"Do we admit, then, that when one, on beholding some particular thing, perceives that it aims, as that which I now see, at being like something else that exists, but falls short of it, and can not become such as that is, but is inferior to it—do we admit that he who perceives this must necessarily have had a previous knowledge of that which he says it resembles, though imperfectly?"
"It is necessary."
"What, then? Are we affected in some such way, or not, with respect to things equal and abstract equality itself?"
"Assuredly."
"It is necessary, therefore, that we must have known abstract equality before the time when, on first seeing equal things, we perceived that they all aimed at resembling equality, but failed in doing so."
"Such is the case."
[53]. "Moreover, we admit this too, that we perceived this, and could not possibly perceive it by any other means than the sight, or touch, or some other of the senses, for I say the same of them all."
"For they are the same, Socrates, so far as, our argument is concerned."
"However, we must perceive, by means of the senses, that all things which come under the senses aim at that abstract equality, and yet fall short of it; or how shall we say it is?"
"Even so."