The binding of the Nile and the new Soudan

by Sidney Cornwallis Peel

But as a matter of fact the real cost during the five years has been a good deal less than this. Various deductions ought to be made. In the first place, Egypt takes all the Custom duties on goods going through to the Soudan. These came to about £60,000 in 1902, and were estimated at about £70,000 for 1903, an estimate very likely to be below the mark. It is safe to reckon that during the five years they amounted to nearly £200,000. Then, the expenses of the Egyptian army of occupation in the Soudan are charged to the Soudan Government. During the first two years these amounted to about £300,000 per annum. Taking an average of £200,000, we get a sum of £1,000,000 under this head. If the Soudan had not been reconquered, Egypt would have had to maintain nearly as large an army as at present, and although the cost of maintenance is naturally larger in the Soudan, it would not be unfair to deduct another £800,000 as money that must have been expended in any case. Of the capital expenditure, £600,000 was in loans for railway and telegraph development. Although the prospect of repayment of these loans is somewhat remote, they ought not to be written off as pure out-of-pocket expenses, seeing that the Soudan Government pays 2½ per cent. per annum upon them. Two and a half per cent. on £600,000 is equal to 5 per cent. on £300,000. An investment with this return would be more advantageous to Egypt than extinguishing an equal portion of her debt, and it is therefore reasonable to deduct that sum from the total expenditure. All these allowances added together make up a sum of £1,300,000, bringing the average annual cost to Egypt during the five years down to £340,000; while in addition to all this the Egyptian revenues have also directly benefited through the Railways and Post-office by the extra passengers, goods, letters, telegrams, and money orders, passing to and fro.

Still, when all deductions have been made, it cannot be denied, especially as the Soudan still calls loudly for more capital expenditure, that the reoccupation of that country, from a strictly financial point of view, though in one aspect philanthropic, is not as yet philanthropy at 5 per cent. But there are certain solid advantages which, though their value to Egypt is difficult to calculate in terms of money, are worth to her many times over the actual sum which the Soudan costs her.

First of all comes the fact, so often insisted upon, that the whole of the upper waters of the Nile are now in the secure possession of those who are responsible for her welfare. This supreme and vital necessity overshadows all others, and would by itself have forced her to undertake almost any sacrifice. In fact, as all the water in Egypt comes through the Soudan, her contribution may be looked upon as a water-rate calculated at an exceedingly low figure. Secondly, she is relieved from all fear of foreign invasion. The frontier is once more at rest, and no longer troubled even by raids. There is a vast difference between a peaceful and comparatively prosperous neighbour and a horde of furious barbarians hammering at her gates.

Further, the pacification of the Soudan enabled the burden of conscription to be diminished. The army was reduced by 5,500 men, and the period of service was reduced from fifteen years to ten, of which five have to be spent with the colours, and five in the reserve or police. Considering how much the Egyptian fellah dislikes military service, those who are affected by this change probably regard it as the greatest benefit of all.

A new field has also been opened for Egyptian trade and the employment of Egyptians. A constantly expanding market at her door for sugar and other goods is no small advantage. A good deal of the money spent in the Soudan, though lost to the Egyptian Treasury, is not lost to Egypt, for it takes the form of salaries for numbers of Egyptians in the Government service, and the money orders passing from the Soudan to Egypt show that at least a portion of it returns immediately. Moreover, the Soudan is gradually losing its old traditional terrors, and more and more Egyptians, though as yet in small numbers, are returning to settle there when their period of service is over.

Lastly, the good name of Egypt has been restored; one of the evil pages in her history has been finally turned. The country which she once ruined by her misgovernment and oppression and by her greedy haste to share in the profits of the slave-trade, and then abandoned to barbarism, has been rescued, and set moving once more on the paths of civilization and good government. It is right that in the days of her prosperity she should do something to assist her less fortunate neighbour.

It has been said that for the present Egypt will continue her annual grant to the Soudan of £E390,000 a year. But she will also be called upon to find some large additional sums. The Soudan requires capital, but has no credit of her own on which to borrow. The British taxpayer ought not to be called upon, even if he had not borne his share already, since it is not his interests, but those of Egypt, which are primarily concerned. But Egypt herself is not in a position, owing to international complications, to contract new loans, nor is it at all desirable to impose additional taxation for the purpose. Private enterprise, even if it was possible to employ it, would in the end be too expensive. But the problem is not insoluble, though difficult. Lord Cromer in his last report gives a most admirable summary of the position:

‘I hope and believe that, although the difficulties are considerable, they will not prove insurmountable. A hopeful feature of the future is to be found in the fact, on which I have dwelt at some length in my Egyptian Report, that the programme of fiscal reform in Egypt is now completed. It cannot be doubted that the people of Egypt are now very lightly taxed. Strongly as I should object to any increase of Egyptian taxation for Soudanese purposes, I can see no objection whatever to maintaining such taxes as at present exist, partly with a view to providing the capital necessary for the improvement of the Soudan. Indeed, far from there being any objection, I believe the adoption of such a course to be strictly in accordance with Egyptian interests; for, until capital is spent, the Egyptian Treasury cannot hope that any considerable reduction in the present Soudan deficit will be possible. I am, of course, aware that the purely Egyptian requirements, such as improved justice and police, to which allusion is made in my Egyptian Report, must, in this connection, take precedence of the necessities of the Soudan, great though these latter be. I am, however, not without hope that, if due care and deliberation be exercised, if the projects on which capital is spent be chosen after a thorough examination of their merits and practicability, and if everything in the nature of undue haste and precipitation be avoided, money in fairly adequate quantities may eventually be found both for the improvement of the Egyptian administrative services and for the development of the Soudan.

‘There can be no question as to the direction in which capital expenditure is most required. As I have said in my Egyptian Report, the construction of the Suakin-Berber Railway is absolutely essential to the well-being of the Soudan. I need only add that all the testimony which I received during my recent visit to the Soudan strongly confirmed me in the opinion which I had previously held on this subject.’

Such words coming from Lord Cromer are full of hope and encouragement for the administrators of the Soudan. The man who found means to overcome the financial difficulties of the Reservoir works at Assouan is more than likely to surmount those of the Suakin-Berber Railway.