There were approximately 124,000 troops engaged at Chickamauga. Of this number, there were 58,000 Union soldiers and 66,000 Confederates. During the two-day battle, there were 34,000 casualties. Of these casualties, there were 16,000 Union; 18,000 Confederates.
The Union army had lost the battle of Chickamauga. Still they had reached their objective—Chattanooga. Bragg’s plan was to attack the Union troops in Chattanooga on the morning of the 22nd. However, this failed to materialize. After some light skirmishing it was decided to call off this attack due to the Union troops being too strongly entrenched. The Union army was still holding their line up Lookout Mountain. Soon this line was abandoned since they realized that Bragg would only have to place forces at any point below in order to have control of the river line of supplies.
REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES
Both Rosecrans and Bragg immediately started a reorganization of their armies. The Confederate army was divided into three corps, the commands being given to Longstreet, Hardee and Breckinridge. These three corps had a total of 10 divisions. Wheeler was in command of the cavalry. On the Union side, McCook and Crittenden were removed from their commands of the 20th and 21st Army Corps. These two corps were consolidated into the 4th and Granger was given the command. The Reserve Corps which was formerly commanded by Granger was consolidated into the 14th Army Corps, Maj.-Gen. John M. Palmer, commanding. The Union army at this time had six divisions, commanded by Baird, Cruft, Davis, Johnson, Sheridan and Wood. The Artillery Reserve was commanded by Brannan. This latter force consisted of two divisions, each with two brigades. Col. Parkhurst commanded the Post of Chattanooga.
Ochs Memorial Observatory, Lookout Mountain
Roper’s Rock. Lookout Mountain
Ladder represents where the Union troops reached the top.
THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA
Bragg was determined to lay siege to the city and force the Union army into surrendering by starvation. While the Union army was strongly entrenching their positions in Chattanooga, the Confederates were establishing their lines on Missionary Ridge, east of the city, and Lookout Mountain, southwest of the city. A strong picket line was placed along the river from Chattanooga Creek to a point below Williams Island, including Brown’s Ferry. Another similar line was placed from just below the city to a point near the mouth of the Chickamauga Creek. A skirmish line was thrown out about one mile in front of Missionary Ridge. A short range of hills, of which Orchard Knob was the highest, was covered by this skirmish line. These Confederate positions controlled all supply lines south of the river, which meant railroads, highway and the river itself. The Union army was soon in dire straits. The only route which was left open was to cross the river north of the city, then cross Walden’s Ridge or Signal Mountain; thence down the Sequatchie Valley to Bridgeport and Stevenson. This route was about 65 miles long and most of it was mountainous roads. The fall rains had set in and this route was almost impassable. The Union supply wagons were easy prey for the Confederate cavalry which had been dispatched north of the river to conduct raids. Wheeler captured dozens of the supply wagons, killing the horses and burning the wagons. The Union base of supplies was Nashville—160 miles distant by very rough roads. Cattle were driven all this distance in many instances to feed the hungry soldiers. By the time the cattle reached Chattanooga (if they did not die enroute), they were so poor that the Union troops often remarked that they had nothing to eat but “hard tack” and “dried beef on the hoof.” To say the Union soldiers were in destitute circumstances would be a mild way of expressing their actual condition. Half rations, then quarter rations and less. At times the soldiers only had a little raw corn to eat. Finally it was necessary to place a sentry at the horse troughs in order to keep the soldiers from taking the grain which was fed to a few choice mounts. Even then, the Union army lost between 12,000 and 15,000 of their finest horses and mules from starvation. The troops were in a starved, sickened condition, and very low in spirits. No doubt they thought they were doomed, and that no one would come to their rescue before they starved. However, in this surmise, to their great joy, they were mistaken. It had been practically a month since their defeat at Chickamauga, but let us review a little to see what was being done to relieve this besieged army. Almost immediately after the battle of Chickamauga, Gen. Grant started Gen. Sherman from Vicksburg with four divisions (Army of the Tennessee) to the assistance of Rosecrans. These re-enforcements consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 4th divisions of the 15th Army Corps, commanded by Brig.-Generals Peter J. Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith and Hugh Ewing, respectively. Also the 2nd division of the 17th Army Corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. John E. Smith. Thirteen brigades were represented by Sherman’s re-enforcements.