[65] Just as in the Sánkhya philosophy, the soul is not really bound though it seems to itself to be so.
[66] A valid non-perception is when an object is not seen, and yet all the usual concurrent causes of vision are present, such as the eye, light, &c.
[67] I read in p. 35, line 5, 'stíti for sthiti.
[68] Hence the term here used for "category"—astikáya.
[69] These (by Hemach. Abhidh. 21), possess only one sense—touch. In p. 35, line 10, I read śaṅkhagaṇḍolakaprabhṛitayas trasáś chaturvidháḥ pṛithivyaptejo.
[70] In p. 35, line 16, I read teshám ajívatvát for tesháṃ jívatvát. If we keep the old reading we must translate it, "because the former only are animate."
[71] In p. 35, line 3 from bottom, I read sarvatrávasthite for sarvatrávasthiti. In the preceding line I read álokenávachchhinne for álokenávichchhinne.
[72] Cf. Siddhánta-muktávali, p. 27. The vishaya is upabhoga-sádhanam, but it begins with the dvyaṇuka. This category takes up the forms of sthávara which were excluded from jíva.
[73] It is an interesting illustration how thoroughly Mádhava for the time throws himself into the Jaina system which he is analysing, when we see that he gives the Jaina terminology for this definition of dravya,—cf. Vaiśesh. Sútra, i. 1, 15. Paryáya is explained as karman in Hemach. Anek. Paryáya, in p. 36, line 11 (infra, p. 53, line 9), seems used in a different sense from that which it bears elsewhere. I have taken it doubtingly as in Hemach. Abhidh. 1503, paryáyo 'nukramaḥ kramaḥ.
[74] Yoga seems to be here the natural impulse of the soul to act.