(e) Rash judgment is a certain conviction or judgment, that is, one which holds its own view as true and certain and does not consider the opposite of its view as worthy of consideration. Thus, it differs from doubt (that is, a state in which the mind is suspended between the unfavorable view and its opposite, and does not incline to one more than the other), from suspicion (that is, a state in which the mind inclines to the unfavorable view, but does not assent to it as being either probable or certain), and from opinion (that is, a state in which the mind assents to the unfavorable view as being probably true, but admits that it may be untrue). These various forms of mental reaction were treated in 654 sqq.
(f) Rash judgment is rash, that is, a belief based on insufficient authority, or an inference that is really groundless or not well drawn from premises. Thus, if one judges that one’s neighbor is a thief, because this was told one by an honest and well-informed person, the judgment is prudent; but, if one judges this on the word of a person who is unreliable or who has no knowledge of the facts, the judgment is imprudent. Again, if one judges that it is certain that one’s neighbor is a thief, because one has evidence that removes all doubt, the judgment is prudent; but if the evidence is merely probable, an opinion based on it is prudent, but a judgment based on it is imprudent. It is not rash to hold that the majority of mankind are lost, or that the present generation is not as good as the generation that preceded, if one has good reasons for such beliefs; but a sweeping and all-inclusive pessimism in such matters is unwarranted.
1732. The reasons for a judgment may be sufficient for something else, but insufficient for the judgment actually formed.
(a) Thus, they may be reasons sufficient for judging that one kind or degree of sin has been committed, but insufficient as regards another kind or degree of sin. For example, if one breaks the lock of another’s desk, there is an argument for willful trespass, but this alone does not prove larceny or the intent to steal.
(b) They may be sufficient for doubt and insufficient for suspicion, sufficient for suspicion and insufficient for opinion, or sufficient for opinion and insufficient for judgment.
1733. Rash Judgment.—Opinion, suspicion, and doubt are also rash, if there is no sufficient reason to warrant them.
(a) Thus, if there are no probable reasons for an unfavorable opinion, it is rash to form such an opinion. For example, the mere fact that two men have frequent and whispered conference together does not make it likely that they are plotting evil.
(b) If there are no sufficient reasons for inclining towards an unfavorable opinion or for suspending all assent, suspicion and doubt are rash. For example, the mere fact that a man enters a house when the owners are absent is no reason to suspect him of dishonest purposes, or even to have doubts, if he is of good reputation and enters the house in daylight and in a usual way.
1734. Sinfulness of Rash Judgment.—Rash judgment strictly understood, then, is a firm assent of the mind, based on insufficient data, and given to the view that a neighbor is or has been guilty of sin.
(a) From its nature this sin is mortal, for it consists in a contempt for, and an injury to, what is regarded as one of the chief goods of man, namely, the favorable opinion of him that is entertained by others. It is denounced in Scripture as an injury to the law itself (“He that judgeth his brother judgeth the law,” James, iv. 11), and as meriting condemnation (“Judge not, and you will not be judged, condemn not and you will not be condemned,” Luke, vi. 37).