In order, however, to pacify the queen, I proposed to her two remedies,—to have Count Brandt at court, and to recall Privy Councillor Count von Rantzau to Copenhagen. Both gentlemen were agreeable to the king; and the latter would be useful in balancing the power of the ministry, whom the queen feared, because she thought they might restore Count Holck's credit, by the removal of those persons who stood in his way. All this was designed to acquire security at court, without forming any intentions or plan for the eventual changes in the ministry. The queen had not the slightest inclination for governing or interfering in affairs of state; she merely wished for peace and security. Count Brandt joined the court in Schleswig; Count Rantzau at Traventhal. Count Holck received his dismissal because the king wished it; but the persons about his Majesty did their share in effecting it.
From this time, other scenes took place, and changes occurred the motives and reasons for which I will state presently. But I will first remark, that the credit I had hitherto enjoyed merely consisted in the king's personal confidence in me; that I employed the influence I possessed solely in matters which had immediate reference to the king's person, and that my private fortunes were of the following nature:—I was Councillor of Conference and Reader, with a salary of 1,500 dollars. I had debts amounting to between 4,000 and 5,000 dollars, which I had formerly contracted in Altona and upon the foreign progress, and had never received any extraordinary present from the king, except the before-mentioned 500 dollars and a horse. I had not asked anything for my friends, except an addition of 400 dollars for Count Brandt, unless I take into consideration that I had twice aided in inducing the king to make Count Holck a present of 10,000 thalers.
On the recall of Counts Brandt and Rantzau, no one, as I have stated, of those who took part in it thought of the changes that afterwards took place, or that any of the ministers would be removed. As concerns myself, however, I do not deny that I, without feeling any personal aversion or repugnance to any one of the ministers, was rather disposed against, than in favour of, the administration. Long before I came to court I had been filled with thoughts against it, and I had never found a reason to doubt the trustworthiness, integrity, patriotic will, and disinterestedness of the persons and reports from which I derived them. I was also confirmed in my opinion by what I heard in this respect in Copenhagen, and partly remarked. The following points were the chief ones alleged against the administration of that day.[94]
1. It had grown into a principle, through habit, to keep the king aloof from affairs, and try to deprive him of all inclination for them, by increasing his governmental labours by superfluous mechanical tasks, and by not bringing matters forward simply and distinctly. Every matter of importance was wrapped up in long-winded phrases and declamations, which led the king into unnecessary details; he was rarely left the choice between two opinions, but was led to decide for the one which had been previously adopted by the ministers; and lastly, his attention was drawn to trivial matters, and for this reason more important ones produced less impression upon him.
2. The king had so little personal authority, that he had no will of his own, even in the poorest trifles, and was even ruled in his domestic life. Hence those persons were always ruined who attached themselves to him, and possessed his taste, inclination, and confidence; while, on the other hand, others held their ground for whom he entertained exactly opposite feelings.
3. Favour and intrigue were mixed up in everything. The most important dignities and offices were given to courtiers whose sole merit was having been pages, and the other appointments were bestowed on creatures and lackeys of personages and families who supported each other in power.
4. A perfect anarchy prevailed, as no one would, or dared, to use his authority, for fear of injuring himself. Everybody was striving to acquire influence in other departments beside his own. Subordination was nowhere to be found: everything resolved itself into consultations, giving advice, investigations, modifications, and expedients. The subordinates, instead of carrying out the orders they received, only strove to raise difficulties, objections, and counter-propositions.
5. The finances were ruined—not through the expenses the king incurred (although many of the latter were unnecessary, as, for instance, the colonists, the costly factories, the forced development of the arts, taste, and luxury, far beyond the resources of the country, the disproportionate augmentation of the army, and the support of a commerce which was not adapted to the nature of the country, while its true and natural industry was neglected), but in consequence of the prevalent disorder, the worthless operations, and the manœuvres so often carried on for private objects.
6. The influence of foreign courts and their ministers had been for some time past great and oppressive. As the mainspring in negociations is complaisance, nought but a dependence could result from this, which could not be compensated by any resulting benefit. As a rule, more expense and attention was devoted to this portion of the business of the state than the nature and circumstances of the country required.
7. Lastly, the great and small offices, distinctions, and honorary titles, were too numerous for the size of the state, too oppressive for the country, and, at the same time, valueless. Everybody wished to live and enrich himself at the cost of the king; there was no impulse among the nobility to serve his Majesty with their fortune and strength, and in the other classes no inclination to seek self-support in industry.