Renouvier’s insistence upon the inherent worth, the dignity and moral value of personality becomes clearer as he proceeds from his treatment of the lonely individual (who, it may be objected, is to such an extent an abstraction, as to resemble a fiction) to associated persons. The reciprocal relation of two persons brings out the essential meaning of Justice. Two personalities co-operating for a common end find themselves each possessed of duties and, inversely therefore, of rights which are simply duties regarded from the point of view not of the agent, but of the other party. The neo-critical ethic here brings itself definitely into line with the principle of practical reason of the Critical Philosophy. This, says Renouvier,[[14]] is the profound meaning of Justice, which consists in the fact that the moral agent, instead of subordinating the ends of other people to his own, considers the personalities[[15]] of others as similar to his own and possessing their own ends which he must respect. This principle is that which Kant formulated under the name of “practical obligation” or “supreme principle.”[[16]] “Recognise the personality of others as equal in nature and dignity, as being an end in itself, and consequently refrain from employing the personality of others merely as a means to achieve your own ends.”
[14] Science de la Morale, vol. I, pp. 82-83.
[15] Personality is a better translation, as it avoids the rather legal and technical meaning of “person” in English.
[16] In a footnote to this passage, Renouvier states his own preference for “moral obligation” rather than “imperative of conscience.”
This doctrine of Personalism is an assertion not only of Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité as necessary and fundamental principles, but also of the value of personality in general and the relativity of “things.” It constitutes an ethical challenge to the existing state of society which is not only inclined, in its headlong pursuit of wealth, its fanatical worship of Mammon, to treat its workers as purely “means” to the attainment of its end, but further minimises personality by its legal codes and social conventions, which both operate far more readily and efficiently in the defence of property than in the defence or protection of personality. From the ethical standpoint the world is a realm of ends or persons and all other values must be adjusted in relation to these.
We have been told by religious ethical teachers that we must love our neighbour as ourself, and have been reminded by moralists continually of the conflict between Egoism and Altruism. Renouvier points out that ultimately obligation towards others is reducible to a duty to oneself. He does not do this from the point of view of Hobbes, who regarded all actions, however altruistic they appeared to be, as founded purely upon self-interest, but rather from the opposite standpoint. “We should make our duty to others rank foremost among our duties to ourselves.”[[17]] This is the transcendent duty through the performance of which we achieve a realisation of the solidarity of persons, demonstrate an objective value for our own existence, and gain a fuller and richer life.
[17] Science de la Morale, vol. I, p. 85.
The idea of personal and moral reciprocity was formulated by the Chinese and the Greeks; at a later date it reappeared in the teaching of Jesus. This ancient and almost universal maxim has been stated both positively and negatively: “Do not to others what you would not have them do unto you,” “Do as you would be done by.” The maxim itself, however, beyond a statement of the principle of reciprocity rather vaguely put, has no great value for the science of ethics. Renouvier regards it not as a principle of morality but a rule-of-thumb, and he considers the negative statement of it to be more in harmony with what was intended by the early ethical teachers—namely, to give a practical warning against the committing of evil actions rather than to establish a scientific principle of right action.
Renouvier has shown the origin of the notion of Justice as arising primarily from an association of two persons. “Reason established a kind of community and moral solidarity in this reciprocity.”[[18]] This right and duty unite to constitute Justice. It is truly said that it is just to fulfil one’s duty, just to demand one’s right, and Justice is formed by a union of these two in such a manner that they always complement one another. Bearing in mind the doctrine of personality as an end, we get a general law of action which may be stated in these terms: “Always act in such a way that the maxim applicable to your act can be erected by your conscience into a law common to you and your associate.” Now to apply this to an association of any number of persons—e g., human society as a whole—we need only generalise it and state it in these terms: “Act always in such a way that the maxim of your conduct can be erected by your conscience into a universal law or formulated in an article of legislation which you can look upon as expressing the will of every rational being.” This “categorical obligation” is the basis of ethics. It stands clear of hypothetical cases as a general law of action, and “there is no such thing really as practical morality,” remarks Renouvier, “except by voluntary obedience to a law.”[[19]]
[18] Ibid., pp. 79-80.