[9] Science de la Morale, vol. I, p. 184.
Renouvier confesses that in most of this treatment of the problem of ethics he follows Kant[[10]] and although his admiration for Kant’s work is not concealed, nevertheless he is not altogether satisfied with it, and does not refrain from criticism. Indeed this reconstruction of the Critical Philosophy in a revised version is the main effort of the neo-critical philosopher, and it is constantly manifest.
[10] On p. 108 (vol. I) he refers to “le philosophie que je suis, et que j’aimerais de pouvoir suivre toujours.”
He complains that Kant did not adhere rigorously to his own principles, but vainly strove to give an objectivity to the laws of the practical reason by connecting them to metaphysics. But, he says, “on the other hand I maintain that the errors of Kant can be corrected in accordance with the actual principles of his own philosophy. I continue my serious attachment to this great reformer in spite of the very serious modifications I am endeavouring to make in his work.”[[11]]
[11] Science de la Morale, vol. I, p. no. 110.
In the opinion of Renouvier, Kant’s work, the Metaphysic of Morals, is marred by its neglect of history in its relation to ethics, by a disfigured picture of right which does not make it any more applicable to existing human conditions, also by the rather artificial and complicated nature of its doctrines. He further reproaches Kant for excessive rigorism and formalism, accompanied by a vagueness which prevents the application of much of his teaching. This, it seems to us, is a reproach which can be hurled easily at most of the ethical teachers whom the world has seen. The incessant vagueness of paradoxical elements in the utterances of such teachers has inevitably compelled their disciples to find refuge in insisting upon a “right spirit” of action, being devoid of any clear teaching as to what might constitute right action in any particular case.
The rudiments of morality, according to Renouvier, are found in the general notion of “obligation,” the sense of ought (devoir-faire) which the human consciousness cannot escape. Any end of action is conceived as a good for the agent himself; and because of liberty of choice between actions or ends, or between both, certain of these are deemed morally preferable. There are certain obligations which are purely personal, elementary virtues demanded from any rational being. It is his interest to preserve his body by abstaining from excesses; it is his interest also to conserve and develop the faculties of his nature. This is the point upon which Guyau makes such insistence in common with Nietzsche—the development, expansion and intensification of life. There are, Renouvier points out, duties towards oneself, involving constant watchfulness and intelligence, so that the agent may be truly self-possessed under all circumstances, maintaining an empire over himself and not falling a constant victim to passion. “Greater is he that ruleth himself than he that taketh a city,” are not vain words. This is the rudimentary but essential virtue which Renouvier calls “virtue militant”—moral courage. Intellectually it issues in Prudence or Wisdom; on the side of sense and passion it is represented by Temperance. These duties are present to conscience, which itself arises from a doubling of consciousness. “We have the empirical person with his experience of the past, and we have the ideal person—that is to say, that which we wish to be,”[[12]] our ideal character. In so far as we are conscientious we endeavour to bring “what we are” into line with “what we conceive we should be.” The moral agent thus has duties towards himself, obligations apart from any relation to or with others of his kind.
[12] Science de la Morale, vol. I, p. 25.
This elementary morality is “essentially subjective,”[[13]] but this only shows us that the most thorough-going individualism does not by its neglect of others, its denial of altruism, thereby escape entirely from moral obligations. There are always duties to one’s higher self, even for a Robinson Crusoe. Frequently it is stated that duties and rights are co-relative; but Renouvier regards Duty as more fundamental than Right, which he uses only of man in association with his fellows. Between persons, right and duty are in a synthesis, but the person himself has no rights as distinct from duties to himself; he has no right not to do what it is his duty to perform. From this it follows that if his personal notion of obligation changes, he has no right whatever to carry out actions in accordance with his judgments made prior to his change of conscience, merely for the sake of consistency. He is in this respect a law to him- self, for no man can act as a conscience for another. The notion of rights only arises when others are in question, and only too often the word has been abused by being employed where simply power is meant, as, for example, in many views of “natural right.” This procedure both sullies the usage of the term Right and lowers the status of personality. It is always, Renouvier claims, to “the inherent worth and force of personality, with its powers of reflection, deliberation, liberty, self-possession and self-direction, that one must return in order to understand each and every virtue.”
[13] Science de la Morale, vol. I, p. 81.