Reasons for a British army in Egypt.
Vantage points held by Great Britain.
The British maintain a large army in Egypt not so much because it is required there as because it is a most convenient central camp within striking distance of all the battle-fronts in the East. This permits of throwing a large army secretly and unexpectedly where it can be most effective. Similar camps are available at Malta and Cyprus. Any attack on Egypt on a formidable scale would be a veritable trap for the invaders. It will be recalled that when Britain held up the Russian advance on Constantinople, in 1878, she entered into a treaty with Turkey guaranteeing the latter in the possession of Asia Minor (only) against all enemies. The consideration was the lease of the Island of Cyprus, which dominates the Taurus passage. In other words, Britain holds the cork with which she can close the Syrian tube and put the closure on any invasion of India or Egypt from this side. This treaty was abrogated some eighteen months ago, when Turkey declared war on the British Empire. Britain, in consequence, annexed Egypt and Cyprus.
At the outbreak of the war the Indian Government, apparently off their own bat, despatched a small force to the Persian oil fields to seize and hold the pipe-line, which had been tampered with and the supply cut off for a time.
The Turks threaten Basra.
British advance up the Tigris to Kut-el-Amara.
It became necessary to hold in force three triangular points—Basra, Muhammereh, and Awaz. A strong Turkish force, with headquarters at Amara, was equidistant about 100 miles from both Basra and Awaz, and could elect to strike the divided British forces either by coming down the Tigris River to Basra, or by going overland to Awaz. Reinforcements were sent from India, and Amara occupied. The oil fields seemed secure. Then the unexpected happened. A Turkish army came down the Shat-el-Hai—an ancient canal or waterway connecting the Tigris River at Kut-el-Amara with the Euphrates at Nasiriyeh (or Nasdi)—about 100 miles to the west of Basra—and threatened the latter place. (Shat-el-Hai means the river which flows by the village of Hai. Kut-el-Amara means the fort of Amara and is not to be confused with the town of Amara lower down the Tigris River.) This led to the British driving the Turks out of Nasiriyeh and also advancing up the Tigris River from Amara to occupy Kut-el-Amara, where a battle was fought. The Turks were strongly entrenched and expected to hold up the Anglo-Indian troops here, but a turning movement made them retire on Bagdad—about 100 miles to the northwest. It was known that large Turkish reinforcements were on the way to Bagdad and an attempt was made to anticipate them.
General Townshend's attempt to take Bagdad.
General Townshend advanced on Bagdad with less than a division of mixed Anglo-Indian troops—some 16,000 to 20,000 strong. At Ctesiphon he found a Turkish army of four divisions, with two others in reserve, awaiting him. After a two days' indecisive battle, Townshend, recognizing he had insufficient forces, retired on his forward base at Kut-el-Amara. The Arabs in the neighborhood awaited the issue of the battle, ready to take sides, for the time being, with the winner.
The Turks much stronger in numbers.