougall, of California, Harding and Nesmith of Oregon. The
bill then passed without a call of the Yeas and Nays."
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 21.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April: South Carolina).
The naval attack on Charleston.
Repulse of the Monitors.
"The engagements in which turret iron-clads had been concerned
had given to the government and the public a high opinion of
their offensive and defensive qualities. It seemed as if
nothing could withstand the blow of their heavy shot, and no
projectile penetrate their invulnerable turrets. It was
supposed that a fleet of such ships could without difficulty
force a passage through Charleston Harbor, in spite of its
numerous defenses, and, appearing before the city, compel its
surrender. … On the 7th of April [1863] Admiral Dupont made
the experiment. He had seven Ericsson Monitors, the frigate
Ironsides, partially iron-clad, and a frailer iron-clad, the
Keokuk, constructed on a plan differing from that of the
Monitors. His intention was to disregard the batteries on
Morris's Island, attack the northwest face of Sumter, and
force his way up to the city. His fleet had 32 guns; the
opposing forts, in the aggregate, 300. At noon on that day the
signal was given to weigh anchor. The Weehawken, a Monitor,
took the lead. She had a raft-like contrivance attached to her
bows, for the purpose of removing obstructions and exploding
torpedoes. This occasioned some delay at the outset, through
its interference with her movements. On her way up she
exploded a torpedo, which, though it lifted her a little, did
no damage. At 2.10 P, M. she encountered obstructions
extending across the harbor from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter;
beyond these, piles were seen extending from James's Island to
the Middle Ground. At 2.50 P. M. the guns of Fort Moultrie
opened upon her, followed shortly after by all the batteries
on Sullivan's Island, Morris's Island, and Fort Sumter. Not
being able to pass the obstructions, the Weehawken, and
subsequently other Monitors, the Passaic, Nahant, etc., were
obliged to turn, which threw the line into confusion, as the
other vessels, advancing, approached. This was particularly
the case with the flag-ship Ironsides, which became entangled
with the Monitors, and could not bring her batteries to bear
upon Fort Sumter without risk of firing into them; she was
obliged, on her way up, to anchor twice to avoid going ashore,
on one of these occasions in consequence of having come into
collision with two of the Monitors. The plan of the
Confederates was, by means of obstructions, to detain the
ships, while a concentrated fire was poured upon them in this
the 'first circle,' as it was termed.
{3493}
Two other still more powerful circles of fire must be passed
before the city could be reached. While in the centre of the
first circle, it was apparent that the Monitors were at a
fearful disadvantage. The forts and earth-works were armed
with heavy guns of the best construction. No ship was exposed
to the severest fire of the enemy for more than forty minutes,
yet in that brief period time of the ironclads were wholly or
partially disabled. In these forty minutes the battle was
substantially over, the question settled. The Keokuk was
struck 99 times, of which 19 were under her water-line. She
was in a sinking condition. She had been able to return only
three shots. The Passaic was struck 27 times; her turret was
jammed, and could not for some time be turned. The Nahant was
most seriously damaged; her turret was jammed, her captain
wounded, her quarter-master killed by a bolt which flew off
and struck him on the head. Many of the bolts of both turret
and pilot-house were thus broken; the latter became nearly
untenable in consequence of the nuts and ends flying across
it. All the other Monitors had received damages more or less
severe. The mailed frigate Ironsides had lost one port
shutter, her bow was penetrated by a red-hot shot. The damage
inflicted on Fort Sumter was comparatively insignificant. It
was Dupont's belief that, had the iron-clads been in action
half an hour longer, they would all have been disabled. 'To my
regret,' he says, 'I soon became convinced of the utter
impracticability of taking the city of Charleston by the force
under my command.' … The iron-clad fleet had therefore been
unable to pass the first line of obstructions, or to get out
of 'the first circle of fire.' The slowness of its fire was no
match for the rapidity and weight of that of the forts. The
iron-clads were able to fire only 139 times from the 14 guns
they could bring into action; the forts, from 76 guns, fired
2,209 times. The projectiles they used were wrought-iron
bolts, some of them tipped with steel, solid shot, shells, of
which 40 were filled with melted cast-iron, others with
incendiary composition. The total amount of cannon-powder used
by the forts was 21,093 pounds. The government, thus satisfied
that its iron-clad fleet was insufficient for the forcing of
Charleston Harbor and the capture of the city, now changed its
purposes, restricting its attempts to a more complete
blockade, the detention of a large confederate force in the
vicinity by continually threatening military operations, and
the destruction of Fort Sumter for the sake of a moral
effect."
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 72 (volume 3).
ALSO IN:
D. D. Porter,
Naval History of the War,
chapter 33.
C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
volume 2, chapter 33.
W. C. Church,
Life of Ericsson,
chapter 21 (volume 2).
A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
chapter 30 (volume 2).
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 14.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Virginia).
Hooker's disastrous movement.
Chancellorsville.
Stonewall Jackson's last flank movement.
"Being now [April 28] fully prepared for active operations,
Hooker determined to take the initiative by moving on the left
of his opponent's position. By careful study of Lee's position
he correctly concluded that his left was his most vulnerable
point. In order to mask his real design he sent forward a
force of 10,000 cavalry under General Stoneman to operate upon
Lee's lines of communication with Richmond, and sent Sedgwick
with a force of 30,000 men still further to mask his movement.
Stoneman crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly's Ford on the 29th,
and Sedgwick appeared on the 28th on the heights below
Fredericksburg. These preparatory measures having been taken,
Hooker proceeded to the execution of his plan. Swinton, after
a picturesque description of the passage of the Rappahannock
and the Rapidan, tells us 'that on the afternoon of the 30th
of April four corps of the Federal army had gained the
position of Chancellorsville, where Hooker at the same time
established his headquarters.' Chancellorsville is situated
ten miles southwest of Fredericksburg. It is not, as its name
implies, a town or village, but simply a farm-house with its
usual appendages, situated at the edge of a small field
surrounded by a dense thicket of second growth, which sprang
up after the primeval forest had been cut to furnish fuel to a
neighboring furnace. This thicket extends for miles in every
direction, and its wild aspect very properly suggests its
name, The Wilderness. The intersection of several important
roads gives it the semblance of strategic importance, while in
reality a more unfavorable place for military operations could
not well be found. Hooker, however, seemed well pleased with
his acquisition, for on reaching Chancellorsville on Thursday
night he issued an order to the troops in which he announced
that 'the enemy must either ingloriously fly or come out from
behind his defences and give us battle on our own ground,
where certain destruction awaits him.' … General Lee was fully
aware of the preparations that were being made by his
adversary, but calmly awaited the complete development of his
plans before exerting his strength to oppose him. … On the
28th … Lee ordered Jackson to concentrate his whole corps in
the immediate vicinity of Fredericksburg. Early on the morning
of the 29th Sedgwick crossed the Rappahannock below the mouth
of Deep Run, but made no other aggressive movement on that day
or the day following. On the night of the 30th, Lee was
informed of Hooker's arrival at Chancellorsville. He had been
previously informed of Stoneman's movements against his line
of operations by General Stuart, and was now satisfied that
the main attack of the enemy would come from the direction of
Chancellorsville. Therefore on the morning of the 1st of May
he made the necessary preparations to meet it. Accompanied by
his staff, he took a position on a height where one of his
batteries overlooked the Rappahannock. He there observed
carefully the position of Sedgwick, while waiting for
information from the direction of Chancellorsville. … Very
soon the sound of cannon indicated that the work had begun. At
the same time couriers arrived from Stuart and Anderson
informing the general that the enemy were advancing on the old
turnpike, the plank road, and on the river roads, and asking
for reinforcements. McLaws was immediately ordered to the
support of Anderson, and shortly after Jackson was ordered to
follow with three of his divisions, leaving … a force of about
9,000 men and 45 pieces of artillery in observation of
Sedgwick. When Jackson joined McLaws and Anderson a lively
skirmish was in progress, in which he immediately
participated.
{3494}
When General Lee arrived he found the Federals were being
driven back to Chancellorsville. At the close of the afternoon
they had retired within their lines. General Lee occupied the
ridge about three-quarters of a mile south-east and south of
Chancellorsville. The opposing armies were hidden from each
other by the intervening thicket of brushwood. … It was
obvious that the Federal position was too formidable to be
attacked in front with any hope of success; therefore Lee
proceeded to devise a plan by which the position of Hooker
might be turned and a point of attack gained from which no
danger was apprehended by the Federal commander. … The
execution of a movement so much in accordance with his genius
and inclination was assigned to General Jackson. … At dawn on
the morning of the 2d, Jackson's corps, 22,000 strong, was in
motion, and while it was making one of the most famous flank
movements on record, General Lee, with the divisions of
Anderson and McLaws, with 20 pieces of artillery, a force not
exceeding 12,000 men, occupied the position he had assumed the
previous evening, and General Hooker, with 90,000 men, lay
behind his breastworks awaiting the Confederate attack. …
After making a circuitous march of 15 miles, Jackson reached a
point on the Orange Courthouse road three miles in the rear of
Chancellorsville. Had Hooker possessed a handful of cavalry
equal in spirit to the 'Virginia horsemen' under W. H. F. Lee
that neutralized Stoneman's ten thousand, he might have
escaped the peril that now awaited him. On the arrival of
Jackson on the plank road, Fitz Lee, who had covered his
movement with his brigade of cavalry, conducted him to a
position from which he obtained a view of the enemy, which
disclosed the following scene: 'Below and but a few hundred
yards distant ran the Federal line of battle. There was the
line of defence, with abatis in front, and long lines of
stacked arms in rear. … The soldiers were in groups in the
rear, laughing, chatting, and smoking, probably engaged here
and there in games of cards and other amusements indulged in
while feeling safe and comfortable, awaiting orders. In the
rear of them were other parties driving up and butchering
beeves.' Returning from this point of observation, Jackson
proceeded to make his dispositions of attack, which by six
o'clock were completed. … Howard's corps was first assailed.
This corps, being surprised, was panic-stricken and fled
precipitately, and in its flight communicated the panic to the
troops through which it passed. Jackson's forces followed,
routing line after line, until arrested by the close of day.
The rout of the Federal army was fast becoming general, and it
was only saved from entire defeat by the interposition of
night. When compelled to halt Jackson remarked that with one
more hour of daylight he could have completed the destruction
of the Federal army. This, the most famous of all Jackson's
brilliant achievements, closed his military career. After his
troops had halted, and while the lines were being adjusted, he
rode forward with several of his staff to reconnoitre the
Federal position." The party were mistaken by some of their
own men for Federal horsemen and received a volley which
struck down Stonewall Jackson. He was wounded in both arms by
three bullets, and died from the effects eight days afterward.
"Early on the morning of the 3d the attack was resumed by the
Confederates with great vigor. Hooker, taking advantage of the
night, had restored order in his army and strengthened his
position; his troops regained courage and contested the field
with great stubbornness until ten o'clock when they yielded at
every point and rapidly retreated … within the strong line of
defences which had been previously constructed to cover the
road to the United States Ford. … While the operations above
described were in progress at Chancellorsville, General Early,
by skilful manœuvring, had detained Sedgwick at Fredericksburg
until the 3d, when that general, by a determined advance,
forced back Early, carried Marye's Heights, and proceeded
toward Chancellorsville. The condition of affairs was
communicated to General Lee during the fore·noon. Wilcox's
brigade, then at Banks's Ford, was ordered to intercept
Sedgwick and retard his advance, while McLaws's division was
ordered to support him. Wilcox on reaching Salem Church, six
miles from Chancellorsville, encountered the Federal advance,
and after a sharp conflict he repulsed it with loss. The
success of Wilcox delayed Sedgwick until Anderson and McLaws
could come up. The premeditated attack on Hooker being thus
interrupted, Lee, on the forenoon of the 4th, repaired to the
neighborhood of Fredericksburg. A combined attack was then
directed to be made by Early on the rear, while McLaws and
Anderson bore down upon the front. The battle was hotly
contested during the afternoon, in which the forces of
Sedgwick were defeated, and were only saved from destruction
by a night-passage across the Rappahannock at Banks's Ford. On
the 5th Lee collected his forces at Chancellorsville to give
the 'coup de grace' to Hooker, but that general, under cover
of a dark and stormy night, effected his retreat beyond the
Rappahannock at the United States Ford."
A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 14.
The Federal loss at Chancellorsville, in killed and wounded,
was 12,197; missing 5,000; total, 17,197. Confederate loss,
killed and wounded, 10,266; missing 2,753; total, 13,019.
A. Doubleday,
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6), chapter 8.
ALSO IN:
T. A. Dodge,
Campaign of Chancellorsville.
W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 8.
D. N. Couch, O. O. Howard, and others,
Chancellorsville
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3).
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 4.
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 25.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (April-May: Mississippi).
Grierson's Raid.
Reporting to headquarters at Washington, on the 5th of May,
1863, General Hurlbut, commanding at Memphis, Tennessee, said:
"As the spring opened, I was daily more and more impressed
with the feasibility of a plan, long entertained, of pushing a
flying column of cavalry through the length of Mississippi,
cutting the Southern Railroad. By consent and approval of
General Grant, I prepared a system of movements along my
entire line from Memphis to Corinth for the purpose of
covering this cavalry dash. At the same time General Rosecrans
proposed to me to cover a movement of 1,800 cavalry from
Tuscumbia down into Alabama and Georgia.
{3495}
This did not interfere with my plan, but simply required extra
force to be developed from Corinth. Delays incident to
combined movements, especially from separate commands, kept
his expeditionary column back for six days. I commenced the
movement from Corinth on the 15th [April]. … On the 17th,
Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, with his own
regiment, the Seventh Illinois, and Second Iowa, moved from La
Grange, by way of Pontotoc, with orders, after passing
Pontotoc, to proceed straight down, throwing one regiment to
the left toward Okolona, and to push for and destroy the
Chunkey River Bridge and any others they could reach, and
either return, or proceed to Baton Rouge, as might be found
advisable. On the same day, April 17, a column of infantry
1,500 strong, and one battery, moved by railroad from La
Grange to Coldwater, with orders to push rapidly between
Coldwater and the Tallahatchee, and take Chalmers in flank and
rear while attacked in front by three regiments, a battery,
and 200 cavalry from Memphis, which left here on the 18th. I
considered that the effect of these movements would be to
puzzle the enemy and withdraw his force from the central line,
which has proven to be correct. … Grierson, on the 19th,
detached the Second Iowa below Pontotoc, which fought its way
gallantly back to La Grange and came home well mounted. The
main cavalry column (Sixth and Seventh Illinois) proceeded,
without loss or engagement, to Newton, on the Southern
Mississippi Railroad, and there destroyed bridges." Colonel
Grierson, in his own full report of the remarkable expedition
thus set on foot, after narrating the proceedings of his
command until it struck Newton Station, on the 24th of April,
continues: "From captured mails and information obtained by my
scouts, I knew that large forces had been sent out to
intercept our return, and having instructions from
Major-General Hurlbut and Brigadier-General Smith to move in
any direction from this point which, in my judgment, would be
best for the safety of my command and the success of the
expedition, I at once decided to move south, in order to
secure the necessary rest and food for men and horses, and
then return to La Grange through Alabama, or make for Baton
Rouge, as I might hereafter deem best. … After resting about
three hours, we moved south to Garlandville. At this point we
found the citizens, many of them venerable with age, armed
with shot-guns and organized to resist our approach. As the
advance entered the town, these citizens fired upon them and
wounded one of our men. We charged upon them and captured
several. After disarming them, we showed them the folly of
their actions, and released them. Without an exception they
acknowledged their mistake, and declared that they had been
grossly deceived as to our real character. One volunteered his
services as guide, and upon leaving us declared that hereafter
his prayers should be for the Union Army. I mention this as a
sample of the feeling which exists, and the good effect which
our presence produced among the people in the country through
which we passed. Hundreds who are skulking and hiding out to
avoid conscription, only await the presence of our arms to
sustain them, when they will rise up and declare their
principles; and thousands who have been deceived, upon the
vindication of our cause would immediately return to loyalty."
It was not until the 2d of May that Grierson and his small
force reached the Union lines at Baton Rouge. The total
accomplishments of the expedition—aside from the important
revelation it made of the condition of things in that region
of the Confederacy—are summed up in the Colonel's report as
follows: "During the expedition we killed and wounded about
100 of the enemy, captured and paroled over 500 prisoners,
many of them officers, destroyed between 50 and 60 miles of
railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over 3,000
stand of arms, and other army stores and Government property
to an immense amount; we also captured 1,000 horses and mules.
Our loss during the entire journey was 3 killed, 7 wounded, 5
left on the route sick; the sergeant-major and surgeon of the
Seventh Illinois left with Lieutenant-Colonel Blackburn, and 9
men missing, supposed to have straggled. We marched over 600
miles in less than sixteen days. The last twenty-eight hours
we marched 76 miles, had four engagements with the enemy, and
forded the Comite River, which was deep enough to swim many of
the horses. During this time the men and horses were without
food or rest. Much of the country through which we passed was
almost entirely destitute of forage and provisions, and it was
but seldom that we obtained over one meal per day. Many of the
inhabitants must undoubtedly suffer for want of the
necessaries of life, which have reached most fabulous prices."
Official Records,
series 1, volume 24, part 1, pages 520-529.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(April-July: On the Mississippi).
Grant's Campaign against Vicksburg.
The final operations.
His personal account of the siege and capture.
"April 30th was spent in transporting troops across the river
[to Bruinsburg]. The troops were moved out towards Port Gibson
as fast as they were landed. On the 1st of May the advance met
the enemy under Bowen about four miles west of Port Gibson,
where quite a severe battle was fought, resulting in the
defeat of the enemy, who were driven from the field. On May 2d
our troops moved into Port Gibson, and, finding that the
bridges over Bayou Pierre were destroyed, spent the balance of
the day in rebuilding and crossing them, and marching to the
North Fork, where we encamped for the night. During the night
we rebuilt the bridge across the North Fork, which had also
been destroyed, and the next day (the 3d) pushed on, and,
after considerable skirmishing, reached the Big Black, near
Hankinson's Ferry, and the Mississippi at Grand Gulf. … Here I
[General Grant] … received a letter from Banks stating that he
could not be at Port Hudson [which Grant had intended to join
Banks in attacking, before he turned against Vicksburg] for
some days, and then, with an army of only 15,000 men. As I did
not regard this force of as much value as the time which would
be lost in waiting for it, I determined to move on to
Vicksburg. The 4th, 5th, and 6th of May were spent in
reconnoitering towards Vicksburg, and also in crossing
Sherman's troops over to Grand Gulf. On the 7th, Sherman
having joined the main body of the army, the troops across the
Big Black were withdrawn, and the movement was commenced to
get in position on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad so as to
attack Vicksburg from the rear. This occupied the army from the
7th to the 12th, when our position was near Fourteen Mile
creek, Raymond being our right flank, our left resting on the
Big Black.
{3496}
To obtain this position we fought the battle of Raymond, where
Logan's and Crocker's divisions of McPherson's corps defeated
the Confederates under General Gregg, driving him back on
Jackson; Sherman and McClernand both having some skirmishing
where they crossed Fourteen Mile creek. As the army under
Pemberton was on my left flank, and that under General Joseph
E. Johnston on my right at Jackson, I determined to move the
army rapidly on Jackson, capturing and destroying that place
as a military depot; then turn west and destroy the army under
Pemberton, or drive it back into Vicksburg. The 13th was spent
in making the first of these moves. On the 14th Jackson was
attacked with Sherman's and McPherson's corps. The place was
taken, and all supplies that could be of service to the enemy
were destroyed, as well as the railroad bridge. On the 15th
the troops were faced to the west and marched towards
Pemberton, who was near Edwards's Station. The next day, the
16th, we met the enemy at Champion's Hill, and, after a
hard-fought battle, defeated and drove him back towards
Vicksburg, capturing 18 guns and nearly 3,000 men. This was
the hardest-fought battle of the campaign. On the 17th we
reached the Big Black, where we found the enemy intrenched.
After a battle of two or three hours' duration we succeeded in
carrying their works by storm, capturing much artillery and
about 1,200 men. … We crossed on the morning of the 18th, and
the outworks of Vicksburg were reached before night, the army
taking position in their front. On the 19th there was
continuous skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting
into better positions. … At two o'clock I ordered an assault.
It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our
troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the
enemy, and the siege of Vicksburg began. … Most of the army
had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations
issued by the commissary. They had had an abundance of food,
however, but had begun to feel the want of bread. … By the
night of the 21st full rations were issued to all the troops.
… I now determined on a second assault. … The attack was
ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock A.
M. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in
position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so
that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The
attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps
succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy …
but at no place were we able to enter. … As soon as it was
dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and had been
obliged to remain there for security all day were withdrawn,
and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg. A regular siege
was now determined upon. … The Union force that had crossed
the Mississippi river up to this time was less than 43,000
men. … The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on
the roads between these places, quite 60,000 men. … My line
was more than 15 miles long, extending from Haines's Bluff to
Vicksburg, thence to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was
about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton
and Jackson in our rear, who was being constantly reënforced,
we required a second line of defense, facing the other way. I
had not troops enough under my command to man this. General
Halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked for
reinforcements, forwarded them with all possible dispatch. …
Johnston … abstained from making an assault on us, because it
would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without
accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken
the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take
any risk of loosing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I
would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves
against an attack by Johnston." The siege was of six weeks'
duration, ending on the memorable 4th of July with the
surrender of Pemberton and 31,000 men, who were released on
parole. "Our men were no sooner inside the lines than the two
armies began to fraternize, We had had full rations from the
time the siege commenced to the close. The enemy had been
suffering, particularly towards the last. I myself saw our men
taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to those whom
they had so recently been engaged in starving out."
U. S. Grant,
The Siege of Vicksburg
(Century Magazine, September, 1885).
ALSO IN:
U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapters 31-30.
The Vicksburg Year
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3).
J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapters 6-8.
F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapters 5-6.
W. Swinton,
Twelve Decisive Battles of the War,
chapter 7.
W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 12.
Official Records,
series 1, volume 24.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-June).
The arrest of Vallandigham.
President Lincoln to the Copperheads.
"The man whose name became unfortunately pre-eminent for
disloyalty at this time was Clement L. Vallandigham, a
Democrat, of Ohio. General Burnside was placed in command of
the Department of the Ohio, March 25, 1863, and having for the
moment no Confederates to deal with, he turned his attention
to the Copperheads, whom he regarded with even greater
animosity. His Order No. 38, issued on April 13, … warned
persons with treasonable tongues that, unless they should keep
that little member in order, they might expect either to
suffer death as traitors, or to be sent southward within the
lines of 'their friends.' Now Mr. Vallandigham had been a
member of Congress since 1856; … he was the popular and rising
leader of the Copperhead wing of the Democracy. Such was his
position that it would have been ignominious for him to allow
any Union general to put a military gag in his mouth. Nor did
he. On the contrary he made speeches which at that time might
well have made Unionists mad with rage, and which still seem
to have gone far beyond the limit of disloyalty which any
government could safely tolerate. Therefore on May 4 he was
arrested by a company of soldiers, brought to Cincinnati, and
thrown into jail. His friends gathered in anger, and a riot
was narrowly avoided. At once, by order of General Burnside,
he was tried by a military commission. He was charged with
'publicly expressing sympathy for those in arms against the
government of the United States, and declaring disloyal
sentiments and opinions, with the object and purpose of
weakening the power of the Government in its efforts to
suppress an unlawful rebellion.' …
{3497}
The evidence conclusively sustained the indictment, and the
officers promptly pronounced him guilty, whereupon he was
sentenced by Burnside to confinement in Fort Warren. … The
Democrats throughout the North, rapidly surveying the
situation, seized the opportunity which perhaps had been too
inconsiderately given them. The country rang with plausible
outcries and high sounding oratory concerning military
usurpation, violation of the Constitution, and stifling
freedom of speech. … Mr. Lincoln only showed that he felt the
pressure of the criticism and denunciation by commuting the
sentence, and directing that Vallandigham should be released
from confinement and sent within the Confederate lines,—which
was, indeed, a very shrewd and clever move, and much better
than the imprisonment. Accordingly the quasi rebel was
tendered to and accepted by a Confederate picket, on May 25.
He protested vehemently, declared his loyalty, and insisted
that his character was that of a prisoner of war. But the
Confederates, who had no objection whatsoever to his peculiar
methods of demonstrating 'loyalty' to their opponents,
insisted upon treating him as a friend, the victim of an enemy
common to themselves and him; and instead of exchanging him as
a prisoner, they facilitated his passage through the blockade
on his way to Canada. There he arrived in safety, and thence
issued sundry manifestoes to the Democracy. On June 11 the
Democratic Convention of Ohio nominated him as their candidate
for governor, and it seems that for a while they really
expected to elect him. … On May 16 a monster meeting of 'the
Democrats of New York' was told by Governor Seymour that the
question was: 'whether this war is waged to put down rebellion
at the South, or to destroy free institutions at the North.'
Excited by such instigation, the audience passed sundry
damnatory resolutions and sent them to the President. Upon
receiving these Mr. Lincoln felt that he must come down into
the arena, without regard to official conventionality. On June
12 he replied by a full presentation of the case, from his
point of view. He had once more to do the same thing in
response to another address of like character which was sent
to him on June 11 by the Democratic State Convention of Ohio."
J. T. Morse,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 2, chapter 6.
To the New York Democrats, Mr. Lincoln said: "It is asserted
in substance, that Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military
commander, seized and tried 'for no other reason than words
addressed to a public meeting in criticism of the course of
the administration, and in condemnation of the military orders
of the general.' Now, if there be no mistake about this, if
this assertion is the truth and the whole truth, if there was
no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that the arrest
was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made for a
very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility to
the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made
because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the
raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and
to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to
suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the
political prospects of the administration or the personal
interests of the commanding general, but because he was
damaging the army, upon the existence of which the life of the
nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this
gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands
upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military
power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of
fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably
satisfactory evidence. I understand the meeting whose
resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the
rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has
shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall
be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires,
and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment.
Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I
must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to
desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by
getting a father, or brother, or friend into a public meeting,
and there working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to
write the soldier boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for
a wicked administration of a contemptible government, too weak
to arrest and punish him if he shall desert. I think that, in
such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not
only constitutional, but withal a great mercy. If I be wrong
on this question of constitutional power, my error lies in
believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when, in
cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires
them, which would not be constitutional when, in absence of
rebellion or invasion, the public safety does not require
them: in other words, that the Constitution is not in its
application in all respects the same in cases of rebellion or
invasion involving the public safety, as it is in times of
profound peace and public security. The Constitution itself
makes the distinction, and I can no more be persuaded that the
government can constitutionally take no strong measures in
time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could
not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be
persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a
sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a
well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended
by the meeting, that the American people will by means of
military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public
discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of
evidence, trial by jury, and habeas corpus throughout the
indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any
more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so
strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to
persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his
healthful life. In giving the resolutions that earnest
consideration which you request of me, I cannot overlook the
fact that the meeting speak as 'Democrats.' Nor can I, with
full respect for their known intelligence, and the fairly
presumed deliberation with which they prepared their
resolutions, be permitted to suppose that this occurred by
accident, or in any way other than that they preferred to
designate themselves 'Democrats' rather than 'American
citizens.'
{3498}
In this time of national peril I would have preferred to meet
you upon a level one step higher than any party platform,
because I am sure that from such more elevated position we
could do better battle for the country we all love than we
possibly can from those lower ones where, from the force of
habit, the prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the
future, we are sure to expend much of our ingenuity and
strength in finding fault with and aiming blows at each other.
But since you have denied me this, I will yet be thankful for
the country's sake that not all Democrats have done so. He on
whose discretionary judgment Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and
tried is a Democrat, having no old party affinity with me, and
the judge who rejected the constitutional view expressed in
these resolutions, by refusing to discharge Mr. Vallandigham
on habeas corpus is a Democrat of better days than these,
having received his judicial mantle at the hands of President
Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats who are nobly
exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the
battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course
taken with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a
single one condemning it. I cannot assert that there are none
such."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 849-350.
To the Ohio Democrats, the President wrote as follows; "You
claim, as I understand, that according to my own position in
the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and
this because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military
service by discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions or
otherwise; and that if he had he should have been turned over
to the civil authorities under the recent acts of Congress. I
certainly do not know that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically
and by direct language advised against enlistments and in
favor of desertion and resistance to drafting. We all know
that combinations, armed in some instances, to resist the
arrest of deserters began several months ago; that more
recently the like has appeared in resistance to the enrolment
preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number of
assassinations have occurred from the same animus. These had
to be met by military force, and this again has led to
bloodshed and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility
more weighty and enduring than any which is merely official, I
solemnly declare my belief that this hindrance of the
military, including maiming and murder, is due to the course
in which Mr. Vallandigham has been engaged in a greater degree
than to any other cause; and it is due to him personally in a
greater degree than to any other one man. These things have
been notorious, known to all, and of course known to Mr.
Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say they
originated with his special friends and adherents. With
perfect knowledge of them, he has frequently if not constantly
made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and
if it can be shown that, with these things staring him in the
face, he has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against
them, it will be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one
of which is yet I am totally ignorant. When it is known that
the whole burden of his speeches has been to stir up men
against the prosecution of the war, and that in the midst of
resistance to it he has not been known in any instance to
counsel against such resistance, it is next to impossible to
repel the inference that he has counseled directly in favor of
it. With all this before their eyes, the convention you
represent have nominated Mr. Vallandigham for governor of
Ohio, and both they and you have declared the purpose to
sustain the National Union by all constitutional means. But of
course they and you in common reserve to yourselves to decide
what are constitutional means; and, unlike the Albany meeting,
you omit to state or intimate that in your opinion an army is
a constitutional means of saving the Union against a
rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious of an
existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object of
destroying that very Union. At the same time your nominee for
governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you and to
the world to declare against the use of an army to suppress
the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages
desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it
teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to
believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that
you will become strong enough to do so. After a short personal
intercourse with you, gentlemen of the committee, I cannot say
I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I
assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look
upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by
consequence a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false
hope and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the
way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter in
order that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose,
indorse your names upon one of them and return it thus
indorsed to me with the understanding that those signing are
thereby committed to the following propositions and to nothing
else;
1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the
object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union;
and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional
means for suppressing that rebellion;
2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own
judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the
decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army or navy while
engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and
3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have
the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while
engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed,
clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.
And with the further understanding that upon receiving the
letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be
published, which publication shall be, within itself, a
revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham. It
will not escape observation that I consent to the release of
Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him
or from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this
because he is not present to speak for himself, or to
authorize others to speak for him; and because I should expect
that on his returning he would not put himself practically in
antagonism with the position of his friends. But I do it
chiefly because I thereby prevail on other influential
gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be of
immense value to the army—thus more than compensating for the
consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to
return; so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have
suffered by it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all
others, I must hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the
public safety may seem to require. I have the honor to be
respectfully yours."
Abraham Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, page 362-363.
ALSO IN:
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay, .
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 12.
{3499}
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (May-July: On the Mississippi).
Siege and Capture of Port Hudson.
The clear opening of the great River.
"About the middle of May all the available force near the
river was concentrated at Baton Rouge, to assist in the attack
on Port Hudson. Thence Generals Augur and Sherman moved to the
south and east of that position, to cooperate with General
Banks. From Simmesport General Banks moved his army to invest
Port Hudson. … It was on the 21st of May that General Banks
landed, and on the next day a junction was effected with the
advance of Major-General Augur and Brigadier-General Sherman.
… On the 25th, the enemy was compelled to abandon his first
line of works. On the next day General Weitzel's brigade,
which had covered the rear in the march from Alexandria,
arrived, and on the morning of the 27th a general assault was
made on the fortifications. Port Hudson, or Hickey's Landing,
as it was called some years ago, is situated on a bend in the
Mississippi river, about 22 miles above Baton Rouge, and 147
above New Orleans." It was strongly fortified and well
defended by Colonel Frank Gardner. The artillery of General
Banks opened fire on the 27th, and at ten o'clock the same day
an assault was made, in which the colored soldiers showed much
firmness and bravery. The assault failed and the losses in it
were heavy. "A bombardment of the position had been made by
the fleet under Admiral Farragut, for a week previous to this
assault. Reconnoissances had discovered that the defences were
very strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments and
rifle pits, with abatis of heavy trees felled in every
direction. The upper batteries on the river were attacked by
the Hartford and Albatross, which had run the blockade, and
the lower by the Monongahela, Richmond, Genesee, and Essex. On
the 14th of June, after a bombardment of several days, another
assault on Port Hudson was made. … All the assaulting columns
were compelled to fall back under the deadly fire of the
enemy, and the fighting finally ceased about 11 o'clock in the
morning. The loss of General Banks was nearly 700 in killed
and wounded. … After these two attempts to reduce Port Hudson
by a land assault, on the 27th of May and 14th of June, the
purpose to make another was given up by General Banks, until
he had fully invested the place by a series of irresistible
approaches. He was thus engaged in pushing forward his works
when Vicksburg was surrendered. Information of this surrender
was sent to General Banks, and it was made the occasion for
firing salutes and a general excitement in his camp, which
attracted the attention of the enemy, to whom the surrender
was communicated. General Gardner, upon receiving the
information, sent by flag of truce, about midnight of the 7th,
the following note to General Banks: … 'Having received
information from your troops that Vicksburg has been
surrendered, I make this communication to request you to give
me the official assurance whether this is true or not, and if
true, I ask for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to the
consideration of terms for surrendering this position.'"
W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
chapter 29.
ALSO IN:
F. V. Greene,
The Mississippi
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 8), chapter 7.
R. B. Irwin,
Port Hudson
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3).
R. B. Irwin,
History of the 19th Army Corps,
chapters 15-18.
Official Records,
Series 1, volume. 26.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June).
Call for Six-Months Men.
A call for 100,000 men to serve six months, for the repulse of
the invasion of Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and
Ohio, was issued June 15.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June: Virginia).
Lee's second movement of invasion and the inducements to it.
Northern invitation and Southern clamor.
The Southern view.
"The defeat of General Hooker at Chancellorsville was the
turning-point of the war, and for the first time there was
apparently a possibility of inducing the Federal Government to
relinquish its opposition to the establishment of a separate
authority in the South. The idea of the formation of a
Southern Confederacy, distinct from the old Union, had, up to
this time, been repudiated by the authorities at Washington as
a thing utterly out of the question; but the defeat of the
Federal arms in the two great battles of the Rappahannock had
caused the most determined opponents of separation to doubt
whether the South could be coerced to return to the Union;
and, what was equally or more important, the proclamations of
President Lincoln, declaring the slaves of the South free, and
placing the United States virtually under martial law, aroused
a violent clamor from the great Democratic party of the North,
who loudly asserted that all constitutional liberty was
disappearing. This combination of non-success in military
affairs and usurpation by the Government emboldened the
advocates of peace to speak out plainly, and utter their
protest against the continuance of the struggle, which they
declared had only resulted in the prostration of all the
liberties of the country. Journals and periodicals, violently
denunciatory of the course pursued by the Government, all at
once made their appearance in New York and elsewhere. A peace
convention was called to meet in Philadelphia. … On all sides
the advocates of peace on the basis of separation were heard
raising their importunate voices. … The plan of moving the
Southern army northward, with the view of invading the Federal
territory, seems to have been the result of many
circumstances. The country [Southern] was elated with the two
great victories of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, and
the people were clamorous for active operations against an
enemy who seemed powerless to stand the pressure of Southern
steel. The army, which had been largely augmented by the
return of absentees to its ranks, new levies, and the recall
of Longstreet's two divisions from Suffolk, shared the general
enthusiasm; and thus a very heavy pressure was brought to bear
upon the authorities and on General Lee, in favor of a forward
movement, which, it was supposed, would terminate in a signal
victory and a treaty of peace. Lee yielded to this view of
things rather than urged it. … Another important consideration
was the question of supplies. … More than ever before, these
supplies were now needed; and when General Lee sent, in May or
June, a requisition for rations to Richmond, the
commissary-general is said to have endorsed upon the paper,
'If General Lee wishes rations, let him seek them in
Pennsylvania.'
{3500}
The considerations here stated were the main inducements for
that great movement northward which followed the battle of
Chancellorsville. … Throughout the month of May, Lee was
busily engaged in organizing and equipping his forces for the
decisive advance. Experience had now dictated many alterations
and improvements in the army. It was divided into three 'corps
d'armée,' each consisting of three divisions, and commanded by
an officer with the rank of lieutenant-general. Longstreet
remained at the head of his former corps. Ewell succeeded
Jackson in command of 'Jackson's old corps', and A. P. Hill
was assigned to a third corps made up of portions of the two
others. … On the last day of May, General Lee had the
satisfaction of finding himself in command of a well-equipped
and admirably-officered army of 68,352 bayonets, and nearly
10,000 cavalry and artillery—in all, about 80,000 men. … Lee
began his movement northward on the 3d day of June, just one
month after the battle of Chancellorsville. … Pursuing his
design of manœuvring the Federal army out of Virginia, without
coming to action, Lee first sent forward one division of
Longstreet's corps in the direction of Culpepper, another then
followed, and, on the 4th and 5th of June, Ewell's entire
corps was sent in the same direction—A. P. Hill remaining
behind on the south bank of the Rappahannock, near
Fredericksburg, to watch the enemy there, and bar the road to
Richmond. These movements became speedily known to General
Hooker, whose army lay north of the river near that point, and
on the 5th he laid a pontoon just below Fredericksburg, and
crossed about a corps to the south bank, opposite Hill. This
threatening demonstration, however, was not suffered by Lee to
arrest his own movements. … He continued the withdrawal of his
troops, by way of Culpepper, in the direction of the
Shenandoah Valley." On the morning of the 9th of June, "two
divisions of Federal cavalry, supported by two brigades of
'picked infantry,' were sent across the river at Kelly's and
Beverley's Fords, east of the court-house, to beat up the
quarters of Stuart and find what was going on in the Southern
camps. The most extensive cavalry fight [known as the battle
of Brandy Station, or the battle of Fleetwood], probably, of
the whole war, followed. … This reconnoisance in force … had
no other result than the discovery of the fact that Lee had
infantry in Culpepper. … This attempt of the enemy to
penetrate his designs had not induced General Lee to interrupt
the movement of his infantry toward the Shenandoah Valley. The
Federal corps sent across the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg,
still remained facing General Hill, and, two days after the
Fleetwood fight, General Hooker moved up the river with his
main body, advancing the Third Corps to a point near
Beverley's Ford. But these movements were disregarded by Lee.
On the same day Ewell's corps moved rapidly toward Chester
Gap, passed through that defile in the mountain, pushed on by
way of Front Royal, and reached Winchester on the evening of
the 13th, having in three days marched 70 miles. The position
of the Southern army now exposed it to very serious danger,
and at first sight seemed to indicate a deficiency of
soldiership in the general commanding it. In face of an enemy
whose force was at least equal to his own, Lee had extended
his line until it stretched over a distance of about 100
miles. … When intelligence now reached Washington that the
head of Lee's column was approaching the Upper Potomac, while
the rear was south of the Rappahannock, the President wrote to
General Hooker: 'If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg,
and the tail of it on the plank road, between Fredericksburg
and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim
somewhere—could you not break him?' … It would seem that
nothing could have been plainer than the good policy of an
attack upon Hill at Fredericksburg, which would certainly have
checked Lee's movement by recalling Longstreet from Culpepper,
and Ewell from the Valley. But … instead of reënforcing the
corps sent across at Fredericksburg and attacking Hill,
General Hooker withdrew the corps, on the 13th, to the north
bank of the river, got his forces together, and began to fall
back toward Manassas."
J. E. Cooke,
Life of General Robert E. Lee,
part 6, chapters 9-12.
ALSO IN:
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 21.
W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 9.
{3501}

Map of the Battlefield of Gettysburg. July 1-3, 1863.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Pennsylvania).
Lee's Invasion.
The Battle of Gettysburg.
"Hooker started toward Washington. Ewell gained possession of
Winchester and Martinsburg, but not of Harper's Ferry. There
is a rocky and thickly wooded range of heights called the Bull
Run Mountains, running from Leesburg south. As Hooker had not
occupied them but was farther to the East, Lee desired to do
so, for it would give him a strong position on Hooker's flank
and bring him (Lee) very near to Washington. He therefore
directed his cavalry to reconnoiter in that direction.
Stuart's reconnoitering party met the Union cavalry at Aldie,
and after a hard battle retreated. A series of cavalry combats
ensued, ending in the retreat of Stuart's cavalry behind the
Blue Ridge. Hooker was strongly posted east of the Bull Run
range and could not be attacked with much chance of success.
As Lee could not well remain inactive or retreat, he resolved
to invade Pennsylvania. This was a hazardous enterprise, for
Hooker might intervene between him and Richmond. Stuart's
cavalry was left to prevent this catastrophe by guarding the
passes in the Blue Ridge. Stuart was also directed to harass
Hooker and attack his rear should he attempt to cross the
Potomac in pursuit of Lee. Lee reached Chambersburg with
Longstreet's and Hill's corps. Ewell's corps was in advance at
Carlisle [June 27] and York," and advance bodies of cavalry
were threatening Harrisburg. The militia of Pennsylvania, New
York and Maryland were called out in force, but arms and
ammunition for them were inadequate. "On June 28th, Hooker
determined to send Slocum's corps and the garrison of Harper's
Ferry—the latter about 10,000 strong—to operate against Lee's
rear. This was an excellent plan, but Hooker's superior,
General Halleck, refused to allow him to remove the troops
from Harper's Ferry; and Hooker said if he could not manage
the campaign in his own way, he preferred to give up the
command of the army."
{3502}
He was accordingly relieved and the command was given to
Major-General George G. Meade, of the Fifth Corps. Meantime
(June 25-27) the Union army had crossed the Potomac and
advanced to Frederick, Maryland. "On June 28th, Lee learned
from a scout that the Union army was in his rear and that his
communication with Richmond was seriously endangered. … In
this emergency he concluded to threaten Baltimore. As a
preliminary measure, he directed his entire army to move on
Gettysburg. This he hoped would induce Meade to concentrate in
his front and leave his rear free; which was precisely what
Meade did do. … Under the impression that Lee's army was
spread out along the Susquehanna from Carlisle to York, Meade
threw out his own forces fan-shaped to march in that
direction. … The Union corps were marching on and getting
farther apart, while the enemy were concentrating. The advance
of Hill's corps, on the morning of July 1st, struck Buford's
division of Union cavalry a short distance to the west of
Gettysburg, and in spite of a stout resistance forced it
slowly back towards the town. The First Corps at this time was
five miles south of Gettysburg. General Reynolds went to the
support of Buford with the nearest division of the First
Corps—Wadsworth's—and directed that the others follow. While
forming his line of battle he was killed. General Howard
succeeded to the command of the field, but did not issue any
orders to the First Corps until the afternoon. In the meantime
General Doubleday continued the contest, captured a great part
of the forces that had assailed him, and cleared his immediate
front of all enemies. Before the Eleventh Corps came up the
enemy could have walked right over the small force opposed to
them, but owing to the absence of Stuart's cavalry [which, not
crossing the Potomac to follow Lee until the 27th, had
undertaken a long raid around the Union forces, and did not
succeed in joining the main body of the Confederates until
July 2d] they had not been kept informed as to the movements
Meade was making, and fearing that the whole Union army was
concentrated in their front they were overcautious. There was
now a lull in the battle for about an hour. The remainder of
the First Corps came up and was followed soon after by the
Eleventh Corps under General Schurz. About the same time the
Confederate corps of General Ewell arrived and made a junction
with that of Hill. General Howard assumed command of the Union
forces. Repeated attacks were now made against the First Corps
by Ewell from the north and Hill from the west; but the
Confederate charges were successfully repulsed. … Ewell's
attack also struck the Eleventh Corps on the right and front
with great force. … General Meade, when he heard of Reynold's
death, was 14 miles from Gettysburg at Taneytown, preparing to
form line of battle along Pipe Creek. He at once sent General
Hancock forward with orders to assume command of the field.
Hancock, perceiving that Cemetery Ridge [about half a mile
south of Gettysburg] was an admirable position for a defensive
battle, determined to hold it if possible. This was not an
easy thing to do, for the enemy were in overwhelming force,
and the feeble remnants of the First and Eleventh Corps were
not in a condition to make a prolonged resistance. … Hancock
directed Doubleday to send a force to Culp's Hill on the
right, while he instructed Buford to parade up and down on the
extreme left with his cavalry. The enemy were thus led to
suppose that the Union line was a long one and had been
heavily reënforced. As the losses on both sides had been
tremendous, probably not exceeded for the same number of
troops during the war, the enemy hesitated to advance,
particularly as some movements of Kilpatrick's cavalry seemed
to threaten their rear. They therefore deferred action until
Meade concentrated the next day. On General Hancock's
recommendation General Meade ordered his entire army to
Gettysburg. By dusk part of the Third Corps had arrived, and
soon after the Twelfth Corps and the Second Corps were close
at hand. … Most of the troops, though worn out with hard
marching, arrived by midday of July 2d. The Sixth Corps had 34
miles to march and came later in the afternoon. … The attack
as ordered by General Lee was to begin with Longstreet on the
right and be made 'en échelon.' That is, as soon as Longstreet
was fairly engaged, Hill's corps was to take up the fight and
go in, and as soon as Hill was fairly engaged, Ewell's corps
on the right was to attack. The object was to keep the whole
Union line in a turmoil at once, and prevent reënforcements
going from any corps not engaged to another that was fighting;
but Hill did not act until Longstreet's fight was over, and
Ewell did not act until Hill had been repulsed. … The enemy …
failed in every attack against Meade's main line, with the
exception of that portion south of Culp's Hill. Elated by the
fact that he had made a lodgement there, Ewell determined to
hold on at all hazards and sent heavy reënforcements during
the night to aid Johnson to make an attack in the morning. …
So ended the battle of the second day. At day dawn [July 3]
General Warren, acting for General Meade, established a cordon
of troops and batteries which drove Johnson out of his
position on the right. … Lee having failed in his attacks both
on Meade's left and right had to decide at once whether he
would give up the contest and retreat, or make another attempt
to force the Union line. As he had been reënforced by Stuart's
cavalry, and as a fresh division under Pickett was available,
he determined to try to pierce the left center of the Union
army and disperse the force opposed to him. To this end he
directed Longstreet to form a strong column of attack to be
composed of Pickett's division and Pettigrew's division and
two brigades of Pender's division, under Trimble, of Hill's
corps. To create confusion and prevent General Meade from
sending reënforcements to the menaced point, Stuart was
ordered to ride around the right of the Union army and make an
attack in rear. And still more to facilitate the attack 135
guns were to concentrate their fire against the Union center
and disperse the forces assembled there. About 1 P. M. the
terrific cannonade began and lasted for two hours, by which
time the Confederate ammunition was nearly exhausted. …
Stuart's cavalry attack proved abortive, for it was met and
frustrated by two brigades of Gregg's cavalry aided by
Custer's brigade, after a severe battle, which was hotly
contested on both sides. Stuart's further progress was checked
and he was forced to retreat. … Pickett formed his great
column of attack and came forward as soon as the fire from the
Union batteries slackened."
{3503}
Fresh guns had, however, been brought into position and swept
the ground over which Pickett moved. His charge, one of the
most desperately determined of the whole war, was heroically
met by Gibbon's division of the Second Corps and by part of
the First Corps, under the personal direction of General
Hancock, who was severely wounded in the terrible conflict.
Pickett was forced to retreat with the survivors of his
onslaught, and "the whole plain was soon covered with
fugitives; but, as no pursuit was ordered, General Lee in
person succeeded in rallying them and in re-forming the line
of battle. The next day, July 4th, General Lee drew back his
flanks and at evening began his retreat by two routes—the main
body on the direct road to Williamsport through the mountains,
the other via Chambersburg, the latter including the immense
train of the wounded. Gregg's division (except Huey's brigade)
was sent in pursuit by way of Chambersburg, but the enemy had
too much the start to render the chase effective. Kilpatrick,
however, got in front of the main body on the direct route
and, after a midnight battle at Monterey, fought during a
terrific thunder storm, succeeded in making sad havoc of
Ewell's trains. … Lee concentrated his army in the vicinity of
Williamsport, but as French had destroyed his pontoon bridge,
and as the Potomac had risen, he was unable to cross. He
therefore fortified his position. Meade did not follow Lee
directly, but went around by way of Frederick. After
considerable delay the Union army again confronted that of Lee
and were about—under orders from President Lincoln-to make an
attack, when Lee slipped away on the night of July 14th to the
Virginia side of the Potomac. This ended the campaign of
Gettysburg. The Union loss was 3,072 killed, 14,497 wounded,
5,434 missing=Total, 23,003. The Confederate loss was 2,592
killed, 12,709 wounded, 5,150 missing=Total, 20,451."
A. Doubleday,
Gettysburg made plain (with 29 maps).
ALSO IN:
A. Doubleday,
Chancellorsville and Gettysburg
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 6, part 2).
J. Longstreet, H. J. Hunt and others,
Gettysburg
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3).
F. A. Walker,
History of the Second Army Corps,
chapter 8.
A. L. Long,
Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,
chapter 15.
Comte de Paris,
History of the American Civil War,
volume 3, book 3, chapter 4.
D. X. Junkin and F. H. Norton,
Life of General Hancock,
chapters 11-13.
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 27.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (June-July: Tennessee).
The Tullahoma campaign.
"During the first six months of the year 1863 the Army of the
Cumberland remained at Murfreesboro' and was comparatively
inactive. The troops were employed in the construction of
elaborate fortifications and in divers minor operations with
defensive or tentative objects. … Late in June the Army of the
Cumberland advanced against its old enemy, the Confederate
Army of the Tennessee, then holding the line of Duck River. In
this movement the Fourteenth Corps [General Thomas] was in the
centre, its appropriate place, and drove the enemy from
Hoover's Gap and from several positions in front of that gap.
General McCook [Twentieth Corps] on the right had a severe
combat at Liberty Gap, but finally pressed the enemy from the
hills. General Crittenden [Twenty-first Corps] on the left did
not meet much opposition. When Bragg's army had been driven
from its defensive line on Duck River, General Rosecrans moved
his army towards Manchester, and regarding this movement as
indicating either an attack upon his position at Tullahoma, or
the interruption of his communications, Bragg fell back from
that place. He did not consider himself strong enough to meet
Rosecrans in battle, and he consequently retreated first to
the Cumberland Mountains, and, soon after, across the
Tennessee River to Chattanooga. The Tullahoma campaign was
begun on the 23d of June and terminated on the 4th of July.
The enemy fought at the gaps of the mountains, but the defense
on the whole was feeble. The result was the possession by the
Army of the Cumberland of the region from Murfreesboro' to
Bridgeport, Alabama. At the close of the campaign the army
advanced to the northern base of the Cumberland Mountains, and
there halted to make preparations for a campaign south of the
Tennessee River."
T. B. Van Horne,
Life of General George H. Thomas,
chapter 5.
ALSO IN:
T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapter 19 (volume 1).
H. M. Cist,
The Army of the Cumberland
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7).
P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 14.
D. S. Stanley,
The Tullahoma Campaign
(Sketches of War History,
Ohio Commandery L. L. of the United States, volume 3).
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: On the Mississippi).
The Defence of Helena.
"One of the most brilliant of the minor victories of the war
was gained at Helena, Arkansas, on the west bank of the
Mississippi, on the 4th of July, General Holmes [Confederate]
had asked and received permission to take that place, in the
middle of June, and had mustered for that purpose an army of
nearly 10,000 men. The garrison of Helena consisted of a
division of the Thirteenth Corps and a brigade of cavalry
numbering in all 4000 men, commanded by Major-General B. M.
Prentiss. Holmes felt so sure of victory that he doubtless
selected the 4th of July for his attack in a mere spirit of
bravado. He assaulted at daylight with converging columns, two
of which made considerable impression upon the outworks, but
never reached the town. The defense of the Union troops was
singularly skilful and energetic, and, after a few hours of
fighting, Holmes, finding himself utterly defeated, retired at
half-past ten. The little army of Prentiss was, of course, too
small to pursue. The last Confederate attempt to hold the
Mississippi River thus ended in a complete and most
humiliating repulse."
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 11.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: Mississippi).
The capture and destruction of Jackson.
When Vicksburg surrendered, Johnston was hovering in the rear
of Grant's army, and Sherman was watching his movements. On
the very day the surrender was completed the latter marched
rapidly upon Jackson, with 50,000 men, Johnston retreating
before him. The city was invested on the 10th, and defended by
the Confederates until the night of the 16th when they
evacuated with haste. General Sherman, writing to Admiral
Porter on the 19th of July, said: "We … have 500 prisoners,
are still pursuing and breaking railroads, so that the good
folks of Jackson will not soon again hear the favorite
locomotive whistle.
{3504}
The enemy burned nearly all the handsome dwellings round about
the town because they gave us shelter or to light up the
ground to prevent night attacks. He also set fire to a chief
block of stores in which were commissary supplies, and our
men, in spite of guards, have widened the circle of fire, so
that Jackson, once the pride and boast of Mississippi, is now
a ruined town. State-house, Governor's mansion, and some fine
dwellings, well within the lines of intrenchments, remain
untouched. I have been and am yet employed in breaking up the
railroad 40 miles north and 60 south; also 10 miles east. My
10-miles break west, of last May, is still untouched, so that
Jackson ceases to be a place for the enemy to collect stores
and men."
Official Records,
series 1, volume 24, part 3, page 531.
ALSO IN:
J. E. Johnston,
Narrative of Military Operations,
chapter 8.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: Kentucky).
John Morgan's Raid into Ohio and Indiana.
"The most famous raid of this time was that made in July by
John Morgan across the Ohio River. General Buckner was then in
East Tennessee, near the borders of Kentucky, getting ready to
make another dash toward Louisville, and Morgan went ahead to
prepare the way. He crossed the Cumberland River into Kentucky
with about 3,000 mounted men, sacked Columbia, captured
Lebanon with 400 prisoners, and rode on through Bardstown to
Brandenburg on the Ohio River, plundering and destroying as he
went. Many Kentuckians had joined him on the way, and he then
had 4,000 men and ten pieces of artillery. The advance of
Rosecrans's army just at that time prevented Buckner from
joining him, and Morgan determined to cross into Indiana.
There were two gunboats in the river, but he kept them off
with his artillery while his men crossed on two captured
steamboats. Morgan then rode through Indiana toward Cincinnati
fighting home guards, tearing up railroads, burning bridges
and mills and capturing much property. The whole State was
aroused by the danger, and thousands of armed men started
after the bold riders. Morgan became alarmed, and after
passing around Cincinnati, almost within sight of its
steeples, turned toward the Ohio to cross again into Kentucky.
A large Union force was following, others were advancing on
his flanks, and gunboats and steamboats filled with armed men
were moving up the river to cut him off. The people aided the
pursuers all they could by cutting down trees and barricading
the roads to stop Morgan's march. He was so delayed by these
and other things that he did not reach the Ohio until July
19th. He hoped to cross at a place called Buffington Ford, but
the Union men were upon him and he had to turn and fight.
After a severe battle, in which the Union troops were helped
by gunboats which cut off the raiders from crossing the ford,
about 800 of Morgan's men surrendered, and the rest, with
Morgan himself, fled up the river fourteen miles to Bellville,
where they tried to cross by swimming their horses. About 300
men had succeeded in getting over when the gunboats came up
and opened fire on them. A fearful scene ensued, for it was a
struggle of life and death. … Some got across, some were shot
and some drowned. Morgan was not among the fortunate ones who
escaped. With about 200 men he fled further up the river to
New Lisbon, where he was surrounded and forced to surrender.
This was a wonderful raid, but it did not do the Confederate
cause any good. A large part of the property destroyed was
private property, and this roused the anger of all the people
of the Border States. … Morgan and some of his officers were
sent to Columbus and confined in the penitentiary, from which
he and six others escaped in the following November by making
a hole through the bottom of their cell and digging a tunnel
under the foundations of the building."
J. D. Champlin Jr.,
Young Folk's History of the War for the Union,
chapter 31.
ALSO IN:
B. W. Duke,
History of Morgan's Cavalry,
chapters 14-15.
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 23.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: New York).
The Draft Riots.
See NEW YORK (CITY): A. D. 1863.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July: South Carolina).
The lodgement on Morris Island, and the assault on Fort Wagner.
After Du Pont's attack upon the forts in Charleston harbor
"the Confederates enjoyed two months of undisturbed leisure
for the construction and strengthening of their works, though
all this time the matter of a new essay at the reduction of
Sumter occupied more than its proper share of the attention of
the Government.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(APRIL: South CAROLINA).
The forces in the Department of the South were not sufficient
to undertake a siege of Charleston by land, and the exigencies
of the more important campaigns going forward in Virginia,
Tennessee and Mississippi prevented their being reenforced. It
was resolved, therefore, to restrict operations to the harbor
and the islands immediately adjoining, and Admiral John A.
Dahlgren—after the death of Admiral Foote, who had been
designated for the purpose—and General Q. A. Gillmore were
charged with the command of the military and naval forces
engaged. … Admiral Dahlgren … assumed command on the 6th of
July. Gillmore had already been on the ground some three
weeks, and had nearly completed his preparations for a descent
upon Morris Island, when Dahlgren arrived. The admiral,
without a moment's delay, entered into the plans of the
general, and within forty-eight hours collected his scattered
monitors and steamed away to the harbor of Charleston. Morris
Island is a low strip of sandy beach, which lies to the south
of Charleston and, with Sullivan's Island to the north, guards
the entrance to the harbor, the two stretching out to sea like
the open jaws of an alligator. They are each about three and a
half miles long, separated from the mainland on the north, and
from the high ground of James Island on the south, by miry and
impracticable marshes stretching a distance of two or three
miles. Their inner ends are a little less than four miles from
the Charleston wharves, with Fort Sumter lying midway.
Gillmore resolved to make his attack from Folly Island, which
lies on the coast directly south of Morris, which it greatly
resembles in conformation, and from which it is separated by
Light House Inlet. It was occupied by a brigade under General
Israel Vogdes, who had fortified the southern end of it,
controlling the waters of Stono harbor and the approaches of
James Island.
{3505}
There was a heavy growth of underbrush at both ends of the
island; taking advantage of this, Vogdes, under Gillmore's
direction, constructed ten powerful batteries near its
southern extremity, completely masked from the enemy's view;
their purpose being to operate against the enemy's guns near
the landing place, to protect the debarkation of the troops,
and to cover their retreat in case of necessity. Most of this
work was done at night, and all of it as silently as possible.
… Alfred H. Terry's division of 4,000 and George C. Strong's
brigade of 2,500 were quietly brought together on Folly
Island, and on the afternoon of the 8th of July the former
force was sent up the Stono to make a demonstration against
James Island, while Strong's brigade was ordered to descend
upon Morris Island at daybreak of the 9th. Colonel T. W.
Higginson of the First South Carolina Volunteers, colored, was
ordered at the same time to cut the railroad between
Charleston and Savannah; a duty in which General Gillmore says
he 'signally failed.' The others punctually performed the
tasks assigned them. Terry's feint against Stono was so
imposing as to be taken for the real attack, by Beauregard,
who hastily gathered together a considerable force to resist
him, and paid little attention to the serious movement on the
beach." The Confederate troops on Morris Island, taken by
surprise, were "speedily driven out of all their batteries
south of Wagner, and abandoned to Gillmore three-fourths of
the island, with 11 pieces of heavy ordnance. The next day he
ordered Strong's brigade to assault Fort Wagner, an attempt
which failed, with slight loss on each side. On the 16th Terry
was attacked by a superior force on James Island, and although
he repulsed the enemy with the assistance of the gunboats
which accompanied him, he was recalled to Fol]y Island, the
purpose of his demonstration having been accomplished.
Although General Gillmore had as yet no conception of the
enormous strength of Fort Wagner, the assault and repulse of
the 11th of July convinced him that it could not be carried
offhand. He therefore determined, on consultation with Admiral
Dahlgren, to establish counter-batteries against it, hoping
with the combined fire of these and the gunboats to dismount
the guns of the work and so shake its defense as to carry it
by a determined assault. The preparations were made with great
energy, and by the morning of the 18th, exactly one week after
the first assault, General Gillmore was ready for the second."
The batteries and the fleet opened fire on the fort at noon of
July 18th; its defenders were soon driven from the parapets,
and "in the course of the afternoon the whole work seemed to
be beaten out of shape"; but, being constructed of fine quartz
sand, it had suffered damage only in appearance. At twilight,
the storming party, headed by Colonel Robert G. Shaw and his
Fifty-fourth Massachusetts Regiment of colored troops, made a
most brave and resolute assault, actually climbing the parapet
of the fort, but only to leave 1500 dead, dying and wounded
upon its treacherous sands. The heroic young Colonel Shaw fell
dead among the foremost men; General Strong, Colonel Chatfield
and Colonel Putnam were killed or mortally wounded; General
Truman Seymour was wounded severely, and many other excellent
officers were in the lists of the slain or the sadly disabled.
"The death of Colonel Shaw was widely lamented, not only
because of his personal worth, but because he had become in a
certain sense the representative of the best strain of New
England anti-slavery sentiment. The Confederates recognized
this representative character by their treatment of his
corpse, replying to a request of his friends for his remains,
that they 'had buried him under a layer of his niggers.'"
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 7, chapter 15.
ALSO IN:
T. W. Higginson,
Army Life in a Black Regiment.
G. W. Williams,
History of the Negro Troops,
chapter 9.
M. V. Dahlgren,
Memoirs of John A. Dahlgren,
chapter 14.
A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
chapter 31 (volume 2).
D. Ammen,
The Navy in the Civil War,
volume 2: The Atlantic Coast, chapter 7.
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 28.
L. F. Emilio,
History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers,
chapters. 4-5.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (July-November: Virginia).
Meade and Lee on the Rapidan.
Bristoe Station.
Rappahannock Station.
Kelly's Ford.
Mine Run.
The 18th of July found the whole army of General Meade once
more on the Virginia side of the Potomac. "His plan for the
pursuit of Lee was not unlike that of McClellan a year before,
but although he displayed much greater expedition and energy
in the execution of it than were shown by his predecessor, the
results, through no fault of his own, were unimportant.
General French, who had taken no part in the battle of
Gettysburg, had been placed in command of the Third Corps; he
was an old officer of the regular army, excellent in drill, in
routine, and all the every-day details of the service, but
utterly unfit for an enterprise requiring great audacity and
celerity. He was assigned upon this expedition to the duty of
throwing his corps through Manassas Gap and attacking the
flank of the enemy as he moved southward by Front Royal. Meade
succeeded in getting French into the Gap in time to have
broken the rebel army in two; but when he attacked, it was in
so inefficient a Manner, and with so small a portion of his
force, that the day was wasted and the enemy made their way
down the Valley to the lower gaps. This failure was a source
of deep mortification to General Meade. … The pursuit of the
enemy was not continued further. … The months of August and
September were a period of repose for the Army of the Potomac.
It was in fact in no condition to undertake active operations;
a considerable body of troops had been taken from Meade for
service in South Carolina, and a strong detachment had been
sent to the City of New York for the purpose of enforcing the
draft there. General Lee had retired behind the Rapidan for
several weeks of rest; neither army was ready at that time to
attack the other." Early in September Longstreet's Corps was
detached from Lee's army and sent west to strengthen Bragg at
Chattanooga, and in the latter part of the same month about
13,000 men (Eleventh and Twelfth Corps) were taken from Meade
and sent, under Hooker's command, to the same scene of pending
conflict. "But, even with this reduction of his command, after
the return of the troops detached to the North, Meade found
himself with an army of about 68,000 men; and, knowing this
force to be somewhat superior to that of the enemy, he
resolved to cross the Rapidan and attack him; but again, as so
often happened in the history of the contending armies in
Virginia, Lee had formed the project of a similar enterprise,
and began its execution a day or two in advance. He had
learned of the departure of two corps for the West." On the
9th of October "he began a flanking movement to the right of
the Union line."
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 9.
{3506}
"Conceiving that the Confederates would move by the Warrenton
pike, in order to cross Bull Run and get possession of
Centreville—thus to interpose between the Federal army and
Washington—Meade retired as speedily as possible. He had, in
reality, the start in the race, notwithstanding the day's loss
in the return movement. … On the morning of the 14th, Lee
advanced from Warrenton in two columns, but not by the 'pike.'
The left, under Hill, moving by the turnpike to New Baltimore,
was ordered to strike the railroad at Bristoe Station; the
right column, under Ewell, taking a more easterly route, was
directed to effect a junction at the same point. When Hill
approached Bristoe, Meade's army, with the exception of
Warren's corps, had passed that point. As the head of this
column came up, the 5th Corps, under General Sykes, had just
crossed Broad Run. Hill at once formed a line of battle to
attack the rear of that corps, when Warren came up, and, by a
bold onset, drove the enemy back, securing 450 prisoners and 5
guns. The National army, having won the race for position, and
obtained possession of the heights of Centreville, Lee's
movement was at an end, and he had but to retire to his old
line again … and, on the 18th, began his retrograde movement.
The following day Meade commenced pursuit, with the intention
of attacking the enemy on his retreat, but did not overtake
him, being detained by a heavy ruin storm, which so raised
Bull Run as to render it unfordable. … On the 7th of November
the whole army was put in motion toward the Rappahannock,
along which river the enemy was in position at Rappahannock
Station and Kelly's Ford. In two columns Meade advanced toward
these points. General French, commanding the left
wing—composed of the 1st, 2d and 3d Corps—was directed to
cross at Kelly's Ford, while the right wing—comprising the
5th and 6th Corps, under General Sedgwick—marched upon
Rappahannock Station. The 3d Corps, under Birney, led the
advance on Kelly's Ford. Reaching that point, without waiting
for pontoons, Birney crossed his own division by wading,
carried the rifle-pits, captured 500 prisoners and prevented
the enemy re-enforcing their troops at the Ford, by means of
batteries which he planted on the hills that commanded the
crossing. At the same time the right wing was contending
against more formidable obstacles at Rappahannock Station.
Early's division of Ewell's corps occupied a series of works
on the north side of the river. … Gaining a good position,
commanding the fort from the rear, Sedgwick planted his guns
and opened a fierce cannonade upon the enemy's several
batteries. Under cover of this fire, the temporary works were
assaulted and carried at the bayonet's point. Over 1,500
prisoners, 4 guns and 8 standards were captured. Sedgwick's
loss was about 300 in killed and wounded. The right column now
crossed the river without opposition, and, uniting with
French's forces, advanced to Brandy Station. November 8th was
lost in getting forward the trains, and in reconnoitering.
Under cover of that night Lee withdrew across the Rapidan.
Taking position between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan,
Meade remained quietly and undisturbed for two weeks. Finding
Lee indisposed for action, the Federal leader resolved once
more to try and bring on a general engagement. … The
Confederate army having gone into winter quarters, was located
over a wide extent of country. … This separation of the
enemy's corps, led Meade to hope, that, by crossing the lower
fords of the Rapidan, and advancing rapidly on the plank and
turnpike roads to Orange, C. H., he could concentrate his army
against Ewell's corps, cripple or destroy it, and then be able
to turn upon Hill, and in this way break Lee's army in
detail." But delays occurred which "frustrated the object of
the movement; … disclosed Meade's intention to the enemy, who
at once concentrated his entire force behind Mine Run, having
also time given for additional entrenchments along the menaced
points. The enemy's position was found to be exceedingly
strong by nature, and further perfected by the skill of busy
hands. … In front was Mine Run, a shallow stream, but
difficult to cross on account of its steep banks, the marshy
nature of the ground, and the dense undergrowth with which it
was flanked. … 'In view of the season of the year [said
General Meade in his subsequent report], the impossibility of
moving from that place if there came on even a couple of days
of rain; having failed in my first plan, which was to attack
the enemy before they could concentrate; and then having
failed in my plan to attack them after they had concentrated,
in the manner which I have related, I concluded that, under
the circumstances, it was impossible for me to do anything
more.' And this was the end of a movement, which, like
Hooker's advance to flank Fredericksburg, opened with fair
promise of success, and, like that advance, was a failure from
incidents which the situation permitted rather than asserted."
O. J. Victor,
History of the Southern Rebellion,
division 12, chapter 1 (volume 4).
ALSO IN:
W. Swinton,
Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,
chapter 10.
J. E. Cooke,
Life of General Robert E. Lee,
part 7.
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 29.
A. A. Humphreys,
From Gettysburg to the Rapidan.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August: Missouri-Kansas).
Quantrell's guerrilla raid.
The sacking and burning of Lawrence.
"Since the fall of Vicksburg many rebel soldiers had returned
from Arkansas to their homes in Western Missouri, and under
the secret orders so frequently sent from commanders in the
South into that State, the guerrilla bands along the Kansas
border suddenly grew in numbers and audacity. Though the whole
region was patrolled almost day and night by Union detachments
and scouts, a daring leader named Quantrell, who had been for
some weeks threatening various Kansas towns, assembled a band
of 300 picked and well-mounted followers at a place of
rendezvous near the line, about sunset of August 20. His
object being divined, half a dozen Union detachments from
different points started in chase of him; but skilfully
eluding all of them by an eccentric march, Quantrell crossed
the State line, and, reaching the open prairie country, where
roads were unnecessary, pushed directly for Lawrence, Kansas.
{3507}
… This town was 40 miles in the interior, and had no reason to
apprehend an attack, and though it could have assembled
several hundred men under arms in half an hour, its
inhabitants had no dream of danger when the marauders entered
the place at sunrise of August 21. Quantrell stationed
detachments to prevent any assembling or concentration of the
citizens, and then began a scene of pillage, arson and
massacre too horrible to relate. Stores and banks were robbed,
185 buildings burned, and from 150 to 200 inhabitants murdered
with a cold-blooded fiendishness which seems impossible to
believe of Americans. The direful work occupied but three or
four hours, when the perpetrators remounted their horses and
departed. Though they managed their retreat with such skill as
to avoid a general encounter, the pursuit was so hot that in
several skirmishes, and by cutting off stragglers and
laggards, 100 or more of the band were killed. The sudden
calamity raised excitement on the Kansas border to almost a
frenzy."
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, page 211.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August-September: Tennessee).
Burnside's deliverance of East Tennessee.
The Union Army in Knoxville.
"Ever since the Federals had become masters of Kentucky they
had projected all expedition into East Tennessee. … Early In
the year 1862 the Federals had taken the defile of Cumberland
Gap, the principal door to East Tennessee; but drawn into the
pursuit of their adversaries in other directions, they had
very wisely renounced proceeding beyond the gap, and shortly
thereafter the Confederates had retaken the defile. In 1863
the role of liberator of East Tennessee was reserved for
General Burnside: it was an honorable compensation accorded to
the unfortunate but gallant soldier vanquished at
Fredericksburg. Two divisions of the Ninth Corps designated to
undertake this campaign having been, on June 4th, sent to the
aid of Grant, it became necessary to commence new
preparations. The scattered troops in Kentucky, several
regiments recruited in that State or composed of refugees from
East Tennessee, and a part of the fresh levies made in Ohio
and Indiana, formed the Twenty-third Corps, under the orders
of General Hartsuff. At the end of June … this little army was
in readiness to move, when Morgan started on his raid [and
Burnside's troops were sent in the pursuit]. Six weeks were
lost. It was the beginning of August. The Ninth Corps was
coming back from Vicksburg. But the men, worn out by the
climate, had need of rest. Burnside could not wait for them."
He set out upon his movement into East Tennessee with about
20,000 men, leaving Camp Nelson, near Lexington, on the 16th
of August. The Confederate General Buckner opposed him with an
equal number, including 3000 under General Fraser at
Cumberland Gap. Instead of attempting to force the passage of
the gap, Burnside "determined to make a flank movement around
the defile, by traversing more to the south, in the State of
Tennessee, the high table-land which on that side bears the
designation of Cumberland plateau. The roads which Burnside
would have to cross were long and difficult to travel, and
that portion of the country was little known, besides being
bare of resources; but the very difficult character of the
roads warranted the belief that the Confederates would be illy
prepared for defence in that region. No precaution was
neglected to ensure the success of this laborious and perilous
march," and the success achieved was perfect. "One can
understand with what joy the Federals, after eleven days of
toilsome march, entered the rich valley, a kind of promised
land, which stretched out before them. Public rumor had
greatly exaggerated their numbers. … Bragg, fearing with
reason lest by its flanking movements it [the division which
Burnside led in person] should separate him from Buckner and
then fall upon Chattanooga, had sent his lieutenant an order
to evacuate Knoxville." Buckner withdrew and Burnside made a
triumphal entry into Knoxville on the 3d of September.
"According to the testimony of eye-witnesses, the joy of the
people was beyond description. Innumerable Federal flags which
had been preserved in secret were displayed at the windows."
Frazer, who had not been withdrawn from Cumberland Gap, found
himself entrapped, when, on the 9th of September, Burnside
appeared before his works, and he surrendered without a shot.
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 1, chapter 2.
ALSO IN:
A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the 9th Army Corps,
part 3, chapters 4-5.
T. W. Humes,
The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee,
chapter 13.
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 30, part 2.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (August-September: Tennessee).
Rosecrans's advance to Chattanooga.
Evacuation of the place by the Confederates.
Battle of Chickamauga.
"The seizure and occupation of the strategic point Chattanooga
was an essential part of the campaign by the national forces
against the Confederates. The Atlantic portion of the Southern
States is separated from the Mississippi Valley by majestic
folds of the earth's surface, constituting the Appalachian
Ranges. These folds run, in a general manner, parallel to each
other, and at intervals are crossed by transverse depressions
or gaps. Such passages or gateways are therefore of great
commercial, political and military importance. Chattanooga,
which in the Cherokee language means 'The Hawk's Nest,' is a
little town seated in one of these transverse depressions,
through which the Tennessee River and a system of railroads
pass. … From the region of Chattanooga the earth-folds range
in a southwesterly direction. Enumerating such of them as are
of interest on the present occasion, they are from west to
east as follows: Raccoon or Sand Mountain, Lookout Mountain,
Missionary Ridge, Pigeon Mountain, Chickamauga Hills. …
Chattanooga Valley … through which runs a stream of the same
name, is formed on the west by Lookout Mountain, here about
2,400 feet high, and on the east by Missionary Ridge, so
called because Catholic Missionaries had established, many
years ago, churches and schools upon it among the Cherokee
Indians. From the summit of Lookout Mountain portions of not
fewer than six States may be seen." In his Tullahoma campaign)
Rosecrans, in July, had compelled Bragg and the Confederate
army, by skilful flanking movements, to fan back to
Chattanooga.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 1863 (June-July: Tennessee).
{3508}
He had ever since been urged from Washington to pursue his
attack and dislodge the enemy from the mountains. But he
delayed further movements for a month, repairing his railroad
communications, asking for reinforcements, and waiting for
corn to ripen for food and forage. When he advanced, it was to
turn the left of Bragg's position at Chattanooga, and "reach
his rear between Dalton and Atlanta. To do this, he had to
cross the Tennessee River below Chattanooga, and then pass the
three or four successive mountain ridges. … Rosecrans reached
the Tennessee River on the evening of the 20th of August, and
shelled Chattanooga from the heights on the north bank on the
21st. Bridges were thrown over the river at Caperton's Ferry,
mouth of Battle Creek, and Shell Mound, and the army, except
the cavalry, safely crossed in face of the enemy. By the 8th
of September" the several movements planned for Thomas, McCook
and Crittenden were successfully accomplished, and Chattanooga
was abandoned by the Confederates. "Thus the first object of
Rosecrans's campaign was accomplished: the important strategic
point Chattanooga was obtained. … Rosecrans, believing himself
perfectly secure in Chattanooga, and being convinced that
Bragg was fleeing southward, did nothing to fortify himself.
Taking measures to pursue his antagonist, he directed
Crittenden to leave one brigade at Chattanooga as a garrison,
and with the rest move forward to Ringgold. Thomas was to
march to Lafayette, and McCook upon Alpine and Summer Creek.
But Bragg, so far from continuing, had stopped his retreat—he
was concentrating at Lafayette. He had received, or was on the
point of receiving, the powerful re-enforcements directed to
join him. He was strictly ordered to check the farther advance
of the Army of the Cumberland. … Rosecrans had separated three
corps of his army by mountain ridges and by distances greater
than those intervening between each of them and the enemy.
Bragg had concentrated opposite his centre, and was holding
such a position that he could attack any of them with
overwhelming numbers. He had caused deserters and citizens to
go into Rosecrans's lines to confirm him in the impression
that the Confederates were in rapid retreat. … On the 11th of
September, Crittenden, not stopping to fortify Chattanooga,
pushed on toward Ringgold to cut off Buckner, who he had heard
was coming from East Tennessee to the support of Bragg.
Finding that Buckner had already passed, he turned toward
Lafayette to follow him, going up the east side of the
Chickamauga, but meeting a steadily increasing resistance he
took alarm, and fell back across that stream at Lee and
Gordon's Mills. The forces he had encountered were Cheatham's
and Walker's divisions. Thomas, who had now discovered Bragg's
position, directed McCook, who was advancing on Rome, to fall
back instantly and connect with him. Rosecrans's troops had
thus become scattered along an extended line from Lee and
Gordon's Mills to Alpine, a space of about forty miles. By the
17th they were brought more within supporting distance, and on
the morning of the 18th a concentration was begun toward
Crawfish Spring, but it was slowly executed. At this time the
two armies were confronting each other on the opposite banks
of the Chickamauga, a stream which, rising at the junction of
Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Mountain … empties into the
beautiful Tennessee River above Chattanooga. In the Indian
tongue Chickamauga means 'The Stagnant Stream,' 'The River of
Death'—a name, as we shall soon find, of ominous import.
Rosecrans was on the west bank of the Chickamauga. … On the
18th his right was … at Gordon's Mills, his left near the road
across from Rossville. Bragg's intention was to flank this
left and interpose between it and Chattanooga. … On the 18th
Longstreet's troops were arriving from Virginia, and Bragg was
ready. … The battle of Chickamauga commenced on the morning of
the 19th." Bragg's flanking movement, executed under General
Polk, and directed against the left of Rosecrans's line, where
Thomas had command, did not succeed. "The centre was then
assailed and pressed back, but, having been re-enforced, it
recovered its ground. Night came, and the battle was thus far
indecisive. … The night was spent in preparation. Thomas
constructed abatis and breastworks before his lines. … Bragg
was still determined to flank the national left, and intervene
between it and Chattanooga. He had ordered Polk to begin the
battle as soon as it was light enough to see," but Polk
delayed and it was not until 10 o'clock that "Breckenridge's
division, followed by Cleburne's, advanced against the
breastworks of Thomas, which were mostly in Cleburne's front.
Cleburne moved directly upon them, Breckenridge swinging round
to flank them. With so much energy were these attacks made,
that Thomas had to send repeatedly to Rosecrans for help. The
Confederates had been gaining ground, but with these
re-enforcements Thomas succeeded in driving back Cleburne with
very great loss, and even in advancing on the right of
Breckenridge." But, presently, by some blunder in the giving
or construing of an order, one division—that of General
"Wood—was withdrawn from Rosecrans line and posted uselessly
in the rear. "By this unfortunate mistake a gap was opened in
the line of battle, of which Hindman, of Longstreet's corps,
took instant advantage, and, striking Davis in flank and rear,
threw his whole division into confusion. … That break in the
line was never repaired. Longstreet's masses charged with such
terrible energy that it was impossible to check them. The
national right and centre were dispersed, flying toward
Rossville and Chattanooga. Sheridan, however, at length
succeeded in rallying a considerable portion of his division,
and managed to reach Thomas. On Thomas, who, in allusion to
these events, is often called 'The Rock of Chickamauga.' the
weight of the battle now fell. Everything depended on his
firmness. … In the flight of the right and part of the centre
from the field, Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden were
enveloped and carried away. … Rosecrans … went to Chattanooga,
and thence telegraphed to Washington that his army had been
beaten. Thomas still remained immovable in his position," and
at a critical moment he was saved from a movement into his
rear, by General Gorden Granger, who pushed to the front with
some reserves. "Night came, and the Confederates were still
unable to shake him. But, as most of the army had retreated to
Chattanooga, he now deliberately fell back to Rossville. … The
dead and wounded he left in the hands of the enemy. On the
21st he offered battle again, and that night withdrew into the
defences of Chattanooga."
J. W. Draper,
History of the American Civil War,
chapter 67, volume 3.
{3509}
"During the heavy fighting of the 20th, Thomas was the only
general officer on the field of rank above a division
commander. … Well was he called the 'Rock of Chickamauga,' …
There is nothing finer in history than Thomas at Chickamauga.
All things considered, the battle of Chickamauga, for the
forces engaged, was the hardest fought and the bloodiest
battle of the Rebellion. … The largest number of troops
Rosecrans had of all arms on the field during the two days'
fighting was 55,000 effective men. … Rosecrans's losses
aggregated killed, 1,687; wounded, 9,394; missing, 5,255.
Total loss, 16,336. Bragg, during the battle, when his entire
five corps were engaged, had about 70,000 effective troops in
line. … His losses, in part estimated, were 2,673 killed,
16,274 wounded, and 2,003 missing, a total of 20,950. A full
report of the rebel losses was never made."
H. M. Cist,
The Army of the Cumberland
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7), chapters 11-12.
ALSO IN:
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 1, chapters 2-6.
T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
volume 1, chapter 20.
T. B. Van Horne,
Life of Major-General George H. Thomas,
chapters 6-7.
W. B. Hazen,
Narrative of Military Service,
chapters 8-9.
D. H. Hill, E. Opdycke, and others,
Chickamauga
(Battles and Leaders, volume 3).
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 30.
P. H. Sheridan,
Personal Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 15.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(August-October: Arkansas-Missouri).
The breaking of Confederate authority in Arkansas.
Occupation of Little Rock by national forces.
Rebel raids into Missouri.
"After the surrender of Vicksburg, the Federal General Steele
was sent to Helena, with a considerable force, and instructed
to form a junction with General Davidson, who was moving south
from Missouri, by way of Crowley's Ridge, west of the St.
Francis, and with the combined force drive the Confederates
south of the Arkansas River. Having effected this junction and
established his depot and hospitals at Duvall's Bluff, on the
White River, General Steele, on the 1st of August, advanced
against the Confederate army, which fell back toward Little
Rock. After several successful skirmishes, he reached the
Arkansas River, and threw part of his force upon the south
side, to threaten the Confederate communications with
Arkadelphia, their depot of supplies, and flank their position
at Little Rock. General Marmaduke was sent out with a cavalry
force to beat the Federals back, but was completely routed.
Seeing what must be the inevitable result of this movement of
General Steele, the Confederate General Holmes destroyed what
property he could, and after a slight resistance retreated
with his army in great disorder, pursued by the Federal
cavalry, and on the 10th of September General Steele, with the
Federal army, entered the capital of Arkansas. His entire
losses in killed, wounded and missing, in this whole movement,
did not exceed 100. He captured 1,000 prisoners, and such
public property as the Confederates had not time to destroy.
The Federal cavalry continued to press the retreating
Confederates southward; but a small force, which had eluded
pursuit and moved eastward, attacked the Federal garrison at
Pine Bluff, on the Arkansas, south of Little Rock, hoping to
recapture it and thus cripple the Federals and break their
communications. The attempt, which was made on the 28th of
October, was repulsed with decided loss on the part of the
confederates, and the same day the Federal cavalry occupied
Arkadelphia, and the Confederates retreated toward the Red
River. This completely restored Arkansas to the Federal
authority, except a small district in the extreme southwest,
and the region of Northwest Arkansas, over which the guerrilla
and other irregular troops of the Confederates continued to
roam, in their plundering excursions into Missouri, Kansas,
and the Indian Territory. Some of these were conducted on a
large scale. … The Confederate General Cabell, collecting
together as many of the guerrillas and Indians as possible,
and some of the routed troops driven from Little Rock and its
vicinity, started with a force variously estimated at from
4,000 to 10,000, in the latter part of September, from the
Choctaw settlements of the Indian Territory, crossed the
Arkansas River east of Fort Smith, and, on the 1st of October,
a detachment of his troops, under General Shelby, joined
Coffee at Crooked Prairie, Missouri, intending to make a raid
into Southwestern Missouri. This combined force, numbering
2,000 or 2,500 men, penetrated as far as the Missouri River at
Booneville, but were pursued by the Missouri militia, and
finally brought to a stand about eight miles southwest of
Arrow Rock, on the evening of the 12th of October. General E.
B. Brown who commanded the Federal troops, fought them till
dark that evening, and during the night, having detached a
small force to attack them in the rear, renewed the battle the
next morning at eight A. M. After a sharp contest they fled,
completely routed and broken up, with a loss of several
hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. They were pursued to
the Arkansas line and prisoners gleaned all the way. … With
these last convulsive throes, the active existence of the
Confederate authority in Arkansas died out. On the 12th of
November a meeting was held at Little Rock, to consult on
measures for the restoration of the State to the Union, and
was succeeded by others in different parts of the State."
W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History of the Rebellion,
chapter 36.
ALSO IN:
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civile war in America,
volume 4, book 3, chapter 3.
W. Britton,
Memoirs of the Rebellion on the Border,
chapters 21-22.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(August-December: South Carolina).
Siege and Reduction of Fort Wagner.
Bombardment of Fort Sumter and Charleston.
After the unsuccessful assault and bloody repulse of July 18th
General Gillmore began against Fort Wagner the operations of a
regular siege.
See UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863
(JULY: SOUTH CAROLINA)
"Trenches were dug, and by the middle of August the batteries
were within a quarter-mile of Wagner and within two and a half
miles of Sumter. The work on these batteries had to be done
mostly by night, for the forts kept up a heavy fire. Another
battery was also begun in the marsh on the west side of Morris
Island. The black mud there was so soft that it would not bear
the weight of a man, and was at least 16 feet deep. After the
site was chosen, a lieutenant was ordered to superintend the
work, and told to call for whatever materials he wanted. Being
something of a wag, he sent to the quartermaster for 100 men 18
feet high, to work in mud 16 feet deep; but as men of that
height could not be had, he had to be satisfied with workmen
of common stature.
{3510}
All the work had to be done in the dark, for it was within
range of the guns of the forts. During fourteen nights piles
were driven through the mud into the solid ground beneath, and
on them were piled 15,000 bags of sand to form a parapet.
After breaking down several trucks, a monster eight-inch
Parrott gun, a 200-pounder, was dragged across the swamp and
mounted, and about the middle of August the Swamp Angel, as
the soldiers named it, was ready to throw shells into
Charleston, nearly five miles away. On the 17th of August
twelve land-batteries and the monitors opened fire on Sumter,
Wagner, and Gregg. The heaviest of the fire was aimed at
Sumter, as General Gillmore wished to silence it before he
made another assault on Wagner. The bombardment was kept up
for seven days, when Gillmore sent a dispatch to General
Halleck, saying: 'Fort Sumter is to-day (August 24) a
shapeless and harmless mass of ruins.' On the 21st of August,
General Gillmore wrote to General Beauregard, who was in
command in Charleston, demanding the evacuation of Fort Sumter
and of Morris Island, threatening, in case of refusal, to
bombard Charleston. Not hearing from him, he ordered a few
shells to be thrown into the city from the Swamp Angel. Some
of them fell in the streets and frightened the people, but did
little damage. Beauregard then wrote him a letter in which he
accused him of barbarity in 'turning his guns against the old
men, the women and children, and the hospitals of a sleeping
city,' and called the act 'unworthy of any soldier. General
Gillmore replied that it was the duty of the commander of an
attacked place to 'see to it that the non-combatants were
removed,' and that he (Beauregard) had had forty days' time in
which to do it. But the Swamp Angel was fired only a few
times. At the thirty-sixth shot it burst and blew out the
whole of its breech, and no other gun was mounted in its
place. Gillmore then turned his attention once more to Fort
Wagner, which he determined to assault again. To do this it
was necessary to silence its guns and drive its defenders into
the bomb-proofs; so a heavy fire was opened on it by the
batteries, while the armored frigate New Ironsides poured
eleven-inch shells into it from the sea side. The bombardment
was kept up day and night, strong calcium lights being used by
night to blind the Confederates and to show all parts of their
works. The Confederates, driven from their guns, were obliged
to fly for safety to their bomb-proofs. In the morning of
September 7, the troops, under General Terry, were about ready
to make the assault, when it was reported that the fort was
empty. The garrisons of both Wagner and Gregg had fled during
the night, and the whole of Morris Island was at last in
possession of the Union troops. The next night an attack was
made on Sumter by thirty boat-loads of men from the fleet.
They reached the base of the walls and began to go up,
thinking that the garrison was asleep; but before they reached
the top a fire of musketry and hand-grenades was opened on
them by the Confederates within, aided by some gun boats
outside, and the assailants were driven off with a loss of
about 200. But little more was done against Charleston during
the rest of the year. General Gillmore thought that, as
Sumter's guns were silenced, the fleet might easily pass into
the harbor and capture Charleston. But Admiral Dahlgren did
not care to run the risk of the torpedoes and powder-mines
over which he knew he would have to pass. Besides, General
Beauregard had taken advantage of the long delay in taking
Wagner to strengthen the inner forts. Fort Johnson had been
made into a powerful earthwork, and the fleet, even if Sumter
were passed, would meet with as hot a fire as had been
experienced outside. General Gillmore therefore contented
himself with repairing Wagner and Gregg and turning their guns
on Charles·ton and the forts defending it. As they were a mile
nearer the city than the Swamp Angel battery, a slow
bombardment was kept up until near the end of the year. About
half of Charleston was reached by the shells, and many
buildings were greatly injured. As the wharfs and most of the
harbor were under fire, blockade-runners could no longer run
in, and the business of the city was thus wholly destroyed."
J. D. Champlin, Jr.,
Young Folk's History of the War for the Union,
chapter 32.
ALSO IN:
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 3, chapter 2.
A. Roman,
Military Operations of General Beauregard,
volume 2, chapters 32-34.
C. B. Boynton,
History of the Navy during the Rebellion,
volume 2, chapter 35.
L. F. Emilio,
History of the 54th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers.,
chapters 6-7.
{3511}

Map of the Battlefield of Chattanooga. 1863.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (October-November: Tennessee).
The raising of the siege of Chattanooga.
"Battle above the Clouds," on Lookout Mountain.
Assault of Missionary Ridge.
The Rout of Bragg's army.
After its defeat at Chickamauga the National Army was
practically besieged on Chattanooga. Bragg acquired strong
positions on Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and was
able to cut off all of Rosecrans's routes of supply, except
one long and difficult wagon-road. On the 17th of October an
important reorganization of the Union armies in the West was
effected. "The departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and
the Tennessee, were united under the title of Military
Division of the Mississippi, of which General Grant was made
commander, and Thomas superseded Rosecrans in command of the
Army of the Cumberland. General Hooker, with two corps, was
sent to Tennessee. Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the 23d of
October, and found affairs in a deplorable condition. It was
impossible to supply the troops properly by the one
wagon-road, and they had been on short rations for some time,
while large numbers of the mules and horses were dead. Grant's
first care was to open a new and better line of supply.
Steamers could come up the river as far as Bridgeport, and he
ordered the immediate construction of a road and bridge to
reach that point by way of Brown's Ferry, which was done
within five days, the 'cracker line,' as the soldiers called
it, was opened, and thenceforth they had full rations and
abundance of everything. The enemy attempted to interrupt the
work on the road; but Hooker met them at Wauhatchie, west of
Lookout Mountain, and after a three-hours' action drove them
off [with It loss of 416 killed and wounded, the Confederate
loss being unknown]. Chattanooga was now no longer in a state
of siege; but it was still seriously menaced by Bragg's army,
which held a most singular position.
{3512}
Its flanks were on the northern ends of Lookout Mountain and
Mission Ridge, the crests of which were occupied for some
distance, and its centre stretched across Chattanooga valley.
This line was twelve miles long, and most of it was well
intrenched. Grant ordered Sherman [coming from Memphis] to
join him with one corps, and Sherman promptly obeyed, but as
he did considerable railroad repairing on the way, he did not
reach Chattanooga till the 15th of November. Meanwhile
Longstreet with 20,000 troops had been detached from Bragg's
army and sent against Burnside at Knoxville. After Sherman's
arrival, Grant had about 80,000 men."
R. Johnson,
Short History of the War of Secession,
chapter 20.
"My orders for battle," writes General Grant, "were all
prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival, except the dates,
which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so
far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no special
advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's
corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the
hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite
Chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, Hooker was, at
a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope
between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into
Chattanooga Valley. The plan of battle was for Sherman to
attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend
our left over South Chickamauga River so as to threaten or
hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him either
to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his
base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like
service on our right. His problem was to get from Lookout
Valley to Chattanooga Valley in the most expeditious way
possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to Rossville, south
of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there across
the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to
Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the
enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce
this also. Thomas, with the Army of the Cumberland, occupied
the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged
with most of his forces on his two flanks. To carry out this
plan, Sherman was to cross at Brown's Ferry and move east of
Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of Mission
Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of
sight of the enemy on the ridge." Remaining in this concealed
position until the time of attack, Sherman's army was then,
under cover of night, to be rapidly brought back to the south
side of the Tennessee, at a point where Missionary Ridge
prolonged would touch the river, this being done by pontoons
ready provided at a spot also concealed. The execution of the
plan was delayed by heavy rains until November 23, when
Burnside's distress at Knoxville forced Grant to begin his
attack on Bragg by an advance of Thomas's army, at the center,
before the flanking preparations were completed. "This
movement [General Grant's narrative continues] secured to us a
line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the
morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied to this
time. The fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other
way. During the following night they were made strong. We lost
in this preliminary action about 1,100 killed and wounded,
while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the
prisoners that were captured. With the exception of the firing
of artillery, kept up from Missionary Ridge and Fort Wood
until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first
day. … By the night of the 23d Sherman's command was in a
position to move," and by daylight two divisions of his
command were on the south side of the river, "well covered by
the works they had built. The work of laying the bridge, on
which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. … By
a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one
over the South Chickamauga … and all the infantry and
artillery were on the south side of the Tennessee. Sherman at
once formed his troops for assault on Missionary Ridge. … By
half-past three Sherman was in possession of the height
without having sustained much loss. … Artillery was dragged to
the top of the hill by hand, The enemy did not seem to be
aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained.
There had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds
were so low that Lookout Mountain and the top of Missionary
Ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley.
But now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made
several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away,
but without avail. Later in the day a more determined attack
was made, but this, too, failed, and Sherman was left to
fortify what he had gained. … While these operations were
going on to the east of Chattanooga, Hooker was engaged on the
west. He had three divisions … all west of Lookout Creek. The
enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and
entrenched. … The side of Lookout Mountain confronting
Hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of
chasms. … Early on the morning of the 24th Hooker moved
Geary's division, supported by a brigade of Cruft's, up
Lookout Creek, to effect a crossing. The remainder of Cruft's
division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the
crossing of the railroad. … This attracted the enemy so that
Geary's movement farther up was not observed. A heavy mist
obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the
mountain. He crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured
the picket of over 40 men on guard near by. He then commenced
ascending the mountain directly in his front. … By noon Geary
had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain,
with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but
there were strong fortifications in his front. The rest of the
command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the
upper palisade to the mouth of Chattanooga Creek. Thomas and I
were on the top of Orchard Knob. Hooker's advance now made our
line a continuous one. … The day was hazy, so that Hooker's
operations were not visible to us except at the moments when
the clouds would rise. But the sound of his artillery and
musketry was heard incessantly. The enemy on his front was
partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works.
During the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top
of Lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the
view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where
Hooker was as to stop operations for the time. At four o'clock
Hooker reported his position as impregnable.
{3513}
By a little after five direct communication was established,
and a brigade of troops was sent from Chattanooga to reinforce
him. … The morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and
the whole field was in full view from the top of Orchard Knob.
It remained so all day. Bragg's headquarters were in full
view. … Sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see,
and by sunrise his command was in motion. Three brigades held
the hill already gained. Morgan L. Smith moved along the east
base of Missionary Ridge; Loomis along the west base … and
Corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly
towards the hill to be captured." The fighting was severe for
hours, and Bragg moved heavy masses of troops to resist
Sherman's advance, while a division from Thomas was sent to
reinforce the latter. "It had now got to be late in the
afternoon, and I had expected before this to see Hooker
crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville and
compelling Bragg to mass in that direction also. The enemy had
evacuated Lookout Mountain during the night, as I expected he
would. In crossing the valley he burned the bridge over
Chattanooga Creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads
behind him. Hooker was off bright and early, with no
obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction
above named. He was detained four hours crossing Chattanooga
Creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage I expected
from his forces. … But Sherman's condition was getting so
critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed
any longer. Sheridan's and Wood's divisions had been lying
under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the
signal was given. I now directed Thomas to order the charge at
once." In this splendid charge the Union troops drove the
Confederates from the first line of their works and then
pushed on, with no further orders, to the second line, with
the same success. "The retreat of the enemy along most of his
line was precipitate, and the panic so great that Bragg and
his officers lost all control over their men. Many were
captured and thousands threw away their arms in their flight.
Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River
at a point above where the enemy crossed. … To Sheridan's
prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland and the nation are
indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery,
and small arms that day. … The enemy confronting Sherman, now
seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. …
Hooker [pushing on to Rossville as soon as he had succeeded in
getting across Chattanooga Creek] … came upon the flank of a
division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along
the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make but
little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as
many of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were
captured. … The victory at Chattanooga was won against great
odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position."
U. S. Grant,
Personal Memoirs,
chapters 42-44 (volume 2).
"Grant's losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4,529
wounded, and 330 missing; total 5,616. The enemy's losses were
fewer in killed and wounded, owing to the fact that he was
protected by intrenchments, while the national' soldiers were
without cover. Grant captured 6,142 prisoners, 40 pieces of
artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7,000
stand of small arms; by far the greatest capture, in the open
field, which had then been made during the war. The battle of
Chattanooga was the grandest ever fought west of the
Alleghanies. It covered an extent of 13 miles, and Grant had
over 60,000 men engaged. The rebels numbered only 45,000 men,
but they enjoyed immense advantages of position in every part
of the field." Pursuit of the retreating Confederates began
early in the morning of the 26th, and considerable fighting
occurred on that day and the next. At Ringgold, Hooker was
checked by Cleburne's division, which held an easily defended
gap while the main column with its trains were moved beyond
reach. In this battle at Ringgold Hooker lost 65 killed and
377 wounded. He took three pieces of artillery and 230
prisoners.
A. Badeau,
Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,
chapters 11-12 (volume 1).
ALSO IN:
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 5.
H. M. Cist,
The Army of the Cumberland
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 7),
chapters 13-14.
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 2.
W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
chapter 13 (volume 1).
P. H. Sheridan,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 16.
T. B. Van Horne,
History of the Army of the Cumberland,
chapters 21-22 (volume 1).
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 31.
B. F. Taylor,
Mission Ridge and Lookout Mountain.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (October-December: Tennessee).
The Siege of Knoxville.
"The Army of the Cumberland remaining quiet at Chattanooga,
Bragg (or his superiors) conceived the idea of improving his
leisure by a movement on Burnside, which Longstreet was
assigned to lead. Burnside had by this time spread his force
very widely, holding innumerable points and places southward
and eastward of Knoxville by brigades and detachments; and
Longstreet advancing silently and rapidly, was enabled to
strike heavily [October 20] at the little outpost of
Philadelphia, held by Colonel F. T. Wolford, with the 1st,
11th, and 12th Kentucky cavalry and 45th Ohio mounted
infantry—in all about 2,000 men. Wolford … withstood several
hours, hoping that the sound of guns would bring him
assistance from Loudon in his rear; but none arrived; and he
was at length obliged to cut his way out; losing his battery
and 32 wagons, but bringing off most of his command, with 51
prisoners. … Our total loss in prisoners to Longstreet
southward of Loudon is stated by Halleck at 650. The enemy
advancing resolutely yet cautiously, our troops were withdrawn
before them from Lenoir and from Loudon, concentrating at
Campbell's Station—General Burnside, who had hastened from
Knoxville at the tidings of danger, being personally in
command. Having been joined by his old (9th) corps, he was now
probably as strong as Longstreet; but a large portion of his
force was still dispersed far to the eastward, and he
apprehended being flanked by an advance from Kingston on his
left. He found himself so closely pressed, however, that he
must either fight or sacrifice his trains; so he chose an
advantageous position and suddenly faced the foe: his
batteries being all at hand, while those of his pursuers were
behind; so that he had decidedly the advantage in the fighting
till late in the afternoon, when they brought up three
batteries and opened, while their infantry were extended on
either hand, as if to outflank him.
{3514}
He then fell back to the next ridge, and again faced about;
holding his position firmly till after nightfall; when—his
trains having meantime obtained a fair start—he resumed his
retreat, and continued it unmolested until safe within the
sheltering intrenchments of Knoxville. Our loss in this affair
was about 800; that of the enemy was probably greater. …
Longstreet continued his pursuit and in due time beleaguered
the city [November 17], though he can hardly be said to have
invested it. … The defenses were engineered by Captain Poe,
and were signally effective. Directly on getting into
position, a smart assault was delivered on our right, held by
the 12th Illinois, 45th Ohio, 3d Michigan, and 12th Kentucky,
and a hill carried; but it was not essential to the defenses.
Our loss this day was about 100; among them was General W. P.
Sanders, of Kentucky, killed. Shelling and skirmishing barely
served to break the monotony for ten weary days, when—having
been reenforced by Sam Jones, and one or two other small
commands from Virginia—Longstreet delivered an assault, by a
picked storming party of three brigades, on an unfinished but
important work known as Fort Sanders, on our left, but was
bloodily repelled by General Ferrero, who held it—the loss of
the assailants being some 800, … while on our side the entire
loss that night was about 100; only 15 of these in the fort.
And now—Bragg having been defeated by Grant before
Chattanooga, and a relieving force under Sherman being close
at hand—Longstreet necessarily abandoned the siege, and moved
rapidly eastward unassailed to Russellville, Virginia: our
entire loss in the defense having been less than 1,000; while
his must have been twice or thrice that number. Sherman's
advance reached the city, and Burnside officially announced
the raising of the siege, December 5th."
H. Greeley,
The American Conflict,
volume 2, chapter 18.
ALSO IN:
A. Woodbury,
Burnside and the Ninth Army Corps,
part 3, chapter 6.
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 31, part 1.
T. W. Humes.
The Loyal Mountaineers of East Tennessee,
chapters 14-16.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (November).
President Lincoln's Address at Gettysburg.
"By the retreat of Lee from Gettysburg and the immediate
pursuit by Meade, the burial of the dead and care of the
wounded on that great battlefield were left largely to the
military and local authorities of the State of Pennsylvania.
Governor Andrew G. Curtin gave the humane and patriotic duty
his thoughtful attention; and during its execution the
appropriate design of changing a portion of the field into a
permanent cemetery, where the remains of the fallen heroes
might be brought together, and their last resting-place
suitably protected and embellished, was conceived and begun.
The citizen soldiery from seventeen of the loyal States had
taken part in the conflict on the Union side, and the several
Governors of these States heartily cooperated in the project,
which thus acquired a National character. This circumstance
made it natural that the dedication ceremonies should be of
more than usual interest and impressiveness. Accordingly, at
the beginning of November, 1863, when the work was approaching
its completion, Mr. David Wills, the special agent of Governor
Curtin, and also acting for the several States, who had not
only originated, but mainly superintended, the enterprise,
wrote the following letter of invitation to President Lincoln:
'The several States having soldiers in the Army of the
Potomac, who were killed at the battle of Gettysburg, or have
since died at the various hospitals which were established in
the vicinity, have procured grounds on a prominent part of the
battlefield for a cemetery, and are having the dead removed to
them and properly buried. These grounds will be consecrated
and set apart to this sacred purpose, by appropriate
ceremonies, on Thursday, the 19th instant. Honorable Edward
Everett will deliver the oration. I am authorized by the
Governors of the different States to invite you to be present
and participate in these ceremonies, which will doubtless be
very imposing and solemnly impressive. It is the desire that
after the oration, you, as Chief Executive of the nation,
formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few
appropriate remarks. It will be a source of great
gratification to the many widows and orphans that have been
made almost friendless by the great battle here, to have you
here personally; and it will kindle anew in the breasts of the
comrades of these brave dead, who are now in the tented field
or nobly meeting the foe in the front, a confidence that they
who sleep in death on the battlefield are not forgotten by
those highest in authority; and they will feel that, should
their fate be the same, their remains will not be uncared-for.
We hope you will be able to be present to perform this last
solemn act to the soldier dead on this battlefield.' President
Lincoln expressed his willingness to perform the duty
requested of him. … At the appointed hour on the 19th a vast
procession, with military music, moved to the cemetery grounds
where, in the midst of a distinguished auditory, the orator of
the day, Edward Everett, made an address worthy alike of his
own fame and the extraordinary occasion. … Mr. Everett ended
in a brilliant peroration, the echoes of which were lost in
the long and hearty plaudits of the great multitude, and then
President Lincoln arose to fill the part assigned him in the
programme. It was a trying ordeal to fittingly crown with a
few brief sentences the ceremonies of such a day, and such an
achievement in oratory; finished, erudite, apparently
exhaustive of the theme, replete with all the strength of
scholastic method and the highest graces of literary culture.
If there arose in the mind of any discriminating listener on
the platform a passing doubt whether Mr. Lincoln would or
could properly honor the unique occasion, that doubt vanished
with his opening sentence; for then and there the President
pronounced an address of dedication so pertinent, so brief yet
so comprehensive, so terse yet so eloquent, linking the deeds
of the present to the thoughts of the future, with simple
words, in such living, original, yet exquisitely molded,
maxim-like phrases that the best critics have awarded it an
unquestioned rank as one of the world's masterpieces in
rhetorical art.
{3515}
He said:
'Four-score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on
this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and
dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that
nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long
endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We
have come to dedicate a portion of that field, as a final
resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that
nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we
should do this. But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we
cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men,
living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it, far
above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little
note, nor long remember, what we say here, but it can never
forget what they did here. It is for us the living, rather, to
be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought
here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to
be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us,—that
from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that
cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion—
that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have
died in vain—that this nation, under God, shall have a new
birth of freedom—and that government of the people, by the
people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.'"
J. G. Nicolay and J. Hay,
Abraham Lincoln,
volume 8, chapter 7.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863 (December).
The President's Message to Congress, at the opening of its
session, December 8, was accompanied by the following
Proclamation of Amnesty, which made known the terms of
political reconstruction and rehabilitation that would be
favored by the Executive, in dealing with rebellious citizens
who might return to their allegiance:
"Whereas, in and by the Constitution of the United States, it
is provided that the President 'shall have power to grant
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States,
except in cases of impeachment;' and Whereas a rebellion now
exists whereby the loyal State governments of several States
have for a long time been subverted, and many persons have
committed and are now guilty of treason against the United
States; and 'Whereas, with reference to said rebellion and
treason, laws have been enacted by Congress declaring
forfeitures and confiscation of property and liberation of
slaves, all upon terms and conditions therein stated, and also
declaring that the President was thereby authorized at any
time thereafter, by proclamation, to extend to persons who may
have participated in the existing rebellion, in any State or
part thereof, pardon and amnesty, with such exceptions and at
such times and on such conditions as he may deem expedient for
the public welfare; and Whereas the congressional declaration
for limited and conditional pardon accords with well
established judicial exposition of the pardoning power; and
Whereas, with reference to said rebellion, the President of
the United States has issued several proclamations, with
provisions in regard to the liberation of slaves; and Whereas
it is now desired by some persons heretofore engaged in said
rebellion to resume their allegiance to the United States, and
to reinaugurate loyal State governments within and for their
respective States: Therefore, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of
the United States, do proclaim, declare and make known to all
persons who have directly, or by implication, participated in
the existing rebellion, except as hereinafter excepted, that a
full pardon is hereby granted to them and each of them, with
restoration of all rights of property, except as to slaves,
and in property cases where rights of third parties shall have
intervened, and upon the condition that every such person
shall take and subscribe an oath, and thenceforward keep and
maintain said oath inviolate; and which oath shall be
registered for permanent preservation, and shall be of the
tenor and effect following, to wit:
'I, ------, do solemnly swear, in presence of Almighty God,
that I will henceforth faithfully support, protect, and
defend the Constitution of the United States, and the union
of the States thereunder; and that I will, in like manner,
abide by and faithfully support all acts of Congress passed
during the existing rebellion with reference to slaves, so
long and so far as not repealed, modified, or held void by
Congress, or by decision of the Supreme Court; and that I
will, in like manner, abide by and faithfully support all
proclamations of the President made during the existing
rebellion having reference to slaves, so long and so far as
not modified or declared void by decision of the Supreme
Court. So help me God.'
The persons excepted from the benefits of the foregoing
provisions are all who are, or shall have been, civil or
diplomatic officers or agents of the so-called Confederate
Government; all who have left judicial stations under the
United States to aid the rebellion; all who are, or shall have
been, military or naval officers of said so-called Confederate
Government above the rank of colonel in the Army, or of
lieutenant in the Navy; all who left seats in the United
States Congress to aid the rebellion; all who resigned
commissions in the Army or Navy of the United States, and
afterwards aided the rebellion; and all who have engaged in
any way in treating colored persons, or white persons in
charge of such, otherwise than lawfully as prisoners of war,
and which persons may have been found in the United States
service as soldiers, seamen, or in any other capacity. And I
do further proclaim, declare, and make known that whenever in
any of the States of Arkansas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
Tennessee, Alabama, Georgia, [Virginia?], Florida, South
Carolina, and North Carolina, a number of persons, not less
than one tenth in number of the votes cast in such State at
the presidential election of the year of our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and sixty, each having taken the oath aforesaid
and not having since violated it, and being a qualified voter
by the election law of the State existing immediately before
the so-called act of secession, and excluding all others,
shall re-establish a State government which shall be
republican, and in nowise contravening said oath, such shall
be recognized as the true government of the State, and the
State shall receive thereunder the benefits of the
constitutional provision which declares that 'the United
States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a
republican form of government, and shall protect each of them
against invasion; and, on application of the Legislature, or
the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened),
against domestic violence.' And I do further proclaim,
declare, and make known that any provision which may be
adopted by such State government in relation to the freed
people of such State, which shall recognize and declare their
permanent freedom, provide for their education, and which may
yet be consistent, as a temporary arrangement, with their
present condition as a laboring, landless, and homeless class,
will not be objected to by the national Executive.
{3516}
And it is suggested as not improper, that, in constructing a
loyal State government in any State, the name of the State,
the boundary, the subdivisions, the constitution, and the
general code of laws, as before the rebellion, be maintained,
subject only to the modifications made necessary by the
conditions hereinbefore stated, and such others, if any, not
contravening said conditions, and which may be deemed
expedient by those framing the new State government. To avoid
misunderstanding, it may be proper to say that this
proclamation, so far as it relates to State governments, has
no reference to States wherein loyal State governments have
all the while been maintained. And for the same reason, it may
be proper to further say, that whether members sent to
Congress from any State shall be admitted to seats
constitutionally rests exclusively with the respective Houses,
and not to any extent with the Executive. And still further,
that this proclamation is intended to present the people of
the States wherein the national authority has been suspended,
and loyal State governments have been subverted, a mode in and
by which the national authority and loyal State governments
may be re-established within said States, or in any of them;
and, while the mode presented is the best the Executive can
suggest, with his present impressions, it must not be
understood that no other possible mode would be acceptable.
Given under my hand, at the City of Washington, the eighth day
of December, in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight
hundred and sixty-three, and of the independence of the United
States of America the eighty-eighth.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN."
In the Message Mr. Lincoln gave his reasons for the
Proclamation, and explained the grounds on which he rested the
policy declared in it, as follows: "On examination of this
proclamation it will appear, as is believed, that nothing is
attempted beyond what is amply justified by the Constitution.
True, the form of an oath is given, but no man is coerced to
take it. The man is only promised a pardon in case he
voluntarily takes the oath. The Constitution authorizes the
Executive to grant or withhold the pardon at his own absolute
discretion; and this includes the power to grant on terms, as
is fully established by judicial and other authorities. It is
also proffered that if, in any of the States named, a State
government shall be, in the mode prescribed, set up, such
government shall be recognized and guaranteed by the United
States, and that under it the State shall, on the
constitutional conditions, be protected against invasion and
domestic violence. The constitutional obligation of tire
United States to guarantee to every State in the Union a
republican form of government, and to protect the State, in
the cases stated, is explicit and full. But why tender the
benefits of this provision only to a State government set up
in this particular way? This section of the Constitution
contemplates a case wherein the element within a State,
favorable to republican government, in the Union, may be too
feeble for an opposite and hostile element external to or even
within the State; and such are precisely the cases with which
we are now dealing. An attempt to guarantee and protect a
revived State government, constructed in whole, or in
preponderating part, from the very element against whose
hostility and violence it is to be protected, is simply
absurd. There must be a test by which to separate the opposing
elements so as to build only from the sound; and that test is
a sufficiently liberal one which accepts as sound whoever will
make a sworn recantation of his former unsoundness. But if it
be proper to require, as a test of admission to the political
body, an oath of allegiance to the Constitution of the United
States, and to the Union under it, why also to the laws and
proclamations in regard to slavery? Those laws and
proclamations were enacted and put forth for the purpose of
aiding in the suppression of the rebellion. To give them their
fullest effect, there had to be a pledge for their
maintenance. In my judgment they have aided, and will further
aid, the cause for which they were intended. To now abandon
them would be not only to relinquish a lever of power, but
would also be a cruel and an astounding breach of faith. I may
add at this point, that while I remain in my present position
I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation
Proclamation; nor shall I return to slavery any person who is
free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts
of Congress. For these and other reasons it is thought best
that support of these measures shall be included in the oath;
and it is believed the Executive may lawfully claim it in
return for pardon and restoration of forfeited rights, which
he has clear constitutional power to withhold altogether, or
grant upon the terms which he shall deem wisest for the public
interest. It should be observed, also, that this part of the
oath is subject to the modifying and abrogating power of
legislation and supreme judicial decision. The proposed
acquiescence of the national Executive in any reasonable
temporary State arrangement for the freed people is made with
the view of possibly modifying the confusion and destitution
which must at best attend all classes by a total revolution of
labor throughout whole States. It is hoped that the already
deeply afflicted people in those States may be somewhat more
ready to give up the cause of their affliction, if, to this
extent, this vital matter be left to themselves; while no
power of the national Executive to prevent an abuse is
abridged by the proposition. The suggestion in the
proclamation as to maintaining the political frame-work of the
States on what is called reconstruction, is made in the hope
that it may do good without danger of harm. It will save
labor, and avoid great confusion. But why any proclamation now
upon this subject? This question is beset with the conflicting
views that the step might be delayed too long or be taken too
soon. In some States the elements for resumption seem ready
for action, but remain inactive, apparently for want of a
rallying-point—a plan of action. Why shall A adopt the plan of
B, rather than B that of A? And if A and B should agree, how
can they know but that the General Government here will reject
their plan? By the proclamation a plan is presented which may
be accepted by them as a rallying-point, and which they are
assured in advance will not be rejected here. This may bring
them to act sooner than they otherwise would. The objection to
a premature presentation of a plan by the national Executive
consists in the danger of committals on points which could be
more safely left to further developments. Care has been taken
to so shape the document as to avoid embarrassments from this
source.
{3517}
Saying that, on certain terms, certain classes will be
pardoned, with rights restored, it is not said that other
classes, or other terms, will never be included. Saying that
reconstruction will be accepted if presented in a specified
way, it is not said it will never be accepted in any other
way. The movements, by State action, for emancipation in
several of the States, not included in the Emancipation
Proclamation, are matters of profound gratulation. And while I
do not repeat in detail what I have heretofore so earnestly
urged upon this subject, my general views and feelings remain
unchanged; and I trust that Congress will omit no fair
opportunity of aiding these important steps to a great
consummation. In the midst of other cares, however important,
we must not lose sight of the fact that the war power is still
our main reliance. To that power alone we can look, yet for a
time, to give confidence to the people in the contested
regions, that the insurgent power will not again overrun them.
Until that confidence shall be established, little can be done
anywhere for what is called reconstruction. Hence our chiefest
care must still be directed to the army and navy, who have
thus far borne their harder part so nobly and well. And it may
be esteemed fortunate that in giving the greatest efficiency
to these indispensable arms, we do also honorably recognize
the gallant men, from commander to sentinel, who compose them,
and to whom, more than to others, the world must stand
indebted for the home of freedom disenthralled, regenerated,
enlarged, and perpetuated.
Abraham Lincoln."
A. Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, pages 442-456.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863-1864
(December-April: Tennessee-Mississippi).
Winter operations.
Sherman's Meridian Expedition.
Longstreet's withdrawal from East Tennessee.
"Sherman was at Vicksburg. On a line with Vicksburg, but
almost on the eastern boundary of the State, was the town of
Meridian. Here two railroads crossed, one running north and
south, extending from Mobile into the heart of Tennessee, and
the other extending to the eastward into Alabama and Georgia.
Railroads were few in the South at that time and the junction
had made Meridian an important point. Here the Confederates
had erected great warehouses for the storage of provisions and
munitions of war. A considerable body of troops, too, was
maintained at this point, whence they could be sent speedily
by rail north or south, east or west, as the necessity might
arise. General Sherman determined to fall upon Meridian, drive
away the Confederate garrison, burn the arsenal and tear up
the railroads so as to isolate the different parts of the
Confederacy thenceforth. But in addition to accomplishing this
he desired to effect the defeat and dispersal of the
Confederate cavalry force under General Forrest, which was
operating in Northern Mississippi and Southern Tennessee.
Forrest was a brave and dashing leader. His men were hardy
troopers, used to quick marches and reckless of danger. To
crush him and annihilate his command would be a notable
victory for the Union cause. Full of this project, Sherman
boarded a steamer at Vicksburg and set out for Memphis, where
were the headquarters of General W. Sooy Smith, then chief of
cavalry in the division of the Mississippi. The river was full
of great cakes of floating ice that bumped against the prow of
the boat and ground against her sides until those on board
feared that she might be sent to the bottom. But Memphis was
reached without accident, and Sherman and the chief of cavalry
were soon in earnest consultation. General Smith was ordered
to take the field against Forrest with a force of 7,000 men. …
It was agreed that General Smith should start from Memphis on
February 1 and march southeast, while Sherman should leave
Vicksburg February 3, and march due east. Thus they would
effect a junction in the vicinity of Meridian. Sherman then
re-embarked on the icy river and made his way back to
Vicksburg. Promptly on the appointed day the head of Sherman's
column passed out through the chain of earthworks that girdled
the land ward side of Vicksburg. It was to be an expedition of
destruction—a raid. His force of 25,000 men was in light
marching order and advanced with such rapidity that the
Confederates were driven from the very first, without having
time to rally and oppose the advance of the invaders. Jackson
was reached without any fighting, other than slight
skirmishing with Polk's cavalry. The ministerial general had
but 9,000 men in all, so he dared not make a determined stand
against Sherman, but fled, without even destroying his pontoon
bridge across the Pearl River, whereby the Federal advance was
much expedited. From Jackson eastward the path of Sherman's
army was marked by a broad belt of ashes and desolation. No
public property was spared, nor anything which could be
applied to public uses. Mills, railway stations, and rolling
stock were burned. Railway tracks were torn up, the ties
heaped on roaring fires and the rails heated red· hot and
twisted out of shape. Sometimes the soldiers would twine a hot
rail about a young tree, making what they facetiously termed
'Jeff Davis's neck-ties.' To Sherman's lines came escaping
slaves in droves, old and young men, women and pickaninnies. …
The slaves still further impoverished their masters by taking
horses and mules with them when they fled, so that after
Sherman's army had passed, most of the plantations in its
track were stripped of their live-stock, both cattle and
human. When Meridian was reached its defenders were nowhere to
be seen. Sherman took possession and waited for Smith. Days
passed without any word coming from the cavalry column. After
a week in Meridian, Sherman set the torch to the public
buildings and retraced his steps toward Vicksburg. He had
taken 400 prisoners, destroyed 150 miles of track, 67 bridges,
20 locomotives and 28 cars; had burned several thousand bales
of cotton, a number of steam mills, and over 2,000,000 bushels
of corn. Over 1,000 Union white refugees and 8,000 negroes
followed in his wake. In 1866, the historian Lossing, passing
through Meridian, asked the Mayor of the town if Sherman had
done the place much injury. 'Injury!' was the emphatic reply,
'Why, he took it away with him.'"
W. J. Abbot,
Battle Fields and Victory,
chapter 1.
{3518}
General Smith, in his report to General Sherman, gave the
reasons for the falling back of the cavalry expedition, as
follows: "We advanced to West Point and felt of the enemy, who
was posted back of the Sakatonchee on our right and the Oktibbeha
in our front, in force fully equal to my own that was
available for service, encumbered as we were with our
pack-mules and the captured stock, which by this time must
have numbered full 3,000 horses and mules. The force consisted
of mounted infantry, which was dismounted and in strong
position under good cover, and beyond obstacles which could
only be passed by defiles. To attempt to force my way through
under such circumstances would have been the height of folly.
I could not cross the Tombigbee, as there were no bridges and
the stream could not be forded. To have attempted to turn the
position by our right would have carried me all the way round
to Houston again, and Forrest could again check me at the
Houlka Swamp. I was ten days behind time; could get no
communication through to you; did not know but what you were
returning, and so determined to make a push at Forrest in
front while I retired all my incumbrances and my main body
rapidly toward Okolona, just in time to prevent a rebel
brigade from getting in my rear, which had been thrown back
for that purpose. We then retired, fighting for over 60 miles
day and night."
Official Records,
Series 1, volume 32, part 1, page 252.
In East Tennessee, during the winter little was done by either
army. A slight encounter occurred at Dandridge, in January,
between Longstreet's forces and those of the Union General
Parke. In April Longstreet was recalled by Lee, and the Ninth
Corps, with Burnside again in command, went back to the army
of the Potomac.
J. D. Cox,
Atlanta
(Campaigns of the Civil War, volume 9),
chapters 1-2.
ALSO IN:
A. Badeau,
Military History of Ulysses S. Grant,
volume 1, chapter 13.
Comte de Paris,
History of the Civil War in America,
volume 4, book 4, chapter 1.
W. T. Sherman,
Memoirs,
volume 1, chapter 14.
W. J. Tenney,
Military and Naval History,
chapter 38.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A. D. 1863-1864 (December-July).
President Lincoln's plan of reconstruction, and its
application to Louisiana.
The opposing Congressional plan.
"The proclamation which accompanied the Annual Message of the
President for 1864 embodied the first suggestions of the
Administration on the important subject of reconstructing the
Governments of those States which had joined in the secession
movement. The matter had been canvassed somewhat extensively
by the public press, and by prominent politicians, in
anticipation of the overthrow of the rebellion. … A
considerable number of the friends of the Government, in both
houses, maintained that, by the act of secession, the revolted
States had put themselves outside the pale of the
Constitution, and were henceforth to be regarded and treated,
not as members of the Union, but as alien enemies:—that their
State organizations and State boundaries had been expunged by
their own act; and that they were to be readmitted to the
jurisdiction of the Constitution, and to the privileges of the
Union, only upon such terms and conditions as the Federal
Government of the loyal States might prescribe. … After the
appearance of the President's proclamation, the movement
towards reconstruction in Louisiana assumed greater
consistency, and was carried forward with greater steadiness
and strength. On the 8th of January a very large Free State
Convention was held at New Orleans, at which resolutions were
adopted indorsing all the acts and proclamations of the
President, and urging the immediate adoption of measures for
the restoration of the State to its old place in the Union. On
the 11th, General Banks issued a proclamation, appointing an
election for State officers on the 22d of February, who were
to be installed on the 4th of March, and another election for
delegates to a convention to revise the Constitution of the
State on the first Monday in April. The old Constitution and
laws of Louisiana were to be observed, except so far as they
relate to slavery. … Under this order, parties were organized
for the election of State officers. The friends of the
National Government were divided, and two candidates were put
in nomination for Governor, Honorable Michael Hahn being the
regular nominee, and representing the supporters of the policy
of the President, and Honorable B. F. Flanders being put in
nomination by those who desired a more radical policy than the
President had proposed. Both took very decided ground against
the continued existence of slavery within the State. … The
election resulted in the election of Mr. Hahn. … Mr. Hahn was
inaugurated as Governor on the 4th of March. On the 15th he
was clothed with the powers previously exercised by General
Banks, as military governor. … On March 16th, Governor Hahn
issued a proclamation, notifying the electors of the State of
the election for delegates to the convention previously
ordered by General Banks. The party which elected Governor
Hahn succeeded also in electing a large majority of the
delegates to the convention, which met in New Orleans on the
6th of April. On the 11th of May it adopted, by a vote of 70
to 16, a clause of the new Constitution, by which slavery was
forever abolished in the State. The Constitution was adopted
on the 5th of September, by a vote of 6,836 to 1,566. Great
umbrage was taken at these proceedings by some of the best
friends of the cause, as if there had been an unauthorized and
unjustifiable interference on the part of the President. … In
Arkansas, where a decided Union feeling had existed from the
outbreak of the rebellion, the appearance of the proclamation
was the signal for a movement to bring the State back into the
Union. On the 20th of January, a delegation of citizens from
that State had an interview with the President, in which they
urged the adoption of certain measures for the
re-establishment of a legal State Government, and especially
the ordering of an election for Governor. … Meantime, a
convention had assembled at Little Rock, composed of delegates
elected without any formality, and not under the authority of
the General Government, and proceeded to form a new State
Constitution, and to fix a day for an election. … The
convention framed a constitution abolishing slavery, which was
subsequently adopted by a large majority of the people. It
also provided for the election of State officers on the day
appointed for the vote upon the constitution; and the
legislature chosen at that election elected two gentlemen,
Messrs. Fishback and Baxter, as United States Senators, and
also Representatives. These gentlemen presented their
credentials at Washington. … The whole matter was referred to
the Judiciary Committee, who … reported on the 27th of June
that on the facts it did not appear that the rebellion was so
far suppressed in Arkansas as to entitle the State to
representation in Congress, and that therefore Messrs.
Fishback and Baxter were not entitled to seats as Senators
from the State of Arkansas. And the Senate on the next day
adopted their report by a vote of 27 to 6.
{3519}
In the House, meanwhile, the Committee on Elections, to whom
the application of the Arkansas members had been referred,
reported to postpone their admission until a commission could
be sent to inquire into and report the facts of the election,
and to create a commission for the examination of all such
cases. This proposition was, however, laid on the table, and
the members were not admitted. … The cause of the rejection of
these Senators and Representatives was, that a majority in
Congress had not agreed with the President in reference to the
plan of reconstruction which he proposed. A bill for the
reconstruction of the States was introduced into the Senate,
and finally passed both Houses on the last day of the session.
It provided that the President should appoint, for each of the
States declared in rebellion, a Provisional Governor, who
should be charged with the civil administration of the State
until a State Government should be organized and such other
civil officers as were necessary for the civil administration
of the State; that as soon as military resistance to the
United States should be suppressed and the people had
sufficiently returned to their obedience, the Governor should
make an enrolment of the white male citizens, specifying which
of them had taken the oath to support the Constitution of the
United States, and if those who had taken it were a majority
of the persons enrolled, he should order an election for
delegates to a Constitutional Convention, to be elected by the
loyal white male citizens of the United States aged twenty-one
years. … The bill further provided that when a constitution
containing … provisions [excluding rebels from office,
prohibiting slavery, and repudiating Confederate debts] should
have been framed by the convention and adopted by the popular
vote, the Governor should certify that fact to the President,
who, after obtaining the assent of Congress, should recognize
this government so established as the Government of the State,
and from that date senators and representatives and electors
for President and Vice-President should be elected in the
State. … This bill thus passed by Congress was presented to
the President just before the close of the session, but was
not signed by him."
H. J. Raymond,
Life and Public Services of Abraham Lincoln,
chapter 16.
The President's reasons for not signing the bill were given to
the public as well as to Congress in the following
Proclamation:
"Whereas, at the late session, Congress passed a bill to
'guarantee to certain States, whose governments have been
usurped or overthrown, a republican form of government,' a
copy of which is hereunto annexed; And whereas the said bill
was presented to the President of the United States for his
approval less than one hour before the sine die adjournment of
said session, and was not signed by him; And whereas the said
bill contains, among other things, a plan for restoring the
States in rebellion to their proper practical relation in the
Union, which plan expresses the sense of Congress upon that
subject, and which plan it is now thought fit to lay before
the people for their consideration: Now, therefore, I, Abraham
Lincoln, President of the United States, do proclaim, declare,
and make known, that, while I am (as I was in December last,
when by proclamation I propounded a plan for restoration)
unprepared, by a formal approval of this bill, to be
inflexibly committed to any single plan of restoration; and,
while I am also unprepared to declare that the free-State
constitutions and governments already adopted and installed in
Arkansas and Louisiana shall be set aside and held for nought,
thereby repelling and discouraging the loyal citizens who have
set up the same as to further effort, or to declare a
constitutional competency in Congress to abolish slavery in
States, but am at the same time sincerely hoping and expecting
that a constitutional amendment abolishing slavery throughout
the nation may be adopted, nevertheless I am fully satisfied
with the system for restoration contained in the bill as one
very proper plan for the loyal people of any State choosing to
adopt it, and that I am, and at all times shall be, prepared
to give the executive aid and assistance to any such people,
so soon as the military resistance to the United States shall
have been suppressed in any such State, and the people thereof
shall have sufficiently returned to their obedience to the
Constitution and the laws of the United States, in which cases
military governors will be appointed, with directions to
proceed according to the bill.
In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused
the seal of the United States to be affixed. Done at the city
of Washington, this eighth day of July, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred an sixty-four, and of the
independence of the United States the eighty-ninth.
Abraham Lincoln. By the President: William H. Seward,
Secretary of State."
A. Lincoln,
Complete Works,
volume 2, page 545.