THE CAMPAIGN FOR CHATTANOOGA
On August 16th, the Union army started their forward movement. Thomas and McCook moved their corps down to the Tennessee River at Bridgeport. Crittenden moved down the Sequatchie Valley, having troops from just north of Jasper to a point above Pikeville. A part of the latter’s corps, (Wilder’s and Wagner’s Mounted Infantry) took positions along Walden’s Ridge and Signal Mountain where they were in plain view of the Confederates in Chattanooga. Numerous demonstrations were made at these points to attract the attention of the Confederates and to make them believe they were attempting to cross the river at some point above the city. They would beat on empty barrels to imitate the rolling of supply wagons. They also built huge bon-fires and would march back and forth in the flare of them. Buglers were placed at distant points where they would strike a few notes at regular intervals. They even sawed planks, boards and pieces of logs to float down the river to give the Confederates the impression they were building a pontoon bridge at some point above the city. On August 21st, a part of Wilder’s brigade advanced to Stringer’s Ridge where they shelled Chattanooga with artillery. One shell landed in front of the First Presbyterian Church at Seventh and Market streets, while services were being conducted. Some reports claim that a little girl had her leg broken by a piece of shell. However, according to the report of Confederate Gen. D. H. Hill, several women and children were killed. Today, Chattanooga’s tallest building, the Hamilton National Bank, stands on this site. The shelling of the city showed that the Union troops were on the immediate front of the Confederates. As a result, Cleburne’s division was sent to Harrison, and then distributed at every ford and ferry between the mouths of the Chickamauga Creek and the Hiwasee River—a distance of at least 50 miles. These troops were so placed in order to guard against any possible crossing by the Union troops. All of these positions were covered by rifle-pits and batteries. With the Confederates’ attention drawn in this direction, the main body of the Union army effected a crossing of the river at Bridgeport, 30 miles below Chattanooga, between August 29th and September 4th, unmolested. Thomas crossed over the Sand Mountain to Trenton, Georgia, after much difficulty.
When Bragg learned that the Union army had crossed the river below him he evacuated Chattanooga during the 8th and 9th of September, moving 26 miles southward to LaFayette, Georgia, behind the Pigeon Mountains. This movement was made in order that he could protect his line of communications and his base of supplies, his base being Atlanta. As the last of Bragg’s army was leaving the city on the morning of September 9th, the 92nd Illinois Mounted Infantry made a reconnaissance on Lookout Mountain. They then entered the city. Crittenden’s corps followed the railroad to Ringgold, then westward to Rock Springs in pursuit of the Confederates. At this latter point, Crittenden was directly between Bragg and Chattanooga.
PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS
Rosecrans was led to believe that Bragg was in full retreat to Rome and Atlanta. He had gathered this information from pretended deserters from the Confederate army. However, he was determined to head the Confederates off. He immediately dispatched Thomas and McCook down Lookout Valley to point 26 and 42 miles below Chattanooga where they crossed Lookout Mountain. Thomas moved into McLemore’s Cove; McCook to Alpine and Summerville, Georgia. In planning these movements and making such disposition of his troops, Rosecrans was falling into a trap which had been set for him. Bragg’s army was not in retreat. They had no intentions of retreating. Rosecrans was not aware of the fact that Bragg was not in retreat until about September 12th. His army was divided into three sections. It was at least 60 miles from the left to right of his troops. Meanwhile, Bragg at LaFayette, was opposite the Union center and in position to attack and crush the Union army in detail as they emerged from the mountains. He had already been re-enforced by Buckner from east Tennessee and Walker from Mississippi. He was only awaiting Longstreet’s arrival from Virginia before turning back in an effort to retake Chattanooga. The latter named troops were seasoned veterans who were sent down by Gen. Lee. A great many of them had fought in the battle of Gettysburg. Upon their arrival Bragg ordered the Confederates to turn back toward Chattanooga. His plan was to attack Crittenden and in case Thomas and McCook should arrive they could be taken care of, likewise, in order. Failure of his subordinate officers to comply promptly with these orders caused this opportunity to be lost. Rosecrans, upon learning that Bragg had received heavy re-enforcements and was turning back in an effort to retake Chattanooga, hurriedly ordered the concentration of his forces. McCook, contrary to orders, took a roundabout route from Summerville, causing some delay. However, on September 17th, he joined Thomas and they in turn started their movement to join Crittenden. At this time Crittenden was on the west side of Chickamauga Creek at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. It was necessary for Thomas and McCook to make a forced march day and night in order to reach Crittenden. They were practically exhausted when they reached him.
BRAGG’S PLAN FOR BATTLE
On September 17th, Bragg had ordered his troops to cross the Chickamauga Creek at Reed’s and Alexander’s bridges. They were to sweep up the creek toward Crittenden’s position. His objective was to gain possession of the main road between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. Incidentally, this main road is known today as Highway U. S. No. 27. The Confederates reached Chickamauga Creek on Friday afternoon, September 18th. Here they met with some opposition from the Union troops. After a great deal of skirmishing, of which some was rather severe, the Confederates effected a crossing.
THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA
On Saturday morning the right of the Confederate line extended to the Reed’s Bridge road. Forrest’s Cavalry Corps was posted on the right of this line. Thomas’ troops arrived on the LaFayette road at the Kelley field near daylight on Saturday morning, the 19th. Brannan’s division moved up the main road to the McDonald field, thence east toward Reed’s bridge. When in the vicinity of Jay’s Mill they encountered Forrest’s cavalry. Croxton’s brigade fired into them and thus opened the battle of Chickamauga. Forrest’s men dismounted and returned the fire, fighting as infantry. It was now 7:30 A. M. The battle was slow to start. Then it became severe. Both sides sent for re-enforcements which were sent at once. Connell’s and VanDerveer’s brigades came to Croxton’s support while Walker and Liddell brought their divisions to Forrest’s assistance. Due to the Confederates not being in the positions which Bragg had ordered them, a great deal of confusion resulted. However, troops kept filling in on both sides until the lines were about three miles in length. Each side gained and lost ground many times by severe charging and counter-charging. Baird made an effort to reform his lines but while doing so, was attacked by Walker in greater numbers. King and Scribner were driven back some distance at the same time. The Union forces then drove Walker to his former position. At this time Cheatham came to Walker’s rescue and they drove Johnson, Palmer and VanCleve back in order. Reynolds was then overpowered by the Confederates, the rebels yelling wildly all the while. Davis and Wood then checked the advance of the Confederates. After adjusting their lines, they drove Cheatham, Walker and Stewart back to their former positions. Most of the fighting was in the woods at this time although some was in open fields. Much of it was at very close range. In just such manner the fighting lasted all the forenoon, neither side gaining very much. Casualties were high on both sides. It is believed that the 10th and 74th Indiana Infantry were the most severely engaged at this time. It may be interesting to learn that Col. William B. Carroll, commanding the 10th Indiana Infantry, was the first field officer to be killed at Chickamauga. By noon the fighting was general throughout the lines.
During the afternoon the most severe fighting took place near the opposite ends of the lines in the Vineyard field. Fighting at this point was all at close range and some was hand-to-hand. About 4:00 P. M., Col. Hans C. Heg, 15th Wisconsin Infantry, was mortally wounded. Col. Heg commanded the 3rd brigade of Davis’ division. With death staring him in the face, he again rallied his men and rode nearly one-quarter of a mile before the loss of blood weakened him to such an extent that he was forced to give up his command. His brigade was taken over by Col. John A. Martin of the 8th Kansas Infantry. Col. Heg was the first brigade commander to fall on the Chickamauga battlefield. After a restless night in a hospital, he passed away near noon of the 20th. After sundown the fighting ceased at all portions of the field. Neither side had gained any worthwhile advantage during this first day of battle, although the Union forces had been driven much closer to the main road. The left of the Union line under Thomas was well anchored across the main highway; the center under McCook was just west of the highway, and the right end of the line under Crittenden was still east of the highway. The Confederate line was very close to the Union line at all points. Shortly after dark the battle was renewed near the north end of the lines. Cleburne and Cheatham encountered Johnson and Baird. The fighting lasted only about an hour but the losses were heavy. Two brigade commanders lost their lives about 7:00 P. M. On the Union side, Col. Philemon P. Baldwin of Indiana, was killed. Col. Baldwin commanded the 3rd brigade of Johnson’s division. Col. William W. Berry of the 5th Kentucky Infantry, assumed command of Baldwin’s brigade. On the Confederate side, Brig.-Gen. Preston Smith of Tennessee was killed. Gen. Smith commanded a brigade of Cheatham’s division. Col. Alfred J. Vaughn, Jr., 13th Tennessee Infantry, assumed command of Smith’s brigade. During the night both armies rearranged their lines in preparation for the next day’s battle. The right end of the Union line was shifted from the vicinity of the Vineyard field westward to the Crawfish Springs road near Widow Glenn’s. The Confederate line remained east of the highway at all points, slightly over-lapping the Union line on either end. The troops on the left of the Union line fortified their positions during the night by falling trees, stacking rails, stumps, etc., in preparation for Sunday’s battle. On the Confederate side Longstreet, the South Carolinian, arrived with his corps about 11:00 P. M. At this time Bragg divided his army into two wings, the left and right. Longstreet was given command of the left wing; Gen. Leonidas Polk, the North Carolinian, who was the first Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, was placed in command of the right wing. Bragg gave order for the battle to be resumed at daylight on Sunday morning. His plan was to launch the Confederate right against the Union left, with each division and brigade to their left to take up the firing in order until the battle became general throughout the field. Hill’s corps was on the right of the Confederate line. Breckinridge commanded the extreme right division. The latter had three brigades, commanded by Helm, Adams and Stovall.