Narrative of the Voyages and Services of the Nemesis from 1840 to 1843 / And of the Combined Naval and Military Operations in China: Comprising a Complete Account of the Colony of Hong-Kong and Remarks on the Character & Habits of the Chinese. Second Edition

by Sir W. H. Hall; W. D. Bernard

The city and suburbs of Amoy can hardly be less than eight or ten miles in circumference, and they are in a great degree commanded by a fortified hill or citadel in the rear, which, however, is again commanded (as is very commonly the case in China) by unfortified heights beyond it to the eastward. The suburbs, or outer town, are separated from the principal or inner town by a line of steep, rocky hills, which run transversely down to the beach; but a paved road or narrow causeway leads into the city, through a pass which is protected by a covered gateway at its summit. As there is, therefore, what may be called a double town, so is there also a sort of double harbour—the outer one running along the face of the outer town, and the inner one extending along the front of the principal town, and joining a large estuary, which runs deep into the island across its centre, and skirts the northern side of the city. In this manner, nearly two-thirds of the city of Amoy are washed by the sea. In fact, it stands upon a corner or tongue of land, having a line of bold mountains in its rear and on its flank. The walls are castellated at top, and vary in height, according to the nature of the ground, from twenty to thirty feet. There are also, as in other places, four principal gates, having each an outwork or outer wall, with a court or open space between them, and a second gate leading from this, and placed at right angles to the inner one, so that the approach to it from the outside is commanded by the principal wall of the town.

The citadel of Amoy was afterwards found to contain a large supply of military accoutrements—ginjals, matchlocks, swords, shields, and spears of all kinds; there was also an immense quantity of gunpowder, and materials for making it; in short, there was every reason to believe that Amoy had been made use of as the great military depôt of the province.

It is impossible to form even a tolerable estimate of the number of troops collected for the defence of the place, but the different accounts which were received varied from six thousand to eight or ten thousand men. It was also known that the high officers of the province had come down to Amoy purposely to encourage the defence, and to witness, as they hoped, the utter discomfiture of the barbarians. It was, however, upon their newly-constructed works that they placed their great reliance.

Numerous forts and field-works had been erected upon nearly all the smaller islands which stretch across the mouth of the great bay; and upon the island of Amoy itself a succession of batteries and field-works had been built to command the approach to the town. The principal of these was a long stone battery, well built of granite, faced with earth, extending along the shore nearly up to the suburbs of the city, and designed to command the passage to the harbour. It presented a line of guns a full mile in length, the embrasures being covered with large slabs of stone protected by earth heaped upon them, and mounting no less than ninety-six guns. In the rear of this battery there was a range of steep, rocky heights, up the side of which the Chinese had carried a strong castellated wall to serve as a flanking defence to the battery.

Still further to defend the approaches to the city, they had also strongly fortified the little island of Kolingsoo, between which and Amoy the passage is not more than six hundred yards across; this island is, in fact, the key of Amoy, and was retained in our possession when the city and the island of Amoy were restored to the Chinese. At that time the Chinese had already mounted upon the works, either completed or in progress, no less than seventy-six guns. Indeed they had spared no labour to endeavour to render Amoy capable of easy defence; although, from want of skill and discipline, the resistance which they offered was comparatively trifling. If the number of guns alone could indicate the strength of a place, the Chinese might have had some grounds for confidence; for, as Sir Hugh Gough remarked, "every island, every projecting headland whence guns could be made to bear, was occupied and strongly armed." In fact, there were altogether not less than five hundred guns captured at Amoy and the adjacent islands.

Early on the morning of the 26th of August, everything was in readiness for the projected attack. The captains and commanders repaired on board the flag-ship for orders; the steamers were all smoking and blowing off their spare steam, and the officers were all anxiously looking for the expected signal to stand in and engage the batteries. Before active operations commenced, however, it was thought right to make a reconnoissance of the defences which were to be attacked. With this view Sir Hugh Gough, Sir William Parker, and the plenipotentiary, stood in on board the Phlegethon, and were able to approach sufficiently close to the works to observe all that was necessary, without having a single shot fired at them.

In the meantime a messenger, supposed to be a Chinese merchant, came off from the town, under a flag of truce, requesting to know the object of the visit of so large and formidable a squadron. The answer to this question was simple enough, and was sent in the name of the plenipotentiary, the general, and the admiral, to the effect that "they required that the demands made last year at Tientsin, (near Pekin,) by Captain Elliot, should be complied with; and that hostile measures would, if necessary, be adopted to enforce them. Nevertheless, that as the plenipotentiary and the commanders-in-chief were moved by compassionate feelings, and were unwilling to cause the death of so many officers and soldiers as must perish, they were willing to allow all the officers and troops in the town to retire with their personal arms and baggage, in order to save the people from being hurt, upon condition that the town and fortifications of Amoy should be at once delivered into the hands of the British forces, to be held for the present by them." A white flag was to be exhibited from the fortifications, if these terms were acceded to; otherwise, hostilities would commence. As might be expected, the white flag was not displayed.

The morning was very hot and sultry; but about one o'clock a steady, favourable breeze set in, and the squadron got under weigh. The plan was, to make a simultaneous attack upon all the batteries at once, both against those upon Amoy and those upon Kolingsoo. The troops were also to be landed, with the object of taking the batteries in the rear; and the Nemesis and Phlegethon steamers were to be employed to convey them to the appointed place of debarkation.

The ships were likely to bear the chief brunt of the engagement; but Sir Hugh Gough made every disposition for the employment of the land forces, and his general order, issued just before the attack was to take place, deserves especial notice. He directed his remarks very strongly to the question of plundering; and observed, that "as Amoy was a large commercial port, and there had once been an English factory there, it was highly important that no act should be committed which could tend to embarrass our future friendly intercourse. The government and the military were to be overcome, and public property taken possession of, under certain instructions, but private property was to be held inviolable; and that which in England," observed the general, "obtains the name of robbery, deserves no better name in China." The camp followers were made liable to be put to death for plundering; and orders were issued to punish on the spot any man straggling from his corps.