Sunday morning came. The battle was not resumed at daylight. Sunrise came, but still no battle. Bragg was waiting impatiently, listening and wondering. His orders were not being carried out, even in part. Finally, becoming nervous, he went in search of Polk, Hill and Breckinridge. He was determined to find the cause for delay. It seems that everyone but the right one had received their orders. Hill claimed he had no knowledge of Bragg’s plan, although his division commanders had received their orders. Some of the Confederates had not had their breakfast, although it was considerably past the breakfast hour. None of the troops were in position for battle as had been ordered. This necessitated a great deal of rearrangement in the lines. It is a known fact that Hill did not approve of Polk being in a higher command than himself. Hill insisted that he was senior to Polk in his rank. Possibly this caused the delay in resuming the battle. About 9:00 o’clock, the Confederate right was thrown forward against the Union left. The logworks were too strong for the Confederates. Time and again they charged, to be driven back with severe losses. This fighting was at very close range. Helm’s brigade was almost shattered, and while engaged in this desperate struggle, the commander, Brig.-Gen. Ben Hardin Helm of Kentucky was mortally wounded. Helm was a brother-in-law of President Lincoln’s wife. However, fragments of his brigade, in addition to Adams and Stovall, gained the left and rear of the Union left and entered the Kelley field. Later they were repulsed. Gradually the battle rolled from right to left along the Confederate line. Longstreet, near the Confederate center, was opposite the Brotherton house. About 11:15 A. M., a gap was created in the Union center when Wood’s division, through the misunderstanding of an order issued by Rosecrans, withdrew from the line and marched to the left and rear of Brannan.
View from Point Lookout overlooking Moccasin Bend with Chattanooga in background.
The famous Umbrella Rock, Lookout Mountain
Longstreet, with eight brigades, forced their way through, throwing the right and right center of the Union line back in confusion. Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden left the field. A great many of the troops under the latter named two left the field. Some few of them later rallied and remained on the field during the afternoon. Gen. Thomas, then being the senior officer on the field, immediately assumed command. Holding a pivot with the extreme left of his line, the right end moved back until it reached Snodgrass hill. This gave him an almost impregnable position. With this newly formed east-west line he could check the advance of the Confederates and also cover Rosecrans’ retreat. The Confederates, upon crossing the road, changed front with their artillery. Their infantry swept around like a large gate on hinges. By almost continuous advancing, the Confederates reached the south side of Snodgrass hill where they established their line. Within less than an hour from the time of the break in the Union line, three other brigade commanders lost their lives. Near the Confederate right, Col. Peyton H. Colquitt, 46th Georgia Infantry, was mortally wounded about noon. Colquitt commanded Gist’s brigade of Walker’s division. Lt.-Col. Leroy Napier assumed command of Colquitt’s brigade. A short distance to the south, Brig.-Gen. James Deshler of Texas was killed about the same time. Deshler commanded a brigade in Cleburne’s division. His command was taken over by Col. Roger Q. Mills. Farther to the southwest in the Union line, Brig.-Gen. William H. Lytle, the Cincinnati soldier-poet, was killed while trying to rally his brigade against the Confederate sweep to the north. Lytle commanded the 1st brigade of Sheridan’s division. His command was taken over by Col. Silas Miller of the 36th Illinois Infantry.
THE PEAK OF THE BATTLE
By 2:00 P. M. the battle was raging on Snodgrass hill. This fighting was at very close range and a great deal was hand-to-hand struggling. The Confederates kept charging up the slopes, making every effort to drive the Union troops from their position. They were never able to carry the hill. A few of the Confederates passed over the hill to the right of the Union line. They moved to the rear of Brannan and entered the valley beyond his position. About 3.00 P. M., when the fighting reached its peak, Longstreet sent to Bragg for re-enforcements from the right wing. However, he never received them. On the contrary, he was told by Bragg that the troops of the right wing had been beaten back so badly that they would be of no service to him. There were Confederates in reserve which had scarcely been engaged, if Longstreet could only have gotten them. Along the Union line, it was quite different. At 3:30 P. M., Steedman’s division of Granger’s reserve corps came to Thomas’s assistance. These re-enforcements consisted of Mitchell’s and Whitaker’s brigades. They drove the Confederates from the rear of Brannan, strengthened and prolonged the Union line westward. They also passed out ammunition along the line. While the fighting was so severe the woods caught on fire. This was caused by the artillery firing so low. Hundreds of the soldiers, both Union and Confederate, were burned and scorched beyond recognition. Steedman no doubt saved Thomas from having to retreat from the hill since the latter’s ammunition supply was completely exhausted. It was at this point that Thomas gained the name of “The Rock of Chickamauga.”
THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE
At 4:45 P. M., Thomas received orders from Rosecrans directing him to withdraw. The withdrawal was not started at this time. There had been severe fighting in the Kelley field during the afternoon. At 5:00 P. M. Col. Edward A. King, 68th Indiana Infantry, was killed in the southeast corner of this field. King commanded the 2nd brigade of Reynolds division. He was the last of the eight brigade commanders who lost their lives on the Chickamauga battlefield. Col. Milton S. Robinson assumed command of his brigade. About 7:00 P. M., Thomas began to withdraw. The Confederates had gained possession of the LaFayette road to the left and rear of the Union line. Since Thomas wanted to re-establish his lines between Bragg and Chattanooga, the withdrawal was made via McFarland Gap to Rossville; then south on the Chattanooga-LaFayette highway to Rossville Gap and Missionary Ridge. Fortifications were thrown up along this portion of the ridge to keep the Confederates in check. The Union line also extended across Chattanooga Valley and up the slopes of Lookout Mountain. Thomas held this line along Missionary Ridge throughout Monday, the 21st. During the night they abandoned this position and moved into Chattanooga. Thus ended the battle of Chickamauga.