(b) From the imperfection of the act or from the lightness of the matter rash judgment may be only a venial sin, as when unfounded suspicions arise in the mind without advertence to their sinfulness, or when one rashly judges in some small matter (e.g., that another person stole a pin or a cent).
1735. Rash judgment is not mortally sinful in an individual case unless the following conditions are present:
(a) there must be perfect deliberation, that is, full advertence to the judgment itself and to its sinfulness and gravity (see 175). There is no full advertence to the sinfulness and gravity of the judgment, however, if one does not perceive at least in a confused manner that one is deciding in one’s mind without sufficient reason that one’s neighbor is guilty of serious sin, and is thereby doing the latter a great injury. But it is not necessary that the rash judgment continue for a considerable time, for the malice depends on the evil done, not on the length of time it has lasted;
(b) there must be serious rashness, for the sinfulness of the judgment rests on its rashness. Hence, if one judges a sin to be certain which is very probable or almost certain, there is no great imprudence and therefore no serious sin;
(c) there must be grave injury and contempt, for in these the malice of rash judgment consists. Hence, if one judges that another is a drunkard and neither the latter person nor others in the same place regard drunkenness as very dishonorable, there is no great harm done. Similarly, if one judges that some indeterminate individual of a multitude or group is a rascal, or that a stranger whom one sees on the street late at night is out on an evil errand, or that an unknown party seen from a distance is on his way to a disreputable meeting, it does not seem that there is great injury done; for one does not greatly resent lack of esteem in others to whom one is not known.
1736. Rules on Perfect Advertence to Rashness of Judgment.—(a) There is perfect advertence when one actually perceives that the reasons for one’s unfavorable judgment are very insufficient; (b) there is perfect advertence when one virtually perceives the serious insufficiency of the reasons, that is, when one could and should perceive it, but is vincibly blind to it (see 30, 31) on account of some passion wilfully indulged, such as hatred or envy of the person judged. In these cases one judges with negligence and precipitancy in a serious matter (see Imprudence).
1737. Rules on Insufficiency of Reasons for Unfavorable Judgments.—(a) Those authorities for sin are not sufficiently trustworthy whose reliability is of inferior worth (e.g., because they are enemies of the person against whom they speak, or calumniators, or gossipers, or of bad reputation, etc.), or whose story does not merit the credence they claim for it (e.g., because the person against whom they speak is known as upright). If both the authorities for a story and the person against whom they speak are equal in good qualities, there is sufficient reason for doubts, but nothing more.
(b) Those arguments for sin are not sufficient which create for what is concluded only a slight presumption (see 658), that is, which offer facts that are never, or seldom, or not necessarily causes or effects or indications of sin. Thus, it is rash to judge that a mature man and woman conversing together in a dignified manner and in a public and open place are discussing obscene matters; or that a respectable person whose face is flushed, or whose hand trembles, or who slips on the street, has been imbibing too freely; or that a man climbing into a second story on a frequented highway and in broad daylight is a burglar. This rule may be expressed in other words by saying that reasons for drawing unfavorable conclusions are insufficient when in view of the circumstances and time, place, persons, deed, etc., no prudent person would consider the conclusions as warranted.
1738. Rules on Gravity of Matter in Rash Judgments.—(a) From the nature of the thing ascribed to the other person, only judgments that mortal sin has been committed are grave matter; for only mortal sin is in itself a grave reproach.
(b) From the circumstances of persons or acts, rash judgment of mortal sin may be only venial; for it sometimes happens that certain kinds of serious sins are not considered very ignominious in certain persons or conditions. Thus, in some places it is considered honorable for soldiers or students to have wounded adversaries in duels; some persons of a rough kind are proud of their proficiency in blasphemy or obscenity; where drunkenness is common, it is not considered as very disgraceful.