The Great Northern was the only line in operation to the coast, and under instructions from J. J. Hill, the president, refused to accept any freight from roads included in the boycott. The men were instructed to decline even to throw a switch or assist in any manner any road on strike, as the Great Northern company did not wish to be drawn into the difficulty. In fact the men on this line were, almost to a man, members of the American Railway Union, and could not even if asked to do any act that might prove a detriment to their brothers. At this time there happened to be sixty car loads of twine in St. Paul, a greater portion of which was at Minnesota Transfer. This freight was consigned to points on the Great Northern Line and a committee headed by Harry Gray, chairman of the general board of mediation of the American Railway Union on that system, appeared at the rooms of the central strike committee and asked permission to switch out the twine, giving as an excuse that the farmers were in need of it.
This permission the committee was loth to grant as any move toward raising this blockade in the Twin Cities might prove detrimental to their cause, and further action on the matter was deferred until it would be submitted to the different unions interested.
That night at a meeting held at Plummer Post Hall in Minneapolis, the American Railway Union headquarters, a committee of farmers, from the peoples' party convention in session there at that time, were admitted.
When appraised of the nature of the trouble they stated that they had contracts with the twine companies to deliver their twine and on failure to do so the farmers would suffer no loss. They further stated that the farmers would bind their grain by hand before they would ask the men to do anything detrimental to the success of the strike. This settled it as far as the twine was concerned. However, the next day, the officials of the Great Northern took an engine and switched the twine out themselves without any objection being made by the men who stood by while the work was being done.
This was the beginning only.
The next move was a positive assurance of treachery.
The Burlington road had about thirty cars of water pipe for the Great Northern, and this same man Gray again waited on the central committee for permission to move the freight, saying, that he had the assurance of the company that no more concessions would be asked. His request was promptly refused. Later a committee of switchmen called on the central committee for instructions and were told not to move the freight under any conditions.
They left apparently satisfied, but nevertheless the cars were moved; no one seemed to know how but it became apparent to the strikers that a traitor was in their ranks, and took immediate steps to ferret him out, and have the embargo once more placed on business at this point.
Gray of St. Paul, and Foster of St. Cloud, were openly accused of being the traitors to the cause, although others were thought to be implicated. Charges were preferred against Gray in the Union, but nothing ever came of it. Every conceivable means was used to again cause a blockade at this point but to no avail.
The switchmen promised to refuse to handle boycotted freight if the road would support them in case of discharge, which they well knew was inevitable. It would be simply a sacrifice to strike in the yards of St. Paul and Minneapolis without the support of the whole system, although after a canvas of the road, when it was found that the majority of the men voted against a strike, the switchmen of these cities sent word that they were ready to ask for their time and quit the service of the company if the Union so desired. This proposition the strikers would not accept, not caring to sacrifice a few loyal switchmen whose places could be easily filled if the rest of the employes remained at work.