He was confident in declaring that this was not a measure of the Executive—that it was engendered by an extensive excitement upon the Executive. He agreed with the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Seybert) that it comes to us in a very questionable shape, or rather in an unquestionable shape—whose ever measure it is, the people of the United States will consider it as a subterfuge for war; as a retreat from the battle. We some years ago resolved that we must have war, embargo, or submission—we have not had war or submitted—we must therefore have embargo. It appears to be limited to sixty days; at the expiration of that time will any one say we shall be prepared for war? Sir, we are in the situation of a debtor who promises to pay his note at the bank in sixty days—we shall prolong the time sixty days, and sixty days after that, until deferred hope makes the heart sick. He would tell the honorable Speaker that, at the end of sixty days, we shall not have war, and the reason is, the Executive dare not plunge the nation into a war in our unprepared state.
Mr. Boyd, of New Jersey, said, while he admitted the fire and spirit of the honorable Speaker, he thought he would do well to be considerate. He asked whether we were prepared to assail our enemy, or repel her attacks? He asked, whether it is wise in an unarmed nation, as we are, to commence hostilities against one so completely prepared?
The motion to strike out the first section was lost—ayes 35, noes 70.
Mr. Seybert said, that in voting for the several important measures which Congress have agreed to this session, he felt himself pledged to go to war; that he was in favor of an embargo as a precautionary measure and precursor to war. When we voted for the twenty-five thousand men he supposed the Executive intended war—but he has now such information from a friend in whom he confides, as leads him to believe that offensive operations are not meant. We ought to be better prepared before we engage in war. He had observed in the Baltimore papers that the British have ordered a squadron and twenty thousand men for our coast.
Mr. Smilie expressed his surprise at the observations of his friend and colleague: he did not know from what quarter he had obtained his information, that the President does not mean war. Does he believe he has all this time been deceiving the Legislature? He had heard but one sentiment from the President, which is, that we must make war unless Great Britain relents. The President had always supposed that the embargo must precede war—the only difference has been as to the time, which has been finally compromised. The embargo is intended as a war measure. He would assure his colleague it was intended by both the Executive and the Committee of Foreign Relations. That being now up, he would observe that, at the beginning of the session, he was not so warm for war as many were, but he was for commercial restrictions. He was not for the twenty-five thousand men; but as the House have determined otherwise he would now go to war—if we now recede we shall be a reproach among all nations.
Mr. Seybert then said, that his intention was to resist seriously Great Britain; he would be plain; but he was not for going to war unprepared. When the bill for raising the twenty-five thousand men was before the House, it was then declared to be according to the wishes of the Secretary at War—since that time the Secretary has said it was not his wish, from which he concluded it was not the wish of the President.
Mr. Randolph proposed to read, from memoranda in his possession, of what occurred in the Committee of Foreign Relations, and a conference between them and the Secretary of State; which was objected to.
Mr. Bassett (Chairman) considered it in order.
Mr. Calhoun appealed.
The Chairman's decision was confirmed—yeas 60.