M. DE MENTHON: It might be preferable to adjourn, because M. Faure’s brief which is going to be presented will last at least an hour. Perhaps it is better to adjourn until tomorrow morning. However, we will remain at the disposal of the Court.
THE PRESIDENT: When you said that the proof which will now be presented would take an hour, do you mean by that that it is an introductory statement or is it a part of the main case which you are presenting?
M. DE MENTHON: Your Honor, it is part of the general case.
THE PRESIDENT: Would it not be possible then to go on until 5 o’clock?
M. DE MENTHON: Yes, quite so.
M. EDGAR FAURE (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic): Mr. President and Your Honor, I propose to submit to the Tribunal an introduction dealing with the first and the second part of the French case.
The first part relates to forced labor; the second part to economic looting. These two over-all questions are complementary to each other and form a whole. Manpower on the one hand and material property on the other constitute the two aspects of the riches of a country and the living conditions in that country. Measures taken with regard to the one necessarily react on the other, and it is understandable that in the occupied countries German policy with regard to manpower and economic property was inspired from the very beginning by common directing principles.
For this reason the French Prosecution has deemed it logical to submit successively to the Tribunal those two briefs corresponding to the letters “H” and “E” of the third Count of the Indictment. My present purpose is to define these initial directives covering the German procedure in regard to manpower and to material in the occupied territories.
When the Germans occupied the territories of Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and part of continental France, they thereby assumed a material power of constraint with regard to the inhabitants and a material power of acquisition with regard to its property. They thus had in fact the possibility of utilizing these dual resources on behalf of the war effort.
On the other hand, legally they were confronted with precise rules of international law relating to the occupation of territories by the military forces of a belligerent state. These rules very strictly limit the rights of the occupant, who may requisition property and services solely for the needs of the army of occupation. I here allude to the regulation annexed to the Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War signed at The Hague on 18 October 1907, Section III, and in particular to the Articles 46, 47, 49, 52, and 53. If it please the Tribunal, I shall merely cite the paragraph of Article 52 which defines in a perfectly exact manner the lawful conditions of requisition of persons and property: