“Requisitions in kind and of services may be demanded of communities or of inhabitants only for the needs of the army of occupation. They will be proportionate to the resources of the country and of such a nature that they do not imply for the population the obligation of taking part in war operations against their native country.”

These various articles must, moreover, be considered in the general spirit defined in the preamble of the Convention, from which I take the liberty of reading the last paragraph to the Tribunal:

“Until such time as a more complete code of the laws of war can be enacted, the High Contracting Parties deem it opportune to state that in cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the safeguard and direction of the principles of the law of nations derived from the established usages among civilized nations, the laws of humanity, and the requirements of public conscience.”

From this point of view it is very evident that the total exploitation of the resources of occupied countries for the benefit of the enemy’s war economy is absolutely contrary to the law of nations and to the requirements of public conscience.

Germany signed the Hague Convention and it must be pointed out that she made no reservations at that time except with regard to Article 44, which relates to the supply of information to the belligerents. She made no reservation with regard to the articles which we have cited nor with regard to the preamble. These articles and the preamble, moreover, reiterate the corresponding text of the previous Hague Convention of 28 July 1899.

German official ratifications of the Conventions were given on 4 September 1900 and 27 November 1909. I have purposely recalled these well-known facts in order to emphasize that the Germans could not fail to recognize the constant principles of international law to which they subscribed on two occasions, long before their defeat in 1918 and consequently outside the alleged pressure to which they referred in regard to the Treaty of Versailles.

While on this subject of juridical theory, may I point out that in the arrangement signed at Versailles on 28 June 1919 in connection with the military occupation of the territories of the Rhine, reference is made in Article 6 to the Hague Convention in the following terms:

“The right of requisition in kind and in services as formulated by the Hague Convention of 1907 will be exercised by the allied and associate armies of occupation.”

Thus, the governing principles of the rights of requisition by the occupiers is confirmed by a third international agreement subscribed to by Germany, who in regard to the occupation of her own territory is here the beneficiary of this limitation.

What, then, will the conduct of the Germans be like, in view of this factual situation, which involves power and temptation, and in view of this legal situation which involves a limitation?